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Posted by Eyeballing the N on February Thu 5th 3:56 PM - Never Expires
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  1.  
  2. Eyeballing the NSA 041 (HTML & UTF-8 Embedded) �
  3.  
  4. http://paste.oneb1t.cz/view/ce4d037d
  5.  
  6. Eyeballing the NSA 041 (PDF) �
  7.  
  8. http://filebeam.com/f50cf8581a757fc0968d3592800d75e3
  9.    
  10.    
  11.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  12. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  13. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  14.  
  15.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  16.  
  17.  
  18. � White House Spy �Reform� - Increase Spying! Flaunt It! ::
  19.  
  20. An in-you�re-face attitude is now considered �reform.�
  21.  
  22. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/ic-ppd-28-15-0203.zip
  23.  
  24. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/29/one-year-major-report-nsa-still-collecting-bulk-domestic-data-still-clueless-much-good-surveillance/
  25. _______________________________________
  26. � Hypocrisy of Youtube�s CitizenFour Censorship ::
  27.  
  28. http://piratetimes.net/new-snowden-documentary-censored-online/
  29.  
  30. � Citizenfour Snowden Documentary (7-Zipped MP4) ::
  31.  
  32. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour.7z
  33.  
  34. � Citizenfour Snowden Documentary HD (7-Zip MP4) ::
  35.  
  36. http://cryptome.org/Citizenfour-HD.7z
  37.  
  38. � Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 PDFs in 13 Files ::
  39.  
  40. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs-pdfs.7z
  41.  
  42. � Citizenfour Screengrabs, 87 JPGs in 13 Folders ::
  43.  
  44. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Citizenfour-Screengrabs.7z
  45. _______________________________________
  46. � Western Spy Agencies Secretly Rely on Hackers for Intel ::
  47.  
  48. http://cryptome.org/2015/02/gchq-lovely-horse-intercept-15-0204.pdf
  49.  
  50. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/04/demonize-prosecute-hackers-nsa-gchq-rely-intel-expertise/
  51. ���������������������������������������
  52. � CSEC Eyeballs File Sharing Host User Data ::
  53.  
  54. http://torrentfreak.com/canadian-government-spies-on-millions-of-file-sharers-150128/
  55. http://www.cbc.ca/news/cse-tracks-millions-of-downloads-daily-snowden-documents-1.2930120
  56. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/01/28/canada-cse-levitation-mass-surveillance
  57. ���������������������������������������
  58. � NSA MORECOWBELL HTTP GET Attacking ::
  59.  
  60. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/nsa-morecowbell.htm
  61. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL.pdf
  62. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/MORECOWBELL-Analysis-Grothoff-etal.pdf
  63. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/Wertheim-NSA-and-Encryption-NotiAMS-Feb15.pdf
  64. http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/visuel/2015/01/24/cowbells-nouvelles-revelations-sur-les-pratiques-de-la-nsa_4561547_3234.html
  65. _______________________________________
  66. � Compilation of Snowden Documents - January 30, 2015 ::
  67.  
  68. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/archive/master.zip
  69.  
  70. https://github.com/nsa-observer/documents/tree/master/files/pdf
  71. _______________________________________
  72. � How GCHQ Prepares Interception of Phone Calls From Satellites ::
  73.  
  74. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2015/01/how-gchq-prepares-for-interception-of.html
  75. _______________________________________
  76. � NSA Documents Expose NSA�s Digital Arms Race for Cyber Warfare ::
  77.  
  78.  The NSA�s mass surveillance is just the beginning. Documents from
  79. Edward Snowden show that the intelligence agency is arming America
  80. for future digital wars -- a struggle for control of the Internet
  81. that is already well underway.
  82.  
  83.  Normally, internship applicants need to have polished resumes,
  84. with volunteer work on social projects considered a plus. But at
  85. Politerain, the job posting calls for candidates with significantly
  86. different skill sets. We are, the ad says, �looking for interns who
  87. want to break things.�
  88.  
  89.  Politerain is not a project associated with a conventional company.
  90. It is run by a US government intelligence organization, the National
  91. Security Agency (NSA). More precisely, it�s operated by the NSA�s
  92. digital snipers with Tailored Access Operations (TAO), the department
  93. responsible for breaking into computers.
  94.  
  95.  Potential interns are also told that research into third party
  96. computers might include plans to �remotely degrade or destroy
  97. opponent computers, routers, servers and network enabled devices
  98. by attacking the hardware.� Using a program called Passionatepolka,
  99. for example, they may be asked to �remotely brick network cards."
  100. With programs like Berserkr they would implant �persistent backdoors�
  101. and �parasitic drivers.� Using another piece of software called
  102. Barnfire, they would �erase the BIOS on a brand of servers that
  103. act as a backbone to many rival governments.�
  104.  
  105.  An intern�s tasks might also include remotely destroying the
  106. functionality of hard drives. Ultimately, the goal of the internship
  107. program was �developing an attacker�s mindset.�
  108.  
  109.  The internship listing is eight years old, but the attacker�s mindset
  110. has since become a kind of doctrine for the NSA�s data spies. And the
  111. intelligence service isn�t just trying to achieve mass surveillance
  112. of Internet communication, either. The digital spies of the Five Eyes
  113. alliance -- comprised of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia
  114. and New Zealand -- want more.
  115.  
  116. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-snowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html
  117.  
  118. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA�s Plans for Cyber Warfare ::
  119.  
  120. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/spiegel-15-0117.7z
  121. _______________________________________
  122. � Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA�s War on Internet Security ::
  123.  
  124.  US and British intelligence agencies undertake every effort imaginable
  125. to crack all types of encrypted Internet communication. The cloud, it
  126. seems, is full of holes. The good news: New Snowden documents show that
  127. some forms of encryption still cause problems for the NSA. ... ...
  128.  
  129.  As one document from the Snowden archive shows, the NSA had been
  130. unsuccessful in attempts to decrypt several communications protocols,
  131. at least as of 2012. An NSA presentation for a conference that took
  132. place that year lists the encryption programs the Americans failed to
  133. crack. In the process, the NSA cryptologists divided their targets
  134. into five levels corresponding to the degree of the difficulty of the
  135. attack and the outcome, ranging from �trivial� to �catastrophic.�
  136.  
  137.  Monitoring a document�s path through the Internet is classified as
  138. �trivial.� Recording Facebook chats is considered a �minor� task,
  139. while the level of difficulty involved in decrypting emails sent
  140. through Moscow-based Internet service provider mail.ru is considered
  141. �moderate.� Still, all three of those classifications don�t appear to
  142. pose any significant problems for the NSA.
  143.  
  144.  Things first become troublesome at the fourth level. The presentation
  145. states that the NSA encounters �major� problems in its attempts to
  146. decrypt messages sent through heavily encrypted email service providers
  147. like Zoho or in monitoring users of the Tor network, which was
  148. developed for surfing the web anonymously. Tor, otherwise known as
  149. The Onion Router, is free and open source software that allows users
  150. to surf the web through a network of more than 6,000 linked volunteer
  151. computers. The software automatically encrypts data in a way that
  152. ensures that no single computer in the network has all of a user�s
  153. information. For surveillance experts, it becomes very difficult to
  154. trace the whereabouts of a person who visits a particular website or
  155. to attack a specific person while they are using Tor to surf the Web.
  156.  
  157.  The NSA also has �major� problems with Truecrypt, a program for
  158. encrypting files on computers. Truecrypt�s developers stopped their
  159. work on the program last May, prompting speculation about pressures
  160. from government agencies. A protocol called Off-the-Record (OTR) for
  161. encrypting instant messaging in an end-to-end encryption process also
  162. seems to cause the NSA major problems. Both are programs whose source
  163. code can be viewed, modified, shared and used by anyone. Experts agree
  164. it is far more difficult for intelligence agencies to manipulate open
  165. source software programs than many of the closed systems developed by
  166. companies like Apple and Microsoft. Since anyone can view free and
  167. open source software, it becomes difficult to insert secret back doors
  168. without it being noticed. Transcripts of intercepted chats using OTR
  169. encryption handed over to the intelligence agency by a partner in
  170. Prism -- an NSA program that accesses data from at least nine American
  171. internet companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple -- show that
  172. the NSA�s efforts appear to have been thwarted in these cases: �No
  173. decrypt available for this OTR message.� This shows that OTR at least
  174. sometimes makes communications impossible to read for the NSA.
  175.  
  176.  Things become �catastrophic� for the NSA at level five - when, for
  177. example, a subject uses a combination of Tor, another anonymization
  178. service, the instant messaging system CSpace and a system for Internet
  179. telephony (voice over IP) called ZRTP. This type of combination results
  180. in a �near-total loss/lack of insight to target communications, presence,�
  181. the NSA document states.
  182.  
  183.  ZRTP, which is used to securely encrypt conversations and text chats
  184. on mobile phones, is used in free and open source programs like RedPhone
  185. and Signal. �It�s satisfying to know that the NSA considers encrypted
  186. communication from our apps to be truly opaque,� says RedPhone developer
  187. Moxie Marlinspike.
  188.  
  189. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html
  190.  
  191. � NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor ::
  192.  
  193. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-spiegel-14-1228.rar
  194. _______________________________________
  195. � Operation Socialist ; How GCHQ Spies Hacked Belgium�s Largest Telco ::
  196.  
  197. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/
  198.  
  199. � GCHQ Belgacom Telecom Hacking (ZIP) ::
  200.  
  201.  Slides show Canada�s intelligence agency, CSEC, was involved in helping
  202. GCHQ intercept Belgacom communications. It also proves 3rd party cookies
  203. are very much instrumental in being used to exploit information about IPs.
  204.  
  205. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/gchq-belgacom-intercept-14-1213.zip
  206. _______________________________________
  207. � Keith Alexander�s Anti-spy Patent Leaked ::
  208.  
  209. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-alexander-patent-14-1125.pdf
  210.  
  211. � Keith Alexander Now Works To Secure Banking Networks ::
  212.  
  213. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/ex-nsa-chief-pitches-advice-on-cyber-threats-to-the-banks.html
  214. _______________________________________
  215. � Operation AURORAGOLD: How the NSA Hacks Cellphone Networks Worldwide ::
  216.  
  217.  Codenamed AURORAGOLD, the covert operation has monitored the content of
  218. messages sent and received by more than 1,200 email accounts associated
  219. with major cellphone network operators, intercepting confidential company
  220. planning papers that help the NSA hack into phone networks.
  221.  
  222.  One high-profile surveillance target is the GSM Association, an influential
  223. UK-headquartered trade group that works closely with large US-based firms
  224. including Microsoft, Facebook, AT&T, and Cisco, and is currently being
  225. funded by the US government to develop privacy-enhancing technologies.
  226.  
  227.  Karsten Nohl, a leading cellphone security expert and cryptographer who
  228. was consulted by The Intercept about details contained in the AURORAGOLD
  229. documents, said that the broad scope of information swept up in the operation
  230. appears aimed at ensuring virtually every cellphone network in the world is
  231. NSA accessible.
  232.  
  233. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/04/nsa-auroragold-hack-cellphones/
  234.  
  235. � NSA Operation AURORAGOLD Slides ::
  236.  
  237. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-aurora-gold-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  238.  
  239. � NSA OPULANT PUP Circumventing Strong Cryptography ::
  240.  
  241.  Last year, the Washington Post reported that the NSA had already managed
  242. to break the most commonly used cellphone encryption algorithm in the world,
  243. known as A5/1. But the information collected under AURORAGOLD allows the
  244. agency to focus on circumventing newer and stronger versions of A5 cellphone
  245. encryption, such as A5/3.
  246.  
  247. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-opulant-pup-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  248. _______________________________________
  249. � Germany�s Intelligence Agency, the BND, Spies On Civilians Too ::
  250.  
  251.  German MPs examining the surveillance activities the US National
  252. Security Agency have found a legal loophole that allows the Berlin�s
  253. foreign intelligence agency to spy on its own citizens.
  254.  
  255.  The agency, known by its German acronym BND, is not usually allowed
  256. to intercept communications made by Germans or German companies, but a
  257. former BND lawyer told parliament this week that citizens working abroad
  258. for foreign companies were not protected.
  259.  
  260.  The German government confirmed on Saturday that work-related calls
  261. or emails were attributed to the employer. As a result, if the employer
  262. is foreign, the BND could legally intercept them.
  263.  
  264.  Angela Merkel pretends to be outraged about industrial espionage by
  265. the NSA while condoning illegal surveillance itself.
  266.  
  267. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/german-loophole-allows-bnd-agency-spy-own-people
  268. http://www.infowars.com/like-the-nsa-and-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-a-legal-loophole-to-spy-on-its-own-citizens/
  269. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141202/09513729296/like-nsa-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-legal-loophole-to-spy-its-own-citizens.shtml
  270. _______________________________________
  271. � How Vodafone-Subsidiary Telecom Aided GCHQ�s Spying Efforts ::
  272.  
  273.  Previously unpublished documents show how the UK telecom firm Cable
  274. & Wireless, acquired by Vodafone in 2012, played a key role in
  275. establishing one of the Government Communications Headquarters�
  276. (GCHQ) most controversial surveillance programs.
  277.  
  278.  A joint investigation by NDR, WDR, S�ddeutsche Zeitung and Channel 4
  279. based on documents leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, reveals
  280. that Cable & Wireless actively shaped and provided the most data to
  281. GCHQ mass surveillance programs, and received millions of pounds in
  282. compensation. The documents also suggest that Cable & Wireless
  283. assisted GCHQ in breaking into a competitor�s network.
  284.  
  285.  In response to these allegations, Vodafone said that an internal
  286. investigation found no evidence of unlawful conduct, but the company
  287. would not deny it happened.
  288.  
  289. http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq
  290. http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html
  291. http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html
  292. http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable
  293.  
  294. � GCHQ�s Vodafone Cable Master List ::
  295.  
  296. https://netzpolitik.org/2014/cable-master-list-wir-spiegeln-die-snowden-dokumente-ueber-angezapfte-glasfasern-auch-von-vodafone/
  297.  
  298. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ::
  299.  
  300. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-slides.pdf
  301. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-slides-14-1125.pdf
  302. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-cables-14-1125.pdf
  303.  
  304. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ZIPPED ::
  305.  
  306. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/Gerontic_GCHQ_SZ.zip
  307.  
  308. � INCENSER: How NSA and GCHQ Are Tapping Internet Cables ::
  309.  
  310. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fi/2014/11/incenser-or-how-nsa-and-gchq-are.html
  311. _______________________________________
  312. � Microsoft SkyDrive (aka OneDrive) Gateway Into NSA PRISM ::
  313.  
  314. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/ms-onedrive-nsa-prism.htm
  315.  
  316.  NOTE: Anything uploaded to �the cloud� is going to be available
  317. for the government to snoop through, the new Apple iphone gadgets
  318. automatically upload all users� personal files into �the cloud�
  319. and yes, looks like Microsoft is also doing it as well.
  320.  
  321.  You might want to avoid using these new systems, go back to using
  322. older desktop computers which are rather easy to fortify. As for
  323. phones, you can buy an old jitterbug phone - it�s a basic cellphone
  324. without all the other crap included - just plain oldschool, mofos!
  325. And add one more thing - a �Blockit Pocket.� ;)
  326. _______________________________________
  327. � German Investigation of the Cooperation Between NSA-BND Part 1 ::
  328.  
  329. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/11/german-investigation-of-cooperation.html
  330. _______________________________________
  331. � UK Lawyers Spied by GCHQ Spies ::
  332.  
  333. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/uk-lawyers-spies-intercept-14-1106.pdf
  334.  
  335. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/06/uk-surveillance-of-lawyers-journalists-gchq/
  336. _______________________________________
  337. � The German Operation Eikonal Part of NSA�s RAMPART-A Program ::
  338.  
  339.  Just over a week ago, the regional German paper S�ddeutsche Zeitung
  340. and the regional broadcasters NDR and WDR came with a story saying that
  341. between 2004 and 2008, the German foreign intelligence service BND had
  342. tapped into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX and shared the
  343. intercepted data with the NSA. As not all communications of German
  344. citizens could be filtered out, this is considered a violation of the
  345. constitution.
  346.  
  347.  Here we will give a summary of what is currently known about this BND
  348. operation and we will combine this with information from earlier reports.
  349. This will show that it was most likely part of the RAMPART-A program of
  350. the NSA, which includes similar interception efforts by foreign partner
  351. agencies. Finally, we will look at where exactly the BND interception
  352. might have taken place.
  353.  
  354. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/10/the-german-operation-eikonal-as-part-of.html
  355. ---------------------------------------
  356. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  357.  
  358. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  359. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  360. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  361. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  362.  
  363. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  364.  
  365. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  366.  
  367. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  368.  
  369. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  370.  
  371. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  372.  
  373. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  374.  
  375. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  376.  
  377. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  378.  
  379. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  380.  
  381. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  382. _______________________________________
  383. � Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
  384.  
  385.  The National Security Agency has had agents in China, Germany,
  386. and South Korea working on programs that use �physical subversion�
  387. to infiltrate and compromise networks and devices, according to
  388. documents obtained by The Intercept.
  389.  
  390.  The documents, leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, also
  391. indicate that the agency has used �under cover� operatives to gain
  392. access to sensitive data and systems in the global communications
  393. industry, and that these secret agents may have even dealt with
  394. American firms. The documents describe a range of clandestine field
  395. activities that are among the agency�s �core secrets� when it comes
  396. to computer network attacks, details of which are apparently shared
  397. with only a small number of officials outside the NSA.
  398.  
  399.  �It�s something that many people have been wondering about for a
  400. long time,� said Chris Soghoian, principal technologist for the
  401. American Civil Liberties Union, after reviewing the documents.
  402. �I�ve had conversations with executives at tech companies about
  403. this precise thing. How do you know the NSA is not sending people
  404. into your data centers?�
  405.  
  406.  Previous disclosures about the NSA�s corporate partnerships have
  407. focused largely on US companies providing the agency with vast amounts
  408. of customer data, including phone records and email traffic. But
  409. documents published today by The Intercept suggest that even as the
  410. agency uses secret operatives to penetrate them, companies have also
  411. cooperated more broadly to undermine the physical infrastructure of
  412. the internet than has been previously confirmed.
  413.  
  414.  In addition to so-called �close access� operations, the NSA�s �core
  415. secrets� include the fact that the agency works with US and foreign
  416. companies to weaken their encryption systems; the fact that the NSA
  417. spends �hundreds of millions of dollars� on technology to defeat
  418. commercial encryption; and the fact that the agency works with US
  419. and foreign companies to penetrate computer networks, possibly without
  420. the knowledge of the host countries. Many of the NSA�s core secrets
  421. concern its relationships to domestic and foreign corporations.
  422.  
  423.  Some of the documents in this article appear in a new documentary,
  424. CITIZENFOUR, which tells the story of the Snowden disclosures and is
  425. directed by Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras. The documents describe
  426. a panoply of programs classified with the rare designation of
  427. �Exceptionally Compartmented Information,� or ECI, which are only
  428. disclosed to a �very select� number of government officials.
  429.  
  430. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
  431.  
  432. � Top Secret Special Source Operations Classification Guides ::
  433.  
  434. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-whipgenie-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  435.  
  436. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-tarex-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  437.  
  438. � Operation Sentry Eagle (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  439.  
  440. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  441.  
  442. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  443.  
  444. � NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information ::
  445.  
  446. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  447.  
  448. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-pawleys-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  449.  
  450. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-compartments-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  451.  
  452. � NSA National Initiative Task Security (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  453.  
  454. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  455.  
  456. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  457.  
  458. � NSA Computer Network Exploitation ::
  459.  
  460. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-cne-declass-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  461.  
  462. � Following 10 NSA Releases (8.5MB | ZIP) ::
  463.  
  464. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-releases-the-intercept-14-1010.zip
  465. _______________________________________
  466. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides ::
  467.  
  468. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wb/binney.html
  469.  
  470. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides (ZIP) ::
  471.  
  472. Includes the report and the slides.
  473.  
  474. http://fileb.ag/i627vr7a6bkx
  475. _______________________________________
  476. � ACLU�s FOIA Documents Shed Light on One of the NSA�s Most
  477. Powerful Tools (Other Agencies and Legal Loopholes) ::
  478.  
  479. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/new-documents-shed-light-one-nsas-most-powerful-tools
  480.  
  481. � Overview of (Other) Signals Intelligence Authorities ::
  482.  
  483. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Overview%20of%20Signals%20Intelligence%20Authorities.pdf
  484.  
  485. � DoD-DIA�s 16 Legal Loopholes to Spy On US Persons ::
  486.  
  487. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/DoD%20HUMINT%20Legal%20Workshop%20Fundamentals%20of%20HUMINT%20Targeting.pdf
  488.  
  489. � Intelligence Law Handbook Defense HUMINT Service ::
  490.  
  491. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/Intelligence%20Law%20Handbook%20Defense%20HUMINT%20Service.pdf
  492. _______________________________________
  493. � NSA Spies on UN in Vienna ::
  494.  
  495. http://fm4.orf.at/stories/1746596/
  496. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28666/intelligence/nsa-spying-un-vienna.html
  497. http://www.techworm.net/2014/09/erich-mochel-leaks-photos-nsa-spying-united-nations.html
  498. ���������������������������������������
  499. � How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive,
  500. and Destroy Reputations ::
  501.  
  502. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  503.  
  504. http://www.infowars.com/cointelrpo-revisited-greenwald-exposes-nsa-agenda-to-destroy-journalists/
  505.  
  506.  One of the many pressing stories that remains to be told from the
  507. Snowden archive is how western intelligence agencies are attempting
  508. to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of
  509. deception and reputation-destruction. It�s time to tell a chunk of
  510. that story, complete with the relevant documents.
  511.  
  512.  Over the last several weeks, I worked with NBC News to publish a
  513. series of articles about �dirty trick� tactics used by GCHQ�s previously
  514. secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group). These
  515. were based on four classified GCHQ documents presented to the NSA
  516. and the other three partners in the English-speaking �Five Eyes�
  517. alliance. Today, we at the Intercept are publishing another new
  518. JTRIG document, in full, entitled �The Art of Deception: Training
  519. for Online Covert Operations.�
  520.  
  521. � GCHQ ; The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations ::
  522.  
  523. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/02/24/art-deception-training-new-generation-online-covert-operations/
  524.  
  525. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1021430/the-art-of-deception-training-for-a-new.pdf
  526. ---------------------------------------
  527. � Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  528. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  529.  
  530.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  531. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  532. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  533. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  534. �amplify� sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  535. content judged to be �extremist.� The capabilities, detailed
  536. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  537. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  538. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  539. together in a call.
  540.  
  541.  The tools were created by GCHQ�s Joint Threat Research
  542. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  543. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  544. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  545. documents have detailed JTRIG�s use of �fake victim blog
  546. posts,� �false flag operations,� �honey traps� and
  547. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  548. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  549. Facebook users.
  550.  
  551. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  552.  
  553. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  554.  
  555. � GCHQ�s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  556.  
  557. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  558. ---------------------------------------
  559. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  560.  
  561. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  562.  
  563.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  564. program run by the US Agency for International
  565. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  566. communications network� run through �secret shell
  567. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  568. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  569. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  570. �American contractors were gathering their private
  571. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  572. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  573. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  574. government. According to top-secret documents
  575. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  576. operation is frequently discussed at western
  577. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  578. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  579. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  580.  
  581. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  582.  
  583. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  584.  
  585. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  586.  
  587.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  588. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  589. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  590. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  591. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  592. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  593. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  594. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  595. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  596. Space Intelligence Center.�
  597.  
  598.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  599. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  600. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  601. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  602. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  603. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  604. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  605. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  606.  
  607.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  608. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  609. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  610. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  611. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  612. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  613. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  614. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  615. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  616.  
  617. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  618.  
  619. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  620. ---------------------------------------
  621. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  622.  
  623. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  624.  
  625. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  626.  
  627. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  628.  
  629. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  630.  
  631.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  632. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  633. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  634. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  635. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  636. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  637. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  638. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  639. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  640. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  641. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  642.  
  643.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  644. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  645. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  646. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  647. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  648. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  649.  
  650. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  651. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  652. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  653. ---------------------------------------
  654. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  655.  
  656. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  657.  
  658. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  659.  
  660. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  661.  
  662. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  663.  
  664. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  665.  
  666. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  667.  
  668. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  669.  
  670. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  671.  
  672. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  673. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  674. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  675.  
  676. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  677. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  678.  
  679. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  680. ---------------------------------------
  681. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  682.  
  683. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  684. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  685. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  686. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  687.  
  688. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  689.  
  690. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  691.  
  692. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  693.  
  694. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  695.  
  696. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  697.  
  698. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  699. ---------------------------------------
  700. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  701.  
  702. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  703. _______________________________________
  704. � Unraveling NSA�s TURBULENCE Programs ::
  705.  
  706. https://robert.sesek.com/2014/9/unraveling_nsa_s_turbulence_programs.html
  707. _______________________________________
  708. � New Zealand�s Prime Minister Isn�t Telling the Truth About
  709. Mass Surveillance ::
  710.  
  711. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  712.  
  713. � New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  714. Denying It ::
  715.  
  716. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  717.  
  718. � Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  719. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald �A Loser� ::
  720.  
  721. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  722.  
  723. � New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  724.  
  725. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  726.  
  727. � NSA Visit by New Zealand Spy PM Ferguson ::
  728.  
  729. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-nz-ferguson-visit-the-intercept-14-0915.pdf
  730.  
  731. � The Questions for New Zealand on Mass Surveillance ::
  732.  
  733. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/questions-new-zealand-mass-surveillance/
  734. _______________________________________
  735. ? NSA Spooks Deny The Evidence (Provided Below) Exists ::
  736.  
  737.  Did the NSA forget Ed Snowden contacted NBC and released
  738. the evidence contacting authorities regarding his concerns?
  739.  
  740. https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsa-has-revealed-new-details-about-its-exhaustive-search-of-edward-snowdens-emails
  741.  
  742. ? FLASHBACK! Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  743.  
  744.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  745. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  746. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  747. activity before he began leaking government documents
  748. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  749. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  750.  
  751.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  752. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  753. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  754. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  755. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  756. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  757. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  758. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  759. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  760. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  761. attention.��
  762.  
  763.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  764. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  765. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  766. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  767. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  768.  
  769. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  770.  
  771. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  772. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  773.  
  774. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  775. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  776. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  777. ---------------------------------------
  778. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  779.  
  780. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  781.  
  782. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  783. _______________________________________
  784. � NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  785.  
  786.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  787. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  788. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  789. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  790.  
  791. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  792.  
  793. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  794.  
  795. � GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  796.  
  797. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  798.  
  799. � NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  800.  
  801. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  802.  
  803. � NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  804.  
  805. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  806.  
  807. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  808. _______________________________________
  809. � NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  810.  
  811. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  812.  
  813. � Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  814.  
  815. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  816.  
  817. ? UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  818.  
  819. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  820. _______________________________________
  821. � Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  822.  
  823. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  824. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  825. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  826.  
  827. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  828.  
  829. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  830.  
  831. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  832.  
  833. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  834.  
  835. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  836.  
  837. � NSA�s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  838.  
  839. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  840.  
  841. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  842.  
  843. � NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  844.  
  845. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  846. _______________________________________
  847. � DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  848.  
  849. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  850. _______________________________________
  851. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden�s Info
  852.  
  853.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  854. documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks so far,
  855. up to September 5th of 2014. I�m still collecting any
  856. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  857. archive twice per year.
  858.  
  859.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  860. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  861. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  862. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  863.  
  864.  After decompression, the first folder is titled �Eyeballing_
  865. Snowden_Info_Folder_01� and the second is titled �Eyeballing_
  866. Snowden_Info_Folder_02� , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  867. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  868.  
  869.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  870. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  871. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  872.  
  873. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  874. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  875.  
  876. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  877. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  878. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  879.  
  880. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  881. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  882.  
  883. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  884. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  885. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  886. ���������������������������������������
  887. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  888.  
  889. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  890.  
  891. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  892.  
  893. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  894.  
  895. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  896. _______________________________________
  897. � NSA�s Foreign Partnerships ::
  898.  
  899. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  900. _______________________________________
  901. � Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  902.  
  903. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  904.  
  905. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  906.  
  907. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  908.  
  909. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  910. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  911. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  912. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  913. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  914. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  915. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  916. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  917. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  918. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  919. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  920. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  921. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  922.  
  923. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  924.  
  925. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  926. _______________________________________
  927. � How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  928.  
  929. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  930.  
  931. � NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  932.  
  933. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  934. _______________________________________
  935. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  936.  
  937. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  938.  
  939. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  940.  
  941. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  942.  
  943. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  944.  
  945. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  946. _______________________________________
  947. � Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  948.  
  949. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  950.  
  951. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  952.  
  953. � Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  954.  
  955. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  956.  
  957. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  958. _______________________________________
  959. � Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the �Now-Discontinued� (?)
  960. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  961. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  962.  
  963. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  964. _______________________________________
  965. � GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  966.  
  967. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  968.  
  969. � Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  970.  
  971. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  972. _______________________________________
  973. � Barack Obama�s Secret �Terrorist-Tracking� System ::
  974.  
  975.  Nearly half of the people on the US government�s widely shared
  976. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  977. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  978. obtained by The Intercept.
  979.  
  980. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  981.  
  982. � NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  983.  
  984. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  985.  
  986. � Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  987.  
  988.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  989. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  990. secret process that requires neither �concrete facts� nor
  991. �irrefutable evidence� to designate an American or foreigner
  992. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  993. by The Intercept.
  994.  
  995. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  996. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  997. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  998. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  999. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  1000.  
  1001. NOBODY notes
  1002.  
  1003.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  1004. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  1005. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  1006. only these �dirty tricks� are now fully digitalized.
  1007.  
  1008. � Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  1009.  
  1010.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  1011. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  1012. and his approach to dissent. �Before I left the State
  1013. Department, I filed a complaint with the department�s
  1014. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  1015. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  1016. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  1017. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,�
  1018. Tye explained. �I have also brought my complaint to the
  1019. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  1020. inspector general of the NSA.�
  1021.  
  1022.  These steps � which many say Snowden should�ve taken �
  1023. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  1024. wouldn�t be garnering attention at all if not for
  1025. Snowden�s leaks.
  1026.  
  1027. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  1028.  
  1029. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  1030. _______________________________________
  1031. � Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  1032. Israeli Attack ::
  1033.  
  1034.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  1035. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  1036. crucial role in Israel�s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  1037. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  1038. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  1039. enable Israel�s military assaults � such as the one on Gaza.
  1040.  
  1041. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  1042.  
  1043. � ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  1044.  
  1045. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  1046.  
  1047. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  1048.  
  1049. � US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  1050.  
  1051. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  1052.  
  1053. � (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  1054.  
  1055. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  1056. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  1057. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  1058.  
  1059. � (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  1060.  
  1061. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  1062. _______________________________________
  1063. � USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  1064.  
  1065. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  1066.  
  1067. � NSA�s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia�s Brutal State Police ::
  1068.  
  1069.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  1070. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  1071. one of the world�s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  1072. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  1073. Snowden details the agency�s plans �to provide direct analytic and
  1074. technical support� to the Saudis on �internal security� matters.
  1075.  
  1076.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior�referred to in the document as MOI
  1077. � has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  1078. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  1079. that �Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  1080. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,� specifically
  1081. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly �poured an
  1082. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat� of one human rights
  1083. activist. The report also notes the MOI�s use of invasive surveillance
  1084. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  1085.  
  1086.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  1087. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  1088. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  1089. Administration�s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  1090. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes �a
  1091. period of rejuvenation� for the NSA�s relationship with the Saudi
  1092. Ministry of Defense.
  1093.  
  1094.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  1095. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  1096. where the US �has [an] interest in regime continuity.�
  1097.  
  1098. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  1099. _______________________________________
  1100. � Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  1101.  
  1102. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  1103. _______________________________________
  1104. � NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  1105.  
  1106. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  1107.  
  1108. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  1109. _______________________________________
  1110. � Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  1111.  
  1112.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  1113. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  1114. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  1115.  
  1116. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  1117.  
  1118. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  1119. _______________________________________
  1120. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1121.  
  1122.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1123. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1124. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1125. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1126. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1127. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1128. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1129.  
  1130. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1131.  
  1132. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1133.  
  1134. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1135. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1136. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1137.  
  1138. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1139.  
  1140. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1141.  
  1142. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1143.  
  1144.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1145. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1146.  
  1147. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1148.  
  1149. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1150.  
  1151. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1152.  
  1153. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1154.  
  1155.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1156. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1157. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1158. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1159.  
  1160. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1161.  
  1162. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1163.  
  1164. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1165.  
  1166. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1167.  
  1168. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1169.  
  1170. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  1171.  
  1172. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  1173.  
  1174. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1175.  
  1176. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1177.  
  1178. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1179.  
  1180. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1181.  
  1182. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1183.  
  1184. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1185.  
  1186. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1187. _______________________________________
  1188. � NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  1189.  
  1190. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  1191.  
  1192. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  1193. _______________________________________
  1194. � The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  1195. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  1196.  
  1197.  The contents of the surveillance files � almost half of which
  1198. contained information from US citizens or residents � �tell
  1199. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  1200. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  1201. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.�
  1202.  
  1203. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  1204. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  1205. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  1206.  
  1207. � Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  1208. Been Spying On ::
  1209.  
  1210.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  1211. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans�including
  1212. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  1213. academics, and lawyers�under secretive procedures intended
  1214. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  1215.  
  1216.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  1217. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  1218. own government includes:
  1219.  
  1220.  � Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  1221. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  1222. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  1223. Security under President George W. Bush;
  1224.  
  1225.  � Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  1226. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  1227.  
  1228.  � Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  1229. international relations at Rutgers University;
  1230.  
  1231.  � Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  1232. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  1233. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  1234.  
  1235.  � Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  1236. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  1237. rights organization in the country.
  1238.  
  1239. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  1240. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  1241. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  1242.  
  1243. � NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  1244.  
  1245. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  1246.  
  1247. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  1248.  
  1249. � Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  1250.  
  1251. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  1252.  
  1253. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  1254.  
  1255. ? NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  1256.                               ���������
  1257.  �The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  1258. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  1259. crime to law enforcement authorities.�
  1260.  
  1261. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  1262.  
  1263. ? US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  1264.  
  1265. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  1266.  
  1267. NOBODY responds
  1268.  
  1269.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  1270. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  1271. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  1272.  
  1273. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  1274.  
  1275.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  1276. back in 2004 up till today.
  1277.  
  1278. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  1279.  
  1280.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  1281. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  1282.  
  1283. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  1284.  
  1285.  Just like those in the �Department of Justice� they
  1286. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  1287. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  1288. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  1289.  
  1290. � Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  1291.  
  1292. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  1293.  
  1294.  �So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  1295. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  1296. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  1297. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  1298.  
  1299.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  1300. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  1301. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  1302. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  1303. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  1304. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  1305. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  1306. first place.  Realistically, it�s not one or the other, it�s
  1307. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  1308. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  1309. On one hand: it�s evidence, on the other, it�s private information
  1310. on many thousands of people.
  1311.  
  1312.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  1313. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  1314. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  1315. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  1316. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  1317. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  1318. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  1319. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  1320. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  1321. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  1322. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  1323. happen now. The US government�s dealings with brutal regimes
  1324. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  1325. their own people.
  1326.  
  1327.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  1328. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  1329. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  1330. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  1331. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  1332. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  1333. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  1334. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  1335. the Post�s story as a dud, it�s the first page of the next
  1336. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  1337. unpredictable consequences.�
  1338.  
  1339. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  1340. _______________________________________
  1341. � Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  1342.  
  1343. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  1344. ���������������������������������������
  1345. � Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  1346.  
  1347.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  1348. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  1349. Binney � that�s a �totalitarian mentality.�
  1350.  
  1351. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  1352. _______________________________________
  1353. � NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  1354.  
  1355. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  1356.  
  1357.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  1358. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  1359. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  1360. Aussp�hprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  1361.  
  1362.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  1363. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  1364. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  1365. investigate.
  1366.  
  1367.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  1368. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  1369. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  1370. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  1371. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  1372. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  1373.  
  1374. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  1375.  
  1376. MP4 Video Format � http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  1377.  
  1378. � XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  1379.  
  1380. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  1381.  
  1382. � NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  1383.  
  1384. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  1385. ---------------------------------------
  1386. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1387.  
  1388. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1389.  
  1390. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  1391.  
  1392.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  1393. using Tor.�
  1394.  
  1395. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  1396.  
  1397. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  1398.  
  1399. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  1400.  
  1401.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t mean that your
  1402. browser isn�t storing cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman,
  1403. a colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes in browser
  1404. vulnerabilities.
  1405.  
  1406.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  1407. aware of Tor�s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  1408. wide surveillance.
  1409.  
  1410.  �The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  1411. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  1412. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  1413. other Web users,� he wrote.
  1414.  
  1415.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  1416. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  1417. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,�
  1418. he said.
  1419.  
  1420. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  1421.  
  1422. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  1423. Traffic From Machines ::
  1424.  
  1425.  �Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  1426. out large-scale �staining� as a means to identify individual
  1427. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  1428.  
  1429.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  1430. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  1431. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  1432. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  1433. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  1434. session.�
  1435.  
  1436. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  1437.  
  1438. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  1439.  
  1440. � Packet Staining ::
  1441.  
  1442. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  1443. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  1444. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  1445. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  1446.  
  1447. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  1448.  
  1449. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  1450. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  1451. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  1452. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  1453.  
  1454. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  1455.  
  1456.  �We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  1457. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  1458. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  1459. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  1460. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  1461. which allows the user finer control.� ... ...
  1462.  
  1463.  �This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  1464. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  1465. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  1466. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  1467. server can be used to hide one�s location, but a single-hop
  1468. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  1469. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  1470. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  1471. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  1472. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  1473. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  1474. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  1475. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  1476. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  1477. order to trace requests back to the originating client.�
  1478.  
  1479. ... ...
  1480.  
  1481.  �In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  1482. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  1483. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  1484. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  1485. of Tor.�
  1486.  
  1487. ... ...
  1488.  
  1489.  �We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  1490. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  1491. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  1492. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  1493. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  1494. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  1495. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  1496. be tried.�
  1497.  
  1498. ... ...
  1499.  
  1500.  �It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  1501. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  1502. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  1503. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  1504. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  1505. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  1506. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  1507. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  1508. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  1509. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  1510. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  1511. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  1512. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  1513. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  1514. who inspecting the directories.�
  1515.  
  1516. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  1517. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  1518. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  1519.  
  1520. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  1521.  
  1522. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  1523.  
  1524. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  1525.  
  1526. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  1527.  
  1528. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  1529.  
  1530.  �This document doesn�t give much insight into capabilities
  1531. the IC has developed against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  1532. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  1533. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  1534. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  1535. investment. I�d expect there are other programs with more
  1536. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  1537.  
  1538. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  1539. _______________________________________
  1540. � UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  1541.  
  1542. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  1543.  
  1544. � UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  1545. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  1546.  
  1547.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  1548. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany�s
  1549. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  1550. as a double agent for the US.
  1551.  
  1552.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  1553. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  1554. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country�s
  1555. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  1556. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  1557.  
  1558.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  1559. week�s arrest of a 31-year-old BND �double agent� who spent
  1560. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  1561. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  1562. of �10,000 (�7,940) per document. ...
  1563.  
  1564.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin�s
  1565. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  1566. in �co-operation�. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  1567. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  1568. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  1569.  
  1570.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  1571. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin�s Russian
  1572. embassy. The Germans had considered it �impossible� that one
  1573. of their own intelligence men could be working as a �double agent�
  1574. for the Americans.
  1575.  
  1576. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1577. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1578. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1579. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1580.  
  1581. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1582.  
  1583. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1584.  
  1585. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1586.  
  1587. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1588.  
  1589. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1590.  
  1591. � Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1592.  
  1593. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1594.  
  1595. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1596.  
  1597. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1598.  
  1599. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1600.  
  1601. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1602.  
  1603. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1604.  
  1605. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1606.  
  1607. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1608.  
  1609. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1610.  
  1611. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1612.  
  1613. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1614.  
  1615. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  1616.  
  1617.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  1618. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  1619. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  1620. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  1621. where she grew up.
  1622.  
  1623. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1624. _______________________________________
  1625. � NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  1626.  
  1627. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  1628. _______________________________________
  1629. � Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  1630.  
  1631. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  1632. _______________________________________
  1633. � Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  1634.  
  1635. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  1636. _______________________________________
  1637. � NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  1638.  
  1639. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  1640. _______________________________________
  1641. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  1642.  
  1643. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  1644. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  1645. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  1646. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  1647.  
  1648. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  1649.  
  1650. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  1651.  
  1652. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  1653.  
  1654. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  1655.  
  1656. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1657.  
  1658. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  1659.  
  1660. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  1661.  
  1662. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  1663.  
  1664. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1665.  
  1666. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  1667. _______________________________________
  1668.  Keith Alexander�s talking points for strategic meeting
  1669. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  1670. Service (DDIS).
  1671.  
  1672. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  1673. _______________________________________
  1674. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1675.  
  1676. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  1677.  
  1678. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1679.  
  1680. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  1681. _______________________________________
  1682. � Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  1683.  
  1684. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  1685. _______________________________________
  1686. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  1687. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  1688.  
  1689. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  1690. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  1691. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  1692.  
  1693.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  1694. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  1695. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  1696. user in the UK.
  1697.  
  1698. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  1699.  
  1700. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  1701. _______________________________________
  1702. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  1703. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  1704.  
  1705. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  1706. ---------------------------------------
  1707. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1708.  
  1709. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1710. _______________________________________
  1711. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  1712.  
  1713. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  1714. _______________________________________
  1715. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  1716.  
  1717. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  1718.  
  1719. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  1720. _______________________________________
  1721. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  1722. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  1723.  
  1724. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  1725. _______________________________________
  1726. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  1727.  
  1728. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  1729.  
  1730. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  1731.  
  1732. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  1733. _______________________________________
  1734. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  1735. to Tap Phones ::
  1736.  
  1737. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  1738. _______________________________________
  1739. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  1740.  
  1741. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  1742. _______________________________________
  1743. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  1744. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  1745. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  1746.  
  1747.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  1748. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  1749. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  1750. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  1751. they were spying on � was hidden?
  1752.  
  1753.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  1754. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  1755. everybody what they�re doing?
  1756.  
  1757.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  1758. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  1759. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  1760. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  1761. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  1762. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  1763. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  1764. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  1765. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  1766.  
  1767.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  1768. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  1769. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  1770. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  1771. was a specialist in, by the way.
  1772.  
  1773.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  1774. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  1775. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  1776. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  1777. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  1778. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  1779.  
  1780.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  1781. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  1782. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  1783. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  1784. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  1785. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  1786. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  1787. for the JWICS.
  1788.  
  1789.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  1790. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  1791. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  1792. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  1793. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  1794. that [clearance].
  1795.  
  1796.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  1797. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  1798. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  1799. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  1800.  
  1801.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  1802. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  1803. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  1804. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  1805. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  1806. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  1807. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1808. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1809.  
  1810.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  1811. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  1812. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  1813.  
  1814.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1815. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  1816. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  1817. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  1818. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  1819.  
  1820.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  1821. to placate the American people.
  1822.  
  1823.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  1824. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  1825. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  1826.  
  1827.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  1828. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  1829. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  1830. investigation.�
  1831.  
  1832. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  1833. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  1834. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  1835. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  1836. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  1837. _______________________________________
  1838. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  1839.  
  1840. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  1841.  
  1842. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  1843.  
  1844. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  1845.  
  1846. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  1847.  
  1848. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  1849.  
  1850. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  1851.  
  1852. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  1853.  
  1854. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  1855.  
  1856. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  1857.  
  1858. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  1859.  
  1860. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  1861.  
  1862. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  1863.  
  1864. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  1865. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  1866.  
  1867. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  1868.  
  1869. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  1870. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  1871.  
  1872. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  1873.  
  1874. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  1875. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  1876.  
  1877. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  1878. _______________________________________
  1879. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  1880.  
  1881.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  1882. agencies are now also using the same facial
  1883. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  1884. identification systems are being developed as well.
  1885. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  1886.  
  1887. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  1888.  
  1889. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  1890.  
  1891. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  1892.  
  1893. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  1894. _______________________________________
  1895. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  1896.  
  1897. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  1898. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  1899. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  1900. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  1901. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  1902. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  1903. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  1904. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  1905. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  1906. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  1907.  
  1908. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  1909.  
  1910. And a few more to think about,
  1911.  
  1912. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  1913. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  1914. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  1915. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  1916. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  1917. _______________________________________
  1918. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1919.  
  1920.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1921. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1922. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  1923. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1924. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  1925. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  1926.  
  1927.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  1928. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1929. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  1930. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  1931. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  1932. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1933. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1934. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1935. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  1936. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  1937. attention.��
  1938.  
  1939.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  1940. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1941. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  1942. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1943. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1944.  
  1945. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1946.  
  1947. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1948. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1949.  
  1950. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1951. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1952. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1953. ---------------------------------------
  1954. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1955.  
  1956. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1957.  
  1958. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1959. _______________________________________
  1960. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  1961.  
  1962. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  1963.  
  1964. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  1965.  
  1966. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  1967. _______________________________________
  1968. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  1969. Securely and Anonymously ::
  1970.  
  1971.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  1972. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  1973. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  1974. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  1975. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  1976. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  1977. internet somewhere or using a third party
  1978. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  1979. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  1980. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  1981. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  1982. download the file from you.
  1983.  
  1984. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  1985. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  1986.  
  1987. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  1988.  
  1989. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  1990.  
  1991. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  1992.  
  1993. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  1994. _______________________________________
  1995. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  1996. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  1997.  
  1998. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  1999.  
  2000. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  2001.  
  2002. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  2003. _______________________________________
  2004. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  2005.  
  2006. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  2007.  
  2008. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  2009.  
  2010. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  2011.  
  2012. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  2013.  
  2014. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  2015.  
  2016. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  2017.  
  2018. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  2019.  
  2020. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  2021. Online Next Week ::
  2022.  
  2023. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  2024. ---------------------------------------
  2025. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  2026.  
  2027. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  2028.  
  2029. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  2030.  
  2031. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  2032. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  2033.  
  2034. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  2035. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  2036.  
  2037. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  2038.  
  2039. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  2040. Infiltration by NSA ::
  2041.  
  2042. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  2043.  
  2044. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  2045.  
  2046. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  2047.  
  2048.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  2049. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  2050. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  2051. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  2052. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  2053. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  2054. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  2055. they�re delivered.
  2056.  
  2057. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  2058.  
  2059. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  2060.  
  2061. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  2062.  
  2063. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  2064.  
  2065. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  2066.  
  2067. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  2068. ______________________________________
  2069. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  2070. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  2071.  
  2072. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  2073. _______________________________________
  2074. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  2075. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  2076.  
  2077. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  2078. _______________________________________
  2079. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  2080.  
  2081. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  2082. _______________________________________
  2083. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  2084.  
  2085. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  2086.  
  2087. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  2088.  
  2089. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  2090. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  2091.  
  2092.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  2093. national security and other government officials will no
  2094. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  2095. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  2096.  
  2097. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  2098. _______________________________________
  2099. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  2100.  
  2101. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  2102.  
  2103. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  2104. ______________________________________
  2105. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  2106.  
  2107. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  2108. ______________________________________
  2109. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  2110. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  2111.  
  2112. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  2113. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  2114.  
  2115. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  2116.  
  2117. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  2118. ______________________________________
  2119. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  2120.  
  2121. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  2122.  
  2123. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  2124.  
  2125. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  2126.  
  2127. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  2128.  
  2129.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  2130. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  2131. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  2132. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  2133. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  2134. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  2135. industry which generates something in the
  2136. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  2137.  
  2138.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  2139.  
  2140. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  2141. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  2142. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  2143. _______________________________________
  2144. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  2145.  
  2146. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  2147. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  2148.  
  2149.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  2150. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  2151. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  2152. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  2153. activities and future plans.� � �
  2154.  
  2155.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  2156. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  2157. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  2158.  
  2159. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  2160.  
  2161. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  2162.  
  2163. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  2164.  
  2165. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  2166.  
  2167. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  2168.  
  2169. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  2170. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  2171.  
  2172.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  2173. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  2174. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  2175. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  2176. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  2177. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  2178. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  2179. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  2180.  
  2181.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  2182. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  2183. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  2184. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  2185. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  2186. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  2187. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  2188.  
  2189. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  2190. _______________________________________
  2191. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  2192.  
  2193. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  2194. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  2195. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  2196.  
  2197.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  2198. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  2199. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  2200. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  2201. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  2202. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  2203. Edward Snowden.
  2204.  
  2205.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  2206. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  2207. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  2208. for surveillance.
  2209.  
  2210.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  2211. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  2212. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  2213. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  2214. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  2215.  
  2216.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  2217. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  2218. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  2219. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  2220.  
  2221.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  2222. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  2223. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  2224. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  2225. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  2226. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  2227. and long-term storage.
  2228.  
  2229. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  2230.  
  2231. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  2232.  
  2233.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  2234. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  2235. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  2236. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  2237. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  2238. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  2239. but they won�t say.
  2240.  
  2241. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  2242.  
  2243. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  2244.  
  2245. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  2246.  
  2247. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  2248. _______________________________________
  2249. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  2250.  
  2251.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  2252. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  2253. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  2254. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  2255. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  2256. already been published previously. The second was
  2257. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  2258.  
  2259. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  2260.  
  2261. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  2262.  
  2263.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  2264. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  2265. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  2266. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  2267. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  2268. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  2269. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  2270. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  2271. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  2272.  
  2273.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  2274. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  2275.  
  2276.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  2277. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  2278. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  2279. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  2280. benefit� the document says.
  2281.  
  2282.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  2283. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  2284. company is working towards creating a so-called
  2285. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  2286. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  2287. per second.
  2288.  
  2289. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  2290. _______________________________________
  2291. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  2292.  
  2293. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  2294. _______________________________________
  2295. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  2296.  
  2297. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  2298. _______________________________________
  2299. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  2300.  
  2301. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  2302. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  2303. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  2304. _______________________________________
  2305. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  2306.  
  2307.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  2308. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  2309. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  2310. top human rights body.
  2311.  
  2312.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  2313. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  2314. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  2315. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  2316. Human Rights Watch.
  2317.  
  2318. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  2319.  
  2320. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  2321. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  2322.  
  2323. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  2324. _______________________________________
  2325. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  2326.  
  2327.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  2328. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  2329. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  2330.  
  2331.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  2332. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  2333. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  2334. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  2335. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  2336. high as two years. ... ...
  2337.  
  2338.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  2339. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  2340. by domestic courts.
  2341.  
  2342. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  2343. _______________________________________
  2344. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  2345.  
  2346. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  2347. _______________________________________
  2348. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  2349.  
  2350.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  2351. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  2352. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  2353. to create national-only electronic networks could
  2354. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  2355. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  2356. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  2357. the USTR said in its annual report.
  2358.  
  2359. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  2360. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  2361. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  2362. ���������������������������������������
  2363. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  2364.  
  2365. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  2366.  
  2367. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  2368.  
  2369. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2370. _______________________________________
  2371. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  2372.  
  2373.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  2374. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  2375. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  2376. any information that comes out and will provide an
  2377. updated archive from time to time.
  2378.  
  2379.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  2380. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  2381. 927MB decompressed.
  2382.  
  2383.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  2384. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  2385. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  2386.  
  2387. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2388. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  2389.  
  2390. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  2391. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2392. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  2393. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2394. _______________________________________
  2395. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  2396.  
  2397. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  2398. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  2399. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  2400. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  2401. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  2402. _______________________________________
  2403. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  2404.  
  2405. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  2406.  
  2407. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  2408.  
  2409. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  2410.  
  2411. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  2412.  
  2413. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  2414. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  2415. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  2416. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  2417.  
  2418. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  2419. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  2420.  
  2421. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  2422. _______________________________________
  2423. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  2424.  
  2425. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  2426.  
  2427. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  2428.  
  2429. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  2430.  
  2431. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  2432.  
  2433. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  2434.  
  2435. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  2436.  
  2437. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  2438. _______________________________________
  2439. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  2440.  
  2441.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  2442. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  2443. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  2444. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  2445. public as possible� as well helping the public
  2446. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  2447. how we�re protecting national security.�
  2448.  
  2449. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  2450. ���������������������������������������
  2451. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  2452.  
  2453. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  2454.  
  2455. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  2456.  
  2457. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  2458.  
  2459. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  2460.  
  2461. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  2462.  
  2463. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  2464.  
  2465. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  2466.  
  2467.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  2468. offensive against China, with targets including the
  2469. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  2470. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  2471. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  2472. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  2473. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  2474. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  2475. well as telecommunications companies.
  2476.  
  2477.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  2478. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  2479. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  2480. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  2481. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  2482. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  2483. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  2484. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  2485. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  2486. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  2487. battle for data supremacy.
  2488.  
  2489.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  2490. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  2491. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  2492. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  2493. among other things.
  2494.  
  2495. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  2496. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  2497. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  2498. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  2499.  
  2500. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  2501.  
  2502.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  2503. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  2504. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  2505. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  2506. has lodged representations with the American side on
  2507. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  2508. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  2509.  
  2510. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  2511. _______________________________________
  2512. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  2513.  
  2514.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  2515. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  2516. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  2517. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  2518. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  2519. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  2520. routers, the devices that connect computer
  2521. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  2522. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  2523. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  2524. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  2525. that flow over their networks.
  2526.  
  2527.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  2528. aspired to create a database that would function
  2529. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  2530. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  2531. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  2532. activity � they are targeted only because they
  2533. control access to networks the agency wants to
  2534. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  2535. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  2536. of the posts says.
  2537.  
  2538.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  2539. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  2540. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  2541. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  2542. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  2543. poses with amusing captions.�
  2544.  
  2545. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  2546. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  2547. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  2548. _______________________________________
  2549. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  2550.  
  2551. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  2552. _______________________________________
  2553. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  2554.  
  2555. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  2556.  
  2557. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  2558.  
  2559. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  2560.  
  2561. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  2562.  
  2563. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  2564.  
  2565. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  2566. _______________________________________
  2567. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  2568.  
  2569. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  2570. _______________________________________
  2571. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  2572.  
  2573. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  2574.  
  2575. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2576. _______________________________________
  2577. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2578.  
  2579. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2580. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2581. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2582. _______________________________________
  2583. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2584.  
  2585. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2586.  
  2587. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2588. _______________________________________
  2589. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2590.  
  2591. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2592. _______________________________________
  2593. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2594.  
  2595. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2596.  
  2597. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2598.  
  2599. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2600. _______________________________________
  2601. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2602.  
  2603. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2604. _______________________________________
  2605. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2606.  
  2607. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2608.  
  2609. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2610.  
  2611. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2612.  
  2613. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2614.  
  2615. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  2616. _______________________________________
  2617. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  2618.  
  2619. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  2620.  
  2621. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  2622.  
  2623. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  2624. _______________________________________
  2625. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  2626.  
  2627. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  2628. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  2629. _______________________________________
  2630. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  2631. With Malware ::
  2632.  
  2633.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  2634. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  2635. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  2636. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  2637. level of human oversight in the process.
  2638.  
  2639.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  2640. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  2641. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  2642. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  2643. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  2644. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  2645. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  2646. Internet and phone networks.
  2647.  
  2648. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  2649. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  2650. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  2651. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  2652. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  2653. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  2654. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  2655. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  2656. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  2657.  
  2658.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  2659. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  2660. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  2661. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  2662. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  2663. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  2664.  
  2665.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  2666. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  2667. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  2668. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  2669. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  2670. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  2671. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  2672. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  2673. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  2674. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  2675. instead of individually.�
  2676.  
  2677. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  2678.  
  2679. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  2680.  
  2681.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  2682. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  2683. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  2684. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  2685. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  2686. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  2687. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  2688. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  2689. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  2690. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  2691. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  2692. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  2693. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  2694. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  2695. execute endpoint operations.�
  2696.  
  2697. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2698.  
  2699.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  2700. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  2701. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  2702. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  2703.  
  2704.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  2705. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  2706. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  2707. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  2708. looks suspicious.
  2709.  
  2710.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  2711. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  2712. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  2713. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  2714. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  2715.  
  2716.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  2717. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  2718. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  2719. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  2720. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  2721. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  2722. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  2723.  
  2724.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  2725. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  2726. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  2727. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  2728. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  2729. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  2730. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  2731. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  2732. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  2733. in action.
  2734.  
  2735. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  2736. Computers for Surveillance ::
  2737.  
  2738. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  2739.  
  2740. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  2741.  
  2742. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  2743.  
  2744.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  2745. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  2746. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  2747. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  2748. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  2749. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  2750.  
  2751. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  2752.  
  2753. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  2754. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  2755. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  2756. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  2757. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2758. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  2759. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  2760. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  2761. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  2762. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  2763.  
  2764. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  2765.  
  2766. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  2767.  
  2768. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  2769.  
  2770. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  2771. _______________________________________
  2772. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  2773.  
  2774. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  2775. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  2776. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  2777. _______________________________________
  2778. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  2779.  
  2780. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  2781. _______________________________________
  2782. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  2783.  
  2784.  Alliances between security services are usually
  2785. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  2786. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  2787. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  2788. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  2789. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  2790. internet traffic.
  2791.  
  2792.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  2793. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  2794. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  2795. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  2796. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  2797.  
  2798.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  2799. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  2800. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  2801. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  2802. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  2803. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  2804.  
  2805.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2806. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2807. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2808. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2809. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2810. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2811. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2812.  
  2813. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2814.  
  2815. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2816. _______________________________________
  2817. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  2818.  
  2819. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  2820.  
  2821. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  2822. ---------------------------------------
  2823. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  2824.  
  2825. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  2826.  
  2827. � NSA Spies Too ::
  2828.  
  2829. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2830. _______________________________________
  2831. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  2832.  
  2833. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  2834.  
  2835. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  2836.  
  2837.  The documents show that images were collected
  2838. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  2839. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  2840. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  2841. programs.
  2842.  
  2843. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  2844. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  2845. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  2846. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  2847.  
  2848. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  2849.  
  2850. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  2851. _______________________________________
  2852. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  2853.  
  2854. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  2855. _______________________________________
  2856. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  2857.  
  2858. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  2859.  
  2860. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  2861. _______________________________________
  2862. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  2863. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  2864.  
  2865. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  2866.  
  2867. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  2868. _______________________________________
  2869. � NSA Observer ::
  2870.  
  2871. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  2872. _______________________________________
  2873. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  2874.  
  2875. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2876.  
  2877. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  2878. _______________________________________
  2879. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  2880.  
  2881. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  2882.  
  2883. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  2884. _______________________________________
  2885. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  2886.  
  2887. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  2888.  
  2889. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  2890.  
  2891. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  2892.  
  2893. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  2894. _______________________________________
  2895. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  2896.  
  2897.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  2898. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  2899. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  2900. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  2901. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  2902. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  2903. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  2904. targets without confirming their veracity on
  2905. the ground.
  2906.  
  2907. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  2908. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  2909. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  2910. _______________________________________
  2911. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  2912.  
  2913.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  2914. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  2915. shows that an American law firm was
  2916. monitored while representing a foreign
  2917. government in trade disputes with the
  2918. United States. The disclosure offers a
  2919. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  2920. which Americans were ensnared by the
  2921. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  2922. interest because lawyers in the United
  2923. States with clients overseas have
  2924. expressed growing concern that their
  2925. confidential communications could be
  2926. compromised by such surveillance.
  2927.  
  2928. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  2929. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  2930. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  2931.  
  2932. NOBODY comments
  2933.  
  2934. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  2935.  
  2936.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  2937. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  2938. be declassified for research in public domain.
  2939. _______________________________________
  2940. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  2941.  
  2942. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  2943.  
  2944. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  2945.  
  2946. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  2947. _______________________________________
  2948. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  2949.  
  2950. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  2951. _______________________________________
  2952. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  2953. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  2954.  
  2955.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  2956. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  2957. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  2958. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  2959. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  2960.  
  2961. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  2962. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  2963. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  2964.  
  2965. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  2966. the German Chancellor ::
  2967.  
  2968. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  2969. _______________________________________
  2970. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  2971. Phone Call Spying ::
  2972.  
  2973. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  2974.  
  2975. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  2976. _______________________________________
  2977. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  2978.  
  2979. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  2980. _______________________________________
  2981. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  2982.  
  2983. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  2984. _______________________________________
  2985.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  2986. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  2987. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  2988. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  2989. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  2990. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  2991.  
  2992. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  2993. ���������������������������������������
  2994. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2995.  
  2996. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2997.  
  2998. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2999.  
  3000. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  3001.  
  3002. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  3003.  
  3004. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  3005.  
  3006.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  3007. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  3008. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  3009. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  3010. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  3011. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  3012. left the terminal.
  3013.  
  3014.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  3015. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  3016. clandestine operation by the Communications
  3017. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  3018. certainly illegal. ... ...
  3019.  
  3020.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  3021. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  3022. software program CSEC was developing with help
  3023. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  3024.  
  3025.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  3026. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  3027. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  3028. into other cities/regions.�
  3029.  
  3030. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  3031.  
  3032.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  3033. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  3034.  
  3035. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  3036.  
  3037. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  3038.  
  3039. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  3040.  
  3041. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  3042.  
  3043. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  3044. _______________________________________
  3045. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  3046.  
  3047. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  3048.  
  3049. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  3050.  
  3051. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  3052. _______________________________________
  3053. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  3054.  
  3055.  Documents taken from the National Security
  3056. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  3057. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  3058. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  3059. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  3060. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  3061. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  3062. information, for analysis. At the time the
  3063. documents were printed, they were also able to
  3064. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  3065.  
  3066.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  3067. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  3068. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  3069. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  3070. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  3071. visits. The monitoring program is called
  3072. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  3073.  
  3074.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  3075. British had to have been either physically able
  3076. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  3077. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  3078. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  3079. and would be able to extract some key data
  3080. about specific users as well.
  3081.  
  3082. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  3083. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  3084. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  3085. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  3086. _______________________________________
  3087. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  3088.  
  3089. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  3090. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  3091. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  3092.  
  3093. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  3094.  
  3095.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  3096. on the iPhone alone.�
  3097.  
  3098. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  3099.  
  3100. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  3101.  
  3102. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  3103.  
  3104. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  3105. _______________________________________
  3106. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  3107.  
  3108.  The National Security Agency program that
  3109. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  3110. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  3111. Thursday in a newly released report.
  3112.  
  3113. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  3114.  
  3115.  �We have not identified a single instance
  3116. involving a threat to the United States in
  3117. which the program made a concrete difference
  3118. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  3119. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  3120. report released Thursday.
  3121.  
  3122.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  3123. domestic spying will continue.
  3124.  
  3125. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  3126. _______________________________________
  3127. � Snowden Speaks ::
  3128.  
  3129. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  3130. _______________________________________
  3131. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  3132.  
  3133. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  3134.  
  3135. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  3136.          ���
  3137. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  3138.  
  3139. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  3140.  
  3141.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  3142. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  3143. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  3144. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  3145. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  3146. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  3147. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  3148. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  3149. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  3150. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  3151. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  3152. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  3153. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  3154. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  3155. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  3156.  
  3157. Reform?
  3158.  
  3159.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  3160. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  3161. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  3162. whether legal or not?
  3163.  
  3164. The reform will come from people taking action.
  3165.  
  3166.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  3167. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  3168. _______________________________________
  3169. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  3170.  
  3171. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  3172. _______________________________________
  3173. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  3174.  
  3175.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  3176. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  3177. main internet cables:
  3178.  
  3179.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  3180.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  3181.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  3182.  
  3183. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  3184. ---------------------------------------
  3185. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  3186. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  3187. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  3188. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  3189. _______________________________________
  3190. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  3191.  
  3192. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  3193.  
  3194. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  3195.  
  3196. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  3197. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  3198. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  3199. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  3200. ---------------------------------------
  3201. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  3202. _______________________________________
  3203. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  3204.  
  3205. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  3206.  
  3207. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  3208.  
  3209. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  3210.  
  3211.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  3212. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  3213. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  3214. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  3215.  
  3216.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  3217. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  3218. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  3219. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  3220.  
  3221.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  3222. text message database to extract information
  3223. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  3224. transactions and more � including of individuals
  3225. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  3226.  
  3227. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  3228. _______________________________________
  3229. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  3230.  
  3231. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  3232.  
  3233. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  3234.  
  3235.  The technology, which the agency has used
  3236. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  3237. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  3238. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  3239. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  3240. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  3241. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  3242. set up miles away from the target.
  3243.  
  3244.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  3245. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  3246. American intelligence agencies for years:
  3247. getting into computers that adversaries,
  3248. and some American partners, have tried to
  3249. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  3250. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  3251. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  3252. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  3253. ---------------------------------------
  3254. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  3255.  
  3256. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  3257. _______________________________________
  3258. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  3259.  
  3260. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  3261. ---------------------------------------
  3262. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  3263.  
  3264. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  3265. _______________________________________
  3266. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  3267.  
  3268. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  3269. _______________________________________
  3270. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  3271.  
  3272. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  3273. _______________________________________
  3274. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  3275.  
  3276. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  3277. _______________________________________
  3278. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  3279. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  3280.  
  3281. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  3282.  
  3283. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  3284. _______________________________________
  3285. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  3286. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  3287.  
  3288. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  3289. _______________________________________
  3290. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  3291. All Encryption ::
  3292.  
  3293.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  3294. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  3295. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  3296. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  3297. used to protect banking, medical, business
  3298. and government records around the world.
  3299.  
  3300.  According to documents provided by former
  3301. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  3302. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  3303. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  3304. than classical computers � is part of a
  3305. $79.7 million research program titled
  3306. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  3307. work is hosted under classified contracts
  3308. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  3309.  
  3310. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  3311. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  3312. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  3313. _______________________________________
  3314. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  3315.  
  3316. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  3317. _______________________________________
  3318. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  3319.  
  3320. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  3321. _______________________________________
  3322. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  3323.  
  3324. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  3325.  
  3326. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  3327.  
  3328. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  3329.  
  3330. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  3331.  
  3332. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  3333.  
  3334. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  3335. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  3336. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  3337.  
  3338. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  3339.  
  3340.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  3341. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  3342. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  3343. infiltrates computers around the world and
  3344. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  3345. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  3346. it is targeting. ... ...
  3347.  
  3348. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  3349.  
  3350.  The insert method and other variants of
  3351. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  3352. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  3353. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  3354. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  3355. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  3356. also incorporates routers and servers
  3357. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  3358. network by infecting these networks with
  3359. �implants� that then allow the government
  3360. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  3361.  
  3362.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  3363. to identify and track its targets based on
  3364. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  3365. could include certain email addresses or
  3366. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  3367. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  3368. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  3369. additional information like an email address.
  3370. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  3371. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  3372. ---------------------------------------
  3373. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  3374.  
  3375. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  3376.  
  3377. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  3378.  
  3379.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  3380. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  3381. that are being logged into on that computer
  3382. as long as the user does not clear browser
  3383. cookies.�
  3384.  
  3385. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  3386.  
  3387. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  3388.  
  3389. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  3390. ---------------------------------------
  3391. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  3392.  
  3393.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  3394. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  3395. could be described as master carpenters for
  3396. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  3397. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  3398. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  3399. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  3400. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  3401. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  3402. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  3403. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  3404. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  3405. ability to establish a global covert network
  3406. that operates alongside the Internet.
  3407.  
  3408.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  3409. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  3410. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  3411. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  3412. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  3413. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  3414. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  3415. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  3416. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  3417. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  3418. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  3419. over $1 million.
  3420.  
  3421.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  3422. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  3423. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  3424. clear preference for planting their malicious
  3425. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  3426. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  3427. to load when a computer is turned on.
  3428.  
  3429.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  3430. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  3431. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  3432. to virus protection and other security programs.
  3433. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  3434. computer has been completely erased and a new
  3435. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  3436. can continue to function and ensures that new
  3437. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  3438. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  3439. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  3440. this approach has provided them with the
  3441. possibility of permanent access.
  3442.  
  3443.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  3444. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  3445. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  3446. with the exception of latter, are American
  3447. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  3448. intelligence agency is compromising the
  3449. technology and products of American companies.
  3450.  
  3451. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  3452. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  3453. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  3454. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  3455. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  3456.  
  3457. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  3458.  
  3459. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  3460.  
  3461. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  3462.  
  3463. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  3464.  
  3465. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  3466.  
  3467. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  3468.  
  3469. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  3470.  
  3471. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  3472.  
  3473. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  3474.  
  3475. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  3476.  
  3477. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  3478.  
  3479. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  3480.  
  3481. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  3482.  
  3483. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  3484.  
  3485. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  3486.  
  3487. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  3488.  
  3489. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  3490.  
  3491. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  3492.  
  3493. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  3494.  
  3495. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  3496.  
  3497. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  3498.  
  3499. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  3500.  
  3501. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  3502.  
  3503. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  3504.  
  3505. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  3506.  
  3507. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  3508. ---------------------------------------
  3509. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  3510.  
  3511. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3512.  
  3513. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  3514.  
  3515. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  3516.  
  3517. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  3518. ---------------------------------------
  3519. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  3520.  
  3521. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  3522.  
  3523. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  3524.  
  3525.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  3526. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  3527. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  3528.  
  3529. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  3530.  
  3531. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  3532. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  3533.  
  3534.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  3535. in its operating system had left devices open
  3536. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  3537. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  3538. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  3539. of its mass spying program.
  3540.  
  3541. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  3542. ---------------------------------------
  3543. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  3544. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  3545.  
  3546. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  3547.  
  3548. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  3549. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  3550.  
  3551. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  3552.  
  3553. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  3554.  
  3555. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  3556.  
  3557.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  3558. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  3559.  
  3560. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  3561. _______________________________________
  3562. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  3563.  
  3564. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  3565.  
  3566. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  3567.  
  3568. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  3569. _______________________________________
  3570. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  3571.  
  3572. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  3573.  
  3574.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3575. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3576. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  3577. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3578. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3579. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3580. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3581. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3582. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  3583. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3584.  
  3585.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  3586. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3587. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3588. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  3589. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3590. did not want to know any more.
  3591. ---------------------------------------
  3592. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3593.  
  3594. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3595. _______________________________________
  3596. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3597. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3598.  
  3599. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3600. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3601. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3602. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3603. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3604. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3605. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3606. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3607.  
  3608. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3609.  
  3610.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3611. National Security Agency program which
  3612. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3613. calls made to, from or within the United
  3614. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3615.  
  3616.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  3617. that the program appears to violate the
  3618. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  3619. searches and seizures. He also said the
  3620. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  3621. that collecting the information had helped
  3622. to head off terrorist attacks.
  3623.  
  3624.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  3625. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  3626. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  3627. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  3628. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  3629. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  3630. the order to allow for an appeal.
  3631.  
  3632. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  3633. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  3634.  
  3635.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  3636. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  3637. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  3638. in June in news stories based on leaks
  3639. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  3640. For seven years, the metadata program has
  3641. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  3642. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  3643. Court and found constitutional by at least
  3644. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  3645.  
  3646. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  3647.  
  3648. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  3649.  
  3650. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  3651.  
  3652. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  3653.  
  3654. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  3655.  
  3656. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  3657. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  3658.  
  3659. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  3660.  
  3661. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  3662.  
  3663. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  3664. ---------------------------------------
  3665. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  3666.  
  3667. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  3668.  
  3669. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  3670.  
  3671. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  3672. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  3673.  
  3674. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  3675. Spying Programs ::
  3676.  
  3677. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  3678. ---------------------------------------
  3679. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  3680. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  3681.  
  3682. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  3683.  
  3684. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  3685.  
  3686. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  3687. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  3688.  
  3689. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  3690.  
  3691. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  3692. _______________________________________
  3693. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  3694.  
  3695.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  3696. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  3697. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  3698.  
  3699. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  3700.  
  3701. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  3702.  
  3703.  - Military Information
  3704.  - Economic Information
  3705.  - Information Operations Information
  3706.  - Political Information �
  3707. _______________________________________
  3708. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  3709. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  3710.  
  3711. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  3712. ���������������������������������������
  3713. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  3714.  
  3715. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  3716.  
  3717. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  3718.  
  3719. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  3720.  
  3721. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  3722.  
  3723. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  3724.  
  3725. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  3726.  
  3727. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  3728.  
  3729. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  3730.  
  3731. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  3732. _______________________________________
  3733. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  3734. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  3735.  
  3736.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  3737. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  3738. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  3739. government access in order to make network
  3740. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  3741. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  3742. in millions of homes and businesses within
  3743. the UK,� the paper states.
  3744.  
  3745.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  3746. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  3747. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  3748. assigns all their modems an extra address
  3749. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  3750. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  3751. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  3752. a second IP address for management, except
  3753. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  3754. assigned to the United States Department
  3755. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  3756. of speculation that this is actually a
  3757. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  3758. they can secretly monitor and control
  3759. peoples� home networks.
  3760.  
  3761.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  3762. The better explanation is that BT simply
  3763. chose this address space because it�s
  3764. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  3765. address, it�s only used inside the private
  3766. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  3767. that address space, you�ll see that your
  3768. packets go nowhere.
  3769.  
  3770. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  3771. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  3772. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  3773.  
  3774. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  3775.  
  3776.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  3777. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  3778. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  3779. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  3780. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  3781. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  3782. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  3783. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  3784. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  3785. It�s past time for something new.�
  3786.  
  3787. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  3788. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  3789. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  3790. ---------------------------------------
  3791. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  3792.  
  3793.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  3794. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  3795. worldwide with malicious software designed
  3796. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  3797. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  3798. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  3799.  
  3800.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  3801. explains how the NSA collects information
  3802. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  3803. shows that the intelligence service uses
  3804. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  3805. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3806. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3807. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3808. software.
  3809.  
  3810.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3811. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3812. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3813. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  3814. has been installing this malicious software
  3815. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3816. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  3817. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  3818. through a process of luring employees to a
  3819. false Linkedin page.
  3820.  
  3821. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  3822. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3823. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  3824. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  3825.  
  3826. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  3827.  
  3828.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  3829. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  3830. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  3831. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  3832. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  3833. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  3834. and citizens.
  3835.  
  3836.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  3837. will deter this bounty of profits for
  3838. the comsec industry, unless the public
  3839. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  3840. the nettle, and all those making money
  3841. from this deception operation decide to
  3842. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  3843.  
  3844.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  3845. lists, those participating in standards
  3846. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  3847. grants in think tanks and universities,
  3848. those in law firms and public interest
  3849. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  3850. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  3851. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  3852. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  3853. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  3854. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  3855. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  3856. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  3857. contracts, list lurking, online and
  3858. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  3859. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  3860. fulfilled.
  3861.  
  3862. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  3863.  
  3864. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3865.  
  3866. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3867.  
  3868. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3869. ���������������������������������������
  3870. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  3871. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  3872.  
  3873. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  3874. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  3875. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  3876. _______________________________________
  3877. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  3878.  
  3879. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  3880.  
  3881. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  3882.  
  3883. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  3884.  
  3885. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  3886.  
  3887. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  3888. _______________________________________
  3889. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  3890.  
  3891. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  3892. _______________________________________
  3893. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  3894. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  3895.  
  3896. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  3897.  
  3898. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  3899. _______________________________________
  3900. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  3901.  
  3902. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  3903. _______________________________________
  3904. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  3905. of Public Concerns ::
  3906.  
  3907. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  3908.  
  3909. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  3910.  
  3911. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  3912. _______________________________________
  3913. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3914.  
  3915.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  3916. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  3917. of metadata about the world�s secure
  3918. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  3919. certainly not a program through which
  3920. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  3921. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  3922. services like Google, as reported by others,
  3923. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  3924. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  3925. Google are based on a small piece of a
  3926. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  3927. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  3928. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  3929. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  3930. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  3931. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  3932. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  3933. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  3934. by providing information about a target.�
  3935.  
  3936. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  3937.  
  3938. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3939.  
  3940. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  3941. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  3942. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  3943. ���������������������������������������
  3944. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  3945.  
  3946. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  3947.  
  3948. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  3949. _______________________________________
  3950. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  3951.  
  3952. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  3953. ---------------------------------------
  3954. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  3955.  
  3956. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  3957.  
  3958.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  3959. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  3960. and later managed by big data corporations
  3961. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  3962.  
  3963.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  3964. large files across machines in a large
  3965. cluster.
  3966.  
  3967. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  3968.  
  3969.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  3970. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  3971. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  3972. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  3973.  
  3974.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  3975. major components, a central metadata server
  3976. and file servers from data.
  3977.  
  3978. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  3979.  
  3980. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  3981.  
  3982.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  3983. posted on public domain.
  3984.  
  3985. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  3986.  
  3987. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  3988. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  3989.  
  3990. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3991. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3992. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  3993.  
  3994. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3995.  
  3996. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3997. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3998. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3999. ---------------------------------------
  4000. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  4001. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  4002.  
  4003. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  4004.  
  4005. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  4006.  
  4007. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  4008.  
  4009. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  4010.  
  4011. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  4012.  
  4013. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  4014.  
  4015. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  4016.  
  4017. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  4018.  
  4019. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  4020.  
  4021.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  4022. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  4023. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  4024. content of all our communications have
  4025. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  4026. program since the 1990s.
  4027.  
  4028.  The new details concern how, �The National
  4029. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  4030. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  4031. of cellphones around the world.�
  4032.  
  4033.  However, the report reveals itself to
  4034. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  4035. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  4036. does not target Americans� location data
  4037. by design, but the agency acquires a
  4038. substantial amount of information on
  4039. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  4040. �incidentally.�
  4041.  
  4042.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  4043. happens to record the locations of Americans
  4044. using data from their cellphones, and is
  4045. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  4046. surveillance, is yet another example of
  4047. damage control by the establishment.
  4048.  
  4049. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  4050. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  4051. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  4052. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  4053. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  4054. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  4055. ---------------------------------------
  4056. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  4057. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  4058.  
  4059.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  4060. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  4061. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  4062. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  4063. targets for government hacking and to
  4064. bolster surveillance.
  4065.  
  4066. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  4067. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  4068. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  4069. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  4070. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  4071. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  4072. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  4073. ---------------------------------------
  4074. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  4075.  
  4076. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  4077. ---------------------------------------
  4078. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  4079. In a World Without Cookies ::
  4080.  
  4081. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  4082. _______________________________________
  4083. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  4084.  
  4085. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  4086. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  4087. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  4088.  
  4089. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  4090.  
  4091. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  4092. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  4093. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  4094. _______________________________________
  4095. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  4096. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  4097.  
  4098. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  4099. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  4100. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  4101. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  4102. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  4103. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  4104.  
  4105. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  4106.  
  4107. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  4108.  
  4109. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  4110.  
  4111. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  4112.  
  4113. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  4114.  
  4115. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  4116.  
  4117. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  4118.  
  4119. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  4120.  
  4121. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  4122.  
  4123. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  4124.  
  4125. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  4126.  
  4127. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  4128. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  4129. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  4130.  
  4131. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  4132.  
  4133. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  4134. ---------------------------------------
  4135. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  4136.  
  4137. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  4138. ---------------------------------------
  4139. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  4140.  
  4141. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  4142.  
  4143. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  4144.  
  4145. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  4146.  
  4147. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  4148.  
  4149. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  4150.  
  4151. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  4152.  
  4153. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  4154. _______________________________________
  4155.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  4156. worldwide was published by the German
  4157. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  4158. map was put online by accident, but before
  4159. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  4160. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  4161. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  4162. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  4163. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  4164. the names of all other cities were blurred
  4165. by Der Spiegel.�
  4166.  
  4167.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  4168.  
  4169. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  4170.  
  4171. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  4172.  
  4173. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  4174.  
  4175. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  4176.  
  4177. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  4178.  
  4179. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  4180. ---------------------------------------
  4181. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  4182.  
  4183. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  4184.  
  4185. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  4186. _______________________________________
  4187. � Five Eyes ::
  4188.  
  4189. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  4190. _______________________________________
  4191. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  4192.  
  4193. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  4194. _______________________________________
  4195. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  4196. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  4197.  
  4198. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  4199.  
  4200. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  4201. _______________________________________
  4202. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  4203.  
  4204. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  4205.  
  4206. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  4207. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  4208. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  4209. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  4210. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  4211. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  4212. _______________________________________
  4213. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  4214.  
  4215.  September 11th, which also happened to
  4216. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  4217. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  4218. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  4219. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  4220. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  4221. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  4222. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  4223. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  4224. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  4225. itself.
  4226.  
  4227.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  4228. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  4229. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  4230. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  4231. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  4232. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  4233. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  4234. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  4235. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  4236. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  4237. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  4238. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  4239. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  4240. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  4241. its workforce by one-third, to about
  4242. 33,000. The number of private companies
  4243. it depended upon more than tripled during
  4244. that time.
  4245.  
  4246.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  4247. and the increasing reliance on the private
  4248. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  4249. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  4250. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  4251. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  4252. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  4253. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  4254. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  4255. getting those clearances. So you had
  4256. this huge apparatus being built, and
  4257. the government was just managing it.
  4258. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  4259. doing that.� ... ...
  4260.  
  4261.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  4262. workforce, the surveillance he would
  4263. later expose was becoming not just
  4264. institutionalized but very big business.
  4265. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  4266. the full flower of that massive, massive
  4267. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  4268. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  4269. could go.� ... ...
  4270.  
  4271.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  4272. leaking government secrets when he was
  4273. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  4274. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  4275. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  4276. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  4277. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  4278. policies that I thought would be reined
  4279. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  4280. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  4281. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  4282. the more he read �true information,�
  4283. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  4284. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  4285. surveillance program � the more he realized
  4286. that there were actually two governments:
  4287. the one that was elected, and the other,
  4288. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  4289. �If the highest officials in government
  4290. can break the law without fearing punishment
  4291. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  4292. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  4293.  
  4294. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  4295. _______________________________________
  4296. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  4297.  
  4298. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  4299. _______________________________________
  4300. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  4301.  
  4302. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  4303. _______________________________________
  4304. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  4305. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  4306.  
  4307.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  4308. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  4309. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  4310. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  4311. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  4312. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  4313. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  4314. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  4315. in terrorism.
  4316.  
  4317.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  4318. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  4319. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  4320. threatening national security. It is
  4321. successfully restricting release of the
  4322. Snowden material and will likely become
  4323. more forceful as releases continue to the
  4324. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  4325. to criminalize release as a national
  4326. security threat.
  4327.  
  4328. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  4329. _______________________________________
  4330. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  4331.  
  4332.  Includes most reports, slides and
  4333. documents all related to the recent
  4334. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  4335. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  4336. any information that comes out and
  4337. will provide updated archives from
  4338. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  4339.  
  4340.  After decompression - the folder is
  4341. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  4342. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  4343.  
  4344. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4345. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  4346.  
  4347. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  4348. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  4349. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  4350. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4351. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4352. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  4353. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  4354. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4355. _______________________________________
  4356. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  4357.  
  4358. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4359. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4360. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4361.  
  4362. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  4363. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  4364.  
  4365.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  4366. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  4367. Australians, and hands over the material
  4368. to the US and its closest allies, according
  4369. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  4370. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  4371. Australia web site.
  4372.  
  4373.  The document obtained by the former US
  4374. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  4375. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  4376. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  4377. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  4378. as well as the people and governments of
  4379. many Asian countries.
  4380.  
  4381.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  4382. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  4383. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  4384. global partners so-called metadata of
  4385. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  4386. address books and social media posts of
  4387. millions of people.
  4388.  
  4389.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  4390. the recent revelations, also from documents
  4391. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  4392. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  4393. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  4394. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  4395. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  4396. operate as electronic listening posts
  4397. for the US-led spying network.
  4398.  
  4399. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  4400. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  4401. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  4402. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  4403. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  4404. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  4405.  
  4406. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  4407. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  4408.  
  4409.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  4410. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  4411. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  4412. political figures has been furiously
  4413. denounced by other media outlets for
  4414. breaching �national security� and the
  4415. �national interest.� The reaction
  4416. underscores the extent to which the
  4417. media establishment has been integrated
  4418. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  4419.  
  4420.  On November 18, after being approached
  4421. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  4422. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  4423. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  4424. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  4425. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  4426. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  4427. senior political figures. The report
  4428. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  4429. crisis for the Australian government, with
  4430. the Indonesian president suspending military
  4431. and intelligence cooperation.
  4432.  
  4433. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  4434. _______________________________________
  4435. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  4436.  
  4437.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  4438. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  4439. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  4440. allowed the largest American spy agency
  4441. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  4442. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  4443.  
  4444.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  4445. by CBC News.
  4446.  
  4447.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  4448. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  4449. a security command post during a six-day
  4450. spying operation by the National Security
  4451. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  4452. other foreign heads of government were on
  4453. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  4454.  
  4455.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  4456. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  4457.  
  4458.  The world was still struggling to climb
  4459. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  4460. were debating a wide array of possible
  4461. measures including a global tax on banks,
  4462. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  4463. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  4464. eventually scotched.
  4465.  
  4466. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  4467. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  4468. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  4469. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  4470. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  4471.  
  4472. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  4473. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  4474.  
  4475. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  4476.  
  4477.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  4478. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  4479.  
  4480. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  4481.  
  4482. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  4483.  
  4484. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  4485.  
  4486. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  4487. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  4488.  
  4489. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  4490.  
  4491. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  4492.  
  4493. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  4494.  
  4495. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  4496. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  4497.  
  4498. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  4499.  
  4500. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  4501.  
  4502.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  4503. believe that they have only �moved on� from discussing
  4504. CSEC�s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  4505. to worry about.
  4506.  
  4507.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  4508. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  4509. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  4510. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC�s
  4511. staff�it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  4512. military personnel assist its work�give an inkling of the
  4513. scale of its activities.
  4514.  
  4515.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  4516. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  4517. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  4518. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  4519. Of especial importance is the CSEC�s partnership with the NSA.
  4520. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  4521. the two organizations �have integrated personnel� i.e. swap
  4522. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  4523. Internet surveillance programs.
  4524.  
  4525.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  4526. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  4527. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  4528. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  4529. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  4530. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates�
  4531. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  4532.  
  4533. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  4534.  
  4535. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  4536.  
  4537. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  4538.  
  4539. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  4540. _______________________________________
  4541. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  4542.  
  4543. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  4544.  
  4545. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  4546.  
  4547. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  4548. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  4549. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  4550.  
  4551. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  4552.  
  4553. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  4554.  
  4555. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  4556.  
  4557. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  4558. _______________________________________
  4559.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  4560. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  4561. in theory � forbid local governments from
  4562. providing services to federal agencies
  4563. that collect electronic data from Americans
  4564. without a personalized warrant.
  4565.  
  4566.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  4567. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  4568. but at least one legislator has committed
  4569. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  4570. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  4571. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  4572. is introduced.
  4573.  
  4574.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  4575. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  4576. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  4577. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  4578. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  4579. and a handful of other groups.
  4580.  
  4581.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  4582. Maharrey adds.
  4583.  
  4584. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  4585. _______________________________________
  4586. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  4587. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  4588.  
  4589.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  4590. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  4591. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  4592. US and British intelligence � particularly
  4593. their cooperation in data collection and
  4594. snooping programs involving British citizens
  4595. and close allies on the European continent.
  4596.  
  4597.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  4598. to account by British authorities for
  4599. jeopardizing national security. The
  4600. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  4601. is being forced to appear before a
  4602. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  4603. the news outlet�s actions.
  4604.  
  4605. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4606. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  4607. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  4608.  
  4609. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  4610.  
  4611. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4612.  
  4613. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  4614. as the British Dictatorship ::
  4615.  
  4616.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  4617. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  4618. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  4619. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  4620. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  4621. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  4622. seems the United States is reaching the event
  4623. horizon to a police state.
  4624.  
  4625. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  4626.  
  4627. Cryptome noted
  4628.  
  4629.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  4630. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  4631. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  4632. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  4633. UKG), although there could be some which have
  4634. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  4635. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  4636.  
  4637.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  4638. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  4639. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  4640. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  4641. deception, co-optation.
  4642.  
  4643.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  4644. had access, or suspected of access, are
  4645. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  4646. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  4647. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  4648. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  4649. standard coercive means of authorities.
  4650.  
  4651.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  4652. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  4653. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  4654. advised successive cooperators, usually
  4655. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  4656. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  4657. participation.
  4658.  
  4659.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  4660. disputes and disagreements among competing
  4661. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  4662. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  4663. along with threats against families, friends
  4664. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  4665. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  4666. with authorities, including use of rewards
  4667. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  4668.  
  4669. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  4670. _______________________________________
  4671. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  4672.  
  4673. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  4674. _______________________________________
  4675. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  4676. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  4677. Governments ::
  4678.  
  4679. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  4680. _______________________________________
  4681. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  4682. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  4683.  
  4684. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  4685. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  4686. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  4687. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  4688. _______________________________________
  4689. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  4690.  
  4691. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  4692.  
  4693. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  4694.  
  4695. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  4696.  
  4697. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  4698.  
  4699. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  4700.  
  4701. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  4702.  
  4703. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  4704.  
  4705. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  4706.  
  4707. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  4708.  
  4709. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  4710.  
  4711. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  4712.  
  4713. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  4714.  
  4715. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  4716.  
  4717. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  4718.  
  4719. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  4720.  
  4721. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  4722. Steal Email Metadata ::
  4723.  
  4724.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  4725. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  4726. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  4727. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  4728.  
  4729.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  4730. servers around the world, reducing the
  4731. chance of losing your information should
  4732. one fail. When you log in to an account
  4733. with these firms, the data sent between
  4734. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  4735. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  4736. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  4737. And because many of the transfers take place
  4738. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  4739. isn�t required to tap the information.
  4740.  
  4741.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  4742. broken into the main communications links
  4743. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  4744. around the world, according to documents
  4745. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  4746. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  4747. officials.
  4748.  
  4749.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  4750. positioned itself to collect at will from
  4751. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  4752. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  4753. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  4754. but it keeps a lot.
  4755.  
  4756.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  4757. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  4758. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  4759. counterpart, the Government Communications
  4760. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  4761. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  4762. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  4763. that carry information among the data
  4764. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  4765.  
  4766. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  4767. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  4768. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  4769. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  4770. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  4771.  
  4772. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  4773.  
  4774.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  4775. email collecting program �does not apply
  4776. to US citizens.�
  4777.  
  4778.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  4779. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  4780. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  4781. accounts around the world, many of them
  4782. belonging to Americans, according to
  4783. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  4784. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  4785. Edward Snowden.
  4786.  
  4787.  The collection program, which has not
  4788. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  4789. address books and �buddy lists� from
  4790. instant messaging services as they move
  4791. across global data links. Online services
  4792. often transmit those contacts when a user
  4793. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  4794. a computer or mobile device with information
  4795. stored on remote servers.
  4796.  
  4797. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  4798. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  4799. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  4800.  
  4801. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  4802.  
  4803. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  4804.  
  4805. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4806.  
  4807. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4808. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4809. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4810. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4811. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4812. ���������������������������������������
  4813. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  4814.  
  4815. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4816.  
  4817. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  4818. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  4819.  
  4820. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  4821.  
  4822. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  4823.  
  4824. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  4825.  
  4826. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4827.  
  4828. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  4829.  
  4830. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4831.  
  4832. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  4833.  
  4834. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  4835.  
  4836. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  4837.  
  4838. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  4839.  
  4840. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  4841.  
  4842. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  4843.  
  4844. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  4845. ---------------------------------------
  4846. NOBODY comments ?
  4847.  
  4848.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  4849. differs from the Guardians.
  4850.  
  4851. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4852.  
  4853. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  4854.  
  4855. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4856.  
  4857. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  4858.  
  4859.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  4860. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  4861. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  4862.  
  4863.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  4864. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  4865. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  4866. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  4867. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  4868. ---------------------------------------
  4869. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  4870.  
  4871. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  4872.  
  4873. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4874.  
  4875.  This was written from a person who purports
  4876. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  4877.  
  4878. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  4879.  
  4880. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4881.  
  4882. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  4883.  
  4884. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  4885. Misleading ::
  4886.  
  4887. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  4888.  
  4889. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  4890. on NSA Spying ::
  4891.  
  4892. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  4893.  
  4894.  �Recent articles published in the
  4895. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  4896. inaccurate and misleading information
  4897. regarding US foreign intelligence
  4898. activities. The allegation that the
  4899. National Security Agency collected more
  4900. than 70 million �recordings of French
  4901. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  4902.  
  4903.  While we are not going to discuss the
  4904. details of our activities, we have
  4905. repeatedly made it clear that the
  4906. United States gathers intelligence of
  4907. the type gathered by all nations. The
  4908. US collects intelligence to protect the
  4909. nation, its interests, and its allies
  4910. from, among other things, threats such
  4911. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  4912. weapons of mass destruction.
  4913.  
  4914.  The United States values our longstanding
  4915. friendship and alliance with France and
  4916. we will continue to cooperate on security
  4917. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  4918.  
  4919. James R. Clapper
  4920. Director of National Intelligence
  4921. ---------------------------------------
  4922. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  4923.  
  4924. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  4925.  
  4926.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  4927. a call without leaving a record with the
  4928. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  4929. or leaves America without passing through
  4930. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  4931. statement Thursday.
  4932.  
  4933.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  4934. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  4935. _______________________________________
  4936. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  4937. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  4938.  
  4939.  US and British intelligence officials
  4940. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  4941. collection of highly classified, heavily
  4942. encrypted materials they believe former
  4943. National Security Agency contractor
  4944. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  4945.  
  4946.  One source saw the cache of documents
  4947. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  4948. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  4949. other harm. ... ...
  4950.  
  4951.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  4952. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  4953. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  4954. that �if anything happens at all to
  4955. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  4956. to get access to the full archives.�
  4957.  
  4958. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  4959. _______________________________________
  4960. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  4961. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  4962.  
  4963.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  4964. government surveillance policies. But he
  4965. is not disclosing those changes to the
  4966. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  4967. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  4968. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  4969. World Bank and the International Monetary
  4970. Fund? He won�t say.
  4971.  
  4972.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  4973. to review and recommend changes to his
  4974. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  4975.  
  4976. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  4977. _______________________________________
  4978. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  4979.  
  4980.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  4981. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  4982. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  4983. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  4984. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  4985.  
  4986.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  4987. broad goals, the five-page document said
  4988. that existing American laws were not adequate
  4989. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  4990. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  4991. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  4992. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  4993. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  4994. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4995. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4996. and target environments, or the operational
  4997. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  4998. document concluded.
  4999.  
  5000. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  5001. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  5002. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  5003. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  5004. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  5005.  
  5006. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  5007.  
  5008.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  5009. called Treasure Map and describes its
  5010. capabilities but does not publish visual
  5011. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  5012. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  5013. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  5014.  
  5015. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  5016. _______________________________________
  5017. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  5018.  
  5019. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  5020. _______________________________________
  5021. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  5022.  
  5023. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  5024.  
  5025. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  5026.  
  5027. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  5028.  
  5029.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  5030. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  5031. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  5032. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  5033. the door to a variety of spying options.
  5034.  
  5035. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  5036. _______________________________________
  5037. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  5038.  
  5039.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  5040. collection of solely domestic communications
  5041. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  5042. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  5043. request each week until we receive your
  5044. response,� EPIC said.
  5045.  
  5046.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  5047. said this week that it would not be hearing
  5048. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  5049. early Monday in which the high court listed
  5050. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  5051. as denied.
  5052.  
  5053. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  5054.  
  5055. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  5056. _______________________________________
  5057. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  5058.  
  5059. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  5060.  
  5061. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  5062. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  5063.  
  5064. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  5065.  
  5066. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  5067.  
  5068. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  5069. No Privacy ::
  5070.  
  5071. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  5072.  
  5073. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  5074. Spying Programs ::
  5075.  
  5076. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  5077.  
  5078. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  5079.  
  5080. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  5081.  
  5082. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  5083. _______________________________________
  5084. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  5085.  
  5086. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5087.  
  5088. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  5089.  
  5090. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  5091.  
  5092. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5093.  
  5094. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  5095.  
  5096. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  5097.  
  5098. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  5099.  
  5100.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  5101. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  5102. or indigenous cryptographic information
  5103. security devices or systems in order to
  5104. make them exploitable.�
  5105.  
  5106. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  5107.  
  5108.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  5109. successfully exploits cryptographic
  5110. components of commercial information
  5111. security devices or systems when the
  5112. device or system specified.�
  5113.  
  5114. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5115.  
  5116. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  5117.  
  5118. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  5119.  
  5120. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5121. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5122. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  5123.  
  5124. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  5125.  
  5126.  US and British intelligence agencies
  5127. have successfully cracked much of the
  5128. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  5129. of millions of people to protect the
  5130. privacy of their personal data, online
  5131. transactions and emails, according to
  5132. top-secret documents revealed by former
  5133. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  5134.  
  5135.  Those methods include covert measures
  5136. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  5137. international encryption standards, the
  5138. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  5139. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  5140. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  5141. technology companies and internet service
  5142. providers themselves.
  5143.  
  5144.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  5145. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  5146. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  5147. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  5148.  
  5149.  Independent security experts have long
  5150. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  5151. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  5152. confirmed for the first time by another
  5153. secret document. It shows the agency
  5154. worked covertly to get its own version
  5155. of a draft security standard issued by
  5156. the US National Institute of Standards
  5157. and Technology approved for worldwide
  5158. use in 2006.
  5159.  
  5160. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  5161.  
  5162. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  5163.  
  5164. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5165.  
  5166. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  5167.  
  5168. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  5169.  
  5170. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  5171.  
  5172. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5173.  
  5174. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5175.  
  5176. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  5177. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  5178. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  5179.  
  5180. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5181.  
  5182. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  5183. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  5184.  
  5185. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5186.  
  5187. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  5188.  
  5189. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  5190.  
  5191. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  5192.  
  5193. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  5194. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  5195.  
  5196. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  5197.  
  5198. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  5199.  
  5200.  A range of US hardware and software
  5201. companies are in danger of being dragged
  5202. into the widening scandal over internet
  5203. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  5204. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  5205. Security Agency contractor.
  5206.  
  5207.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  5208. that it has collaborated with technology
  5209. companies to plant �back doors� into
  5210. their systems � or ways for the agency
  5211. secretly to penetrate systems without
  5212. the users� knowledge.
  5213.  
  5214. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  5215.  
  5216. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  5217.  
  5218. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  5219. _______________________________________
  5220. � SSL Inspector ::
  5221.  
  5222. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  5223.  
  5224. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  5225.  
  5226. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  5227. _______________________________________
  5228. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  5229. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  5230.  
  5231. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  5232.  
  5233. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  5234.  
  5235. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  5236.  
  5237. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  5238.  
  5239. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  5240.  
  5241. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  5242.  
  5243. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  5244.  
  5245. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  5246.  
  5247. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  5248. ���������������������������������������
  5249. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  5250. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  5251.  
  5252. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  5253. ���������������������������������������
  5254. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  5255.  
  5256.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  5257. activities is an obscure organization called
  5258. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  5259. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  5260. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  5261. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  5262. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  5263. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  5264. presentation given to journalists by former
  5265. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  5266. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  5267. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  5268. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  5269. be collected, which is then gathered and
  5270. delivered by the DITU.
  5271.  
  5272.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  5273. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  5274. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  5275. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  5276. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  5277. collection, processing, and reporting.
  5278.  
  5279. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  5280.  
  5281. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  5282.  
  5283. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  5284. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  5285. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5286.  
  5287.  
  5288. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  5289.  
  5290. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5291. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5292. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5293.  
  5294. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  5295.  
  5296. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  5297.  
  5298. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  5299.  
  5300. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  5301.  
  5302. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  5303.  
  5304. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  5305.  
  5306.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  5307. by the NSA.
  5308.  
  5309.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  5310. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  5311. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  5312. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  5313. also now has access to some of these documents.
  5314.  
  5315.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  5316. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  5317. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  5318. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  5319. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  5320. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  5321.  
  5322.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  5323. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  5324. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  5325. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  5326. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  5327. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  5328. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  5329. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  5330. Facebook and Microsoft.
  5331.  
  5332. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  5333.  
  5334.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  5335. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  5336. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  5337. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  5338. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  5339. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  5340. and unilateral access to their servers.
  5341.  
  5342.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  5343. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  5344. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  5345. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  5346. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  5347. diving.
  5348.  
  5349.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  5350. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  5351.  
  5352.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  5353. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  5354. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  5355. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  5356. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  5357. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  5358. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  5359. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  5360. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  5361. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  5362. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  5363. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  5364. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  5365. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  5366. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  5367. major US carriers.
  5368.  
  5369. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  5370.  
  5371.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  5372. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  5373. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  5374. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  5375. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  5376. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  5377. engines.
  5378.  
  5379.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  5380. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  5381. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  5382. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  5383. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  5384.  
  5385.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  5386. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  5387. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  5388. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  5389. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  5390. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  5391. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  5392. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  5393. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  5394. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  5395. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  5396. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  5397. companies have been targeted.
  5398.  
  5399.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  5400. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  5401. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  5402. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  5403. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  5404. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  5405. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  5406. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  5407. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  5408. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  5409. _______________________________________
  5410. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  5411.  
  5412. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  5413.  
  5414. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  5415.  
  5416. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  5417.  
  5418. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  5419. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  5420.  
  5421. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  5422.  
  5423. NOBODY comments
  5424.  
  5425.  100% expected. They will continue to
  5426. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  5427. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  5428. We must adjust to it by learning how
  5429. to counter their surveillance.
  5430.  
  5431. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  5432. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  5433.  
  5434.  The United States and its key intelligence
  5435. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  5436. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  5437. Nations to promote a universal human right
  5438. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  5439. sources and an internal American government
  5440. document obtained by The Cable.
  5441.  
  5442.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  5443. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  5444. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  5445. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  5446. internet surveillance by the National
  5447. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  5448. services. American representatives have made
  5449. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  5450. checks on their global surveillance network.
  5451. The stakes are high, particularly in
  5452. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  5453. an international backlash against NSA
  5454. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  5455. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  5456. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  5457.  
  5458. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  5459.  
  5460. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  5461. _______________________________________
  5462. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  5463. Public News Coverage ::
  5464.  
  5465. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  5466. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  5467. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  5468. _______________________________________
  5469. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  5470. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  5471.  
  5472. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  5473. _______________________________________
  5474. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  5475.  
  5476.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  5477. a division for particularly difficult
  5478. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  5479. (TAO), this department devises special
  5480. methods for special targets.
  5481.  
  5482.  That category includes surveillance of
  5483. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  5484. the division reported its mission
  5485. accomplished. A report classified as
  5486. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  5487. exploited a key mail server in the
  5488. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  5489. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  5490. first-ever access to President Felipe
  5491. Calderon�s public email account.�
  5492.  
  5493. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  5494.  
  5495. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  5496.  
  5497. Cryptome comments ?
  5498.  
  5499.  This spying was apparently done from
  5500. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  5501. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  5502. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  5503. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  5504.  
  5505. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  5506.  
  5507. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  5508. _______________________________________
  5509. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  5510.  
  5511. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  5512.  
  5513. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  5514.  
  5515. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5516.  
  5517. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  5518.  
  5519. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5520.  
  5521. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  5522.  
  5523. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  5524.  
  5525. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  5526.  
  5527. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  5528.  
  5529. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  5530.  
  5531. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  5532.  
  5533.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  5534. thought that the NSA should use its
  5535. technology to intercept emails and
  5536. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  5537. terminal to another, and was upset to
  5538. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  5539. That was a line he would only cross,
  5540. deliberately, with court and congressional
  5541. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  5542. but as we now know, the agency added
  5543. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  5544. suspicious communications that transited
  5545. the border of the United States, and
  5546. later began to collect reams of metadata
  5547. in order to analyze it.
  5548.  
  5549.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  5550. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  5551. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  5552. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  5553. in order to provide policymakers with a
  5554. decision advantage. The advantage the
  5555. NSA provided was accurate information
  5556. about what people who interacted with
  5557. the United States said in private about
  5558. their intentions; that gap between saying
  5559. and doing, and the ability to predict
  5560. action from it, allows the president of
  5561. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  5562.  
  5563.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  5564. States� actions don�t always match up
  5565. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  5566. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  5567. our moral authority wanes and our
  5568. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  5569.  
  5570.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  5571. countries are any purer. They never have
  5572. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  5573. purer than others, so the amount of
  5574. resources the intelligence community
  5575. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  5576. to correspond with how honest our allies
  5577. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  5578. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  5579. can we figure out which allies are more
  5580. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  5581. correspondence between public and private
  5582. words and actions.
  5583.  
  5584.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  5585. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  5586. want their leaders to gain a decision
  5587. advantage in the give and take between
  5588. countries. They want to know what US
  5589. policymakers will do before the Americans
  5590. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  5591. France, they aggressively spy on the
  5592. United States, on US citizens and
  5593. politicians, in order to collect that
  5594. information. The difference lies in the
  5595. scale of intelligence collection: The
  5596. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  5597. most sophisticated intelligence community
  5598. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  5599. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  5600. envious.
  5601. _______________________________________
  5602. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  5603.  
  5604. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  5605. _______________________________________
  5606. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  5607.  
  5608. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  5609. ���������������������������������������
  5610. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  5611. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  5612.  
  5613. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  5614. _______________________________________
  5615. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  5616. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  5617.  
  5618. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  5619. _______________________________________
  5620.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  5621. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  5622. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  5623. from the award ceremony are the first of
  5624. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  5625. Russia.
  5626.  
  5627. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  5628. ���������������������������������������
  5629. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  5630.  
  5631.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  5632. of the Security Service, said the
  5633. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  5634. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  5635. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  5636. agencies.
  5637.  
  5638. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  5639.  
  5640. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  5641.  
  5642.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  5643. they are not using Tor.�
  5644.  
  5645. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  5646.  
  5647. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  5648. ---------------------------------------
  5649.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  5650. old bleach log.
  5651.  
  5652. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  5653. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  5654. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  5655. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  5656.  
  5657. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  5658.  
  5659.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  5660. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  5661. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  5662. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  5663. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  5664. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  5665. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  5666. function.
  5667.  
  5668.  There are also various third party
  5669. programs that can produce files in
  5670. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  5671. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  5672.  
  5673.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  5674. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  5675. data stored on the system running the
  5676. Flash player.�
  5677. ---------------------------------------
  5678. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  5679.  
  5680.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  5681. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  5682. It can be found within Windows systems
  5683. and can be wiped out here ;
  5684.  
  5685. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5686. Application Data\Macromedia\
  5687.  
  5688. and may also be cloned here ;
  5689.  
  5690. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  5691.  
  5692.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  5693. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  5694.  
  5695. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  5696.  
  5697. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5698. Local Settings\Temp\
  5699. ---------------------------------------
  5700. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  5701.  
  5702. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  5703.  
  5704. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  5705.  
  5706. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  5707.  
  5708. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  5709.  
  5710. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  5711.  
  5712. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  5713.  
  5714. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  5715.  
  5716. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  5717.  
  5718. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  5719.  
  5720. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  5721.  
  5722. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  5723.  
  5724. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  5725.  
  5726. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  5727.  
  5728. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  5729. ---------------------------------------
  5730. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  5731.  
  5732.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  5733. application created by Samy Kamkar
  5734. which produces zombie cookies in a
  5735. web browser that are intentionally
  5736. difficult to delete. ... ...
  5737.  
  5738.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  5739. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  5740. by copying itself in different forms on
  5741. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  5742. itself if it notices that some of the
  5743. copies are missing or expired.
  5744.  
  5745.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  5746. Evercookie uses the following storage
  5747. mechanisms when available:
  5748.  
  5749. � Standard HTTP cookies
  5750. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  5751. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  5752. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  5753. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  5754. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  5755. (cookies) back out
  5756. � Storing cookies in Web history
  5757. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  5758. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  5759. � window.name caching
  5760. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  5761. � HTML5 Session Storage
  5762. � HTML5 Local Storage
  5763. � HTML5 Global Storage
  5764. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  5765. ---------------------------------------
  5766. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  5767.  
  5768.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  5769. mean that your browser isn't storing
  5770. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  5771. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  5772. in browser vulnerabilities.
  5773.  
  5774.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  5775. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  5776. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  5777. wide surveillance.
  5778.  
  5779.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  5780. powerful anonymity service, and the
  5781. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  5782. the Internet, makes it easy to
  5783. differentiate Tor users from other
  5784. Web users,� he wrote.
  5785.  
  5786.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  5787. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  5788. identifies you. Even though your IP
  5789. address changed [because of Tor], the
  5790. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  5791.  
  5792. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  5793. ---------------------------------------
  5794. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  5795. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  5796.  
  5797.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  5798. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  5799. �staining� as a means to identify
  5800. individual machines linked to that
  5801. IP address. ... ...
  5802.  
  5803.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  5804. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  5805. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  5806. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  5807. and is stamped into every packet, which
  5808. enables all the events from that stained
  5809. machine to be brought back together to
  5810. recreate a browsing session.�
  5811.  
  5812. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  5813.  
  5814. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  5815.  
  5816. � Packet Staining ::
  5817.  
  5818. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  5819. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  5820. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  5821. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  5822.  
  5823. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  5824.  
  5825. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  5826. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  5827. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  5828. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  5829.  
  5830. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  5831.  
  5832.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  5833. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  5834. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  5835. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  5836. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  5837. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  5838. identify it. We also worked to create
  5839. a custom Tor client which allows the
  5840. user finer control.� ... ...
  5841.  
  5842.  �This accomplishes several things.
  5843. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  5844. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  5845. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  5846. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  5847. be excessively complex, as a single
  5848. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  5849. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  5850. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  5851. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  5852. going to and from the proxy server,
  5853. it is possible to deduce which clients
  5854. are making which requests. Second, if
  5855. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  5856. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  5857. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  5858. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  5859. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  5860. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  5861. must be coordinated across several machines,
  5862. and an attacker must own all the hops
  5863. along the circuit in order to trace
  5864. requests back to the originating client.�
  5865.  
  5866. ... ...
  5867.  
  5868.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  5869. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  5870. a hidden service will turn up the port
  5871. that the hidden service is using to deal
  5872. with incoming connections. It can then be
  5873. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  5874.  
  5875. ... ...
  5876.  
  5877.  �We would have to try to connect to
  5878. each of the ports we see open on a
  5879. machine to determine if there is a
  5880. hidden service being run. We would not
  5881. even know which protocol the hidden
  5882. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  5883. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  5884. etc. The only thing we know is that
  5885. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  5886. not enough to attempt to connect once
  5887. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  5888. Several protocols must be tried.�
  5889.  
  5890. ... ...
  5891.  
  5892.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  5893. directory servers in more detail. Our
  5894. work focused solely on the client, but
  5895. many attacks would be much easier with
  5896. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  5897. servers ultimately control which Tor
  5898. servers are used by clients. We have found
  5899. that a server can put itself on a directory
  5900. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  5901. server running several Tor processes, each
  5902. having a different nickname, open port,
  5903. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  5904. requires different configuration files
  5905. for the different processes, which are
  5906. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  5907. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  5908. since it is listed several times. This
  5909. increases the density of friendly servers
  5910. in the cloud without increasing the number
  5911. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  5912. each listing has the same IP address,
  5913. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  5914. who inspecting the directories.�
  5915.  
  5916. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  5917. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  5918. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  5919.  
  5920. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  5921.  
  5922. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  5923.  
  5924. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  5925.  
  5926. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  5927.  
  5928. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  5929.  
  5930.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  5931. into capabilities the IC has developed
  5932. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  5933. to run multiple research teams (either
  5934. known or unknown to each other) against
  5935. a single target, and a few summer students
  5936. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  5937. small investment. I�d expect there are
  5938. other programs with more sophisticated
  5939. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  5940.  
  5941. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  5942. _______________________________________
  5943. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  5944.  
  5945. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  5946. _______________________________________
  5947. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  5948. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  5949.  
  5950. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  5951.  
  5952.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  5953. the past several months, I�d also thought
  5954. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  5955. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  5956. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  5957. Sasso of The Hill.
  5958.  
  5959.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  5960. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  5961. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  5962. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  5963. help you with that.�
  5964.  
  5965. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  5966.  
  5967.  The conversation then turned specifically
  5968. to the government�s use of targeted
  5969. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  5970. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  5971. hope they make full use of the capacities
  5972. of the National Security Agency when we
  5973. do that.�
  5974.  
  5975.  Hayden was responding to a question
  5976. about a new project announced by journalists
  5977. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  5978. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  5979. assassinations.
  5980.  
  5981. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  5982. _______________________________________
  5983. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  5984.  
  5985. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  5986.  
  5987. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  5988.  
  5989. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  5990. _______________________________________
  5991. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  5992. Breaches ::
  5993.  
  5994. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  5995.  
  5996. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  5997.  
  5998. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  5999. _______________________________________
  6000. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  6001. of US Citizens ::
  6002.  
  6003.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  6004. body of knowledge in recent months about
  6005. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  6006. information concerning Americans, prompting
  6007. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  6008. in the agency and President Obama to order
  6009. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  6010. Almost everything about the agency�s
  6011. operations is hidden, and the decision
  6012. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  6013. was made in secret, without review by the
  6014. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  6015. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  6016. Department memo warned of the potential
  6017. for the �misuse� of such information
  6018. without adequate safeguards.
  6019.  
  6020. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  6021. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  6022. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  6023.  
  6024. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  6025. From American Social Networks ::
  6026.  
  6027. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  6028. _______________________________________
  6029. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  6030. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  6031.  
  6032. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  6033. _______________________________________
  6034. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  6035. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  6036.  
  6037.  Led by the German government, a loose
  6038. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  6039. across the world is pushing to update an
  6040. influential international human rights
  6041. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  6042.  
  6043. ... ...
  6044.  
  6045.  The annual conference was attended by a
  6046. diverse selection of privacy and data
  6047. protection officials from across the
  6048. world, with representatives attending
  6049. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  6050. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  6051. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  6052. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  6053. United Kingdom.
  6054.  
  6055.  During a closed session at the conference
  6056. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  6057. resolution was put forward for a vote
  6058. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  6059. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  6060. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  6061. globally applicable standards for data
  6062. protection and the protection of privacy
  6063. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  6064.  
  6065.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  6066. of the resolution ... the United States.
  6067.  
  6068.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  6069. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  6070. eventually need to be put forward at the
  6071. United Nations and voted on by member
  6072. states, and that could take time. But
  6073. the growing appetite to amend the
  6074. international treaty in light of the
  6075. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  6076. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  6077. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  6078. technology in the digital age to trample
  6079. over basic universal privacy rights.
  6080.  
  6081. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  6082.  
  6083. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  6084.  
  6085. NOBODY comments
  6086.  
  6087.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  6088. all secret agencies around the world,
  6089. in general. All secret agencies and
  6090. their third-party vendors or allies
  6091. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  6092. backdoors in electronic communication
  6093. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  6094. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  6095. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  6096. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  6097. you must kill any trust in security.
  6098.  
  6099.  Security does not exist on the web.
  6100. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  6101. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  6102. _______________________________________
  6103. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  6104.  
  6105. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  6106.  
  6107. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  6108.  
  6109. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  6110. _______________________________________
  6111. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  6112.  
  6113. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  6114. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  6115. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  6116. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  6117. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  6118.  
  6119. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  6120. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  6121.  
  6122. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  6123. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  6124. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  6125.  
  6126.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are tapping the
  6127. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  6128. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  6129. of this) as opposed to �downstream� collection, which
  6130. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  6131.  
  6132. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  6133.  
  6134. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  6135.  
  6136. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  6137.  
  6138. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6139. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6140. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6141. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6142. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6143. _______________________________________
  6144. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  6145. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  6146. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  6147.  
  6148. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  6149. _______________________________________
  6150. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  6151.  
  6152.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  6153. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  6154. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  6155. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  6156. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  6157. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  6158. file transfer and social networking services.
  6159.  
  6160.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  6161. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  6162. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  6163. officials.
  6164.  
  6165.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India�s
  6166. domestic politics and the country�s strategic and commercial
  6167. interests.
  6168.  
  6169. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  6170.  
  6171.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  6172. document about �Close Access SIGADs�, the offices of Indian
  6173. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  6174. at these important posts were targets of four different
  6175. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  6176.  
  6177.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  6178. of computers.
  6179.  
  6180. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  6181.  
  6182. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  6183.  
  6184. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  6185.  
  6186. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  6187. _______________________________________
  6188. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  6189.  
  6190.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  6191. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  6192. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  6193. in some cases plan the destruction of, �more than 10,000
  6194. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  6195. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  6196. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  6197. that could threaten US or allied interests.�
  6198.  
  6199. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  6200. _______________________________________
  6201. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  6202.  
  6203. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  6204. _______________________________________
  6205. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  6206. NSA Leaks ::
  6207.  
  6208. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  6209. _______________________________________
  6210. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  6211.  
  6212. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  6213. _______________________________________
  6214. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  6215. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  6216.  
  6217. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  6218. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  6219. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  6220.  
  6221. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  6222. Under United States Control ::
  6223.  
  6224.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  6225. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  6226. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  6227.  
  6228.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  6229. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  6230. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  6231. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  6232. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  6233. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  6234. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it�s,
  6235. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  6236.  
  6237.  �The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  6238. severe in coming months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  6239. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  6240. America Foundation think-tank. �This notion of national
  6241. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  6242. issue around the globe.�
  6243.  
  6244. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  6245. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  6246. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  6247. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  6248.  
  6249. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  6250.  
  6251.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  6252. optic cable system.
  6253.  
  6254. http://www.bricscable.com/
  6255.  
  6256. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  6257. _______________________________________
  6258. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  6259.  
  6260.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  6261. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court�s
  6262. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  6263. PATRIOT Act that�s used to justify the National Security
  6264. Agency�s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  6265. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  6266. orders has ever challenged one.
  6267.  
  6268. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  6269. _______________________________________
  6270. � Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  6271. Revelations ::
  6272.  
  6273.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  6274. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA�s
  6275. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  6276. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  6277. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  6278. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  6279.  
  6280.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  6281. the agency�s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  6282. and its �partnerships� with software and hardware vendors
  6283. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  6284. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  6285. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  6286. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  6287. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  6288. But one thing that�s become clear is that when the government
  6289. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn�t
  6290. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  6291.  
  6292. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  6293.  
  6294. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  6295.  
  6296.  The security community didn�t invent the concept of fear,
  6297. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  6298. it to the level of religion. It�s the way that security products
  6299. are marketed and sold, but it�s also the way that the intelligence
  6300. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  6301. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  6302. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  6303. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  6304. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  6305. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  6306. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  6307. fundamental building blocks of security.
  6308.  
  6309.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  6310. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  6311. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  6312. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  6313. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company�s
  6314. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  6315. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  6316. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  6317.  
  6318. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  6319. _______________________________________
  6320. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  6321.  
  6322.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  6323. President approximately every 45 days,
  6324. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  6325. the activities carried out under these
  6326. Authorizations are referred to as the
  6327. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  6328. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  6329. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  6330. the content of communications into and out
  6331. of the United States where there was a
  6332. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  6333. party to the communication was a member
  6334. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  6335.  
  6336.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  6337. acknowledged and described by the President,
  6338. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  6339. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  6340. a series of articles published in The New York
  6341. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  6342. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  6343. intelligence activities were also authorized
  6344. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  6345. but the details of those activities remain
  6346. classified.� ... ...
  6347.  
  6348.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  6349. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  6350. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  6351. as the principal governing authorities for
  6352. conducting electronic surveillance for
  6353. national security purposes. The Foreign
  6354. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  6355. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  6356. "provide legislative authorization and
  6357. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  6358. conducted within the United States for
  6359. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  6360.  
  6361. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  6362.  
  6363. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  6364. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  6365.  
  6366. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  6367.  
  6368. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  6369.  
  6370.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  6371. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  6372. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  6373. require special approval. Therefore, just
  6374. another gap. Also take in consideration
  6375. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  6376. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  6377. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  6378. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  6379. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  6380. _______________________________________
  6381. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  6382. Firm ::
  6383.  
  6384.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  6385. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  6386. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  6387. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  6388. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  6389. A �top secret� Government Communications
  6390. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  6391. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  6392. conducted under the codename �Operation
  6393. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  6394. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  6395. improve understanding of the provider�s
  6396. infrastructure. ... ...
  6397.  
  6398.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  6399. presentation, the attack was directed
  6400. at several Belgacom employees and
  6401. involved the planting of a highly
  6402. developed attack technology referred
  6403. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  6404. appears to be a method with which the
  6405. person being targeted, without their
  6406. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  6407. that then plant malware on their
  6408. computers that can then manipulate
  6409. them. Some of the employees whose
  6410. computers were infiltrated had �good
  6411. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  6412. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  6413. please the British spies, according
  6414. to the slides.
  6415.    
  6416. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  6417. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  6418. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  6419. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  6420. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  6421. _______________________________________
  6422. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  6423.  
  6424. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  6425.  
  6426. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  6427. _______________________________________
  6428. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  6429.  
  6430. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  6431. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  6432. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  6433. _______________________________________
  6434. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  6435. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  6436.  
  6437. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  6438. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  6439. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  6440. _______________________________________
  6441. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  6442.  
  6443. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  6444. ���������������������������������������
  6445. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  6446. Allocated to One Release ::
  6447.  
  6448. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  6449.  
  6450. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  6451.  
  6452. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  6453.  
  6454. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  6455. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  6456.  
  6457. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  6458.  
  6459. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  6460. Schedule ::
  6461.  
  6462. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6463.  
  6464. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6465.  
  6466. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6467.  
  6468. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6469.  
  6470. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6471.  
  6472. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6473.  
  6474. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6475. ���������������������������������������
  6476. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  6477.  
  6478.  In response to a FOIA request from
  6479. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  6480. its ethics office never looked into
  6481. complaints from two federal judges
  6482. that they had been misled about NSA
  6483. surveillance.
  6484.  
  6485. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  6486. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  6487. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  6488. ���������������������������������������
  6489.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  6490. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  6491. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  6492. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  6493. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  6494.  
  6495. Livestream will be at:
  6496.  
  6497. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  6498. _______________________________________
  6499. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  6500. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  6501.  
  6502. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  6503.  
  6504. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  6505. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  6506. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  6507.  
  6508. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  6509.  
  6510.  The Director of National Intelligence
  6511. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  6512. pages of documents related to the
  6513. government�s secret interpretation of
  6514. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  6515. (mis)use of its massive database of
  6516. every American�s phone records. The
  6517. documents were released as a result
  6518. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  6519. Act lawsuit.
  6520.  
  6521.  We�ve posted links to each document
  6522. below. While the government also posted
  6523. many of the documents here ...
  6524.  
  6525. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  6526.  
  6527. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  6528.  
  6529. Links to the documents ;
  6530.  
  6531. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  6532. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6533.  
  6534. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6535.  
  6536. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  6537. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6538. Court
  6539.  
  6540. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6541.  
  6542. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6543. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6544. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6545. Court
  6546.  
  6547. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6548.  
  6549. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6550. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6551. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6552. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  6553.  
  6554. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6555.  
  6556. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  6557. Incident
  6558.  
  6559. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6560.  
  6561. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6562. Intelligence Court
  6563.  
  6564. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6565.  
  6566. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6567. Intelligence Court
  6568.  
  6569. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6570.  
  6571. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  6572. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  6573. Business Records FISA
  6574.  
  6575. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6576.  
  6577. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  6578. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  6579.  
  6580. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6581.  
  6582. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  6583. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6584.  
  6585. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6586.  
  6587. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  6588. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  6589. Surveillance Court
  6590.  
  6591. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6592.  
  6593. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  6594. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  6595. Surveillance Court
  6596.  
  6597. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6598.  
  6599. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  6600. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  6601.  
  6602. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  6603.  
  6604. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  6605. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  6606.  
  6607. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  6608. _______________________________________
  6609. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  6610.  
  6611. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  6612.  
  6613. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  6614.  
  6615. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  6616. ���������������������������������������
  6617. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  6618.  
  6619. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  6620. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  6621. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  6622. _______________________________________
  6623. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  6624. Over Data to the NSA ::
  6625.  
  6626.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6627. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  6628. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  6629. media report. The revelation comes as
  6630. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  6631. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  6632. troves of data with the US and UK.
  6633.  
  6634.  Citing secret government documents,
  6635. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  6636. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6637. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  6638. with domestic security, works closely
  6639. with the US and regularly sends them
  6640. information.
  6641.  
  6642.  The security service gathers intelligence
  6643. on internal security threats. The documents
  6644. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  6645. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  6646. well as regular meetings between officers
  6647. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  6648.  
  6649. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  6650. _______________________________________
  6651. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  6652. Revelations ::
  6653.  
  6654. This is an unofficial translation.
  6655.  
  6656. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  6657.  
  6658.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  6659. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  6660. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  6661.  
  6662. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  6663.  
  6664. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  6665. _______________________________________
  6666. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  6667.  
  6668. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  6669. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  6670. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  6671. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  6672. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  6673. _______________________________________
  6674. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  6675.  
  6676. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  6677.  
  6678. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  6679.  
  6680. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  6681. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  6682.  
  6683. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  6684.  
  6685. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  6686.  
  6687.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  6688. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  6689. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  6690. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  6691. and control over natural resources.
  6692. _______________________________________
  6693. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  6694.  
  6695.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  6696. machines to read.
  6697.  
  6698. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  6699. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  6700. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  6701. _______________________________________
  6702. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  6703.  
  6704. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  6705.  
  6706. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  6707. _______________________________________
  6708. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  6709. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  6710. National Unit ::
  6711.  
  6712.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  6713. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  6714. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  6715. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  6716. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  6717. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  6718. it Wednesday.
  6719.  
  6720.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  6721. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  6722. raw signals intelligence, referred
  6723. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  6724. swathes of digital data traffic that
  6725. the agency gathers under secret court
  6726. authority from US Internet providers.
  6727.  
  6728.  So sensitive is this data that even
  6729. before being disseminated to other US
  6730. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  6731. to a court-mandated process called
  6732. minimization, under which the names
  6733. of any Americans are removed unless
  6734. they are essential for foreign
  6735. intelligence interest.
  6736.  
  6737.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  6738. that the data shared with Israel
  6739. �includes, but is not limited to,
  6740. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  6741. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  6742. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  6743. and content.�
  6744.  
  6745.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  6746. and unminimized raw collection associated
  6747. with selectors from multiple Target office
  6748. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  6749. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  6750. relationship between the two organizations.�
  6751.  
  6752. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  6753. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  6754. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  6755. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  6756. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  6757. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  6758.  
  6759.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  6760. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  6761. that spy most aggressively against the
  6762. United States.
  6763.  
  6764.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6765. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6766. insider threat detection capabilities
  6767. across the Community. In addition, we
  6768. are investing in target surveillance
  6769. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6770. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6771. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  6772.  
  6773. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6774. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6775. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6776.  
  6777. NOBODY comments
  6778.  
  6779.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  6780. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  6781. plenty of inside information.
  6782.  
  6783.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  6784. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  6785. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  6786.  
  6787. This reminds of a quote ;
  6788.  
  6789.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  6790. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  6791. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  6792. to play out one big game of destruction
  6793. and domination with humans as the visible
  6794. and spiritual puppets?�
  6795. _______________________________________
  6796. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  6797.  
  6798. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  6799. _______________________________________
  6800. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  6801.  
  6802. (EN)
  6803. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6804.  
  6805. (DE)
  6806. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  6807.  
  6808. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  6809.  
  6810.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  6811. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  6812. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  6813. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  6814. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  6815. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  6816. deployed in a government intelligence
  6817. agency presentation.
  6818.  
  6819. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6820. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  6821. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  6822. ���������������������������������������
  6823. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  6824. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  6825.  
  6826.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  6827. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  6828. reverse restrictions on the National
  6829. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  6830. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  6831. the agency to search deliberately for
  6832. Americans� communications in its massive
  6833. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  6834. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  6835. �declassified material� - (which, by
  6836. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  6837. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  6838. of which agency it came from and most
  6839. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  6840.  
  6841. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  6842.  
  6843.  In addition, the court extended the
  6844. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  6845. to retain intercepted US communications
  6846. from five years to six years � and more
  6847. under special circumstances, according
  6848. to the documents, which include a
  6849. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  6850. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  6851. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6852. Surveillance Court.
  6853.  
  6854. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6855.  
  6856. NOBODY comments
  6857.  
  6858.  The document which was declassified by
  6859. US intelligence officials explains the
  6860. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6861. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  6862. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  6863.  
  6864. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6865. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6866. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6867.  
  6868.  National Security Agency analysts
  6869. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6870. their authority to spy on Americans.
  6871.  
  6872. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6873.  
  6874.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  6875. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  6876.  
  6877. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6878.  
  6879. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6880.  
  6881.  And this is not the first attempt to
  6882. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  6883.  
  6884. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6885.  
  6886. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6887.  
  6888.  The new Washington Post report has
  6889. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  6890. (press) release exposing yet another
  6891. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  6892. or take responsibility for the abuses
  6893. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  6894.  
  6895. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6896.  
  6897.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  6898. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  6899.  
  6900.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  6901. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  6902.  
  6903.  All of this information is backed up
  6904. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  6905. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  6906. 2,776 violations one year after the
  6907. FISA Court order.
  6908.  
  6909. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6910.  
  6911.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  6912. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  6913. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  6914. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  6915. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  6916. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  6917. them out of office come next election.
  6918. _______________________________________
  6919. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  6920.  
  6921. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  6922. _______________________________________
  6923. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  6924.  
  6925. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  6926.  
  6927.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  6928. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  6929. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  6930.  
  6931. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  6932.  
  6933. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  6934.  
  6935. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  6936.  
  6937. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  6938.  
  6939. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  6940.  
  6941. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  6942.  
  6943. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  6944.  
  6945. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6946. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6947. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  6948. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  6949.  
  6950. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  6951.  
  6952.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  6953. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  6954. reports that the US National Security Agency
  6955. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  6956.  
  6957.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  6958. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  6959. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  6960. Tuesday.
  6961.  
  6962.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  6963. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  6964. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  6965. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  6966. several of her top aides, and tapped
  6967. her phone.
  6968.  
  6969. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  6970.  
  6971. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  6972. Impacted ::
  6973.  
  6974.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  6975. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  6976. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  6977. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  6978. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  6979. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  6980.  
  6981.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  6982. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  6983. visit to Washington in October, the
  6984. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  6985. year, or will take action on digital
  6986. security that may affect US companies
  6987. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  6988.  
  6989.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  6990. a proposal that would suspend operations
  6991. of companies that cooperate with the
  6992. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  6993.  
  6994. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  6995. _______________________________________
  6996. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  6997.  
  6998. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  6999.  
  7000. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  7001.  
  7002. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  7003. ���������������������������������������
  7004. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  7005.  
  7006.  �We are bolstering our support for
  7007. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  7008. collect against high priority targets,
  7009. including foreign leadership targets.
  7010. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  7011. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  7012. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  7013. internet traffic.�
  7014.  
  7015. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7016.  
  7017. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7018.  
  7019. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  7020.  
  7021. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  7022.  
  7023. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  7024.  
  7025. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  7026.  
  7027.  �The Post is withholding some information
  7028. after consultation with US officials who
  7029. expressed concerns about the risk to
  7030. intelligence sources and methods.
  7031. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  7032. the documents that The Post is publishing
  7033. only summary tables and charts online.�
  7034.  
  7035. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  7036.  
  7037. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  7038. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  7039.  
  7040. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  7041.  
  7042. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  7043.  
  7044. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  7045. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  7046.  
  7047. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  7048.  
  7049. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  7050.  
  7051. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  7052.  
  7053.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  7054. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  7055. intelligence services, leaked documents
  7056. reveal.
  7057.  
  7058.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  7059. to have an aggressive intelligence
  7060. collection operations against the
  7061. United States,� Pillar said. While
  7062. much information is collected through
  7063. traditional political contacts, �I
  7064. would personally have no doubt that
  7065. that is supplemented by whatever means
  7066. they can use to find out as much as
  7067. they can about what we�re doing,
  7068. thinking, deciding on anything of
  7069. interest to Israel, which would include
  7070. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  7071.  
  7072. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  7073.  
  7074. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  7075.  
  7076.  �To further safeguard our classified
  7077. networks, we continue to strengthen
  7078. insider threat detection capabilities
  7079. across the Community. In addition, we
  7080. are investing in target surveillance
  7081. and offensive CI against key targets,
  7082. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  7083. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  7084. _______________________________________
  7085. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  7086.  
  7087.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  7088. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  7089. the worst part is the Received headers.
  7090. Everyone should look at their own headers
  7091. -- especially people on this list and
  7092. at least comprehend that your email
  7093. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  7094. the Mailman archive.
  7095.  
  7096.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  7097. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  7098. the actual separators in MIME part
  7099. breaks, and so on.
  7100.  
  7101.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  7102. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  7103. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  7104. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  7105. don�t do it all the time.
  7106.  
  7107.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  7108. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  7109. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  7110. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  7111. is that this tells us that the crypto
  7112. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  7113. for quite some time.
  7114.  
  7115.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  7116. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  7117. that works being deployed everywhere.
  7118. What do you do? You just be patient and
  7119. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  7120. analysis.
  7121.  
  7122. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  7123.  
  7124. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  7125.  
  7126. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  7127.  
  7128.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  7129. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  7130. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  7131. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  7132. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  7133. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  7134. reveal.
  7135.  
  7136. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  7137.  
  7138.  �We are bolstering our support for
  7139. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  7140. collect against high priority targets,
  7141. including foreign leadership targets.
  7142. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  7143. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  7144. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  7145. internet traffic.� ... ...
  7146.  
  7147. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  7148.  
  7149.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  7150. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  7151. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  7152. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  7153. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  7154. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  7155.  
  7156.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  7157. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  7158.  
  7159. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7160.  
  7161. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7162.  
  7163. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  7164.  
  7165. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  7166.  
  7167. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  7168.  
  7169.  The US government has attempted to
  7170. obtain the master encryption keys that
  7171. Internet companies use to shield millions
  7172. of users� private web communications
  7173. from eavesdropping.
  7174.  
  7175.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  7176. which have not been disclosed previously,
  7177. represent a technological escalation in
  7178. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  7179. the National Security Agency employ when
  7180. conducting electronic surveillance against
  7181. Internet users. ... ...
  7182.  
  7183.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  7184. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  7185. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  7186. communications are typically destroyed
  7187. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  7188. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  7189. of all communications that are enciphered�
  7190. is permissible.
  7191.  
  7192. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  7193. _______________________________________
  7194. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  7195. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  7196.  
  7197.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  7198. intercepts well before 2001, former
  7199. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  7200. secretive Special Services Office,
  7201. these types of programs were at first
  7202. designed to intercept communications
  7203. overseas through arrangements with
  7204. foreign Internet providers, the former
  7205. officials say. NSA still has such
  7206. arrangements in many countries,
  7207. particularly in the Middle East and
  7208. Europe, the former officials say.�
  7209.  
  7210. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  7211.  
  7212. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  7213.  
  7214. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  7215. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  7216. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  7217. ���������������������������������������
  7218. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  7219. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  7220.  
  7221.  A common hacking technique can be used
  7222. to make emails look as if they came from
  7223. outside the United States.
  7224.  
  7225. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  7226. _______________________________________
  7227. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  7228. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  7229.  
  7230. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  7231.  
  7232. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  7233.  
  7234. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  7235.  
  7236. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7237. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7238. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  7239. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  7240. ���������������������������������������
  7241. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  7242. Patrick Leahy ::
  7243.  
  7244. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  7245.  
  7246. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  7247.  
  7248. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  7249. _______________________________________
  7250. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  7251.  
  7252.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  7253. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  7254. their authority to spy on Americans
  7255. multiple times in the past decade,
  7256. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  7257. and lawmakers� statements that no
  7258. willful violations occurred. ...
  7259.  
  7260.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  7261. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  7262. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  7263. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  7264. of having links to terrorism, before a
  7265. secret court that oversees surveillance
  7266. found the operation unconstitutional
  7267. in 2011.
  7268.  
  7269. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  7270.  
  7271. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  7272. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  7273. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  7274.  
  7275.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  7276. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  7277. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  7278. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  7279. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  7280.  
  7281.  The documents were released in response
  7282. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  7283. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  7284.  
  7285.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  7286. litigation and the most significant leak
  7287. in American history to finally get them
  7288. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  7289. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  7290. �but I�m happy that the administration
  7291. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  7292.  
  7293. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  7294. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  7295. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  7296.  
  7297. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  7298.  
  7299. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7300.  
  7301. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7302.  
  7303. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  7304.  
  7305. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  7306.  
  7307. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  7308.  
  7309. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  7310. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  7311.  
  7312. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7313. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  7314. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  7315. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  7316. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  7317. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  7318.  
  7319.  The account is based on top-secret
  7320. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  7321. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  7322. including unauthorized collection,
  7323. storage, access to or distribution of
  7324. legally protected communications � in
  7325. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  7326. originally only meant to be seen by top
  7327. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  7328. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  7329. and other locations in the Washington DC
  7330. region.
  7331.  
  7332. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  7333.  
  7334.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  7335. and other things, there�s people talking
  7336. about privacy violations or abuses or
  7337. willful or violations, right, it is
  7338. important for people to understand,
  7339. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  7340. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  7341. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  7342.  
  7343.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  7344. We detect them, as early as we can.
  7345. We correct them, right. None of the
  7346. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  7347. the document released were willful.
  7348. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  7349. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  7350. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  7351.  
  7352. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  7353.  
  7354. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  7355. Database Queries Per Month ::
  7356.  
  7357. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  7358.  
  7359. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  7360.  
  7361. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  7362. _______________________________________
  7363. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  7364.  
  7365.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  7366. station in the Middle East to intercept
  7367. and process vast quantities of emails,
  7368. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  7369. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  7370. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  7371.  
  7372.  The information is then processed for
  7373. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  7374. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  7375. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  7376. The Government claims the station is a
  7377. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  7378. and provides a vital �early warning�
  7379. system for potential attacks around
  7380. the world.
  7381.  
  7382.  The Independent is not revealing the
  7383. precise location of the station but
  7384. information on its activities was
  7385. contained in the leaked documents
  7386. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  7387. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  7388. these documents in recent months has
  7389. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  7390. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  7391. the destruction of hard drives containing
  7392. the data. ... ...
  7393.  
  7394.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  7395. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  7396. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  7397. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  7398. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  7399. the global interception of digital
  7400. communications, such as emails and text
  7401. messages.
  7402.  
  7403.  Across three sites, communications �
  7404. including telephone calls � are tracked
  7405. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  7406. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  7407.  
  7408. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  7409. ���������������������������������������
  7410. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  7411.  
  7412. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  7413. _______________________________________
  7414. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  7415. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  7416. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  7417. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  7418. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  7419. E Grassley ::
  7420.  
  7421. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  7422.  
  7423. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  7424.  
  7425. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  7426.  
  7427. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  7428.  
  7429. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  7430.  
  7431. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  7432.  
  7433. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  7434.  
  7435. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  7436.  
  7437. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  7438.  
  7439. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  7440.  
  7441. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  7442. Congress ::
  7443.  
  7444.  �I can now confirm that the House
  7445. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  7446. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  7447. available to Representatives in Congress,
  7448. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  7449. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  7450. the now declassified documents detailing
  7451. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  7452.  
  7453. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  7454.  
  7455. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  7456.  
  7457. ?
  7458.  
  7459. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7460.  
  7461.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7462. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7463. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7464. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7465. discussions with the president when he
  7466. first came on board we talked to him about
  7467. these programs and the issue was how do
  7468. we know the compliance is there and what
  7469. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7470. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  7471. of compliance. This directorate of
  7472. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7473. and information specialists that can look
  7474. at everything that we do in these programs
  7475. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7476. orders but we also have oversight from
  7477. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7478. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7479. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7480. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  7481. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7482. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7483. _______________________________________
  7484. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  7485.  
  7486.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  7487. public so far.
  7488.  
  7489. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  7490. _______________________________________
  7491. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  7492.  
  7493. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  7494. _______________________________________
  7495. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  7496. Data Lab ::
  7497.  
  7498. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  7499.  
  7500. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  7501. _______________________________________
  7502. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  7503. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  7504.  
  7505. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  7506. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  7507. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  7508. _______________________________________
  7509. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  7510.  
  7511.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  7512. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  7513. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  7514. there since he assumed the position
  7515. of Secretary of State. He has already
  7516. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  7517. � where officials demanded an explanation
  7518. to reports that Washington had collected
  7519. vast amounts of internet data there.
  7520. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  7521. which allegedly was the top regional
  7522. target of the surveillance program.
  7523.  
  7524. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  7525.  
  7526. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  7527.  
  7528. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  7529. Surveillance ::
  7530.  
  7531. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  7532.  
  7533. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  7534.  
  7535. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  7536. _______________________________________
  7537. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  7538.  
  7539. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  7540. ���������������������������������������
  7541. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  7542.  
  7543. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  7544.  
  7545. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  7546.  
  7547. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  7548.  
  7549. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  7550.  
  7551. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  7552. _______________________________________
  7553. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  7554.  
  7555. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  7556.  
  7557. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  7558. _______________________________________
  7559. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  7560.  
  7561. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  7562.  
  7563.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  7564. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  7565. use of certain United States person names
  7566. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  7567. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  7568. implement any USP queries until an effective
  7569. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  7570. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  7571. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  7572. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  7573. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  7574. databases).�
  7575.  
  7576. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  7577.  
  7578. NOBODY comments
  7579.  
  7580. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  7581.  
  7582. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7583.  
  7584.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7585. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7586. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7587. communications not related to foreign
  7588. information or foreign activity for up
  7589. to five years.
  7590.  
  7591.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  7592. acquired communications of or concerning a
  7593. United States person may be retained no
  7594. longer than five years in any event.�
  7595.  
  7596.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  7597. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  7598. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  7599. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  7600. communications that have been stored.
  7601. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  7602. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  7603. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  7604. to �communications security vulnerability�
  7605. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  7606. _______________________________________
  7607. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  7608.  
  7609. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  7610. _______________________________________
  7611. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  7612.  
  7613. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  7614. _______________________________________
  7615. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  7616. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  7617.  
  7618.  As the steady stream of revelations
  7619. continues, the White House has choosen
  7620. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  7621. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  7622.  
  7623. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  7624. _______________________________________
  7625. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  7626.  
  7627. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  7628.  
  7629. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  7630. Spying Press Conference ::
  7631.  
  7632.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  7633. Presidential press conference in which the
  7634. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  7635. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  7636. that Obama told today about the program
  7637. by citing multiple articles with information
  7638. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  7639.  
  7640. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  7641. ���������������������������������������
  7642. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  7643. Partners ::
  7644.  
  7645. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  7646. ���������������������������������������
  7647. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  7648. Metadata ::
  7649.  
  7650. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  7651. ���������������������������������������
  7652. � National Security Run Amok ::
  7653.  
  7654. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  7655. _______________________________________
  7656.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  7657. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  7658. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  7659. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  7660.  
  7661. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  7662.  
  7663.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  7664. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  7665. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  7666. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  7667. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  7668. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  7669. for including former senators Hillary
  7670. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  7671.  
  7672. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  7673.  
  7674. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  7675. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  7676.  
  7677. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  7678.  
  7679. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7680.  
  7681. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  7682. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  7683.  
  7684. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  7685.  
  7686.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  7687. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  7688.  
  7689. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  7690. ���������������������������������������
  7691. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  7692.  
  7693. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  7694.  
  7695. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  7696.  
  7697. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  7698.  
  7699. NOBODY comments
  7700.  
  7701. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  7702.  
  7703.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  7704. the document was still classified. It was
  7705. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  7706.  
  7707. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7708.  
  7709.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  7710. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  7711. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  7712. many of these operations being leaked.
  7713. _______________________________________
  7714. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  7715. on Brazilian Television ::
  7716.  
  7717. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  7718. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  7719. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  7720.  
  7721. NOBODY comments
  7722.  
  7723.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  7724. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  7725.  
  7726.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  7727. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  7728. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  7729.  
  7730. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  7731. ���������������������������������������
  7732. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7733. English Report ::
  7734.  
  7735.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  7736. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  7737. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  7738. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  7739. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  7740. matters is also much closer than first
  7741. thought. ... ...
  7742.  
  7743.  Day after day and month after month,
  7744. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  7745. amounts of connection data relating
  7746. to the communications it had placed
  7747. under surveillance. The so-called
  7748. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  7749. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  7750. into the Americans� giant databases.
  7751.  
  7752. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  7753.  
  7754. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7755. Deutsch Report ::
  7756.  
  7757. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  7758.  
  7759. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  7760.  
  7761. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  7762. ���������������������������������������
  7763. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  7764.  
  7765. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  7766. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  7767. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  7768.  
  7769. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  7770.  
  7771. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  7772.  
  7773.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  7774. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  7775. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  7776. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  7777. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  7778. the Guardian�s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  7779. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  7780.  
  7781. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  7782. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  7783. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  7784. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  7785.  
  7786. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  7787.  
  7788. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  7789.  
  7790. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  7791.  
  7792. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  7793.  
  7794. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  7795.  
  7796. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  7797.  
  7798. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  7799.  
  7800. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  7801.  
  7802. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  7803.  
  7804. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  7805.  
  7806. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  7807.  
  7808. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  7809.  
  7810. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  7811.  
  7812. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  7813.  
  7814.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  7815. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  7816. they are shunted off to various �production
  7817. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  7818. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  7819. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  7820. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  7821. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  7822. stored in a database called MARINA and
  7823. is generally retained for five years.
  7824.  
  7825. ... ...
  7826.  
  7827.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  7828. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  7829. to change the surveillance laws once the
  7830. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  7831. This was for a simple reason: they did
  7832. not want to be responsible for a program
  7833. that was not legal.�
  7834.  
  7835. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  7836.  
  7837. NOBODY comments
  7838.  
  7839.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7840. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7841. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7842. communications not related to foreign
  7843. information or foreign activity for up
  7844. to five years.
  7845.  
  7846.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  7847. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  7848. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  7849. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  7850. ���������������������������������������
  7851. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  7852. for GCHQ Bude ::
  7853.  
  7854. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  7855. _______________________________________
  7856. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  7857. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  7858.  
  7859.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  7860. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  7861. counterfeiting and even copyright
  7862. infringement complain that their
  7863. attempts to exploit the security
  7864. agency�s vast resources have often
  7865. been turned down because their own
  7866. investigations are not considered a
  7867. high enough priority, current and
  7868. former government officials say.
  7869.  
  7870.  Intelligence officials say they have
  7871. been careful to limit the use of the
  7872. security agency�s troves of data and
  7873. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  7874. could be misused in ways that violate
  7875. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  7876.  
  7877.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  7878. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  7879. senior intelligence official at the
  7880. White House and at the office of the
  7881. director of national intelligence.
  7882. �They collect all this information,
  7883. but it�s difficult for the other
  7884. agencies to get access to what
  7885. they want.�
  7886.  
  7887. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  7888. _______________________________________
  7889. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  7890. Security Forum ::
  7891.  
  7892. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  7893.  
  7894. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  7895. Conference ::
  7896.  
  7897. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  7898.  
  7899. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  7900. Conference ::
  7901.  
  7902. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7903. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  7904. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  7905.  
  7906.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7907. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7908. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7909. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7910. discussions with the president when he
  7911. first came on board we talked to him about
  7912. these programs and the issue was how do
  7913. we know the compliance is there and what
  7914. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7915. the committees in Congress a directorate
  7916. of compliance. This directorate of
  7917. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7918. and information specialists that can look
  7919. at everything that we do in these programs
  7920. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7921. orders but we also have oversight from
  7922. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7923. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7924. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7925. from the White House, from Congress, the
  7926. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7927. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7928.  
  7929. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  7930. Blackhat Conference ::
  7931.  
  7932. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  7933.  
  7934. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  7935.  
  7936. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  7937.  
  7938. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  7939.  
  7940. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  7941.  
  7942. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  7943.  
  7944. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  7945. _______________________________________
  7946. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  7947.  
  7948. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  7949.  
  7950. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  7951. All Domestic Calls ::
  7952.  
  7953.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  7954. three documents related to the National
  7955. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  7956. records, including briefings to Congress
  7957. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  7958. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  7959. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7960. Court that outlines rules that must be
  7961. followed when accessing data provided by
  7962. a Verizon subsidiary.
  7963.  
  7964. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  7965.  
  7966.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  7967. what the government was doing with the
  7968. Patriot Act program, several senators
  7969. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  7970. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  7971. the law in a twisted way to do something
  7972. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  7973. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  7974. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  7975. Act to obtain that document.
  7976.  
  7977. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  7978. _______________________________________
  7979. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  7980.  
  7981. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  7982.  
  7983. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  7984. _______________________________________
  7985. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  7986.  
  7987.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  7988. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  7989. two or three years ago.�
  7990.  
  7991. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  7992. _______________________________________
  7993. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7994. Received Dox ::
  7995.  
  7996. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  7997. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  7998. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  7999. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  8000. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  8001.  
  8002. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  8003.  
  8004. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  8005.  
  8006. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  8007. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  8008.  
  8009.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  8010. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  8011. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  8012. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  8013. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  8014. twice as much campaign financing from
  8015. the defense and intelligence industry
  8016. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  8017.  
  8018. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  8019.  
  8020. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  8021. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  8022.  
  8023. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  8024. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  8025. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  8026.  
  8027. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  8028.  
  8029. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  8030.  
  8031. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  8032. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  8033.  
  8034. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  8035. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  8036. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  8037. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  8038.  
  8039. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  8040. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  8041.  
  8042.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  8043. disclosures, the President has said
  8044. that he welcomes a debate about how
  8045. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  8046. our national security and the privacy
  8047. of our citizens.  The Administration
  8048. has taken various proactive steps to
  8049. advance this debate including the
  8050. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  8051. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  8052. his public statements on the disclosed
  8053. programs, the Office of the Director
  8054. of National Intelligence�s release of
  8055. its own public statements, ODNI General
  8056. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  8057. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  8058. disclose publicly that the Administration
  8059. filed an application with the Foreign
  8060. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  8061. look forward to continuing to discuss
  8062. these critical issues with the American
  8063. people and the Congress.
  8064.  
  8065.  However, we oppose the current effort
  8066. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  8067. of our Intelligence Community�s
  8068. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  8069. approach is not the product of an
  8070. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  8071. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  8072. Amendment, and instead move forward
  8073. with an approach that appropriately
  8074. takes into account the need for a
  8075. reasoned review of what tools can
  8076. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  8077.  
  8078. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  8079.  
  8080. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  8081.  
  8082. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  8083. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  8084.  
  8085. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  8086.  
  8087. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  8088. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  8089. to Defund NSA ::
  8090.  
  8091. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  8092. _______________________________________
  8093.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  8094. official letter from the NSA, which was
  8095. sent to the German government to clarify
  8096. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  8097. because German media and politics were
  8098. heavily confused after it became clear
  8099. that there�s more than one program named
  8100. PRISM.
  8101.  
  8102.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  8103. data collection program is about and
  8104. then confirms that this program is
  8105. different from a more common military
  8106. web tool called "Planning tool for
  8107. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  8108. and Management" (PRISM).
  8109.  
  8110.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  8111. there�s even a third program called
  8112. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  8113. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  8114. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  8115. apparently an internal NSA information
  8116. sharing program. It was unknown until
  8117. now, probably because it�s used in the
  8118. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  8119. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  8120.  
  8121.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  8122. different PRISM programs:
  8123.  
  8124. 1. PRISM
  8125.  
  8126.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  8127. of collecting information about foreign
  8128. targets from data of nine major US
  8129. internet companies. This program started
  8130. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  8131. in June 2013.
  8132.  
  8133. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  8134. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  8135.  
  8136.  This is a web tool used by US military
  8137. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  8138. to data collection platforms deployed to
  8139. military operations. This program is
  8140. not very secret and was first mentioned
  8141. in 2002.
  8142.  
  8143. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  8144. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  8145.  
  8146.  This is an internal NSA program for
  8147. real-time sharing of information,
  8148. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  8149. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  8150. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  8151.  
  8152. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  8153.  
  8154. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  8155. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  8156.  
  8157.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  8158. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  8159. surveillance activities in Germany.
  8160. It only added to the mystery. A US
  8161. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  8162. that there are actually three unrelated
  8163. Prism programs. ... ...
  8164.  
  8165.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  8166. and Maassen, officials also read a
  8167. written statement from the NSA in
  8168. response to a query from the German
  8169. government. According to the statement,
  8170. there are three separate Prism programs,
  8171. all of them unconnected to each other.
  8172. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  8173. said that one of the Prism programs was
  8174. only used internally. That program had
  8175. thus far remained secret. Another of
  8176. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  8177. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  8178. -- vaguely described in the statement
  8179. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  8180. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  8181. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  8182. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  8183.  
  8184. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  8185.  
  8186. NOBODY comments
  8187.  
  8188.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  8189. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  8190. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  8191. _______________________________________
  8192. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  8193.  
  8194. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  8195.  
  8196. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  8197.  
  8198. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  8199.  
  8200.  Description and drawings by US Army
  8201. Corps of Engineers.
  8202.  
  8203. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  8204. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  8205. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  8206. _______________________________________
  8207. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  8208.  
  8209. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  8210.  
  8211. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  8212.  
  8213. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  8214. ���������������������������������������
  8215. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  8216.  
  8217. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  8218.  
  8219. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  8220.  
  8221. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  8222.  
  8223. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  8224.  
  8225. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  8226. _______________________________________
  8227. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  8228.  
  8229.  �First, the United States would not seek
  8230. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  8231. return to the United States. The charges
  8232. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  8233. and the United States would not seek the
  8234. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  8235. charged with additional, death penalty-
  8236. eligible crimes.�
  8237.  
  8238. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  8239.  
  8240. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  8241. _______________________________________
  8242. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  8243. Peace Prize ::
  8244.  
  8245.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  8246. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  8247. agency�s data collection program, has
  8248. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  8249.  
  8250.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  8251. at great personal cost � revealed the
  8252. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  8253. the US government devotes electronic
  8254. communications worldwide,� read the
  8255. nomination. �By putting light on this
  8256. monitoring program � conducted in
  8257. contravention of national laws and
  8258. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  8259. has helped to make the world a little
  8260. bit better and safer.� ...
  8261.  
  8262.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  8263. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  8264. to being well justified in itself �
  8265. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  8266. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  8267. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  8268. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  8269. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  8270.  
  8271. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  8272. _______________________________________
  8273. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  8274. Komsomolets News ::
  8275.  
  8276. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  8277. ���������������������������������������
  8278. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  8279. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  8280.  
  8281.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  8282. his experience when he received a Foreign
  8283. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  8284. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  8285. federal government to monitor a customer
  8286. of his.
  8287.  
  8288.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  8289. contained a broad gag order, which still
  8290. prevents him from telling all the details.
  8291.  
  8292.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  8293. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  8294. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  8295. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  8296.  
  8297.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  8298. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  8299. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  8300. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  8301.  
  8302.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  8303. facility that was capturing all of the
  8304. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  8305. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  8306. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  8307. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  8308.  
  8309. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  8310. _______________________________________
  8311. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  8312.  
  8313. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  8314. _______________________________________
  8315. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  8316.  
  8317. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  8318. ���������������������������������������
  8319. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  8320. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  8321.  
  8322.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  8323. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  8324. representative rather casually indicated
  8325. that the government looks at data from
  8326. a universe of far, far more people than
  8327. previously indicated.
  8328.  
  8329.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  8330. was one of several government representatives
  8331. �including from the FBI and the office of
  8332. the Director of National Intelligence�
  8333. testifying before the House Judiciary
  8334. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  8335. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  8336. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  8337. surveillance, including a retread of the
  8338. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  8339. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  8340. Act had stopped terror events.
  8341.  
  8342.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  8343. look �two or three hops� from terror
  8344. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  8345. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  8346. how surveillance was extended had been
  8347. described as two hops. This meant that
  8348. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  8349. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  8350. could also look at the calls from the
  8351. people that suspect has spoken with one
  8352. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  8353. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  8354. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  8355. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  8356.  
  8357. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  8358.  
  8359.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  8360. them or not - two hops.
  8361.  
  8362.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  8363. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  8364.  
  8365. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  8366. ���������������������������������������
  8367. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  8368.  
  8369.  It is a good thing that people are
  8370. becoming aware of the fact that they
  8371. are being monitored - it is not only
  8372. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  8373. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  8374. made to collect information and to store
  8375. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  8376. resources that PRISM used and how it
  8377. could combine these resources to multiple
  8378. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  8379.  
  8380. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  8381. _______________________________________
  8382. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  8383.  
  8384. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  8385. ���������������������������������������
  8386. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  8387. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  8388.  
  8389.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  8390. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  8391. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  8392. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  8393. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  8394. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  8395. stories about the US government�s vast
  8396. foreign and domestic spying programs
  8397. will stop. ... ...
  8398.  
  8399.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  8400. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  8401. the United States by releasing more
  8402. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  8403.  
  8404.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  8405. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  8406. since he has already said that he gave
  8407. all of his classified information --
  8408. thousands of documents -- to several
  8409. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  8410. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  8411. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  8412. half done with the stories he plans to
  8413. write based on the secret information.
  8414.  
  8415. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  8416. ���������������������������������������
  8417. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  8418.  
  8419. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  8420. _______________________________________
  8421. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  8422.  
  8423. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  8424. ���������������������������������������
  8425. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  8426.  
  8427.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  8428. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  8429. typewriters. What do they know that
  8430. we don�t?
  8431.  
  8432. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  8433. ���������������������������������������
  8434. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  8435. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  8436.  
  8437.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  8438. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  8439. has existed since at least 2002. The
  8440. following document refers to it directly.
  8441. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  8442. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  8443. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  8444. limitation of it and similar projects.
  8445.  
  8446. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  8447.  
  8448. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  8449. _______________________________________
  8450. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  8451. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  8452.  
  8453. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  8454.  
  8455. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  8456. in Latin America ::
  8457.  
  8458. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  8459. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  8460. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  8461. _______________________________________
  8462. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  8463. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  8464.  
  8465. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  8466.  
  8467. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  8468.  
  8469. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  8470. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  8471.  
  8472. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  8473. _______________________________________
  8474. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  8475.  
  8476. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  8477. _______________________________________
  8478. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  8479. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  8480.  
  8481. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  8482. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  8483. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  8484. ���������������������������������������
  8485. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  8486.  
  8487. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  8488.  
  8489. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  8490.  
  8491. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  8492. _______________________________________
  8493. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  8494. Metadata ::
  8495.  
  8496. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  8497. _______________________________________
  8498. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  8499. by US Citizens ::
  8500.  
  8501. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  8502. ���������������������������������������
  8503. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  8504.  
  8505. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  8506.  
  8507.  �This may look like a small release, but
  8508. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  8509. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  8510. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  8511. sending encrypted data to and from the
  8512. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  8513. those servers. If you crash these servers
  8514. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  8515. "broken". We are also planning to release
  8516. some of that data (which we have access
  8517. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  8518. ���������������������������������������
  8519. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  8520. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  8521.  
  8522.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  8523. Snowden�s employer.
  8524.  
  8525. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  8526.  
  8527. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  8528.  
  8529. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  8530. _______________________________________
  8531. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  8532.  
  8533. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  8534. _______________________________________
  8535. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  8536.  
  8537.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  8538. it became clear that my freedom and
  8539. safety were under threat for revealing
  8540. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  8541. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  8542. old, family, and others who I have never
  8543. met and probably never will. I trusted
  8544. them with my life and they returned that
  8545. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  8546. always be thankful.
  8547.  
  8548.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  8549. before the world that he would not permit
  8550. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  8551. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  8552. after promising not to do so, the President
  8553. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  8554. leaders of nations from which I have
  8555. requested protection to deny my asylum
  8556. petitions.
  8557.  
  8558.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  8559. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  8560. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  8561. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  8562. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  8563. come after me.
  8564.  
  8565.  For decades the United States of America
  8566. have been one of the strongest defenders
  8567. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  8568. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  8569. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  8570. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  8571. the current government of my country. The
  8572. Obama administration has now adopted the
  8573. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  8574. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  8575. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  8576. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  8577. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  8578. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  8579. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  8580. asylum.
  8581.  
  8582.  In the end the Obama administration is
  8583. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  8584. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  8585. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  8586. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  8587. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  8588. demanding the constitutional government
  8589. it was promised � and it should be.
  8590.  
  8591.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  8592. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  8593. many.�
  8594.  
  8595. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  8596. ���������������������������������������
  8597. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  8598.  
  8599. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  8600.  
  8601. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  8602.  
  8603. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  8604. _______________________________________
  8605. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  8606.  
  8607. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  8608. ���������������������������������������
  8609. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  8610.  
  8611. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8612. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  8613. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  8614. _______________________________________
  8615. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  8616.  
  8617. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  8618. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  8619. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  8620. _______________________________________
  8621. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  8622.  
  8623. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  8624.  
  8625.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  8626. over private data to America.
  8627.  
  8628.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  8629. according to new claims by former US defence
  8630. analyst.
  8631.  
  8632.  At least six European Union countries in
  8633. addition to Britain have been colluding
  8634. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  8635. personal communications data, according
  8636. to a former contractor to America�s
  8637. National Security Agency, who said the
  8638. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  8639.  
  8640.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  8641. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  8642. and over the next 12 years held several
  8643. sensitive positions within the agency,
  8644. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  8645. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  8646. deals with the US.
  8647.  
  8648.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  8649. second and third party status� under
  8650. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  8651. that compels them to hand over data,
  8652. including mobile phone and internet
  8653. information to the NSA if requested.
  8654.  
  8655.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  8656. confirmed by declassified documents,
  8657. nations are categorised by the US according
  8658. to their trust level. The US is first party
  8659. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  8660. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  8661. Germany and France have third party
  8662. relationships.
  8663.  
  8664.  In an interview published last night
  8665. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  8666. who has been attacked for holding
  8667. controversial views on espionage issues,
  8668. said he had decided to speak out after
  8669. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  8670. told by EU politicians regarding the
  8671. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  8672.  
  8673.  He said that under the agreements,
  8674. which were drawn up after the second
  8675. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  8676. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  8677. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  8678. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  8679.  
  8680.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  8681. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  8682. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  8683. about the spying operations while staying
  8684. silent about their own arrangements
  8685. with the US, and was particularly
  8686. concerned that senior German politicians
  8687. had accused the UK of spying when their
  8688. country had a similar third-party deal
  8689. with the NSA.
  8690.  
  8691.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  8692. by other European countries to the NSA is
  8693. not on the same scale as that provided by
  8694. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  8695. embarrassing.
  8696.  
  8697.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  8698. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  8699. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  8700. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  8701. Madsen said.
  8702.  
  8703.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  8704. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  8705. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  8706. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  8707. confirmed that the entire system for
  8708. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  8709. because the EU was unable to intervene
  8710. in intelligence matters, which remained
  8711. the exclusive concern of national
  8712. governments.
  8713.  
  8714.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  8715. these contradictions and no one is really
  8716. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  8717. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  8718. democracy.�
  8719.  
  8720.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  8721. for European governments to come clean
  8722. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  8723. �There needs to be transparency as to
  8724. whether or not it is legal for the US
  8725. or any other security service to
  8726. interrogate private material,� said
  8727. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  8728. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  8729. is that none of these arrangements has
  8730. been debated in any democratic arena.
  8731. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  8732. things have to be done in secret, but you
  8733. don�t break the law in secret.�
  8734.  
  8735.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  8736. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  8737. fibre-optic cable network running between
  8738. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  8739. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  8740. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  8741. including phone calls, emails and records
  8742. of users� access to websites.
  8743.  
  8744.  He said the public needed to be made
  8745. aware of the full scale of the communication
  8746. -sharing arrangements between European
  8747. countries and the US, which predate the
  8748. internet and became of strategic importance
  8749. during the cold war.
  8750.  
  8751.  The covert relationship between the
  8752. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  8753. report by the European parliament, but
  8754. their explicit connection with the NSA
  8755. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  8756. to speak out.
  8757.  
  8758.  The European parliament�s report followed
  8759. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  8760. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  8761. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  8762. established the framework for European
  8763. member states to collaborate with the US.
  8764.  
  8765.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  8766. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  8767. that governments have chosen to keep the
  8768. public in the dark about it. The days
  8769. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  8770. of silence are over.�
  8771.  
  8772.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  8773. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  8774. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  8775. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  8776. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  8777. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  8778. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  8779. ���������������������������������������
  8780. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  8781. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  8782.  
  8783.  A former contractor to the US National
  8784. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  8785. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  8786. intelligence arrangements between the
  8787. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  8788. murky and far reaching� than the public
  8789. has been led to believe. ...
  8790.  
  8791.  He was particularly concerned about the
  8792. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  8793. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  8794. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  8795. while staying silent about their own role
  8796. in global interception arrangements with
  8797. the United States. ...
  8798.  
  8799.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  8800. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  8801.  
  8802.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  8803. many who say he had no authority or right
  8804. to provide the public with details of
  8805. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  8806. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  8807. have to provide information on NSA
  8808. surveillance at five meetings of the
  8809. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  8810. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  8811. Spain and Switzerland?�
  8812.  
  8813.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  8814. American people from a constantly changing
  8815. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  8816. is providing information to elites on
  8817. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  8818. student, religious and progressive
  8819. organizations.�
  8820.  
  8821.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  8822. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  8823. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  8824.  
  8825. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  8826. _______________________________________
  8827. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  8828.  
  8829. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  8830. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  8831. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  8832. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  8833. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  8834. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  8835. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  8836.  
  8837. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  8838.  
  8839. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  8840. ���������������������������������������
  8841. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  8842.  
  8843. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  8844. _______________________________________
  8845. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  8846.  
  8847. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  8848. _______________________________________
  8849. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  8850.  
  8851. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  8852. _______________________________________
  8853. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  8854.  
  8855. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  8856. _______________________________________
  8857. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  8858.  
  8859. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  8860. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  8861. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  8862.  
  8863. � Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  8864.  
  8865. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  8866. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8867. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  8868. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  8869. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  8870. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  8871. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  8872. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  8873. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  8874. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  8875. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  8876. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  8877. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  8878. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  8879. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  8880. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  8881. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  8882. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  8883. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  8884. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  8885. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  8886. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  8887. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  8888. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  8889. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  8890. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  8891. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  8892. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  8893. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  8894. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  8895. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  8896. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  8897. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  8898. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  8899. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  8900. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  8901. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  8902. _______________________________________
  8903. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  8904. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  8905.  
  8906. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  8907. _______________________________________
  8908. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  8909.  
  8910. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  8911.  
  8912. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  8913.  
  8914. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  8915.  
  8916. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  8917. _______________________________________
  8918. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  8919.  
  8920. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  8921.  
  8922. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  8923. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  8924. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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