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Posted by Eyeballing the N on March Tue 24th 4:43 PM - Never Expires
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  1. Eyeballing the NSA 042
  2.  
  3.  
  4. Eyeballing the NSA 042 (HTML & UTF-8 Embedded) �
  5.  
  6. http://paste.oneb1t.cz/view/6e27f40d
  7.  
  8. Eyeballing the NSA 042 (PDF) �
  9.  
  10. http://filebeam.com/a4b10af6fe74f7b372b66ed344db132d
  11.    
  12.    
  13.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  14. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  15. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  16.  
  17.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  18.  
  19.  
  20. � CSEC Cyberwarfare Toolbox Revealed ::
  21.  
  22.  Top-secret documents obtained by the CBC show Canada�s
  23. electronic spy agency has developed a vast arsenal of
  24. cyberwarfare tools alongside its US and British counterparts
  25. to hack into computers and phones in many parts of the
  26. world, including in friendly trade countries like Mexico
  27. and hotspots like the Middle East. ... ...
  28.  
  29.  The CSE toolbox includes the ability to redirect someone
  30. to a fake website, create unrest by pretending to be
  31. another government or hacker, and siphon classified
  32. information out of computer networks, according to experts
  33. who viewed the documents. ... ...
  34.  
  35.  But the latest top-secret documents released to CBC News
  36. and The Intercept illustrate the development of a large
  37. stockpile of Canadian cyber-spy capabilities that go beyond
  38. hacking for intelligence, including:
  39.  
  40. � destroying infrastructure, which could include electricity,
  41. transportation or banking systems;
  42.  
  43. � creating unrest by using false-flags � ie. making a target
  44. think another country conducted the operation;
  45.  
  46. � disrupting online traffic by such techniques as deleting
  47. emails, freezing internet connections, blocking websites and
  48. redirecting wire money transfers.
  49.  
  50. http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/communication-security-establishment-s-cyberwarfare-toolbox-revealed-1.3002978
  51. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/23/canada-cse-hacking-cyberwar-secret-arsenal
  52.  
  53. � CSEC Cyber Threats / Cyberwarfare Toolbox ::
  54.  
  55. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/csec-cyber-threats-cbc-15-0320.pdf
  56. ���������������������������������������
  57. � NSA Releases William Friedman Papers ::
  58.  
  59. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-friedman-15-0323.pdf
  60. _______________________________________
  61. � The CIA Campaign to Steal Apple�s Secrets ::
  62.  
  63. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/10/ispy-cia-campaign-steal-apples-secrets/
  64. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-documents-cia-has-spent-10-years-hacking-iphones-ipads/
  65.  
  66. � NSA-CIA Apple DPA Cryptanalysis ::
  67.  
  68. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-apple-dpa-intercept-15-0309.zip
  69. _______________________________________
  70. � Leaked Snowden Files Show Most of GCSB�s Targets Are NOT
  71. Security Threats to New Zealand (UPDATED SEVERAL TIMES) ::
  72.  
  73.  New Zealand�s electronic surveillance agency, the GCSB, has
  74. dramatically expanded its spying operations during the years
  75. of John Key's National Government and is automatically funnelling
  76. vast amounts of intelligence to the US National Security Agency,
  77. top-secret documents reveal.
  78.  
  79.  Since 2009, the Government Communications Security Bureau
  80. intelligence base at Waihopai has moved to �full-take collection�,
  81. indiscriminately intercepting Asia-Pacific communications and
  82. providing them en masse to the NSA through the controversial
  83. NSA intelligence system XKeyscore, which is used to monitor
  84. emails and internet browsing habits. ... ...
  85.  
  86.  New Zealand is selling out its close relations with the Pacific
  87. nations to be close with the United States, author Nicky Hager
  88. has said.
  89.  
  90.  Hager, in conjunction with the New Zealand Herald and the
  91. Intercept news site, revealed today how New Zealand�s spies
  92. are targeting the entire email, phone and social media
  93. communications of the country�s closest, friendliest and
  94. most vulnerable neighbours.
  95.  
  96.  This morning, Hager told Radio New Zealand that the documents
  97. revealed even more countries which New Zealand was spying on,
  98. and more information would come.
  99.  
  100.  �The Five Eyes countries led by the US are literally trying
  101. to spy on every country in the world ... and what we�re going
  102. to be hearing about in the next few days is New Zealand in all
  103. kinds of very surprising ways playing a role in that,� he said.
  104.  
  105. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-herald-15-0305.pdf
  106. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-herald-15-0306.pdf
  107. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-xkeyscore-nz-star-times-15-0308.pdf
  108. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/nsa-nz-nz-herald-15-0310.pdf
  109. http://cryptome.org/2015/03/gcsb-solomons-nz-herald-15-0314.pdf
  110. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11411759
  111. http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11411730
  112. http://media.nzherald.co.nz/webcontent/document/pdf/201513/WTO%20document.pdf
  113. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/04/new-zealand-gcsb-surveillance-waihopai-xkeyscore/
  114. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  115. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/07/new-zealand-ironsand-waihopai-nsa-gcsb/
  116. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/03/22/new-zealand-gcsb-spying-wto-director-general/
  117. http://www.stuff.co.nz/national/67082905/snowden-files-inside-waihopais-domes
  118. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-asia-pacific-spying-five-eyes-nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  119. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-provide-nsa-nz-data.pdf
  120. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-xks-ironsand-access-multiple-choice-test-check-box.pdf
  121. https://leaksource.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/gcsb-asd-nzsis-asis-south-pacific-spying-high-priority.pdf
  122. http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/267923/gcsb-in-mass-collection-of-pacific-data-ferguson
  123. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31741564
  124. _______________________________________
  125. � How NSA-GCHQ Stole the Keys to the Encryption Castle ::
  126.  
  127.  AMERICAN AND BRITISH spies hacked into the internal computer network
  128. of the largest manufacturer of SIM cards in the world, stealing
  129. encryption keys used to protect the privacy of cellphone communications
  130. across the globe, according to top-secret documents provided to The
  131. Intercept by National Security Agency whistleblower Edward Snowden.
  132.  
  133.  The hack was perpetrated by a joint unit consisting of operatives
  134. from the NSA and its British counterpart Government Communications
  135. Headquarters, or GCHQ. The breach, detailed in a secret 2010 GCHQ
  136. document, gave the surveillance agencies the potential to secretly
  137. monitor a large portion of the world�s cellular communications,
  138. including both voice and data.
  139.  
  140. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gchq-pcs-harvesting-intercept-15-0219.pdf
  141. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/19/great-sim-heist/
  142. http://www.democracynow.org/2015/2/20/nsa_british_gchq_hacked_sim_card
  143. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/20/gemalto-heist-shocks-europe/
  144.  
  145. � Gemalto Government National Mobile ID Schemes / Partners ::
  146.  
  147. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gemalto-gov-national-mobile-id.pdf
  148.  
  149. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gemalto-partner-list.htm
  150.  
  151. � Gemalto Responds After SIM Encryption Key Heist Exposed ::
  152.  
  153. http://www.gemalto.com/press/Pages/Information-regarding-a-report-mentioning-a-hacking-of-SIM-card-encryption-keys.aspx
  154.  
  155. http://www.infowars.com/sim-card-producer-denies-any-real-risk-from-nsa-hacking-its-encryption-keys/
  156.  
  157. � White House Responds After SIM Encryption Key Heist Exposed ::
  158.  
  159. MIRROR #1 http://postimg.org/image/yj37iju33/
  160.  
  161. MIRROR #2 https://pbs.twimg.com/media/B-U0B20CIAASRpq.png
  162. _______________________________________
  163. � NSA�s �Equation Group� Firmware-imbedded Malware Found ::
  164.  
  165.  NSA stores secret imbedded malware inside the firmware of
  166. harddrives and USB(s).
  167.  
  168.  Malware can be used as a beacon once plugged into an air-gapped
  169. system and data can be accessed remotely while OFFLINE.
  170.  
  171.  Kaspersky�s reconstructions of the spying programs show that
  172. they could work in disk drives sold by more than a dozen
  173. companies, comprising essentially the entire market. They
  174. include Western Digital Corp, Seagate Technology Plc, Toshiba
  175. Corp, IBM, Micron Technology Inc and Samsung Electronics Co Ltd.
  176.  
  177.  Western Digital, Seagate and Micron said they had no knowledge
  178. of these spying programs. Toshiba and Samsung declined to comment.
  179. IBM did not respond to requests for comment.
  180.  
  181. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/nsa-equation-group.pdf
  182. http://www.stuff.co.nz/technology/digital-living/66279485/nsa-hiding-equation-spy-program-on-hard-drives
  183. https://news.yahoo.com/russian-researchers-expose-breakthrough-u-spying-program-194217480--sector.html
  184. http://arstechnica.com/security/2015/02/how-omnipotent-hackers-tied-to-the-nsa-hid-for-14-years-and-were-found-at-last/
  185. _______________________________________
  186. � NY Times� David Carr Snowden Interview Hours Before Death ::
  187.  
  188. http://timestalks.com/laura-poitras-glenn-greenwald-edward-snowden.html
  189.  
  190. http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/David-Carr-died-New-York-Times-Snowden/2015/02/13/id/624700/
  191. _______________________________________
  192. � NSA Claims Iran Learned from Western Cyberattacks ::
  193.  
  194. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/iran-gchq-intercept-15-0210.pdf
  195.  
  196. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/10/nsa-iran-developing-sophisticated-cyber-attacks-learning-attacks/
  197. _______________________________________
  198. � White House Spy �Reform� - Increase Spying! Flaunt It! ::
  199.  
  200. An in-you�re-face attitude is now considered �reform.�
  201.  
  202. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/ic-ppd-28-15-0203.zip
  203.  
  204. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/29/one-year-major-report-nsa-still-collecting-bulk-domestic-data-still-clueless-much-good-surveillance/
  205. _______________________________________
  206. � Hypocrisy of Youtube�s CitizenFour Censorship ::
  207.  
  208. http://piratetimes.net/new-snowden-documentary-censored-online/
  209.  
  210. � Citizenfour Snowden Documentary (7-Zipped MP4) ::
  211.  
  212. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour.7z
  213.  
  214. � Citizenfour Snowden Documentary HD (7-Zip MP4) ::
  215.  
  216. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour-HD.7z
  217.  
  218. � Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 PDFs in 13 Files ::
  219.  
  220. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs-pdfs.7z
  221.  
  222. � Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 JPGs in 13 Folders ::
  223.  
  224. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs.7z
  225. _______________________________________
  226. � Western Spy Agencies Secretly Rely on Hackers for Intel ::
  227.  
  228. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gchq-lovely-horse-intercept-15-0204.pdf
  229.  
  230. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/04/demonize-prosecute-hackers-nsa-gchq-rely-intel-expertise/
  231. ���������������������������������������
  232. � CSEC Eyeballs File Sharing Host User Data ::
  233.  
  234. http://torrentfreak.com/canadian-government-spies-on-millions-of-file-sharers-150128/
  235. http://www.cbc.ca/news/cse-tracks-millions-of-downloads-daily-snowden-documents-1.2930120
  236. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cse-levitation-mass-surveillance
  237. http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-canadian-spies-infiltrated-the-internets-core-to-watch-what-you-do-online?
  238.  
  239. ���������������������������������������
  240. � NSA MORECOWBELL HTTP GET Attacking ::
  241.  
  242. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/nsa-morecowbell.htm
  243. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL.pdf
  244. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL-Analysis-Grothoff-etal.pdf
  245. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Wertheim-NSA-and-Encryption-NotiAMS-Feb15.pdf
  246. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/visuel/2015/01/24/cowbells-nouvelles-revelations-sur-les-pratiques-de-la-nsa_4561547_3234.html
  247. _______________________________________
  248. � Compilation of Snowden Documents - January 30, 2015 ::
  249.  
  250. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/archive/master.zip
  251.  
  252. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/tree/master/files/pdf
  253. _______________________________________
  254. � How GCHQ Prepares Interception of Phone Calls From Satellites ::
  255.  
  256. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2015/01/how-gchq-prepares-for-interception-of.html
  257. _______________________________________
  258. � NSA Documents Expose NSA�s Digital Arms Race for Cyber Warfare ::
  259.  
  260.  The NSA�s mass surveillance is just the beginning. Documents from
  261. Edward Snowden show that the intelligence agency is arming America
  262. for future digital wars -- a struggle for control of the Internet
  263. that is already well underway.
  264.  
  265.  Normally, internship applicants need to have polished resumes,
  266. with volunteer work on social projects considered a plus. But at
  267. Politerain, the job posting calls for candidates with significantly
  268. different skill sets. We are, the ad says, �looking for interns who
  269. want to break things.�
  270.  
  271.  Politerain is not a project associated with a conventional company.
  272. It is run by a US government intelligence organization, the National
  273. Security Agency (NSA). More precisely, it�s operated by the NSA�s
  274. digital snipers with Tailored Access Operations (TAO), the department
  275. responsible for breaking into computers.
  276.  
  277.  Potential interns are also told that research into third party
  278. computers might include plans to �remotely degrade or destroy
  279. opponent computers, routers, servers and network enabled devices
  280. by attacking the hardware.� Using a program called Passionatepolka,
  281. for example, they may be asked to �remotely brick network cards."
  282. With programs like Berserkr they would implant �persistent backdoors�
  283. and �parasitic drivers.� Using another piece of software called
  284. Barnfire, they would �erase the BIOS on a brand of servers that
  285. act as a backbone to many rival governments.�
  286.  
  287.  An intern�s tasks might also include remotely destroying the
  288. functionality of hard drives. Ultimately, the goal of the internship
  289. program was �developing an attacker�s mindset.�
  290.  
  291.  The internship listing is eight years old, but the attacker�s mindset
  292. has since become a kind of doctrine for the NSA�s data spies. And the
  293. intelligence service isn�t just trying to achieve mass surveillance
  294. of Internet communication, either. The digital spies of the Five Eyes
  295. alliance -- comprised of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia
  296. and New Zealand -- want more.
  297.  
  298. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-snowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html
  299.  
  300. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA�s Plans for Cyber Warfare ::
  301.  
  302. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/spiegel-15-0117.7z
  303. _______________________________________
  304. � Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA�s War on Internet Security ::
  305.  
  306.  US and British intelligence agencies undertake every effort imaginable
  307. to crack all types of encrypted Internet communication. The cloud, it
  308. seems, is full of holes. The good news: New Snowden documents show that
  309. some forms of encryption still cause problems for the NSA. ... ...
  310.  
  311.  As one document from the Snowden archive shows, the NSA had been
  312. unsuccessful in attempts to decrypt several communications protocols,
  313. at least as of 2012. An NSA presentation for a conference that took
  314. place that year lists the encryption programs the Americans failed to
  315. crack. In the process, the NSA cryptologists divided their targets
  316. into five levels corresponding to the degree of the difficulty of the
  317. attack and the outcome, ranging from �trivial� to �catastrophic.�
  318.  
  319.  Monitoring a document�s path through the Internet is classified as
  320. �trivial.� Recording Facebook chats is considered a �minor� task,
  321. while the level of difficulty involved in decrypting emails sent
  322. through Moscow-based Internet service provider mail.ru is considered
  323. �moderate.� Still, all three of those classifications don�t appear to
  324. pose any significant problems for the NSA.
  325.  
  326.  Things first become troublesome at the fourth level. The presentation
  327. states that the NSA encounters �major� problems in its attempts to
  328. decrypt messages sent through heavily encrypted email service providers
  329. like Zoho or in monitoring users of the Tor network, which was
  330. developed for surfing the web anonymously. Tor, otherwise known as
  331. The Onion Router, is free and open source software that allows users
  332. to surf the web through a network of more than 6,000 linked volunteer
  333. computers. The software automatically encrypts data in a way that
  334. ensures that no single computer in the network has all of a user�s
  335. information. For surveillance experts, it becomes very difficult to
  336. trace the whereabouts of a person who visits a particular website or
  337. to attack a specific person while they are using Tor to surf the Web.
  338.  
  339.  The NSA also has �major� problems with Truecrypt, a program for
  340. encrypting files on computers. Truecrypt�s developers stopped their
  341. work on the program last May, prompting speculation about pressures
  342. from government agencies. A protocol called Off-the-Record (OTR) for
  343. encrypting instant messaging in an end-to-end encryption process also
  344. seems to cause the NSA major problems. Both are programs whose source
  345. code can be viewed, modified, shared and used by anyone. Experts agree
  346. it is far more difficult for intelligence agencies to manipulate open
  347. source software programs than many of the closed systems developed by
  348. companies like Apple and Microsoft. Since anyone can view free and
  349. open source software, it becomes difficult to insert secret back doors
  350. without it being noticed. Transcripts of intercepted chats using OTR
  351. encryption handed over to the intelligence agency by a partner in
  352. Prism -- an NSA program that accesses data from at least nine American
  353. internet companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple -- show that
  354. the NSA�s efforts appear to have been thwarted in these cases: �No
  355. decrypt available for this OTR message.� This shows that OTR at least
  356. sometimes makes communications impossible to read for the NSA.
  357.  
  358.  Things become �catastrophic� for the NSA at level five - when, for
  359. example, a subject uses a combination of Tor, another anonymization
  360. service, the instant messaging system CSpace and a system for Internet
  361. telephony (voice over IP) called ZRTP. This type of combination results
  362. in a �near-total loss/lack of insight to target communications, presence,�
  363. the NSA document states.
  364.  
  365.  ZRTP, which is used to securely encrypt conversations and text chats
  366. on mobile phones, is used in free and open source programs like RedPhone
  367. and Signal. �It�s satisfying to know that the NSA considers encrypted
  368. communication from our apps to be truly opaque,� says RedPhone developer
  369. Moxie Marlinspike.
  370.  
  371. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html
  372.  
  373. � NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor ::
  374.  
  375. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-spiegel-14-1228.rar
  376. _______________________________________
  377. � Operation Socialist ; How GCHQ Spies Hacked Belgium�s Largest Telco ::
  378.  
  379. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/
  380.  
  381. � GCHQ Belgacom Telecom Hacking (ZIP) ::
  382.  
  383.  Slides show Canada�s intelligence agency, CSEC, was involved in helping
  384. GCHQ intercept Belgacom communications. It also proves 3rd party cookies
  385. are very much instrumental in being used to exploit information about IPs.
  386.  
  387. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/gchq-belgacom-intercept-14-1213.zip
  388. _______________________________________
  389. � Keith Alexander�s Anti-spy Patent Leaked ::
  390.  
  391. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-alexander-patent-14-1125.pdf
  392.  
  393. � Keith Alexander Now Works To Secure Banking Networks ::
  394.  
  395. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/ex-nsa-chief-pitches-advice-on-cyber-threats-to-the-banks.html
  396. _______________________________________
  397. � Operation AURORAGOLD: How the NSA Hacks Cellphone Networks Worldwide ::
  398.  
  399.  Codenamed AURORAGOLD, the covert operation has monitored the content of
  400. messages sent and received by more than 1,200 email accounts associated
  401. with major cellphone network operators, intercepting confidential company
  402. planning papers that help the NSA hack into phone networks.
  403.  
  404.  One high-profile surveillance target is the GSM Association, an influential
  405. UK-headquartered trade group that works closely with large US-based firms
  406. including Microsoft, Facebook, AT&T, and Cisco, and is currently being
  407. funded by the US government to develop privacy-enhancing technologies.
  408.  
  409.  Karsten Nohl, a leading cellphone security expert and cryptographer who
  410. was consulted by The Intercept about details contained in the AURORAGOLD
  411. documents, said that the broad scope of information swept up in the operation
  412. appears aimed at ensuring virtually every cellphone network in the world is
  413. NSA accessible.
  414.  
  415. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/04/nsa-auroragold-hack-cellphones/
  416.  
  417. � NSA Operation AURORAGOLD Slides ::
  418.  
  419. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-aurora-gold-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  420.  
  421. � NSA OPULANT PUP Circumventing Strong Cryptography ::
  422.  
  423.  Last year, the Washington Post reported that the NSA had already managed
  424. to break the most commonly used cellphone encryption algorithm in the world,
  425. known as A5/1. But the information collected under AURORAGOLD allows the
  426. agency to focus on circumventing newer and stronger versions of A5 cellphone
  427. encryption, such as A5/3.
  428.  
  429. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-opulant-pup-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  430. _______________________________________
  431. � Germany�s Intelligence Agency, the BND, Spies On Civilians Too ::
  432.  
  433.  German MPs examining the surveillance activities the US National
  434. Security Agency have found a legal loophole that allows the Berlin�s
  435. foreign intelligence agency to spy on its own citizens.
  436.  
  437.  The agency, known by its German acronym BND, is not usually allowed
  438. to intercept communications made by Germans or German companies, but a
  439. former BND lawyer told parliament this week that citizens working abroad
  440. for foreign companies were not protected.
  441.  
  442.  The German government confirmed on Saturday that work-related calls
  443. or emails were attributed to the employer. As a result, if the employer
  444. is foreign, the BND could legally intercept them.
  445.  
  446.  Angela Merkel pretends to be outraged about industrial espionage by
  447. the NSA while condoning illegal surveillance itself.
  448.  
  449. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/german-loophole-allows-bnd-agency-spy-own-people
  450. http://www.infowars.com/like-the-nsa-and-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-a-legal-loophole-to-spy-on-its-own-citizens/
  451. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141202/09513729296/like-nsa-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-legal-loophole-to-spy-its-own-citizens.shtml
  452. _______________________________________
  453. � How Vodafone-Subsidiary Telecom Aided GCHQ�s Spying Efforts ::
  454.  
  455.  Previously unpublished documents show how the UK telecom firm Cable
  456. & Wireless, acquired by Vodafone in 2012, played a key role in
  457. establishing one of the Government Communications Headquarters�
  458. (GCHQ) most controversial surveillance programs.
  459.  
  460.  A joint investigation by NDR, WDR, S�ddeutsche Zeitung and Channel 4
  461. based on documents leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, reveals
  462. that Cable & Wireless actively shaped and provided the most data to
  463. GCHQ mass surveillance programs, and received millions of pounds in
  464. compensation. The documents also suggest that Cable & Wireless
  465. assisted GCHQ in breaking into a competitor�s network.
  466.  
  467.  In response to these allegations, Vodafone said that an internal
  468. investigation found no evidence of unlawful conduct, but the company
  469. would not deny it happened.
  470.  
  471. http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq
  472. http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html
  473. http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html
  474. http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable
  475.  
  476. � GCHQ�s Vodafone Cable Master List ::
  477.  
  478. https://netzpolitik.org/2014/cable-master-list-wir-spiegeln-die-snowden-dokumente-ueber-angezapfte-glasfasern-auch-von-vodafone/
  479.  
  480. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ::
  481.  
  482. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-slides.pdf
  483. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-slides-14-1125.pdf
  484. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-cables-14-1125.pdf
  485.  
  486. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ZIPPED ::
  487.  
  488. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/Gerontic_GCHQ_SZ.zip
  489.  
  490. � INCENSER: How NSA and GCHQ Are Tapping Internet Cables ::
  491.  
  492. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fi/2014/11/incenser-or-how-nsa-and-gchq-are.html
  493. _______________________________________
  494. � Microsoft SkyDrive (aka OneDrive) Gateway Into NSA PRISM ::
  495.  
  496. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/ms-onedrive-nsa-prism.htm
  497.  
  498.  NOTE: Anything uploaded to �the cloud� is going to be available
  499. for the government to snoop through, the new Apple iphone gadgets
  500. automatically upload all users� personal files into �the cloud�
  501. and yes, looks like Microsoft is also doing it as well.
  502.  
  503.  You might want to avoid using these new systems, go back to using
  504. older desktop computers which are rather easy to fortify. As for
  505. phones, you can buy an old jitterbug phone - it�s a basic cellphone
  506. without all the other crap included - just plain oldschool, mofos!
  507. And add one more thing - a �Blockit Pocket.� ;)
  508. _______________________________________
  509. � German Investigation of the Cooperation Between NSA-BND Part 1 ::
  510.  
  511. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/11/german-investigation-of-cooperation.html
  512. _______________________________________
  513. � UK Lawyers Spied by GCHQ Spies ::
  514.  
  515. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/uk-lawyers-spies-intercept-14-1106.pdf
  516.  
  517. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/06/uk-surveillance-of-lawyers-journalists-gchq/
  518. _______________________________________
  519. � The German Operation Eikonal Part of NSA�s RAMPART-A Program ::
  520.  
  521.  Just over a week ago, the regional German paper S�ddeutsche Zeitung
  522. and the regional broadcasters NDR and WDR came with a story saying that
  523. between 2004 and 2008, the German foreign intelligence service BND had
  524. tapped into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX and shared the
  525. intercepted data with the NSA. As not all communications of German
  526. citizens could be filtered out, this is considered a violation of the
  527. constitution.
  528.  
  529.  Here we will give a summary of what is currently known about this BND
  530. operation and we will combine this with information from earlier reports.
  531. This will show that it was most likely part of the RAMPART-A program of
  532. the NSA, which includes similar interception efforts by foreign partner
  533. agencies. Finally, we will look at where exactly the BND interception
  534. might have taken place.
  535.  
  536. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/10/the-german-operation-eikonal-as-part-of.html
  537. ---------------------------------------
  538. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  539.  
  540. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  541. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  542. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  543. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  544.  
  545. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  546.  
  547. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  548.  
  549. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  550.  
  551. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  552.  
  553. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  554.  
  555. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  556.  
  557. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  558.  
  559. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  560.  
  561. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  562.  
  563. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  564. _______________________________________
  565. � Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
  566.  
  567.  The National Security Agency has had agents in China, Germany,
  568. and South Korea working on programs that use �physical subversion�
  569. to infiltrate and compromise networks and devices, according to
  570. documents obtained by The Intercept.
  571.  
  572.  The documents, leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, also
  573. indicate that the agency has used �under cover� operatives to gain
  574. access to sensitive data and systems in the global communications
  575. industry, and that these secret agents may have even dealt with
  576. American firms. The documents describe a range of clandestine field
  577. activities that are among the agency�s �core secrets� when it comes
  578. to computer network attacks, details of which are apparently shared
  579. with only a small number of officials outside the NSA.
  580.  
  581.  �It�s something that many people have been wondering about for a
  582. long time,� said Chris Soghoian, principal technologist for the
  583. American Civil Liberties Union, after reviewing the documents.
  584. �I�ve had conversations with executives at tech companies about
  585. this precise thing. How do you know the NSA is not sending people
  586. into your data centers?�
  587.  
  588.  Previous disclosures about the NSA�s corporate partnerships have
  589. focused largely on US companies providing the agency with vast amounts
  590. of customer data, including phone records and email traffic. But
  591. documents published today by The Intercept suggest that even as the
  592. agency uses secret operatives to penetrate them, companies have also
  593. cooperated more broadly to undermine the physical infrastructure of
  594. the internet than has been previously confirmed.
  595.  
  596.  In addition to so-called �close access� operations, the NSA�s �core
  597. secrets� include the fact that the agency works with US and foreign
  598. companies to weaken their encryption systems; the fact that the NSA
  599. spends �hundreds of millions of dollars� on technology to defeat
  600. commercial encryption; and the fact that the agency works with US
  601. and foreign companies to penetrate computer networks, possibly without
  602. the knowledge of the host countries. Many of the NSA�s core secrets
  603. concern its relationships to domestic and foreign corporations.
  604.  
  605.  Some of the documents in this article appear in a new documentary,
  606. CITIZENFOUR, which tells the story of the Snowden disclosures and is
  607. directed by Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras. The documents describe
  608. a panoply of programs classified with the rare designation of
  609. �Exceptionally Compartmented Information,� or ECI, which are only
  610. disclosed to a �very select� number of government officials.
  611.  
  612. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
  613.  
  614. � Top Secret Special Source Operations Classification Guides ::
  615.  
  616. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-whipgenie-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  617.  
  618. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-tarex-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  619.  
  620. � Operation Sentry Eagle (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  621.  
  622. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  623.  
  624. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  625.  
  626. � NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information ::
  627.  
  628. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  629.  
  630. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-pawleys-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  631.  
  632. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-compartments-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  633.  
  634. � NSA National Initiative Task Security (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  635.  
  636. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  637.  
  638. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  639.  
  640. � NSA Computer Network Exploitation ::
  641.  
  642. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-cne-declass-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  643.  
  644. � Following 10 NSA Releases (8.5MB | ZIP) ::
  645.  
  646. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-releases-the-intercept-14-1010.zip
  647. _______________________________________
  648. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides ::
  649.  
  650. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wb/binney.html
  651.  
  652. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides (ZIP) ::
  653.  
  654. Includes the report and the slides.
  655.  
  656. http://fileb.ag/i627vr7a6bkx
  657. _______________________________________
  658. � ACLU�s FOIA Documents Shed Light on One of the NSA�s Most
  659. Powerful Tools (Other Agencies and Legal Loopholes) ::
  660.  
  661. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/new-documents-shed-light-one-nsas-most-powerful-tools
  662.  
  663. � Overview of (Other) Signals Intelligence Authorities ::
  664.  
  665. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Overview%20of%20Signals%20Intelligence%20Authorities.pdf
  666.  
  667. � DoD-DIA�s 16 Legal Loopholes to Spy On US Persons ::
  668.  
  669. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/DoD%20HUMINT%20Legal%20Workshop%20Fundamentals%20of%20HUMINT%20Targeting.pdf
  670.  
  671. � Intelligence Law Handbook Defense HUMINT Service ::
  672.  
  673. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/Intelligence%20Law%20Handbook%20Defense%20HUMINT%20Service.pdf
  674. _______________________________________
  675. � NSA Spies on UN in Vienna ::
  676.  
  677. http://fm4.orf.at/stories/1746596/
  678. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28666/intelligence/nsa-spying-un-vienna.html
  679. http://www.techworm.net/2014/09/erich-mochel-leaks-photos-nsa-spying-united-nations.html
  680. ���������������������������������������
  681. � How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive,
  682. and Destroy Reputations ::
  683.  
  684. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  685.  
  686. http://www.infowars.com/cointelrpo-revisited-greenwald-exposes-nsa-agenda-to-destroy-journalists/
  687.  
  688.  One of the many pressing stories that remains to be told from the
  689. Snowden archive is how western intelligence agencies are attempting
  690. to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of
  691. deception and reputation-destruction. It�s time to tell a chunk of
  692. that story, complete with the relevant documents.
  693.  
  694.  Over the last several weeks, I worked with NBC News to publish a
  695. series of articles about �dirty trick� tactics used by GCHQ�s previously
  696. secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group). These
  697. were based on four classified GCHQ documents presented to the NSA
  698. and the other three partners in the English-speaking �Five Eyes�
  699. alliance. Today, we at the Intercept are publishing another new
  700. JTRIG document, in full, entitled �The Art of Deception: Training
  701. for Online Covert Operations.�
  702.  
  703. � GCHQ ; The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations ::
  704.  
  705. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/02/24/art-deception-training-new-generation-online-covert-operations/
  706.  
  707. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1021430/the-art-of-deception-training-for-a-new.pdf
  708. ---------------------------------------
  709. � Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  710. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  711.  
  712.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  713. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  714. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  715. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  716. �amplify� sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  717. content judged to be �extremist.� The capabilities, detailed
  718. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  719. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  720. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  721. together in a call.
  722.  
  723.  The tools were created by GCHQ�s Joint Threat Research
  724. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  725. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  726. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  727. documents have detailed JTRIG�s use of �fake victim blog
  728. posts,� �false flag operations,� �honey traps� and
  729. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  730. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  731. Facebook users.
  732.  
  733. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  734.  
  735. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  736.  
  737. � GCHQ�s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  738.  
  739. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  740. ---------------------------------------
  741. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  742.  
  743. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  744.  
  745.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  746. program run by the US Agency for International
  747. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  748. communications network� run through �secret shell
  749. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  750. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  751. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  752. �American contractors were gathering their private
  753. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  754. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  755. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  756. government. According to top-secret documents
  757. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  758. operation is frequently discussed at western
  759. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  760. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  761. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  762.  
  763. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  764.  
  765. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  766.  
  767. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  768.  
  769.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  770. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  771. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  772. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  773. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  774. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  775. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  776. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  777. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  778. Space Intelligence Center.�
  779.  
  780.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  781. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  782. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  783. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  784. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  785. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  786. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  787. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  788.  
  789.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  790. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  791. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  792. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  793. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  794. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  795. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  796. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  797. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  798.  
  799. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  800.  
  801. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  802. ---------------------------------------
  803. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  804.  
  805. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  806.  
  807. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  808.  
  809. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  810.  
  811. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  812.  
  813.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  814. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  815. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  816. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  817. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  818. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  819. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  820. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  821. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  822. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  823. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  824.  
  825.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  826. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  827. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  828. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  829. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  830. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  831.  
  832. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  833. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  834. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  835. ---------------------------------------
  836. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  837.  
  838. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  839.  
  840. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  841.  
  842. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  843.  
  844. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  845.  
  846. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  847.  
  848. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  849.  
  850. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  851.  
  852. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  853.  
  854. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  855. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  856. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  857.  
  858. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  859. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  860.  
  861. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  862. ---------------------------------------
  863. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  864.  
  865. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  866. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  867. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  868. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  869.  
  870. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  871.  
  872. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  873.  
  874. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  875.  
  876. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  877.  
  878. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  879.  
  880. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  881. ---------------------------------------
  882. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  883.  
  884. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  885. _______________________________________
  886. � Unraveling NSA�s TURBULENCE Programs ::
  887.  
  888. https://robert.sesek.com/2014/9/unraveling_nsa_s_turbulence_programs.html
  889. _______________________________________
  890. � New Zealand�s Prime Minister Isn�t Telling the Truth About
  891. Mass Surveillance ::
  892.  
  893. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  894.  
  895. � New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  896. Denying It ::
  897.  
  898. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  899.  
  900. � Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  901. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald �A Loser� ::
  902.  
  903. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  904.  
  905. � New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  906.  
  907. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  908.  
  909. � NSA Visit by New Zealand Spy PM Ferguson ::
  910.  
  911. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-nz-ferguson-visit-the-intercept-14-0915.pdf
  912.  
  913. � The Questions for New Zealand on Mass Surveillance ::
  914.  
  915. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/questions-new-zealand-mass-surveillance/
  916. _______________________________________
  917. ? NSA Spooks Deny The Evidence (Provided Below) Exists ::
  918.  
  919.  Did the NSA forget Ed Snowden contacted NBC and released
  920. the evidence contacting authorities regarding his concerns?
  921.  
  922. https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsa-has-revealed-new-details-about-its-exhaustive-search-of-edward-snowdens-emails
  923.  
  924. ? FLASHBACK! Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  925.  
  926.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  927. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  928. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  929. activity before he began leaking government documents
  930. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  931. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  932.  
  933.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  934. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  935. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  936. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  937. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  938. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  939. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  940. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  941. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  942. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  943. attention.��
  944.  
  945.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  946. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  947. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  948. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  949. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  950.  
  951. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  952.  
  953. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  954. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  955.  
  956. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  957. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  958. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  959. ---------------------------------------
  960. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  961.  
  962. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  963.  
  964. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  965. _______________________________________
  966. � NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  967.  
  968.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  969. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  970. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  971. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  972.  
  973. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  974.  
  975. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  976.  
  977. � GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  978.  
  979. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  980.  
  981. � NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  982.  
  983. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  984.  
  985. � NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  986.  
  987. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  988.  
  989. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  990. _______________________________________
  991. � NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  992.  
  993. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  994.  
  995. � Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  996.  
  997. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  998.  
  999. ? UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  1000.  
  1001. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  1002. _______________________________________
  1003. � Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  1004.  
  1005. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  1006. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  1007. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  1008.  
  1009. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  1010.  
  1011. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  1012.  
  1013. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  1014.  
  1015. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  1016.  
  1017. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  1018.  
  1019. � NSA�s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  1020.  
  1021. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  1022.  
  1023. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1024.  
  1025. � NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  1026.  
  1027. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  1028. _______________________________________
  1029. � DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  1030.  
  1031. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  1032. _______________________________________
  1033. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden�s Info
  1034.  
  1035.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  1036. documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks so far,
  1037. up to September 5th of 2014. I�m still collecting any
  1038. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  1039. archive twice per year.
  1040.  
  1041.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  1042. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  1043. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  1044. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  1045.  
  1046.  After decompression, the first folder is titled �Eyeballing_
  1047. Snowden_Info_Folder_01� and the second is titled �Eyeballing_
  1048. Snowden_Info_Folder_02� , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  1049. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  1050.  
  1051.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  1052. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  1053. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  1054.  
  1055. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  1056. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  1057.  
  1058. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  1059. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  1060. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  1061.  
  1062. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  1063. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  1064.  
  1065. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  1066. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  1067. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  1068. ���������������������������������������
  1069. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  1070.  
  1071. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1072.  
  1073. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1074.  
  1075. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  1076.  
  1077. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  1078. _______________________________________
  1079. � NSA�s Foreign Partnerships ::
  1080.  
  1081. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  1082. _______________________________________
  1083. � Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  1084.  
  1085. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  1086.  
  1087. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  1088.  
  1089. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  1090.  
  1091. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  1092. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  1093. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  1094. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  1095. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  1096. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  1097. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  1098. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  1099. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  1100. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  1101. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  1102. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  1103. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  1104.  
  1105. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  1106.  
  1107. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  1108. _______________________________________
  1109. � How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  1110.  
  1111. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  1112.  
  1113. � NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  1114.  
  1115. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  1116. _______________________________________
  1117. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  1118.  
  1119. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  1120.  
  1121. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  1122.  
  1123. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  1124.  
  1125. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  1126.  
  1127. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  1128. _______________________________________
  1129. � Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  1130.  
  1131. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  1132.  
  1133. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  1134.  
  1135. � Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  1136.  
  1137. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  1138.  
  1139. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  1140. _______________________________________
  1141. � Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the �Now-Discontinued� (?)
  1142. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  1143. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  1144.  
  1145. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1146. _______________________________________
  1147. � GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  1148.  
  1149. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  1150.  
  1151. � Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  1152.  
  1153. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  1154. _______________________________________
  1155. � Barack Obama�s Secret �Terrorist-Tracking� System ::
  1156.  
  1157.  Nearly half of the people on the US government�s widely shared
  1158. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  1159. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  1160. obtained by The Intercept.
  1161.  
  1162. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  1163.  
  1164. � NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  1165.  
  1166. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  1167.  
  1168. � Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  1169.  
  1170.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  1171. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  1172. secret process that requires neither �concrete facts� nor
  1173. �irrefutable evidence� to designate an American or foreigner
  1174. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  1175. by The Intercept.
  1176.  
  1177. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  1178. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  1179. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  1180. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  1181. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  1182.  
  1183. NOBODY notes
  1184.  
  1185.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  1186. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  1187. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  1188. only these �dirty tricks� are now fully digitalized.
  1189.  
  1190. � Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  1191.  
  1192.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  1193. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  1194. and his approach to dissent. �Before I left the State
  1195. Department, I filed a complaint with the department�s
  1196. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  1197. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  1198. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  1199. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,�
  1200. Tye explained. �I have also brought my complaint to the
  1201. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  1202. inspector general of the NSA.�
  1203.  
  1204.  These steps � which many say Snowden should�ve taken �
  1205. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  1206. wouldn�t be garnering attention at all if not for
  1207. Snowden�s leaks.
  1208.  
  1209. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  1210.  
  1211. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  1212. _______________________________________
  1213. � Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  1214. Israeli Attack ::
  1215.  
  1216.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  1217. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  1218. crucial role in Israel�s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  1219. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  1220. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  1221. enable Israel�s military assaults � such as the one on Gaza.
  1222.  
  1223. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  1224.  
  1225. � ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  1226.  
  1227. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  1228.  
  1229. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  1230.  
  1231. � US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  1232.  
  1233. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  1234.  
  1235. � (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  1236.  
  1237. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  1238. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  1239. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  1240.  
  1241. � (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  1242.  
  1243. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  1244. _______________________________________
  1245. � USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  1246.  
  1247. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  1248.  
  1249. � NSA�s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia�s Brutal State Police ::
  1250.  
  1251.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  1252. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  1253. one of the world�s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  1254. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  1255. Snowden details the agency�s plans �to provide direct analytic and
  1256. technical support� to the Saudis on �internal security� matters.
  1257.  
  1258.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior�referred to in the document as MOI
  1259. � has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  1260. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  1261. that �Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  1262. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,� specifically
  1263. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly �poured an
  1264. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat� of one human rights
  1265. activist. The report also notes the MOI�s use of invasive surveillance
  1266. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  1267.  
  1268.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  1269. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  1270. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  1271. Administration�s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  1272. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes �a
  1273. period of rejuvenation� for the NSA�s relationship with the Saudi
  1274. Ministry of Defense.
  1275.  
  1276.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  1277. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  1278. where the US �has [an] interest in regime continuity.�
  1279.  
  1280. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  1281. _______________________________________
  1282. � Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  1283.  
  1284. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  1285. _______________________________________
  1286. � NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  1287.  
  1288. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  1289.  
  1290. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  1291. _______________________________________
  1292. � Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  1293.  
  1294.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  1295. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  1296. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  1297.  
  1298. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  1299.  
  1300. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  1301. _______________________________________
  1302. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1303.  
  1304.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1305. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1306. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1307. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1308. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1309. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1310. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1311.  
  1312. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1313.  
  1314. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1315.  
  1316. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1317. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1318. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1319.  
  1320. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1321.  
  1322. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1323.  
  1324. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1325.  
  1326.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1327. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1328.  
  1329. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1330.  
  1331. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1332.  
  1333. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1334.  
  1335. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1336.  
  1337.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1338. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1339. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1340. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1341.  
  1342. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1343.  
  1344. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1345.  
  1346. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1347.  
  1348. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1349.  
  1350. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1351.  
  1352. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  1353.  
  1354. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  1355.  
  1356. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1357.  
  1358. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1359.  
  1360. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1361.  
  1362. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1363.  
  1364. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1365.  
  1366. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1367.  
  1368. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1369. _______________________________________
  1370. � NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  1371.  
  1372. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  1373.  
  1374. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  1375. _______________________________________
  1376. � The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  1377. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  1378.  
  1379.  The contents of the surveillance files � almost half of which
  1380. contained information from US citizens or residents � �tell
  1381. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  1382. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  1383. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.�
  1384.  
  1385. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  1386. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  1387. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  1388.  
  1389. � Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  1390. Been Spying On ::
  1391.  
  1392.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  1393. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans�including
  1394. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  1395. academics, and lawyers�under secretive procedures intended
  1396. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  1397.  
  1398.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  1399. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  1400. own government includes:
  1401.  
  1402.  � Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  1403. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  1404. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  1405. Security under President George W. Bush;
  1406.  
  1407.  � Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  1408. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  1409.  
  1410.  � Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  1411. international relations at Rutgers University;
  1412.  
  1413.  � Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  1414. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  1415. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  1416.  
  1417.  � Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  1418. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  1419. rights organization in the country.
  1420.  
  1421. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  1422. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  1423. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  1424.  
  1425. � NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  1426.  
  1427. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  1428.  
  1429. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  1430.  
  1431. � Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  1432.  
  1433. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  1434.  
  1435. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  1436.  
  1437. ? NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  1438.                               ���������
  1439.  �The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  1440. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  1441. crime to law enforcement authorities.�
  1442.  
  1443. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  1444.  
  1445. ? US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  1446.  
  1447. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  1448.  
  1449. NOBODY responds
  1450.  
  1451.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  1452. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  1453. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  1454.  
  1455. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  1456.  
  1457.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  1458. back in 2004 up till today.
  1459.  
  1460. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  1461.  
  1462.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  1463. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  1464.  
  1465. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  1466.  
  1467.  Just like those in the �Department of Justice� they
  1468. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  1469. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  1470. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  1471.  
  1472. � Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  1473.  
  1474. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  1475.  
  1476.  �So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  1477. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  1478. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  1479. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  1480.  
  1481.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  1482. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  1483. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  1484. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  1485. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  1486. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  1487. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  1488. first place.  Realistically, it�s not one or the other, it�s
  1489. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  1490. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  1491. On one hand: it�s evidence, on the other, it�s private information
  1492. on many thousands of people.
  1493.  
  1494.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  1495. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  1496. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  1497. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  1498. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  1499. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  1500. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  1501. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  1502. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  1503. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  1504. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  1505. happen now. The US government�s dealings with brutal regimes
  1506. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  1507. their own people.
  1508.  
  1509.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  1510. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  1511. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  1512. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  1513. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  1514. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  1515. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  1516. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  1517. the Post�s story as a dud, it�s the first page of the next
  1518. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  1519. unpredictable consequences.�
  1520.  
  1521. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  1522. _______________________________________
  1523. � Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  1524.  
  1525. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  1526. ���������������������������������������
  1527. � Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  1528.  
  1529.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  1530. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  1531. Binney � that�s a �totalitarian mentality.�
  1532.  
  1533. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  1534. _______________________________________
  1535. � NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  1536.  
  1537. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  1538.  
  1539.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  1540. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  1541. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  1542. Aussp�hprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  1543.  
  1544.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  1545. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  1546. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  1547. investigate.
  1548.  
  1549.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  1550. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  1551. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  1552. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  1553. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  1554. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  1555.  
  1556. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  1557.  
  1558. MP4 Video Format � http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  1559.  
  1560. � XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  1561.  
  1562. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  1563.  
  1564. � NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  1565.  
  1566. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  1567. ---------------------------------------
  1568. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1569.  
  1570. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1571.  
  1572. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  1573.  
  1574.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  1575. using Tor.�
  1576.  
  1577. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  1578.  
  1579. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  1580.  
  1581. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  1582.  
  1583.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t mean that your
  1584. browser isn�t storing cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman,
  1585. a colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes in browser
  1586. vulnerabilities.
  1587.  
  1588.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  1589. aware of Tor�s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  1590. wide surveillance.
  1591.  
  1592.  �The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  1593. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  1594. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  1595. other Web users,� he wrote.
  1596.  
  1597.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  1598. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  1599. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,�
  1600. he said.
  1601.  
  1602. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  1603.  
  1604. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  1605. Traffic From Machines ::
  1606.  
  1607.  �Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  1608. out large-scale �staining� as a means to identify individual
  1609. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  1610.  
  1611.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  1612. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  1613. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  1614. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  1615. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  1616. session.�
  1617.  
  1618. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  1619.  
  1620. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  1621.  
  1622. � Packet Staining ::
  1623.  
  1624. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  1625. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  1626. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  1627. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  1628.  
  1629. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  1630.  
  1631. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  1632. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  1633. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  1634. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  1635.  
  1636. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  1637.  
  1638.  �We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  1639. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  1640. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  1641. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  1642. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  1643. which allows the user finer control.� ... ...
  1644.  
  1645.  �This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  1646. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  1647. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  1648. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  1649. server can be used to hide one�s location, but a single-hop
  1650. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  1651. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  1652. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  1653. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  1654. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  1655. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  1656. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  1657. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  1658. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  1659. order to trace requests back to the originating client.�
  1660.  
  1661. ... ...
  1662.  
  1663.  �In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  1664. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  1665. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  1666. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  1667. of Tor.�
  1668.  
  1669. ... ...
  1670.  
  1671.  �We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  1672. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  1673. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  1674. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  1675. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  1676. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  1677. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  1678. be tried.�
  1679.  
  1680. ... ...
  1681.  
  1682.  �It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  1683. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  1684. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  1685. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  1686. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  1687. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  1688. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  1689. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  1690. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  1691. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  1692. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  1693. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  1694. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  1695. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  1696. who inspecting the directories.�
  1697.  
  1698. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  1699. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  1700. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  1701.  
  1702. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  1703.  
  1704. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  1705.  
  1706. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  1707.  
  1708. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  1709.  
  1710. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  1711.  
  1712.  �This document doesn�t give much insight into capabilities
  1713. the IC has developed against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  1714. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  1715. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  1716. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  1717. investment. I�d expect there are other programs with more
  1718. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  1719.  
  1720. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  1721. _______________________________________
  1722. � UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  1723.  
  1724. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  1725.  
  1726. � UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  1727. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  1728.  
  1729.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  1730. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany�s
  1731. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  1732. as a double agent for the US.
  1733.  
  1734.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  1735. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  1736. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country�s
  1737. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  1738. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  1739.  
  1740.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  1741. week�s arrest of a 31-year-old BND �double agent� who spent
  1742. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  1743. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  1744. of �10,000 (�7,940) per document. ...
  1745.  
  1746.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin�s
  1747. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  1748. in �co-operation�. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  1749. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  1750. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  1751.  
  1752.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  1753. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin�s Russian
  1754. embassy. The Germans had considered it �impossible� that one
  1755. of their own intelligence men could be working as a �double agent�
  1756. for the Americans.
  1757.  
  1758. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1759. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1760. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1761. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1762.  
  1763. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1764.  
  1765. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1766.  
  1767. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1768.  
  1769. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1770.  
  1771. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1772.  
  1773. � Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1774.  
  1775. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1776.  
  1777. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1778.  
  1779. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1780.  
  1781. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1782.  
  1783. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1784.  
  1785. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1786.  
  1787. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1788.  
  1789. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1790.  
  1791. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1792.  
  1793. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1794.  
  1795. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1796.  
  1797. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  1798.  
  1799.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  1800. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  1801. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  1802. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  1803. where she grew up.
  1804.  
  1805. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1806. _______________________________________
  1807. � NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  1808.  
  1809. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  1810. _______________________________________
  1811. � Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  1812.  
  1813. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  1814. _______________________________________
  1815. � Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  1816.  
  1817. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  1818. _______________________________________
  1819. � NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  1820.  
  1821. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  1822. _______________________________________
  1823. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  1824.  
  1825. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  1826. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  1827. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  1828. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  1829.  
  1830. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  1831.  
  1832. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  1833.  
  1834. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  1835.  
  1836. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  1837.  
  1838. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1839.  
  1840. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  1841.  
  1842. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  1843.  
  1844. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  1845.  
  1846. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1847.  
  1848. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  1849. _______________________________________
  1850.  Keith Alexander�s talking points for strategic meeting
  1851. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  1852. Service (DDIS).
  1853.  
  1854. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  1855. _______________________________________
  1856. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1857.  
  1858. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  1859.  
  1860. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1861.  
  1862. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  1863. _______________________________________
  1864. � Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  1865.  
  1866. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  1867. _______________________________________
  1868. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  1869. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  1870.  
  1871. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  1872. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  1873. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  1874.  
  1875.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  1876. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  1877. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  1878. user in the UK.
  1879.  
  1880. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  1881.  
  1882. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  1883. _______________________________________
  1884. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  1885. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  1886.  
  1887. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  1888. ---------------------------------------
  1889. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1890.  
  1891. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1892. _______________________________________
  1893. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  1894.  
  1895. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  1896. _______________________________________
  1897. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  1898.  
  1899. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  1900.  
  1901. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  1902. _______________________________________
  1903. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  1904. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  1905.  
  1906. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  1907. _______________________________________
  1908. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  1909.  
  1910. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  1911.  
  1912. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  1913.  
  1914. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  1915. _______________________________________
  1916. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  1917. to Tap Phones ::
  1918.  
  1919. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  1920. _______________________________________
  1921. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  1922.  
  1923. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  1924. _______________________________________
  1925. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  1926. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  1927. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  1928.  
  1929.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  1930. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  1931. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  1932. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  1933. they were spying on � was hidden?
  1934.  
  1935.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  1936. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  1937. everybody what they�re doing?
  1938.  
  1939.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  1940. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  1941. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  1942. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  1943. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  1944. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  1945. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  1946. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  1947. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  1948.  
  1949.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  1950. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  1951. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  1952. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  1953. was a specialist in, by the way.
  1954.  
  1955.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  1956. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  1957. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  1958. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  1959. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  1960. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  1961.  
  1962.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  1963. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  1964. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  1965. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  1966. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  1967. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  1968. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  1969. for the JWICS.
  1970.  
  1971.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  1972. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  1973. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  1974. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  1975. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  1976. that [clearance].
  1977.  
  1978.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  1979. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  1980. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  1981. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  1982.  
  1983.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  1984. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  1985. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  1986. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  1987. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  1988. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  1989. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1990. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1991.  
  1992.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  1993. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  1994. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  1995.  
  1996.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1997. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  1998. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  1999. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  2000. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  2001.  
  2002.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  2003. to placate the American people.
  2004.  
  2005.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  2006. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  2007. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  2008.  
  2009.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  2010. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  2011. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  2012. investigation.�
  2013.  
  2014. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  2015. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  2016. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  2017. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  2018. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  2019. _______________________________________
  2020. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  2021.  
  2022. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  2023.  
  2024. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  2025.  
  2026. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  2027.  
  2028. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  2029.  
  2030. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  2031.  
  2032. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  2033.  
  2034. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  2035.  
  2036. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  2037.  
  2038. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  2039.  
  2040. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  2041.  
  2042. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  2043.  
  2044. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  2045.  
  2046. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  2047. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  2048.  
  2049. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  2050.  
  2051. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  2052. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  2053.  
  2054. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  2055.  
  2056. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  2057. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  2058.  
  2059. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  2060. _______________________________________
  2061. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  2062.  
  2063.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  2064. agencies are now also using the same facial
  2065. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  2066. identification systems are being developed as well.
  2067. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  2068.  
  2069. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  2070.  
  2071. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  2072.  
  2073. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  2074.  
  2075. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  2076. _______________________________________
  2077. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  2078.  
  2079. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  2080. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  2081. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  2082. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  2083. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  2084. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  2085. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  2086. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  2087. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  2088. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  2089.  
  2090. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  2091.  
  2092. And a few more to think about,
  2093.  
  2094. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  2095. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  2096. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  2097. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  2098. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  2099. _______________________________________
  2100. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  2101.  
  2102.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  2103. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  2104. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  2105. activity before he began leaking government documents
  2106. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  2107. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  2108.  
  2109.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  2110. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  2111. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  2112. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  2113. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  2114. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  2115. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  2116. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  2117. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  2118. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  2119. attention.��
  2120.  
  2121.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  2122. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  2123. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  2124. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  2125. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  2126.  
  2127. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  2128.  
  2129. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  2130. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  2131.  
  2132. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  2133. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  2134. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  2135. ---------------------------------------
  2136. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  2137.  
  2138. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  2139.  
  2140. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  2141. _______________________________________
  2142. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  2143.  
  2144. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  2145.  
  2146. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  2147.  
  2148. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  2149. _______________________________________
  2150. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  2151. Securely and Anonymously ::
  2152.  
  2153.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  2154. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  2155. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  2156. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  2157. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  2158. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  2159. internet somewhere or using a third party
  2160. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  2161. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  2162. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  2163. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  2164. download the file from you.
  2165.  
  2166. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  2167. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  2168.  
  2169. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  2170.  
  2171. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  2172.  
  2173. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  2174.  
  2175. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  2176. _______________________________________
  2177. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  2178. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  2179.  
  2180. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  2181.  
  2182. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  2183.  
  2184. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  2185. _______________________________________
  2186. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  2187.  
  2188. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  2189.  
  2190. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  2191.  
  2192. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  2193.  
  2194. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  2195.  
  2196. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  2197.  
  2198. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  2199.  
  2200. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  2201.  
  2202. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  2203. Online Next Week ::
  2204.  
  2205. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  2206. ---------------------------------------
  2207. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  2208.  
  2209. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  2210.  
  2211. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  2212.  
  2213. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  2214. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  2215.  
  2216. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  2217. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  2218.  
  2219. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  2220.  
  2221. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  2222. Infiltration by NSA ::
  2223.  
  2224. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  2225.  
  2226. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  2227.  
  2228. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  2229.  
  2230.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  2231. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  2232. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  2233. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  2234. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  2235. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  2236. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  2237. they�re delivered.
  2238.  
  2239. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  2240.  
  2241. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  2242.  
  2243. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  2244.  
  2245. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  2246.  
  2247. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  2248.  
  2249. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  2250. ______________________________________
  2251. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  2252. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  2253.  
  2254. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  2255. _______________________________________
  2256. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  2257. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  2258.  
  2259. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  2260. _______________________________________
  2261. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  2262.  
  2263. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  2264. _______________________________________
  2265. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  2266.  
  2267. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  2268.  
  2269. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  2270.  
  2271. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  2272. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  2273.  
  2274.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  2275. national security and other government officials will no
  2276. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  2277. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  2278.  
  2279. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  2280. _______________________________________
  2281. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  2282.  
  2283. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  2284.  
  2285. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  2286. ______________________________________
  2287. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  2288.  
  2289. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  2290. ______________________________________
  2291. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  2292. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  2293.  
  2294. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  2295. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  2296.  
  2297. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  2298.  
  2299. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  2300. ______________________________________
  2301. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  2302.  
  2303. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  2304.  
  2305. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  2306.  
  2307. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  2308.  
  2309. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  2310.  
  2311.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  2312. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  2313. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  2314. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  2315. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  2316. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  2317. industry which generates something in the
  2318. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  2319.  
  2320.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  2321.  
  2322. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  2323. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  2324. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  2325. _______________________________________
  2326. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  2327.  
  2328. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  2329. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  2330.  
  2331.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  2332. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  2333. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  2334. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  2335. activities and future plans.� � �
  2336.  
  2337.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  2338. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  2339. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  2340.  
  2341. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  2342.  
  2343. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  2344.  
  2345. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  2346.  
  2347. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  2348.  
  2349. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  2350.  
  2351. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  2352. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  2353.  
  2354.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  2355. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  2356. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  2357. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  2358. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  2359. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  2360. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  2361. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  2362.  
  2363.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  2364. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  2365. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  2366. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  2367. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  2368. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  2369. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  2370.  
  2371. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  2372. _______________________________________
  2373. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  2374.  
  2375. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  2376. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  2377. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  2378.  
  2379.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  2380. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  2381. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  2382. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  2383. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  2384. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  2385. Edward Snowden.
  2386.  
  2387.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  2388. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  2389. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  2390. for surveillance.
  2391.  
  2392.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  2393. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  2394. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  2395. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  2396. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  2397.  
  2398.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  2399. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  2400. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  2401. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  2402.  
  2403.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  2404. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  2405. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  2406. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  2407. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  2408. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  2409. and long-term storage.
  2410.  
  2411. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  2412.  
  2413. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  2414.  
  2415.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  2416. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  2417. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  2418. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  2419. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  2420. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  2421. but they won�t say.
  2422.  
  2423. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  2424.  
  2425. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  2426.  
  2427. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  2428.  
  2429. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  2430. _______________________________________
  2431. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  2432.  
  2433.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  2434. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  2435. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  2436. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  2437. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  2438. already been published previously. The second was
  2439. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  2440.  
  2441. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  2442.  
  2443. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  2444.  
  2445.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  2446. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  2447. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  2448. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  2449. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  2450. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  2451. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  2452. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  2453. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  2454.  
  2455.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  2456. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  2457.  
  2458.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  2459. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  2460. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  2461. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  2462. benefit� the document says.
  2463.  
  2464.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  2465. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  2466. company is working towards creating a so-called
  2467. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  2468. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  2469. per second.
  2470.  
  2471. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  2472. _______________________________________
  2473. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  2474.  
  2475. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  2476. _______________________________________
  2477. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  2478.  
  2479. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  2480. _______________________________________
  2481. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  2482.  
  2483. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  2484. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  2485. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  2486. _______________________________________
  2487. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  2488.  
  2489.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  2490. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  2491. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  2492. top human rights body.
  2493.  
  2494.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  2495. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  2496. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  2497. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  2498. Human Rights Watch.
  2499.  
  2500. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  2501.  
  2502. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  2503. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  2504.  
  2505. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  2506. _______________________________________
  2507. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  2508.  
  2509.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  2510. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  2511. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  2512.  
  2513.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  2514. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  2515. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  2516. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  2517. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  2518. high as two years. ... ...
  2519.  
  2520.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  2521. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  2522. by domestic courts.
  2523.  
  2524. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  2525. _______________________________________
  2526. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  2527.  
  2528. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  2529. _______________________________________
  2530. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  2531.  
  2532.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  2533. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  2534. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  2535. to create national-only electronic networks could
  2536. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  2537. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  2538. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  2539. the USTR said in its annual report.
  2540.  
  2541. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  2542. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  2543. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  2544. ���������������������������������������
  2545. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  2546.  
  2547. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  2548.  
  2549. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  2550.  
  2551. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2552. _______________________________________
  2553. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  2554.  
  2555.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  2556. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  2557. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  2558. any information that comes out and will provide an
  2559. updated archive from time to time.
  2560.  
  2561.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  2562. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  2563. 927MB decompressed.
  2564.  
  2565.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  2566. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  2567. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  2568.  
  2569. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2570. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  2571.  
  2572. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  2573. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2574. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  2575. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2576. _______________________________________
  2577. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  2578.  
  2579. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  2580. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  2581. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  2582. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  2583. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  2584. _______________________________________
  2585. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  2586.  
  2587. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  2588.  
  2589. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  2590.  
  2591. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  2592.  
  2593. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  2594.  
  2595. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  2596. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  2597. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  2598. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  2599.  
  2600. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  2601. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  2602.  
  2603. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  2604. _______________________________________
  2605. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  2606.  
  2607. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  2608.  
  2609. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  2610.  
  2611. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  2612.  
  2613. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  2614.  
  2615. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  2616.  
  2617. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  2618.  
  2619. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  2620. _______________________________________
  2621. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  2622.  
  2623.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  2624. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  2625. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  2626. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  2627. public as possible� as well helping the public
  2628. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  2629. how we�re protecting national security.�
  2630.  
  2631. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  2632. ���������������������������������������
  2633. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  2634.  
  2635. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  2636.  
  2637. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  2638.  
  2639. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  2640.  
  2641. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  2642.  
  2643. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  2644.  
  2645. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  2646.  
  2647. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  2648.  
  2649.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  2650. offensive against China, with targets including the
  2651. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  2652. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  2653. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  2654. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  2655. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  2656. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  2657. well as telecommunications companies.
  2658.  
  2659.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  2660. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  2661. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  2662. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  2663. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  2664. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  2665. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  2666. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  2667. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  2668. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  2669. battle for data supremacy.
  2670.  
  2671.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  2672. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  2673. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  2674. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  2675. among other things.
  2676.  
  2677. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  2678. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  2679. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  2680. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  2681.  
  2682. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  2683.  
  2684.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  2685. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  2686. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  2687. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  2688. has lodged representations with the American side on
  2689. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  2690. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  2691.  
  2692. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  2693. _______________________________________
  2694. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  2695.  
  2696.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  2697. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  2698. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  2699. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  2700. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  2701. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  2702. routers, the devices that connect computer
  2703. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  2704. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  2705. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  2706. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  2707. that flow over their networks.
  2708.  
  2709.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  2710. aspired to create a database that would function
  2711. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  2712. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  2713. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  2714. activity � they are targeted only because they
  2715. control access to networks the agency wants to
  2716. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  2717. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  2718. of the posts says.
  2719.  
  2720.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  2721. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  2722. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  2723. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  2724. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  2725. poses with amusing captions.�
  2726.  
  2727. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  2728. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  2729. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  2730. _______________________________________
  2731. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  2732.  
  2733. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  2734. _______________________________________
  2735. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  2736.  
  2737. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  2738.  
  2739. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  2740.  
  2741. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  2742.  
  2743. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  2744.  
  2745. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  2746.  
  2747. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  2748. _______________________________________
  2749. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  2750.  
  2751. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  2752. _______________________________________
  2753. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  2754.  
  2755. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  2756.  
  2757. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2758. _______________________________________
  2759. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2760.  
  2761. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2762. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2763. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2764. _______________________________________
  2765. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2766.  
  2767. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2768.  
  2769. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2770. _______________________________________
  2771. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2772.  
  2773. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2774. _______________________________________
  2775. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2776.  
  2777. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2778.  
  2779. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2780.  
  2781. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2782. _______________________________________
  2783. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2784.  
  2785. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2786. _______________________________________
  2787. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2788.  
  2789. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2790.  
  2791. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2792.  
  2793. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2794.  
  2795. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2796.  
  2797. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  2798. _______________________________________
  2799. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  2800.  
  2801. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  2802.  
  2803. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  2804.  
  2805. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  2806. _______________________________________
  2807. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  2808.  
  2809. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  2810. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  2811. _______________________________________
  2812. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  2813. With Malware ::
  2814.  
  2815.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  2816. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  2817. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  2818. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  2819. level of human oversight in the process.
  2820.  
  2821.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  2822. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  2823. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  2824. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  2825. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  2826. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  2827. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  2828. Internet and phone networks.
  2829.  
  2830. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  2831. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  2832. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  2833. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  2834. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  2835. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  2836. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  2837. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  2838. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  2839.  
  2840.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  2841. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  2842. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  2843. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  2844. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  2845. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  2846.  
  2847.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  2848. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  2849. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  2850. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  2851. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  2852. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  2853. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  2854. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  2855. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  2856. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  2857. instead of individually.�
  2858.  
  2859. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  2860.  
  2861. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  2862.  
  2863.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  2864. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  2865. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  2866. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  2867. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  2868. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  2869. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  2870. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  2871. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  2872. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  2873. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  2874. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  2875. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  2876. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  2877. execute endpoint operations.�
  2878.  
  2879. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2880.  
  2881.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  2882. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  2883. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  2884. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  2885.  
  2886.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  2887. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  2888. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  2889. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  2890. looks suspicious.
  2891.  
  2892.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  2893. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  2894. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  2895. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  2896. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  2897.  
  2898.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  2899. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  2900. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  2901. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  2902. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  2903. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  2904. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  2905.  
  2906.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  2907. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  2908. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  2909. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  2910. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  2911. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  2912. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  2913. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  2914. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  2915. in action.
  2916.  
  2917. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  2918. Computers for Surveillance ::
  2919.  
  2920. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  2921.  
  2922. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  2923.  
  2924. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  2925.  
  2926.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  2927. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  2928. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  2929. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  2930. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  2931. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  2932.  
  2933. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  2934.  
  2935. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  2936. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  2937. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  2938. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  2939. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2940. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  2941. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  2942. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  2943. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  2944. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  2945.  
  2946. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  2947.  
  2948. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  2949.  
  2950. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  2951.  
  2952. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  2953. _______________________________________
  2954. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  2955.  
  2956. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  2957. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  2958. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  2959. _______________________________________
  2960. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  2961.  
  2962. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  2963. _______________________________________
  2964. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  2965.  
  2966.  Alliances between security services are usually
  2967. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  2968. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  2969. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  2970. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  2971. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  2972. internet traffic.
  2973.  
  2974.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  2975. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  2976. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  2977. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  2978. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  2979.  
  2980.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  2981. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  2982. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  2983. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  2984. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  2985. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  2986.  
  2987.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2988. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2989. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2990. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2991. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2992. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2993. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2994.  
  2995. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2996.  
  2997. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2998. _______________________________________
  2999. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  3000.  
  3001. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  3002.  
  3003. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  3004. ---------------------------------------
  3005. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  3006.  
  3007. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  3008.  
  3009. � NSA Spies Too ::
  3010.  
  3011. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  3012. _______________________________________
  3013. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  3014.  
  3015. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  3016.  
  3017. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  3018.  
  3019.  The documents show that images were collected
  3020. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  3021. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  3022. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  3023. programs.
  3024.  
  3025. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  3026. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  3027. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  3028. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  3029.  
  3030. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  3031.  
  3032. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  3033. _______________________________________
  3034. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  3035.  
  3036. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  3037. _______________________________________
  3038. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  3039.  
  3040. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  3041.  
  3042. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  3043. _______________________________________
  3044. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  3045. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  3046.  
  3047. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  3048.  
  3049. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  3050. _______________________________________
  3051. � NSA Observer ::
  3052.  
  3053. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  3054. _______________________________________
  3055. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  3056.  
  3057. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  3058.  
  3059. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  3060. _______________________________________
  3061. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  3062.  
  3063. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  3064.  
  3065. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  3066. _______________________________________
  3067. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  3068.  
  3069. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  3070.  
  3071. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  3072.  
  3073. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  3074.  
  3075. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  3076. _______________________________________
  3077. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  3078.  
  3079.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  3080. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  3081. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  3082. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  3083. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  3084. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  3085. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  3086. targets without confirming their veracity on
  3087. the ground.
  3088.  
  3089. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  3090. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  3091. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  3092. _______________________________________
  3093. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  3094.  
  3095.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  3096. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  3097. shows that an American law firm was
  3098. monitored while representing a foreign
  3099. government in trade disputes with the
  3100. United States. The disclosure offers a
  3101. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  3102. which Americans were ensnared by the
  3103. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  3104. interest because lawyers in the United
  3105. States with clients overseas have
  3106. expressed growing concern that their
  3107. confidential communications could be
  3108. compromised by such surveillance.
  3109.  
  3110. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  3111. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  3112. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  3113.  
  3114. NOBODY comments
  3115.  
  3116. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  3117.  
  3118.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  3119. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  3120. be declassified for research in public domain.
  3121. _______________________________________
  3122. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  3123.  
  3124. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  3125.  
  3126. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  3127.  
  3128. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  3129. _______________________________________
  3130. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  3131.  
  3132. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  3133. _______________________________________
  3134. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  3135. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  3136.  
  3137.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  3138. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  3139. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  3140. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  3141. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  3142.  
  3143. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  3144. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  3145. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  3146.  
  3147. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  3148. the German Chancellor ::
  3149.  
  3150. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  3151. _______________________________________
  3152. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  3153. Phone Call Spying ::
  3154.  
  3155. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  3156.  
  3157. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  3158. _______________________________________
  3159. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  3160.  
  3161. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  3162. _______________________________________
  3163. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  3164.  
  3165. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  3166. _______________________________________
  3167.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  3168. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  3169. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  3170. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  3171. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  3172. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  3173.  
  3174. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  3175. ���������������������������������������
  3176. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  3177.  
  3178. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  3179.  
  3180. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  3181.  
  3182. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  3183.  
  3184. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  3185.  
  3186. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  3187.  
  3188.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  3189. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  3190. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  3191. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  3192. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  3193. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  3194. left the terminal.
  3195.  
  3196.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  3197. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  3198. clandestine operation by the Communications
  3199. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  3200. certainly illegal. ... ...
  3201.  
  3202.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  3203. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  3204. software program CSEC was developing with help
  3205. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  3206.  
  3207.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  3208. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  3209. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  3210. into other cities/regions.�
  3211.  
  3212. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  3213.  
  3214.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  3215. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  3216.  
  3217. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  3218.  
  3219. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  3220.  
  3221. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  3222.  
  3223. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  3224.  
  3225. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  3226. _______________________________________
  3227. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  3228.  
  3229. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  3230.  
  3231. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  3232.  
  3233. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  3234. _______________________________________
  3235. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  3236.  
  3237.  Documents taken from the National Security
  3238. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  3239. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  3240. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  3241. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  3242. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  3243. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  3244. information, for analysis. At the time the
  3245. documents were printed, they were also able to
  3246. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  3247.  
  3248.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  3249. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  3250. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  3251. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  3252. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  3253. visits. The monitoring program is called
  3254. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  3255.  
  3256.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  3257. British had to have been either physically able
  3258. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  3259. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  3260. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  3261. and would be able to extract some key data
  3262. about specific users as well.
  3263.  
  3264. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  3265. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  3266. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  3267. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  3268. _______________________________________
  3269. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  3270.  
  3271. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  3272. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  3273. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  3274.  
  3275. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  3276.  
  3277.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  3278. on the iPhone alone.�
  3279.  
  3280. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  3281.  
  3282. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  3283.  
  3284. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  3285.  
  3286. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  3287. _______________________________________
  3288. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  3289.  
  3290.  The National Security Agency program that
  3291. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  3292. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  3293. Thursday in a newly released report.
  3294.  
  3295. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  3296.  
  3297.  �We have not identified a single instance
  3298. involving a threat to the United States in
  3299. which the program made a concrete difference
  3300. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  3301. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  3302. report released Thursday.
  3303.  
  3304.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  3305. domestic spying will continue.
  3306.  
  3307. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  3308. _______________________________________
  3309. � Snowden Speaks ::
  3310.  
  3311. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  3312. _______________________________________
  3313. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  3314.  
  3315. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  3316.  
  3317. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  3318.          ���
  3319. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  3320.  
  3321. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  3322.  
  3323.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  3324. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  3325. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  3326. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  3327. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  3328. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  3329. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  3330. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  3331. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  3332. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  3333. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  3334. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  3335. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  3336. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  3337. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  3338.  
  3339. Reform?
  3340.  
  3341.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  3342. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  3343. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  3344. whether legal or not?
  3345.  
  3346. The reform will come from people taking action.
  3347.  
  3348.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  3349. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  3350. _______________________________________
  3351. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  3352.  
  3353. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  3354. _______________________________________
  3355. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  3356.  
  3357.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  3358. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  3359. main internet cables:
  3360.  
  3361.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  3362.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  3363.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  3364.  
  3365. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  3366. ---------------------------------------
  3367. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  3368. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  3369. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  3370. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  3371. _______________________________________
  3372. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  3373.  
  3374. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  3375.  
  3376. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  3377.  
  3378. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  3379. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  3380. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  3381. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  3382. ---------------------------------------
  3383. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  3384. _______________________________________
  3385. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  3386.  
  3387. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  3388.  
  3389. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  3390.  
  3391. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  3392.  
  3393.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  3394. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  3395. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  3396. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  3397.  
  3398.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  3399. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  3400. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  3401. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  3402.  
  3403.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  3404. text message database to extract information
  3405. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  3406. transactions and more � including of individuals
  3407. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  3408.  
  3409. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  3410. _______________________________________
  3411. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  3412.  
  3413. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  3414.  
  3415. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  3416.  
  3417.  The technology, which the agency has used
  3418. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  3419. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  3420. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  3421. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  3422. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  3423. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  3424. set up miles away from the target.
  3425.  
  3426.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  3427. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  3428. American intelligence agencies for years:
  3429. getting into computers that adversaries,
  3430. and some American partners, have tried to
  3431. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  3432. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  3433. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  3434. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  3435. ---------------------------------------
  3436. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  3437.  
  3438. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  3439. _______________________________________
  3440. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  3441.  
  3442. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  3443. ---------------------------------------
  3444. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  3445.  
  3446. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  3447. _______________________________________
  3448. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  3449.  
  3450. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  3451. _______________________________________
  3452. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  3453.  
  3454. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  3455. _______________________________________
  3456. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  3457.  
  3458. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  3459. _______________________________________
  3460. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  3461. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  3462.  
  3463. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  3464.  
  3465. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  3466. _______________________________________
  3467. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  3468. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  3469.  
  3470. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  3471. _______________________________________
  3472. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  3473. All Encryption ::
  3474.  
  3475.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  3476. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  3477. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  3478. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  3479. used to protect banking, medical, business
  3480. and government records around the world.
  3481.  
  3482.  According to documents provided by former
  3483. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  3484. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  3485. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  3486. than classical computers � is part of a
  3487. $79.7 million research program titled
  3488. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  3489. work is hosted under classified contracts
  3490. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  3491.  
  3492. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  3493. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  3494. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  3495. _______________________________________
  3496. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  3497.  
  3498. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  3499. _______________________________________
  3500. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  3501.  
  3502. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  3503. _______________________________________
  3504. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  3505.  
  3506. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  3507.  
  3508. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  3509.  
  3510. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  3511.  
  3512. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  3513.  
  3514. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  3515.  
  3516. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  3517. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  3518. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  3519.  
  3520. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  3521.  
  3522.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  3523. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  3524. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  3525. infiltrates computers around the world and
  3526. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  3527. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  3528. it is targeting. ... ...
  3529.  
  3530. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  3531.  
  3532.  The insert method and other variants of
  3533. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  3534. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  3535. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  3536. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  3537. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  3538. also incorporates routers and servers
  3539. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  3540. network by infecting these networks with
  3541. �implants� that then allow the government
  3542. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  3543.  
  3544.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  3545. to identify and track its targets based on
  3546. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  3547. could include certain email addresses or
  3548. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  3549. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  3550. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  3551. additional information like an email address.
  3552. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  3553. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  3554. ---------------------------------------
  3555. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  3556.  
  3557. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  3558.  
  3559. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  3560.  
  3561.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  3562. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  3563. that are being logged into on that computer
  3564. as long as the user does not clear browser
  3565. cookies.�
  3566.  
  3567. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  3568.  
  3569. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  3570.  
  3571. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  3572. ---------------------------------------
  3573. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  3574.  
  3575.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  3576. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  3577. could be described as master carpenters for
  3578. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  3579. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  3580. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  3581. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  3582. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  3583. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  3584. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  3585. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  3586. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  3587. ability to establish a global covert network
  3588. that operates alongside the Internet.
  3589.  
  3590.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  3591. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  3592. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  3593. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  3594. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  3595. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  3596. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  3597. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  3598. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  3599. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  3600. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  3601. over $1 million.
  3602.  
  3603.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  3604. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  3605. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  3606. clear preference for planting their malicious
  3607. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  3608. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  3609. to load when a computer is turned on.
  3610.  
  3611.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  3612. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  3613. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  3614. to virus protection and other security programs.
  3615. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  3616. computer has been completely erased and a new
  3617. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  3618. can continue to function and ensures that new
  3619. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  3620. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  3621. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  3622. this approach has provided them with the
  3623. possibility of permanent access.
  3624.  
  3625.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  3626. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  3627. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  3628. with the exception of latter, are American
  3629. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  3630. intelligence agency is compromising the
  3631. technology and products of American companies.
  3632.  
  3633. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  3634. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  3635. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  3636. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  3637. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  3638.  
  3639. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  3640.  
  3641. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  3642.  
  3643. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  3644.  
  3645. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  3646.  
  3647. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  3648.  
  3649. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  3650.  
  3651. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  3652.  
  3653. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  3654.  
  3655. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  3656.  
  3657. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  3658.  
  3659. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  3660.  
  3661. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  3662.  
  3663. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  3664.  
  3665. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  3666.  
  3667. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  3668.  
  3669. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  3670.  
  3671. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  3672.  
  3673. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  3674.  
  3675. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  3676.  
  3677. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  3678.  
  3679. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  3680.  
  3681. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  3682.  
  3683. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  3684.  
  3685. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  3686.  
  3687. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  3688.  
  3689. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  3690. ---------------------------------------
  3691. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  3692.  
  3693. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3694.  
  3695. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  3696.  
  3697. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  3698.  
  3699. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  3700. ---------------------------------------
  3701. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  3702.  
  3703. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  3704.  
  3705. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  3706.  
  3707.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  3708. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  3709. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  3710.  
  3711. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  3712.  
  3713. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  3714. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  3715.  
  3716.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  3717. in its operating system had left devices open
  3718. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  3719. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  3720. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  3721. of its mass spying program.
  3722.  
  3723. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  3724. ---------------------------------------
  3725. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  3726. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  3727.  
  3728. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  3729.  
  3730. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  3731. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  3732.  
  3733. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  3734.  
  3735. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  3736.  
  3737. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  3738.  
  3739.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  3740. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  3741.  
  3742. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  3743. _______________________________________
  3744. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  3745.  
  3746. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  3747.  
  3748. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  3749.  
  3750. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  3751. _______________________________________
  3752. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  3753.  
  3754. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  3755.  
  3756.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3757. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3758. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  3759. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3760. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3761. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3762. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3763. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3764. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  3765. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3766.  
  3767.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  3768. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3769. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3770. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  3771. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3772. did not want to know any more.
  3773. ---------------------------------------
  3774. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3775.  
  3776. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3777. _______________________________________
  3778. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3779. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3780.  
  3781. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3782. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3783. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3784. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3785. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3786. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3787. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3788. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3789.  
  3790. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3791.  
  3792.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3793. National Security Agency program which
  3794. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3795. calls made to, from or within the United
  3796. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3797.  
  3798.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  3799. that the program appears to violate the
  3800. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  3801. searches and seizures. He also said the
  3802. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  3803. that collecting the information had helped
  3804. to head off terrorist attacks.
  3805.  
  3806.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  3807. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  3808. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  3809. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  3810. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  3811. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  3812. the order to allow for an appeal.
  3813.  
  3814. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  3815. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  3816.  
  3817.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  3818. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  3819. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  3820. in June in news stories based on leaks
  3821. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  3822. For seven years, the metadata program has
  3823. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  3824. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  3825. Court and found constitutional by at least
  3826. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  3827.  
  3828. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  3829.  
  3830. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  3831.  
  3832. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  3833.  
  3834. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  3835.  
  3836. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  3837.  
  3838. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  3839. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  3840.  
  3841. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  3842.  
  3843. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  3844.  
  3845. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  3846. ---------------------------------------
  3847. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  3848.  
  3849. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  3850.  
  3851. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  3852.  
  3853. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  3854. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  3855.  
  3856. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  3857. Spying Programs ::
  3858.  
  3859. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  3860. ---------------------------------------
  3861. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  3862. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  3863.  
  3864. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  3865.  
  3866. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  3867.  
  3868. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  3869. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  3870.  
  3871. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  3872.  
  3873. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  3874. _______________________________________
  3875. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  3876.  
  3877.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  3878. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  3879. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  3880.  
  3881. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  3882.  
  3883. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  3884.  
  3885.  - Military Information
  3886.  - Economic Information
  3887.  - Information Operations Information
  3888.  - Political Information �
  3889. _______________________________________
  3890. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  3891. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  3892.  
  3893. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  3894. ���������������������������������������
  3895. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  3896.  
  3897. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  3898.  
  3899. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  3900.  
  3901. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  3902.  
  3903. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  3904.  
  3905. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  3906.  
  3907. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  3908.  
  3909. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  3910.  
  3911. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  3912.  
  3913. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  3914. _______________________________________
  3915. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  3916. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  3917.  
  3918.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  3919. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  3920. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  3921. government access in order to make network
  3922. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  3923. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  3924. in millions of homes and businesses within
  3925. the UK,� the paper states.
  3926.  
  3927.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  3928. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  3929. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  3930. assigns all their modems an extra address
  3931. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  3932. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  3933. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  3934. a second IP address for management, except
  3935. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  3936. assigned to the United States Department
  3937. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  3938. of speculation that this is actually a
  3939. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  3940. they can secretly monitor and control
  3941. peoples� home networks.
  3942.  
  3943.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  3944. The better explanation is that BT simply
  3945. chose this address space because it�s
  3946. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  3947. address, it�s only used inside the private
  3948. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  3949. that address space, you�ll see that your
  3950. packets go nowhere.
  3951.  
  3952. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  3953. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  3954. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  3955.  
  3956. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  3957.  
  3958.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  3959. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  3960. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  3961. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  3962. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  3963. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  3964. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  3965. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  3966. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  3967. It�s past time for something new.�
  3968.  
  3969. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  3970. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  3971. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  3972. ---------------------------------------
  3973. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  3974.  
  3975.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  3976. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  3977. worldwide with malicious software designed
  3978. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  3979. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  3980. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  3981.  
  3982.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  3983. explains how the NSA collects information
  3984. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  3985. shows that the intelligence service uses
  3986. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  3987. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3988. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3989. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3990. software.
  3991.  
  3992.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3993. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3994. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3995. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  3996. has been installing this malicious software
  3997. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3998. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  3999. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  4000. through a process of luring employees to a
  4001. false Linkedin page.
  4002.  
  4003. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  4004. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  4005. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  4006. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  4007.  
  4008. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  4009.  
  4010.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  4011. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  4012. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  4013. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  4014. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  4015. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  4016. and citizens.
  4017.  
  4018.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  4019. will deter this bounty of profits for
  4020. the comsec industry, unless the public
  4021. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  4022. the nettle, and all those making money
  4023. from this deception operation decide to
  4024. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  4025.  
  4026.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  4027. lists, those participating in standards
  4028. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  4029. grants in think tanks and universities,
  4030. those in law firms and public interest
  4031. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  4032. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  4033. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  4034. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  4035. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  4036. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  4037. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  4038. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  4039. contracts, list lurking, online and
  4040. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  4041. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  4042. fulfilled.
  4043.  
  4044. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  4045.  
  4046. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  4047.  
  4048. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  4049.  
  4050. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  4051. ���������������������������������������
  4052. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  4053. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  4054.  
  4055. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  4056. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  4057. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  4058. _______________________________________
  4059. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  4060.  
  4061. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  4062.  
  4063. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  4064.  
  4065. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  4066.  
  4067. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  4068.  
  4069. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  4070. _______________________________________
  4071. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  4072.  
  4073. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  4074. _______________________________________
  4075. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  4076. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  4077.  
  4078. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  4079.  
  4080. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  4081. _______________________________________
  4082. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  4083.  
  4084. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  4085. _______________________________________
  4086. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  4087. of Public Concerns ::
  4088.  
  4089. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  4090.  
  4091. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  4092.  
  4093. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  4094. _______________________________________
  4095. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  4096.  
  4097.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  4098. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  4099. of metadata about the world�s secure
  4100. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  4101. certainly not a program through which
  4102. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  4103. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  4104. services like Google, as reported by others,
  4105. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  4106. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  4107. Google are based on a small piece of a
  4108. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  4109. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  4110. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  4111. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  4112. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  4113. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  4114. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  4115. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  4116. by providing information about a target.�
  4117.  
  4118. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  4119.  
  4120. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  4121.  
  4122. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  4123. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  4124. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  4125. ���������������������������������������
  4126. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  4127.  
  4128. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  4129.  
  4130. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  4131. _______________________________________
  4132. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  4133.  
  4134. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  4135. ---------------------------------------
  4136. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  4137.  
  4138. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  4139.  
  4140.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  4141. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  4142. and later managed by big data corporations
  4143. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  4144.  
  4145.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  4146. large files across machines in a large
  4147. cluster.
  4148.  
  4149. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  4150.  
  4151.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  4152. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  4153. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  4154. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  4155.  
  4156.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  4157. major components, a central metadata server
  4158. and file servers from data.
  4159.  
  4160. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  4161.  
  4162. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  4163.  
  4164.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  4165. posted on public domain.
  4166.  
  4167. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  4168.  
  4169. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  4170. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  4171.  
  4172. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  4173. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  4174. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  4175.  
  4176. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  4177.  
  4178. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  4179. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  4180. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  4181. ---------------------------------------
  4182. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  4183. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  4184.  
  4185. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  4186.  
  4187. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  4188.  
  4189. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  4190.  
  4191. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  4192.  
  4193. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  4194.  
  4195. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  4196.  
  4197. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  4198.  
  4199. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  4200.  
  4201. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  4202.  
  4203.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  4204. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  4205. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  4206. content of all our communications have
  4207. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  4208. program since the 1990s.
  4209.  
  4210.  The new details concern how, �The National
  4211. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  4212. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  4213. of cellphones around the world.�
  4214.  
  4215.  However, the report reveals itself to
  4216. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  4217. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  4218. does not target Americans� location data
  4219. by design, but the agency acquires a
  4220. substantial amount of information on
  4221. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  4222. �incidentally.�
  4223.  
  4224.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  4225. happens to record the locations of Americans
  4226. using data from their cellphones, and is
  4227. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  4228. surveillance, is yet another example of
  4229. damage control by the establishment.
  4230.  
  4231. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  4232. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  4233. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  4234. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  4235. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  4236. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  4237. ---------------------------------------
  4238. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  4239. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  4240.  
  4241.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  4242. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  4243. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  4244. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  4245. targets for government hacking and to
  4246. bolster surveillance.
  4247.  
  4248. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  4249. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  4250. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  4251. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  4252. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  4253. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  4254. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  4255. ---------------------------------------
  4256. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  4257.  
  4258. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  4259. ---------------------------------------
  4260. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  4261. In a World Without Cookies ::
  4262.  
  4263. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  4264. _______________________________________
  4265. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  4266.  
  4267. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  4268. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  4269. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  4270.  
  4271. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  4272.  
  4273. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  4274. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  4275. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  4276. _______________________________________
  4277. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  4278. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  4279.  
  4280. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  4281. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  4282. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  4283. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  4284. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  4285. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  4286.  
  4287. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  4288.  
  4289. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  4290.  
  4291. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  4292.  
  4293. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  4294.  
  4295. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  4296.  
  4297. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  4298.  
  4299. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  4300.  
  4301. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  4302.  
  4303. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  4304.  
  4305. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  4306.  
  4307. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  4308.  
  4309. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  4310. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  4311. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  4312.  
  4313. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  4314.  
  4315. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  4316. ---------------------------------------
  4317. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  4318.  
  4319. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  4320. ---------------------------------------
  4321. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  4322.  
  4323. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  4324.  
  4325. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  4326.  
  4327. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  4328.  
  4329. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  4330.  
  4331. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  4332.  
  4333. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  4334.  
  4335. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  4336. _______________________________________
  4337.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  4338. worldwide was published by the German
  4339. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  4340. map was put online by accident, but before
  4341. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  4342. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  4343. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  4344. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  4345. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  4346. the names of all other cities were blurred
  4347. by Der Spiegel.�
  4348.  
  4349.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  4350.  
  4351. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  4352.  
  4353. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  4354.  
  4355. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  4356.  
  4357. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  4358.  
  4359. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  4360.  
  4361. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  4362. ---------------------------------------
  4363. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  4364.  
  4365. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  4366.  
  4367. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  4368. _______________________________________
  4369. � Five Eyes ::
  4370.  
  4371. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  4372. _______________________________________
  4373. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  4374.  
  4375. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  4376. _______________________________________
  4377. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  4378. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  4379.  
  4380. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  4381.  
  4382. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  4383. _______________________________________
  4384. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  4385.  
  4386. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  4387.  
  4388. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  4389. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  4390. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  4391. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  4392. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  4393. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  4394. _______________________________________
  4395. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  4396.  
  4397.  September 11th, which also happened to
  4398. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  4399. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  4400. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  4401. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  4402. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  4403. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  4404. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  4405. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  4406. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  4407. itself.
  4408.  
  4409.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  4410. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  4411. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  4412. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  4413. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  4414. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  4415. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  4416. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  4417. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  4418. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  4419. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  4420. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  4421. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  4422. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  4423. its workforce by one-third, to about
  4424. 33,000. The number of private companies
  4425. it depended upon more than tripled during
  4426. that time.
  4427.  
  4428.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  4429. and the increasing reliance on the private
  4430. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  4431. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  4432. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  4433. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  4434. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  4435. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  4436. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  4437. getting those clearances. So you had
  4438. this huge apparatus being built, and
  4439. the government was just managing it.
  4440. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  4441. doing that.� ... ...
  4442.  
  4443.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  4444. workforce, the surveillance he would
  4445. later expose was becoming not just
  4446. institutionalized but very big business.
  4447. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  4448. the full flower of that massive, massive
  4449. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  4450. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  4451. could go.� ... ...
  4452.  
  4453.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  4454. leaking government secrets when he was
  4455. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  4456. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  4457. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  4458. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  4459. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  4460. policies that I thought would be reined
  4461. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  4462. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  4463. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  4464. the more he read �true information,�
  4465. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  4466. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  4467. surveillance program � the more he realized
  4468. that there were actually two governments:
  4469. the one that was elected, and the other,
  4470. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  4471. �If the highest officials in government
  4472. can break the law without fearing punishment
  4473. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  4474. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  4475.  
  4476. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  4477. _______________________________________
  4478. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  4479.  
  4480. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  4481. _______________________________________
  4482. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  4483.  
  4484. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  4485. _______________________________________
  4486. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  4487. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  4488.  
  4489.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  4490. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  4491. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  4492. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  4493. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  4494. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  4495. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  4496. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  4497. in terrorism.
  4498.  
  4499.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  4500. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  4501. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  4502. threatening national security. It is
  4503. successfully restricting release of the
  4504. Snowden material and will likely become
  4505. more forceful as releases continue to the
  4506. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  4507. to criminalize release as a national
  4508. security threat.
  4509.  
  4510. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  4511. _______________________________________
  4512. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  4513.  
  4514.  Includes most reports, slides and
  4515. documents all related to the recent
  4516. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  4517. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  4518. any information that comes out and
  4519. will provide updated archives from
  4520. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  4521.  
  4522.  After decompression - the folder is
  4523. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  4524. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  4525.  
  4526. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4527. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  4528.  
  4529. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  4530. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  4531. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  4532. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4533. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4534. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  4535. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  4536. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4537. _______________________________________
  4538. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  4539.  
  4540. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4541. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4542. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4543.  
  4544. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  4545. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  4546.  
  4547.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  4548. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  4549. Australians, and hands over the material
  4550. to the US and its closest allies, according
  4551. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  4552. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  4553. Australia web site.
  4554.  
  4555.  The document obtained by the former US
  4556. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  4557. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  4558. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  4559. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  4560. as well as the people and governments of
  4561. many Asian countries.
  4562.  
  4563.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  4564. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  4565. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  4566. global partners so-called metadata of
  4567. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  4568. address books and social media posts of
  4569. millions of people.
  4570.  
  4571.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  4572. the recent revelations, also from documents
  4573. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  4574. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  4575. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  4576. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  4577. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  4578. operate as electronic listening posts
  4579. for the US-led spying network.
  4580.  
  4581. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  4582. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  4583. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  4584. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  4585. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  4586. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  4587.  
  4588. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  4589. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  4590.  
  4591.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  4592. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  4593. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  4594. political figures has been furiously
  4595. denounced by other media outlets for
  4596. breaching �national security� and the
  4597. �national interest.� The reaction
  4598. underscores the extent to which the
  4599. media establishment has been integrated
  4600. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  4601.  
  4602.  On November 18, after being approached
  4603. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  4604. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  4605. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  4606. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  4607. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  4608. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  4609. senior political figures. The report
  4610. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  4611. crisis for the Australian government, with
  4612. the Indonesian president suspending military
  4613. and intelligence cooperation.
  4614.  
  4615. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  4616. _______________________________________
  4617. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  4618.  
  4619.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  4620. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  4621. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  4622. allowed the largest American spy agency
  4623. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  4624. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  4625.  
  4626.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  4627. by CBC News.
  4628.  
  4629.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  4630. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  4631. a security command post during a six-day
  4632. spying operation by the National Security
  4633. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  4634. other foreign heads of government were on
  4635. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  4636.  
  4637.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  4638. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  4639.  
  4640.  The world was still struggling to climb
  4641. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  4642. were debating a wide array of possible
  4643. measures including a global tax on banks,
  4644. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  4645. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  4646. eventually scotched.
  4647.  
  4648. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  4649. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  4650. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  4651. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  4652. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  4653.  
  4654. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  4655. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  4656.  
  4657. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  4658.  
  4659.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  4660. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  4661.  
  4662. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  4663.  
  4664. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  4665.  
  4666. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  4667.  
  4668. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  4669. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  4670.  
  4671. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  4672.  
  4673. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  4674.  
  4675. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  4676.  
  4677. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  4678. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  4679.  
  4680. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  4681.  
  4682. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  4683.  
  4684.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  4685. believe that they have only �moved on� from discussing
  4686. CSEC�s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  4687. to worry about.
  4688.  
  4689.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  4690. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  4691. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  4692. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC�s
  4693. staff�it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  4694. military personnel assist its work�give an inkling of the
  4695. scale of its activities.
  4696.  
  4697.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  4698. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  4699. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  4700. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  4701. Of especial importance is the CSEC�s partnership with the NSA.
  4702. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  4703. the two organizations �have integrated personnel� i.e. swap
  4704. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  4705. Internet surveillance programs.
  4706.  
  4707.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  4708. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  4709. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  4710. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  4711. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  4712. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates�
  4713. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  4714.  
  4715. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  4716.  
  4717. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  4718.  
  4719. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  4720.  
  4721. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  4722. _______________________________________
  4723. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  4724.  
  4725. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  4726.  
  4727. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  4728.  
  4729. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  4730. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  4731. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  4732.  
  4733. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  4734.  
  4735. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  4736.  
  4737. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  4738.  
  4739. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  4740. _______________________________________
  4741.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  4742. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  4743. in theory � forbid local governments from
  4744. providing services to federal agencies
  4745. that collect electronic data from Americans
  4746. without a personalized warrant.
  4747.  
  4748.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  4749. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  4750. but at least one legislator has committed
  4751. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  4752. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  4753. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  4754. is introduced.
  4755.  
  4756.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  4757. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  4758. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  4759. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  4760. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  4761. and a handful of other groups.
  4762.  
  4763.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  4764. Maharrey adds.
  4765.  
  4766. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  4767. _______________________________________
  4768. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  4769. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  4770.  
  4771.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  4772. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  4773. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  4774. US and British intelligence � particularly
  4775. their cooperation in data collection and
  4776. snooping programs involving British citizens
  4777. and close allies on the European continent.
  4778.  
  4779.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  4780. to account by British authorities for
  4781. jeopardizing national security. The
  4782. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  4783. is being forced to appear before a
  4784. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  4785. the news outlet�s actions.
  4786.  
  4787. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4788. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  4789. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  4790.  
  4791. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  4792.  
  4793. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4794.  
  4795. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  4796. as the British Dictatorship ::
  4797.  
  4798.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  4799. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  4800. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  4801. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  4802. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  4803. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  4804. seems the United States is reaching the event
  4805. horizon to a police state.
  4806.  
  4807. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  4808.  
  4809. Cryptome noted
  4810.  
  4811.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  4812. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  4813. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  4814. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  4815. UKG), although there could be some which have
  4816. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  4817. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  4818.  
  4819.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  4820. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  4821. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  4822. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  4823. deception, co-optation.
  4824.  
  4825.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  4826. had access, or suspected of access, are
  4827. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  4828. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  4829. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  4830. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  4831. standard coercive means of authorities.
  4832.  
  4833.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  4834. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  4835. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  4836. advised successive cooperators, usually
  4837. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  4838. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  4839. participation.
  4840.  
  4841.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  4842. disputes and disagreements among competing
  4843. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  4844. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  4845. along with threats against families, friends
  4846. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  4847. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  4848. with authorities, including use of rewards
  4849. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  4850.  
  4851. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  4852. _______________________________________
  4853. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  4854.  
  4855. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  4856. _______________________________________
  4857. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  4858. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  4859. Governments ::
  4860.  
  4861. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  4862. _______________________________________
  4863. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  4864. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  4865.  
  4866. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  4867. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  4868. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  4869. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  4870. _______________________________________
  4871. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  4872.  
  4873. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  4874.  
  4875. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  4876.  
  4877. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  4878.  
  4879. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  4880.  
  4881. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  4882.  
  4883. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  4884.  
  4885. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  4886.  
  4887. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  4888.  
  4889. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  4890.  
  4891. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  4892.  
  4893. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  4894.  
  4895. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  4896.  
  4897. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  4898.  
  4899. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  4900.  
  4901. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  4902.  
  4903. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  4904. Steal Email Metadata ::
  4905.  
  4906.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  4907. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  4908. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  4909. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  4910.  
  4911.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  4912. servers around the world, reducing the
  4913. chance of losing your information should
  4914. one fail. When you log in to an account
  4915. with these firms, the data sent between
  4916. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  4917. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  4918. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  4919. And because many of the transfers take place
  4920. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  4921. isn�t required to tap the information.
  4922.  
  4923.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  4924. broken into the main communications links
  4925. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  4926. around the world, according to documents
  4927. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  4928. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  4929. officials.
  4930.  
  4931.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  4932. positioned itself to collect at will from
  4933. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  4934. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  4935. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  4936. but it keeps a lot.
  4937.  
  4938.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  4939. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  4940. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  4941. counterpart, the Government Communications
  4942. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  4943. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  4944. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  4945. that carry information among the data
  4946. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  4947.  
  4948. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  4949. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  4950. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  4951. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  4952. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  4953.  
  4954. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  4955.  
  4956.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  4957. email collecting program �does not apply
  4958. to US citizens.�
  4959.  
  4960.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  4961. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  4962. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  4963. accounts around the world, many of them
  4964. belonging to Americans, according to
  4965. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  4966. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  4967. Edward Snowden.
  4968.  
  4969.  The collection program, which has not
  4970. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  4971. address books and �buddy lists� from
  4972. instant messaging services as they move
  4973. across global data links. Online services
  4974. often transmit those contacts when a user
  4975. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  4976. a computer or mobile device with information
  4977. stored on remote servers.
  4978.  
  4979. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  4980. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  4981. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  4982.  
  4983. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  4984.  
  4985. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  4986.  
  4987. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4988.  
  4989. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4990. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4991. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4992. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4993. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4994. ���������������������������������������
  4995. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  4996.  
  4997. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4998.  
  4999. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  5000. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  5001.  
  5002. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  5003.  
  5004. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  5005.  
  5006. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  5007.  
  5008. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  5009.  
  5010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  5011.  
  5012. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  5013.  
  5014. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  5015.  
  5016. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  5017.  
  5018. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  5019.  
  5020. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  5021.  
  5022. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  5023.  
  5024. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  5025.  
  5026. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  5027. ---------------------------------------
  5028. NOBODY comments ?
  5029.  
  5030.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  5031. differs from the Guardians.
  5032.  
  5033. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  5034.  
  5035. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  5036.  
  5037. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  5038.  
  5039. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  5040.  
  5041.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  5042. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  5043. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  5044.  
  5045.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  5046. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  5047. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  5048. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  5049. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  5050. ---------------------------------------
  5051. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  5052.  
  5053. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  5054.  
  5055. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  5056.  
  5057.  This was written from a person who purports
  5058. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  5059.  
  5060. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  5061.  
  5062. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  5063.  
  5064. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  5065.  
  5066. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  5067. Misleading ::
  5068.  
  5069. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  5070.  
  5071. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  5072. on NSA Spying ::
  5073.  
  5074. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  5075.  
  5076.  �Recent articles published in the
  5077. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  5078. inaccurate and misleading information
  5079. regarding US foreign intelligence
  5080. activities. The allegation that the
  5081. National Security Agency collected more
  5082. than 70 million �recordings of French
  5083. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  5084.  
  5085.  While we are not going to discuss the
  5086. details of our activities, we have
  5087. repeatedly made it clear that the
  5088. United States gathers intelligence of
  5089. the type gathered by all nations. The
  5090. US collects intelligence to protect the
  5091. nation, its interests, and its allies
  5092. from, among other things, threats such
  5093. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  5094. weapons of mass destruction.
  5095.  
  5096.  The United States values our longstanding
  5097. friendship and alliance with France and
  5098. we will continue to cooperate on security
  5099. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  5100.  
  5101. James R. Clapper
  5102. Director of National Intelligence
  5103. ---------------------------------------
  5104. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  5105.  
  5106. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  5107.  
  5108.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  5109. a call without leaving a record with the
  5110. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  5111. or leaves America without passing through
  5112. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  5113. statement Thursday.
  5114.  
  5115.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  5116. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  5117. _______________________________________
  5118. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  5119. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  5120.  
  5121.  US and British intelligence officials
  5122. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  5123. collection of highly classified, heavily
  5124. encrypted materials they believe former
  5125. National Security Agency contractor
  5126. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  5127.  
  5128.  One source saw the cache of documents
  5129. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  5130. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  5131. other harm. ... ...
  5132.  
  5133.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  5134. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  5135. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  5136. that �if anything happens at all to
  5137. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  5138. to get access to the full archives.�
  5139.  
  5140. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  5141. _______________________________________
  5142. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  5143. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  5144.  
  5145.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  5146. government surveillance policies. But he
  5147. is not disclosing those changes to the
  5148. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  5149. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  5150. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  5151. World Bank and the International Monetary
  5152. Fund? He won�t say.
  5153.  
  5154.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  5155. to review and recommend changes to his
  5156. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  5157.  
  5158. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  5159. _______________________________________
  5160. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  5161.  
  5162.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  5163. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  5164. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  5165. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  5166. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  5167.  
  5168.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  5169. broad goals, the five-page document said
  5170. that existing American laws were not adequate
  5171. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  5172. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  5173. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  5174. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  5175. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  5176. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  5177. pace with the complexity of the technology
  5178. and target environments, or the operational
  5179. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  5180. document concluded.
  5181.  
  5182. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  5183. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  5184. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  5185. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  5186. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  5187.  
  5188. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  5189.  
  5190.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  5191. called Treasure Map and describes its
  5192. capabilities but does not publish visual
  5193. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  5194. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  5195. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  5196.  
  5197. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  5198. _______________________________________
  5199. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  5200.  
  5201. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  5202. _______________________________________
  5203. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  5204.  
  5205. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  5206.  
  5207. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  5208.  
  5209. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  5210.  
  5211.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  5212. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  5213. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  5214. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  5215. the door to a variety of spying options.
  5216.  
  5217. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  5218. _______________________________________
  5219. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  5220.  
  5221.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  5222. collection of solely domestic communications
  5223. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  5224. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  5225. request each week until we receive your
  5226. response,� EPIC said.
  5227.  
  5228.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  5229. said this week that it would not be hearing
  5230. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  5231. early Monday in which the high court listed
  5232. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  5233. as denied.
  5234.  
  5235. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  5236.  
  5237. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  5238. _______________________________________
  5239. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  5240.  
  5241. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  5242.  
  5243. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  5244. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  5245.  
  5246. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  5247.  
  5248. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  5249.  
  5250. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  5251. No Privacy ::
  5252.  
  5253. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  5254.  
  5255. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  5256. Spying Programs ::
  5257.  
  5258. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  5259.  
  5260. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  5261.  
  5262. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  5263.  
  5264. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  5265. _______________________________________
  5266. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  5267.  
  5268. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5269.  
  5270. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  5271.  
  5272. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  5273.  
  5274. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5275.  
  5276. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  5277.  
  5278. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  5279.  
  5280. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  5281.  
  5282.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  5283. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  5284. or indigenous cryptographic information
  5285. security devices or systems in order to
  5286. make them exploitable.�
  5287.  
  5288. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  5289.  
  5290.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  5291. successfully exploits cryptographic
  5292. components of commercial information
  5293. security devices or systems when the
  5294. device or system specified.�
  5295.  
  5296. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5297.  
  5298. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  5299.  
  5300. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  5301.  
  5302. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5303. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5304. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  5305.  
  5306. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  5307.  
  5308.  US and British intelligence agencies
  5309. have successfully cracked much of the
  5310. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  5311. of millions of people to protect the
  5312. privacy of their personal data, online
  5313. transactions and emails, according to
  5314. top-secret documents revealed by former
  5315. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  5316.  
  5317.  Those methods include covert measures
  5318. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  5319. international encryption standards, the
  5320. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  5321. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  5322. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  5323. technology companies and internet service
  5324. providers themselves.
  5325.  
  5326.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  5327. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  5328. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  5329. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  5330.  
  5331.  Independent security experts have long
  5332. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  5333. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  5334. confirmed for the first time by another
  5335. secret document. It shows the agency
  5336. worked covertly to get its own version
  5337. of a draft security standard issued by
  5338. the US National Institute of Standards
  5339. and Technology approved for worldwide
  5340. use in 2006.
  5341.  
  5342. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  5343.  
  5344. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  5345.  
  5346. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5347.  
  5348. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  5349.  
  5350. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  5351.  
  5352. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  5353.  
  5354. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5355.  
  5356. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5357.  
  5358. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  5359. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  5360. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  5361.  
  5362. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5363.  
  5364. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  5365. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  5366.  
  5367. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5368.  
  5369. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  5370.  
  5371. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  5372.  
  5373. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  5374.  
  5375. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  5376. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  5377.  
  5378. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  5379.  
  5380. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  5381.  
  5382.  A range of US hardware and software
  5383. companies are in danger of being dragged
  5384. into the widening scandal over internet
  5385. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  5386. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  5387. Security Agency contractor.
  5388.  
  5389.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  5390. that it has collaborated with technology
  5391. companies to plant �back doors� into
  5392. their systems � or ways for the agency
  5393. secretly to penetrate systems without
  5394. the users� knowledge.
  5395.  
  5396. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  5397.  
  5398. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  5399.  
  5400. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  5401. _______________________________________
  5402. � SSL Inspector ::
  5403.  
  5404. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  5405.  
  5406. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  5407.  
  5408. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  5409. _______________________________________
  5410. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  5411. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  5412.  
  5413. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  5414.  
  5415. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  5416.  
  5417. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  5418.  
  5419. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  5420.  
  5421. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  5422.  
  5423. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  5424.  
  5425. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  5426.  
  5427. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  5428.  
  5429. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  5430. ���������������������������������������
  5431. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  5432. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  5433.  
  5434. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  5435. ���������������������������������������
  5436. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  5437.  
  5438.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  5439. activities is an obscure organization called
  5440. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  5441. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  5442. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  5443. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  5444. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  5445. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  5446. presentation given to journalists by former
  5447. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  5448. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  5449. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  5450. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  5451. be collected, which is then gathered and
  5452. delivered by the DITU.
  5453.  
  5454.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  5455. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  5456. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  5457. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  5458. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  5459. collection, processing, and reporting.
  5460.  
  5461. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  5462.  
  5463. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  5464.  
  5465. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  5466. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  5467. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5468.  
  5469.  
  5470. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  5471.  
  5472. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5473. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5474. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5475.  
  5476. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  5477.  
  5478. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  5479.  
  5480. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  5481.  
  5482. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  5483.  
  5484. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  5485.  
  5486. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  5487.  
  5488.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  5489. by the NSA.
  5490.  
  5491.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  5492. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  5493. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  5494. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  5495. also now has access to some of these documents.
  5496.  
  5497.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  5498. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  5499. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  5500. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  5501. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  5502. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  5503.  
  5504.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  5505. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  5506. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  5507. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  5508. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  5509. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  5510. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  5511. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  5512. Facebook and Microsoft.
  5513.  
  5514. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  5515.  
  5516.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  5517. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  5518. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  5519. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  5520. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  5521. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  5522. and unilateral access to their servers.
  5523.  
  5524.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  5525. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  5526. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  5527. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  5528. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  5529. diving.
  5530.  
  5531.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  5532. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  5533.  
  5534.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  5535. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  5536. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  5537. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  5538. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  5539. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  5540. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  5541. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  5542. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  5543. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  5544. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  5545. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  5546. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  5547. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  5548. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  5549. major US carriers.
  5550.  
  5551. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  5552.  
  5553.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  5554. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  5555. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  5556. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  5557. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  5558. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  5559. engines.
  5560.  
  5561.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  5562. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  5563. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  5564. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  5565. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  5566.  
  5567.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  5568. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  5569. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  5570. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  5571. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  5572. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  5573. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  5574. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  5575. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  5576. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  5577. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  5578. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  5579. companies have been targeted.
  5580.  
  5581.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  5582. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  5583. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  5584. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  5585. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  5586. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  5587. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  5588. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  5589. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  5590. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  5591. _______________________________________
  5592. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  5593.  
  5594. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  5595.  
  5596. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  5597.  
  5598. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  5599.  
  5600. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  5601. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  5602.  
  5603. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  5604.  
  5605. NOBODY comments
  5606.  
  5607.  100% expected. They will continue to
  5608. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  5609. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  5610. We must adjust to it by learning how
  5611. to counter their surveillance.
  5612.  
  5613. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  5614. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  5615.  
  5616.  The United States and its key intelligence
  5617. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  5618. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  5619. Nations to promote a universal human right
  5620. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  5621. sources and an internal American government
  5622. document obtained by The Cable.
  5623.  
  5624.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  5625. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  5626. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  5627. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  5628. internet surveillance by the National
  5629. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  5630. services. American representatives have made
  5631. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  5632. checks on their global surveillance network.
  5633. The stakes are high, particularly in
  5634. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  5635. an international backlash against NSA
  5636. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  5637. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  5638. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  5639.  
  5640. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  5641.  
  5642. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  5643. _______________________________________
  5644. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  5645. Public News Coverage ::
  5646.  
  5647. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  5648. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  5649. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  5650. _______________________________________
  5651. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  5652. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  5653.  
  5654. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  5655. _______________________________________
  5656. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  5657.  
  5658.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  5659. a division for particularly difficult
  5660. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  5661. (TAO), this department devises special
  5662. methods for special targets.
  5663.  
  5664.  That category includes surveillance of
  5665. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  5666. the division reported its mission
  5667. accomplished. A report classified as
  5668. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  5669. exploited a key mail server in the
  5670. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  5671. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  5672. first-ever access to President Felipe
  5673. Calderon�s public email account.�
  5674.  
  5675. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  5676.  
  5677. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  5678.  
  5679. Cryptome comments ?
  5680.  
  5681.  This spying was apparently done from
  5682. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  5683. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  5684. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  5685. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  5686.  
  5687. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  5688.  
  5689. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  5690. _______________________________________
  5691. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  5692.  
  5693. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  5694.  
  5695. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  5696.  
  5697. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5698.  
  5699. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  5700.  
  5701. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5702.  
  5703. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  5704.  
  5705. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  5706.  
  5707. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  5708.  
  5709. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  5710.  
  5711. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  5712.  
  5713. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  5714.  
  5715.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  5716. thought that the NSA should use its
  5717. technology to intercept emails and
  5718. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  5719. terminal to another, and was upset to
  5720. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  5721. That was a line he would only cross,
  5722. deliberately, with court and congressional
  5723. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  5724. but as we now know, the agency added
  5725. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  5726. suspicious communications that transited
  5727. the border of the United States, and
  5728. later began to collect reams of metadata
  5729. in order to analyze it.
  5730.  
  5731.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  5732. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  5733. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  5734. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  5735. in order to provide policymakers with a
  5736. decision advantage. The advantage the
  5737. NSA provided was accurate information
  5738. about what people who interacted with
  5739. the United States said in private about
  5740. their intentions; that gap between saying
  5741. and doing, and the ability to predict
  5742. action from it, allows the president of
  5743. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  5744.  
  5745.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  5746. States� actions don�t always match up
  5747. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  5748. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  5749. our moral authority wanes and our
  5750. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  5751.  
  5752.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  5753. countries are any purer. They never have
  5754. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  5755. purer than others, so the amount of
  5756. resources the intelligence community
  5757. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  5758. to correspond with how honest our allies
  5759. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  5760. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  5761. can we figure out which allies are more
  5762. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  5763. correspondence between public and private
  5764. words and actions.
  5765.  
  5766.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  5767. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  5768. want their leaders to gain a decision
  5769. advantage in the give and take between
  5770. countries. They want to know what US
  5771. policymakers will do before the Americans
  5772. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  5773. France, they aggressively spy on the
  5774. United States, on US citizens and
  5775. politicians, in order to collect that
  5776. information. The difference lies in the
  5777. scale of intelligence collection: The
  5778. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  5779. most sophisticated intelligence community
  5780. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  5781. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  5782. envious.
  5783. _______________________________________
  5784. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  5785.  
  5786. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  5787. _______________________________________
  5788. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  5789.  
  5790. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  5791. ���������������������������������������
  5792. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  5793. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  5794.  
  5795. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  5796. _______________________________________
  5797. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  5798. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  5799.  
  5800. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  5801. _______________________________________
  5802.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  5803. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  5804. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  5805. from the award ceremony are the first of
  5806. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  5807. Russia.
  5808.  
  5809. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  5810. ���������������������������������������
  5811. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  5812.  
  5813.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  5814. of the Security Service, said the
  5815. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  5816. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  5817. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  5818. agencies.
  5819.  
  5820. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  5821.  
  5822. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  5823.  
  5824.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  5825. they are not using Tor.�
  5826.  
  5827. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  5828.  
  5829. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  5830. ---------------------------------------
  5831.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  5832. old bleach log.
  5833.  
  5834. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  5835. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  5836. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  5837. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  5838.  
  5839. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  5840.  
  5841.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  5842. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  5843. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  5844. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  5845. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  5846. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  5847. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  5848. function.
  5849.  
  5850.  There are also various third party
  5851. programs that can produce files in
  5852. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  5853. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  5854.  
  5855.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  5856. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  5857. data stored on the system running the
  5858. Flash player.�
  5859. ---------------------------------------
  5860. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  5861.  
  5862.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  5863. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  5864. It can be found within Windows systems
  5865. and can be wiped out here ;
  5866.  
  5867. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5868. Application Data\Macromedia\
  5869.  
  5870. and may also be cloned here ;
  5871.  
  5872. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  5873.  
  5874.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  5875. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  5876.  
  5877. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  5878.  
  5879. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5880. Local Settings\Temp\
  5881. ---------------------------------------
  5882. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  5883.  
  5884. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  5885.  
  5886. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  5887.  
  5888. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  5889.  
  5890. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  5891.  
  5892. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  5893.  
  5894. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  5895.  
  5896. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  5897.  
  5898. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  5899.  
  5900. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  5901.  
  5902. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  5903.  
  5904. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  5905.  
  5906. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  5907.  
  5908. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  5909.  
  5910. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  5911. ---------------------------------------
  5912. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  5913.  
  5914.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  5915. application created by Samy Kamkar
  5916. which produces zombie cookies in a
  5917. web browser that are intentionally
  5918. difficult to delete. ... ...
  5919.  
  5920.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  5921. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  5922. by copying itself in different forms on
  5923. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  5924. itself if it notices that some of the
  5925. copies are missing or expired.
  5926.  
  5927.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  5928. Evercookie uses the following storage
  5929. mechanisms when available:
  5930.  
  5931. � Standard HTTP cookies
  5932. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  5933. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  5934. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  5935. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  5936. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  5937. (cookies) back out
  5938. � Storing cookies in Web history
  5939. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  5940. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  5941. � window.name caching
  5942. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  5943. � HTML5 Session Storage
  5944. � HTML5 Local Storage
  5945. � HTML5 Global Storage
  5946. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  5947. ---------------------------------------
  5948. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  5949.  
  5950.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  5951. mean that your browser isn't storing
  5952. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  5953. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  5954. in browser vulnerabilities.
  5955.  
  5956.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  5957. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  5958. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  5959. wide surveillance.
  5960.  
  5961.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  5962. powerful anonymity service, and the
  5963. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  5964. the Internet, makes it easy to
  5965. differentiate Tor users from other
  5966. Web users,� he wrote.
  5967.  
  5968.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  5969. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  5970. identifies you. Even though your IP
  5971. address changed [because of Tor], the
  5972. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  5973.  
  5974. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  5975. ---------------------------------------
  5976. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  5977. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  5978.  
  5979.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  5980. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  5981. �staining� as a means to identify
  5982. individual machines linked to that
  5983. IP address. ... ...
  5984.  
  5985.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  5986. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  5987. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  5988. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  5989. and is stamped into every packet, which
  5990. enables all the events from that stained
  5991. machine to be brought back together to
  5992. recreate a browsing session.�
  5993.  
  5994. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  5995.  
  5996. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  5997.  
  5998. � Packet Staining ::
  5999.  
  6000. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  6001. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  6002. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  6003. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  6004.  
  6005. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  6006.  
  6007. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  6008. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  6009. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  6010. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  6011.  
  6012. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  6013.  
  6014.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  6015. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  6016. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  6017. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  6018. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  6019. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  6020. identify it. We also worked to create
  6021. a custom Tor client which allows the
  6022. user finer control.� ... ...
  6023.  
  6024.  �This accomplishes several things.
  6025. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  6026. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  6027. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  6028. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  6029. be excessively complex, as a single
  6030. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  6031. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  6032. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  6033. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  6034. going to and from the proxy server,
  6035. it is possible to deduce which clients
  6036. are making which requests. Second, if
  6037. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  6038. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  6039. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  6040. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  6041. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  6042. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  6043. must be coordinated across several machines,
  6044. and an attacker must own all the hops
  6045. along the circuit in order to trace
  6046. requests back to the originating client.�
  6047.  
  6048. ... ...
  6049.  
  6050.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  6051. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  6052. a hidden service will turn up the port
  6053. that the hidden service is using to deal
  6054. with incoming connections. It can then be
  6055. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  6056.  
  6057. ... ...
  6058.  
  6059.  �We would have to try to connect to
  6060. each of the ports we see open on a
  6061. machine to determine if there is a
  6062. hidden service being run. We would not
  6063. even know which protocol the hidden
  6064. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  6065. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  6066. etc. The only thing we know is that
  6067. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  6068. not enough to attempt to connect once
  6069. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  6070. Several protocols must be tried.�
  6071.  
  6072. ... ...
  6073.  
  6074.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  6075. directory servers in more detail. Our
  6076. work focused solely on the client, but
  6077. many attacks would be much easier with
  6078. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  6079. servers ultimately control which Tor
  6080. servers are used by clients. We have found
  6081. that a server can put itself on a directory
  6082. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  6083. server running several Tor processes, each
  6084. having a different nickname, open port,
  6085. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  6086. requires different configuration files
  6087. for the different processes, which are
  6088. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  6089. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  6090. since it is listed several times. This
  6091. increases the density of friendly servers
  6092. in the cloud without increasing the number
  6093. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  6094. each listing has the same IP address,
  6095. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  6096. who inspecting the directories.�
  6097.  
  6098. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  6099. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  6100. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  6101.  
  6102. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  6103.  
  6104. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  6105.  
  6106. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  6107.  
  6108. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  6109.  
  6110. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  6111.  
  6112.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  6113. into capabilities the IC has developed
  6114. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  6115. to run multiple research teams (either
  6116. known or unknown to each other) against
  6117. a single target, and a few summer students
  6118. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  6119. small investment. I�d expect there are
  6120. other programs with more sophisticated
  6121. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  6122.  
  6123. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  6124. _______________________________________
  6125. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  6126.  
  6127. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  6128. _______________________________________
  6129. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  6130. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  6131.  
  6132. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  6133.  
  6134.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  6135. the past several months, I�d also thought
  6136. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  6137. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  6138. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  6139. Sasso of The Hill.
  6140.  
  6141.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  6142. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  6143. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  6144. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  6145. help you with that.�
  6146.  
  6147. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  6148.  
  6149.  The conversation then turned specifically
  6150. to the government�s use of targeted
  6151. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  6152. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  6153. hope they make full use of the capacities
  6154. of the National Security Agency when we
  6155. do that.�
  6156.  
  6157.  Hayden was responding to a question
  6158. about a new project announced by journalists
  6159. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  6160. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  6161. assassinations.
  6162.  
  6163. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  6164. _______________________________________
  6165. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  6166.  
  6167. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  6168.  
  6169. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  6170.  
  6171. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  6172. _______________________________________
  6173. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  6174. Breaches ::
  6175.  
  6176. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  6177.  
  6178. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  6179.  
  6180. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  6181. _______________________________________
  6182. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  6183. of US Citizens ::
  6184.  
  6185.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  6186. body of knowledge in recent months about
  6187. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  6188. information concerning Americans, prompting
  6189. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  6190. in the agency and President Obama to order
  6191. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  6192. Almost everything about the agency�s
  6193. operations is hidden, and the decision
  6194. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  6195. was made in secret, without review by the
  6196. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  6197. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  6198. Department memo warned of the potential
  6199. for the �misuse� of such information
  6200. without adequate safeguards.
  6201.  
  6202. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  6203. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  6204. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  6205.  
  6206. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  6207. From American Social Networks ::
  6208.  
  6209. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  6210. _______________________________________
  6211. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  6212. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  6213.  
  6214. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  6215. _______________________________________
  6216. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  6217. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  6218.  
  6219.  Led by the German government, a loose
  6220. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  6221. across the world is pushing to update an
  6222. influential international human rights
  6223. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  6224.  
  6225. ... ...
  6226.  
  6227.  The annual conference was attended by a
  6228. diverse selection of privacy and data
  6229. protection officials from across the
  6230. world, with representatives attending
  6231. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  6232. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  6233. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  6234. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  6235. United Kingdom.
  6236.  
  6237.  During a closed session at the conference
  6238. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  6239. resolution was put forward for a vote
  6240. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  6241. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  6242. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  6243. globally applicable standards for data
  6244. protection and the protection of privacy
  6245. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  6246.  
  6247.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  6248. of the resolution ... the United States.
  6249.  
  6250.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  6251. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  6252. eventually need to be put forward at the
  6253. United Nations and voted on by member
  6254. states, and that could take time. But
  6255. the growing appetite to amend the
  6256. international treaty in light of the
  6257. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  6258. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  6259. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  6260. technology in the digital age to trample
  6261. over basic universal privacy rights.
  6262.  
  6263. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  6264.  
  6265. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  6266.  
  6267. NOBODY comments
  6268.  
  6269.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  6270. all secret agencies around the world,
  6271. in general. All secret agencies and
  6272. their third-party vendors or allies
  6273. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  6274. backdoors in electronic communication
  6275. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  6276. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  6277. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  6278. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  6279. you must kill any trust in security.
  6280.  
  6281.  Security does not exist on the web.
  6282. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  6283. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  6284. _______________________________________
  6285. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  6286.  
  6287. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  6288.  
  6289. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  6290.  
  6291. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  6292. _______________________________________
  6293. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  6294.  
  6295. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  6296. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  6297. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  6298. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  6299. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  6300.  
  6301. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  6302. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  6303.  
  6304. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  6305. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  6306. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  6307.  
  6308.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are tapping the
  6309. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  6310. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  6311. of this) as opposed to �downstream� collection, which
  6312. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  6313.  
  6314. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  6315.  
  6316. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  6317.  
  6318. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  6319.  
  6320. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6321. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6322. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6323. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6324. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6325. _______________________________________
  6326. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  6327. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  6328. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  6329.  
  6330. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  6331. _______________________________________
  6332. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  6333.  
  6334.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  6335. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  6336. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  6337. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  6338. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  6339. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  6340. file transfer and social networking services.
  6341.  
  6342.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  6343. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  6344. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  6345. officials.
  6346.  
  6347.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India�s
  6348. domestic politics and the country�s strategic and commercial
  6349. interests.
  6350.  
  6351. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  6352.  
  6353.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  6354. document about �Close Access SIGADs�, the offices of Indian
  6355. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  6356. at these important posts were targets of four different
  6357. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  6358.  
  6359.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  6360. of computers.
  6361.  
  6362. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  6363.  
  6364. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  6365.  
  6366. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  6367.  
  6368. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  6369. _______________________________________
  6370. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  6371.  
  6372.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  6373. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  6374. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  6375. in some cases plan the destruction of, �more than 10,000
  6376. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  6377. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  6378. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  6379. that could threaten US or allied interests.�
  6380.  
  6381. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  6382. _______________________________________
  6383. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  6384.  
  6385. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  6386. _______________________________________
  6387. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  6388. NSA Leaks ::
  6389.  
  6390. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  6391. _______________________________________
  6392. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  6393.  
  6394. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  6395. _______________________________________
  6396. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  6397. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  6398.  
  6399. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  6400. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  6401. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  6402.  
  6403. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  6404. Under United States Control ::
  6405.  
  6406.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  6407. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  6408. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  6409.  
  6410.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  6411. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  6412. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  6413. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  6414. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  6415. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  6416. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it�s,
  6417. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  6418.  
  6419.  �The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  6420. severe in coming months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  6421. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  6422. America Foundation think-tank. �This notion of national
  6423. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  6424. issue around the globe.�
  6425.  
  6426. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  6427. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  6428. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  6429. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  6430.  
  6431. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  6432.  
  6433.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  6434. optic cable system.
  6435.  
  6436. http://www.bricscable.com/
  6437.  
  6438. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  6439. _______________________________________
  6440. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  6441.  
  6442.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  6443. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court�s
  6444. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  6445. PATRIOT Act that�s used to justify the National Security
  6446. Agency�s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  6447. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  6448. orders has ever challenged one.
  6449.  
  6450. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  6451. _______________________________________
  6452. � Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  6453. Revelations ::
  6454.  
  6455.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  6456. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA�s
  6457. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  6458. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  6459. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  6460. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  6461.  
  6462.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  6463. the agency�s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  6464. and its �partnerships� with software and hardware vendors
  6465. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  6466. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  6467. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  6468. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  6469. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  6470. But one thing that�s become clear is that when the government
  6471. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn�t
  6472. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  6473.  
  6474. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  6475.  
  6476. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  6477.  
  6478.  The security community didn�t invent the concept of fear,
  6479. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  6480. it to the level of religion. It�s the way that security products
  6481. are marketed and sold, but it�s also the way that the intelligence
  6482. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  6483. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  6484. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  6485. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  6486. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  6487. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  6488. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  6489. fundamental building blocks of security.
  6490.  
  6491.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  6492. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  6493. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  6494. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  6495. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company�s
  6496. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  6497. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  6498. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  6499.  
  6500. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  6501. _______________________________________
  6502. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  6503.  
  6504.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  6505. President approximately every 45 days,
  6506. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  6507. the activities carried out under these
  6508. Authorizations are referred to as the
  6509. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  6510. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  6511. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  6512. the content of communications into and out
  6513. of the United States where there was a
  6514. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  6515. party to the communication was a member
  6516. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  6517.  
  6518.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  6519. acknowledged and described by the President,
  6520. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  6521. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  6522. a series of articles published in The New York
  6523. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  6524. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  6525. intelligence activities were also authorized
  6526. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  6527. but the details of those activities remain
  6528. classified.� ... ...
  6529.  
  6530.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  6531. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  6532. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  6533. as the principal governing authorities for
  6534. conducting electronic surveillance for
  6535. national security purposes. The Foreign
  6536. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  6537. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  6538. "provide legislative authorization and
  6539. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  6540. conducted within the United States for
  6541. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  6542.  
  6543. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  6544.  
  6545. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  6546. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  6547.  
  6548. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  6549.  
  6550. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  6551.  
  6552.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  6553. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  6554. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  6555. require special approval. Therefore, just
  6556. another gap. Also take in consideration
  6557. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  6558. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  6559. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  6560. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  6561. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  6562. _______________________________________
  6563. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  6564. Firm ::
  6565.  
  6566.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  6567. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  6568. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  6569. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  6570. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  6571. A �top secret� Government Communications
  6572. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  6573. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  6574. conducted under the codename �Operation
  6575. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  6576. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  6577. improve understanding of the provider�s
  6578. infrastructure. ... ...
  6579.  
  6580.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  6581. presentation, the attack was directed
  6582. at several Belgacom employees and
  6583. involved the planting of a highly
  6584. developed attack technology referred
  6585. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  6586. appears to be a method with which the
  6587. person being targeted, without their
  6588. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  6589. that then plant malware on their
  6590. computers that can then manipulate
  6591. them. Some of the employees whose
  6592. computers were infiltrated had �good
  6593. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  6594. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  6595. please the British spies, according
  6596. to the slides.
  6597.    
  6598. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  6599. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  6600. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  6601. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  6602. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  6603. _______________________________________
  6604. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  6605.  
  6606. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  6607.  
  6608. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  6609. _______________________________________
  6610. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  6611.  
  6612. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  6613. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  6614. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  6615. _______________________________________
  6616. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  6617. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  6618.  
  6619. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  6620. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  6621. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  6622. _______________________________________
  6623. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  6624.  
  6625. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  6626. ���������������������������������������
  6627. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  6628. Allocated to One Release ::
  6629.  
  6630. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  6631.  
  6632. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  6633.  
  6634. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  6635.  
  6636. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  6637. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  6638.  
  6639. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  6640.  
  6641. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  6642. Schedule ::
  6643.  
  6644. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6645.  
  6646. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6647.  
  6648. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6649.  
  6650. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6651.  
  6652. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6653.  
  6654. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6655.  
  6656. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6657. ���������������������������������������
  6658. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  6659.  
  6660.  In response to a FOIA request from
  6661. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  6662. its ethics office never looked into
  6663. complaints from two federal judges
  6664. that they had been misled about NSA
  6665. surveillance.
  6666.  
  6667. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  6668. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  6669. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  6670. ���������������������������������������
  6671.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  6672. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  6673. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  6674. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  6675. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  6676.  
  6677. Livestream will be at:
  6678.  
  6679. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  6680. _______________________________________
  6681. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  6682. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  6683.  
  6684. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  6685.  
  6686. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  6687. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  6688. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  6689.  
  6690. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  6691.  
  6692.  The Director of National Intelligence
  6693. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  6694. pages of documents related to the
  6695. government�s secret interpretation of
  6696. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  6697. (mis)use of its massive database of
  6698. every American�s phone records. The
  6699. documents were released as a result
  6700. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  6701. Act lawsuit.
  6702.  
  6703.  We�ve posted links to each document
  6704. below. While the government also posted
  6705. many of the documents here ...
  6706.  
  6707. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  6708.  
  6709. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  6710.  
  6711. Links to the documents ;
  6712.  
  6713. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  6714. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6715.  
  6716. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6717.  
  6718. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  6719. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6720. Court
  6721.  
  6722. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6723.  
  6724. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6725. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6726. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6727. Court
  6728.  
  6729. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6730.  
  6731. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6732. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6733. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6734. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  6735.  
  6736. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6737.  
  6738. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  6739. Incident
  6740.  
  6741. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6742.  
  6743. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6744. Intelligence Court
  6745.  
  6746. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6747.  
  6748. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6749. Intelligence Court
  6750.  
  6751. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6752.  
  6753. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  6754. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  6755. Business Records FISA
  6756.  
  6757. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6758.  
  6759. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  6760. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  6761.  
  6762. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6763.  
  6764. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  6765. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6766.  
  6767. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6768.  
  6769. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  6770. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  6771. Surveillance Court
  6772.  
  6773. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6774.  
  6775. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  6776. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  6777. Surveillance Court
  6778.  
  6779. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6780.  
  6781. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  6782. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  6783.  
  6784. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  6785.  
  6786. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  6787. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  6788.  
  6789. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  6790. _______________________________________
  6791. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  6792.  
  6793. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  6794.  
  6795. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  6796.  
  6797. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  6798. ���������������������������������������
  6799. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  6800.  
  6801. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  6802. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  6803. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  6804. _______________________________________
  6805. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  6806. Over Data to the NSA ::
  6807.  
  6808.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6809. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  6810. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  6811. media report. The revelation comes as
  6812. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  6813. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  6814. troves of data with the US and UK.
  6815.  
  6816.  Citing secret government documents,
  6817. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  6818. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6819. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  6820. with domestic security, works closely
  6821. with the US and regularly sends them
  6822. information.
  6823.  
  6824.  The security service gathers intelligence
  6825. on internal security threats. The documents
  6826. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  6827. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  6828. well as regular meetings between officers
  6829. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  6830.  
  6831. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  6832. _______________________________________
  6833. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  6834. Revelations ::
  6835.  
  6836. This is an unofficial translation.
  6837.  
  6838. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  6839.  
  6840.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  6841. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  6842. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  6843.  
  6844. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  6845.  
  6846. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  6847. _______________________________________
  6848. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  6849.  
  6850. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  6851. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  6852. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  6853. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  6854. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  6855. _______________________________________
  6856. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  6857.  
  6858. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  6859.  
  6860. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  6861.  
  6862. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  6863. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  6864.  
  6865. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  6866.  
  6867. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  6868.  
  6869.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  6870. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  6871. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  6872. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  6873. and control over natural resources.
  6874. _______________________________________
  6875. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  6876.  
  6877.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  6878. machines to read.
  6879.  
  6880. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  6881. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  6882. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  6883. _______________________________________
  6884. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  6885.  
  6886. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  6887.  
  6888. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  6889. _______________________________________
  6890. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  6891. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  6892. National Unit ::
  6893.  
  6894.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  6895. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  6896. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  6897. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  6898. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  6899. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  6900. it Wednesday.
  6901.  
  6902.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  6903. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  6904. raw signals intelligence, referred
  6905. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  6906. swathes of digital data traffic that
  6907. the agency gathers under secret court
  6908. authority from US Internet providers.
  6909.  
  6910.  So sensitive is this data that even
  6911. before being disseminated to other US
  6912. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  6913. to a court-mandated process called
  6914. minimization, under which the names
  6915. of any Americans are removed unless
  6916. they are essential for foreign
  6917. intelligence interest.
  6918.  
  6919.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  6920. that the data shared with Israel
  6921. �includes, but is not limited to,
  6922. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  6923. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  6924. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  6925. and content.�
  6926.  
  6927.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  6928. and unminimized raw collection associated
  6929. with selectors from multiple Target office
  6930. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  6931. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  6932. relationship between the two organizations.�
  6933.  
  6934. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  6935. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  6936. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  6937. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  6938. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  6939. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  6940.  
  6941.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  6942. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  6943. that spy most aggressively against the
  6944. United States.
  6945.  
  6946.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6947. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6948. insider threat detection capabilities
  6949. across the Community. In addition, we
  6950. are investing in target surveillance
  6951. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6952. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6953. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  6954.  
  6955. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6956. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6957. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6958.  
  6959. NOBODY comments
  6960.  
  6961.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  6962. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  6963. plenty of inside information.
  6964.  
  6965.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  6966. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  6967. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  6968.  
  6969. This reminds of a quote ;
  6970.  
  6971.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  6972. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  6973. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  6974. to play out one big game of destruction
  6975. and domination with humans as the visible
  6976. and spiritual puppets?�
  6977. _______________________________________
  6978. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  6979.  
  6980. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  6981. _______________________________________
  6982. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  6983.  
  6984. (EN)
  6985. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6986.  
  6987. (DE)
  6988. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  6989.  
  6990. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  6991.  
  6992.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  6993. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  6994. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  6995. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  6996. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  6997. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  6998. deployed in a government intelligence
  6999. agency presentation.
  7000.  
  7001. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  7002. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  7003. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  7004. ���������������������������������������
  7005. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  7006. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  7007.  
  7008.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  7009. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  7010. reverse restrictions on the National
  7011. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  7012. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  7013. the agency to search deliberately for
  7014. Americans� communications in its massive
  7015. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  7016. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  7017. �declassified material� - (which, by
  7018. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  7019. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  7020. of which agency it came from and most
  7021. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  7022.  
  7023. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  7024.  
  7025.  In addition, the court extended the
  7026. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  7027. to retain intercepted US communications
  7028. from five years to six years � and more
  7029. under special circumstances, according
  7030. to the documents, which include a
  7031. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  7032. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  7033. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  7034. Surveillance Court.
  7035.  
  7036. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  7037.  
  7038. NOBODY comments
  7039.  
  7040.  The document which was declassified by
  7041. US intelligence officials explains the
  7042. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  7043. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  7044. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  7045.  
  7046. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  7047. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  7048. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  7049.  
  7050.  National Security Agency analysts
  7051. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  7052. their authority to spy on Americans.
  7053.  
  7054. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  7055.  
  7056.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  7057. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  7058.  
  7059. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7060.  
  7061. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7062.  
  7063.  And this is not the first attempt to
  7064. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  7065.  
  7066. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  7067.  
  7068. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  7069.  
  7070.  The new Washington Post report has
  7071. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  7072. (press) release exposing yet another
  7073. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  7074. or take responsibility for the abuses
  7075. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  7076.  
  7077. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  7078.  
  7079.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  7080. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  7081.  
  7082.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  7083. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  7084.  
  7085.  All of this information is backed up
  7086. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  7087. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  7088. 2,776 violations one year after the
  7089. FISA Court order.
  7090.  
  7091. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7092.  
  7093.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  7094. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  7095. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  7096. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  7097. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  7098. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  7099. them out of office come next election.
  7100. _______________________________________
  7101. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  7102.  
  7103. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  7104. _______________________________________
  7105. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  7106.  
  7107. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  7108.  
  7109.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  7110. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  7111. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  7112.  
  7113. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  7114.  
  7115. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  7116.  
  7117. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  7118.  
  7119. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  7120.  
  7121. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  7122.  
  7123. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  7124.  
  7125. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  7126.  
  7127. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  7128. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  7129. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  7130. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  7131.  
  7132. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  7133.  
  7134.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  7135. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  7136. reports that the US National Security Agency
  7137. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  7138.  
  7139.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  7140. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  7141. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  7142. Tuesday.
  7143.  
  7144.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  7145. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  7146. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  7147. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  7148. several of her top aides, and tapped
  7149. her phone.
  7150.  
  7151. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  7152.  
  7153. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  7154. Impacted ::
  7155.  
  7156.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  7157. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  7158. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  7159. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  7160. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  7161. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  7162.  
  7163.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  7164. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  7165. visit to Washington in October, the
  7166. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  7167. year, or will take action on digital
  7168. security that may affect US companies
  7169. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  7170.  
  7171.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  7172. a proposal that would suspend operations
  7173. of companies that cooperate with the
  7174. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  7175.  
  7176. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  7177. _______________________________________
  7178. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  7179.  
  7180. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  7181.  
  7182. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  7183.  
  7184. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  7185. ���������������������������������������
  7186. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  7187.  
  7188.  �We are bolstering our support for
  7189. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  7190. collect against high priority targets,
  7191. including foreign leadership targets.
  7192. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  7193. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  7194. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  7195. internet traffic.�
  7196.  
  7197. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7198.  
  7199. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7200.  
  7201. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  7202.  
  7203. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  7204.  
  7205. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  7206.  
  7207. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  7208.  
  7209.  �The Post is withholding some information
  7210. after consultation with US officials who
  7211. expressed concerns about the risk to
  7212. intelligence sources and methods.
  7213. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  7214. the documents that The Post is publishing
  7215. only summary tables and charts online.�
  7216.  
  7217. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  7218.  
  7219. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  7220. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  7221.  
  7222. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  7223.  
  7224. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  7225.  
  7226. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  7227. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  7228.  
  7229. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  7230.  
  7231. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  7232.  
  7233. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  7234.  
  7235.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  7236. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  7237. intelligence services, leaked documents
  7238. reveal.
  7239.  
  7240.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  7241. to have an aggressive intelligence
  7242. collection operations against the
  7243. United States,� Pillar said. While
  7244. much information is collected through
  7245. traditional political contacts, �I
  7246. would personally have no doubt that
  7247. that is supplemented by whatever means
  7248. they can use to find out as much as
  7249. they can about what we�re doing,
  7250. thinking, deciding on anything of
  7251. interest to Israel, which would include
  7252. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  7253.  
  7254. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  7255.  
  7256. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  7257.  
  7258.  �To further safeguard our classified
  7259. networks, we continue to strengthen
  7260. insider threat detection capabilities
  7261. across the Community. In addition, we
  7262. are investing in target surveillance
  7263. and offensive CI against key targets,
  7264. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  7265. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  7266. _______________________________________
  7267. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  7268.  
  7269.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  7270. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  7271. the worst part is the Received headers.
  7272. Everyone should look at their own headers
  7273. -- especially people on this list and
  7274. at least comprehend that your email
  7275. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  7276. the Mailman archive.
  7277.  
  7278.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  7279. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  7280. the actual separators in MIME part
  7281. breaks, and so on.
  7282.  
  7283.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  7284. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  7285. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  7286. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  7287. don�t do it all the time.
  7288.  
  7289.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  7290. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  7291. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  7292. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  7293. is that this tells us that the crypto
  7294. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  7295. for quite some time.
  7296.  
  7297.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  7298. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  7299. that works being deployed everywhere.
  7300. What do you do? You just be patient and
  7301. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  7302. analysis.
  7303.  
  7304. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  7305.  
  7306. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  7307.  
  7308. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  7309.  
  7310.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  7311. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  7312. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  7313. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  7314. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  7315. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  7316. reveal.
  7317.  
  7318. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  7319.  
  7320.  �We are bolstering our support for
  7321. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  7322. collect against high priority targets,
  7323. including foreign leadership targets.
  7324. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  7325. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  7326. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  7327. internet traffic.� ... ...
  7328.  
  7329. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  7330.  
  7331.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  7332. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  7333. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  7334. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  7335. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  7336. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  7337.  
  7338.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  7339. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  7340.  
  7341. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7342.  
  7343. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7344.  
  7345. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  7346.  
  7347. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  7348.  
  7349. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  7350.  
  7351.  The US government has attempted to
  7352. obtain the master encryption keys that
  7353. Internet companies use to shield millions
  7354. of users� private web communications
  7355. from eavesdropping.
  7356.  
  7357.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  7358. which have not been disclosed previously,
  7359. represent a technological escalation in
  7360. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  7361. the National Security Agency employ when
  7362. conducting electronic surveillance against
  7363. Internet users. ... ...
  7364.  
  7365.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  7366. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  7367. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  7368. communications are typically destroyed
  7369. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  7370. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  7371. of all communications that are enciphered�
  7372. is permissible.
  7373.  
  7374. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  7375. _______________________________________
  7376. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  7377. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  7378.  
  7379.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  7380. intercepts well before 2001, former
  7381. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  7382. secretive Special Services Office,
  7383. these types of programs were at first
  7384. designed to intercept communications
  7385. overseas through arrangements with
  7386. foreign Internet providers, the former
  7387. officials say. NSA still has such
  7388. arrangements in many countries,
  7389. particularly in the Middle East and
  7390. Europe, the former officials say.�
  7391.  
  7392. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  7393.  
  7394. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  7395.  
  7396. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  7397. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  7398. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  7399. ���������������������������������������
  7400. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  7401. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  7402.  
  7403.  A common hacking technique can be used
  7404. to make emails look as if they came from
  7405. outside the United States.
  7406.  
  7407. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  7408. _______________________________________
  7409. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  7410. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  7411.  
  7412. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  7413.  
  7414. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  7415.  
  7416. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  7417.  
  7418. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7419. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7420. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  7421. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  7422. ���������������������������������������
  7423. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  7424. Patrick Leahy ::
  7425.  
  7426. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  7427.  
  7428. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  7429.  
  7430. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  7431. _______________________________________
  7432. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  7433.  
  7434.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  7435. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  7436. their authority to spy on Americans
  7437. multiple times in the past decade,
  7438. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  7439. and lawmakers� statements that no
  7440. willful violations occurred. ...
  7441.  
  7442.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  7443. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  7444. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  7445. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  7446. of having links to terrorism, before a
  7447. secret court that oversees surveillance
  7448. found the operation unconstitutional
  7449. in 2011.
  7450.  
  7451. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  7452.  
  7453. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  7454. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  7455. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  7456.  
  7457.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  7458. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  7459. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  7460. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  7461. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  7462.  
  7463.  The documents were released in response
  7464. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  7465. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  7466.  
  7467.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  7468. litigation and the most significant leak
  7469. in American history to finally get them
  7470. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  7471. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  7472. �but I�m happy that the administration
  7473. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  7474.  
  7475. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  7476. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  7477. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  7478.  
  7479. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  7480.  
  7481. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7482.  
  7483. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7484.  
  7485. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  7486.  
  7487. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  7488.  
  7489. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  7490.  
  7491. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  7492. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  7493.  
  7494. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7495. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  7496. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  7497. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  7498. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  7499. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  7500.  
  7501.  The account is based on top-secret
  7502. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  7503. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  7504. including unauthorized collection,
  7505. storage, access to or distribution of
  7506. legally protected communications � in
  7507. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  7508. originally only meant to be seen by top
  7509. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  7510. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  7511. and other locations in the Washington DC
  7512. region.
  7513.  
  7514. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  7515.  
  7516.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  7517. and other things, there�s people talking
  7518. about privacy violations or abuses or
  7519. willful or violations, right, it is
  7520. important for people to understand,
  7521. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  7522. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  7523. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  7524.  
  7525.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  7526. We detect them, as early as we can.
  7527. We correct them, right. None of the
  7528. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  7529. the document released were willful.
  7530. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  7531. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  7532. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  7533.  
  7534. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  7535.  
  7536. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  7537. Database Queries Per Month ::
  7538.  
  7539. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  7540.  
  7541. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  7542.  
  7543. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  7544. _______________________________________
  7545. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  7546.  
  7547.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  7548. station in the Middle East to intercept
  7549. and process vast quantities of emails,
  7550. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  7551. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  7552. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  7553.  
  7554.  The information is then processed for
  7555. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  7556. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  7557. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  7558. The Government claims the station is a
  7559. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  7560. and provides a vital �early warning�
  7561. system for potential attacks around
  7562. the world.
  7563.  
  7564.  The Independent is not revealing the
  7565. precise location of the station but
  7566. information on its activities was
  7567. contained in the leaked documents
  7568. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  7569. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  7570. these documents in recent months has
  7571. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  7572. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  7573. the destruction of hard drives containing
  7574. the data. ... ...
  7575.  
  7576.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  7577. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  7578. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  7579. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  7580. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  7581. the global interception of digital
  7582. communications, such as emails and text
  7583. messages.
  7584.  
  7585.  Across three sites, communications �
  7586. including telephone calls � are tracked
  7587. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  7588. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  7589.  
  7590. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  7591. ���������������������������������������
  7592. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  7593.  
  7594. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  7595. _______________________________________
  7596. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  7597. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  7598. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  7599. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  7600. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  7601. E Grassley ::
  7602.  
  7603. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  7604.  
  7605. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  7606.  
  7607. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  7608.  
  7609. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  7610.  
  7611. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  7612.  
  7613. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  7614.  
  7615. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  7616.  
  7617. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  7618.  
  7619. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  7620.  
  7621. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  7622.  
  7623. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  7624. Congress ::
  7625.  
  7626.  �I can now confirm that the House
  7627. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  7628. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  7629. available to Representatives in Congress,
  7630. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  7631. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  7632. the now declassified documents detailing
  7633. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  7634.  
  7635. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  7636.  
  7637. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  7638.  
  7639. ?
  7640.  
  7641. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7642.  
  7643.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7644. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7645. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7646. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7647. discussions with the president when he
  7648. first came on board we talked to him about
  7649. these programs and the issue was how do
  7650. we know the compliance is there and what
  7651. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7652. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  7653. of compliance. This directorate of
  7654. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7655. and information specialists that can look
  7656. at everything that we do in these programs
  7657. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7658. orders but we also have oversight from
  7659. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7660. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7661. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7662. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  7663. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7664. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7665. _______________________________________
  7666. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  7667.  
  7668.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  7669. public so far.
  7670.  
  7671. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  7672. _______________________________________
  7673. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  7674.  
  7675. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  7676. _______________________________________
  7677. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  7678. Data Lab ::
  7679.  
  7680. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  7681.  
  7682. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  7683. _______________________________________
  7684. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  7685. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  7686.  
  7687. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  7688. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  7689. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  7690. _______________________________________
  7691. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  7692.  
  7693.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  7694. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  7695. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  7696. there since he assumed the position
  7697. of Secretary of State. He has already
  7698. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  7699. � where officials demanded an explanation
  7700. to reports that Washington had collected
  7701. vast amounts of internet data there.
  7702. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  7703. which allegedly was the top regional
  7704. target of the surveillance program.
  7705.  
  7706. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  7707.  
  7708. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  7709.  
  7710. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  7711. Surveillance ::
  7712.  
  7713. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  7714.  
  7715. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  7716.  
  7717. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  7718. _______________________________________
  7719. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  7720.  
  7721. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  7722. ���������������������������������������
  7723. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  7724.  
  7725. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  7726.  
  7727. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  7728.  
  7729. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  7730.  
  7731. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  7732.  
  7733. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  7734. _______________________________________
  7735. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  7736.  
  7737. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  7738.  
  7739. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  7740. _______________________________________
  7741. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  7742.  
  7743. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  7744.  
  7745.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  7746. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  7747. use of certain United States person names
  7748. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  7749. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  7750. implement any USP queries until an effective
  7751. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  7752. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  7753. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  7754. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  7755. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  7756. databases).�
  7757.  
  7758. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  7759.  
  7760. NOBODY comments
  7761.  
  7762. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  7763.  
  7764. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7765.  
  7766.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7767. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7768. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7769. communications not related to foreign
  7770. information or foreign activity for up
  7771. to five years.
  7772.  
  7773.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  7774. acquired communications of or concerning a
  7775. United States person may be retained no
  7776. longer than five years in any event.�
  7777.  
  7778.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  7779. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  7780. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  7781. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  7782. communications that have been stored.
  7783. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  7784. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  7785. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  7786. to �communications security vulnerability�
  7787. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  7788. _______________________________________
  7789. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  7790.  
  7791. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  7792. _______________________________________
  7793. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  7794.  
  7795. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  7796. _______________________________________
  7797. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  7798. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  7799.  
  7800.  As the steady stream of revelations
  7801. continues, the White House has choosen
  7802. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  7803. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  7804.  
  7805. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  7806. _______________________________________
  7807. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  7808.  
  7809. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  7810.  
  7811. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  7812. Spying Press Conference ::
  7813.  
  7814.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  7815. Presidential press conference in which the
  7816. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  7817. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  7818. that Obama told today about the program
  7819. by citing multiple articles with information
  7820. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  7821.  
  7822. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  7823. ���������������������������������������
  7824. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  7825. Partners ::
  7826.  
  7827. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  7828. ���������������������������������������
  7829. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  7830. Metadata ::
  7831.  
  7832. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  7833. ���������������������������������������
  7834. � National Security Run Amok ::
  7835.  
  7836. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  7837. _______________________________________
  7838.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  7839. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  7840. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  7841. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  7842.  
  7843. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  7844.  
  7845.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  7846. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  7847. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  7848. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  7849. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  7850. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  7851. for including former senators Hillary
  7852. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  7853.  
  7854. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  7855.  
  7856. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  7857. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  7858.  
  7859. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  7860.  
  7861. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7862.  
  7863. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  7864. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  7865.  
  7866. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  7867.  
  7868.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  7869. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  7870.  
  7871. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  7872. ���������������������������������������
  7873. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  7874.  
  7875. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  7876.  
  7877. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  7878.  
  7879. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  7880.  
  7881. NOBODY comments
  7882.  
  7883. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  7884.  
  7885.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  7886. the document was still classified. It was
  7887. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  7888.  
  7889. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7890.  
  7891.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  7892. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  7893. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  7894. many of these operations being leaked.
  7895. _______________________________________
  7896. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  7897. on Brazilian Television ::
  7898.  
  7899. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  7900. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  7901. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  7902.  
  7903. NOBODY comments
  7904.  
  7905.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  7906. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  7907.  
  7908.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  7909. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  7910. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  7911.  
  7912. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  7913. ���������������������������������������
  7914. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7915. English Report ::
  7916.  
  7917.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  7918. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  7919. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  7920. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  7921. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  7922. matters is also much closer than first
  7923. thought. ... ...
  7924.  
  7925.  Day after day and month after month,
  7926. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  7927. amounts of connection data relating
  7928. to the communications it had placed
  7929. under surveillance. The so-called
  7930. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  7931. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  7932. into the Americans� giant databases.
  7933.  
  7934. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  7935.  
  7936. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7937. Deutsch Report ::
  7938.  
  7939. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  7940.  
  7941. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  7942.  
  7943. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  7944. ���������������������������������������
  7945. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  7946.  
  7947. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  7948. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  7949. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  7950.  
  7951. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  7952.  
  7953. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  7954.  
  7955.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  7956. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  7957. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  7958. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  7959. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  7960. the Guardian�s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  7961. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  7962.  
  7963. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  7964. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  7965. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  7966. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  7967.  
  7968. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  7969.  
  7970. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  7971.  
  7972. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  7973.  
  7974. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  7975.  
  7976. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  7977.  
  7978. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  7979.  
  7980. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  7981.  
  7982. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  7983.  
  7984. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  7985.  
  7986. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  7987.  
  7988. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  7989.  
  7990. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  7991.  
  7992. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  7993.  
  7994. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  7995.  
  7996.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  7997. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  7998. they are shunted off to various �production
  7999. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  8000. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  8001. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  8002. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  8003. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  8004. stored in a database called MARINA and
  8005. is generally retained for five years.
  8006.  
  8007. ... ...
  8008.  
  8009.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  8010. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  8011. to change the surveillance laws once the
  8012. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  8013. This was for a simple reason: they did
  8014. not want to be responsible for a program
  8015. that was not legal.�
  8016.  
  8017. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  8018.  
  8019. NOBODY comments
  8020.  
  8021.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  8022. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  8023. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  8024. communications not related to foreign
  8025. information or foreign activity for up
  8026. to five years.
  8027.  
  8028.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  8029. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  8030. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  8031. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  8032. ���������������������������������������
  8033. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  8034. for GCHQ Bude ::
  8035.  
  8036. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  8037. _______________________________________
  8038. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  8039. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  8040.  
  8041.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  8042. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  8043. counterfeiting and even copyright
  8044. infringement complain that their
  8045. attempts to exploit the security
  8046. agency�s vast resources have often
  8047. been turned down because their own
  8048. investigations are not considered a
  8049. high enough priority, current and
  8050. former government officials say.
  8051.  
  8052.  Intelligence officials say they have
  8053. been careful to limit the use of the
  8054. security agency�s troves of data and
  8055. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  8056. could be misused in ways that violate
  8057. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  8058.  
  8059.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  8060. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  8061. senior intelligence official at the
  8062. White House and at the office of the
  8063. director of national intelligence.
  8064. �They collect all this information,
  8065. but it�s difficult for the other
  8066. agencies to get access to what
  8067. they want.�
  8068.  
  8069. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  8070. _______________________________________
  8071. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  8072. Security Forum ::
  8073.  
  8074. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  8075.  
  8076. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  8077. Conference ::
  8078.  
  8079. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  8080.  
  8081. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  8082. Conference ::
  8083.  
  8084. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  8085. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  8086. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  8087.  
  8088.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  8089. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  8090. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  8091. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  8092. discussions with the president when he
  8093. first came on board we talked to him about
  8094. these programs and the issue was how do
  8095. we know the compliance is there and what
  8096. more could we do? We stood up working with
  8097. the committees in Congress a directorate
  8098. of compliance. This directorate of
  8099. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  8100. and information specialists that can look
  8101. at everything that we do in these programs
  8102. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  8103. orders but we also have oversight from
  8104. the Director of National Intelligence,
  8105. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  8106. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  8107. from the White House, from Congress, the
  8108. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  8109. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  8110.  
  8111. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  8112. Blackhat Conference ::
  8113.  
  8114. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  8115.  
  8116. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  8117.  
  8118. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  8119.  
  8120. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  8121.  
  8122. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  8123.  
  8124. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  8125.  
  8126. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  8127. _______________________________________
  8128. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  8129.  
  8130. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  8131.  
  8132. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  8133. All Domestic Calls ::
  8134.  
  8135.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  8136. three documents related to the National
  8137. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  8138. records, including briefings to Congress
  8139. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  8140. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  8141. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  8142. Court that outlines rules that must be
  8143. followed when accessing data provided by
  8144. a Verizon subsidiary.
  8145.  
  8146. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  8147.  
  8148.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  8149. what the government was doing with the
  8150. Patriot Act program, several senators
  8151. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  8152. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  8153. the law in a twisted way to do something
  8154. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  8155. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  8156. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  8157. Act to obtain that document.
  8158.  
  8159. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  8160. _______________________________________
  8161. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  8162.  
  8163. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  8164.  
  8165. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  8166. _______________________________________
  8167. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  8168.  
  8169.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  8170. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  8171. two or three years ago.�
  8172.  
  8173. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  8174. _______________________________________
  8175. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  8176. Received Dox ::
  8177.  
  8178. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  8179. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  8180. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  8181. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  8182. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  8183.  
  8184. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  8185.  
  8186. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  8187.  
  8188. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  8189. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  8190.  
  8191.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  8192. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  8193. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  8194. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  8195. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  8196. twice as much campaign financing from
  8197. the defense and intelligence industry
  8198. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  8199.  
  8200. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  8201.  
  8202. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  8203. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  8204.  
  8205. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  8206. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  8207. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  8208.  
  8209. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  8210.  
  8211. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  8212.  
  8213. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  8214. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  8215.  
  8216. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  8217. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  8218. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  8219. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  8220.  
  8221. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  8222. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  8223.  
  8224.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  8225. disclosures, the President has said
  8226. that he welcomes a debate about how
  8227. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  8228. our national security and the privacy
  8229. of our citizens.  The Administration
  8230. has taken various proactive steps to
  8231. advance this debate including the
  8232. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  8233. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  8234. his public statements on the disclosed
  8235. programs, the Office of the Director
  8236. of National Intelligence�s release of
  8237. its own public statements, ODNI General
  8238. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  8239. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  8240. disclose publicly that the Administration
  8241. filed an application with the Foreign
  8242. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  8243. look forward to continuing to discuss
  8244. these critical issues with the American
  8245. people and the Congress.
  8246.  
  8247.  However, we oppose the current effort
  8248. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  8249. of our Intelligence Community�s
  8250. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  8251. approach is not the product of an
  8252. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  8253. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  8254. Amendment, and instead move forward
  8255. with an approach that appropriately
  8256. takes into account the need for a
  8257. reasoned review of what tools can
  8258. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  8259.  
  8260. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  8261.  
  8262. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  8263.  
  8264. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  8265. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  8266.  
  8267. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  8268.  
  8269. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  8270. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  8271. to Defund NSA ::
  8272.  
  8273. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  8274. _______________________________________
  8275.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  8276. official letter from the NSA, which was
  8277. sent to the German government to clarify
  8278. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  8279. because German media and politics were
  8280. heavily confused after it became clear
  8281. that there�s more than one program named
  8282. PRISM.
  8283.  
  8284.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  8285. data collection program is about and
  8286. then confirms that this program is
  8287. different from a more common military
  8288. web tool called "Planning tool for
  8289. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  8290. and Management" (PRISM).
  8291.  
  8292.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  8293. there�s even a third program called
  8294. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  8295. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  8296. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  8297. apparently an internal NSA information
  8298. sharing program. It was unknown until
  8299. now, probably because it�s used in the
  8300. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  8301. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  8302.  
  8303.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  8304. different PRISM programs:
  8305.  
  8306. 1. PRISM
  8307.  
  8308.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  8309. of collecting information about foreign
  8310. targets from data of nine major US
  8311. internet companies. This program started
  8312. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  8313. in June 2013.
  8314.  
  8315. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  8316. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  8317.  
  8318.  This is a web tool used by US military
  8319. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  8320. to data collection platforms deployed to
  8321. military operations. This program is
  8322. not very secret and was first mentioned
  8323. in 2002.
  8324.  
  8325. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  8326. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  8327.  
  8328.  This is an internal NSA program for
  8329. real-time sharing of information,
  8330. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  8331. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  8332. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  8333.  
  8334. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  8335.  
  8336. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  8337. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  8338.  
  8339.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  8340. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  8341. surveillance activities in Germany.
  8342. It only added to the mystery. A US
  8343. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  8344. that there are actually three unrelated
  8345. Prism programs. ... ...
  8346.  
  8347.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  8348. and Maassen, officials also read a
  8349. written statement from the NSA in
  8350. response to a query from the German
  8351. government. According to the statement,
  8352. there are three separate Prism programs,
  8353. all of them unconnected to each other.
  8354. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  8355. said that one of the Prism programs was
  8356. only used internally. That program had
  8357. thus far remained secret. Another of
  8358. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  8359. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  8360. -- vaguely described in the statement
  8361. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  8362. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  8363. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  8364. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  8365.  
  8366. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  8367.  
  8368. NOBODY comments
  8369.  
  8370.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  8371. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  8372. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  8373. _______________________________________
  8374. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  8375.  
  8376. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  8377.  
  8378. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  8379.  
  8380. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  8381.  
  8382.  Description and drawings by US Army
  8383. Corps of Engineers.
  8384.  
  8385. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  8386. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  8387. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  8388. _______________________________________
  8389. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  8390.  
  8391. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  8392.  
  8393. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  8394.  
  8395. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  8396. ���������������������������������������
  8397. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  8398.  
  8399. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  8400.  
  8401. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  8402.  
  8403. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  8404.  
  8405. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  8406.  
  8407. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  8408. _______________________________________
  8409. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  8410.  
  8411.  �First, the United States would not seek
  8412. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  8413. return to the United States. The charges
  8414. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  8415. and the United States would not seek the
  8416. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  8417. charged with additional, death penalty-
  8418. eligible crimes.�
  8419.  
  8420. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  8421.  
  8422. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  8423. _______________________________________
  8424. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  8425. Peace Prize ::
  8426.  
  8427.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  8428. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  8429. agency�s data collection program, has
  8430. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  8431.  
  8432.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  8433. at great personal cost � revealed the
  8434. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  8435. the US government devotes electronic
  8436. communications worldwide,� read the
  8437. nomination. �By putting light on this
  8438. monitoring program � conducted in
  8439. contravention of national laws and
  8440. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  8441. has helped to make the world a little
  8442. bit better and safer.� ...
  8443.  
  8444.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  8445. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  8446. to being well justified in itself �
  8447. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  8448. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  8449. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  8450. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  8451. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  8452.  
  8453. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  8454. _______________________________________
  8455. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  8456. Komsomolets News ::
  8457.  
  8458. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  8459. ���������������������������������������
  8460. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  8461. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  8462.  
  8463.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  8464. his experience when he received a Foreign
  8465. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  8466. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  8467. federal government to monitor a customer
  8468. of his.
  8469.  
  8470.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  8471. contained a broad gag order, which still
  8472. prevents him from telling all the details.
  8473.  
  8474.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  8475. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  8476. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  8477. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  8478.  
  8479.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  8480. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  8481. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  8482. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  8483.  
  8484.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  8485. facility that was capturing all of the
  8486. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  8487. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  8488. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  8489. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  8490.  
  8491. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  8492. _______________________________________
  8493. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  8494.  
  8495. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  8496. _______________________________________
  8497. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  8498.  
  8499. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  8500. ���������������������������������������
  8501. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  8502. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  8503.  
  8504.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  8505. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  8506. representative rather casually indicated
  8507. that the government looks at data from
  8508. a universe of far, far more people than
  8509. previously indicated.
  8510.  
  8511.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  8512. was one of several government representatives
  8513. �including from the FBI and the office of
  8514. the Director of National Intelligence�
  8515. testifying before the House Judiciary
  8516. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  8517. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  8518. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  8519. surveillance, including a retread of the
  8520. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  8521. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  8522. Act had stopped terror events.
  8523.  
  8524.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  8525. look �two or three hops� from terror
  8526. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  8527. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  8528. how surveillance was extended had been
  8529. described as two hops. This meant that
  8530. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  8531. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  8532. could also look at the calls from the
  8533. people that suspect has spoken with one
  8534. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  8535. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  8536. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  8537. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  8538.  
  8539. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  8540.  
  8541.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  8542. them or not - two hops.
  8543.  
  8544.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  8545. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  8546.  
  8547. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  8548. ���������������������������������������
  8549. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  8550.  
  8551.  It is a good thing that people are
  8552. becoming aware of the fact that they
  8553. are being monitored - it is not only
  8554. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  8555. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  8556. made to collect information and to store
  8557. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  8558. resources that PRISM used and how it
  8559. could combine these resources to multiple
  8560. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  8561.  
  8562. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  8563. _______________________________________
  8564. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  8565.  
  8566. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  8567. ���������������������������������������
  8568. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  8569. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  8570.  
  8571.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  8572. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  8573. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  8574. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  8575. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  8576. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  8577. stories about the US government�s vast
  8578. foreign and domestic spying programs
  8579. will stop. ... ...
  8580.  
  8581.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  8582. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  8583. the United States by releasing more
  8584. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  8585.  
  8586.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  8587. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  8588. since he has already said that he gave
  8589. all of his classified information --
  8590. thousands of documents -- to several
  8591. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  8592. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  8593. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  8594. half done with the stories he plans to
  8595. write based on the secret information.
  8596.  
  8597. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  8598. ���������������������������������������
  8599. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  8600.  
  8601. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  8602. _______________________________________
  8603. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  8604.  
  8605. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  8606. ���������������������������������������
  8607. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  8608.  
  8609.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  8610. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  8611. typewriters. What do they know that
  8612. we don�t?
  8613.  
  8614. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  8615. ���������������������������������������
  8616. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  8617. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  8618.  
  8619.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  8620. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  8621. has existed since at least 2002. The
  8622. following document refers to it directly.
  8623. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  8624. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  8625. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  8626. limitation of it and similar projects.
  8627.  
  8628. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  8629.  
  8630. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  8631. _______________________________________
  8632. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  8633. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  8634.  
  8635. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  8636.  
  8637. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  8638. in Latin America ::
  8639.  
  8640. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  8641. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  8642. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  8643. _______________________________________
  8644. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  8645. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  8646.  
  8647. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  8648.  
  8649. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  8650.  
  8651. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  8652. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  8653.  
  8654. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  8655. _______________________________________
  8656. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  8657.  
  8658. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  8659. _______________________________________
  8660. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  8661. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  8662.  
  8663. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  8664. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  8665. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  8666. ���������������������������������������
  8667. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  8668.  
  8669. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  8670.  
  8671. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  8672.  
  8673. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  8674. _______________________________________
  8675. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  8676. Metadata ::
  8677.  
  8678. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  8679. _______________________________________
  8680. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  8681. by US Citizens ::
  8682.  
  8683. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  8684. ���������������������������������������
  8685. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  8686.  
  8687. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  8688.  
  8689.  �This may look like a small release, but
  8690. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  8691. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  8692. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  8693. sending encrypted data to and from the
  8694. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  8695. those servers. If you crash these servers
  8696. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  8697. "broken". We are also planning to release
  8698. some of that data (which we have access
  8699. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  8700. ���������������������������������������
  8701. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  8702. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  8703.  
  8704.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  8705. Snowden�s employer.
  8706.  
  8707. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  8708.  
  8709. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  8710.  
  8711. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  8712. _______________________________________
  8713. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  8714.  
  8715. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  8716. _______________________________________
  8717. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  8718.  
  8719.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  8720. it became clear that my freedom and
  8721. safety were under threat for revealing
  8722. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  8723. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  8724. old, family, and others who I have never
  8725. met and probably never will. I trusted
  8726. them with my life and they returned that
  8727. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  8728. always be thankful.
  8729.  
  8730.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  8731. before the world that he would not permit
  8732. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  8733. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  8734. after promising not to do so, the President
  8735. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  8736. leaders of nations from which I have
  8737. requested protection to deny my asylum
  8738. petitions.
  8739.  
  8740.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  8741. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  8742. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  8743. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  8744. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  8745. come after me.
  8746.  
  8747.  For decades the United States of America
  8748. have been one of the strongest defenders
  8749. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  8750. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  8751. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  8752. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  8753. the current government of my country. The
  8754. Obama administration has now adopted the
  8755. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  8756. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  8757. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  8758. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  8759. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  8760. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  8761. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  8762. asylum.
  8763.  
  8764.  In the end the Obama administration is
  8765. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  8766. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  8767. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  8768. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  8769. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  8770. demanding the constitutional government
  8771. it was promised � and it should be.
  8772.  
  8773.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  8774. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  8775. many.�
  8776.  
  8777. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  8778. ���������������������������������������
  8779. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  8780.  
  8781. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  8782.  
  8783. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  8784.  
  8785. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  8786. _______________________________________
  8787. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  8788.  
  8789. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  8790. ���������������������������������������
  8791. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  8792.  
  8793. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8794. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  8795. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  8796. _______________________________________
  8797. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  8798.  
  8799. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  8800. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  8801. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  8802. _______________________________________
  8803. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  8804.  
  8805. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  8806.  
  8807.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  8808. over private data to America.
  8809.  
  8810.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  8811. according to new claims by former US defence
  8812. analyst.
  8813.  
  8814.  At least six European Union countries in
  8815. addition to Britain have been colluding
  8816. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  8817. personal communications data, according
  8818. to a former contractor to America�s
  8819. National Security Agency, who said the
  8820. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  8821.  
  8822.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  8823. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  8824. and over the next 12 years held several
  8825. sensitive positions within the agency,
  8826. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  8827. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  8828. deals with the US.
  8829.  
  8830.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  8831. second and third party status� under
  8832. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  8833. that compels them to hand over data,
  8834. including mobile phone and internet
  8835. information to the NSA if requested.
  8836.  
  8837.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  8838. confirmed by declassified documents,
  8839. nations are categorised by the US according
  8840. to their trust level. The US is first party
  8841. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  8842. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  8843. Germany and France have third party
  8844. relationships.
  8845.  
  8846.  In an interview published last night
  8847. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  8848. who has been attacked for holding
  8849. controversial views on espionage issues,
  8850. said he had decided to speak out after
  8851. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  8852. told by EU politicians regarding the
  8853. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  8854.  
  8855.  He said that under the agreements,
  8856. which were drawn up after the second
  8857. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  8858. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  8859. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  8860. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  8861.  
  8862.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  8863. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  8864. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  8865. about the spying operations while staying
  8866. silent about their own arrangements
  8867. with the US, and was particularly
  8868. concerned that senior German politicians
  8869. had accused the UK of spying when their
  8870. country had a similar third-party deal
  8871. with the NSA.
  8872.  
  8873.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  8874. by other European countries to the NSA is
  8875. not on the same scale as that provided by
  8876. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  8877. embarrassing.
  8878.  
  8879.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  8880. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  8881. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  8882. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  8883. Madsen said.
  8884.  
  8885.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  8886. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  8887. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  8888. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  8889. confirmed that the entire system for
  8890. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  8891. because the EU was unable to intervene
  8892. in intelligence matters, which remained
  8893. the exclusive concern of national
  8894. governments.
  8895.  
  8896.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  8897. these contradictions and no one is really
  8898. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  8899. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  8900. democracy.�
  8901.  
  8902.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  8903. for European governments to come clean
  8904. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  8905. �There needs to be transparency as to
  8906. whether or not it is legal for the US
  8907. or any other security service to
  8908. interrogate private material,� said
  8909. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  8910. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  8911. is that none of these arrangements has
  8912. been debated in any democratic arena.
  8913. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  8914. things have to be done in secret, but you
  8915. don�t break the law in secret.�
  8916.  
  8917.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  8918. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  8919. fibre-optic cable network running between
  8920. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  8921. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  8922. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  8923. including phone calls, emails and records
  8924. of users� access to websites.
  8925.  
  8926.  He said the public needed to be made
  8927. aware of the full scale of the communication
  8928. -sharing arrangements between European
  8929. countries and the US, which predate the
  8930. internet and became of strategic importance
  8931. during the cold war.
  8932.  
  8933.  The covert relationship between the
  8934. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  8935. report by the European parliament, but
  8936. their explicit connection with the NSA
  8937. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  8938. to speak out.
  8939.  
  8940.  The European parliament�s report followed
  8941. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  8942. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  8943. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  8944. established the framework for European
  8945. member states to collaborate with the US.
  8946.  
  8947.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  8948. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  8949. that governments have chosen to keep the
  8950. public in the dark about it. The days
  8951. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  8952. of silence are over.�
  8953.  
  8954.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  8955. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  8956. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  8957. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  8958. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  8959. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  8960. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  8961. ���������������������������������������
  8962. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  8963. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  8964.  
  8965.  A former contractor to the US National
  8966. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  8967. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  8968. intelligence arrangements between the
  8969. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  8970. murky and far reaching� than the public
  8971. has been led to believe. ...
  8972.  
  8973.  He was particularly concerned about the
  8974. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  8975. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  8976. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  8977. while staying silent about their own role
  8978. in global interception arrangements with
  8979. the United States. ...
  8980.  
  8981.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  8982. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  8983.  
  8984.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  8985. many who say he had no authority or right
  8986. to provide the public with details of
  8987. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  8988. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  8989. have to provide information on NSA
  8990. surveillance at five meetings of the
  8991. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  8992. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  8993. Spain and Switzerland?�
  8994.  
  8995.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  8996. American people from a constantly changing
  8997. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  8998. is providing information to elites on
  8999. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  9000. student, religious and progressive
  9001. organizations.�
  9002.  
  9003.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  9004. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  9005. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  9006.  
  9007. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  9008. _______________________________________
  9009. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  9010.  
  9011. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  9012. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  9013. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  9014. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  9015. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  9016. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  9017. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  9018.  
  9019. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  9020.  
  9021. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  9022. ���������������������������������������
  9023. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  9024.  
  9025. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  9026. _______________________________________
  9027. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  9028.  
  9029. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  9030. _______________________________________
  9031. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  9032.  
  9033. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  9034. _______________________________________
  9035. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  9036.  
  9037. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  9038. _______________________________________
  9039. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  9040.  
  9041. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  9042. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  9043. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  9044.  
  9045. � Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  9046.  
  9047. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  9048. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  9049. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  9050. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  9051. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  9052. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  9053. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  9054. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  9055. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  9056. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  9057. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  9058. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  9059. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  9060. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  9061. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  9062. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  9063. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  9064. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  9065. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  9066. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  9067. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  9068. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  9069. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  9070. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  9071. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  9072. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  9073. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  9074. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  9075. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  9076. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  9077. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  9078. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  9079. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  9080. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  9081. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  9082. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  9083. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  9084. _______________________________________
  9085. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  9086. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  9087.  
  9088. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  9089. _______________________________________
  9090. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  9091.  
  9092. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  9093.  
  9094. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  9095.  
  9096. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  9097.  
  9098. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  9099. _______________________________________
  9100. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  9101.  
  9102. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  9103.  
  9104. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  9105. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  9106. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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