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Posted by Eyeballing the N on May Tue 6th 8:22 PM - Never Expires
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  1. VIEW FULL @ http://slexy.org/view/s20fcIPvBI
  2.  
  3. DOWNLOAD TXT-HTML @ http://upsto.re/RFkA4n
  4.    
  5.    
  6.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  7. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  8. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  9.  
  10.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  11.  
  12.  
  13. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  14.  
  15. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  16. _______________________________________
  17. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  18.  
  19. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  20.  
  21. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  22.  
  23. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  24.  
  25. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  26.  
  27. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  28. _______________________________________
  29. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  30.  
  31. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  32. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  33.  
  34.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  35. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  36. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  37. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  38. activities and future plans.� � �
  39.  
  40.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  41. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  42. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  43.  
  44. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  45.  
  46. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  47.  
  48. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  49.  
  50. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  51.  
  52. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  53.  
  54. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  55. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  56.  
  57.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  58. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  59. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  60. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  61. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  62. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  63. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  64. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  65.  
  66.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  67. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  68. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  69. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  70. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  71. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  72. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  73.  
  74. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  75. _______________________________________
  76. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  77.  
  78.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  79. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  80. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  81. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  82. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  83. already been published previously. The second was
  84. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  85.  
  86. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  87.  
  88. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  89.  
  90.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  91. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  92. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  93. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  94. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  95. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  96. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  97. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  98. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  99.  
  100.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  101. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  102.  
  103.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  104. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  105. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  106. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  107. benefit� the document says.
  108.  
  109.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  110. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  111. company is working towards creating a so-called
  112. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  113. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  114. per second.
  115.  
  116. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  117. _______________________________________
  118. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  119.  
  120. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  121. _______________________________________
  122. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  123.  
  124. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  125. _______________________________________
  126. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  127.  
  128. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  129. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  130. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  131. _______________________________________
  132. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  133.  
  134.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  135. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  136. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  137. top human rights body.
  138.  
  139.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  140. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  141. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  142. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  143. Human Rights Watch.
  144.  
  145. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  146.  
  147. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  148. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  149.  
  150. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  151. _______________________________________
  152. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  153.  
  154.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  155. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  156. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  157.  
  158.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  159. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  160. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  161. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  162. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  163. high as two years. ... ...
  164.  
  165.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  166. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  167. by domestic courts.
  168.  
  169. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  170. _______________________________________
  171. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  172.  
  173. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  174. _______________________________________
  175. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  176.  
  177.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  178. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  179. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  180. to create national-only electronic networks could
  181. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  182. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  183. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  184. the USTR said in its annual report.
  185.  
  186. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  187. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  188. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  189. ���������������������������������������
  190. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  191.  
  192. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  193.  
  194.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  195. program run by the US Agency for International
  196. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  197. communications network� run through �secret shell
  198. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  199. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  200. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  201. �American contractors were gathering their private
  202. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  203. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  204. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  205. government. According to top-secret documents
  206. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  207. operation is frequently discussed at western
  208. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  209. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  210. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  211.  
  212. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  213.  
  214. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  215.  
  216. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  217.  
  218.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  219. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  220. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  221. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  222. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  223. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  224. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  225. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  226. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  227. Space Intelligence Center.�
  228.  
  229.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  230. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  231. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  232. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  233. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  234. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  235. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  236. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  237.  
  238.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  239. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  240. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  241. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  242. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  243. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  244. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  245. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  246. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  247.  
  248. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  249.  
  250. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  251. ---------------------------------------
  252. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  253.  
  254. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  255.  
  256. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  257.  
  258. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  259.  
  260. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  261.  
  262.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  263. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  264. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  265. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  266. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  267. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  268. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  269. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  270. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  271. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  272. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  273.  
  274.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  275. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  276. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  277. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  278. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  279. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  280.  
  281. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  282. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  283. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  284. ---------------------------------------
  285. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  286.  
  287. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  288.  
  289. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  290.  
  291. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  292.  
  293. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  294.  
  295. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  296.  
  297. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  298.  
  299. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  300.  
  301. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  302.  
  303. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  304. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  305. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  306.  
  307. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  308. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  309.  
  310. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  311. ---------------------------------------
  312. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  313.  
  314. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  315. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  316. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  317. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  318.  
  319. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  320.  
  321. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  322.  
  323. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  324.  
  325. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  326.  
  327. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  328.  
  329. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  330. ---------------------------------------
  331. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  332.  
  333. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  334. _______________________________________
  335. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  336.  
  337. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  338.  
  339. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  340.  
  341. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  342. _______________________________________
  343. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  344.  
  345.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  346. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  347. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  348. any information that comes out and will provide an
  349. updated archive from time to time.
  350.  
  351.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  352. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  353. 927MB decompressed.
  354.  
  355.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  356. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  357. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  358.  
  359. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  360. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  361.  
  362. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  363. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  364. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  365. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  366. _______________________________________
  367. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  368.  
  369. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  370. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  371. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  372. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  373. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  374. _______________________________________
  375. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  376.  
  377. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  378.  
  379. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  380.  
  381. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  382.  
  383. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  384.  
  385. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  386. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  387. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  388. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  389.  
  390. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  391. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  392.  
  393. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  394. _______________________________________
  395. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  396.  
  397. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  398.  
  399. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  400.  
  401. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  402.  
  403. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  404.  
  405. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  406.  
  407. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  408.  
  409. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  410. _______________________________________
  411. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  412.  
  413.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  414. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  415. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  416. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  417. public as possible� as well helping the public
  418. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  419. how we�re protecting national security.�
  420.  
  421. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  422. ���������������������������������������
  423. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  424.  
  425. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  426.  
  427. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  428.  
  429. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  430.  
  431. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  432.  
  433. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  434.  
  435. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  436.  
  437. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  438.  
  439.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  440. offensive against China, with targets including the
  441. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  442. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  443. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  444. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  445. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  446. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  447. well as telecommunications companies.
  448.  
  449.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  450. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  451. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  452. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  453. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  454. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  455. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  456. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  457. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  458. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  459. battle for data supremacy.
  460.  
  461.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  462. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  463. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  464. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  465. among other things.
  466.  
  467. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  468. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  469. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  470. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  471.  
  472. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  473.  
  474.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  475. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  476. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  477. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  478. has lodged representations with the American side on
  479. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  480. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  481.  
  482. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  483. _______________________________________
  484. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  485.  
  486.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  487. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  488. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  489. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  490. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  491. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  492. routers, the devices that connect computer
  493. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  494. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  495. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  496. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  497. that flow over their networks.
  498.  
  499.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  500. aspired to create a database that would function
  501. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  502. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  503. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  504. activity � they are targeted only because they
  505. control access to networks the agency wants to
  506. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  507. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  508. of the posts says.
  509.  
  510.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  511. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  512. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  513. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  514. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  515. poses with amusing captions.�
  516.  
  517. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  518. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  519. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  520. _______________________________________
  521. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  522.  
  523. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  524. _______________________________________
  525. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  526.  
  527. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  528.  
  529. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  530.  
  531. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  532.  
  533. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  534.  
  535. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  536.  
  537. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  538. _______________________________________
  539. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  540.  
  541. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  542. _______________________________________
  543. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  544.  
  545. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  546.  
  547. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  548. _______________________________________
  549. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  550.  
  551. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  552. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  553. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  554. _______________________________________
  555. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  556.  
  557. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  558.  
  559. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  560. _______________________________________
  561. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  562.  
  563. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  564. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  565. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  566.  
  567.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  568. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  569. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  570. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  571. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  572. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  573. Edward Snowden.
  574.  
  575.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  576. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  577. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  578. for surveillance.
  579.  
  580.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  581. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  582. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  583. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  584. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  585.  
  586.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  587. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  588. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  589. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  590.  
  591.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  592. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  593. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  594. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  595. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  596. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  597. and long-term storage.
  598.  
  599. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  600.  
  601. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  602.  
  603.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  604. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  605. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  606. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  607. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  608. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  609. but they won�t say.
  610.  
  611. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  612. _______________________________________
  613. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  614.  
  615. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  616. _______________________________________
  617. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  618.  
  619. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  620.  
  621. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  622.  
  623. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  624. _______________________________________
  625. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  626.  
  627.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  628. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  629. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  630. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  631. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  632. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  633. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  634.  
  635. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  636.  
  637. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  638.  
  639. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  640. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  641. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  642.  
  643. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  644.  
  645. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  646.  
  647. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  648.  
  649.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  650. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  651.  
  652. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  653.  
  654. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  655.  
  656. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  657.  
  658. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  659.  
  660.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  661. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  662. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  663. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  664.  
  665. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  666.  
  667. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  668.  
  669. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  670.  
  671. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  672.  
  673. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  674.  
  675. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  676.  
  677. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  678.  
  679. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  680.  
  681. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  682.  
  683. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  684.  
  685. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  686.  
  687. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  688. _______________________________________
  689. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  690.  
  691. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  692. _______________________________________
  693. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  694.  
  695. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  696.  
  697. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  698.  
  699. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  700.  
  701. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  702.  
  703. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  704. _______________________________________
  705. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  706.  
  707. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  708.  
  709. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  710.  
  711. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  712. _______________________________________
  713. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  714.  
  715. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  716. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  717. _______________________________________
  718. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  719. With Malware ::
  720.  
  721.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  722. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  723. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  724. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  725. level of human oversight in the process.
  726.  
  727.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  728. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  729. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  730. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  731. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  732. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  733. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  734. Internet and phone networks.
  735.  
  736. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  737. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  738. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  739. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  740. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  741. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  742. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  743. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  744. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  745.  
  746.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  747. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  748. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  749. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  750. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  751. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  752.  
  753.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  754. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  755. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  756. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  757. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  758. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  759. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  760. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  761. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  762. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  763. instead of individually.�
  764.  
  765. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  766.  
  767. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  768.  
  769.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  770. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  771. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  772. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  773. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  774. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  775. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  776. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  777. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  778. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  779. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  780. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  781. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  782. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  783. execute endpoint operations.�
  784.  
  785. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  786.  
  787.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  788. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  789. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  790. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  791.  
  792.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  793. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  794. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  795. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  796. looks suspicious.
  797.  
  798.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  799. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  800. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  801. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  802. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  803.  
  804.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  805. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  806. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  807. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  808. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  809. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  810. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  811.  
  812.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  813. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  814. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  815. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  816. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  817. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  818. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  819. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  820. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  821. in action.
  822.  
  823. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  824. Computers for Surveillance ::
  825.  
  826. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  827.  
  828. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  829.  
  830. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  831.  
  832.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  833. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  834. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  835. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  836. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  837. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  838.  
  839. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  840.  
  841. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  842. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  843. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  844. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  845. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  846. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  847. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  848. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  849. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  850. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  851.  
  852. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  853.  
  854. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  855.  
  856. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  857.  
  858. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  859. _______________________________________
  860. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  861.  
  862. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  863. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  864. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  865. _______________________________________
  866. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  867.  
  868. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  869. _______________________________________
  870. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  871.  
  872.  Alliances between security services are usually
  873. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  874. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  875. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  876. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  877. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  878. internet traffic.
  879.  
  880.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  881. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  882. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  883. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  884. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  885.  
  886.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  887. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  888. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  889. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  890. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  891. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  892.  
  893.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  894. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  895. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  896. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  897. Americans may possibly use the information for
  898. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  899. by attacking them with armed drones.
  900.  
  901. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  902.  
  903. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  904. _______________________________________
  905. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  906.  
  907. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  908.  
  909. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  910. ---------------------------------------
  911. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  912.  
  913. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  914.  
  915. � NSA Spies Too ::
  916.  
  917. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  918. _______________________________________
  919. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  920.  
  921. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  922.  
  923. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  924.  
  925.  The documents show that images were collected
  926. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  927. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  928. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  929. programs.
  930.  
  931. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  932. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  933. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  934. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  935.  
  936. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  937.  
  938. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  939. _______________________________________
  940. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  941.  
  942. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  943. _______________________________________
  944. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  945.  
  946. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  947.  
  948. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  949. _______________________________________
  950. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  951. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  952.  
  953. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  954.  
  955. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  956. _______________________________________
  957. � NSA Observer ::
  958.  
  959. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  960. _______________________________________
  961. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  962.  
  963. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  964.  
  965. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  966. _______________________________________
  967. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  968.  
  969. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  970.  
  971. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  972. _______________________________________
  973. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  974.  
  975. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  976.  
  977. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  978.  
  979. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  980.  
  981. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  982. _______________________________________
  983. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  984.  
  985.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  986. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  987. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  988. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  989. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  990. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  991. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  992. targets without confirming their veracity on
  993. the ground.
  994.  
  995. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  996. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  997. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  998. _______________________________________
  999. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  1000.  
  1001.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  1002. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  1003. shows that an American law firm was
  1004. monitored while representing a foreign
  1005. government in trade disputes with the
  1006. United States. The disclosure offers a
  1007. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  1008. which Americans were ensnared by the
  1009. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  1010. interest because lawyers in the United
  1011. States with clients overseas have
  1012. expressed growing concern that their
  1013. confidential communications could be
  1014. compromised by such surveillance.
  1015.  
  1016. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  1017. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  1018. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  1019.  
  1020. NOBODY comments
  1021.  
  1022. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  1023.  
  1024.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  1025. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  1026. be declassified for research in public domain.
  1027. _______________________________________
  1028. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  1029.  
  1030. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  1031.  
  1032. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  1033.  
  1034. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  1035. _______________________________________
  1036. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  1037.  
  1038. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  1039. _______________________________________
  1040. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  1041. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  1042.  
  1043.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  1044. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  1045. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  1046. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  1047. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  1048.  
  1049. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  1050. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  1051. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  1052.  
  1053. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  1054. the German Chancellor ::
  1055.  
  1056. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  1057. _______________________________________
  1058. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  1059. Phone Call Spying ::
  1060.  
  1061. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  1062.  
  1063. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  1064. _______________________________________
  1065. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  1066.  
  1067. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  1068. _______________________________________
  1069. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  1070.  
  1071. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  1072. _______________________________________
  1073.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  1074. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  1075. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  1076. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  1077. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  1078. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  1079.  
  1080. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  1081. ���������������������������������������
  1082. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  1083.  
  1084. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  1085.  
  1086. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  1087.  
  1088. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  1089.  
  1090. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  1091.  
  1092. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  1093.  
  1094.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  1095. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  1096. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  1097. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  1098. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  1099. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  1100. left the terminal.
  1101.  
  1102.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  1103. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  1104. clandestine operation by the Communications
  1105. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  1106. certainly illegal. ... ...
  1107.  
  1108.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  1109. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  1110. software program CSEC was developing with help
  1111. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  1112.  
  1113.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  1114. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  1115. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  1116. into other cities/regions.�
  1117.  
  1118. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  1119.  
  1120.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  1121. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  1122.  
  1123. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  1124.  
  1125. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  1126.  
  1127. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  1128.  
  1129. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  1130.  
  1131. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  1132. _______________________________________
  1133. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  1134.  
  1135. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  1136.  
  1137. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  1138.  
  1139. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  1140. _______________________________________
  1141. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  1142.  
  1143.  Documents taken from the National Security
  1144. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  1145. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  1146. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  1147. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  1148. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  1149. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  1150. information, for analysis. At the time the
  1151. documents were printed, they were also able to
  1152. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  1153.  
  1154.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  1155. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  1156. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  1157. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  1158. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  1159. visits. The monitoring program is called
  1160. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  1161.  
  1162.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  1163. British had to have been either physically able
  1164. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  1165. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  1166. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  1167. and would be able to extract some key data
  1168. about specific users as well.
  1169.  
  1170. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  1171. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  1172. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  1173. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  1174. _______________________________________
  1175. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  1176.  
  1177. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  1178. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  1179. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  1180.  
  1181. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  1182.  
  1183.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  1184. on the iPhone alone.�
  1185.  
  1186. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  1187.  
  1188. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  1189.  
  1190. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  1191.  
  1192. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  1193. _______________________________________
  1194. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  1195.  
  1196.  The National Security Agency program that
  1197. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  1198. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  1199. Thursday in a newly released report.
  1200.  
  1201. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  1202.  
  1203.  �We have not identified a single instance
  1204. involving a threat to the United States in
  1205. which the program made a concrete difference
  1206. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  1207. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  1208. report released Thursday.
  1209.  
  1210.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  1211. domestic spying will continue.
  1212.  
  1213. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  1214. _______________________________________
  1215. � Snowden Speaks ::
  1216.  
  1217. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  1218. _______________________________________
  1219. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  1220.  
  1221. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  1222.  
  1223. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  1224.          ���
  1225. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  1226.  
  1227. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  1228.  
  1229.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  1230. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  1231. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  1232. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  1233. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  1234. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  1235. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  1236. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  1237. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  1238. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  1239. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  1240. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  1241. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  1242. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  1243. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  1244.  
  1245. Reform?
  1246.  
  1247.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  1248. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  1249. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  1250. whether legal or not?
  1251.  
  1252. The reform will come from people taking action.
  1253.  
  1254.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  1255. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  1256. _______________________________________
  1257. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  1258.  
  1259. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  1260. _______________________________________
  1261. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  1262.  
  1263.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  1264. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  1265. main internet cables:
  1266.  
  1267.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  1268.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  1269.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  1270.  
  1271. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  1272. ---------------------------------------
  1273. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  1274. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  1275. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  1276. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  1277. _______________________________________
  1278. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  1279.  
  1280. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  1281.  
  1282. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  1283.  
  1284. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  1285. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  1286. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  1287. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  1288. ---------------------------------------
  1289. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1290. _______________________________________
  1291. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  1292.  
  1293. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  1294.  
  1295. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  1296.  
  1297. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  1298.  
  1299.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  1300. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  1301. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  1302. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  1303.  
  1304.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  1305. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  1306. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  1307. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  1308.  
  1309.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  1310. text message database to extract information
  1311. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  1312. transactions and more � including of individuals
  1313. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  1314.  
  1315. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  1316. _______________________________________
  1317. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  1318.  
  1319. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  1320.  
  1321. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  1322.  
  1323.  The technology, which the agency has used
  1324. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  1325. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  1326. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  1327. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  1328. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  1329. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  1330. set up miles away from the target.
  1331.  
  1332.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  1333. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  1334. American intelligence agencies for years:
  1335. getting into computers that adversaries,
  1336. and some American partners, have tried to
  1337. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  1338. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  1339. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  1340. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  1341. ---------------------------------------
  1342. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  1343.  
  1344. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  1345. _______________________________________
  1346. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  1347.  
  1348. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  1349. ---------------------------------------
  1350. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  1351.  
  1352. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  1353. _______________________________________
  1354. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  1355.  
  1356. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  1357. _______________________________________
  1358. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  1359.  
  1360. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  1361. _______________________________________
  1362. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  1363.  
  1364. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  1365. _______________________________________
  1366. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  1367. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  1368.  
  1369. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  1370.  
  1371. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  1372. _______________________________________
  1373. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  1374. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  1375.  
  1376. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  1377. _______________________________________
  1378. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  1379. All Encryption ::
  1380.  
  1381.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  1382. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  1383. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  1384. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  1385. used to protect banking, medical, business
  1386. and government records around the world.
  1387.  
  1388.  According to documents provided by former
  1389. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  1390. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  1391. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  1392. than classical computers � is part of a
  1393. $79.7 million research program titled
  1394. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  1395. work is hosted under classified contracts
  1396. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  1397.  
  1398. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  1399. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  1400. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  1401. _______________________________________
  1402. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  1403.  
  1404. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  1405. _______________________________________
  1406. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  1407.  
  1408. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  1409. _______________________________________
  1410. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  1411.  
  1412. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  1413.  
  1414. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  1415.  
  1416. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  1417.  
  1418. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  1419.  
  1420. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  1421.  
  1422. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  1423. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  1424. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  1425.  
  1426. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  1427.  
  1428.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  1429. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  1430. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  1431. infiltrates computers around the world and
  1432. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  1433. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  1434. it is targeting. ... ...
  1435.  
  1436. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  1437.  
  1438.  The insert method and other variants of
  1439. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  1440. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  1441. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  1442. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  1443. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  1444. also incorporates routers and servers
  1445. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  1446. network by infecting these networks with
  1447. �implants� that then allow the government
  1448. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  1449.  
  1450.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  1451. to identify and track its targets based on
  1452. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  1453. could include certain email addresses or
  1454. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  1455. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  1456. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  1457. additional information like an email address.
  1458. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  1459. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  1460. ---------------------------------------
  1461. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  1462.  
  1463. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  1464.  
  1465. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  1466.  
  1467.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  1468. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  1469. that are being logged into on that computer
  1470. as long as the user does not clear browser
  1471. cookies.�
  1472.  
  1473. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  1474.  
  1475. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  1476.  
  1477. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  1478. ---------------------------------------
  1479. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  1480.  
  1481.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  1482. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  1483. could be described as master carpenters for
  1484. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  1485. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  1486. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  1487. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  1488. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  1489. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  1490. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  1491. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  1492. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  1493. ability to establish a global covert network
  1494. that operates alongside the Internet.
  1495.  
  1496.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  1497. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  1498. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  1499. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  1500. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  1501. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  1502. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  1503. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  1504. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  1505. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  1506. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  1507. over $1 million.
  1508.  
  1509.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  1510. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  1511. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  1512. clear preference for planting their malicious
  1513. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  1514. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  1515. to load when a computer is turned on.
  1516.  
  1517.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  1518. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  1519. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  1520. to virus protection and other security programs.
  1521. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  1522. computer has been completely erased and a new
  1523. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  1524. can continue to function and ensures that new
  1525. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  1526. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  1527. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  1528. this approach has provided them with the
  1529. possibility of permanent access.
  1530.  
  1531.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  1532. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  1533. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  1534. with the exception of latter, are American
  1535. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  1536. intelligence agency is compromising the
  1537. technology and products of American companies.
  1538.  
  1539. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  1540. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  1541. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  1542. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  1543. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  1544.  
  1545. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  1546.  
  1547. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  1548.  
  1549. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  1550.  
  1551. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  1552.  
  1553. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  1554.  
  1555. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  1556.  
  1557. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  1558.  
  1559. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  1560.  
  1561. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  1562.  
  1563. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  1564.  
  1565. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  1566.  
  1567. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  1568.  
  1569. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  1570.  
  1571. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  1572.  
  1573. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  1574.  
  1575. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  1576.  
  1577. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  1578.  
  1579. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  1580.  
  1581. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  1582.  
  1583. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  1584.  
  1585. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  1586.  
  1587. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  1588.  
  1589. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  1590.  
  1591. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  1592.  
  1593. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  1594.  
  1595. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  1596. ---------------------------------------
  1597. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  1598.  
  1599. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  1600.  
  1601. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  1602.  
  1603. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  1604.  
  1605. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  1606. ---------------------------------------
  1607. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  1608.  
  1609. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  1610.  
  1611. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  1612.  
  1613.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  1614. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  1615. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  1616.  
  1617. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  1618.  
  1619. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  1620. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  1621.  
  1622.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  1623. in its operating system had left devices open
  1624. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  1625. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  1626. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  1627. of its mass spying program.
  1628.  
  1629. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  1630. ---------------------------------------
  1631. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  1632. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  1633.  
  1634. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  1635.  
  1636. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  1637. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  1638.  
  1639. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  1640.  
  1641. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  1642.  
  1643. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  1644.  
  1645.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  1646. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  1647.  
  1648. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  1649. _______________________________________
  1650. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  1651.  
  1652. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  1653.  
  1654. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  1655.  
  1656. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  1657. _______________________________________
  1658. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  1659.  
  1660. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  1661.  
  1662.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  1663. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  1664. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  1665. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  1666. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  1667. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  1668. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  1669. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  1670. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  1671. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  1672.  
  1673.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  1674. learn we are collecting more in the United
  1675. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  1676. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  1677. troubled, he said, and several said they
  1678. did not want to know any more.
  1679. ---------------------------------------
  1680. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  1681.  
  1682. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  1683. _______________________________________
  1684. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  1685. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  1686.  
  1687. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  1688. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  1689. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  1690. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  1691. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  1692. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  1693. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  1694. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  1695.  
  1696. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  1697.  
  1698.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  1699. National Security Agency program which
  1700. collects information on nearly all telephone
  1701. calls made to, from or within the United
  1702. States is likely unconstitutional.
  1703.  
  1704.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  1705. that the program appears to violate the
  1706. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  1707. searches and seizures. He also said the
  1708. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  1709. that collecting the information had helped
  1710. to head off terrorist attacks.
  1711.  
  1712.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  1713. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  1714. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  1715. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  1716. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  1717. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  1718. the order to allow for an appeal.
  1719.  
  1720. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  1721. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  1722.  
  1723.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  1724. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  1725. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  1726. in June in news stories based on leaks
  1727. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  1728. For seven years, the metadata program has
  1729. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  1730. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  1731. Court and found constitutional by at least
  1732. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  1733.  
  1734. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  1735.  
  1736. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  1737.  
  1738. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  1739.  
  1740. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  1741.  
  1742. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  1743.  
  1744. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  1745. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  1746.  
  1747. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  1748.  
  1749. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  1750.  
  1751. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  1752. ---------------------------------------
  1753. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  1754.  
  1755. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  1756.  
  1757. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  1758.  
  1759. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  1760. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  1761.  
  1762. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  1763. Spying Programs ::
  1764.  
  1765. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  1766. ---------------------------------------
  1767. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  1768. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  1769.  
  1770. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  1771.  
  1772. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  1773.  
  1774. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  1775. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  1776.  
  1777. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  1778.  
  1779. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  1780. _______________________________________
  1781. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  1782.  
  1783.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  1784. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  1785. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  1786.  
  1787. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  1788.  
  1789. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  1790.  
  1791.  - Military Information
  1792.  - Economic Information
  1793.  - Information Operations Information
  1794.  - Political Information �
  1795. _______________________________________
  1796. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  1797. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  1798.  
  1799. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  1800. ���������������������������������������
  1801. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  1802.  
  1803. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  1804.  
  1805. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  1806.  
  1807. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  1808.  
  1809. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  1810.  
  1811. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  1812.  
  1813. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  1814.  
  1815. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  1816.  
  1817. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  1818.  
  1819. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  1820. _______________________________________
  1821. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  1822. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  1823.  
  1824.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  1825. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  1826. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  1827. government access in order to make network
  1828. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  1829. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  1830. in millions of homes and businesses within
  1831. the UK,� the paper states.
  1832.  
  1833.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  1834. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  1835. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  1836. assigns all their modems an extra address
  1837. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  1838. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  1839. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  1840. a second IP address for management, except
  1841. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  1842. assigned to the United States Department
  1843. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  1844. of speculation that this is actually a
  1845. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  1846. they can secretly monitor and control
  1847. peoples� home networks.
  1848.  
  1849.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  1850. The better explanation is that BT simply
  1851. chose this address space because it�s
  1852. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  1853. address, it�s only used inside the private
  1854. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  1855. that address space, you�ll see that your
  1856. packets go nowhere.
  1857.  
  1858. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  1859. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  1860. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  1861.  
  1862. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  1863.  
  1864.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  1865. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  1866. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  1867. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  1868. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  1869. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  1870. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  1871. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  1872. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  1873. It�s past time for something new.�
  1874.  
  1875. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  1876. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  1877. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  1878. ---------------------------------------
  1879. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  1880.  
  1881.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  1882. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  1883. worldwide with malicious software designed
  1884. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  1885. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  1886. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  1887.  
  1888.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  1889. explains how the NSA collects information
  1890. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  1891. shows that the intelligence service uses
  1892. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  1893. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  1894. secret infiltration of computer systems
  1895. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  1896. software.
  1897.  
  1898.  One example of this type of hacking was
  1899. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  1900. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  1901. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  1902. has been installing this malicious software
  1903. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  1904. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  1905. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  1906. through a process of luring employees to a
  1907. false Linkedin page.
  1908.  
  1909. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  1910. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  1911. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  1912. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  1913.  
  1914. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  1915.  
  1916.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  1917. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  1918. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  1919. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  1920. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  1921. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  1922. and citizens.
  1923.  
  1924.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  1925. will deter this bounty of profits for
  1926. the comsec industry, unless the public
  1927. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  1928. the nettle, and all those making money
  1929. from this deception operation decide to
  1930. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  1931.  
  1932.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  1933. lists, those participating in standards
  1934. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  1935. grants in think tanks and universities,
  1936. those in law firms and public interest
  1937. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  1938. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  1939. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  1940. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  1941. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  1942. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  1943. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  1944. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  1945. contracts, list lurking, online and
  1946. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  1947. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  1948. fulfilled.
  1949.  
  1950. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  1951.  
  1952. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  1953.  
  1954. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  1955.  
  1956. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  1957. ���������������������������������������
  1958. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  1959. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  1960.  
  1961. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  1962. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  1963. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  1964. _______________________________________
  1965. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  1966.  
  1967. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  1968.  
  1969. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  1970.  
  1971. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  1972.  
  1973. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  1974.  
  1975. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  1976. _______________________________________
  1977. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  1978.  
  1979. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  1980. _______________________________________
  1981. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  1982. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  1983.  
  1984. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  1985.  
  1986. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  1987. _______________________________________
  1988. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  1989.  
  1990. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  1991. _______________________________________
  1992. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  1993. of Public Concerns ::
  1994.  
  1995. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  1996.  
  1997. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  1998.  
  1999. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  2000. _______________________________________
  2001. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2002.  
  2003.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  2004. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  2005. of metadata about the world�s secure
  2006. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  2007. certainly not a program through which
  2008. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  2009. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  2010. services like Google, as reported by others,
  2011. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  2012. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  2013. Google are based on a small piece of a
  2014. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  2015. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  2016. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  2017. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  2018. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  2019. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  2020. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  2021. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  2022. by providing information about a target.�
  2023.  
  2024. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  2025.  
  2026. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2027.  
  2028. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  2029. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  2030. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  2031. ���������������������������������������
  2032. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  2033.  
  2034. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  2035.  
  2036. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  2037. _______________________________________
  2038. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  2039.  
  2040. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  2041. ---------------------------------------
  2042. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  2043.  
  2044. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  2045.  
  2046.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  2047. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  2048. and later managed by big data corporations
  2049. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  2050.  
  2051.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  2052. large files across machines in a large
  2053. cluster.
  2054.  
  2055. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  2056.  
  2057.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  2058. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  2059. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  2060. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  2061.  
  2062.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  2063. major components, a central metadata server
  2064. and file servers from data.
  2065.  
  2066. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  2067.  
  2068. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  2069.  
  2070.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  2071. posted on public domain.
  2072.  
  2073. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  2074.  
  2075. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  2076. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  2077.  
  2078. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2079. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2080. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  2081.  
  2082. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  2083.  
  2084. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  2085. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  2086. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  2087. ---------------------------------------
  2088. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  2089. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  2090.  
  2091. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  2092.  
  2093. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  2094.  
  2095. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  2096.  
  2097. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  2098.  
  2099. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  2100.  
  2101. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  2102.  
  2103. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  2104.  
  2105. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2106.  
  2107. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  2108.  
  2109.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  2110. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  2111. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  2112. content of all our communications have
  2113. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  2114. program since the 1990s.
  2115.  
  2116.  The new details concern how, �The National
  2117. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  2118. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  2119. of cellphones around the world.�
  2120.  
  2121.  However, the report reveals itself to
  2122. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  2123. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  2124. does not target Americans� location data
  2125. by design, but the agency acquires a
  2126. substantial amount of information on
  2127. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  2128. �incidentally.�
  2129.  
  2130.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  2131. happens to record the locations of Americans
  2132. using data from their cellphones, and is
  2133. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  2134. surveillance, is yet another example of
  2135. damage control by the establishment.
  2136.  
  2137. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  2138. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  2139. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  2140. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  2141. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  2142. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  2143. ---------------------------------------
  2144. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  2145. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  2146.  
  2147.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  2148. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  2149. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  2150. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  2151. targets for government hacking and to
  2152. bolster surveillance.
  2153.  
  2154. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  2155. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  2156. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  2157. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  2158. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  2159. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  2160. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  2161. ---------------------------------------
  2162. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  2163.  
  2164. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  2165. ---------------------------------------
  2166. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  2167. In a World Without Cookies ::
  2168.  
  2169. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  2170. _______________________________________
  2171. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  2172.  
  2173. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  2174. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  2175. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  2176.  
  2177. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  2178.  
  2179. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  2180. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  2181. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  2182. _______________________________________
  2183. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  2184. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  2185.  
  2186. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  2187. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  2188. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  2189. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  2190. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  2191. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  2192.  
  2193. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  2194.  
  2195. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  2196.  
  2197. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  2198.  
  2199. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  2200.  
  2201. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  2202.  
  2203. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  2204.  
  2205. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  2206.  
  2207. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  2208.  
  2209. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  2210.  
  2211. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  2212.  
  2213. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  2214.  
  2215. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  2216. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  2217. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  2218.  
  2219. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  2220.  
  2221. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  2222. ---------------------------------------
  2223. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  2224.  
  2225. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  2226. ---------------------------------------
  2227. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  2228.  
  2229. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  2230.  
  2231. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  2232.  
  2233. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  2234.  
  2235. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  2236.  
  2237. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  2238.  
  2239. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  2240.  
  2241. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  2242. _______________________________________
  2243.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  2244. worldwide was published by the German
  2245. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  2246. map was put online by accident, but before
  2247. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  2248. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  2249. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  2250. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  2251. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  2252. the names of all other cities were blurred
  2253. by Der Spiegel.�
  2254.  
  2255.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  2256.  
  2257. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  2258.  
  2259. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  2260.  
  2261. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  2262.  
  2263. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  2264.  
  2265. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  2266.  
  2267. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  2268. ---------------------------------------
  2269. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  2270.  
  2271. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  2272.  
  2273. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  2274. _______________________________________
  2275. � Five Eyes ::
  2276.  
  2277. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  2278. _______________________________________
  2279. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  2280.  
  2281. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  2282. _______________________________________
  2283. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  2284. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  2285.  
  2286. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  2287.  
  2288. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  2289. _______________________________________
  2290. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  2291.  
  2292. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  2293.  
  2294. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  2295. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  2296. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  2297. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  2298. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  2299. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  2300. _______________________________________
  2301. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  2302.  
  2303.  September 11th, which also happened to
  2304. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  2305. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  2306. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  2307. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  2308. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  2309. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  2310. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  2311. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  2312. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  2313. itself.
  2314.  
  2315.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  2316. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  2317. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  2318. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  2319. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  2320. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  2321. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  2322. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  2323. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  2324. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  2325. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  2326. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  2327. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  2328. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  2329. its workforce by one-third, to about
  2330. 33,000. The number of private companies
  2331. it depended upon more than tripled during
  2332. that time.
  2333.  
  2334.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  2335. and the increasing reliance on the private
  2336. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  2337. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  2338. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  2339. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  2340. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  2341. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  2342. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  2343. getting those clearances. So you had
  2344. this huge apparatus being built, and
  2345. the government was just managing it.
  2346. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  2347. doing that.� ... ...
  2348.  
  2349.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  2350. workforce, the surveillance he would
  2351. later expose was becoming not just
  2352. institutionalized but very big business.
  2353. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  2354. the full flower of that massive, massive
  2355. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  2356. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  2357. could go.� ... ...
  2358.  
  2359.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  2360. leaking government secrets when he was
  2361. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  2362. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  2363. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  2364. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  2365. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  2366. policies that I thought would be reined
  2367. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  2368. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  2369. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  2370. the more he read �true information,�
  2371. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  2372. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  2373. surveillance program � the more he realized
  2374. that there were actually two governments:
  2375. the one that was elected, and the other,
  2376. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  2377. �If the highest officials in government
  2378. can break the law without fearing punishment
  2379. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  2380. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  2381.  
  2382. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  2383. _______________________________________
  2384. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  2385.  
  2386. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  2387. _______________________________________
  2388. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  2389.  
  2390. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  2391. _______________________________________
  2392. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  2393. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  2394.  
  2395.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  2396. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  2397. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  2398. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  2399. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  2400. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  2401. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  2402. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  2403. in terrorism.
  2404.  
  2405.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  2406. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  2407. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  2408. threatening national security. It is
  2409. successfully restricting release of the
  2410. Snowden material and will likely become
  2411. more forceful as releases continue to the
  2412. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  2413. to criminalize release as a national
  2414. security threat.
  2415.  
  2416. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  2417. _______________________________________
  2418. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  2419.  
  2420.  Includes most reports, slides and
  2421. documents all related to the recent
  2422. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  2423. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  2424. any information that comes out and
  2425. will provide updated archives from
  2426. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  2427.  
  2428.  After decompression - the folder is
  2429. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  2430. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  2431.  
  2432. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2433. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  2434.  
  2435. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  2436. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  2437. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  2438. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2439. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2440. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  2441. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  2442. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2443. _______________________________________
  2444. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  2445.  
  2446. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2447. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2448. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2449.  
  2450. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  2451. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  2452.  
  2453.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  2454. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  2455. Australians, and hands over the material
  2456. to the US and its closest allies, according
  2457. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  2458. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  2459. Australia web site.
  2460.  
  2461.  The document obtained by the former US
  2462. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  2463. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  2464. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  2465. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  2466. as well as the people and governments of
  2467. many Asian countries.
  2468.  
  2469.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  2470. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  2471. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  2472. global partners so-called metadata of
  2473. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  2474. address books and social media posts of
  2475. millions of people.
  2476.  
  2477.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  2478. the recent revelations, also from documents
  2479. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  2480. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  2481. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  2482. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  2483. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  2484. operate as electronic listening posts
  2485. for the US-led spying network.
  2486.  
  2487. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  2488. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  2489. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  2490. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  2491. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  2492. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  2493.  
  2494. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  2495. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  2496.  
  2497.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  2498. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  2499. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  2500. political figures has been furiously
  2501. denounced by other media outlets for
  2502. breaching �national security� and the
  2503. �national interest.� The reaction
  2504. underscores the extent to which the
  2505. media establishment has been integrated
  2506. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  2507.  
  2508.  On November 18, after being approached
  2509. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  2510. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  2511. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  2512. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  2513. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  2514. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  2515. senior political figures. The report
  2516. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  2517. crisis for the Australian government, with
  2518. the Indonesian president suspending military
  2519. and intelligence cooperation.
  2520.  
  2521. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  2522. _______________________________________
  2523. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  2524.  
  2525.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  2526. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  2527. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  2528. allowed the largest American spy agency
  2529. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  2530. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  2531.  
  2532.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  2533. by CBC News.
  2534.  
  2535.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  2536. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  2537. a security command post during a six-day
  2538. spying operation by the National Security
  2539. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  2540. other foreign heads of government were on
  2541. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  2542.  
  2543.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  2544. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  2545.  
  2546.  The world was still struggling to climb
  2547. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  2548. were debating a wide array of possible
  2549. measures including a global tax on banks,
  2550. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  2551. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  2552. eventually scotched.
  2553.  
  2554. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  2555. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  2556. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  2557. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  2558. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  2559.  
  2560. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  2561. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  2562.  
  2563. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  2564.  
  2565.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  2566. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  2567.  
  2568. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  2569.  
  2570. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  2571.  
  2572. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  2573.  
  2574. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  2575. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  2576.  
  2577. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  2578.  
  2579. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  2580.  
  2581. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  2582.  
  2583. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  2584. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  2585.  
  2586. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  2587.  
  2588. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  2589.  
  2590.  The politicians and corporate media
  2591. would have Canadians believe that they
  2592. have only �moved on� from discussing
  2593. CSEC�s activities because there is
  2594. nothing for Canadians to worry about.
  2595.  
  2596.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool
  2597. of the Canadian ruling class that plays
  2598. an important role in the pursuit of its
  2599. imperialist foreign policy and in the
  2600. surveillance and suppression of opposition
  2601. at home. The size of CSEC�s staff�it
  2602. employs almost 2,000 people and a further
  2603. thousand military personnel assist its
  2604. work�give an inkling of the scale of
  2605. its activities.
  2606.  
  2607.  These include everything from supporting
  2608. the overseas operations of the Canadian
  2609. military, to spying on governments that
  2610. are reputed allies of Canada and assisting
  2611. CSIS and the RCMP in conducting a vast
  2612. program of domestic surveillance. Of
  2613. especial importance is the CSEC�s
  2614. partnership with the NSA. According to
  2615. former NSA technical director William
  2616. Binney, the two organizations �have
  2617. integrated personnel� i.e. swap personnel
  2618. to improve seamless collaboration. They
  2619. also share Internet surveillance programs.
  2620.  
  2621.  As a further element of its collaboration
  2622. with the Five Eyes alliance, CSEC was
  2623. relied on in the project of spying on
  2624. diplomats and officials during the 2009
  2625. London G20 meeting according to a report
  2626. in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  2627. which was based on documents supplied
  2628. by Snowden. The highly sensitive operation
  2629. involved the penetration of delegates�
  2630. smartphones to monitor their email
  2631. messages and calls.
  2632.  
  2633. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  2634.  
  2635. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  2636.  
  2637. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  2638.  
  2639. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  2640. _______________________________________
  2641. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  2642.  
  2643. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  2644.  
  2645. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  2646.  
  2647. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  2648. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  2649. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  2650.  
  2651. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  2652.  
  2653. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  2654.  
  2655. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  2656.  
  2657. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  2658. _______________________________________
  2659.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  2660. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  2661. in theory � forbid local governments from
  2662. providing services to federal agencies
  2663. that collect electronic data from Americans
  2664. without a personalized warrant.
  2665.  
  2666.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  2667. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  2668. but at least one legislator has committed
  2669. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  2670. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  2671. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  2672. is introduced.
  2673.  
  2674.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  2675. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  2676. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  2677. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  2678. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  2679. and a handful of other groups.
  2680.  
  2681.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  2682. Maharrey adds.
  2683.  
  2684. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  2685. _______________________________________
  2686. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  2687. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  2688.  
  2689.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  2690. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  2691. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  2692. US and British intelligence � particularly
  2693. their cooperation in data collection and
  2694. snooping programs involving British citizens
  2695. and close allies on the European continent.
  2696.  
  2697.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  2698. to account by British authorities for
  2699. jeopardizing national security. The
  2700. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  2701. is being forced to appear before a
  2702. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  2703. the news outlet�s actions.
  2704.  
  2705. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2706. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  2707. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  2708.  
  2709. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  2710.  
  2711. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2712.  
  2713. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  2714. as the British Dictatorship ::
  2715.  
  2716.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  2717. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  2718. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  2719. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  2720. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  2721. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  2722. seems the United States is reaching the event
  2723. horizon to a police state.
  2724.  
  2725. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  2726.  
  2727. Cryptome noted
  2728.  
  2729.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  2730. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  2731. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  2732. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  2733. UKG), although there could be some which have
  2734. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  2735. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  2736.  
  2737.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  2738. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  2739. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  2740. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  2741. deception, co-optation.
  2742.  
  2743.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  2744. had access, or suspected of access, are
  2745. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  2746. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  2747. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  2748. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  2749. standard coercive means of authorities.
  2750.  
  2751.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  2752. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  2753. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  2754. advised successive cooperators, usually
  2755. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  2756. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  2757. participation.
  2758.  
  2759.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  2760. disputes and disagreements among competing
  2761. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  2762. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  2763. along with threats against families, friends
  2764. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  2765. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  2766. with authorities, including use of rewards
  2767. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  2768.  
  2769. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  2770. _______________________________________
  2771. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  2772.  
  2773. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  2774. _______________________________________
  2775. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  2776. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  2777. Governments ::
  2778.  
  2779. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  2780. _______________________________________
  2781. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  2782. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  2783.  
  2784. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  2785. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  2786. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  2787. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  2788. _______________________________________
  2789. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  2790.  
  2791. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  2792.  
  2793. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  2794.  
  2795. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  2796.  
  2797. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  2798.  
  2799. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  2800.  
  2801. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  2802.  
  2803. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  2804.  
  2805. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  2806.  
  2807. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  2808.  
  2809. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  2810.  
  2811. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  2812.  
  2813. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  2814.  
  2815. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  2816.  
  2817. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  2818.  
  2819. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  2820.  
  2821. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  2822. Steal Email Metadata ::
  2823.  
  2824.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  2825. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  2826. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  2827. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  2828.  
  2829.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  2830. servers around the world, reducing the
  2831. chance of losing your information should
  2832. one fail. When you log in to an account
  2833. with these firms, the data sent between
  2834. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  2835. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  2836. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  2837. And because many of the transfers take place
  2838. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  2839. isn�t required to tap the information.
  2840.  
  2841.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  2842. broken into the main communications links
  2843. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  2844. around the world, according to documents
  2845. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  2846. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  2847. officials.
  2848.  
  2849.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  2850. positioned itself to collect at will from
  2851. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  2852. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  2853. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  2854. but it keeps a lot.
  2855.  
  2856.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  2857. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  2858. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  2859. counterpart, the Government Communications
  2860. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  2861. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  2862. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  2863. that carry information among the data
  2864. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  2865.  
  2866. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  2867. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  2868. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  2869. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  2870. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  2871.  
  2872. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  2873.  
  2874.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  2875. email collecting program �does not apply
  2876. to US citizens.�
  2877.  
  2878.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  2879. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  2880. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  2881. accounts around the world, many of them
  2882. belonging to Americans, according to
  2883. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  2884. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  2885. Edward Snowden.
  2886.  
  2887.  The collection program, which has not
  2888. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  2889. address books and �buddy lists� from
  2890. instant messaging services as they move
  2891. across global data links. Online services
  2892. often transmit those contacts when a user
  2893. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  2894. a computer or mobile device with information
  2895. stored on remote servers.
  2896.  
  2897. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  2898. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  2899. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  2900.  
  2901. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  2902.  
  2903. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  2904.  
  2905. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  2906.  
  2907. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  2908. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  2909. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  2910. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  2911. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  2912. ���������������������������������������
  2913. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  2914.  
  2915. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  2916.  
  2917. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  2918. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  2919.  
  2920. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  2921.  
  2922. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  2923.  
  2924. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  2925.  
  2926. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  2927.  
  2928. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  2929.  
  2930. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  2931.  
  2932. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  2933.  
  2934. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  2935.  
  2936. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  2937.  
  2938. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  2939.  
  2940. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  2941.  
  2942. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  2943.  
  2944. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  2945. ---------------------------------------
  2946. NOBODY comments ?
  2947.  
  2948.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  2949. differs from the Guardians.
  2950.  
  2951. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  2952.  
  2953. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  2954.  
  2955. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  2956.  
  2957. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  2958.  
  2959.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  2960. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  2961. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  2962.  
  2963.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  2964. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  2965. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  2966. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  2967. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  2968. ---------------------------------------
  2969. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  2970.  
  2971. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  2972.  
  2973. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  2974.  
  2975.  This was written from a person who purports
  2976. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  2977.  
  2978. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  2979.  
  2980. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  2981.  
  2982. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  2983.  
  2984. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  2985. Misleading ::
  2986.  
  2987. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  2988.  
  2989. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  2990. on NSA Spying ::
  2991.  
  2992. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  2993.  
  2994.  �Recent articles published in the
  2995. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  2996. inaccurate and misleading information
  2997. regarding US foreign intelligence
  2998. activities. The allegation that the
  2999. National Security Agency collected more
  3000. than 70 million �recordings of French
  3001. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  3002.  
  3003.  While we are not going to discuss the
  3004. details of our activities, we have
  3005. repeatedly made it clear that the
  3006. United States gathers intelligence of
  3007. the type gathered by all nations. The
  3008. US collects intelligence to protect the
  3009. nation, its interests, and its allies
  3010. from, among other things, threats such
  3011. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  3012. weapons of mass destruction.
  3013.  
  3014.  The United States values our longstanding
  3015. friendship and alliance with France and
  3016. we will continue to cooperate on security
  3017. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  3018.  
  3019. James R. Clapper
  3020. Director of National Intelligence
  3021. ---------------------------------------
  3022. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  3023.  
  3024. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  3025.  
  3026.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  3027. a call without leaving a record with the
  3028. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  3029. or leaves America without passing through
  3030. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  3031. statement Thursday.
  3032.  
  3033.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  3034. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  3035. _______________________________________
  3036. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  3037. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  3038.  
  3039.  US and British intelligence officials
  3040. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  3041. collection of highly classified, heavily
  3042. encrypted materials they believe former
  3043. National Security Agency contractor
  3044. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  3045.  
  3046.  One source saw the cache of documents
  3047. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  3048. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  3049. other harm. ... ...
  3050.  
  3051.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  3052. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  3053. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  3054. that �if anything happens at all to
  3055. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  3056. to get access to the full archives.�
  3057.  
  3058. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  3059. _______________________________________
  3060. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  3061. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  3062.  
  3063.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  3064. government surveillance policies. But he
  3065. is not disclosing those changes to the
  3066. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  3067. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  3068. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  3069. World Bank and the International Monetary
  3070. Fund? He won�t say.
  3071.  
  3072.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  3073. to review and recommend changes to his
  3074. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  3075.  
  3076. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  3077. _______________________________________
  3078. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  3079.  
  3080.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  3081. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  3082. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  3083. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  3084. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  3085.  
  3086.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  3087. broad goals, the five-page document said
  3088. that existing American laws were not adequate
  3089. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  3090. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  3091. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  3092. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  3093. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  3094. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  3095. pace with the complexity of the technology
  3096. and target environments, or the operational
  3097. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  3098. document concluded.
  3099.  
  3100. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  3101. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  3102. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  3103. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  3104. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  3105.  
  3106. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  3107.  
  3108.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  3109. called Treasure Map and describes its
  3110. capabilities but does not publish visual
  3111. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  3112. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  3113. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  3114.  
  3115. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  3116. _______________________________________
  3117. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  3118.  
  3119. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  3120. _______________________________________
  3121. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  3122.  
  3123. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  3124.  
  3125. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  3126.  
  3127. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  3128.  
  3129.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  3130. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  3131. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  3132. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  3133. the door to a variety of spying options.
  3134.  
  3135. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  3136. _______________________________________
  3137. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  3138.  
  3139.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  3140. collection of solely domestic communications
  3141. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  3142. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  3143. request each week until we receive your
  3144. response,� EPIC said.
  3145.  
  3146.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  3147. said this week that it would not be hearing
  3148. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  3149. early Monday in which the high court listed
  3150. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  3151. as denied.
  3152.  
  3153. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  3154.  
  3155. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  3156. _______________________________________
  3157. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  3158.  
  3159. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  3160.  
  3161. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  3162. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  3163.  
  3164. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  3165.  
  3166. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  3167.  
  3168. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  3169. No Privacy ::
  3170.  
  3171. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  3172.  
  3173. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  3174. Spying Programs ::
  3175.  
  3176. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  3177.  
  3178. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  3179.  
  3180. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  3181.  
  3182. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  3183. _______________________________________
  3184. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  3185.  
  3186. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3187.  
  3188. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  3189.  
  3190. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  3191.  
  3192. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3193.  
  3194. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  3195.  
  3196. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  3197.  
  3198. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  3199.  
  3200.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  3201. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  3202. or indigenous cryptographic information
  3203. security devices or systems in order to
  3204. make them exploitable.�
  3205.  
  3206. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  3207.  
  3208.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  3209. successfully exploits cryptographic
  3210. components of commercial information
  3211. security devices or systems when the
  3212. device or system specified.�
  3213.  
  3214. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3215.  
  3216. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  3217.  
  3218. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  3219.  
  3220. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3221. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3222. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  3223.  
  3224. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  3225.  
  3226.  US and British intelligence agencies
  3227. have successfully cracked much of the
  3228. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  3229. of millions of people to protect the
  3230. privacy of their personal data, online
  3231. transactions and emails, according to
  3232. top-secret documents revealed by former
  3233. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  3234.  
  3235.  Those methods include covert measures
  3236. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  3237. international encryption standards, the
  3238. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  3239. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  3240. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  3241. technology companies and internet service
  3242. providers themselves.
  3243.  
  3244.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  3245. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  3246. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  3247. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  3248.  
  3249.  Independent security experts have long
  3250. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  3251. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  3252. confirmed for the first time by another
  3253. secret document. It shows the agency
  3254. worked covertly to get its own version
  3255. of a draft security standard issued by
  3256. the US National Institute of Standards
  3257. and Technology approved for worldwide
  3258. use in 2006.
  3259.  
  3260. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  3261.  
  3262. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  3263.  
  3264. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3265.  
  3266. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  3267.  
  3268. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  3269.  
  3270. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  3271.  
  3272. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3273.  
  3274. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3275.  
  3276. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  3277. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  3278. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  3279.  
  3280. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3281.  
  3282. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  3283. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  3284.  
  3285. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3286.  
  3287. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  3288.  
  3289. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  3290.  
  3291. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  3292.  
  3293. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  3294. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  3295.  
  3296. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  3297.  
  3298. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  3299.  
  3300.  A range of US hardware and software
  3301. companies are in danger of being dragged
  3302. into the widening scandal over internet
  3303. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  3304. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  3305. Security Agency contractor.
  3306.  
  3307.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  3308. that it has collaborated with technology
  3309. companies to plant �back doors� into
  3310. their systems � or ways for the agency
  3311. secretly to penetrate systems without
  3312. the users� knowledge.
  3313.  
  3314. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  3315.  
  3316. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  3317.  
  3318. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  3319. _______________________________________
  3320. � SSL Inspector ::
  3321.  
  3322. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  3323.  
  3324. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  3325.  
  3326. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  3327. _______________________________________
  3328. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  3329. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  3330.  
  3331. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  3332.  
  3333. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  3334.  
  3335. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  3336.  
  3337. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  3338.  
  3339. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  3340.  
  3341. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  3342.  
  3343. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  3344.  
  3345. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  3346.  
  3347. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  3348. ���������������������������������������
  3349. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  3350. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  3351.  
  3352. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  3353. ���������������������������������������
  3354. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  3355.  
  3356.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  3357. activities is an obscure organization called
  3358. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  3359. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  3360. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  3361. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  3362. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  3363. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  3364. presentation given to journalists by former
  3365. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  3366. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  3367. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  3368. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  3369. be collected, which is then gathered and
  3370. delivered by the DITU.
  3371.  
  3372.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  3373. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  3374. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  3375. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  3376. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  3377. collection, processing, and reporting.
  3378.  
  3379. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  3380.  
  3381. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  3382.  
  3383. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  3384. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  3385. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3386.  
  3387.  
  3388. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  3389.  
  3390. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3391. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3392. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3393.  
  3394. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  3395.  
  3396. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  3397.  
  3398. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  3399.  
  3400. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  3401.  
  3402. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  3403.  
  3404. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  3405.  
  3406.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  3407. by the NSA.
  3408.  
  3409.  During the summer, the documents provided
  3410. to the Guardian and the Washington Post by
  3411. former NSA employee Edward Snowden helped
  3412. unveil the extent of surveillance and
  3413. espionage carried out by the NSA and its
  3414. allies. Le Monde also now has access to
  3415. some of these documents.
  3416.  
  3417.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most
  3418. secretive intelligence agencies of the
  3419. United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  3420. who was granted an asylum for a year in
  3421. Russia. Wanting to denounce "the largest
  3422. program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  3423. history," the American working for a
  3424. subcontractor of the NSA has obtained
  3425. several thousands of highly confidential
  3426. documents.
  3427.  
  3428.  In early June, the first secrets of the
  3429. National Security Agency in these parts
  3430. start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  3431. that the telephone operator Verizon
  3432. provides NSA phone data of several
  3433. million Americans, according to a court
  3434. order secret. Then it was the turn of
  3435. the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  3436. allows the US Secret Service, and first
  3437. and foremost to the NSA, to access a
  3438. privileged manner, since December 2007,
  3439. data from nine major Internet companies,
  3440. including Google, Facebook and Microsoft.
  3441.  
  3442. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  3443.  
  3444.  A document providing internal training
  3445. on Prism, which Le Monde has also had
  3446. access, how the NSA analysts can query
  3447. the databases of Web giants, research
  3448. documents, emails or instant discussions.
  3449. All within a legal framework that
  3450. overcomes the request of an individual
  3451. mandate. The companies named in the
  3452. documents have denied that the NSA
  3453. had a direct and unilateral access to
  3454. their servers.
  3455.  
  3456.  In addition to this targeted surveillance,
  3457. Snowden records reveal another method of
  3458. massive collection of the NSA called
  3459. Upstream. This system can collect data
  3460. from the submarine cable and Internet
  3461. infrastructures. A logical strategy,
  3462. when we know that 99% of global
  3463. communications now pass through diving.
  3464.  
  3465.  To learn more about the context of the
  3466. revelations of the World, the editorial
  3467. read : "Fight Big Brother"
  3468.  
  3469.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the
  3470. Government Communications Headquarters
  3471. (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system,
  3472. because of the historical proximity of
  3473. Great Britain and the United States,
  3474. confidentiality agreements and a financial
  3475. dependence of those services from London
  3476. to Washington. There are also technical
  3477. reasons : a significant portion of
  3478. submarine cables linking Europe to
  3479. America through Britain. With Edward
  3480. Snowden, the Tempora program , which
  3481. aims to "control the Internet" by
  3482. monitoring these cables, has been
  3483. revealed. "You're in an enviable
  3484. position, says a document presenting
  3485. Tempora, presented by the Guardian,
  3486. have fun and pull in the best." Turning
  3487. a page of the document presenting the
  3488. Prism program, we discover Upstream
  3489. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview,
  3490. and oakstar Stormbrew ) which we know to
  3491. date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  3492. would largely on intercepted telephone
  3493. conversations via the major US carriers.
  3494.  
  3495. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  3496.  
  3497.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass
  3498. of intercepted data. One of them is called
  3499. XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  3500. detailed in the columns of the Guardian.
  3501. The extreme precision of the data are
  3502. clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  3503. the content of e-mails to a list of
  3504. websites visited by their target or the
  3505. keywords entered by the latter in the
  3506. search engines.
  3507.  
  3508.  The framework for this research is not
  3509. binding, as the Guardian explained, and
  3510. many Americans are data made available to
  3511. agents. According to the presentation
  3512. materials, to promote the capabilities
  3513. of the tool, three hundred terrorists
  3514. have been arrested since 2008 thanks to
  3515. XKeyscore.
  3516.  
  3517.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their
  3518. considerable resources monitoring the
  3519. fight against terrorism, but also to
  3520. spy allies. At the G20 summit in London
  3521. in 2009, computers of diplomats and heads
  3522. of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well
  3523. as some of their phone calls. NSA, she
  3524. focused on the European Union (EU), as
  3525. revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the
  3526. basis of documents Snowden. NSA has
  3527. installed cookies on the premises of
  3528. the EU representation in Washington.
  3529. The EU delegation to the UN in New York,
  3530. and the building of the Council of the
  3531. European Union in Brussels were also
  3532. scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil
  3533. is also one of the countries affected
  3534. by this intelligence. According to
  3535. Brazilian media group O Globo, its
  3536. political leaders as some companies
  3537. have been targeted.
  3538.  
  3539.  The Snowden documents have informed
  3540. the considerable efforts made by the
  3541. United States to start listening to
  3542. Internet, in a sometimes unclear legal
  3543. framework and often away from real
  3544. democratic debate. Interviewed by
  3545. Le Monde, the US authorities have
  3546. assured that the Prism program was
  3547. the subject of a parliamentary debate
  3548. in the United States and was working
  3549. in a strictly regulated legal framework.
  3550. Asked on September 12 revelations
  3551. Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director
  3552. of National Intelligence, said: "What
  3553. happened - and that is harmful -
  3554. sparked conversation and debate that
  3555. it probably was necessary."
  3556. _______________________________________
  3557. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  3558.  
  3559. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  3560.  
  3561. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  3562.  
  3563. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  3564.  
  3565. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  3566. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  3567.  
  3568. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  3569.  
  3570. NOBODY comments
  3571.  
  3572.  100% expected. They will continue to
  3573. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  3574. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  3575. We must adjust to it by learning how
  3576. to counter their surveillance.
  3577.  
  3578. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  3579. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  3580.  
  3581.  The United States and its key intelligence
  3582. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  3583. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  3584. Nations to promote a universal human right
  3585. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  3586. sources and an internal American government
  3587. document obtained by The Cable.
  3588.  
  3589.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  3590. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  3591. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  3592. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  3593. internet surveillance by the National
  3594. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  3595. services. American representatives have made
  3596. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  3597. checks on their global surveillance network.
  3598. The stakes are high, particularly in
  3599. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  3600. an international backlash against NSA
  3601. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  3602. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  3603. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  3604.  
  3605. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  3606.  
  3607. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  3608. _______________________________________
  3609. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  3610. Public News Coverage ::
  3611.  
  3612. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  3613. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  3614. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  3615. _______________________________________
  3616. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  3617. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  3618.  
  3619. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  3620. _______________________________________
  3621. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  3622.  
  3623.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  3624. a division for particularly difficult
  3625. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  3626. (TAO), this department devises special
  3627. methods for special targets.
  3628.  
  3629.  That category includes surveillance of
  3630. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  3631. the division reported its mission
  3632. accomplished. A report classified as
  3633. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  3634. exploited a key mail server in the
  3635. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  3636. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  3637. first-ever access to President Felipe
  3638. Calderon�s public email account.�
  3639.  
  3640. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  3641.  
  3642. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  3643.  
  3644. Cryptome comments ?
  3645.  
  3646.  This spying was apparently done from
  3647. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  3648. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  3649. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  3650. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  3651.  
  3652. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  3653.  
  3654. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  3655. _______________________________________
  3656. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  3657.  
  3658. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  3659.  
  3660. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  3661.  
  3662. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3663.  
  3664. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  3665.  
  3666. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3667.  
  3668. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  3669.  
  3670. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  3671.  
  3672. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  3673.  
  3674. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  3675.  
  3676. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  3677.  
  3678. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  3679.  
  3680.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  3681. thought that the NSA should use its
  3682. technology to intercept emails and
  3683. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  3684. terminal to another, and was upset to
  3685. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  3686. That was a line he would only cross,
  3687. deliberately, with court and congressional
  3688. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  3689. but as we now know, the agency added
  3690. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  3691. suspicious communications that transited
  3692. the border of the United States, and
  3693. later began to collect reams of metadata
  3694. in order to analyze it.
  3695.  
  3696.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  3697. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  3698. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  3699. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  3700. in order to provide policymakers with a
  3701. decision advantage. The advantage the
  3702. NSA provided was accurate information
  3703. about what people who interacted with
  3704. the United States said in private about
  3705. their intentions; that gap between saying
  3706. and doing, and the ability to predict
  3707. action from it, allows the president of
  3708. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  3709.  
  3710.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  3711. States� actions don�t always match up
  3712. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  3713. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  3714. our moral authority wanes and our
  3715. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  3716.  
  3717.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  3718. countries are any purer. They never have
  3719. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  3720. purer than others, so the amount of
  3721. resources the intelligence community
  3722. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  3723. to correspond with how honest our allies
  3724. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  3725. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  3726. can we figure out which allies are more
  3727. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  3728. correspondence between public and private
  3729. words and actions.
  3730.  
  3731.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  3732. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  3733. want their leaders to gain a decision
  3734. advantage in the give and take between
  3735. countries. They want to know what US
  3736. policymakers will do before the Americans
  3737. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  3738. France, they aggressively spy on the
  3739. United States, on US citizens and
  3740. politicians, in order to collect that
  3741. information. The difference lies in the
  3742. scale of intelligence collection: The
  3743. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  3744. most sophisticated intelligence community
  3745. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  3746. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  3747. envious.
  3748. _______________________________________
  3749. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  3750.  
  3751. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  3752. _______________________________________
  3753. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  3754.  
  3755. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  3756. ���������������������������������������
  3757. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  3758. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  3759.  
  3760. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  3761. _______________________________________
  3762. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  3763. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  3764.  
  3765. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  3766. _______________________________________
  3767.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  3768. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  3769. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  3770. from the award ceremony are the first of
  3771. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  3772. Russia.
  3773.  
  3774. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  3775. ���������������������������������������
  3776. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  3777.  
  3778.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  3779. of the Security Service, said the
  3780. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  3781. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  3782. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  3783. agencies.
  3784.  
  3785. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  3786.  
  3787. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  3788.  
  3789.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  3790. they are not using Tor.�
  3791.  
  3792. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  3793.  
  3794. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  3795. ---------------------------------------
  3796.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  3797. old bleach log.
  3798.  
  3799. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  3800. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  3801. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  3802. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  3803.  
  3804. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  3805.  
  3806.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  3807. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  3808. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  3809. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  3810. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  3811. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  3812. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  3813. function.
  3814.  
  3815.  There are also various third party
  3816. programs that can produce files in
  3817. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  3818. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  3819.  
  3820.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  3821. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  3822. data stored on the system running the
  3823. Flash player.�
  3824. ---------------------------------------
  3825. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  3826.  
  3827.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  3828. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  3829. It can be found within Windows systems
  3830. and can be wiped out here ;
  3831.  
  3832. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3833. Application Data\Macromedia\
  3834.  
  3835. and may also be cloned here ;
  3836.  
  3837. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  3838.  
  3839.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  3840. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  3841.  
  3842. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  3843.  
  3844. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3845. Local Settings\Temp\
  3846. ---------------------------------------
  3847. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  3848.  
  3849. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  3850.  
  3851. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  3852.  
  3853. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  3854.  
  3855. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  3856.  
  3857. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  3858.  
  3859. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  3860.  
  3861. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  3862.  
  3863. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  3864.  
  3865. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  3866.  
  3867. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  3868.  
  3869. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  3870.  
  3871. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  3872.  
  3873. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  3874.  
  3875. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  3876. ---------------------------------------
  3877. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  3878.  
  3879.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  3880. application created by Samy Kamkar
  3881. which produces zombie cookies in a
  3882. web browser that are intentionally
  3883. difficult to delete. ... ...
  3884.  
  3885.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  3886. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  3887. by copying itself in different forms on
  3888. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  3889. itself if it notices that some of the
  3890. copies are missing or expired.
  3891.  
  3892.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  3893. Evercookie uses the following storage
  3894. mechanisms when available:
  3895.  
  3896. � Standard HTTP cookies
  3897. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  3898. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  3899. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  3900. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  3901. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  3902. (cookies) back out
  3903. � Storing cookies in Web history
  3904. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  3905. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  3906. � window.name caching
  3907. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  3908. � HTML5 Session Storage
  3909. � HTML5 Local Storage
  3910. � HTML5 Global Storage
  3911. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  3912. ---------------------------------------
  3913. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  3914.  
  3915.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  3916. mean that your browser isn't storing
  3917. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  3918. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  3919. in browser vulnerabilities.
  3920.  
  3921.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  3922. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  3923. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  3924. wide surveillance.
  3925.  
  3926.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  3927. powerful anonymity service, and the
  3928. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  3929. the Internet, makes it easy to
  3930. differentiate Tor users from other
  3931. Web users,� he wrote.
  3932.  
  3933.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  3934. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  3935. identifies you. Even though your IP
  3936. address changed [because of Tor], the
  3937. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  3938.  
  3939. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  3940. ---------------------------------------
  3941. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  3942. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  3943.  
  3944.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  3945. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  3946. �staining� as a means to identify
  3947. individual machines linked to that
  3948. IP address. ... ...
  3949.  
  3950.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  3951. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  3952. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  3953. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  3954. and is stamped into every packet, which
  3955. enables all the events from that stained
  3956. machine to be brought back together to
  3957. recreate a browsing session.�
  3958.  
  3959. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  3960.  
  3961. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  3962.  
  3963. � Packet Staining ::
  3964.  
  3965. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  3966. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  3967. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  3968. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  3969.  
  3970. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  3971.  
  3972. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  3973. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  3974. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  3975. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  3976.  
  3977. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  3978.  
  3979.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  3980. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  3981. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  3982. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  3983. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  3984. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  3985. identify it. We also worked to create
  3986. a custom Tor client which allows the
  3987. user finer control.� ... ...
  3988.  
  3989.  �This accomplishes several things.
  3990. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  3991. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  3992. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  3993. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  3994. be excessively complex, as a single
  3995. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  3996. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  3997. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  3998. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  3999. going to and from the proxy server,
  4000. it is possible to deduce which clients
  4001. are making which requests. Second, if
  4002. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  4003. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  4004. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  4005. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  4006. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  4007. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  4008. must be coordinated across several machines,
  4009. and an attacker must own all the hops
  4010. along the circuit in order to trace
  4011. requests back to the originating client.�
  4012.  
  4013. ... ...
  4014.  
  4015.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  4016. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  4017. a hidden service will turn up the port
  4018. that the hidden service is using to deal
  4019. with incoming connections. It can then be
  4020. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  4021.  
  4022. ... ...
  4023.  
  4024.  �We would have to try to connect to
  4025. each of the ports we see open on a
  4026. machine to determine if there is a
  4027. hidden service being run. We would not
  4028. even know which protocol the hidden
  4029. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  4030. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  4031. etc. The only thing we know is that
  4032. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  4033. not enough to attempt to connect once
  4034. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  4035. Several protocols must be tried.�
  4036.  
  4037. ... ...
  4038.  
  4039.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  4040. directory servers in more detail. Our
  4041. work focused solely on the client, but
  4042. many attacks would be much easier with
  4043. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  4044. servers ultimately control which Tor
  4045. servers are used by clients. We have found
  4046. that a server can put itself on a directory
  4047. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  4048. server running several Tor processes, each
  4049. having a different nickname, open port,
  4050. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  4051. requires different configuration files
  4052. for the different processes, which are
  4053. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  4054. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  4055. since it is listed several times. This
  4056. increases the density of friendly servers
  4057. in the cloud without increasing the number
  4058. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  4059. each listing has the same IP address,
  4060. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  4061. who inspecting the directories.�
  4062.  
  4063. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  4064. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  4065. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  4066.  
  4067. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  4068.  
  4069. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  4070.  
  4071. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  4072.  
  4073. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  4074.  
  4075. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  4076.  
  4077.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  4078. into capabilities the IC has developed
  4079. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  4080. to run multiple research teams (either
  4081. known or unknown to each other) against
  4082. a single target, and a few summer students
  4083. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  4084. small investment. I�d expect there are
  4085. other programs with more sophisticated
  4086. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  4087.  
  4088. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  4089. _______________________________________
  4090. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  4091.  
  4092. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  4093. _______________________________________
  4094. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  4095. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  4096.  
  4097. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  4098.  
  4099.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  4100. the past several months, I�d also thought
  4101. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  4102. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  4103. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  4104. Sasso of The Hill.
  4105.  
  4106.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  4107. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  4108. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  4109. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  4110. help you with that.�
  4111.  
  4112. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  4113.  
  4114.  The conversation then turned specifically
  4115. to the government�s use of targeted
  4116. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  4117. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  4118. hope they make full use of the capacities
  4119. of the National Security Agency when we
  4120. do that.�
  4121.  
  4122.  Hayden was responding to a question
  4123. about a new project announced by journalists
  4124. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  4125. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  4126. assassinations.
  4127.  
  4128. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  4129. _______________________________________
  4130. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  4131.  
  4132. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  4133.  
  4134. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  4135.  
  4136. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  4137. _______________________________________
  4138. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  4139. Breaches ::
  4140.  
  4141. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  4142.  
  4143. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  4144.  
  4145. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  4146. _______________________________________
  4147. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  4148. of US Citizens ::
  4149.  
  4150.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  4151. body of knowledge in recent months about
  4152. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  4153. information concerning Americans, prompting
  4154. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  4155. in the agency and President Obama to order
  4156. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  4157. Almost everything about the agency�s
  4158. operations is hidden, and the decision
  4159. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  4160. was made in secret, without review by the
  4161. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  4162. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  4163. Department memo warned of the potential
  4164. for the �misuse� of such information
  4165. without adequate safeguards.
  4166.  
  4167. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  4168. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  4169. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  4170.  
  4171. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  4172. From American Social Networks ::
  4173.  
  4174. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  4175. _______________________________________
  4176. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  4177. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  4178.  
  4179. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  4180. _______________________________________
  4181. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  4182. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  4183.  
  4184.  Led by the German government, a loose
  4185. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  4186. across the world is pushing to update an
  4187. influential international human rights
  4188. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  4189.  
  4190. ... ...
  4191.  
  4192.  The annual conference was attended by a
  4193. diverse selection of privacy and data
  4194. protection officials from across the
  4195. world, with representatives attending
  4196. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  4197. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  4198. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  4199. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  4200. United Kingdom.
  4201.  
  4202.  During a closed session at the conference
  4203. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  4204. resolution was put forward for a vote
  4205. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  4206. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  4207. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  4208. globally applicable standards for data
  4209. protection and the protection of privacy
  4210. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  4211.  
  4212.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  4213. of the resolution ... the United States.
  4214.  
  4215.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  4216. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  4217. eventually need to be put forward at the
  4218. United Nations and voted on by member
  4219. states, and that could take time. But
  4220. the growing appetite to amend the
  4221. international treaty in light of the
  4222. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  4223. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  4224. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  4225. technology in the digital age to trample
  4226. over basic universal privacy rights.
  4227.  
  4228. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  4229.  
  4230. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  4231.  
  4232. NOBODY comments
  4233.  
  4234.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  4235. all secret agencies around the world,
  4236. in general. All secret agencies and
  4237. their third-party vendors or allies
  4238. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  4239. backdoors in electronic communication
  4240. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  4241. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  4242. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  4243. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  4244. you must kill any trust in security.
  4245.  
  4246.  Security does not exist on the web.
  4247. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  4248. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  4249. _______________________________________
  4250. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  4251.  
  4252. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  4253.  
  4254. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  4255.  
  4256. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  4257. _______________________________________
  4258. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  4259.  
  4260. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  4261. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  4262. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  4263. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  4264. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  4265.  
  4266. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  4267. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  4268.  
  4269. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  4270. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  4271. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  4272.  
  4273.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are
  4274. tapping the backbone itself, via the
  4275. willing assistance of the telcos (who
  4276. still have remained mostly silent on
  4277. all of this) as opposed to �downstream�
  4278. collection, which requires going to the
  4279. internet companies directly.
  4280.  
  4281. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  4282.  
  4283. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  4284.  
  4285. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  4286.  
  4287. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  4288. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  4289. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  4290. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  4291. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  4292. _______________________________________
  4293. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  4294. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  4295. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  4296.  
  4297. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  4298. _______________________________________
  4299. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  4300.  
  4301.  According to a top secret document
  4302. disclosed by NSA whistleblower Edward
  4303. Snowden and obtained by The Hindu, the
  4304. PRISM programme was deployed by the
  4305. American agency to gather key information
  4306. from India by tapping directly into the
  4307. servers of tech giants which provide
  4308. services such as email, video sharing,
  4309. voice-over-IPs, online chats, file
  4310. transfer and social networking services.
  4311.  
  4312.  And, according to the PRISM document
  4313. seen by The Hindu, much of the communication
  4314. targeted by the NSA is unrelated to terrorism,
  4315. contrary to claims of Indian and American
  4316. officials.
  4317.  
  4318.  Instead, much of the surveillance was
  4319. focused on India�s domestic politics and
  4320. the country�s strategic and commercial
  4321. interests.
  4322.  
  4323. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  4324.  
  4325.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication
  4326. intelligence) document about �Close Access
  4327. SIGADs�, the offices of Indian diplomats
  4328. and high-ranking military officials stationed
  4329. at these important posts were targets of
  4330. four different kinds of electronic snooping
  4331. devices:
  4332.  
  4333.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of
  4334. the hard drive of computers.
  4335.  
  4336.  Highlands, which makes digital collection
  4337. from implants.
  4338.  
  4339.  Vagrant, which collects data of open
  4340. computer screens.
  4341.  
  4342.  Magnetic, which is a collection of
  4343. digital signals.
  4344.  
  4345. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  4346. _______________________________________
  4347. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US
  4348. Intelligence ::
  4349.  
  4350.  Accessing archived government documents,
  4351. the National Security Archive, an
  4352. anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  4353. decades-long effort by the US to detect,
  4354. monitor, and in some cases plan the
  4355. destruction of, �more than 10,000 such
  4356. facilities worldwide, many of them in
  4357. hostile territory, and many presumably
  4358. intended to hide or protect lethal military
  4359. equipment and activities, including
  4360. weapons of mass destruction, that could
  4361. threaten US or allied interests.�
  4362.  
  4363. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  4364. _______________________________________
  4365. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  4366.  
  4367. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  4368. _______________________________________
  4369. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the
  4370. Inside Story of NSA Leaks ::
  4371.  
  4372. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  4373. _______________________________________
  4374. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  4375.  
  4376. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  4377. _______________________________________
  4378. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  4379. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  4380.  
  4381. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  4382. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  4383. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  4384.  
  4385. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  4386. Under United States Control ::
  4387.  
  4388.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff
  4389. announces publicly the creation of a
  4390. world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  4391. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  4392.  
  4393.  Not many understand that, while the
  4394. immediate trigger for the decision
  4395. (coupled with the cancellation of a
  4396. summit with the US president) was the
  4397. revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  4398. why Rousseff can take such a historic
  4399. step is that the alternative infrastructure:
  4400. The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  4401. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai,
  4402. India to Cape Town, South Africa to
  4403. Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and
  4404. it�s, actually, in its final phase of
  4405. implementation.
  4406.  
  4407.  �The global backlash is only beginning
  4408. and will get far more severe in coming
  4409. months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  4410. of the Open Technology Institute at the
  4411. Washington-based New America Foundation
  4412. think-tank. �This notion of national
  4413. privacy sovereignty is going to be an
  4414. increasingly salient issue around the
  4415. globe.�
  4416.  
  4417. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  4418. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  4419. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  4420. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  4421.  
  4422. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  4423.  
  4424.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s
  4425. capacity, fibre optic cable system.
  4426.  
  4427. http://www.bricscable.com/
  4428.  
  4429. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  4430. _______________________________________
  4431. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA
  4432. Metadata Collection Orders ::
  4433.  
  4434.  A newly declassified opinion from the
  4435. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4436. from this summer shows the court�s
  4437. interpretation of the controversial
  4438. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
  4439. that�s used to justify the National
  4440. Security Agency�s bulk telephone
  4441. metadata collections, and reveals
  4442. that none of the companies that have
  4443. been served with such orders has ever
  4444. challenged one.
  4445.  
  4446. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  4447. _______________________________________
  4448. � Experts Worry About Long-Term Blowback
  4449. of NSA Revelations ::
  4450.  
  4451.  With all of the disturbing revelations
  4452. that have come to light in the last few
  4453. weeks regarding the NSA�s collection
  4454. methods and its efforts to weaken
  4455. cryptographic protocols and security
  4456. products, experts say that perhaps the
  4457. most worrisome result of all of this
  4458. is that no one knows who or what they
  4459. can trust anymore.
  4460.  
  4461.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA
  4462. leaks, which revealed the agency�s
  4463. ability to subvert some cryptographic
  4464. standards and its �partnerships� with
  4465. software and hardware vendors to insert
  4466. backdoors into various unnamed products,
  4467. has continued to accumulate over the
  4468. course of the last couple of weeks.
  4469. Cryptographers and security researchers
  4470. have been eager to determine which
  4471. products and protocols are suspect,
  4472. and the discussion has veered in a
  4473. lot of different directions. But one
  4474. thing that�s become clear is that when
  4475. the government lost the so-called
  4476. Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA
  4477. didn�t just go back to Fort Meade
  4478. and tend to its knitting.
  4479.  
  4480. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  4481.  
  4482. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  4483.  
  4484.  The security community didn�t invent
  4485. the concept of fear, uncertainty and
  4486. doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  4487. it to the level of religion. It�s the
  4488. way that security products are marketed
  4489. and sold, but it�s also the way that
  4490. the intelligence community justifies
  4491. its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  4492. unconstitutional, data-gathering
  4493. practices. Just as vendors use the
  4494. specter of catastrophic hacks, data
  4495. loss and public embarrassment to push
  4496. their wares, the NSA and its allies
  4497. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and
  4498. global terrorism to justify their
  4499. increasingly aggressive practices,
  4500. some of which have now been shown to
  4501. have deliberately weakened some of the
  4502. fundamental building blocks of security.
  4503.  
  4504.  The most damning bit of string in this
  4505. ball is the news that the NSA likely
  4506. inserted a back door into a key
  4507. cryptographic algorithm known as
  4508. DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  4509. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning
  4510. to its developer customers warning them
  4511. to immediately stop using the company�s
  4512. BSAFE library because it uses the
  4513. compromised random number generator.
  4514. That means that untold numbers of products
  4515. that include the BSAFE crypto libraries
  4516. are compromised.
  4517.  
  4518. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  4519. _______________________________________
  4520. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  4521.  
  4522.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  4523. President approximately every 45 days,
  4524. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  4525. the activities carried out under these
  4526. Authorizations are referred to as the
  4527. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  4528. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  4529. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  4530. the content of communications into and out
  4531. of the United States where there was a
  4532. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  4533. party to the communication was a member
  4534. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  4535.  
  4536.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  4537. acknowledged and described by the President,
  4538. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  4539. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  4540. a series of articles published in The New York
  4541. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  4542. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  4543. intelligence activities were also authorized
  4544. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  4545. but the details of those activities remain
  4546. classified.� ... ...
  4547.  
  4548.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  4549. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  4550. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  4551. as the principal governing authorities for
  4552. conducting electronic surveillance for
  4553. national security purposes. The Foreign
  4554. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  4555. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  4556. "provide legislative authorization and
  4557. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  4558. conducted within the United States for
  4559. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  4560.  
  4561. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  4562.  
  4563. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  4564. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  4565.  
  4566. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  4567.  
  4568. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  4569.  
  4570.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  4571. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  4572. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  4573. require special approval. Therefore, just
  4574. another gap. Also take in consideration
  4575. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  4576. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  4577. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  4578. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  4579. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  4580. _______________________________________
  4581. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  4582. Firm ::
  4583.  
  4584.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  4585. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  4586. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  4587. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  4588. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  4589. A �top secret� Government Communications
  4590. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  4591. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  4592. conducted under the codename �Operation
  4593. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  4594. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  4595. improve understanding of the provider�s
  4596. infrastructure. ... ...
  4597.  
  4598.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  4599. presentation, the attack was directed
  4600. at several Belgacom employees and
  4601. involved the planting of a highly
  4602. developed attack technology referred
  4603. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  4604. appears to be a method with which the
  4605. person being targeted, without their
  4606. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  4607. that then plant malware on their
  4608. computers that can then manipulate
  4609. them. Some of the employees whose
  4610. computers were infiltrated had �good
  4611. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  4612. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  4613. please the British spies, according
  4614. to the slides.
  4615.    
  4616. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  4617. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  4618. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  4619. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  4620. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  4621. _______________________________________
  4622. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  4623.  
  4624. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  4625.  
  4626. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  4627. _______________________________________
  4628. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  4629.  
  4630. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  4631. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  4632. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  4633. _______________________________________
  4634. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  4635. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  4636.  
  4637. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  4638. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  4639. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  4640. _______________________________________
  4641. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  4642.  
  4643. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  4644. ���������������������������������������
  4645. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  4646. Allocated to One Release ::
  4647.  
  4648. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  4649.  
  4650. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  4651.  
  4652. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  4653.  
  4654. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  4655. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  4656.  
  4657. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  4658.  
  4659. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  4660. Schedule ::
  4661.  
  4662. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4663.  
  4664. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4665.  
  4666. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4667.  
  4668. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4669.  
  4670. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4671.  
  4672. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4673.  
  4674. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4675. ���������������������������������������
  4676. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  4677.  
  4678.  In response to a FOIA request from
  4679. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  4680. its ethics office never looked into
  4681. complaints from two federal judges
  4682. that they had been misled about NSA
  4683. surveillance.
  4684.  
  4685. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  4686. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  4687. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  4688. ���������������������������������������
  4689.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  4690. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  4691. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  4692. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  4693. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  4694.  
  4695. Livestream will be at:
  4696.  
  4697. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  4698. _______________________________________
  4699. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  4700. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  4701.  
  4702. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  4703.  
  4704. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  4705. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  4706. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  4707.  
  4708. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  4709.  
  4710.  The Director of National Intelligence
  4711. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  4712. pages of documents related to the
  4713. government�s secret interpretation of
  4714. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  4715. (mis)use of its massive database of
  4716. every American�s phone records. The
  4717. documents were released as a result
  4718. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  4719. Act lawsuit.
  4720.  
  4721.  We�ve posted links to each document
  4722. below. While the government also posted
  4723. many of the documents here ...
  4724.  
  4725. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  4726.  
  4727. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  4728.  
  4729. Links to the documents ;
  4730.  
  4731. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  4732. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4733.  
  4734. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4735.  
  4736. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  4737. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4738. Court
  4739.  
  4740. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4741.  
  4742. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4743. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4744. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4745. Court
  4746.  
  4747. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4748.  
  4749. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4750. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4751. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4752. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  4753.  
  4754. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4755.  
  4756. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  4757. Incident
  4758.  
  4759. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4760.  
  4761. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4762. Intelligence Court
  4763.  
  4764. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4765.  
  4766. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4767. Intelligence Court
  4768.  
  4769. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4770.  
  4771. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  4772. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  4773. Business Records FISA
  4774.  
  4775. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4776.  
  4777. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  4778. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  4779.  
  4780. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4781.  
  4782. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  4783. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4784.  
  4785. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4786.  
  4787. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  4788. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  4789. Surveillance Court
  4790.  
  4791. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4792.  
  4793. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  4794. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  4795. Surveillance Court
  4796.  
  4797. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4798.  
  4799. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  4800. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  4801.  
  4802. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  4803.  
  4804. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  4805. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  4806.  
  4807. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  4808. _______________________________________
  4809. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  4810.  
  4811. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  4812.  
  4813. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  4814.  
  4815. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  4816. ���������������������������������������
  4817. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  4818.  
  4819. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  4820. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  4821. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  4822. _______________________________________
  4823. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  4824. Over Data to the NSA ::
  4825.  
  4826.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4827. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  4828. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  4829. media report. The revelation comes as
  4830. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  4831. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  4832. troves of data with the US and UK.
  4833.  
  4834.  Citing secret government documents,
  4835. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  4836. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4837. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  4838. with domestic security, works closely
  4839. with the US and regularly sends them
  4840. information.
  4841.  
  4842.  The security service gathers intelligence
  4843. on internal security threats. The documents
  4844. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  4845. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  4846. well as regular meetings between officers
  4847. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  4848.  
  4849. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  4850. _______________________________________
  4851. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  4852. Revelations ::
  4853.  
  4854. This is an unofficial translation.
  4855.  
  4856. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  4857.  
  4858.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  4859. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  4860. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  4861.  
  4862. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  4863.  
  4864. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  4865. _______________________________________
  4866. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  4867.  
  4868. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  4869. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  4870. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  4871. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  4872. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  4873. _______________________________________
  4874. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  4875.  
  4876. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  4877.  
  4878. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  4879.  
  4880. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  4881. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  4882.  
  4883. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  4884.  
  4885. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  4886.  
  4887.  (1) The US wants to maintain global
  4888. economic power, (2) the US wants to
  4889. maintain control over major natural
  4890. resources and (3) the US is afraid the
  4891. new economic powers (within the BRICS)
  4892. may destabilize their economic power
  4893. and control over natural resources.
  4894. _______________________________________
  4895. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  4896.  
  4897.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult
  4898. for machines to read.
  4899.  
  4900. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  4901. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  4902. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  4903. _______________________________________
  4904. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  4905.  
  4906. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  4907.  
  4908. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  4909. _______________________________________
  4910. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  4911. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  4912. National Unit ::
  4913.  
  4914.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  4915. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  4916. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  4917. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  4918. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  4919. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  4920. it Wednesday.
  4921.  
  4922.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  4923. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  4924. raw signals intelligence, referred
  4925. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  4926. swathes of digital data traffic that
  4927. the agency gathers under secret court
  4928. authority from US Internet providers.
  4929.  
  4930.  So sensitive is this data that even
  4931. before being disseminated to other US
  4932. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  4933. to a court-mandated process called
  4934. minimization, under which the names
  4935. of any Americans are removed unless
  4936. they are essential for foreign
  4937. intelligence interest.
  4938.  
  4939.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  4940. that the data shared with Israel
  4941. �includes, but is not limited to,
  4942. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  4943. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  4944. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  4945. and content.�
  4946.  
  4947.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  4948. and unminimized raw collection associated
  4949. with selectors from multiple Target office
  4950. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  4951. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  4952. relationship between the two organizations.�
  4953.  
  4954. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  4955. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  4956. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  4957. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  4958. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  4959. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  4960.  
  4961.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  4962. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  4963. that spy most aggressively against the
  4964. United States.
  4965.  
  4966.  �To further safeguard our classified
  4967. networks, we continue to strengthen
  4968. insider threat detection capabilities
  4969. across the Community. In addition, we
  4970. are investing in target surveillance
  4971. and offensive CI against key targets,
  4972. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  4973. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  4974.  
  4975. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  4976. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  4977. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  4978.  
  4979. NOBODY comments
  4980.  
  4981.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  4982. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  4983. plenty of inside information.
  4984.  
  4985.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  4986. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  4987. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  4988.  
  4989. This reminds of a quote ;
  4990.  
  4991.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  4992. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  4993. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  4994. to play out one big game of destruction
  4995. and domination with humans as the visible
  4996. and spiritual puppets?�
  4997. _______________________________________
  4998. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  4999.  
  5000. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  5001. _______________________________________
  5002. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  5003.  
  5004. (EN)
  5005. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  5006.  
  5007. (DE)
  5008. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  5009.  
  5010. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  5011.  
  5012.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  5013. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  5014. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  5015. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  5016. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  5017. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  5018. deployed in a government intelligence
  5019. agency presentation.
  5020.  
  5021. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  5022. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  5023. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  5024. ���������������������������������������
  5025. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  5026. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  5027.  
  5028.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  5029. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  5030. reverse restrictions on the National
  5031. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  5032. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  5033. the agency to search deliberately for
  5034. Americans� communications in its massive
  5035. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  5036. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  5037. �declassified material� - (which, by
  5038. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  5039. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  5040. of which agency it came from and most
  5041. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  5042.  
  5043. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  5044.  
  5045.  In addition, the court extended the
  5046. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  5047. to retain intercepted US communications
  5048. from five years to six years � and more
  5049. under special circumstances, according
  5050. to the documents, which include a
  5051. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  5052. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  5053. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  5054. Surveillance Court.
  5055.  
  5056. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  5057.  
  5058. NOBODY comments
  5059.  
  5060.  The document which was declassified by
  5061. US intelligence officials explains the
  5062. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  5063. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  5064. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  5065.  
  5066. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  5067. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  5068. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  5069.  
  5070.  National Security Agency analysts
  5071. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  5072. their authority to spy on Americans.
  5073.  
  5074. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  5075.  
  5076.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  5077. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  5078.  
  5079. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5080.  
  5081. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5082.  
  5083.  And this is not the first attempt to
  5084. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  5085.  
  5086. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  5087.  
  5088. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  5089.  
  5090.  The new Washington Post report has
  5091. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  5092. (press) release exposing yet another
  5093. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  5094. or take responsibility for the abuses
  5095. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  5096.  
  5097. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  5098.  
  5099.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  5100. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  5101.  
  5102.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  5103. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  5104.  
  5105.  All of this information is backed up
  5106. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  5107. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  5108. 2,776 violations one year after the
  5109. FISA Court order.
  5110.  
  5111. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5112.  
  5113.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  5114. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  5115. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  5116. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  5117. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  5118. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  5119. them out of office come next election.
  5120. _______________________________________
  5121. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence ::
  5122.  
  5123.  �Ever since the remarkable case of Edward
  5124. Snowden broke into the limelight at the
  5125. beginning of the summer that�s now
  5126. winding down, I�ve had a great deal to
  5127. say about it here, on Twitter, and on
  5128. radio and television. As one of the
  5129. very few former NSA officers who�s
  5130. in the public eye and willing to talk
  5131. about Snowden, I�ve had an audience.
  5132. As a former NSA counterintelligence
  5133. officer with experience dealing with
  5134. the Russians, I�ve been pretty much
  5135. a solo act.
  5136.  
  5137.  From nearly the outset I�ve stated
  5138. that Snowden is very likely an agent
  5139. of Russian intelligence; this was met
  5140. with howls of indignation which have
  5141. died down in recent weeks as it�s
  5142. become apparent that Ed�s staying in
  5143. Russia for some time, along with
  5144. whatever classified materials he
  5145. had on his person. (Since Glenn
  5146. Greenwald�s partner when stopped by
  5147. British authorities at Heathrow had
  5148. 58,000 highly classified documents
  5149. on him, thanks to Ed, one can only
  5150. wonder how big the initial haul
  5151. actually was.) That Snowden was in
  5152. contact with the Russian consulate
  5153. in Hong Kong during his pre-Moscow
  5154. visit there, including spending his
  5155. 30th birthday with his new friends,
  5156. is now admitted. Even President
  5157. Vladimir Putin has conceded that
  5158. Ed�s contacts with Russian officials
  5159. did not commence when he landed at
  5160. Sheremtyevo airport, rather before.�
  5161.  
  5162. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  5163. _______________________________________
  5164. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  5165.  
  5166. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  5167.  
  5168.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  5169. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  5170. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  5171.  
  5172. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  5173.  
  5174. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  5175.  
  5176. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  5177.  
  5178. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  5179.  
  5180. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  5181.  
  5182. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  5183.  
  5184. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  5185.  
  5186. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  5187. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  5188. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  5189. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  5190.  
  5191. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  5192.  
  5193.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  5194. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  5195. reports that the US National Security Agency
  5196. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  5197.  
  5198.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  5199. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  5200. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  5201. Tuesday.
  5202.  
  5203.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  5204. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  5205. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  5206. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  5207. several of her top aides, and tapped
  5208. her phone.
  5209.  
  5210. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  5211.  
  5212. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  5213. Impacted ::
  5214.  
  5215.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  5216. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  5217. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  5218. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  5219. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  5220. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  5221.  
  5222.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  5223. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  5224. visit to Washington in October, the
  5225. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  5226. year, or will take action on digital
  5227. security that may affect US companies
  5228. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  5229.  
  5230.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  5231. a proposal that would suspend operations
  5232. of companies that cooperate with the
  5233. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  5234.  
  5235. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  5236. _______________________________________
  5237. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  5238.  
  5239. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  5240.  
  5241. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  5242.  
  5243. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  5244. ���������������������������������������
  5245. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  5246.  
  5247.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5248. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5249. collect against high priority targets,
  5250. including foreign leadership targets.
  5251. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5252. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5253. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5254. internet traffic.�
  5255.  
  5256. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5257.  
  5258. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5259.  
  5260. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  5261.  
  5262. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  5263.  
  5264. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  5265.  
  5266. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  5267.  
  5268.  �The Post is withholding some information
  5269. after consultation with US officials who
  5270. expressed concerns about the risk to
  5271. intelligence sources and methods.
  5272. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  5273. the documents that The Post is publishing
  5274. only summary tables and charts online.�
  5275.  
  5276. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  5277.  
  5278. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5279. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  5280.  
  5281. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  5282.  
  5283. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  5284.  
  5285. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5286. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  5287.  
  5288. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  5289.  
  5290. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  5291.  
  5292. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  5293.  
  5294.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  5295. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  5296. intelligence services, leaked documents
  5297. reveal.
  5298.  
  5299.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  5300. to have an aggressive intelligence
  5301. collection operations against the
  5302. United States,� Pillar said. While
  5303. much information is collected through
  5304. traditional political contacts, �I
  5305. would personally have no doubt that
  5306. that is supplemented by whatever means
  5307. they can use to find out as much as
  5308. they can about what we�re doing,
  5309. thinking, deciding on anything of
  5310. interest to Israel, which would include
  5311. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  5312.  
  5313. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  5314.  
  5315. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  5316.  
  5317.  �To further safeguard our classified
  5318. networks, we continue to strengthen
  5319. insider threat detection capabilities
  5320. across the Community. In addition, we
  5321. are investing in target surveillance
  5322. and offensive CI against key targets,
  5323. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  5324. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  5325. _______________________________________
  5326. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  5327.  
  5328.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  5329. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  5330. the worst part is the Received headers.
  5331. Everyone should look at their own headers
  5332. -- especially people on this list and
  5333. at least comprehend that your email
  5334. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  5335. the Mailman archive.
  5336.  
  5337.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  5338. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  5339. the actual separators in MIME part
  5340. breaks, and so on.
  5341.  
  5342.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  5343. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  5344. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  5345. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  5346. don�t do it all the time.
  5347.  
  5348.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  5349. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  5350. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  5351. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  5352. is that this tells us that the crypto
  5353. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  5354. for quite some time.
  5355.  
  5356.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  5357. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  5358. that works being deployed everywhere.
  5359. What do you do? You just be patient and
  5360. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  5361. analysis.
  5362.  
  5363. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  5364.  
  5365. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  5366.  
  5367. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  5368.  
  5369.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  5370. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  5371. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  5372. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  5373. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  5374. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  5375. reveal.
  5376.  
  5377. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  5378.  
  5379.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5380. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5381. collect against high priority targets,
  5382. including foreign leadership targets.
  5383. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5384. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5385. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5386. internet traffic.� ... ...
  5387.  
  5388. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  5389.  
  5390.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  5391. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  5392. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  5393. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  5394. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  5395. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  5396.  
  5397.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  5398. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  5399.  
  5400. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5401.  
  5402. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5403.  
  5404. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  5405.  
  5406. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  5407.  
  5408. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  5409.  
  5410.  The US government has attempted to
  5411. obtain the master encryption keys that
  5412. Internet companies use to shield millions
  5413. of users� private web communications
  5414. from eavesdropping.
  5415.  
  5416.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  5417. which have not been disclosed previously,
  5418. represent a technological escalation in
  5419. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  5420. the National Security Agency employ when
  5421. conducting electronic surveillance against
  5422. Internet users. ... ...
  5423.  
  5424.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  5425. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  5426. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  5427. communications are typically destroyed
  5428. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  5429. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  5430. of all communications that are enciphered�
  5431. is permissible.
  5432.  
  5433. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  5434. _______________________________________
  5435. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  5436. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  5437.  
  5438.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  5439. intercepts well before 2001, former
  5440. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  5441. secretive Special Services Office,
  5442. these types of programs were at first
  5443. designed to intercept communications
  5444. overseas through arrangements with
  5445. foreign Internet providers, the former
  5446. officials say. NSA still has such
  5447. arrangements in many countries,
  5448. particularly in the Middle East and
  5449. Europe, the former officials say.�
  5450.  
  5451. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  5452.  
  5453. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  5454.  
  5455. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  5456. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  5457. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  5458. ���������������������������������������
  5459. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  5460. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  5461.  
  5462.  A common hacking technique can be used
  5463. to make emails look as if they came from
  5464. outside the United States.
  5465.  
  5466. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  5467. _______________________________________
  5468. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  5469. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  5470.  
  5471. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  5472.  
  5473. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  5474.  
  5475. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  5476.  
  5477. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  5478. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  5479. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  5480. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  5481. ���������������������������������������
  5482. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  5483. Patrick Leahy ::
  5484.  
  5485. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  5486.  
  5487. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  5488.  
  5489. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  5490. _______________________________________
  5491. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  5492.  
  5493.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  5494. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  5495. their authority to spy on Americans
  5496. multiple times in the past decade,
  5497. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  5498. and lawmakers� statements that no
  5499. willful violations occurred. ...
  5500.  
  5501.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  5502. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  5503. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  5504. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  5505. of having links to terrorism, before a
  5506. secret court that oversees surveillance
  5507. found the operation unconstitutional
  5508. in 2011.
  5509.  
  5510. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  5511.  
  5512. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  5513. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  5514. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  5515.  
  5516.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  5517. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  5518. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  5519. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  5520. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  5521.  
  5522.  The documents were released in response
  5523. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  5524. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  5525.  
  5526.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  5527. litigation and the most significant leak
  5528. in American history to finally get them
  5529. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  5530. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  5531. �but I�m happy that the administration
  5532. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  5533.  
  5534. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  5535. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  5536. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  5537.  
  5538. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  5539.  
  5540. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5541.  
  5542. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5543.  
  5544. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  5545.  
  5546. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  5547.  
  5548. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  5549.  
  5550. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  5551. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  5552.  
  5553. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5554. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  5555. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  5556. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  5557. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  5558. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  5559.  
  5560.  The account is based on top-secret
  5561. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  5562. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  5563. including unauthorized collection,
  5564. storage, access to or distribution of
  5565. legally protected communications � in
  5566. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  5567. originally only meant to be seen by top
  5568. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  5569. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  5570. and other locations in the Washington DC
  5571. region.
  5572.  
  5573. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  5574.  
  5575.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  5576. and other things, there�s people talking
  5577. about privacy violations or abuses or
  5578. willful or violations, right, it is
  5579. important for people to understand,
  5580. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  5581. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  5582. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  5583.  
  5584.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  5585. We detect them, as early as we can.
  5586. We correct them, right. None of the
  5587. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  5588. the document released were willful.
  5589. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  5590. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  5591. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  5592.  
  5593. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  5594.  
  5595. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  5596. Database Queries Per Month ::
  5597.  
  5598. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  5599.  
  5600. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  5601.  
  5602. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  5603. _______________________________________
  5604. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  5605.  
  5606.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  5607. station in the Middle East to intercept
  5608. and process vast quantities of emails,
  5609. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  5610. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  5611. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  5612.  
  5613.  The information is then processed for
  5614. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  5615. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  5616. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  5617. The Government claims the station is a
  5618. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  5619. and provides a vital �early warning�
  5620. system for potential attacks around
  5621. the world.
  5622.  
  5623.  The Independent is not revealing the
  5624. precise location of the station but
  5625. information on its activities was
  5626. contained in the leaked documents
  5627. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  5628. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  5629. these documents in recent months has
  5630. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  5631. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  5632. the destruction of hard drives containing
  5633. the data. ... ...
  5634.  
  5635.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  5636. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  5637. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  5638. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  5639. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  5640. the global interception of digital
  5641. communications, such as emails and text
  5642. messages.
  5643.  
  5644.  Across three sites, communications �
  5645. including telephone calls � are tracked
  5646. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  5647. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  5648.  
  5649. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  5650. ���������������������������������������
  5651. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  5652.  
  5653. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  5654. _______________________________________
  5655. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  5656. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  5657. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  5658. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  5659. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  5660. E Grassley ::
  5661.  
  5662. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  5663.  
  5664. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  5665.  
  5666. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  5667.  
  5668. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  5669.  
  5670. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  5671.  
  5672. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  5673.  
  5674. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  5675.  
  5676. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  5677.  
  5678. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  5679.  
  5680. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  5681.  
  5682. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  5683. Congress ::
  5684.  
  5685.  �I can now confirm that the House
  5686. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  5687. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  5688. available to Representatives in Congress,
  5689. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  5690. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  5691. the now declassified documents detailing
  5692. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  5693.  
  5694. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  5695.  
  5696. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  5697.  
  5698. ?
  5699.  
  5700. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  5701.  
  5702.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  5703. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  5704. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  5705. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  5706. discussions with the president when he
  5707. first came on board we talked to him about
  5708. these programs and the issue was how do
  5709. we know the compliance is there and what
  5710. more could we do? We stood up working with
  5711. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  5712. of compliance. This directorate of
  5713. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  5714. and information specialists that can look
  5715. at everything that we do in these programs
  5716. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  5717. orders but we also have oversight from
  5718. the Director of National Intelligence,
  5719. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  5720. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  5721. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  5722. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  5723. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  5724. _______________________________________
  5725. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  5726.  
  5727.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  5728. public so far.
  5729.  
  5730. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  5731. _______________________________________
  5732. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  5733.  
  5734. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  5735. _______________________________________
  5736. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  5737. Data Lab ::
  5738.  
  5739. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  5740.  
  5741. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  5742. _______________________________________
  5743. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  5744. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  5745.  
  5746. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  5747. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  5748. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  5749. _______________________________________
  5750. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  5751.  
  5752.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  5753. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  5754. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  5755. there since he assumed the position
  5756. of Secretary of State. He has already
  5757. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  5758. � where officials demanded an explanation
  5759. to reports that Washington had collected
  5760. vast amounts of internet data there.
  5761. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  5762. which allegedly was the top regional
  5763. target of the surveillance program.
  5764.  
  5765. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  5766.  
  5767. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  5768.  
  5769. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  5770. Surveillance ::
  5771.  
  5772. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  5773.  
  5774. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  5775.  
  5776. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  5777. _______________________________________
  5778. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  5779.  
  5780. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  5781. ���������������������������������������
  5782. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  5783.  
  5784. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  5785.  
  5786. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  5787.  
  5788. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  5789.  
  5790. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  5791.  
  5792. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  5793. _______________________________________
  5794. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  5795.  
  5796. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  5797.  
  5798. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  5799. _______________________________________
  5800. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  5801.  
  5802. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  5803.  
  5804.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  5805. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  5806. use of certain United States person names
  5807. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  5808. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  5809. implement any USP queries until an effective
  5810. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  5811. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  5812. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  5813. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  5814. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  5815. databases).�
  5816.  
  5817. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  5818.  
  5819. NOBODY comments
  5820.  
  5821. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  5822.  
  5823. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  5824.  
  5825.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  5826. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  5827. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  5828. communications not related to foreign
  5829. information or foreign activity for up
  5830. to five years.
  5831.  
  5832.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  5833. acquired communications of or concerning a
  5834. United States person may be retained no
  5835. longer than five years in any event.�
  5836.  
  5837.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  5838. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  5839. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  5840. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  5841. communications that have been stored.
  5842. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  5843. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  5844. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  5845. to �communications security vulnerability�
  5846. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  5847. _______________________________________
  5848. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  5849.  
  5850. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  5851. _______________________________________
  5852. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  5853.  
  5854. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  5855. _______________________________________
  5856. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  5857. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  5858.  
  5859.  As the steady stream of revelations
  5860. continues, the White House has choosen
  5861. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  5862. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  5863.  
  5864. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  5865. _______________________________________
  5866. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  5867.  
  5868. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  5869.  
  5870. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  5871. Spying Press Conference ::
  5872.  
  5873.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  5874. Presidential press conference in which the
  5875. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  5876. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  5877. that Obama told today about the program
  5878. by citing multiple articles with information
  5879. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  5880.  
  5881. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  5882. ���������������������������������������
  5883. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  5884. Partners ::
  5885.  
  5886. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  5887. ���������������������������������������
  5888. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  5889. Metadata ::
  5890.  
  5891. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  5892. ���������������������������������������
  5893. � National Security Run Amok ::
  5894.  
  5895. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  5896. _______________________________________
  5897.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  5898. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  5899. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  5900. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  5901.  
  5902. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  5903.  
  5904.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  5905. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  5906. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  5907. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  5908. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  5909. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  5910. for including former senators Hillary
  5911. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  5912.  
  5913. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  5914.  
  5915. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  5916. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  5917.  
  5918. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  5919.  
  5920. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  5921.  
  5922. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  5923. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  5924.  
  5925. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  5926.  
  5927.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  5928. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  5929.  
  5930. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  5931. ���������������������������������������
  5932. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  5933.  
  5934. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  5935.  
  5936. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  5937.  
  5938. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  5939.  
  5940. NOBODY comments
  5941.  
  5942. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  5943.  
  5944.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  5945. the document was still classified. It was
  5946. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  5947.  
  5948. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  5949.  
  5950.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  5951. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  5952. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  5953. many of these operations being leaked.
  5954. _______________________________________
  5955. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  5956. on Brazilian Television ::
  5957.  
  5958. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  5959. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  5960. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  5961.  
  5962. NOBODY comments
  5963.  
  5964.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  5965. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  5966.  
  5967.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  5968. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  5969. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  5970.  
  5971. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  5972. ���������������������������������������
  5973. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  5974. English Report ::
  5975.  
  5976.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  5977. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  5978. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  5979. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  5980. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  5981. matters is also much closer than first
  5982. thought. ... ...
  5983.  
  5984.  Day after day and month after month,
  5985. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  5986. amounts of connection data relating
  5987. to the communications it had placed
  5988. under surveillance. The so-called
  5989. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  5990. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  5991. into the Americans� giant databases.
  5992.  
  5993. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  5994.  
  5995. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  5996. Deutsch Report ::
  5997.  
  5998. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  5999.  
  6000. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  6001.  
  6002. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  6003. ���������������������������������������
  6004. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  6005.  
  6006. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  6007. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  6008. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  6009.  
  6010. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  6011.  
  6012. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  6013.  
  6014. � Fed-up Congress Dumps �Em ::
  6015.  
  6016.  The latest revelations will add to
  6017. the intense public and congressional
  6018. debate around the extent of NSA
  6019. surveillance programs. They come
  6020. as senior intelligence officials
  6021. testify to the Senate judiciary
  6022. committee on Wednesday, releasing
  6023. classified documents in response to
  6024. the Guardian�s earlier stories on
  6025. bulk collection of phone records
  6026. and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  6027.  
  6028.  XKeyscore, the documents boast, is
  6029. the NSA�s �widest reaching� system
  6030. developing intelligence from computer
  6031. networks � what the agency calls
  6032. Digital Network Intelligence (DNI).
  6033. One presentation claims the program
  6034. covers �nearly everything a typical
  6035. user does on the internet�, including
  6036. the content of emails, websites
  6037. visited and searches, as well as
  6038. their metadata.
  6039.  
  6040. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  6041. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  6042. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  6043. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  6044.  
  6045. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  6046.  
  6047. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  6048.  
  6049. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  6050.  
  6051. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  6052.  
  6053. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  6054.  
  6055. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  6056.  
  6057. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  6058.  
  6059. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  6060.  
  6061. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  6062.  
  6063. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  6064.  
  6065. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  6066.  
  6067. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  6068.  
  6069. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  6070.  
  6071. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  6072.  
  6073.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  6074. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  6075. they are shunted off to various �production
  6076. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  6077. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  6078. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  6079. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  6080. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  6081. stored in a database called MARINA and
  6082. is generally retained for five years.
  6083.  
  6084. ... ...
  6085.  
  6086.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  6087. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  6088. to change the surveillance laws once the
  6089. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  6090. This was for a simple reason: they did
  6091. not want to be responsible for a program
  6092. that was not legal.�
  6093.  
  6094. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  6095.  
  6096. NOBODY comments
  6097.  
  6098.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  6099. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  6100. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  6101. communications not related to foreign
  6102. information or foreign activity for up
  6103. to five years.
  6104.  
  6105.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  6106. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  6107. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  6108. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  6109. ���������������������������������������
  6110. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  6111. for GCHQ Bude ::
  6112.  
  6113. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  6114. _______________________________________
  6115. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  6116. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  6117.  
  6118.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  6119. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  6120. counterfeiting and even copyright
  6121. infringement complain that their
  6122. attempts to exploit the security
  6123. agency�s vast resources have often
  6124. been turned down because their own
  6125. investigations are not considered a
  6126. high enough priority, current and
  6127. former government officials say.
  6128.  
  6129.  Intelligence officials say they have
  6130. been careful to limit the use of the
  6131. security agency�s troves of data and
  6132. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  6133. could be misused in ways that violate
  6134. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  6135.  
  6136.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  6137. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  6138. senior intelligence official at the
  6139. White House and at the office of the
  6140. director of national intelligence.
  6141. �They collect all this information,
  6142. but it�s difficult for the other
  6143. agencies to get access to what
  6144. they want.�
  6145.  
  6146. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  6147. _______________________________________
  6148. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  6149. Security Forum ::
  6150.  
  6151. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  6152.  
  6153. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  6154. Conference ::
  6155.  
  6156. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  6157.  
  6158. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  6159. Conference ::
  6160.  
  6161. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  6162. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  6163. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  6164.  
  6165.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  6166. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  6167. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  6168. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  6169. discussions with the president when he
  6170. first came on board we talked to him about
  6171. these programs and the issue was how do
  6172. we know the compliance is there and what
  6173. more could we do? We stood up working with
  6174. the committees in Congress a directorate
  6175. of compliance. This directorate of
  6176. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  6177. and information specialists that can look
  6178. at everything that we do in these programs
  6179. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  6180. orders but we also have oversight from
  6181. the Director of National Intelligence,
  6182. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  6183. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  6184. from the White House, from Congress, the
  6185. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  6186. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  6187.  
  6188. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  6189. Blackhat Conference ::
  6190.  
  6191. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  6192.  
  6193. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  6194.  
  6195. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  6196.  
  6197. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  6198.  
  6199. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  6200.  
  6201. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  6202.  
  6203. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  6204. _______________________________________
  6205. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  6206.  
  6207. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  6208.  
  6209. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  6210. All Domestic Calls ::
  6211.  
  6212.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  6213. three documents related to the National
  6214. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  6215. records, including briefings to Congress
  6216. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  6217. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  6218. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6219. Court that outlines rules that must be
  6220. followed when accessing data provided by
  6221. a Verizon subsidiary.
  6222.  
  6223. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  6224.  
  6225.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  6226. what the government was doing with the
  6227. Patriot Act program, several senators
  6228. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  6229. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  6230. the law in a twisted way to do something
  6231. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  6232. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  6233. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  6234. Act to obtain that document.
  6235.  
  6236. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  6237. _______________________________________
  6238. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  6239.  
  6240. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  6241.  
  6242. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  6243. _______________________________________
  6244. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  6245.  
  6246.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  6247. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  6248. two or three years ago.�
  6249.  
  6250. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  6251. _______________________________________
  6252. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6253. Received Dox ::
  6254.  
  6255. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6256. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6257. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6258. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6259. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6260.  
  6261. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  6262.  
  6263. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  6264.  
  6265. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6266. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  6267.  
  6268.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  6269. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  6270. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  6271. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  6272. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  6273. twice as much campaign financing from
  6274. the defense and intelligence industry
  6275. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  6276.  
  6277. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  6278.  
  6279. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  6280. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  6281.  
  6282. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  6283. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  6284. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  6285.  
  6286. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  6287.  
  6288. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  6289.  
  6290. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  6291. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  6292.  
  6293. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  6294. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  6295. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  6296. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  6297.  
  6298. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  6299. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  6300.  
  6301.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  6302. disclosures, the President has said
  6303. that he welcomes a debate about how
  6304. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  6305. our national security and the privacy
  6306. of our citizens.  The Administration
  6307. has taken various proactive steps to
  6308. advance this debate including the
  6309. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  6310. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  6311. his public statements on the disclosed
  6312. programs, the Office of the Director
  6313. of National Intelligence�s release of
  6314. its own public statements, ODNI General
  6315. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  6316. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  6317. disclose publicly that the Administration
  6318. filed an application with the Foreign
  6319. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  6320. look forward to continuing to discuss
  6321. these critical issues with the American
  6322. people and the Congress.
  6323.  
  6324.  However, we oppose the current effort
  6325. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  6326. of our Intelligence Community�s
  6327. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  6328. approach is not the product of an
  6329. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  6330. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  6331. Amendment, and instead move forward
  6332. with an approach that appropriately
  6333. takes into account the need for a
  6334. reasoned review of what tools can
  6335. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  6336.  
  6337. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  6338.  
  6339. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  6340.  
  6341. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  6342. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  6343.  
  6344. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  6345.  
  6346. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  6347. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  6348. to Defund NSA ::
  6349.  
  6350. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  6351. _______________________________________
  6352.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  6353. official letter from the NSA, which was
  6354. sent to the German government to clarify
  6355. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  6356. because German media and politics were
  6357. heavily confused after it became clear
  6358. that there�s more than one program named
  6359. PRISM.
  6360.  
  6361.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  6362. data collection program is about and
  6363. then confirms that this program is
  6364. different from a more common military
  6365. web tool called "Planning tool for
  6366. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  6367. and Management" (PRISM).
  6368.  
  6369.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  6370. there�s even a third program called
  6371. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  6372. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  6373. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  6374. apparently an internal NSA information
  6375. sharing program. It was unknown until
  6376. now, probably because it�s used in the
  6377. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  6378. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  6379.  
  6380.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  6381. different PRISM programs:
  6382.  
  6383. 1. PRISM
  6384.  
  6385.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  6386. of collecting information about foreign
  6387. targets from data of nine major US
  6388. internet companies. This program started
  6389. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  6390. in June 2013.
  6391.  
  6392. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  6393. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  6394.  
  6395.  This is a web tool used by US military
  6396. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  6397. to data collection platforms deployed to
  6398. military operations. This program is
  6399. not very secret and was first mentioned
  6400. in 2002.
  6401.  
  6402. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  6403. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  6404.  
  6405.  This is an internal NSA program for
  6406. real-time sharing of information,
  6407. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  6408. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  6409. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  6410.  
  6411. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  6412.  
  6413. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  6414. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  6415.  
  6416.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  6417. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  6418. surveillance activities in Germany.
  6419. It only added to the mystery. A US
  6420. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  6421. that there are actually three unrelated
  6422. Prism programs. ... ...
  6423.  
  6424.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  6425. and Maassen, officials also read a
  6426. written statement from the NSA in
  6427. response to a query from the German
  6428. government. According to the statement,
  6429. there are three separate Prism programs,
  6430. all of them unconnected to each other.
  6431. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  6432. said that one of the Prism programs was
  6433. only used internally. That program had
  6434. thus far remained secret. Another of
  6435. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  6436. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  6437. -- vaguely described in the statement
  6438. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  6439. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  6440. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  6441. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  6442.  
  6443. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  6444.  
  6445. NOBODY comments
  6446.  
  6447.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  6448. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  6449. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  6450. _______________________________________
  6451. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  6452.  
  6453. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  6454.  
  6455. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  6456.  
  6457. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  6458.  
  6459.  Description and drawings by US Army
  6460. Corps of Engineers.
  6461.  
  6462. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  6463. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  6464. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  6465. _______________________________________
  6466. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  6467.  
  6468. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  6469.  
  6470. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  6471.  
  6472. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  6473. ���������������������������������������
  6474. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  6475.  
  6476. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  6477.  
  6478. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  6479.  
  6480. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  6481.  
  6482. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  6483.  
  6484. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  6485. _______________________________________
  6486. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  6487.  
  6488.  �First, the United States would not seek
  6489. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  6490. return to the United States. The charges
  6491. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  6492. and the United States would not seek the
  6493. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  6494. charged with additional, death penalty-
  6495. eligible crimes.�
  6496.  
  6497. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  6498.  
  6499. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  6500. _______________________________________
  6501. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  6502. Peace Prize ::
  6503.  
  6504.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  6505. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  6506. agency�s data collection program, has
  6507. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  6508.  
  6509.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  6510. at great personal cost � revealed the
  6511. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  6512. the US government devotes electronic
  6513. communications worldwide,� read the
  6514. nomination. �By putting light on this
  6515. monitoring program � conducted in
  6516. contravention of national laws and
  6517. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  6518. has helped to make the world a little
  6519. bit better and safer.� ...
  6520.  
  6521.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  6522. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  6523. to being well justified in itself �
  6524. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  6525. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  6526. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  6527. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  6528. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  6529.  
  6530. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  6531. _______________________________________
  6532. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  6533. Komsomolets News ::
  6534.  
  6535. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  6536. ���������������������������������������
  6537. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  6538. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  6539.  
  6540.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  6541. his experience when he received a Foreign
  6542. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  6543. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  6544. federal government to monitor a customer
  6545. of his.
  6546.  
  6547.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  6548. contained a broad gag order, which still
  6549. prevents him from telling all the details.
  6550.  
  6551.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  6552. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  6553. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  6554. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  6555.  
  6556.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  6557. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  6558. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  6559. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  6560.  
  6561.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  6562. facility that was capturing all of the
  6563. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  6564. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  6565. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  6566. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  6567.  
  6568. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  6569. _______________________________________
  6570. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  6571.  
  6572. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  6573. _______________________________________
  6574. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  6575.  
  6576. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  6577. ���������������������������������������
  6578. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  6579. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  6580.  
  6581.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  6582. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  6583. representative rather casually indicated
  6584. that the government looks at data from
  6585. a universe of far, far more people than
  6586. previously indicated.
  6587.  
  6588.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  6589. was one of several government representatives
  6590. �including from the FBI and the office of
  6591. the Director of National Intelligence�
  6592. testifying before the House Judiciary
  6593. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  6594. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  6595. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  6596. surveillance, including a retread of the
  6597. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  6598. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6599. Act had stopped terror events.
  6600.  
  6601.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  6602. look �two or three hops� from terror
  6603. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  6604. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  6605. how surveillance was extended had been
  6606. described as two hops. This meant that
  6607. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  6608. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  6609. could also look at the calls from the
  6610. people that suspect has spoken with one
  6611. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  6612. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  6613. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  6614. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  6615.  
  6616. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  6617.  
  6618.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  6619. them or not - two hops.
  6620.  
  6621.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  6622. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  6623.  
  6624. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  6625. ���������������������������������������
  6626. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  6627.  
  6628.  It is a good thing that people are
  6629. becoming aware of the fact that they
  6630. are being monitored - it is not only
  6631. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  6632. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  6633. made to collect information and to store
  6634. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  6635. resources that PRISM used and how it
  6636. could combine these resources to multiple
  6637. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  6638.  
  6639. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  6640. _______________________________________
  6641. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  6642.  
  6643. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  6644. ���������������������������������������
  6645. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  6646. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  6647.  
  6648.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  6649. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  6650. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  6651. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  6652. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  6653. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  6654. stories about the US government�s vast
  6655. foreign and domestic spying programs
  6656. will stop. ... ...
  6657.  
  6658.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  6659. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  6660. the United States by releasing more
  6661. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  6662.  
  6663.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  6664. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  6665. since he has already said that he gave
  6666. all of his classified information --
  6667. thousands of documents -- to several
  6668. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  6669. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  6670. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  6671. half done with the stories he plans to
  6672. write based on the secret information.
  6673.  
  6674. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  6675. ���������������������������������������
  6676. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  6677.  
  6678. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  6679. _______________________________________
  6680. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  6681.  
  6682. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  6683. ���������������������������������������
  6684. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  6685.  
  6686.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  6687. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  6688. typewriters. What do they know that
  6689. we don�t?
  6690.  
  6691. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  6692. ���������������������������������������
  6693. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  6694. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  6695.  
  6696.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  6697. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  6698. has existed since at least 2002. The
  6699. following document refers to it directly.
  6700. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  6701. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  6702. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  6703. limitation of it and similar projects.
  6704.  
  6705. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  6706.  
  6707. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  6708. _______________________________________
  6709. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  6710. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  6711.  
  6712. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  6713.  
  6714. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  6715. in Latin America ::
  6716.  
  6717. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  6718. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  6719. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  6720. _______________________________________
  6721. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  6722. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  6723.  
  6724. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  6725.  
  6726. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  6727.  
  6728. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  6729. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  6730.  
  6731. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  6732. _______________________________________
  6733. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  6734.  
  6735. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  6736. _______________________________________
  6737. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  6738. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  6739.  
  6740. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  6741. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  6742. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  6743. ���������������������������������������
  6744. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  6745.  
  6746. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  6747.  
  6748. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  6749.  
  6750. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  6751. _______________________________________
  6752. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  6753. Metadata ::
  6754.  
  6755. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  6756. _______________________________________
  6757. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  6758. by US Citizens ::
  6759.  
  6760. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  6761. ���������������������������������������
  6762. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  6763.  
  6764. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  6765.  
  6766.  �This may look like a small release, but
  6767. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  6768. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  6769. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  6770. sending encrypted data to and from the
  6771. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  6772. those servers. If you crash these servers
  6773. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  6774. "broken". We are also planning to release
  6775. some of that data (which we have access
  6776. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  6777. ���������������������������������������
  6778. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  6779. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  6780.  
  6781.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  6782. Snowden�s employer.
  6783.  
  6784. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  6785.  
  6786. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  6787.  
  6788. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  6789. _______________________________________
  6790. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  6791.  
  6792. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  6793. _______________________________________
  6794. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  6795.  
  6796.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  6797. it became clear that my freedom and
  6798. safety were under threat for revealing
  6799. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  6800. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  6801. old, family, and others who I have never
  6802. met and probably never will. I trusted
  6803. them with my life and they returned that
  6804. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  6805. always be thankful.
  6806.  
  6807.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  6808. before the world that he would not permit
  6809. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  6810. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  6811. after promising not to do so, the President
  6812. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  6813. leaders of nations from which I have
  6814. requested protection to deny my asylum
  6815. petitions.
  6816.  
  6817.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  6818. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  6819. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  6820. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  6821. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  6822. come after me.
  6823.  
  6824.  For decades the United States of America
  6825. have been one of the strongest defenders
  6826. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  6827. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  6828. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  6829. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  6830. the current government of my country. The
  6831. Obama administration has now adopted the
  6832. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  6833. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  6834. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  6835. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  6836. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  6837. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  6838. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  6839. asylum.
  6840.  
  6841.  In the end the Obama administration is
  6842. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  6843. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  6844. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  6845. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  6846. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  6847. demanding the constitutional government
  6848. it was promised � and it should be.
  6849.  
  6850.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  6851. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  6852. many.�
  6853.  
  6854. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  6855. ���������������������������������������
  6856. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  6857.  
  6858. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  6859.  
  6860. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  6861.  
  6862. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  6863. _______________________________________
  6864. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  6865.  
  6866. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  6867. ���������������������������������������
  6868. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  6869.  
  6870. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  6871. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  6872. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  6873. _______________________________________
  6874. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  6875.  
  6876. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  6877. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  6878. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  6879. _______________________________________
  6880. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  6881.  
  6882. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  6883.  
  6884.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  6885. over private data to America.
  6886.  
  6887.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  6888. according to new claims by former US defence
  6889. analyst.
  6890.  
  6891.  At least six European Union countries in
  6892. addition to Britain have been colluding
  6893. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  6894. personal communications data, according
  6895. to a former contractor to America�s
  6896. National Security Agency, who said the
  6897. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  6898.  
  6899.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  6900. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  6901. and over the next 12 years held several
  6902. sensitive positions within the agency,
  6903. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  6904. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  6905. deals with the US.
  6906.  
  6907.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  6908. second and third party status� under
  6909. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  6910. that compels them to hand over data,
  6911. including mobile phone and internet
  6912. information to the NSA if requested.
  6913.  
  6914.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  6915. confirmed by declassified documents,
  6916. nations are categorised by the US according
  6917. to their trust level. The US is first party
  6918. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  6919. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  6920. Germany and France have third party
  6921. relationships.
  6922.  
  6923.  In an interview published last night
  6924. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  6925. who has been attacked for holding
  6926. controversial views on espionage issues,
  6927. said he had decided to speak out after
  6928. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  6929. told by EU politicians regarding the
  6930. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  6931.  
  6932.  He said that under the agreements,
  6933. which were drawn up after the second
  6934. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  6935. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  6936. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  6937. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  6938.  
  6939.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  6940. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  6941. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  6942. about the spying operations while staying
  6943. silent about their own arrangements
  6944. with the US, and was particularly
  6945. concerned that senior German politicians
  6946. had accused the UK of spying when their
  6947. country had a similar third-party deal
  6948. with the NSA.
  6949.  
  6950.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  6951. by other European countries to the NSA is
  6952. not on the same scale as that provided by
  6953. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  6954. embarrassing.
  6955.  
  6956.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  6957. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  6958. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  6959. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  6960. Madsen said.
  6961.  
  6962.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  6963. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  6964. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  6965. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  6966. confirmed that the entire system for
  6967. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  6968. because the EU was unable to intervene
  6969. in intelligence matters, which remained
  6970. the exclusive concern of national
  6971. governments.
  6972.  
  6973.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  6974. these contradictions and no one is really
  6975. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  6976. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  6977. democracy.�
  6978.  
  6979.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  6980. for European governments to come clean
  6981. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  6982. �There needs to be transparency as to
  6983. whether or not it is legal for the US
  6984. or any other security service to
  6985. interrogate private material,� said
  6986. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  6987. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  6988. is that none of these arrangements has
  6989. been debated in any democratic arena.
  6990. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  6991. things have to be done in secret, but you
  6992. don�t break the law in secret.�
  6993.  
  6994.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  6995. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  6996. fibre-optic cable network running between
  6997. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  6998. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  6999. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  7000. including phone calls, emails and records
  7001. of users� access to websites.
  7002.  
  7003.  He said the public needed to be made
  7004. aware of the full scale of the communication
  7005. -sharing arrangements between European
  7006. countries and the US, which predate the
  7007. internet and became of strategic importance
  7008. during the cold war.
  7009.  
  7010.  The covert relationship between the
  7011. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  7012. report by the European parliament, but
  7013. their explicit connection with the NSA
  7014. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  7015. to speak out.
  7016.  
  7017.  The European parliament�s report followed
  7018. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  7019. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  7020. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  7021. established the framework for European
  7022. member states to collaborate with the US.
  7023.  
  7024.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  7025. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  7026. that governments have chosen to keep the
  7027. public in the dark about it. The days
  7028. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  7029. of silence are over.�
  7030.  
  7031.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  7032. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  7033. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  7034. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  7035. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  7036. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  7037. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  7038. ���������������������������������������
  7039. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  7040. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  7041.  
  7042.  A former contractor to the US National
  7043. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  7044. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  7045. intelligence arrangements between the
  7046. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  7047. murky and far reaching� than the public
  7048. has been led to believe. ...
  7049.  
  7050.  He was particularly concerned about the
  7051. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  7052. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  7053. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  7054. while staying silent about their own role
  7055. in global interception arrangements with
  7056. the United States. ...
  7057.  
  7058.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  7059. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  7060.  
  7061.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  7062. many who say he had no authority or right
  7063. to provide the public with details of
  7064. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  7065. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  7066. have to provide information on NSA
  7067. surveillance at five meetings of the
  7068. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  7069. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  7070. Spain and Switzerland?�
  7071.  
  7072.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  7073. American people from a constantly changing
  7074. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  7075. is providing information to elites on
  7076. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  7077. student, religious and progressive
  7078. organizations.�
  7079.  
  7080.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  7081. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  7082. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  7083.  
  7084. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  7085. _______________________________________
  7086. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  7087.  
  7088. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  7089. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  7090. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  7091. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  7092. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  7093. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  7094. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  7095.  
  7096. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  7097.  
  7098. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  7099. ���������������������������������������
  7100. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  7101. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  7102.  
  7103. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  7104. ??????????????????????????????????????
  7105.  ????????????????????????????????????
  7106. ??????????????????????????????????????
  7107. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ �
  7108.  
  7109. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  7110.  
  7111. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data
  7112. Collection �
  7113.  
  7114. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7115.  
  7116. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on
  7117. Americans �
  7118.  
  7119. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  7120.  
  7121. � List of Retreats for Whistleblowers ;
  7122. Countries With No US Extradition Treaty �
  7123.  
  7124. http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1372346844.php
  7125.  
  7126. � Snowden Was Smart ; NSA Leaks Were
  7127. Given to Untold Others, Encrypted �
  7128.  
  7129. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/greenwald-snowden-s-files-are-out-there-if-anything-happens-to-him.html
  7130.  
  7131. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in
  7132. the Dark on NSA Spying �
  7133.  
  7134. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  7135.  
  7136. � Is PRISM a Not-So-Secret GUI and is
  7137. There More Than One PRISM Tool? �
  7138.  
  7139. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/06/is-prism-just-not-so-secret-web-tool.html
  7140.  
  7141. � Screenshot of the PRISM Input Tool �
  7142.  
  7143. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aKIwdHzpBxM/UbkjPyyl9pI/AAAAAAAAAWQ/hJWQkBFWDic/s1600/PRISM+input+tool.jpg
  7144.  
  7145. � NSA Also Spying on the �Deep Web� �
  7146.  
  7147. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-23/u-s-surveillance-is-not-aimed-at-terrorists.html
  7148.  
  7149. � Obama Regime Irate as Snowden Flees
  7150. Hong Kong to Undisclosed Location �
  7151.  
  7152. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/23/us-usa-security-flight-idUSBRE95M02H20130623
  7153. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_HONG_KONG?SITE=AP
  7154. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-us-politicians-react
  7155.  
  7156. � Wikileaks Comments on Helping Edward
  7157. Snowden Flee to Undisclosed Location �
  7158.  
  7159. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-Statement-On-Edward.html
  7160.  
  7161. � Obama Regime Charges Edward Snowden
  7162. With Espionage �
  7163.  
  7164. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_print.html
  7165.  
  7166. � USA vs. Edward Snowden Complaint �
  7167.  
  7168. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-complaint.pdf
  7169.  
  7170. � Pre-Crime in FISA Leak Detailed �
  7171.  
  7172. http://p.iain.it/view/raw/1296961
  7173.  
  7174. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks �
  7175.  
  7176. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  7177. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7178. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  7179.  
  7180. � Illegal Warrantless Mass Spying of
  7181. All Telecommunication by NSA via FISA �
  7182.  
  7183. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  7184. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  7185. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  7186. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  7187. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  7188. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  7189. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  7190. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  7191. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7192. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  7193. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  7194. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  7195. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  7196. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  7197. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  7198. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  7199. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  7200. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  7201. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  7202. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  7203. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  7204. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  7205. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  7206. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  7207. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  7208. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  7209. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  7210. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  7211. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7212. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7213. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  7214. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  7215. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  7216. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  7217. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  7218. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  7219.  
  7220. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable
  7221. Tapping 1 & 2 (Repost) �
  7222.  
  7223. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  7224.  
  7225. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  7226.  
  7227. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic
  7228. Tapping (Repost) �
  7229.  
  7230. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  7231.  
  7232. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip �
  7233.  
  7234. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  7235.  
  7236. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  7237. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  7238. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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