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Posted by Eyeballing the N on January Sun 18th 3:29 PM - Never Expires
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  1.  
  2. Eyeballing the NSA 040 (HTML & UTF-8 Embedded) �
  3.  
  4. http://paste.oneb1t.cz/view/eb5da897
  5.  
  6. Eyeballing the NSA 040 (PDF) �
  7.  
  8. http://megaswf.com/f/2714779
  9.    
  10.    
  11.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  12. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  13. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  14.  
  15.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  16.  
  17.  
  18. � NSA Documents Expose NSA�s Digital Arms Race for Cyber Warfare ::
  19.  
  20.  The NSA�s mass surveillance is just the beginning. Documents from
  21. Edward Snowden show that the intelligence agency is arming America
  22. for future digital wars -- a struggle for control of the Internet
  23. that is already well underway.
  24.  
  25.  Normally, internship applicants need to have polished resumes,
  26. with volunteer work on social projects considered a plus. But at
  27. Politerain, the job posting calls for candidates with significantly
  28. different skill sets. We are, the ad says, �looking for interns who
  29. want to break things.�
  30.  
  31.  Politerain is not a project associated with a conventional company.
  32. It is run by a US government intelligence organization, the National
  33. Security Agency (NSA). More precisely, it�s operated by the NSA�s
  34. digital snipers with Tailored Access Operations (TAO), the department
  35. responsible for breaking into computers.
  36.  
  37.  Potential interns are also told that research into third party
  38. computers might include plans to �remotely degrade or destroy
  39. opponent computers, routers, servers and network enabled devices
  40. by attacking the hardware.� Using a program called Passionatepolka,
  41. for example, they may be asked to �remotely brick network cards."
  42. With programs like Berserkr they would implant �persistent backdoors�
  43. and �parasitic drivers.� Using another piece of software called
  44. Barnfire, they would �erase the BIOS on a brand of servers that
  45. act as a backbone to many rival governments.�
  46.  
  47.  An intern�s tasks might also include remotely destroying the
  48. functionality of hard drives. Ultimately, the goal of the internship
  49. program was �developing an attacker�s mindset.�
  50.  
  51.  The internship listing is eight years old, but the attacker�s mindset
  52. has since become a kind of doctrine for the NSA�s data spies. And the
  53. intelligence service isn�t just trying to achieve mass surveillance
  54. of Internet communication, either. The digital spies of the Five Eyes
  55. alliance -- comprised of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia
  56. and New Zealand -- want more.
  57.  
  58. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/new-snowden-docs-indicate-scope-of-nsa-preparations-for-cyber-battle-a-1013409.html
  59.  
  60. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA�s Plans for Cyber Warfare ::
  61.  
  62. http://cryptome.org/2015/01/spiegel-15-0117.7z
  63. _______________________________________
  64. � Prying Eyes: Inside the NSA�s War on Internet Security ::
  65.  
  66.  US and British intelligence agencies undertake every effort imaginable
  67. to crack all types of encrypted Internet communication. The cloud, it
  68. seems, is full of holes. The good news: New Snowden documents show that
  69. some forms of encryption still cause problems for the NSA. ... ...
  70.  
  71.  As one document from the Snowden archive shows, the NSA had been
  72. unsuccessful in attempts to decrypt several communications protocols,
  73. at least as of 2012. An NSA presentation for a conference that took
  74. place that year lists the encryption programs the Americans failed to
  75. crack. In the process, the NSA cryptologists divided their targets
  76. into five levels corresponding to the degree of the difficulty of the
  77. attack and the outcome, ranging from �trivial� to �catastrophic.�
  78.  
  79.  Monitoring a document�s path through the Internet is classified as
  80. �trivial.� Recording Facebook chats is considered a �minor� task,
  81. while the level of difficulty involved in decrypting emails sent
  82. through Moscow-based Internet service provider mail.ru is considered
  83. �moderate.� Still, all three of those classifications don�t appear to
  84. pose any significant problems for the NSA.
  85.  
  86.  Things first become troublesome at the fourth level. The presentation
  87. states that the NSA encounters �major� problems in its attempts to
  88. decrypt messages sent through heavily encrypted email service providers
  89. like Zoho or in monitoring users of the Tor network, which was
  90. developed for surfing the web anonymously. Tor, otherwise known as
  91. The Onion Router, is free and open source software that allows users
  92. to surf the web through a network of more than 6,000 linked volunteer
  93. computers. The software automatically encrypts data in a way that
  94. ensures that no single computer in the network has all of a user�s
  95. information. For surveillance experts, it becomes very difficult to
  96. trace the whereabouts of a person who visits a particular website or
  97. to attack a specific person while they are using Tor to surf the Web.
  98.  
  99.  The NSA also has �major� problems with Truecrypt, a program for
  100. encrypting files on computers. Truecrypt�s developers stopped their
  101. work on the program last May, prompting speculation about pressures
  102. from government agencies. A protocol called Off-the-Record (OTR) for
  103. encrypting instant messaging in an end-to-end encryption process also
  104. seems to cause the NSA major problems. Both are programs whose source
  105. code can be viewed, modified, shared and used by anyone. Experts agree
  106. it is far more difficult for intelligence agencies to manipulate open
  107. source software programs than many of the closed systems developed by
  108. companies like Apple and Microsoft. Since anyone can view free and
  109. open source software, it becomes difficult to insert secret back doors
  110. without it being noticed. Transcripts of intercepted chats using OTR
  111. encryption handed over to the intelligence agency by a partner in
  112. Prism -- an NSA program that accesses data from at least nine American
  113. internet companies such as Google, Facebook and Apple -- show that
  114. the NSA�s efforts appear to have been thwarted in these cases: �No
  115. decrypt available for this OTR message.� This shows that OTR at least
  116. sometimes makes communications impossible to read for the NSA.
  117.  
  118.  Things become �catastrophic� for the NSA at level five - when, for
  119. example, a subject uses a combination of Tor, another anonymization
  120. service, the instant messaging system CSpace and a system for Internet
  121. telephony (voice over IP) called ZRTP. This type of combination results
  122. in a �near-total loss/lack of insight to target communications, presence,�
  123. the NSA document states.
  124.  
  125.  ZRTP, which is used to securely encrypt conversations and text chats
  126. on mobile phones, is used in free and open source programs like RedPhone
  127. and Signal. �It�s satisfying to know that the NSA considers encrypted
  128. communication from our apps to be truly opaque,� says RedPhone developer
  129. Moxie Marlinspike.
  130.  
  131. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html
  132.  
  133. � NSA Attacks on VPN, SSL, TLS, SSH, Tor ::
  134.  
  135. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-spiegel-14-1228.rar
  136. _______________________________________
  137. � Operation Socialist ; How GCHQ Spies Hacked Belgium�s Largest Telco ::
  138.  
  139. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/
  140.  
  141. � GCHQ Belgacom Telecom Hacking (ZIP) ::
  142.  
  143.  Slides show Canada�s intelligence agency, CSEC, was involved in helping
  144. GCHQ intercept Belgacom communications. It also proves 3rd party cookies
  145. are very much instrumental in being used to exploit information about IPs.
  146.  
  147. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/gchq-belgacom-intercept-14-1213.zip
  148. _______________________________________
  149. � Keith Alexander�s Anti-spy Patent Leaked ::
  150.  
  151. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-alexander-patent-14-1125.pdf
  152.  
  153. � Keith Alexander Now Works To Secure Banking Networks ::
  154.  
  155. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-20/ex-nsa-chief-pitches-advice-on-cyber-threats-to-the-banks.html
  156. _______________________________________
  157. � Operation AURORAGOLD: How the NSA Hacks Cellphone Networks Worldwide ::
  158.  
  159.  Codenamed AURORAGOLD, the covert operation has monitored the content of
  160. messages sent and received by more than 1,200 email accounts associated
  161. with major cellphone network operators, intercepting confidential company
  162. planning papers that help the NSA hack into phone networks.
  163.  
  164.  One high-profile surveillance target is the GSM Association, an influential
  165. UK-headquartered trade group that works closely with large US-based firms
  166. including Microsoft, Facebook, AT&T, and Cisco, and is currently being
  167. funded by the US government to develop privacy-enhancing technologies.
  168.  
  169.  Karsten Nohl, a leading cellphone security expert and cryptographer who
  170. was consulted by The Intercept about details contained in the AURORAGOLD
  171. documents, said that the broad scope of information swept up in the operation
  172. appears aimed at ensuring virtually every cellphone network in the world is
  173. NSA accessible.
  174.  
  175. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/04/nsa-auroragold-hack-cellphones/
  176.  
  177. � NSA Operation AURORAGOLD Slides ::
  178.  
  179. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-aurora-gold-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  180.  
  181. � NSA OPULANT PUP Circumventing Strong Cryptography ::
  182.  
  183.  Last year, the Washington Post reported that the NSA had already managed
  184. to break the most commonly used cellphone encryption algorithm in the world,
  185. known as A5/1. But the information collected under AURORAGOLD allows the
  186. agency to focus on circumventing newer and stronger versions of A5 cellphone
  187. encryption, such as A5/3.
  188.  
  189. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-opulant-pup-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  190. _______________________________________
  191. � Germany�s Intelligence Agency, the BND, Spies On Civilians Too ::
  192.  
  193.  German MPs examining the surveillance activities the US National
  194. Security Agency have found a legal loophole that allows the Berlin�s
  195. foreign intelligence agency to spy on its own citizens.
  196.  
  197.  The agency, known by its German acronym BND, is not usually allowed
  198. to intercept communications made by Germans or German companies, but a
  199. former BND lawyer told parliament this week that citizens working abroad
  200. for foreign companies were not protected.
  201.  
  202.  The German government confirmed on Saturday that work-related calls
  203. or emails were attributed to the employer. As a result, if the employer
  204. is foreign, the BND could legally intercept them.
  205.  
  206.  Angela Merkel pretends to be outraged about industrial espionage by
  207. the NSA while condoning illegal surveillance itself.
  208.  
  209. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/german-loophole-allows-bnd-agency-spy-own-people
  210. http://www.infowars.com/like-the-nsa-and-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-a-legal-loophole-to-spy-on-its-own-citizens/
  211. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141202/09513729296/like-nsa-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-legal-loophole-to-spy-its-own-citizens.shtml
  212. _______________________________________
  213. � How Vodafone-Subsidiary Telecom Aided GCHQ�s Spying Efforts ::
  214.  
  215.  Previously unpublished documents show how the UK telecom firm Cable
  216. & Wireless, acquired by Vodafone in 2012, played a key role in
  217. establishing one of the Government Communications Headquarters�
  218. (GCHQ) most controversial surveillance programs.
  219.  
  220.  A joint investigation by NDR, WDR, S�ddeutsche Zeitung and Channel 4
  221. based on documents leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, reveals
  222. that Cable & Wireless actively shaped and provided the most data to
  223. GCHQ mass surveillance programs, and received millions of pounds in
  224. compensation. The documents also suggest that Cable & Wireless
  225. assisted GCHQ in breaking into a competitor�s network.
  226.  
  227.  In response to these allegations, Vodafone said that an internal
  228. investigation found no evidence of unlawful conduct, but the company
  229. would not deny it happened.
  230.  
  231. http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq
  232. http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html
  233. http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html
  234. http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable
  235.  
  236. � GCHQ�s Vodafone Cable Master List ::
  237.  
  238. https://netzpolitik.org/2014/cable-master-list-wir-spiegeln-die-snowden-dokumente-ueber-angezapfte-glasfasern-auch-von-vodafone/
  239.  
  240. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ::
  241.  
  242. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-slides.pdf
  243. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-slides-14-1125.pdf
  244. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-cables-14-1125.pdf
  245.  
  246. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ZIPPED ::
  247.  
  248. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/Gerontic_GCHQ_SZ.zip
  249.  
  250. � INCENSER: How NSA and GCHQ Are Tapping Internet Cables ::
  251.  
  252. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fi/2014/11/incenser-or-how-nsa-and-gchq-are.html
  253. _______________________________________
  254. � Microsoft SkyDrive (aka OneDrive) Gateway Into NSA PRISM ::
  255.  
  256. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/ms-onedrive-nsa-prism.htm
  257.  
  258.  NOTE: Anything uploaded to �the cloud� is going to be available
  259. for the government to snoop through, the new Apple iphone gadgets
  260. automatically upload all users� personal files into �the cloud�
  261. and yes, looks like Microsoft is also doing it as well.
  262.  
  263.  You might want to avoid using these new systems, go back to using
  264. older desktop computers which are rather easy to fortify. As for
  265. phones, you can buy an old jitterbug phone - it�s a basic cellphone
  266. without all the other crap included - just plain oldschool, mofos!
  267. And add one more thing - a �Blockit Pocket.� ;)
  268. _______________________________________
  269. � German Investigation of the Cooperation Between NSA-BND Part 1 ::
  270.  
  271. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/11/german-investigation-of-cooperation.html
  272. _______________________________________
  273. � UK Lawyers Spied by GCHQ Spies ::
  274.  
  275. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/uk-lawyers-spies-intercept-14-1106.pdf
  276.  
  277. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/06/uk-surveillance-of-lawyers-journalists-gchq/
  278. _______________________________________
  279. � The German Operation Eikonal Part of NSA�s RAMPART-A Program ::
  280.  
  281.  Just over a week ago, the regional German paper S�ddeutsche Zeitung
  282. and the regional broadcasters NDR and WDR came with a story saying that
  283. between 2004 and 2008, the German foreign intelligence service BND had
  284. tapped into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX and shared the
  285. intercepted data with the NSA. As not all communications of German
  286. citizens could be filtered out, this is considered a violation of the
  287. constitution.
  288.  
  289.  Here we will give a summary of what is currently known about this BND
  290. operation and we will combine this with information from earlier reports.
  291. This will show that it was most likely part of the RAMPART-A program of
  292. the NSA, which includes similar interception efforts by foreign partner
  293. agencies. Finally, we will look at where exactly the BND interception
  294. might have taken place.
  295.  
  296. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/10/the-german-operation-eikonal-as-part-of.html
  297. ---------------------------------------
  298. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  299.  
  300. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  301. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  302. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  303. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  304.  
  305. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  306.  
  307. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  308.  
  309. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  310.  
  311. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  312.  
  313. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  314.  
  315. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  316.  
  317. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  318.  
  319. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  320.  
  321. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  322.  
  323. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  324. _______________________________________
  325. � Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
  326.  
  327.  The National Security Agency has had agents in China, Germany,
  328. and South Korea working on programs that use �physical subversion�
  329. to infiltrate and compromise networks and devices, according to
  330. documents obtained by The Intercept.
  331.  
  332.  The documents, leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, also
  333. indicate that the agency has used �under cover� operatives to gain
  334. access to sensitive data and systems in the global communications
  335. industry, and that these secret agents may have even dealt with
  336. American firms. The documents describe a range of clandestine field
  337. activities that are among the agency�s �core secrets� when it comes
  338. to computer network attacks, details of which are apparently shared
  339. with only a small number of officials outside the NSA.
  340.  
  341.  �It�s something that many people have been wondering about for a
  342. long time,� said Chris Soghoian, principal technologist for the
  343. American Civil Liberties Union, after reviewing the documents.
  344. �I�ve had conversations with executives at tech companies about
  345. this precise thing. How do you know the NSA is not sending people
  346. into your data centers?�
  347.  
  348.  Previous disclosures about the NSA�s corporate partnerships have
  349. focused largely on US companies providing the agency with vast amounts
  350. of customer data, including phone records and email traffic. But
  351. documents published today by The Intercept suggest that even as the
  352. agency uses secret operatives to penetrate them, companies have also
  353. cooperated more broadly to undermine the physical infrastructure of
  354. the internet than has been previously confirmed.
  355.  
  356.  In addition to so-called �close access� operations, the NSA�s �core
  357. secrets� include the fact that the agency works with US and foreign
  358. companies to weaken their encryption systems; the fact that the NSA
  359. spends �hundreds of millions of dollars� on technology to defeat
  360. commercial encryption; and the fact that the agency works with US
  361. and foreign companies to penetrate computer networks, possibly without
  362. the knowledge of the host countries. Many of the NSA�s core secrets
  363. concern its relationships to domestic and foreign corporations.
  364.  
  365.  Some of the documents in this article appear in a new documentary,
  366. CITIZENFOUR, which tells the story of the Snowden disclosures and is
  367. directed by Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras. The documents describe
  368. a panoply of programs classified with the rare designation of
  369. �Exceptionally Compartmented Information,� or ECI, which are only
  370. disclosed to a �very select� number of government officials.
  371.  
  372. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
  373.  
  374. � Top Secret Special Source Operations Classification Guides ::
  375.  
  376. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-whipgenie-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  377.  
  378. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-tarex-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  379.  
  380. � Operation Sentry Eagle (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  381.  
  382. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  383.  
  384. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  385.  
  386. � NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information ::
  387.  
  388. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  389.  
  390. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-pawleys-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  391.  
  392. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-compartments-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  393.  
  394. � NSA National Initiative Task Security (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  395.  
  396. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  397.  
  398. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  399.  
  400. � NSA Computer Network Exploitation ::
  401.  
  402. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-cne-declass-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  403.  
  404. � Following 10 NSA Releases (8.5MB | ZIP) ::
  405.  
  406. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-releases-the-intercept-14-1010.zip
  407. _______________________________________
  408. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides ::
  409.  
  410. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wb/binney.html
  411.  
  412. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides (ZIP) ::
  413.  
  414. Includes the report and the slides.
  415.  
  416. http://fileb.ag/i627vr7a6bkx
  417. _______________________________________
  418. � ACLU�s FOIA Documents Shed Light on One of the NSA�s Most
  419. Powerful Tools (Other Agencies and Legal Loopholes) ::
  420.  
  421. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/new-documents-shed-light-one-nsas-most-powerful-tools
  422.  
  423. � Overview of (Other) Signals Intelligence Authorities ::
  424.  
  425. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Overview%20of%20Signals%20Intelligence%20Authorities.pdf
  426.  
  427. � DoD-DIA�s 16 Legal Loopholes to Spy On US Persons ::
  428.  
  429. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/DoD%20HUMINT%20Legal%20Workshop%20Fundamentals%20of%20HUMINT%20Targeting.pdf
  430.  
  431. � Intelligence Law Handbook Defense HUMINT Service ::
  432.  
  433. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/Intelligence%20Law%20Handbook%20Defense%20HUMINT%20Service.pdf
  434. _______________________________________
  435. � NSA Spies on UN in Vienna ::
  436.  
  437. http://fm4.orf.at/stories/1746596/
  438. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28666/intelligence/nsa-spying-un-vienna.html
  439. http://www.techworm.net/2014/09/erich-mochel-leaks-photos-nsa-spying-united-nations.html
  440. ���������������������������������������
  441. � How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive,
  442. and Destroy Reputations ::
  443.  
  444. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  445.  
  446. http://www.infowars.com/cointelrpo-revisited-greenwald-exposes-nsa-agenda-to-destroy-journalists/
  447.  
  448.  One of the many pressing stories that remains to be told from the
  449. Snowden archive is how western intelligence agencies are attempting
  450. to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of
  451. deception and reputation-destruction. It�s time to tell a chunk of
  452. that story, complete with the relevant documents.
  453.  
  454.  Over the last several weeks, I worked with NBC News to publish a
  455. series of articles about �dirty trick� tactics used by GCHQ�s previously
  456. secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group). These
  457. were based on four classified GCHQ documents presented to the NSA
  458. and the other three partners in the English-speaking �Five Eyes�
  459. alliance. Today, we at the Intercept are publishing another new
  460. JTRIG document, in full, entitled �The Art of Deception: Training
  461. for Online Covert Operations.�
  462.  
  463. � GCHQ ; The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations ::
  464.  
  465. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/02/24/art-deception-training-new-generation-online-covert-operations/
  466.  
  467. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1021430/the-art-of-deception-training-for-a-new.pdf
  468. ---------------------------------------
  469. � Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  470. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  471.  
  472.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  473. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  474. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  475. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  476. �amplify� sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  477. content judged to be �extremist.� The capabilities, detailed
  478. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  479. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  480. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  481. together in a call.
  482.  
  483.  The tools were created by GCHQ�s Joint Threat Research
  484. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  485. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  486. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  487. documents have detailed JTRIG�s use of �fake victim blog
  488. posts,� �false flag operations,� �honey traps� and
  489. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  490. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  491. Facebook users.
  492.  
  493. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  494.  
  495. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  496.  
  497. � GCHQ�s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  498.  
  499. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  500. ---------------------------------------
  501. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  502.  
  503. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  504.  
  505.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  506. program run by the US Agency for International
  507. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  508. communications network� run through �secret shell
  509. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  510. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  511. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  512. �American contractors were gathering their private
  513. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  514. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  515. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  516. government. According to top-secret documents
  517. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  518. operation is frequently discussed at western
  519. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  520. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  521. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  522.  
  523. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  524.  
  525. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  526.  
  527. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  528.  
  529.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  530. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  531. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  532. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  533. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  534. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  535. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  536. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  537. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  538. Space Intelligence Center.�
  539.  
  540.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  541. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  542. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  543. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  544. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  545. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  546. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  547. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  548.  
  549.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  550. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  551. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  552. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  553. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  554. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  555. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  556. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  557. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  558.  
  559. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  560.  
  561. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  562. ---------------------------------------
  563. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  564.  
  565. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  566.  
  567. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  568.  
  569. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  570.  
  571. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  572.  
  573.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  574. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  575. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  576. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  577. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  578. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  579. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  580. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  581. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  582. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  583. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  584.  
  585.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  586. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  587. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  588. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  589. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  590. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  591.  
  592. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  593. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  594. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  595. ---------------------------------------
  596. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  597.  
  598. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  599.  
  600. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  601.  
  602. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  603.  
  604. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  605.  
  606. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  607.  
  608. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  609.  
  610. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  611.  
  612. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  613.  
  614. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  615. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  616. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  617.  
  618. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  619. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  620.  
  621. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  622. ---------------------------------------
  623. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  624.  
  625. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  626. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  627. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  628. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  629.  
  630. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  631.  
  632. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  633.  
  634. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  635.  
  636. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  637.  
  638. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  639.  
  640. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  641. ---------------------------------------
  642. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  643.  
  644. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  645. _______________________________________
  646. � Unraveling NSA�s TURBULENCE Programs ::
  647.  
  648. https://robert.sesek.com/2014/9/unraveling_nsa_s_turbulence_programs.html
  649. _______________________________________
  650. � New Zealand�s Prime Minister Isn�t Telling the Truth About
  651. Mass Surveillance ::
  652.  
  653. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  654.  
  655. � New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  656. Denying It ::
  657.  
  658. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  659.  
  660. � Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  661. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald �A Loser� ::
  662.  
  663. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  664.  
  665. � New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  666.  
  667. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  668.  
  669. � NSA Visit by New Zealand Spy PM Ferguson ::
  670.  
  671. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-nz-ferguson-visit-the-intercept-14-0915.pdf
  672.  
  673. � The Questions for New Zealand on Mass Surveillance ::
  674.  
  675. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/questions-new-zealand-mass-surveillance/
  676. _______________________________________
  677. ? NSA Spooks Deny The Evidence (Provided Below) Exists ::
  678.  
  679.  Did the NSA forget Ed Snowden contacted NBC and released
  680. the evidence contacting authorities regarding his concerns?
  681.  
  682. https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsa-has-revealed-new-details-about-its-exhaustive-search-of-edward-snowdens-emails
  683.  
  684. ? FLASHBACK! Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  685.  
  686.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  687. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  688. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  689. activity before he began leaking government documents
  690. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  691. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  692.  
  693.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  694. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  695. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  696. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  697. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  698. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  699. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  700. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  701. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  702. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  703. attention.��
  704.  
  705.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  706. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  707. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  708. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  709. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  710.  
  711. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  712.  
  713. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  714. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  715.  
  716. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  717. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  718. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  719. ---------------------------------------
  720. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  721.  
  722. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  723.  
  724. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  725. _______________________________________
  726. � NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  727.  
  728.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  729. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  730. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  731. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  732.  
  733. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  734.  
  735. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  736.  
  737. � GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  738.  
  739. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  740.  
  741. � NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  742.  
  743. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  744.  
  745. � NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  746.  
  747. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  748.  
  749. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  750. _______________________________________
  751. � NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  752.  
  753. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  754.  
  755. � Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  756.  
  757. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  758.  
  759. ? UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  760.  
  761. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  762. _______________________________________
  763. � Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  764.  
  765. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  766. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  767. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  768.  
  769. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  770.  
  771. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  772.  
  773. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  774.  
  775. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  776.  
  777. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  778.  
  779. � NSA�s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  780.  
  781. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  782.  
  783. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  784.  
  785. � NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  786.  
  787. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  788. _______________________________________
  789. � DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  790.  
  791. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  792. _______________________________________
  793. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden�s Info
  794.  
  795.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  796. documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks so far,
  797. up to September 5th of 2014. I�m still collecting any
  798. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  799. archive twice per year.
  800.  
  801.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  802. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  803. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  804. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  805.  
  806.  After decompression, the first folder is titled �Eyeballing_
  807. Snowden_Info_Folder_01� and the second is titled �Eyeballing_
  808. Snowden_Info_Folder_02� , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  809. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  810.  
  811.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  812. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  813. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  814.  
  815. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  816. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  817.  
  818. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  819. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  820. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  821.  
  822. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  823. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  824.  
  825. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  826. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  827. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  828. ���������������������������������������
  829. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  830.  
  831. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  832.  
  833. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  834.  
  835. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  836.  
  837. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  838. _______________________________________
  839. � NSA�s Foreign Partnerships ::
  840.  
  841. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  842. _______________________________________
  843. � Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  844.  
  845. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  846.  
  847. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  848.  
  849. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  850.  
  851. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  852. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  853. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  854. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  855. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  856. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  857. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  858. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  859. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  860. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  861. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  862. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  863. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  864.  
  865. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  866.  
  867. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  868. _______________________________________
  869. � How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  870.  
  871. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  872.  
  873. � NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  874.  
  875. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  876. _______________________________________
  877. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  878.  
  879. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  880.  
  881. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  882.  
  883. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  884.  
  885. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  886.  
  887. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  888. _______________________________________
  889. � Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  890.  
  891. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  892.  
  893. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  894.  
  895. � Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  896.  
  897. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  898.  
  899. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  900. _______________________________________
  901. � Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the �Now-Discontinued� (?)
  902. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  903. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  904.  
  905. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  906. _______________________________________
  907. � GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  908.  
  909. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  910.  
  911. � Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  912.  
  913. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  914. _______________________________________
  915. � Barack Obama�s Secret �Terrorist-Tracking� System ::
  916.  
  917.  Nearly half of the people on the US government�s widely shared
  918. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  919. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  920. obtained by The Intercept.
  921.  
  922. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  923.  
  924. � NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  925.  
  926. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  927.  
  928. � Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  929.  
  930.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  931. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  932. secret process that requires neither �concrete facts� nor
  933. �irrefutable evidence� to designate an American or foreigner
  934. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  935. by The Intercept.
  936.  
  937. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  938. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  939. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  940. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  941. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  942.  
  943. NOBODY notes
  944.  
  945.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  946. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  947. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  948. only these �dirty tricks� are now fully digitalized.
  949.  
  950. � Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  951.  
  952.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  953. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  954. and his approach to dissent. �Before I left the State
  955. Department, I filed a complaint with the department�s
  956. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  957. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  958. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  959. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,�
  960. Tye explained. �I have also brought my complaint to the
  961. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  962. inspector general of the NSA.�
  963.  
  964.  These steps � which many say Snowden should�ve taken �
  965. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  966. wouldn�t be garnering attention at all if not for
  967. Snowden�s leaks.
  968.  
  969. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  970.  
  971. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  972. _______________________________________
  973. � Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  974. Israeli Attack ::
  975.  
  976.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  977. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  978. crucial role in Israel�s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  979. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  980. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  981. enable Israel�s military assaults � such as the one on Gaza.
  982.  
  983. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  984.  
  985. � ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  986.  
  987. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  988.  
  989. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  990.  
  991. � US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  992.  
  993. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  994.  
  995. � (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  996.  
  997. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  998. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  999. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  1000.  
  1001. � (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  1002.  
  1003. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  1004. _______________________________________
  1005. � USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  1006.  
  1007. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  1008.  
  1009. � NSA�s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia�s Brutal State Police ::
  1010.  
  1011.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  1012. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  1013. one of the world�s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  1014. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  1015. Snowden details the agency�s plans �to provide direct analytic and
  1016. technical support� to the Saudis on �internal security� matters.
  1017.  
  1018.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior�referred to in the document as MOI
  1019. � has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  1020. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  1021. that �Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  1022. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,� specifically
  1023. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly �poured an
  1024. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat� of one human rights
  1025. activist. The report also notes the MOI�s use of invasive surveillance
  1026. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  1027.  
  1028.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  1029. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  1030. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  1031. Administration�s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  1032. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes �a
  1033. period of rejuvenation� for the NSA�s relationship with the Saudi
  1034. Ministry of Defense.
  1035.  
  1036.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  1037. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  1038. where the US �has [an] interest in regime continuity.�
  1039.  
  1040. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  1041. _______________________________________
  1042. � Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  1043.  
  1044. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  1045. _______________________________________
  1046. � NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  1047.  
  1048. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  1049.  
  1050. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  1051. _______________________________________
  1052. � Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  1053.  
  1054.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  1055. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  1056. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  1057.  
  1058. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  1059.  
  1060. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  1061. _______________________________________
  1062. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1063.  
  1064.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1065. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1066. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1067. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1068. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1069. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1070. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1071.  
  1072. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1073.  
  1074. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1075.  
  1076. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1077. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1078. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1079.  
  1080. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1081.  
  1082. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1083.  
  1084. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1085.  
  1086.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1087. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1088.  
  1089. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1090.  
  1091. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1092.  
  1093. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1094.  
  1095. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1096.  
  1097.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1098. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1099. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1100. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1101.  
  1102. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1103.  
  1104. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1105.  
  1106. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1107.  
  1108. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1109.  
  1110. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1111.  
  1112. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  1113.  
  1114. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  1115.  
  1116. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1117.  
  1118. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1119.  
  1120. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1121.  
  1122. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1123.  
  1124. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1125.  
  1126. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1127.  
  1128. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1129. _______________________________________
  1130. � NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  1131.  
  1132. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  1133.  
  1134. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  1135. _______________________________________
  1136. � The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  1137. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  1138.  
  1139.  The contents of the surveillance files � almost half of which
  1140. contained information from US citizens or residents � �tell
  1141. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  1142. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  1143. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.�
  1144.  
  1145. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  1146. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  1147. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  1148.  
  1149. � Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  1150. Been Spying On ::
  1151.  
  1152.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  1153. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans�including
  1154. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  1155. academics, and lawyers�under secretive procedures intended
  1156. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  1157.  
  1158.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  1159. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  1160. own government includes:
  1161.  
  1162.  � Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  1163. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  1164. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  1165. Security under President George W. Bush;
  1166.  
  1167.  � Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  1168. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  1169.  
  1170.  � Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  1171. international relations at Rutgers University;
  1172.  
  1173.  � Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  1174. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  1175. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  1176.  
  1177.  � Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  1178. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  1179. rights organization in the country.
  1180.  
  1181. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  1182. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  1183. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  1184.  
  1185. � NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  1186.  
  1187. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  1188.  
  1189. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  1190.  
  1191. � Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  1192.  
  1193. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  1194.  
  1195. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  1196.  
  1197. ? NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  1198.                               ���������
  1199.  �The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  1200. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  1201. crime to law enforcement authorities.�
  1202.  
  1203. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  1204.  
  1205. ? US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  1206.  
  1207. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  1208.  
  1209. NOBODY responds
  1210.  
  1211.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  1212. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  1213. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  1214.  
  1215. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  1216.  
  1217.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  1218. back in 2004 up till today.
  1219.  
  1220. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  1221.  
  1222.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  1223. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  1224.  
  1225. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  1226.  
  1227.  Just like those in the �Department of Justice� they
  1228. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  1229. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  1230. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  1231.  
  1232. � Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  1233.  
  1234. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  1235.  
  1236.  �So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  1237. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  1238. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  1239. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  1240.  
  1241.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  1242. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  1243. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  1244. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  1245. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  1246. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  1247. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  1248. first place.  Realistically, it�s not one or the other, it�s
  1249. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  1250. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  1251. On one hand: it�s evidence, on the other, it�s private information
  1252. on many thousands of people.
  1253.  
  1254.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  1255. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  1256. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  1257. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  1258. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  1259. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  1260. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  1261. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  1262. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  1263. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  1264. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  1265. happen now. The US government�s dealings with brutal regimes
  1266. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  1267. their own people.
  1268.  
  1269.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  1270. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  1271. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  1272. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  1273. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  1274. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  1275. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  1276. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  1277. the Post�s story as a dud, it�s the first page of the next
  1278. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  1279. unpredictable consequences.�
  1280.  
  1281. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  1282. _______________________________________
  1283. � Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  1284.  
  1285. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  1286. ���������������������������������������
  1287. � Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  1288.  
  1289.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  1290. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  1291. Binney � that�s a �totalitarian mentality.�
  1292.  
  1293. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  1294. _______________________________________
  1295. � NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  1296.  
  1297. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  1298.  
  1299.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  1300. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  1301. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  1302. Aussp�hprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  1303.  
  1304.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  1305. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  1306. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  1307. investigate.
  1308.  
  1309.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  1310. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  1311. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  1312. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  1313. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  1314. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  1315.  
  1316. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  1317.  
  1318. MP4 Video Format � http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  1319.  
  1320. � XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  1321.  
  1322. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  1323.  
  1324. � NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  1325.  
  1326. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  1327. ---------------------------------------
  1328. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1329.  
  1330. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1331.  
  1332. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  1333.  
  1334.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  1335. using Tor.�
  1336.  
  1337. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  1338.  
  1339. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  1340.  
  1341. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  1342.  
  1343.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t mean that your
  1344. browser isn�t storing cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman,
  1345. a colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes in browser
  1346. vulnerabilities.
  1347.  
  1348.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  1349. aware of Tor�s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  1350. wide surveillance.
  1351.  
  1352.  �The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  1353. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  1354. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  1355. other Web users,� he wrote.
  1356.  
  1357.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  1358. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  1359. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,�
  1360. he said.
  1361.  
  1362. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  1363.  
  1364. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  1365. Traffic From Machines ::
  1366.  
  1367.  �Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  1368. out large-scale �staining� as a means to identify individual
  1369. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  1370.  
  1371.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  1372. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  1373. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  1374. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  1375. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  1376. session.�
  1377.  
  1378. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  1379.  
  1380. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  1381.  
  1382. � Packet Staining ::
  1383.  
  1384. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  1385. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  1386. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  1387. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  1388.  
  1389. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  1390.  
  1391. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  1392. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  1393. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  1394. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  1395.  
  1396. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  1397.  
  1398.  �We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  1399. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  1400. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  1401. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  1402. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  1403. which allows the user finer control.� ... ...
  1404.  
  1405.  �This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  1406. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  1407. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  1408. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  1409. server can be used to hide one�s location, but a single-hop
  1410. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  1411. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  1412. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  1413. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  1414. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  1415. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  1416. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  1417. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  1418. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  1419. order to trace requests back to the originating client.�
  1420.  
  1421. ... ...
  1422.  
  1423.  �In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  1424. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  1425. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  1426. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  1427. of Tor.�
  1428.  
  1429. ... ...
  1430.  
  1431.  �We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  1432. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  1433. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  1434. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  1435. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  1436. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  1437. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  1438. be tried.�
  1439.  
  1440. ... ...
  1441.  
  1442.  �It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  1443. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  1444. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  1445. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  1446. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  1447. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  1448. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  1449. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  1450. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  1451. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  1452. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  1453. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  1454. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  1455. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  1456. who inspecting the directories.�
  1457.  
  1458. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  1459. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  1460. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  1461.  
  1462. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  1463.  
  1464. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  1465.  
  1466. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  1467.  
  1468. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  1469.  
  1470. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  1471.  
  1472.  �This document doesn�t give much insight into capabilities
  1473. the IC has developed against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  1474. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  1475. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  1476. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  1477. investment. I�d expect there are other programs with more
  1478. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  1479.  
  1480. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  1481. _______________________________________
  1482. � UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  1483.  
  1484. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  1485.  
  1486. � UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  1487. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  1488.  
  1489.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  1490. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany�s
  1491. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  1492. as a double agent for the US.
  1493.  
  1494.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  1495. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  1496. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country�s
  1497. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  1498. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  1499.  
  1500.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  1501. week�s arrest of a 31-year-old BND �double agent� who spent
  1502. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  1503. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  1504. of �10,000 (�7,940) per document. ...
  1505.  
  1506.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin�s
  1507. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  1508. in �co-operation�. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  1509. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  1510. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  1511.  
  1512.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  1513. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin�s Russian
  1514. embassy. The Germans had considered it �impossible� that one
  1515. of their own intelligence men could be working as a �double agent�
  1516. for the Americans.
  1517.  
  1518. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1519. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1520. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1521. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1522.  
  1523. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1524.  
  1525. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1526.  
  1527. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1528.  
  1529. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1530.  
  1531. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1532.  
  1533. � Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1534.  
  1535. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1536.  
  1537. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1538.  
  1539. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1540.  
  1541. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1542.  
  1543. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1544.  
  1545. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1546.  
  1547. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1548.  
  1549. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1550.  
  1551. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1552.  
  1553. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1554.  
  1555. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1556.  
  1557. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  1558.  
  1559.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  1560. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  1561. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  1562. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  1563. where she grew up.
  1564.  
  1565. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1566. _______________________________________
  1567. � NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  1568.  
  1569. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  1570. _______________________________________
  1571. � Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  1572.  
  1573. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  1574. _______________________________________
  1575. � Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  1576.  
  1577. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  1578. _______________________________________
  1579. � NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  1580.  
  1581. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  1582. _______________________________________
  1583. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  1584.  
  1585. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  1586. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  1587. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  1588. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  1589.  
  1590. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  1591.  
  1592. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  1593.  
  1594. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  1595.  
  1596. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  1597.  
  1598. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1599.  
  1600. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  1601.  
  1602. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  1603.  
  1604. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  1605.  
  1606. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1607.  
  1608. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  1609. _______________________________________
  1610.  Keith Alexander�s talking points for strategic meeting
  1611. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  1612. Service (DDIS).
  1613.  
  1614. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  1615. _______________________________________
  1616. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1617.  
  1618. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  1619.  
  1620. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1621.  
  1622. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  1623. _______________________________________
  1624. � Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  1625.  
  1626. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  1627. _______________________________________
  1628. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  1629. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  1630.  
  1631. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  1632. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  1633. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  1634.  
  1635.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  1636. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  1637. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  1638. user in the UK.
  1639.  
  1640. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  1641.  
  1642. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  1643. _______________________________________
  1644. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  1645. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  1646.  
  1647. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  1648. ---------------------------------------
  1649. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1650.  
  1651. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1652. _______________________________________
  1653. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  1654.  
  1655. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  1656. _______________________________________
  1657. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  1658.  
  1659. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  1660.  
  1661. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  1662. _______________________________________
  1663. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  1664. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  1665.  
  1666. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  1667. _______________________________________
  1668. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  1669.  
  1670. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  1671.  
  1672. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  1673.  
  1674. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  1675. _______________________________________
  1676. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  1677. to Tap Phones ::
  1678.  
  1679. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  1680. _______________________________________
  1681. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  1682.  
  1683. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  1684. _______________________________________
  1685. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  1686. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  1687. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  1688.  
  1689.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  1690. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  1691. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  1692. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  1693. they were spying on � was hidden?
  1694.  
  1695.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  1696. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  1697. everybody what they�re doing?
  1698.  
  1699.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  1700. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  1701. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  1702. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  1703. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  1704. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  1705. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  1706. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  1707. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  1708.  
  1709.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  1710. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  1711. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  1712. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  1713. was a specialist in, by the way.
  1714.  
  1715.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  1716. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  1717. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  1718. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  1719. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  1720. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  1721.  
  1722.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  1723. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  1724. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  1725. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  1726. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  1727. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  1728. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  1729. for the JWICS.
  1730.  
  1731.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  1732. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  1733. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  1734. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  1735. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  1736. that [clearance].
  1737.  
  1738.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  1739. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  1740. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  1741. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  1742.  
  1743.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  1744. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  1745. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  1746. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  1747. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  1748. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  1749. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1750. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1751.  
  1752.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  1753. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  1754. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  1755.  
  1756.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1757. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  1758. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  1759. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  1760. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  1761.  
  1762.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  1763. to placate the American people.
  1764.  
  1765.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  1766. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  1767. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  1768.  
  1769.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  1770. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  1771. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  1772. investigation.�
  1773.  
  1774. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  1775. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  1776. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  1777. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  1778. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  1779. _______________________________________
  1780. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  1781.  
  1782. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  1783.  
  1784. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  1785.  
  1786. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  1787.  
  1788. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  1789.  
  1790. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  1791.  
  1792. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  1793.  
  1794. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  1795.  
  1796. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  1797.  
  1798. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  1799.  
  1800. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  1801.  
  1802. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  1803.  
  1804. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  1805.  
  1806. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  1807. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  1808.  
  1809. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  1810.  
  1811. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  1812. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  1813.  
  1814. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  1815.  
  1816. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  1817. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  1818.  
  1819. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  1820. _______________________________________
  1821. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  1822.  
  1823.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  1824. agencies are now also using the same facial
  1825. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  1826. identification systems are being developed as well.
  1827. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  1828.  
  1829. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  1830.  
  1831. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  1832.  
  1833. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  1834.  
  1835. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  1836. _______________________________________
  1837. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  1838.  
  1839. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  1840. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  1841. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  1842. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  1843. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  1844. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  1845. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  1846. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  1847. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  1848. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  1849.  
  1850. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  1851.  
  1852. And a few more to think about,
  1853.  
  1854. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  1855. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  1856. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  1857. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  1858. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  1859. _______________________________________
  1860. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1861.  
  1862.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1863. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1864. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  1865. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1866. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  1867. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  1868.  
  1869.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  1870. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1871. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  1872. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  1873. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  1874. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1875. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1876. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1877. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  1878. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  1879. attention.��
  1880.  
  1881.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  1882. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1883. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  1884. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1885. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1886.  
  1887. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1888.  
  1889. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1890. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1891.  
  1892. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1893. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1894. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1895. ---------------------------------------
  1896. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1897.  
  1898. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1899.  
  1900. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1901. _______________________________________
  1902. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  1903.  
  1904. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  1905.  
  1906. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  1907.  
  1908. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  1909. _______________________________________
  1910. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  1911. Securely and Anonymously ::
  1912.  
  1913.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  1914. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  1915. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  1916. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  1917. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  1918. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  1919. internet somewhere or using a third party
  1920. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  1921. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  1922. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  1923. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  1924. download the file from you.
  1925.  
  1926. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  1927. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  1928.  
  1929. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  1930.  
  1931. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  1932.  
  1933. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  1934.  
  1935. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  1936. _______________________________________
  1937. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  1938. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  1939.  
  1940. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  1941.  
  1942. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  1943.  
  1944. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  1945. _______________________________________
  1946. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  1947.  
  1948. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  1949.  
  1950. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  1951.  
  1952. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  1953.  
  1954. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  1955.  
  1956. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  1957.  
  1958. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  1959.  
  1960. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  1961.  
  1962. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  1963. Online Next Week ::
  1964.  
  1965. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  1966. ---------------------------------------
  1967. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  1968.  
  1969. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  1970.  
  1971. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  1972.  
  1973. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  1974. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  1975.  
  1976. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  1977. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  1978.  
  1979. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  1980.  
  1981. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  1982. Infiltration by NSA ::
  1983.  
  1984. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  1985.  
  1986. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  1987.  
  1988. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  1989.  
  1990.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  1991. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  1992. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  1993. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  1994. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  1995. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  1996. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  1997. they�re delivered.
  1998.  
  1999. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  2000.  
  2001. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  2002.  
  2003. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  2004.  
  2005. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  2006.  
  2007. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  2008.  
  2009. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  2010. ______________________________________
  2011. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  2012. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  2013.  
  2014. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  2015. _______________________________________
  2016. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  2017. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  2018.  
  2019. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  2020. _______________________________________
  2021. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  2022.  
  2023. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  2024. _______________________________________
  2025. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  2026.  
  2027. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  2028.  
  2029. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  2030.  
  2031. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  2032. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  2033.  
  2034.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  2035. national security and other government officials will no
  2036. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  2037. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  2038.  
  2039. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  2040. _______________________________________
  2041. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  2042.  
  2043. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  2044.  
  2045. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  2046. ______________________________________
  2047. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  2048.  
  2049. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  2050. ______________________________________
  2051. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  2052. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  2053.  
  2054. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  2055. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  2056.  
  2057. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  2058.  
  2059. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  2060. ______________________________________
  2061. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  2062.  
  2063. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  2064.  
  2065. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  2066.  
  2067. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  2068.  
  2069. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  2070.  
  2071.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  2072. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  2073. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  2074. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  2075. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  2076. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  2077. industry which generates something in the
  2078. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  2079.  
  2080.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  2081.  
  2082. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  2083. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  2084. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  2085. _______________________________________
  2086. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  2087.  
  2088. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  2089. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  2090.  
  2091.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  2092. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  2093. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  2094. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  2095. activities and future plans.� � �
  2096.  
  2097.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  2098. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  2099. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  2100.  
  2101. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  2102.  
  2103. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  2104.  
  2105. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  2106.  
  2107. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  2108.  
  2109. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  2110.  
  2111. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  2112. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  2113.  
  2114.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  2115. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  2116. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  2117. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  2118. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  2119. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  2120. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  2121. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  2122.  
  2123.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  2124. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  2125. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  2126. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  2127. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  2128. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  2129. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  2130.  
  2131. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  2132. _______________________________________
  2133. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  2134.  
  2135. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  2136. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  2137. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  2138.  
  2139.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  2140. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  2141. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  2142. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  2143. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  2144. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  2145. Edward Snowden.
  2146.  
  2147.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  2148. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  2149. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  2150. for surveillance.
  2151.  
  2152.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  2153. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  2154. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  2155. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  2156. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  2157.  
  2158.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  2159. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  2160. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  2161. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  2162.  
  2163.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  2164. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  2165. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  2166. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  2167. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  2168. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  2169. and long-term storage.
  2170.  
  2171. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  2172.  
  2173. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  2174.  
  2175.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  2176. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  2177. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  2178. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  2179. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  2180. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  2181. but they won�t say.
  2182.  
  2183. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  2184.  
  2185. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  2186.  
  2187. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  2188.  
  2189. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  2190. _______________________________________
  2191. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  2192.  
  2193.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  2194. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  2195. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  2196. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  2197. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  2198. already been published previously. The second was
  2199. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  2200.  
  2201. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  2202.  
  2203. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  2204.  
  2205.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  2206. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  2207. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  2208. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  2209. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  2210. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  2211. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  2212. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  2213. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  2214.  
  2215.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  2216. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  2217.  
  2218.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  2219. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  2220. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  2221. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  2222. benefit� the document says.
  2223.  
  2224.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  2225. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  2226. company is working towards creating a so-called
  2227. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  2228. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  2229. per second.
  2230.  
  2231. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  2232. _______________________________________
  2233. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  2234.  
  2235. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  2236. _______________________________________
  2237. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  2238.  
  2239. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  2240. _______________________________________
  2241. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  2242.  
  2243. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  2244. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  2245. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  2246. _______________________________________
  2247. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  2248.  
  2249.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  2250. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  2251. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  2252. top human rights body.
  2253.  
  2254.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  2255. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  2256. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  2257. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  2258. Human Rights Watch.
  2259.  
  2260. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  2261.  
  2262. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  2263. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  2264.  
  2265. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  2266. _______________________________________
  2267. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  2268.  
  2269.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  2270. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  2271. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  2272.  
  2273.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  2274. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  2275. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  2276. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  2277. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  2278. high as two years. ... ...
  2279.  
  2280.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  2281. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  2282. by domestic courts.
  2283.  
  2284. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  2285. _______________________________________
  2286. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  2287.  
  2288. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  2289. _______________________________________
  2290. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  2291.  
  2292.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  2293. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  2294. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  2295. to create national-only electronic networks could
  2296. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  2297. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  2298. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  2299. the USTR said in its annual report.
  2300.  
  2301. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  2302. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  2303. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  2304. ���������������������������������������
  2305. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  2306.  
  2307. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  2308.  
  2309. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  2310.  
  2311. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2312. _______________________________________
  2313. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  2314.  
  2315.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  2316. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  2317. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  2318. any information that comes out and will provide an
  2319. updated archive from time to time.
  2320.  
  2321.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  2322. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  2323. 927MB decompressed.
  2324.  
  2325.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  2326. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  2327. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  2328.  
  2329. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2330. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  2331.  
  2332. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  2333. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2334. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  2335. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2336. _______________________________________
  2337. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  2338.  
  2339. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  2340. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  2341. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  2342. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  2343. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  2344. _______________________________________
  2345. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  2346.  
  2347. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  2348.  
  2349. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  2350.  
  2351. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  2352.  
  2353. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  2354.  
  2355. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  2356. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  2357. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  2358. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  2359.  
  2360. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  2361. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  2362.  
  2363. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  2364. _______________________________________
  2365. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  2366.  
  2367. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  2368.  
  2369. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  2370.  
  2371. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  2372.  
  2373. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  2374.  
  2375. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  2376.  
  2377. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  2378.  
  2379. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  2380. _______________________________________
  2381. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  2382.  
  2383.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  2384. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  2385. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  2386. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  2387. public as possible� as well helping the public
  2388. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  2389. how we�re protecting national security.�
  2390.  
  2391. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  2392. ���������������������������������������
  2393. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  2394.  
  2395. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  2396.  
  2397. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  2398.  
  2399. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  2400.  
  2401. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  2402.  
  2403. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  2404.  
  2405. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  2406.  
  2407. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  2408.  
  2409.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  2410. offensive against China, with targets including the
  2411. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  2412. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  2413. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  2414. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  2415. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  2416. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  2417. well as telecommunications companies.
  2418.  
  2419.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  2420. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  2421. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  2422. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  2423. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  2424. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  2425. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  2426. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  2427. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  2428. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  2429. battle for data supremacy.
  2430.  
  2431.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  2432. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  2433. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  2434. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  2435. among other things.
  2436.  
  2437. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  2438. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  2439. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  2440. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  2441.  
  2442. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  2443.  
  2444.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  2445. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  2446. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  2447. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  2448. has lodged representations with the American side on
  2449. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  2450. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  2451.  
  2452. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  2453. _______________________________________
  2454. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  2455.  
  2456.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  2457. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  2458. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  2459. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  2460. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  2461. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  2462. routers, the devices that connect computer
  2463. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  2464. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  2465. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  2466. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  2467. that flow over their networks.
  2468.  
  2469.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  2470. aspired to create a database that would function
  2471. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  2472. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  2473. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  2474. activity � they are targeted only because they
  2475. control access to networks the agency wants to
  2476. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  2477. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  2478. of the posts says.
  2479.  
  2480.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  2481. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  2482. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  2483. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  2484. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  2485. poses with amusing captions.�
  2486.  
  2487. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  2488. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  2489. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  2490. _______________________________________
  2491. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  2492.  
  2493. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  2494. _______________________________________
  2495. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  2496.  
  2497. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  2498.  
  2499. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  2500.  
  2501. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  2502.  
  2503. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  2504.  
  2505. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  2506.  
  2507. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  2508. _______________________________________
  2509. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  2510.  
  2511. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  2512. _______________________________________
  2513. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  2514.  
  2515. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  2516.  
  2517. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2518. _______________________________________
  2519. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2520.  
  2521. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2522. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2523. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2524. _______________________________________
  2525. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2526.  
  2527. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2528.  
  2529. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2530. _______________________________________
  2531. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2532.  
  2533. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2534. _______________________________________
  2535. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2536.  
  2537. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2538.  
  2539. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2540.  
  2541. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2542. _______________________________________
  2543. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2544.  
  2545. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2546. _______________________________________
  2547. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2548.  
  2549. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2550.  
  2551. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2552.  
  2553. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2554.  
  2555. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2556.  
  2557. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  2558. _______________________________________
  2559. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  2560.  
  2561. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  2562.  
  2563. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  2564.  
  2565. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  2566. _______________________________________
  2567. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  2568.  
  2569. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  2570. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  2571. _______________________________________
  2572. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  2573. With Malware ::
  2574.  
  2575.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  2576. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  2577. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  2578. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  2579. level of human oversight in the process.
  2580.  
  2581.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  2582. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  2583. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  2584. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  2585. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  2586. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  2587. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  2588. Internet and phone networks.
  2589.  
  2590. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  2591. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  2592. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  2593. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  2594. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  2595. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  2596. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  2597. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  2598. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  2599.  
  2600.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  2601. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  2602. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  2603. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  2604. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  2605. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  2606.  
  2607.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  2608. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  2609. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  2610. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  2611. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  2612. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  2613. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  2614. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  2615. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  2616. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  2617. instead of individually.�
  2618.  
  2619. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  2620.  
  2621. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  2622.  
  2623.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  2624. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  2625. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  2626. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  2627. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  2628. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  2629. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  2630. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  2631. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  2632. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  2633. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  2634. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  2635. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  2636. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  2637. execute endpoint operations.�
  2638.  
  2639. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2640.  
  2641.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  2642. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  2643. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  2644. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  2645.  
  2646.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  2647. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  2648. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  2649. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  2650. looks suspicious.
  2651.  
  2652.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  2653. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  2654. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  2655. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  2656. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  2657.  
  2658.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  2659. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  2660. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  2661. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  2662. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  2663. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  2664. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  2665.  
  2666.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  2667. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  2668. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  2669. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  2670. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  2671. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  2672. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  2673. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  2674. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  2675. in action.
  2676.  
  2677. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  2678. Computers for Surveillance ::
  2679.  
  2680. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  2681.  
  2682. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  2683.  
  2684. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  2685.  
  2686.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  2687. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  2688. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  2689. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  2690. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  2691. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  2692.  
  2693. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  2694.  
  2695. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  2696. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  2697. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  2698. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  2699. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2700. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  2701. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  2702. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  2703. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  2704. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  2705.  
  2706. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  2707.  
  2708. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  2709.  
  2710. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  2711.  
  2712. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  2713. _______________________________________
  2714. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  2715.  
  2716. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  2717. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  2718. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  2719. _______________________________________
  2720. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  2721.  
  2722. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  2723. _______________________________________
  2724. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  2725.  
  2726.  Alliances between security services are usually
  2727. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  2728. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  2729. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  2730. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  2731. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  2732. internet traffic.
  2733.  
  2734.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  2735. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  2736. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  2737. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  2738. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  2739.  
  2740.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  2741. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  2742. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  2743. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  2744. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  2745. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  2746.  
  2747.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2748. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2749. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2750. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2751. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2752. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2753. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2754.  
  2755. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2756.  
  2757. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2758. _______________________________________
  2759. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  2760.  
  2761. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  2762.  
  2763. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  2764. ---------------------------------------
  2765. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  2766.  
  2767. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  2768.  
  2769. � NSA Spies Too ::
  2770.  
  2771. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2772. _______________________________________
  2773. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  2774.  
  2775. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  2776.  
  2777. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  2778.  
  2779.  The documents show that images were collected
  2780. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  2781. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  2782. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  2783. programs.
  2784.  
  2785. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  2786. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  2787. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  2788. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  2789.  
  2790. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  2791.  
  2792. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  2793. _______________________________________
  2794. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  2795.  
  2796. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  2797. _______________________________________
  2798. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  2799.  
  2800. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  2801.  
  2802. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  2803. _______________________________________
  2804. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  2805. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  2806.  
  2807. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  2808.  
  2809. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  2810. _______________________________________
  2811. � NSA Observer ::
  2812.  
  2813. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  2814. _______________________________________
  2815. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  2816.  
  2817. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2818.  
  2819. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  2820. _______________________________________
  2821. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  2822.  
  2823. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  2824.  
  2825. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  2826. _______________________________________
  2827. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  2828.  
  2829. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  2830.  
  2831. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  2832.  
  2833. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  2834.  
  2835. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  2836. _______________________________________
  2837. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  2838.  
  2839.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  2840. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  2841. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  2842. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  2843. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  2844. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  2845. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  2846. targets without confirming their veracity on
  2847. the ground.
  2848.  
  2849. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  2850. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  2851. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  2852. _______________________________________
  2853. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  2854.  
  2855.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  2856. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  2857. shows that an American law firm was
  2858. monitored while representing a foreign
  2859. government in trade disputes with the
  2860. United States. The disclosure offers a
  2861. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  2862. which Americans were ensnared by the
  2863. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  2864. interest because lawyers in the United
  2865. States with clients overseas have
  2866. expressed growing concern that their
  2867. confidential communications could be
  2868. compromised by such surveillance.
  2869.  
  2870. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  2871. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  2872. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  2873.  
  2874. NOBODY comments
  2875.  
  2876. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  2877.  
  2878.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  2879. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  2880. be declassified for research in public domain.
  2881. _______________________________________
  2882. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  2883.  
  2884. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  2885.  
  2886. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  2887.  
  2888. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  2889. _______________________________________
  2890. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  2891.  
  2892. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  2893. _______________________________________
  2894. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  2895. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  2896.  
  2897.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  2898. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  2899. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  2900. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  2901. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  2902.  
  2903. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  2904. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  2905. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  2906.  
  2907. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  2908. the German Chancellor ::
  2909.  
  2910. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  2911. _______________________________________
  2912. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  2913. Phone Call Spying ::
  2914.  
  2915. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  2916.  
  2917. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  2918. _______________________________________
  2919. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  2920.  
  2921. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  2922. _______________________________________
  2923. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  2924.  
  2925. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  2926. _______________________________________
  2927.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  2928. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  2929. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  2930. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  2931. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  2932. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  2933.  
  2934. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  2935. ���������������������������������������
  2936. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2937.  
  2938. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2939.  
  2940. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2941.  
  2942. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  2943.  
  2944. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  2945.  
  2946. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  2947.  
  2948.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  2949. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  2950. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  2951. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  2952. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  2953. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  2954. left the terminal.
  2955.  
  2956.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  2957. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  2958. clandestine operation by the Communications
  2959. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  2960. certainly illegal. ... ...
  2961.  
  2962.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  2963. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  2964. software program CSEC was developing with help
  2965. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  2966.  
  2967.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  2968. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  2969. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  2970. into other cities/regions.�
  2971.  
  2972. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  2973.  
  2974.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  2975. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  2976.  
  2977. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  2978.  
  2979. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  2980.  
  2981. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  2982.  
  2983. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  2984.  
  2985. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  2986. _______________________________________
  2987. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  2988.  
  2989. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  2990.  
  2991. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  2992.  
  2993. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  2994. _______________________________________
  2995. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  2996.  
  2997.  Documents taken from the National Security
  2998. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  2999. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  3000. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  3001. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  3002. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  3003. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  3004. information, for analysis. At the time the
  3005. documents were printed, they were also able to
  3006. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  3007.  
  3008.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  3009. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  3010. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  3011. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  3012. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  3013. visits. The monitoring program is called
  3014. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  3015.  
  3016.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  3017. British had to have been either physically able
  3018. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  3019. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  3020. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  3021. and would be able to extract some key data
  3022. about specific users as well.
  3023.  
  3024. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  3025. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  3026. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  3027. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  3028. _______________________________________
  3029. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  3030.  
  3031. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  3032. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  3033. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  3034.  
  3035. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  3036.  
  3037.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  3038. on the iPhone alone.�
  3039.  
  3040. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  3041.  
  3042. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  3043.  
  3044. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  3045.  
  3046. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  3047. _______________________________________
  3048. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  3049.  
  3050.  The National Security Agency program that
  3051. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  3052. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  3053. Thursday in a newly released report.
  3054.  
  3055. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  3056.  
  3057.  �We have not identified a single instance
  3058. involving a threat to the United States in
  3059. which the program made a concrete difference
  3060. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  3061. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  3062. report released Thursday.
  3063.  
  3064.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  3065. domestic spying will continue.
  3066.  
  3067. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  3068. _______________________________________
  3069. � Snowden Speaks ::
  3070.  
  3071. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  3072. _______________________________________
  3073. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  3074.  
  3075. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  3076.  
  3077. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  3078.          ���
  3079. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  3080.  
  3081. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  3082.  
  3083.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  3084. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  3085. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  3086. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  3087. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  3088. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  3089. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  3090. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  3091. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  3092. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  3093. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  3094. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  3095. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  3096. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  3097. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  3098.  
  3099. Reform?
  3100.  
  3101.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  3102. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  3103. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  3104. whether legal or not?
  3105.  
  3106. The reform will come from people taking action.
  3107.  
  3108.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  3109. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  3110. _______________________________________
  3111. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  3112.  
  3113. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  3114. _______________________________________
  3115. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  3116.  
  3117.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  3118. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  3119. main internet cables:
  3120.  
  3121.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  3122.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  3123.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  3124.  
  3125. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  3126. ---------------------------------------
  3127. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  3128. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  3129. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  3130. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  3131. _______________________________________
  3132. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  3133.  
  3134. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  3135.  
  3136. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  3137.  
  3138. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  3139. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  3140. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  3141. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  3142. ---------------------------------------
  3143. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  3144. _______________________________________
  3145. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  3146.  
  3147. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  3148.  
  3149. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  3150.  
  3151. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  3152.  
  3153.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  3154. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  3155. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  3156. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  3157.  
  3158.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  3159. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  3160. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  3161. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  3162.  
  3163.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  3164. text message database to extract information
  3165. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  3166. transactions and more � including of individuals
  3167. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  3168.  
  3169. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  3170. _______________________________________
  3171. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  3172.  
  3173. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  3174.  
  3175. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  3176.  
  3177.  The technology, which the agency has used
  3178. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  3179. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  3180. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  3181. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  3182. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  3183. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  3184. set up miles away from the target.
  3185.  
  3186.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  3187. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  3188. American intelligence agencies for years:
  3189. getting into computers that adversaries,
  3190. and some American partners, have tried to
  3191. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  3192. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  3193. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  3194. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  3195. ---------------------------------------
  3196. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  3197.  
  3198. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  3199. _______________________________________
  3200. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  3201.  
  3202. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  3203. ---------------------------------------
  3204. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  3205.  
  3206. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  3207. _______________________________________
  3208. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  3209.  
  3210. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  3211. _______________________________________
  3212. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  3213.  
  3214. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  3215. _______________________________________
  3216. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  3217.  
  3218. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  3219. _______________________________________
  3220. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  3221. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  3222.  
  3223. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  3224.  
  3225. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  3226. _______________________________________
  3227. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  3228. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  3229.  
  3230. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  3231. _______________________________________
  3232. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  3233. All Encryption ::
  3234.  
  3235.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  3236. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  3237. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  3238. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  3239. used to protect banking, medical, business
  3240. and government records around the world.
  3241.  
  3242.  According to documents provided by former
  3243. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  3244. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  3245. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  3246. than classical computers � is part of a
  3247. $79.7 million research program titled
  3248. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  3249. work is hosted under classified contracts
  3250. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  3251.  
  3252. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  3253. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  3254. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  3255. _______________________________________
  3256. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  3257.  
  3258. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  3259. _______________________________________
  3260. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  3261.  
  3262. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  3263. _______________________________________
  3264. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  3265.  
  3266. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  3267.  
  3268. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  3269.  
  3270. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  3271.  
  3272. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  3273.  
  3274. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  3275.  
  3276. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  3277. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  3278. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  3279.  
  3280. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  3281.  
  3282.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  3283. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  3284. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  3285. infiltrates computers around the world and
  3286. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  3287. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  3288. it is targeting. ... ...
  3289.  
  3290. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  3291.  
  3292.  The insert method and other variants of
  3293. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  3294. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  3295. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  3296. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  3297. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  3298. also incorporates routers and servers
  3299. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  3300. network by infecting these networks with
  3301. �implants� that then allow the government
  3302. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  3303.  
  3304.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  3305. to identify and track its targets based on
  3306. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  3307. could include certain email addresses or
  3308. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  3309. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  3310. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  3311. additional information like an email address.
  3312. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  3313. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  3314. ---------------------------------------
  3315. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  3316.  
  3317. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  3318.  
  3319. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  3320.  
  3321.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  3322. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  3323. that are being logged into on that computer
  3324. as long as the user does not clear browser
  3325. cookies.�
  3326.  
  3327. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  3328.  
  3329. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  3330.  
  3331. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  3332. ---------------------------------------
  3333. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  3334.  
  3335.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  3336. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  3337. could be described as master carpenters for
  3338. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  3339. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  3340. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  3341. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  3342. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  3343. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  3344. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  3345. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  3346. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  3347. ability to establish a global covert network
  3348. that operates alongside the Internet.
  3349.  
  3350.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  3351. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  3352. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  3353. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  3354. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  3355. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  3356. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  3357. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  3358. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  3359. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  3360. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  3361. over $1 million.
  3362.  
  3363.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  3364. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  3365. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  3366. clear preference for planting their malicious
  3367. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  3368. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  3369. to load when a computer is turned on.
  3370.  
  3371.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  3372. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  3373. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  3374. to virus protection and other security programs.
  3375. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  3376. computer has been completely erased and a new
  3377. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  3378. can continue to function and ensures that new
  3379. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  3380. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  3381. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  3382. this approach has provided them with the
  3383. possibility of permanent access.
  3384.  
  3385.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  3386. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  3387. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  3388. with the exception of latter, are American
  3389. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  3390. intelligence agency is compromising the
  3391. technology and products of American companies.
  3392.  
  3393. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  3394. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  3395. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  3396. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  3397. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  3398.  
  3399. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  3400.  
  3401. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  3402.  
  3403. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  3404.  
  3405. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  3406.  
  3407. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  3408.  
  3409. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  3410.  
  3411. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  3412.  
  3413. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  3414.  
  3415. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  3416.  
  3417. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  3418.  
  3419. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  3420.  
  3421. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  3422.  
  3423. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  3424.  
  3425. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  3426.  
  3427. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  3428.  
  3429. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  3430.  
  3431. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  3432.  
  3433. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  3434.  
  3435. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  3436.  
  3437. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  3438.  
  3439. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  3440.  
  3441. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  3442.  
  3443. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  3444.  
  3445. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  3446.  
  3447. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  3448.  
  3449. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  3450. ---------------------------------------
  3451. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  3452.  
  3453. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3454.  
  3455. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  3456.  
  3457. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  3458.  
  3459. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  3460. ---------------------------------------
  3461. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  3462.  
  3463. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  3464.  
  3465. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  3466.  
  3467.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  3468. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  3469. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  3470.  
  3471. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  3472.  
  3473. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  3474. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  3475.  
  3476.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  3477. in its operating system had left devices open
  3478. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  3479. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  3480. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  3481. of its mass spying program.
  3482.  
  3483. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  3484. ---------------------------------------
  3485. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  3486. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  3487.  
  3488. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  3489.  
  3490. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  3491. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  3492.  
  3493. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  3494.  
  3495. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  3496.  
  3497. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  3498.  
  3499.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  3500. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  3501.  
  3502. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  3503. _______________________________________
  3504. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  3505.  
  3506. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  3507.  
  3508. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  3509.  
  3510. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  3511. _______________________________________
  3512. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  3513.  
  3514. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  3515.  
  3516.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3517. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3518. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  3519. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3520. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3521. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3522. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3523. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3524. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  3525. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3526.  
  3527.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  3528. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3529. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3530. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  3531. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3532. did not want to know any more.
  3533. ---------------------------------------
  3534. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3535.  
  3536. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3537. _______________________________________
  3538. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3539. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3540.  
  3541. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3542. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3543. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3544. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3545. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3546. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3547. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3548. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3549.  
  3550. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3551.  
  3552.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3553. National Security Agency program which
  3554. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3555. calls made to, from or within the United
  3556. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3557.  
  3558.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  3559. that the program appears to violate the
  3560. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  3561. searches and seizures. He also said the
  3562. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  3563. that collecting the information had helped
  3564. to head off terrorist attacks.
  3565.  
  3566.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  3567. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  3568. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  3569. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  3570. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  3571. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  3572. the order to allow for an appeal.
  3573.  
  3574. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  3575. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  3576.  
  3577.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  3578. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  3579. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  3580. in June in news stories based on leaks
  3581. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  3582. For seven years, the metadata program has
  3583. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  3584. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  3585. Court and found constitutional by at least
  3586. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  3587.  
  3588. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  3589.  
  3590. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  3591.  
  3592. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  3593.  
  3594. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  3595.  
  3596. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  3597.  
  3598. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  3599. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  3600.  
  3601. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  3602.  
  3603. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  3604.  
  3605. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  3606. ---------------------------------------
  3607. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  3608.  
  3609. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  3610.  
  3611. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  3612.  
  3613. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  3614. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  3615.  
  3616. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  3617. Spying Programs ::
  3618.  
  3619. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  3620. ---------------------------------------
  3621. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  3622. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  3623.  
  3624. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  3625.  
  3626. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  3627.  
  3628. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  3629. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  3630.  
  3631. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  3632.  
  3633. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  3634. _______________________________________
  3635. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  3636.  
  3637.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  3638. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  3639. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  3640.  
  3641. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  3642.  
  3643. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  3644.  
  3645.  - Military Information
  3646.  - Economic Information
  3647.  - Information Operations Information
  3648.  - Political Information �
  3649. _______________________________________
  3650. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  3651. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  3652.  
  3653. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  3654. ���������������������������������������
  3655. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  3656.  
  3657. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  3658.  
  3659. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  3660.  
  3661. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  3662.  
  3663. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  3664.  
  3665. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  3666.  
  3667. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  3668.  
  3669. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  3670.  
  3671. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  3672.  
  3673. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  3674. _______________________________________
  3675. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  3676. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  3677.  
  3678.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  3679. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  3680. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  3681. government access in order to make network
  3682. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  3683. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  3684. in millions of homes and businesses within
  3685. the UK,� the paper states.
  3686.  
  3687.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  3688. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  3689. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  3690. assigns all their modems an extra address
  3691. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  3692. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  3693. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  3694. a second IP address for management, except
  3695. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  3696. assigned to the United States Department
  3697. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  3698. of speculation that this is actually a
  3699. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  3700. they can secretly monitor and control
  3701. peoples� home networks.
  3702.  
  3703.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  3704. The better explanation is that BT simply
  3705. chose this address space because it�s
  3706. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  3707. address, it�s only used inside the private
  3708. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  3709. that address space, you�ll see that your
  3710. packets go nowhere.
  3711.  
  3712. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  3713. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  3714. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  3715.  
  3716. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  3717.  
  3718.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  3719. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  3720. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  3721. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  3722. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  3723. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  3724. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  3725. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  3726. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  3727. It�s past time for something new.�
  3728.  
  3729. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  3730. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  3731. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  3732. ---------------------------------------
  3733. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  3734.  
  3735.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  3736. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  3737. worldwide with malicious software designed
  3738. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  3739. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  3740. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  3741.  
  3742.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  3743. explains how the NSA collects information
  3744. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  3745. shows that the intelligence service uses
  3746. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  3747. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3748. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3749. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3750. software.
  3751.  
  3752.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3753. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3754. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3755. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  3756. has been installing this malicious software
  3757. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3758. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  3759. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  3760. through a process of luring employees to a
  3761. false Linkedin page.
  3762.  
  3763. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  3764. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3765. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  3766. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  3767.  
  3768. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  3769.  
  3770.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  3771. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  3772. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  3773. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  3774. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  3775. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  3776. and citizens.
  3777.  
  3778.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  3779. will deter this bounty of profits for
  3780. the comsec industry, unless the public
  3781. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  3782. the nettle, and all those making money
  3783. from this deception operation decide to
  3784. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  3785.  
  3786.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  3787. lists, those participating in standards
  3788. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  3789. grants in think tanks and universities,
  3790. those in law firms and public interest
  3791. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  3792. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  3793. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  3794. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  3795. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  3796. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  3797. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  3798. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  3799. contracts, list lurking, online and
  3800. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  3801. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  3802. fulfilled.
  3803.  
  3804. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  3805.  
  3806. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3807.  
  3808. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3809.  
  3810. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3811. ���������������������������������������
  3812. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  3813. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  3814.  
  3815. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  3816. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  3817. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  3818. _______________________________________
  3819. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  3820.  
  3821. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  3822.  
  3823. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  3824.  
  3825. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  3826.  
  3827. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  3828.  
  3829. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  3830. _______________________________________
  3831. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  3832.  
  3833. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  3834. _______________________________________
  3835. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  3836. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  3837.  
  3838. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  3839.  
  3840. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  3841. _______________________________________
  3842. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  3843.  
  3844. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  3845. _______________________________________
  3846. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  3847. of Public Concerns ::
  3848.  
  3849. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  3850.  
  3851. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  3852.  
  3853. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  3854. _______________________________________
  3855. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3856.  
  3857.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  3858. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  3859. of metadata about the world�s secure
  3860. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  3861. certainly not a program through which
  3862. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  3863. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  3864. services like Google, as reported by others,
  3865. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  3866. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  3867. Google are based on a small piece of a
  3868. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  3869. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  3870. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  3871. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  3872. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  3873. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  3874. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  3875. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  3876. by providing information about a target.�
  3877.  
  3878. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  3879.  
  3880. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3881.  
  3882. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  3883. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  3884. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  3885. ���������������������������������������
  3886. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  3887.  
  3888. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  3889.  
  3890. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  3891. _______________________________________
  3892. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  3893.  
  3894. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  3895. ---------------------------------------
  3896. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  3897.  
  3898. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  3899.  
  3900.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  3901. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  3902. and later managed by big data corporations
  3903. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  3904.  
  3905.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  3906. large files across machines in a large
  3907. cluster.
  3908.  
  3909. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  3910.  
  3911.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  3912. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  3913. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  3914. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  3915.  
  3916.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  3917. major components, a central metadata server
  3918. and file servers from data.
  3919.  
  3920. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  3921.  
  3922. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  3923.  
  3924.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  3925. posted on public domain.
  3926.  
  3927. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  3928.  
  3929. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  3930. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  3931.  
  3932. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3933. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3934. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  3935.  
  3936. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3937.  
  3938. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3939. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3940. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3941. ---------------------------------------
  3942. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  3943. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  3944.  
  3945. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  3946.  
  3947. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  3948.  
  3949. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  3950.  
  3951. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  3952.  
  3953. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  3954.  
  3955. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  3956.  
  3957. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3958.  
  3959. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3960.  
  3961. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  3962.  
  3963.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  3964. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  3965. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  3966. content of all our communications have
  3967. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  3968. program since the 1990s.
  3969.  
  3970.  The new details concern how, �The National
  3971. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  3972. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  3973. of cellphones around the world.�
  3974.  
  3975.  However, the report reveals itself to
  3976. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  3977. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  3978. does not target Americans� location data
  3979. by design, but the agency acquires a
  3980. substantial amount of information on
  3981. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  3982. �incidentally.�
  3983.  
  3984.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  3985. happens to record the locations of Americans
  3986. using data from their cellphones, and is
  3987. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  3988. surveillance, is yet another example of
  3989. damage control by the establishment.
  3990.  
  3991. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  3992. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  3993. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  3994. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  3995. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  3996. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  3997. ---------------------------------------
  3998. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  3999. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  4000.  
  4001.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  4002. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  4003. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  4004. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  4005. targets for government hacking and to
  4006. bolster surveillance.
  4007.  
  4008. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  4009. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  4010. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  4011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  4012. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  4013. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  4014. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  4015. ---------------------------------------
  4016. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  4017.  
  4018. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  4019. ---------------------------------------
  4020. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  4021. In a World Without Cookies ::
  4022.  
  4023. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  4024. _______________________________________
  4025. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  4026.  
  4027. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  4028. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  4029. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  4030.  
  4031. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  4032.  
  4033. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  4034. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  4035. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  4036. _______________________________________
  4037. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  4038. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  4039.  
  4040. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  4041. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  4042. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  4043. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  4044. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  4045. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  4046.  
  4047. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  4048.  
  4049. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  4050.  
  4051. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  4052.  
  4053. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  4054.  
  4055. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  4056.  
  4057. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  4058.  
  4059. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  4060.  
  4061. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  4062.  
  4063. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  4064.  
  4065. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  4066.  
  4067. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  4068.  
  4069. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  4070. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  4071. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  4072.  
  4073. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  4074.  
  4075. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  4076. ---------------------------------------
  4077. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  4078.  
  4079. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  4080. ---------------------------------------
  4081. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  4082.  
  4083. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  4084.  
  4085. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  4086.  
  4087. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  4088.  
  4089. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  4090.  
  4091. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  4092.  
  4093. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  4094.  
  4095. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  4096. _______________________________________
  4097.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  4098. worldwide was published by the German
  4099. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  4100. map was put online by accident, but before
  4101. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  4102. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  4103. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  4104. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  4105. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  4106. the names of all other cities were blurred
  4107. by Der Spiegel.�
  4108.  
  4109.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  4110.  
  4111. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  4112.  
  4113. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  4114.  
  4115. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  4116.  
  4117. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  4118.  
  4119. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  4120.  
  4121. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  4122. ---------------------------------------
  4123. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  4124.  
  4125. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  4126.  
  4127. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  4128. _______________________________________
  4129. � Five Eyes ::
  4130.  
  4131. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  4132. _______________________________________
  4133. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  4134.  
  4135. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  4136. _______________________________________
  4137. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  4138. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  4139.  
  4140. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  4141.  
  4142. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  4143. _______________________________________
  4144. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  4145.  
  4146. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  4147.  
  4148. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  4149. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  4150. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  4151. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  4152. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  4153. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  4154. _______________________________________
  4155. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  4156.  
  4157.  September 11th, which also happened to
  4158. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  4159. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  4160. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  4161. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  4162. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  4163. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  4164. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  4165. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  4166. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  4167. itself.
  4168.  
  4169.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  4170. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  4171. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  4172. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  4173. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  4174. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  4175. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  4176. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  4177. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  4178. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  4179. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  4180. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  4181. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  4182. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  4183. its workforce by one-third, to about
  4184. 33,000. The number of private companies
  4185. it depended upon more than tripled during
  4186. that time.
  4187.  
  4188.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  4189. and the increasing reliance on the private
  4190. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  4191. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  4192. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  4193. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  4194. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  4195. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  4196. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  4197. getting those clearances. So you had
  4198. this huge apparatus being built, and
  4199. the government was just managing it.
  4200. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  4201. doing that.� ... ...
  4202.  
  4203.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  4204. workforce, the surveillance he would
  4205. later expose was becoming not just
  4206. institutionalized but very big business.
  4207. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  4208. the full flower of that massive, massive
  4209. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  4210. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  4211. could go.� ... ...
  4212.  
  4213.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  4214. leaking government secrets when he was
  4215. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  4216. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  4217. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  4218. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  4219. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  4220. policies that I thought would be reined
  4221. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  4222. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  4223. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  4224. the more he read �true information,�
  4225. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  4226. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  4227. surveillance program � the more he realized
  4228. that there were actually two governments:
  4229. the one that was elected, and the other,
  4230. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  4231. �If the highest officials in government
  4232. can break the law without fearing punishment
  4233. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  4234. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  4235.  
  4236. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  4237. _______________________________________
  4238. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  4239.  
  4240. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  4241. _______________________________________
  4242. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  4243.  
  4244. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  4245. _______________________________________
  4246. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  4247. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  4248.  
  4249.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  4250. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  4251. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  4252. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  4253. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  4254. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  4255. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  4256. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  4257. in terrorism.
  4258.  
  4259.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  4260. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  4261. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  4262. threatening national security. It is
  4263. successfully restricting release of the
  4264. Snowden material and will likely become
  4265. more forceful as releases continue to the
  4266. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  4267. to criminalize release as a national
  4268. security threat.
  4269.  
  4270. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  4271. _______________________________________
  4272. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  4273.  
  4274.  Includes most reports, slides and
  4275. documents all related to the recent
  4276. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  4277. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  4278. any information that comes out and
  4279. will provide updated archives from
  4280. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  4281.  
  4282.  After decompression - the folder is
  4283. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  4284. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  4285.  
  4286. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4287. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  4288.  
  4289. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  4290. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  4291. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  4292. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4293. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4294. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  4295. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  4296. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4297. _______________________________________
  4298. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  4299.  
  4300. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4301. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4302. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4303.  
  4304. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  4305. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  4306.  
  4307.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  4308. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  4309. Australians, and hands over the material
  4310. to the US and its closest allies, according
  4311. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  4312. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  4313. Australia web site.
  4314.  
  4315.  The document obtained by the former US
  4316. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  4317. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  4318. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  4319. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  4320. as well as the people and governments of
  4321. many Asian countries.
  4322.  
  4323.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  4324. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  4325. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  4326. global partners so-called metadata of
  4327. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  4328. address books and social media posts of
  4329. millions of people.
  4330.  
  4331.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  4332. the recent revelations, also from documents
  4333. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  4334. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  4335. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  4336. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  4337. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  4338. operate as electronic listening posts
  4339. for the US-led spying network.
  4340.  
  4341. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  4342. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  4343. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  4344. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  4345. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  4346. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  4347.  
  4348. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  4349. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  4350.  
  4351.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  4352. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  4353. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  4354. political figures has been furiously
  4355. denounced by other media outlets for
  4356. breaching �national security� and the
  4357. �national interest.� The reaction
  4358. underscores the extent to which the
  4359. media establishment has been integrated
  4360. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  4361.  
  4362.  On November 18, after being approached
  4363. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  4364. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  4365. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  4366. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  4367. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  4368. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  4369. senior political figures. The report
  4370. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  4371. crisis for the Australian government, with
  4372. the Indonesian president suspending military
  4373. and intelligence cooperation.
  4374.  
  4375. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  4376. _______________________________________
  4377. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  4378.  
  4379.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  4380. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  4381. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  4382. allowed the largest American spy agency
  4383. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  4384. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  4385.  
  4386.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  4387. by CBC News.
  4388.  
  4389.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  4390. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  4391. a security command post during a six-day
  4392. spying operation by the National Security
  4393. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  4394. other foreign heads of government were on
  4395. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  4396.  
  4397.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  4398. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  4399.  
  4400.  The world was still struggling to climb
  4401. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  4402. were debating a wide array of possible
  4403. measures including a global tax on banks,
  4404. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  4405. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  4406. eventually scotched.
  4407.  
  4408. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  4409. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  4410. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  4411. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  4412. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  4413.  
  4414. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  4415. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  4416.  
  4417. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  4418.  
  4419.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  4420. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  4421.  
  4422. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  4423.  
  4424. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  4425.  
  4426. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  4427.  
  4428. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  4429. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  4430.  
  4431. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  4432.  
  4433. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  4434.  
  4435. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  4436.  
  4437. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  4438. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  4439.  
  4440. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  4441.  
  4442. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  4443.  
  4444.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  4445. believe that they have only �moved on� from discussing
  4446. CSEC�s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  4447. to worry about.
  4448.  
  4449.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  4450. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  4451. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  4452. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC�s
  4453. staff�it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  4454. military personnel assist its work�give an inkling of the
  4455. scale of its activities.
  4456.  
  4457.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  4458. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  4459. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  4460. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  4461. Of especial importance is the CSEC�s partnership with the NSA.
  4462. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  4463. the two organizations �have integrated personnel� i.e. swap
  4464. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  4465. Internet surveillance programs.
  4466.  
  4467.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  4468. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  4469. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  4470. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  4471. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  4472. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates�
  4473. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  4474.  
  4475. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  4476.  
  4477. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  4478.  
  4479. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  4480.  
  4481. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  4482. _______________________________________
  4483. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  4484.  
  4485. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  4486.  
  4487. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  4488.  
  4489. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  4490. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  4491. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  4492.  
  4493. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  4494.  
  4495. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  4496.  
  4497. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  4498.  
  4499. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  4500. _______________________________________
  4501.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  4502. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  4503. in theory � forbid local governments from
  4504. providing services to federal agencies
  4505. that collect electronic data from Americans
  4506. without a personalized warrant.
  4507.  
  4508.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  4509. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  4510. but at least one legislator has committed
  4511. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  4512. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  4513. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  4514. is introduced.
  4515.  
  4516.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  4517. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  4518. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  4519. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  4520. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  4521. and a handful of other groups.
  4522.  
  4523.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  4524. Maharrey adds.
  4525.  
  4526. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  4527. _______________________________________
  4528. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  4529. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  4530.  
  4531.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  4532. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  4533. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  4534. US and British intelligence � particularly
  4535. their cooperation in data collection and
  4536. snooping programs involving British citizens
  4537. and close allies on the European continent.
  4538.  
  4539.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  4540. to account by British authorities for
  4541. jeopardizing national security. The
  4542. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  4543. is being forced to appear before a
  4544. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  4545. the news outlet�s actions.
  4546.  
  4547. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4548. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  4549. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  4550.  
  4551. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  4552.  
  4553. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4554.  
  4555. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  4556. as the British Dictatorship ::
  4557.  
  4558.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  4559. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  4560. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  4561. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  4562. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  4563. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  4564. seems the United States is reaching the event
  4565. horizon to a police state.
  4566.  
  4567. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  4568.  
  4569. Cryptome noted
  4570.  
  4571.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  4572. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  4573. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  4574. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  4575. UKG), although there could be some which have
  4576. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  4577. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  4578.  
  4579.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  4580. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  4581. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  4582. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  4583. deception, co-optation.
  4584.  
  4585.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  4586. had access, or suspected of access, are
  4587. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  4588. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  4589. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  4590. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  4591. standard coercive means of authorities.
  4592.  
  4593.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  4594. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  4595. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  4596. advised successive cooperators, usually
  4597. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  4598. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  4599. participation.
  4600.  
  4601.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  4602. disputes and disagreements among competing
  4603. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  4604. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  4605. along with threats against families, friends
  4606. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  4607. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  4608. with authorities, including use of rewards
  4609. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  4610.  
  4611. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  4612. _______________________________________
  4613. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  4614.  
  4615. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  4616. _______________________________________
  4617. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  4618. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  4619. Governments ::
  4620.  
  4621. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  4622. _______________________________________
  4623. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  4624. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  4625.  
  4626. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  4627. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  4628. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  4629. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  4630. _______________________________________
  4631. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  4632.  
  4633. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  4634.  
  4635. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  4636.  
  4637. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  4638.  
  4639. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  4640.  
  4641. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  4642.  
  4643. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  4644.  
  4645. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  4646.  
  4647. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  4648.  
  4649. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  4650.  
  4651. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  4652.  
  4653. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  4654.  
  4655. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  4656.  
  4657. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  4658.  
  4659. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  4660.  
  4661. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  4662.  
  4663. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  4664. Steal Email Metadata ::
  4665.  
  4666.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  4667. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  4668. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  4669. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  4670.  
  4671.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  4672. servers around the world, reducing the
  4673. chance of losing your information should
  4674. one fail. When you log in to an account
  4675. with these firms, the data sent between
  4676. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  4677. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  4678. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  4679. And because many of the transfers take place
  4680. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  4681. isn�t required to tap the information.
  4682.  
  4683.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  4684. broken into the main communications links
  4685. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  4686. around the world, according to documents
  4687. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  4688. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  4689. officials.
  4690.  
  4691.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  4692. positioned itself to collect at will from
  4693. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  4694. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  4695. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  4696. but it keeps a lot.
  4697.  
  4698.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  4699. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  4700. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  4701. counterpart, the Government Communications
  4702. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  4703. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  4704. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  4705. that carry information among the data
  4706. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  4707.  
  4708. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  4709. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  4710. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  4711. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  4712. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  4713.  
  4714. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  4715.  
  4716.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  4717. email collecting program �does not apply
  4718. to US citizens.�
  4719.  
  4720.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  4721. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  4722. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  4723. accounts around the world, many of them
  4724. belonging to Americans, according to
  4725. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  4726. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  4727. Edward Snowden.
  4728.  
  4729.  The collection program, which has not
  4730. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  4731. address books and �buddy lists� from
  4732. instant messaging services as they move
  4733. across global data links. Online services
  4734. often transmit those contacts when a user
  4735. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  4736. a computer or mobile device with information
  4737. stored on remote servers.
  4738.  
  4739. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  4740. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  4741. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  4742.  
  4743. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  4744.  
  4745. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  4746.  
  4747. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4748.  
  4749. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4750. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4751. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4752. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4753. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4754. ���������������������������������������
  4755. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  4756.  
  4757. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4758.  
  4759. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  4760. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  4761.  
  4762. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  4763.  
  4764. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  4765.  
  4766. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  4767.  
  4768. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4769.  
  4770. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  4771.  
  4772. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4773.  
  4774. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  4775.  
  4776. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  4777.  
  4778. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  4779.  
  4780. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  4781.  
  4782. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  4783.  
  4784. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  4785.  
  4786. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  4787. ---------------------------------------
  4788. NOBODY comments ?
  4789.  
  4790.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  4791. differs from the Guardians.
  4792.  
  4793. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4794.  
  4795. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  4796.  
  4797. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4798.  
  4799. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  4800.  
  4801.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  4802. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  4803. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  4804.  
  4805.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  4806. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  4807. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  4808. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  4809. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  4810. ---------------------------------------
  4811. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  4812.  
  4813. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  4814.  
  4815. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4816.  
  4817.  This was written from a person who purports
  4818. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  4819.  
  4820. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  4821.  
  4822. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4823.  
  4824. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  4825.  
  4826. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  4827. Misleading ::
  4828.  
  4829. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  4830.  
  4831. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  4832. on NSA Spying ::
  4833.  
  4834. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  4835.  
  4836.  �Recent articles published in the
  4837. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  4838. inaccurate and misleading information
  4839. regarding US foreign intelligence
  4840. activities. The allegation that the
  4841. National Security Agency collected more
  4842. than 70 million �recordings of French
  4843. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  4844.  
  4845.  While we are not going to discuss the
  4846. details of our activities, we have
  4847. repeatedly made it clear that the
  4848. United States gathers intelligence of
  4849. the type gathered by all nations. The
  4850. US collects intelligence to protect the
  4851. nation, its interests, and its allies
  4852. from, among other things, threats such
  4853. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  4854. weapons of mass destruction.
  4855.  
  4856.  The United States values our longstanding
  4857. friendship and alliance with France and
  4858. we will continue to cooperate on security
  4859. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  4860.  
  4861. James R. Clapper
  4862. Director of National Intelligence
  4863. ---------------------------------------
  4864. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  4865.  
  4866. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  4867.  
  4868.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  4869. a call without leaving a record with the
  4870. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  4871. or leaves America without passing through
  4872. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  4873. statement Thursday.
  4874.  
  4875.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  4876. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  4877. _______________________________________
  4878. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  4879. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  4880.  
  4881.  US and British intelligence officials
  4882. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  4883. collection of highly classified, heavily
  4884. encrypted materials they believe former
  4885. National Security Agency contractor
  4886. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  4887.  
  4888.  One source saw the cache of documents
  4889. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  4890. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  4891. other harm. ... ...
  4892.  
  4893.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  4894. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  4895. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  4896. that �if anything happens at all to
  4897. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  4898. to get access to the full archives.�
  4899.  
  4900. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  4901. _______________________________________
  4902. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  4903. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  4904.  
  4905.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  4906. government surveillance policies. But he
  4907. is not disclosing those changes to the
  4908. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  4909. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  4910. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  4911. World Bank and the International Monetary
  4912. Fund? He won�t say.
  4913.  
  4914.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  4915. to review and recommend changes to his
  4916. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  4917.  
  4918. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  4919. _______________________________________
  4920. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  4921.  
  4922.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  4923. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  4924. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  4925. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  4926. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  4927.  
  4928.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  4929. broad goals, the five-page document said
  4930. that existing American laws were not adequate
  4931. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  4932. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  4933. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  4934. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  4935. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  4936. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4937. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4938. and target environments, or the operational
  4939. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  4940. document concluded.
  4941.  
  4942. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  4943. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  4944. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  4945. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  4946. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  4947.  
  4948. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  4949.  
  4950.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  4951. called Treasure Map and describes its
  4952. capabilities but does not publish visual
  4953. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  4954. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  4955. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  4956.  
  4957. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  4958. _______________________________________
  4959. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  4960.  
  4961. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  4962. _______________________________________
  4963. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  4964.  
  4965. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  4966.  
  4967. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  4968.  
  4969. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  4970.  
  4971.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  4972. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  4973. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  4974. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  4975. the door to a variety of spying options.
  4976.  
  4977. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  4978. _______________________________________
  4979. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  4980.  
  4981.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  4982. collection of solely domestic communications
  4983. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  4984. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  4985. request each week until we receive your
  4986. response,� EPIC said.
  4987.  
  4988.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  4989. said this week that it would not be hearing
  4990. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  4991. early Monday in which the high court listed
  4992. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  4993. as denied.
  4994.  
  4995. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  4996.  
  4997. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  4998. _______________________________________
  4999. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  5000.  
  5001. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  5002.  
  5003. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  5004. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  5005.  
  5006. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  5007.  
  5008. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  5009.  
  5010. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  5011. No Privacy ::
  5012.  
  5013. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  5014.  
  5015. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  5016. Spying Programs ::
  5017.  
  5018. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  5019.  
  5020. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  5021.  
  5022. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  5023.  
  5024. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  5025. _______________________________________
  5026. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  5027.  
  5028. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5029.  
  5030. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  5031.  
  5032. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  5033.  
  5034. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5035.  
  5036. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  5037.  
  5038. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  5039.  
  5040. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  5041.  
  5042.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  5043. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  5044. or indigenous cryptographic information
  5045. security devices or systems in order to
  5046. make them exploitable.�
  5047.  
  5048. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  5049.  
  5050.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  5051. successfully exploits cryptographic
  5052. components of commercial information
  5053. security devices or systems when the
  5054. device or system specified.�
  5055.  
  5056. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5057.  
  5058. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  5059.  
  5060. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  5061.  
  5062. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5063. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5064. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  5065.  
  5066. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  5067.  
  5068.  US and British intelligence agencies
  5069. have successfully cracked much of the
  5070. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  5071. of millions of people to protect the
  5072. privacy of their personal data, online
  5073. transactions and emails, according to
  5074. top-secret documents revealed by former
  5075. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  5076.  
  5077.  Those methods include covert measures
  5078. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  5079. international encryption standards, the
  5080. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  5081. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  5082. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  5083. technology companies and internet service
  5084. providers themselves.
  5085.  
  5086.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  5087. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  5088. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  5089. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  5090.  
  5091.  Independent security experts have long
  5092. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  5093. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  5094. confirmed for the first time by another
  5095. secret document. It shows the agency
  5096. worked covertly to get its own version
  5097. of a draft security standard issued by
  5098. the US National Institute of Standards
  5099. and Technology approved for worldwide
  5100. use in 2006.
  5101.  
  5102. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  5103.  
  5104. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  5105.  
  5106. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  5107.  
  5108. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  5109.  
  5110. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  5111.  
  5112. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  5113.  
  5114. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  5115.  
  5116. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5117.  
  5118. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  5119. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  5120. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  5121.  
  5122. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5123.  
  5124. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  5125. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  5126.  
  5127. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  5128.  
  5129. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  5130.  
  5131. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  5132.  
  5133. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  5134.  
  5135. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  5136. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  5137.  
  5138. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  5139.  
  5140. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  5141.  
  5142.  A range of US hardware and software
  5143. companies are in danger of being dragged
  5144. into the widening scandal over internet
  5145. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  5146. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  5147. Security Agency contractor.
  5148.  
  5149.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  5150. that it has collaborated with technology
  5151. companies to plant �back doors� into
  5152. their systems � or ways for the agency
  5153. secretly to penetrate systems without
  5154. the users� knowledge.
  5155.  
  5156. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  5157.  
  5158. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  5159.  
  5160. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  5161. _______________________________________
  5162. � SSL Inspector ::
  5163.  
  5164. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  5165.  
  5166. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  5167.  
  5168. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  5169. _______________________________________
  5170. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  5171. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  5172.  
  5173. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  5174.  
  5175. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  5176.  
  5177. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  5178.  
  5179. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  5180.  
  5181. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  5182.  
  5183. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  5184.  
  5185. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  5186.  
  5187. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  5188.  
  5189. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  5190. ���������������������������������������
  5191. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  5192. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  5193.  
  5194. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  5195. ���������������������������������������
  5196. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  5197.  
  5198.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  5199. activities is an obscure organization called
  5200. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  5201. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  5202. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  5203. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  5204. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  5205. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  5206. presentation given to journalists by former
  5207. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  5208. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  5209. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  5210. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  5211. be collected, which is then gathered and
  5212. delivered by the DITU.
  5213.  
  5214.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  5215. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  5216. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  5217. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  5218. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  5219. collection, processing, and reporting.
  5220.  
  5221. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  5222.  
  5223. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  5224.  
  5225. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  5226. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  5227. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5228.  
  5229.  
  5230. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  5231.  
  5232. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5233. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5234. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5235.  
  5236. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  5237.  
  5238. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  5239.  
  5240. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  5241.  
  5242. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  5243.  
  5244. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  5245.  
  5246. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  5247.  
  5248.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  5249. by the NSA.
  5250.  
  5251.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  5252. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  5253. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  5254. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  5255. also now has access to some of these documents.
  5256.  
  5257.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  5258. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  5259. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  5260. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  5261. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  5262. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  5263.  
  5264.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  5265. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  5266. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  5267. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  5268. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  5269. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  5270. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  5271. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  5272. Facebook and Microsoft.
  5273.  
  5274. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  5275.  
  5276.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  5277. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  5278. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  5279. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  5280. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  5281. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  5282. and unilateral access to their servers.
  5283.  
  5284.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  5285. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  5286. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  5287. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  5288. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  5289. diving.
  5290.  
  5291.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  5292. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  5293.  
  5294.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  5295. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  5296. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  5297. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  5298. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  5299. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  5300. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  5301. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  5302. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  5303. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  5304. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  5305. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  5306. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  5307. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  5308. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  5309. major US carriers.
  5310.  
  5311. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  5312.  
  5313.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  5314. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  5315. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  5316. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  5317. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  5318. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  5319. engines.
  5320.  
  5321.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  5322. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  5323. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  5324. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  5325. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  5326.  
  5327.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  5328. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  5329. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  5330. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  5331. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  5332. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  5333. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  5334. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  5335. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  5336. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  5337. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  5338. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  5339. companies have been targeted.
  5340.  
  5341.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  5342. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  5343. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  5344. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  5345. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  5346. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  5347. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  5348. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  5349. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  5350. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  5351. _______________________________________
  5352. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  5353.  
  5354. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  5355.  
  5356. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  5357.  
  5358. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  5359.  
  5360. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  5361. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  5362.  
  5363. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  5364.  
  5365. NOBODY comments
  5366.  
  5367.  100% expected. They will continue to
  5368. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  5369. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  5370. We must adjust to it by learning how
  5371. to counter their surveillance.
  5372.  
  5373. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  5374. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  5375.  
  5376.  The United States and its key intelligence
  5377. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  5378. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  5379. Nations to promote a universal human right
  5380. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  5381. sources and an internal American government
  5382. document obtained by The Cable.
  5383.  
  5384.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  5385. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  5386. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  5387. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  5388. internet surveillance by the National
  5389. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  5390. services. American representatives have made
  5391. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  5392. checks on their global surveillance network.
  5393. The stakes are high, particularly in
  5394. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  5395. an international backlash against NSA
  5396. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  5397. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  5398. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  5399.  
  5400. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  5401.  
  5402. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  5403. _______________________________________
  5404. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  5405. Public News Coverage ::
  5406.  
  5407. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  5408. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  5409. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  5410. _______________________________________
  5411. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  5412. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  5413.  
  5414. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  5415. _______________________________________
  5416. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  5417.  
  5418.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  5419. a division for particularly difficult
  5420. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  5421. (TAO), this department devises special
  5422. methods for special targets.
  5423.  
  5424.  That category includes surveillance of
  5425. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  5426. the division reported its mission
  5427. accomplished. A report classified as
  5428. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  5429. exploited a key mail server in the
  5430. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  5431. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  5432. first-ever access to President Felipe
  5433. Calderon�s public email account.�
  5434.  
  5435. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  5436.  
  5437. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  5438.  
  5439. Cryptome comments ?
  5440.  
  5441.  This spying was apparently done from
  5442. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  5443. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  5444. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  5445. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  5446.  
  5447. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  5448.  
  5449. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  5450. _______________________________________
  5451. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  5452.  
  5453. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  5454.  
  5455. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  5456.  
  5457. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5458.  
  5459. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  5460.  
  5461. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5462.  
  5463. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  5464.  
  5465. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  5466.  
  5467. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  5468.  
  5469. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  5470.  
  5471. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  5472.  
  5473. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  5474.  
  5475.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  5476. thought that the NSA should use its
  5477. technology to intercept emails and
  5478. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  5479. terminal to another, and was upset to
  5480. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  5481. That was a line he would only cross,
  5482. deliberately, with court and congressional
  5483. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  5484. but as we now know, the agency added
  5485. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  5486. suspicious communications that transited
  5487. the border of the United States, and
  5488. later began to collect reams of metadata
  5489. in order to analyze it.
  5490.  
  5491.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  5492. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  5493. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  5494. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  5495. in order to provide policymakers with a
  5496. decision advantage. The advantage the
  5497. NSA provided was accurate information
  5498. about what people who interacted with
  5499. the United States said in private about
  5500. their intentions; that gap between saying
  5501. and doing, and the ability to predict
  5502. action from it, allows the president of
  5503. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  5504.  
  5505.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  5506. States� actions don�t always match up
  5507. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  5508. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  5509. our moral authority wanes and our
  5510. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  5511.  
  5512.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  5513. countries are any purer. They never have
  5514. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  5515. purer than others, so the amount of
  5516. resources the intelligence community
  5517. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  5518. to correspond with how honest our allies
  5519. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  5520. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  5521. can we figure out which allies are more
  5522. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  5523. correspondence between public and private
  5524. words and actions.
  5525.  
  5526.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  5527. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  5528. want their leaders to gain a decision
  5529. advantage in the give and take between
  5530. countries. They want to know what US
  5531. policymakers will do before the Americans
  5532. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  5533. France, they aggressively spy on the
  5534. United States, on US citizens and
  5535. politicians, in order to collect that
  5536. information. The difference lies in the
  5537. scale of intelligence collection: The
  5538. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  5539. most sophisticated intelligence community
  5540. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  5541. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  5542. envious.
  5543. _______________________________________
  5544. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  5545.  
  5546. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  5547. _______________________________________
  5548. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  5549.  
  5550. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  5551. ���������������������������������������
  5552. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  5553. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  5554.  
  5555. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  5556. _______________________________________
  5557. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  5558. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  5559.  
  5560. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  5561. _______________________________________
  5562.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  5563. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  5564. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  5565. from the award ceremony are the first of
  5566. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  5567. Russia.
  5568.  
  5569. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  5570. ���������������������������������������
  5571. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  5572.  
  5573.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  5574. of the Security Service, said the
  5575. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  5576. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  5577. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  5578. agencies.
  5579.  
  5580. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  5581.  
  5582. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  5583.  
  5584.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  5585. they are not using Tor.�
  5586.  
  5587. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  5588.  
  5589. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  5590. ---------------------------------------
  5591.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  5592. old bleach log.
  5593.  
  5594. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  5595. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  5596. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  5597. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  5598.  
  5599. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  5600.  
  5601.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  5602. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  5603. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  5604. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  5605. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  5606. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  5607. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  5608. function.
  5609.  
  5610.  There are also various third party
  5611. programs that can produce files in
  5612. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  5613. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  5614.  
  5615.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  5616. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  5617. data stored on the system running the
  5618. Flash player.�
  5619. ---------------------------------------
  5620. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  5621.  
  5622.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  5623. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  5624. It can be found within Windows systems
  5625. and can be wiped out here ;
  5626.  
  5627. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5628. Application Data\Macromedia\
  5629.  
  5630. and may also be cloned here ;
  5631.  
  5632. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  5633.  
  5634.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  5635. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  5636.  
  5637. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  5638.  
  5639. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5640. Local Settings\Temp\
  5641. ---------------------------------------
  5642. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  5643.  
  5644. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  5645.  
  5646. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  5647.  
  5648. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  5649.  
  5650. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  5651.  
  5652. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  5653.  
  5654. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  5655.  
  5656. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  5657.  
  5658. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  5659.  
  5660. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  5661.  
  5662. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  5663.  
  5664. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  5665.  
  5666. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  5667.  
  5668. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  5669.  
  5670. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  5671. ---------------------------------------
  5672. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  5673.  
  5674.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  5675. application created by Samy Kamkar
  5676. which produces zombie cookies in a
  5677. web browser that are intentionally
  5678. difficult to delete. ... ...
  5679.  
  5680.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  5681. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  5682. by copying itself in different forms on
  5683. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  5684. itself if it notices that some of the
  5685. copies are missing or expired.
  5686.  
  5687.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  5688. Evercookie uses the following storage
  5689. mechanisms when available:
  5690.  
  5691. � Standard HTTP cookies
  5692. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  5693. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  5694. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  5695. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  5696. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  5697. (cookies) back out
  5698. � Storing cookies in Web history
  5699. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  5700. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  5701. � window.name caching
  5702. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  5703. � HTML5 Session Storage
  5704. � HTML5 Local Storage
  5705. � HTML5 Global Storage
  5706. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  5707. ---------------------------------------
  5708. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  5709.  
  5710.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  5711. mean that your browser isn't storing
  5712. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  5713. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  5714. in browser vulnerabilities.
  5715.  
  5716.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  5717. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  5718. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  5719. wide surveillance.
  5720.  
  5721.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  5722. powerful anonymity service, and the
  5723. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  5724. the Internet, makes it easy to
  5725. differentiate Tor users from other
  5726. Web users,� he wrote.
  5727.  
  5728.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  5729. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  5730. identifies you. Even though your IP
  5731. address changed [because of Tor], the
  5732. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  5733.  
  5734. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  5735. ---------------------------------------
  5736. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  5737. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  5738.  
  5739.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  5740. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  5741. �staining� as a means to identify
  5742. individual machines linked to that
  5743. IP address. ... ...
  5744.  
  5745.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  5746. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  5747. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  5748. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  5749. and is stamped into every packet, which
  5750. enables all the events from that stained
  5751. machine to be brought back together to
  5752. recreate a browsing session.�
  5753.  
  5754. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  5755.  
  5756. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  5757.  
  5758. � Packet Staining ::
  5759.  
  5760. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  5761. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  5762. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  5763. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  5764.  
  5765. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  5766.  
  5767. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  5768. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  5769. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  5770. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  5771.  
  5772. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  5773.  
  5774.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  5775. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  5776. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  5777. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  5778. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  5779. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  5780. identify it. We also worked to create
  5781. a custom Tor client which allows the
  5782. user finer control.� ... ...
  5783.  
  5784.  �This accomplishes several things.
  5785. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  5786. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  5787. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  5788. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  5789. be excessively complex, as a single
  5790. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  5791. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  5792. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  5793. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  5794. going to and from the proxy server,
  5795. it is possible to deduce which clients
  5796. are making which requests. Second, if
  5797. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  5798. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  5799. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  5800. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  5801. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  5802. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  5803. must be coordinated across several machines,
  5804. and an attacker must own all the hops
  5805. along the circuit in order to trace
  5806. requests back to the originating client.�
  5807.  
  5808. ... ...
  5809.  
  5810.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  5811. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  5812. a hidden service will turn up the port
  5813. that the hidden service is using to deal
  5814. with incoming connections. It can then be
  5815. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  5816.  
  5817. ... ...
  5818.  
  5819.  �We would have to try to connect to
  5820. each of the ports we see open on a
  5821. machine to determine if there is a
  5822. hidden service being run. We would not
  5823. even know which protocol the hidden
  5824. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  5825. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  5826. etc. The only thing we know is that
  5827. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  5828. not enough to attempt to connect once
  5829. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  5830. Several protocols must be tried.�
  5831.  
  5832. ... ...
  5833.  
  5834.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  5835. directory servers in more detail. Our
  5836. work focused solely on the client, but
  5837. many attacks would be much easier with
  5838. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  5839. servers ultimately control which Tor
  5840. servers are used by clients. We have found
  5841. that a server can put itself on a directory
  5842. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  5843. server running several Tor processes, each
  5844. having a different nickname, open port,
  5845. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  5846. requires different configuration files
  5847. for the different processes, which are
  5848. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  5849. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  5850. since it is listed several times. This
  5851. increases the density of friendly servers
  5852. in the cloud without increasing the number
  5853. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  5854. each listing has the same IP address,
  5855. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  5856. who inspecting the directories.�
  5857.  
  5858. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  5859. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  5860. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  5861.  
  5862. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  5863.  
  5864. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  5865.  
  5866. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  5867.  
  5868. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  5869.  
  5870. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  5871.  
  5872.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  5873. into capabilities the IC has developed
  5874. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  5875. to run multiple research teams (either
  5876. known or unknown to each other) against
  5877. a single target, and a few summer students
  5878. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  5879. small investment. I�d expect there are
  5880. other programs with more sophisticated
  5881. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  5882.  
  5883. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  5884. _______________________________________
  5885. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  5886.  
  5887. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  5888. _______________________________________
  5889. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  5890. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  5891.  
  5892. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  5893.  
  5894.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  5895. the past several months, I�d also thought
  5896. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  5897. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  5898. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  5899. Sasso of The Hill.
  5900.  
  5901.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  5902. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  5903. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  5904. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  5905. help you with that.�
  5906.  
  5907. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  5908.  
  5909.  The conversation then turned specifically
  5910. to the government�s use of targeted
  5911. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  5912. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  5913. hope they make full use of the capacities
  5914. of the National Security Agency when we
  5915. do that.�
  5916.  
  5917.  Hayden was responding to a question
  5918. about a new project announced by journalists
  5919. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  5920. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  5921. assassinations.
  5922.  
  5923. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  5924. _______________________________________
  5925. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  5926.  
  5927. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  5928.  
  5929. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  5930.  
  5931. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  5932. _______________________________________
  5933. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  5934. Breaches ::
  5935.  
  5936. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  5937.  
  5938. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  5939.  
  5940. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  5941. _______________________________________
  5942. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  5943. of US Citizens ::
  5944.  
  5945.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  5946. body of knowledge in recent months about
  5947. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  5948. information concerning Americans, prompting
  5949. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  5950. in the agency and President Obama to order
  5951. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  5952. Almost everything about the agency�s
  5953. operations is hidden, and the decision
  5954. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  5955. was made in secret, without review by the
  5956. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  5957. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  5958. Department memo warned of the potential
  5959. for the �misuse� of such information
  5960. without adequate safeguards.
  5961.  
  5962. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  5963. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  5964. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  5965.  
  5966. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  5967. From American Social Networks ::
  5968.  
  5969. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  5970. _______________________________________
  5971. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  5972. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  5973.  
  5974. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  5975. _______________________________________
  5976. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  5977. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  5978.  
  5979.  Led by the German government, a loose
  5980. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  5981. across the world is pushing to update an
  5982. influential international human rights
  5983. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  5984.  
  5985. ... ...
  5986.  
  5987.  The annual conference was attended by a
  5988. diverse selection of privacy and data
  5989. protection officials from across the
  5990. world, with representatives attending
  5991. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  5992. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  5993. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  5994. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  5995. United Kingdom.
  5996.  
  5997.  During a closed session at the conference
  5998. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  5999. resolution was put forward for a vote
  6000. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  6001. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  6002. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  6003. globally applicable standards for data
  6004. protection and the protection of privacy
  6005. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  6006.  
  6007.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  6008. of the resolution ... the United States.
  6009.  
  6010.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  6011. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  6012. eventually need to be put forward at the
  6013. United Nations and voted on by member
  6014. states, and that could take time. But
  6015. the growing appetite to amend the
  6016. international treaty in light of the
  6017. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  6018. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  6019. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  6020. technology in the digital age to trample
  6021. over basic universal privacy rights.
  6022.  
  6023. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  6024.  
  6025. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  6026.  
  6027. NOBODY comments
  6028.  
  6029.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  6030. all secret agencies around the world,
  6031. in general. All secret agencies and
  6032. their third-party vendors or allies
  6033. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  6034. backdoors in electronic communication
  6035. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  6036. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  6037. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  6038. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  6039. you must kill any trust in security.
  6040.  
  6041.  Security does not exist on the web.
  6042. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  6043. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  6044. _______________________________________
  6045. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  6046.  
  6047. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  6048.  
  6049. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  6050.  
  6051. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  6052. _______________________________________
  6053. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  6054.  
  6055. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  6056. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  6057. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  6058. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  6059. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  6060.  
  6061. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  6062. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  6063.  
  6064. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  6065. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  6066. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  6067.  
  6068.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are tapping the
  6069. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  6070. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  6071. of this) as opposed to �downstream� collection, which
  6072. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  6073.  
  6074. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  6075.  
  6076. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  6077.  
  6078. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  6079.  
  6080. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6081. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6082. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6083. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6084. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6085. _______________________________________
  6086. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  6087. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  6088. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  6089.  
  6090. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  6091. _______________________________________
  6092. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  6093.  
  6094.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  6095. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  6096. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  6097. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  6098. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  6099. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  6100. file transfer and social networking services.
  6101.  
  6102.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  6103. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  6104. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  6105. officials.
  6106.  
  6107.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India�s
  6108. domestic politics and the country�s strategic and commercial
  6109. interests.
  6110.  
  6111. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  6112.  
  6113.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  6114. document about �Close Access SIGADs�, the offices of Indian
  6115. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  6116. at these important posts were targets of four different
  6117. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  6118.  
  6119.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  6120. of computers.
  6121.  
  6122. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  6123.  
  6124. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  6125.  
  6126. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  6127.  
  6128. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  6129. _______________________________________
  6130. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  6131.  
  6132.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  6133. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  6134. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  6135. in some cases plan the destruction of, �more than 10,000
  6136. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  6137. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  6138. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  6139. that could threaten US or allied interests.�
  6140.  
  6141. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  6142. _______________________________________
  6143. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  6144.  
  6145. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  6146. _______________________________________
  6147. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  6148. NSA Leaks ::
  6149.  
  6150. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  6151. _______________________________________
  6152. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  6153.  
  6154. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  6155. _______________________________________
  6156. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  6157. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  6158.  
  6159. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  6160. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  6161. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  6162.  
  6163. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  6164. Under United States Control ::
  6165.  
  6166.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  6167. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  6168. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  6169.  
  6170.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  6171. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  6172. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  6173. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  6174. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  6175. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  6176. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it�s,
  6177. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  6178.  
  6179.  �The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  6180. severe in coming months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  6181. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  6182. America Foundation think-tank. �This notion of national
  6183. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  6184. issue around the globe.�
  6185.  
  6186. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  6187. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  6188. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  6189. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  6190.  
  6191. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  6192.  
  6193.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  6194. optic cable system.
  6195.  
  6196. http://www.bricscable.com/
  6197.  
  6198. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  6199. _______________________________________
  6200. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  6201.  
  6202.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  6203. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court�s
  6204. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  6205. PATRIOT Act that�s used to justify the National Security
  6206. Agency�s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  6207. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  6208. orders has ever challenged one.
  6209.  
  6210. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  6211. _______________________________________
  6212. � Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  6213. Revelations ::
  6214.  
  6215.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  6216. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA�s
  6217. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  6218. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  6219. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  6220. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  6221.  
  6222.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  6223. the agency�s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  6224. and its �partnerships� with software and hardware vendors
  6225. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  6226. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  6227. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  6228. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  6229. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  6230. But one thing that�s become clear is that when the government
  6231. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn�t
  6232. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  6233.  
  6234. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  6235.  
  6236. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  6237.  
  6238.  The security community didn�t invent the concept of fear,
  6239. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  6240. it to the level of religion. It�s the way that security products
  6241. are marketed and sold, but it�s also the way that the intelligence
  6242. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  6243. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  6244. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  6245. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  6246. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  6247. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  6248. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  6249. fundamental building blocks of security.
  6250.  
  6251.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  6252. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  6253. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  6254. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  6255. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company�s
  6256. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  6257. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  6258. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  6259.  
  6260. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  6261. _______________________________________
  6262. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  6263.  
  6264.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  6265. President approximately every 45 days,
  6266. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  6267. the activities carried out under these
  6268. Authorizations are referred to as the
  6269. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  6270. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  6271. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  6272. the content of communications into and out
  6273. of the United States where there was a
  6274. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  6275. party to the communication was a member
  6276. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  6277.  
  6278.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  6279. acknowledged and described by the President,
  6280. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  6281. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  6282. a series of articles published in The New York
  6283. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  6284. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  6285. intelligence activities were also authorized
  6286. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  6287. but the details of those activities remain
  6288. classified.� ... ...
  6289.  
  6290.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  6291. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  6292. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  6293. as the principal governing authorities for
  6294. conducting electronic surveillance for
  6295. national security purposes. The Foreign
  6296. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  6297. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  6298. "provide legislative authorization and
  6299. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  6300. conducted within the United States for
  6301. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  6302.  
  6303. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  6304.  
  6305. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  6306. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  6307.  
  6308. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  6309.  
  6310. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  6311.  
  6312.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  6313. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  6314. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  6315. require special approval. Therefore, just
  6316. another gap. Also take in consideration
  6317. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  6318. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  6319. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  6320. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  6321. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  6322. _______________________________________
  6323. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  6324. Firm ::
  6325.  
  6326.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  6327. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  6328. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  6329. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  6330. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  6331. A �top secret� Government Communications
  6332. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  6333. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  6334. conducted under the codename �Operation
  6335. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  6336. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  6337. improve understanding of the provider�s
  6338. infrastructure. ... ...
  6339.  
  6340.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  6341. presentation, the attack was directed
  6342. at several Belgacom employees and
  6343. involved the planting of a highly
  6344. developed attack technology referred
  6345. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  6346. appears to be a method with which the
  6347. person being targeted, without their
  6348. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  6349. that then plant malware on their
  6350. computers that can then manipulate
  6351. them. Some of the employees whose
  6352. computers were infiltrated had �good
  6353. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  6354. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  6355. please the British spies, according
  6356. to the slides.
  6357.    
  6358. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  6359. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  6360. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  6361. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  6362. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  6363. _______________________________________
  6364. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  6365.  
  6366. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  6367.  
  6368. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  6369. _______________________________________
  6370. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  6371.  
  6372. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  6373. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  6374. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  6375. _______________________________________
  6376. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  6377. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  6378.  
  6379. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  6380. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  6381. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  6382. _______________________________________
  6383. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  6384.  
  6385. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  6386. ���������������������������������������
  6387. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  6388. Allocated to One Release ::
  6389.  
  6390. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  6391.  
  6392. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  6393.  
  6394. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  6395.  
  6396. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  6397. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  6398.  
  6399. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  6400.  
  6401. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  6402. Schedule ::
  6403.  
  6404. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6405.  
  6406. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6407.  
  6408. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6409.  
  6410. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6411.  
  6412. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6413.  
  6414. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6415.  
  6416. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6417. ���������������������������������������
  6418. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  6419.  
  6420.  In response to a FOIA request from
  6421. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  6422. its ethics office never looked into
  6423. complaints from two federal judges
  6424. that they had been misled about NSA
  6425. surveillance.
  6426.  
  6427. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  6428. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  6429. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  6430. ���������������������������������������
  6431.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  6432. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  6433. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  6434. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  6435. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  6436.  
  6437. Livestream will be at:
  6438.  
  6439. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  6440. _______________________________________
  6441. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  6442. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  6443.  
  6444. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  6445.  
  6446. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  6447. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  6448. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  6449.  
  6450. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  6451.  
  6452.  The Director of National Intelligence
  6453. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  6454. pages of documents related to the
  6455. government�s secret interpretation of
  6456. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  6457. (mis)use of its massive database of
  6458. every American�s phone records. The
  6459. documents were released as a result
  6460. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  6461. Act lawsuit.
  6462.  
  6463.  We�ve posted links to each document
  6464. below. While the government also posted
  6465. many of the documents here ...
  6466.  
  6467. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  6468.  
  6469. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  6470.  
  6471. Links to the documents ;
  6472.  
  6473. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  6474. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6475.  
  6476. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6477.  
  6478. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  6479. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6480. Court
  6481.  
  6482. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6483.  
  6484. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6485. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6486. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6487. Court
  6488.  
  6489. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6490.  
  6491. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6492. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6493. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6494. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  6495.  
  6496. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6497.  
  6498. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  6499. Incident
  6500.  
  6501. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6502.  
  6503. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6504. Intelligence Court
  6505.  
  6506. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6507.  
  6508. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6509. Intelligence Court
  6510.  
  6511. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6512.  
  6513. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  6514. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  6515. Business Records FISA
  6516.  
  6517. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6518.  
  6519. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  6520. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  6521.  
  6522. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6523.  
  6524. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  6525. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6526.  
  6527. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6528.  
  6529. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  6530. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  6531. Surveillance Court
  6532.  
  6533. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6534.  
  6535. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  6536. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  6537. Surveillance Court
  6538.  
  6539. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6540.  
  6541. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  6542. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  6543.  
  6544. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  6545.  
  6546. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  6547. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  6548.  
  6549. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  6550. _______________________________________
  6551. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  6552.  
  6553. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  6554.  
  6555. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  6556.  
  6557. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  6558. ���������������������������������������
  6559. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  6560.  
  6561. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  6562. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  6563. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  6564. _______________________________________
  6565. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  6566. Over Data to the NSA ::
  6567.  
  6568.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6569. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  6570. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  6571. media report. The revelation comes as
  6572. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  6573. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  6574. troves of data with the US and UK.
  6575.  
  6576.  Citing secret government documents,
  6577. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  6578. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6579. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  6580. with domestic security, works closely
  6581. with the US and regularly sends them
  6582. information.
  6583.  
  6584.  The security service gathers intelligence
  6585. on internal security threats. The documents
  6586. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  6587. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  6588. well as regular meetings between officers
  6589. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  6590.  
  6591. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  6592. _______________________________________
  6593. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  6594. Revelations ::
  6595.  
  6596. This is an unofficial translation.
  6597.  
  6598. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  6599.  
  6600.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  6601. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  6602. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  6603.  
  6604. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  6605.  
  6606. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  6607. _______________________________________
  6608. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  6609.  
  6610. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  6611. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  6612. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  6613. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  6614. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  6615. _______________________________________
  6616. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  6617.  
  6618. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  6619.  
  6620. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  6621.  
  6622. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  6623. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  6624.  
  6625. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  6626.  
  6627. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  6628.  
  6629.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  6630. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  6631. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  6632. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  6633. and control over natural resources.
  6634. _______________________________________
  6635. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  6636.  
  6637.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  6638. machines to read.
  6639.  
  6640. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  6641. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  6642. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  6643. _______________________________________
  6644. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  6645.  
  6646. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  6647.  
  6648. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  6649. _______________________________________
  6650. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  6651. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  6652. National Unit ::
  6653.  
  6654.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  6655. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  6656. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  6657. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  6658. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  6659. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  6660. it Wednesday.
  6661.  
  6662.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  6663. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  6664. raw signals intelligence, referred
  6665. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  6666. swathes of digital data traffic that
  6667. the agency gathers under secret court
  6668. authority from US Internet providers.
  6669.  
  6670.  So sensitive is this data that even
  6671. before being disseminated to other US
  6672. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  6673. to a court-mandated process called
  6674. minimization, under which the names
  6675. of any Americans are removed unless
  6676. they are essential for foreign
  6677. intelligence interest.
  6678.  
  6679.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  6680. that the data shared with Israel
  6681. �includes, but is not limited to,
  6682. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  6683. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  6684. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  6685. and content.�
  6686.  
  6687.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  6688. and unminimized raw collection associated
  6689. with selectors from multiple Target office
  6690. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  6691. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  6692. relationship between the two organizations.�
  6693.  
  6694. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  6695. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  6696. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  6697. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  6698. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  6699. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  6700.  
  6701.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  6702. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  6703. that spy most aggressively against the
  6704. United States.
  6705.  
  6706.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6707. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6708. insider threat detection capabilities
  6709. across the Community. In addition, we
  6710. are investing in target surveillance
  6711. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6712. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6713. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  6714.  
  6715. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6716. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6717. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6718.  
  6719. NOBODY comments
  6720.  
  6721.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  6722. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  6723. plenty of inside information.
  6724.  
  6725.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  6726. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  6727. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  6728.  
  6729. This reminds of a quote ;
  6730.  
  6731.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  6732. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  6733. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  6734. to play out one big game of destruction
  6735. and domination with humans as the visible
  6736. and spiritual puppets?�
  6737. _______________________________________
  6738. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  6739.  
  6740. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  6741. _______________________________________
  6742. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  6743.  
  6744. (EN)
  6745. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6746.  
  6747. (DE)
  6748. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  6749.  
  6750. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  6751.  
  6752.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  6753. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  6754. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  6755. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  6756. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  6757. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  6758. deployed in a government intelligence
  6759. agency presentation.
  6760.  
  6761. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6762. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  6763. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  6764. ���������������������������������������
  6765. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  6766. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  6767.  
  6768.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  6769. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  6770. reverse restrictions on the National
  6771. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  6772. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  6773. the agency to search deliberately for
  6774. Americans� communications in its massive
  6775. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  6776. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  6777. �declassified material� - (which, by
  6778. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  6779. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  6780. of which agency it came from and most
  6781. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  6782.  
  6783. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  6784.  
  6785.  In addition, the court extended the
  6786. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  6787. to retain intercepted US communications
  6788. from five years to six years � and more
  6789. under special circumstances, according
  6790. to the documents, which include a
  6791. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  6792. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  6793. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6794. Surveillance Court.
  6795.  
  6796. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6797.  
  6798. NOBODY comments
  6799.  
  6800.  The document which was declassified by
  6801. US intelligence officials explains the
  6802. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6803. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  6804. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  6805.  
  6806. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6807. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6808. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6809.  
  6810.  National Security Agency analysts
  6811. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6812. their authority to spy on Americans.
  6813.  
  6814. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6815.  
  6816.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  6817. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  6818.  
  6819. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6820.  
  6821. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6822.  
  6823.  And this is not the first attempt to
  6824. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  6825.  
  6826. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6827.  
  6828. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6829.  
  6830.  The new Washington Post report has
  6831. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  6832. (press) release exposing yet another
  6833. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  6834. or take responsibility for the abuses
  6835. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  6836.  
  6837. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6838.  
  6839.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  6840. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  6841.  
  6842.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  6843. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  6844.  
  6845.  All of this information is backed up
  6846. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  6847. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  6848. 2,776 violations one year after the
  6849. FISA Court order.
  6850.  
  6851. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6852.  
  6853.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  6854. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  6855. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  6856. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  6857. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  6858. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  6859. them out of office come next election.
  6860. _______________________________________
  6861. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  6862.  
  6863. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  6864. _______________________________________
  6865. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  6866.  
  6867. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  6868.  
  6869.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  6870. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  6871. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  6872.  
  6873. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  6874.  
  6875. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  6876.  
  6877. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  6878.  
  6879. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  6880.  
  6881. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  6882.  
  6883. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  6884.  
  6885. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  6886.  
  6887. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6888. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6889. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  6890. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  6891.  
  6892. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  6893.  
  6894.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  6895. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  6896. reports that the US National Security Agency
  6897. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  6898.  
  6899.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  6900. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  6901. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  6902. Tuesday.
  6903.  
  6904.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  6905. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  6906. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  6907. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  6908. several of her top aides, and tapped
  6909. her phone.
  6910.  
  6911. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  6912.  
  6913. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  6914. Impacted ::
  6915.  
  6916.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  6917. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  6918. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  6919. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  6920. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  6921. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  6922.  
  6923.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  6924. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  6925. visit to Washington in October, the
  6926. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  6927. year, or will take action on digital
  6928. security that may affect US companies
  6929. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  6930.  
  6931.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  6932. a proposal that would suspend operations
  6933. of companies that cooperate with the
  6934. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  6935.  
  6936. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  6937. _______________________________________
  6938. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  6939.  
  6940. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  6941.  
  6942. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  6943.  
  6944. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  6945. ���������������������������������������
  6946. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  6947.  
  6948.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6949. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6950. collect against high priority targets,
  6951. including foreign leadership targets.
  6952. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6953. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6954. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6955. internet traffic.�
  6956.  
  6957. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6958.  
  6959. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6960.  
  6961. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  6962.  
  6963. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  6964.  
  6965. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  6966.  
  6967. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  6968.  
  6969.  �The Post is withholding some information
  6970. after consultation with US officials who
  6971. expressed concerns about the risk to
  6972. intelligence sources and methods.
  6973. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  6974. the documents that The Post is publishing
  6975. only summary tables and charts online.�
  6976.  
  6977. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  6978.  
  6979. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6980. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  6981.  
  6982. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  6983.  
  6984. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  6985.  
  6986. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6987. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  6988.  
  6989. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  6990.  
  6991. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  6992.  
  6993. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  6994.  
  6995.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  6996. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  6997. intelligence services, leaked documents
  6998. reveal.
  6999.  
  7000.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  7001. to have an aggressive intelligence
  7002. collection operations against the
  7003. United States,� Pillar said. While
  7004. much information is collected through
  7005. traditional political contacts, �I
  7006. would personally have no doubt that
  7007. that is supplemented by whatever means
  7008. they can use to find out as much as
  7009. they can about what we�re doing,
  7010. thinking, deciding on anything of
  7011. interest to Israel, which would include
  7012. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  7013.  
  7014. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  7015.  
  7016. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  7017.  
  7018.  �To further safeguard our classified
  7019. networks, we continue to strengthen
  7020. insider threat detection capabilities
  7021. across the Community. In addition, we
  7022. are investing in target surveillance
  7023. and offensive CI against key targets,
  7024. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  7025. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  7026. _______________________________________
  7027. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  7028.  
  7029.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  7030. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  7031. the worst part is the Received headers.
  7032. Everyone should look at their own headers
  7033. -- especially people on this list and
  7034. at least comprehend that your email
  7035. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  7036. the Mailman archive.
  7037.  
  7038.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  7039. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  7040. the actual separators in MIME part
  7041. breaks, and so on.
  7042.  
  7043.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  7044. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  7045. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  7046. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  7047. don�t do it all the time.
  7048.  
  7049.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  7050. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  7051. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  7052. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  7053. is that this tells us that the crypto
  7054. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  7055. for quite some time.
  7056.  
  7057.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  7058. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  7059. that works being deployed everywhere.
  7060. What do you do? You just be patient and
  7061. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  7062. analysis.
  7063.  
  7064. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  7065.  
  7066. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  7067.  
  7068. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  7069.  
  7070.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  7071. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  7072. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  7073. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  7074. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  7075. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  7076. reveal.
  7077.  
  7078. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  7079.  
  7080.  �We are bolstering our support for
  7081. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  7082. collect against high priority targets,
  7083. including foreign leadership targets.
  7084. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  7085. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  7086. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  7087. internet traffic.� ... ...
  7088.  
  7089. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  7090.  
  7091.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  7092. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  7093. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  7094. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  7095. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  7096. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  7097.  
  7098.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  7099. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  7100.  
  7101. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  7102.  
  7103. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  7104.  
  7105. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  7106.  
  7107. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  7108.  
  7109. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  7110.  
  7111.  The US government has attempted to
  7112. obtain the master encryption keys that
  7113. Internet companies use to shield millions
  7114. of users� private web communications
  7115. from eavesdropping.
  7116.  
  7117.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  7118. which have not been disclosed previously,
  7119. represent a technological escalation in
  7120. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  7121. the National Security Agency employ when
  7122. conducting electronic surveillance against
  7123. Internet users. ... ...
  7124.  
  7125.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  7126. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  7127. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  7128. communications are typically destroyed
  7129. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  7130. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  7131. of all communications that are enciphered�
  7132. is permissible.
  7133.  
  7134. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  7135. _______________________________________
  7136. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  7137. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  7138.  
  7139.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  7140. intercepts well before 2001, former
  7141. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  7142. secretive Special Services Office,
  7143. these types of programs were at first
  7144. designed to intercept communications
  7145. overseas through arrangements with
  7146. foreign Internet providers, the former
  7147. officials say. NSA still has such
  7148. arrangements in many countries,
  7149. particularly in the Middle East and
  7150. Europe, the former officials say.�
  7151.  
  7152. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  7153.  
  7154. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  7155.  
  7156. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  7157. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  7158. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  7159. ���������������������������������������
  7160. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  7161. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  7162.  
  7163.  A common hacking technique can be used
  7164. to make emails look as if they came from
  7165. outside the United States.
  7166.  
  7167. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  7168. _______________________________________
  7169. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  7170. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  7171.  
  7172. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  7173.  
  7174. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  7175.  
  7176. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  7177.  
  7178. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7179. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7180. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  7181. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  7182. ���������������������������������������
  7183. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  7184. Patrick Leahy ::
  7185.  
  7186. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  7187.  
  7188. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  7189.  
  7190. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  7191. _______________________________________
  7192. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  7193.  
  7194.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  7195. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  7196. their authority to spy on Americans
  7197. multiple times in the past decade,
  7198. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  7199. and lawmakers� statements that no
  7200. willful violations occurred. ...
  7201.  
  7202.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  7203. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  7204. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  7205. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  7206. of having links to terrorism, before a
  7207. secret court that oversees surveillance
  7208. found the operation unconstitutional
  7209. in 2011.
  7210.  
  7211. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  7212.  
  7213. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  7214. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  7215. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  7216.  
  7217.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  7218. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  7219. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  7220. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  7221. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  7222.  
  7223.  The documents were released in response
  7224. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  7225. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  7226.  
  7227.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  7228. litigation and the most significant leak
  7229. in American history to finally get them
  7230. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  7231. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  7232. �but I�m happy that the administration
  7233. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  7234.  
  7235. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  7236. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  7237. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  7238.  
  7239. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  7240.  
  7241. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7242.  
  7243. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7244.  
  7245. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  7246.  
  7247. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  7248.  
  7249. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  7250.  
  7251. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  7252. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  7253.  
  7254. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7255. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  7256. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  7257. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  7258. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  7259. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  7260.  
  7261.  The account is based on top-secret
  7262. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  7263. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  7264. including unauthorized collection,
  7265. storage, access to or distribution of
  7266. legally protected communications � in
  7267. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  7268. originally only meant to be seen by top
  7269. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  7270. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  7271. and other locations in the Washington DC
  7272. region.
  7273.  
  7274. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  7275.  
  7276.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  7277. and other things, there�s people talking
  7278. about privacy violations or abuses or
  7279. willful or violations, right, it is
  7280. important for people to understand,
  7281. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  7282. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  7283. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  7284.  
  7285.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  7286. We detect them, as early as we can.
  7287. We correct them, right. None of the
  7288. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  7289. the document released were willful.
  7290. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  7291. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  7292. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  7293.  
  7294. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  7295.  
  7296. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  7297. Database Queries Per Month ::
  7298.  
  7299. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  7300.  
  7301. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  7302.  
  7303. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  7304. _______________________________________
  7305. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  7306.  
  7307.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  7308. station in the Middle East to intercept
  7309. and process vast quantities of emails,
  7310. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  7311. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  7312. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  7313.  
  7314.  The information is then processed for
  7315. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  7316. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  7317. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  7318. The Government claims the station is a
  7319. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  7320. and provides a vital �early warning�
  7321. system for potential attacks around
  7322. the world.
  7323.  
  7324.  The Independent is not revealing the
  7325. precise location of the station but
  7326. information on its activities was
  7327. contained in the leaked documents
  7328. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  7329. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  7330. these documents in recent months has
  7331. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  7332. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  7333. the destruction of hard drives containing
  7334. the data. ... ...
  7335.  
  7336.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  7337. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  7338. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  7339. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  7340. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  7341. the global interception of digital
  7342. communications, such as emails and text
  7343. messages.
  7344.  
  7345.  Across three sites, communications �
  7346. including telephone calls � are tracked
  7347. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  7348. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  7349.  
  7350. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  7351. ���������������������������������������
  7352. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  7353.  
  7354. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  7355. _______________________________________
  7356. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  7357. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  7358. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  7359. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  7360. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  7361. E Grassley ::
  7362.  
  7363. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  7364.  
  7365. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  7366.  
  7367. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  7368.  
  7369. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  7370.  
  7371. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  7372.  
  7373. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  7374.  
  7375. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  7376.  
  7377. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  7378.  
  7379. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  7380.  
  7381. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  7382.  
  7383. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  7384. Congress ::
  7385.  
  7386.  �I can now confirm that the House
  7387. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  7388. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  7389. available to Representatives in Congress,
  7390. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  7391. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  7392. the now declassified documents detailing
  7393. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  7394.  
  7395. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  7396.  
  7397. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  7398.  
  7399. ?
  7400.  
  7401. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7402.  
  7403.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7404. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7405. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7406. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7407. discussions with the president when he
  7408. first came on board we talked to him about
  7409. these programs and the issue was how do
  7410. we know the compliance is there and what
  7411. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7412. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  7413. of compliance. This directorate of
  7414. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7415. and information specialists that can look
  7416. at everything that we do in these programs
  7417. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7418. orders but we also have oversight from
  7419. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7420. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7421. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7422. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  7423. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7424. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7425. _______________________________________
  7426. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  7427.  
  7428.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  7429. public so far.
  7430.  
  7431. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  7432. _______________________________________
  7433. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  7434.  
  7435. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  7436. _______________________________________
  7437. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  7438. Data Lab ::
  7439.  
  7440. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  7441.  
  7442. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  7443. _______________________________________
  7444. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  7445. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  7446.  
  7447. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  7448. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  7449. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  7450. _______________________________________
  7451. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  7452.  
  7453.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  7454. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  7455. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  7456. there since he assumed the position
  7457. of Secretary of State. He has already
  7458. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  7459. � where officials demanded an explanation
  7460. to reports that Washington had collected
  7461. vast amounts of internet data there.
  7462. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  7463. which allegedly was the top regional
  7464. target of the surveillance program.
  7465.  
  7466. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  7467.  
  7468. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  7469.  
  7470. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  7471. Surveillance ::
  7472.  
  7473. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  7474.  
  7475. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  7476.  
  7477. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  7478. _______________________________________
  7479. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  7480.  
  7481. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  7482. ���������������������������������������
  7483. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  7484.  
  7485. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  7486.  
  7487. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  7488.  
  7489. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  7490.  
  7491. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  7492.  
  7493. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  7494. _______________________________________
  7495. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  7496.  
  7497. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  7498.  
  7499. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  7500. _______________________________________
  7501. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  7502.  
  7503. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  7504.  
  7505.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  7506. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  7507. use of certain United States person names
  7508. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  7509. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  7510. implement any USP queries until an effective
  7511. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  7512. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  7513. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  7514. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  7515. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  7516. databases).�
  7517.  
  7518. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  7519.  
  7520. NOBODY comments
  7521.  
  7522. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  7523.  
  7524. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7525.  
  7526.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7527. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7528. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7529. communications not related to foreign
  7530. information or foreign activity for up
  7531. to five years.
  7532.  
  7533.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  7534. acquired communications of or concerning a
  7535. United States person may be retained no
  7536. longer than five years in any event.�
  7537.  
  7538.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  7539. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  7540. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  7541. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  7542. communications that have been stored.
  7543. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  7544. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  7545. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  7546. to �communications security vulnerability�
  7547. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  7548. _______________________________________
  7549. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  7550.  
  7551. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  7552. _______________________________________
  7553. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  7554.  
  7555. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  7556. _______________________________________
  7557. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  7558. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  7559.  
  7560.  As the steady stream of revelations
  7561. continues, the White House has choosen
  7562. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  7563. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  7564.  
  7565. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  7566. _______________________________________
  7567. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  7568.  
  7569. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  7570.  
  7571. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  7572. Spying Press Conference ::
  7573.  
  7574.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  7575. Presidential press conference in which the
  7576. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  7577. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  7578. that Obama told today about the program
  7579. by citing multiple articles with information
  7580. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  7581.  
  7582. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  7583. ���������������������������������������
  7584. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  7585. Partners ::
  7586.  
  7587. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  7588. ���������������������������������������
  7589. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  7590. Metadata ::
  7591.  
  7592. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  7593. ���������������������������������������
  7594. � National Security Run Amok ::
  7595.  
  7596. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  7597. _______________________________________
  7598.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  7599. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  7600. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  7601. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  7602.  
  7603. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  7604.  
  7605.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  7606. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  7607. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  7608. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  7609. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  7610. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  7611. for including former senators Hillary
  7612. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  7613.  
  7614. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  7615.  
  7616. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  7617. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  7618.  
  7619. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  7620.  
  7621. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7622.  
  7623. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  7624. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  7625.  
  7626. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  7627.  
  7628.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  7629. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  7630.  
  7631. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  7632. ���������������������������������������
  7633. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  7634.  
  7635. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  7636.  
  7637. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  7638.  
  7639. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  7640.  
  7641. NOBODY comments
  7642.  
  7643. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  7644.  
  7645.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  7646. the document was still classified. It was
  7647. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  7648.  
  7649. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7650.  
  7651.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  7652. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  7653. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  7654. many of these operations being leaked.
  7655. _______________________________________
  7656. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  7657. on Brazilian Television ::
  7658.  
  7659. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  7660. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  7661. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  7662.  
  7663. NOBODY comments
  7664.  
  7665.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  7666. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  7667.  
  7668.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  7669. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  7670. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  7671.  
  7672. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  7673. ���������������������������������������
  7674. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7675. English Report ::
  7676.  
  7677.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  7678. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  7679. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  7680. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  7681. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  7682. matters is also much closer than first
  7683. thought. ... ...
  7684.  
  7685.  Day after day and month after month,
  7686. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  7687. amounts of connection data relating
  7688. to the communications it had placed
  7689. under surveillance. The so-called
  7690. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  7691. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  7692. into the Americans� giant databases.
  7693.  
  7694. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  7695.  
  7696. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7697. Deutsch Report ::
  7698.  
  7699. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  7700.  
  7701. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  7702.  
  7703. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  7704. ���������������������������������������
  7705. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  7706.  
  7707. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  7708. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  7709. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  7710.  
  7711. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  7712.  
  7713. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  7714.  
  7715.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  7716. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  7717. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  7718. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  7719. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  7720. the Guardian�s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  7721. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  7722.  
  7723. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  7724. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  7725. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  7726. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  7727.  
  7728. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  7729.  
  7730. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  7731.  
  7732. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  7733.  
  7734. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  7735.  
  7736. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  7737.  
  7738. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  7739.  
  7740. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  7741.  
  7742. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  7743.  
  7744. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  7745.  
  7746. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  7747.  
  7748. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  7749.  
  7750. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  7751.  
  7752. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  7753.  
  7754. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  7755.  
  7756.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  7757. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  7758. they are shunted off to various �production
  7759. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  7760. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  7761. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  7762. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  7763. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  7764. stored in a database called MARINA and
  7765. is generally retained for five years.
  7766.  
  7767. ... ...
  7768.  
  7769.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  7770. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  7771. to change the surveillance laws once the
  7772. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  7773. This was for a simple reason: they did
  7774. not want to be responsible for a program
  7775. that was not legal.�
  7776.  
  7777. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  7778.  
  7779. NOBODY comments
  7780.  
  7781.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7782. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7783. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7784. communications not related to foreign
  7785. information or foreign activity for up
  7786. to five years.
  7787.  
  7788.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  7789. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  7790. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  7791. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  7792. ���������������������������������������
  7793. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  7794. for GCHQ Bude ::
  7795.  
  7796. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  7797. _______________________________________
  7798. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  7799. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  7800.  
  7801.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  7802. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  7803. counterfeiting and even copyright
  7804. infringement complain that their
  7805. attempts to exploit the security
  7806. agency�s vast resources have often
  7807. been turned down because their own
  7808. investigations are not considered a
  7809. high enough priority, current and
  7810. former government officials say.
  7811.  
  7812.  Intelligence officials say they have
  7813. been careful to limit the use of the
  7814. security agency�s troves of data and
  7815. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  7816. could be misused in ways that violate
  7817. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  7818.  
  7819.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  7820. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  7821. senior intelligence official at the
  7822. White House and at the office of the
  7823. director of national intelligence.
  7824. �They collect all this information,
  7825. but it�s difficult for the other
  7826. agencies to get access to what
  7827. they want.�
  7828.  
  7829. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  7830. _______________________________________
  7831. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  7832. Security Forum ::
  7833.  
  7834. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  7835.  
  7836. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  7837. Conference ::
  7838.  
  7839. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  7840.  
  7841. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  7842. Conference ::
  7843.  
  7844. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7845. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  7846. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  7847.  
  7848.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7849. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7850. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7851. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7852. discussions with the president when he
  7853. first came on board we talked to him about
  7854. these programs and the issue was how do
  7855. we know the compliance is there and what
  7856. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7857. the committees in Congress a directorate
  7858. of compliance. This directorate of
  7859. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7860. and information specialists that can look
  7861. at everything that we do in these programs
  7862. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7863. orders but we also have oversight from
  7864. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7865. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7866. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7867. from the White House, from Congress, the
  7868. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7869. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7870.  
  7871. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  7872. Blackhat Conference ::
  7873.  
  7874. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  7875.  
  7876. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  7877.  
  7878. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  7879.  
  7880. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  7881.  
  7882. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  7883.  
  7884. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  7885.  
  7886. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  7887. _______________________________________
  7888. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  7889.  
  7890. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  7891.  
  7892. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  7893. All Domestic Calls ::
  7894.  
  7895.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  7896. three documents related to the National
  7897. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  7898. records, including briefings to Congress
  7899. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  7900. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  7901. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7902. Court that outlines rules that must be
  7903. followed when accessing data provided by
  7904. a Verizon subsidiary.
  7905.  
  7906. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  7907.  
  7908.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  7909. what the government was doing with the
  7910. Patriot Act program, several senators
  7911. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  7912. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  7913. the law in a twisted way to do something
  7914. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  7915. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  7916. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  7917. Act to obtain that document.
  7918.  
  7919. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  7920. _______________________________________
  7921. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  7922.  
  7923. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  7924.  
  7925. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  7926. _______________________________________
  7927. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  7928.  
  7929.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  7930. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  7931. two or three years ago.�
  7932.  
  7933. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  7934. _______________________________________
  7935. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7936. Received Dox ::
  7937.  
  7938. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  7939. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  7940. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  7941. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  7942. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  7943.  
  7944. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  7945.  
  7946. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  7947.  
  7948. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7949. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  7950.  
  7951.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  7952. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  7953. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  7954. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  7955. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  7956. twice as much campaign financing from
  7957. the defense and intelligence industry
  7958. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  7959.  
  7960. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  7961.  
  7962. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  7963. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  7964.  
  7965. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  7966. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  7967. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  7968.  
  7969. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  7970.  
  7971. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  7972.  
  7973. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  7974. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  7975.  
  7976. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  7977. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  7978. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  7979. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  7980.  
  7981. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  7982. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  7983.  
  7984.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  7985. disclosures, the President has said
  7986. that he welcomes a debate about how
  7987. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  7988. our national security and the privacy
  7989. of our citizens.  The Administration
  7990. has taken various proactive steps to
  7991. advance this debate including the
  7992. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  7993. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  7994. his public statements on the disclosed
  7995. programs, the Office of the Director
  7996. of National Intelligence�s release of
  7997. its own public statements, ODNI General
  7998. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  7999. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  8000. disclose publicly that the Administration
  8001. filed an application with the Foreign
  8002. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  8003. look forward to continuing to discuss
  8004. these critical issues with the American
  8005. people and the Congress.
  8006.  
  8007.  However, we oppose the current effort
  8008. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  8009. of our Intelligence Community�s
  8010. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  8011. approach is not the product of an
  8012. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  8013. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  8014. Amendment, and instead move forward
  8015. with an approach that appropriately
  8016. takes into account the need for a
  8017. reasoned review of what tools can
  8018. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  8019.  
  8020. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  8021.  
  8022. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  8023.  
  8024. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  8025. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  8026.  
  8027. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  8028.  
  8029. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  8030. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  8031. to Defund NSA ::
  8032.  
  8033. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  8034. _______________________________________
  8035.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  8036. official letter from the NSA, which was
  8037. sent to the German government to clarify
  8038. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  8039. because German media and politics were
  8040. heavily confused after it became clear
  8041. that there�s more than one program named
  8042. PRISM.
  8043.  
  8044.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  8045. data collection program is about and
  8046. then confirms that this program is
  8047. different from a more common military
  8048. web tool called "Planning tool for
  8049. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  8050. and Management" (PRISM).
  8051.  
  8052.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  8053. there�s even a third program called
  8054. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  8055. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  8056. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  8057. apparently an internal NSA information
  8058. sharing program. It was unknown until
  8059. now, probably because it�s used in the
  8060. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  8061. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  8062.  
  8063.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  8064. different PRISM programs:
  8065.  
  8066. 1. PRISM
  8067.  
  8068.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  8069. of collecting information about foreign
  8070. targets from data of nine major US
  8071. internet companies. This program started
  8072. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  8073. in June 2013.
  8074.  
  8075. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  8076. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  8077.  
  8078.  This is a web tool used by US military
  8079. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  8080. to data collection platforms deployed to
  8081. military operations. This program is
  8082. not very secret and was first mentioned
  8083. in 2002.
  8084.  
  8085. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  8086. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  8087.  
  8088.  This is an internal NSA program for
  8089. real-time sharing of information,
  8090. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  8091. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  8092. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  8093.  
  8094. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  8095.  
  8096. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  8097. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  8098.  
  8099.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  8100. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  8101. surveillance activities in Germany.
  8102. It only added to the mystery. A US
  8103. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  8104. that there are actually three unrelated
  8105. Prism programs. ... ...
  8106.  
  8107.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  8108. and Maassen, officials also read a
  8109. written statement from the NSA in
  8110. response to a query from the German
  8111. government. According to the statement,
  8112. there are three separate Prism programs,
  8113. all of them unconnected to each other.
  8114. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  8115. said that one of the Prism programs was
  8116. only used internally. That program had
  8117. thus far remained secret. Another of
  8118. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  8119. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  8120. -- vaguely described in the statement
  8121. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  8122. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  8123. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  8124. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  8125.  
  8126. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  8127.  
  8128. NOBODY comments
  8129.  
  8130.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  8131. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  8132. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  8133. _______________________________________
  8134. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  8135.  
  8136. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  8137.  
  8138. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  8139.  
  8140. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  8141.  
  8142.  Description and drawings by US Army
  8143. Corps of Engineers.
  8144.  
  8145. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  8146. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  8147. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  8148. _______________________________________
  8149. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  8150.  
  8151. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  8152.  
  8153. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  8154.  
  8155. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  8156. ���������������������������������������
  8157. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  8158.  
  8159. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  8160.  
  8161. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  8162.  
  8163. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  8164.  
  8165. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  8166.  
  8167. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  8168. _______________________________________
  8169. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  8170.  
  8171.  �First, the United States would not seek
  8172. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  8173. return to the United States. The charges
  8174. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  8175. and the United States would not seek the
  8176. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  8177. charged with additional, death penalty-
  8178. eligible crimes.�
  8179.  
  8180. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  8181.  
  8182. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  8183. _______________________________________
  8184. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  8185. Peace Prize ::
  8186.  
  8187.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  8188. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  8189. agency�s data collection program, has
  8190. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  8191.  
  8192.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  8193. at great personal cost � revealed the
  8194. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  8195. the US government devotes electronic
  8196. communications worldwide,� read the
  8197. nomination. �By putting light on this
  8198. monitoring program � conducted in
  8199. contravention of national laws and
  8200. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  8201. has helped to make the world a little
  8202. bit better and safer.� ...
  8203.  
  8204.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  8205. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  8206. to being well justified in itself �
  8207. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  8208. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  8209. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  8210. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  8211. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  8212.  
  8213. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  8214. _______________________________________
  8215. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  8216. Komsomolets News ::
  8217.  
  8218. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  8219. ���������������������������������������
  8220. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  8221. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  8222.  
  8223.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  8224. his experience when he received a Foreign
  8225. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  8226. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  8227. federal government to monitor a customer
  8228. of his.
  8229.  
  8230.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  8231. contained a broad gag order, which still
  8232. prevents him from telling all the details.
  8233.  
  8234.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  8235. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  8236. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  8237. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  8238.  
  8239.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  8240. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  8241. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  8242. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  8243.  
  8244.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  8245. facility that was capturing all of the
  8246. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  8247. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  8248. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  8249. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  8250.  
  8251. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  8252. _______________________________________
  8253. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  8254.  
  8255. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  8256. _______________________________________
  8257. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  8258.  
  8259. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  8260. ���������������������������������������
  8261. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  8262. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  8263.  
  8264.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  8265. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  8266. representative rather casually indicated
  8267. that the government looks at data from
  8268. a universe of far, far more people than
  8269. previously indicated.
  8270.  
  8271.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  8272. was one of several government representatives
  8273. �including from the FBI and the office of
  8274. the Director of National Intelligence�
  8275. testifying before the House Judiciary
  8276. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  8277. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  8278. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  8279. surveillance, including a retread of the
  8280. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  8281. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  8282. Act had stopped terror events.
  8283.  
  8284.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  8285. look �two or three hops� from terror
  8286. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  8287. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  8288. how surveillance was extended had been
  8289. described as two hops. This meant that
  8290. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  8291. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  8292. could also look at the calls from the
  8293. people that suspect has spoken with one
  8294. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  8295. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  8296. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  8297. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  8298.  
  8299. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  8300.  
  8301.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  8302. them or not - two hops.
  8303.  
  8304.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  8305. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  8306.  
  8307. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  8308. ���������������������������������������
  8309. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  8310.  
  8311.  It is a good thing that people are
  8312. becoming aware of the fact that they
  8313. are being monitored - it is not only
  8314. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  8315. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  8316. made to collect information and to store
  8317. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  8318. resources that PRISM used and how it
  8319. could combine these resources to multiple
  8320. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  8321.  
  8322. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  8323. _______________________________________
  8324. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  8325.  
  8326. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  8327. ���������������������������������������
  8328. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  8329. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  8330.  
  8331.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  8332. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  8333. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  8334. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  8335. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  8336. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  8337. stories about the US government�s vast
  8338. foreign and domestic spying programs
  8339. will stop. ... ...
  8340.  
  8341.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  8342. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  8343. the United States by releasing more
  8344. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  8345.  
  8346.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  8347. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  8348. since he has already said that he gave
  8349. all of his classified information --
  8350. thousands of documents -- to several
  8351. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  8352. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  8353. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  8354. half done with the stories he plans to
  8355. write based on the secret information.
  8356.  
  8357. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  8358. ���������������������������������������
  8359. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  8360.  
  8361. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  8362. _______________________________________
  8363. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  8364.  
  8365. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  8366. ���������������������������������������
  8367. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  8368.  
  8369.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  8370. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  8371. typewriters. What do they know that
  8372. we don�t?
  8373.  
  8374. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  8375. ���������������������������������������
  8376. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  8377. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  8378.  
  8379.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  8380. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  8381. has existed since at least 2002. The
  8382. following document refers to it directly.
  8383. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  8384. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  8385. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  8386. limitation of it and similar projects.
  8387.  
  8388. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  8389.  
  8390. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  8391. _______________________________________
  8392. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  8393. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  8394.  
  8395. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  8396.  
  8397. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  8398. in Latin America ::
  8399.  
  8400. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  8401. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  8402. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  8403. _______________________________________
  8404. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  8405. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  8406.  
  8407. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  8408.  
  8409. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  8410.  
  8411. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  8412. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  8413.  
  8414. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  8415. _______________________________________
  8416. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  8417.  
  8418. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  8419. _______________________________________
  8420. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  8421. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  8422.  
  8423. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  8424. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  8425. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  8426. ���������������������������������������
  8427. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  8428.  
  8429. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  8430.  
  8431. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  8432.  
  8433. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  8434. _______________________________________
  8435. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  8436. Metadata ::
  8437.  
  8438. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  8439. _______________________________________
  8440. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  8441. by US Citizens ::
  8442.  
  8443. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  8444. ���������������������������������������
  8445. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  8446.  
  8447. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  8448.  
  8449.  �This may look like a small release, but
  8450. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  8451. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  8452. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  8453. sending encrypted data to and from the
  8454. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  8455. those servers. If you crash these servers
  8456. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  8457. "broken". We are also planning to release
  8458. some of that data (which we have access
  8459. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  8460. ���������������������������������������
  8461. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  8462. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  8463.  
  8464.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  8465. Snowden�s employer.
  8466.  
  8467. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  8468.  
  8469. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  8470.  
  8471. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  8472. _______________________________________
  8473. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  8474.  
  8475. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  8476. _______________________________________
  8477. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  8478.  
  8479.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  8480. it became clear that my freedom and
  8481. safety were under threat for revealing
  8482. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  8483. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  8484. old, family, and others who I have never
  8485. met and probably never will. I trusted
  8486. them with my life and they returned that
  8487. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  8488. always be thankful.
  8489.  
  8490.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  8491. before the world that he would not permit
  8492. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  8493. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  8494. after promising not to do so, the President
  8495. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  8496. leaders of nations from which I have
  8497. requested protection to deny my asylum
  8498. petitions.
  8499.  
  8500.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  8501. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  8502. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  8503. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  8504. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  8505. come after me.
  8506.  
  8507.  For decades the United States of America
  8508. have been one of the strongest defenders
  8509. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  8510. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  8511. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  8512. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  8513. the current government of my country. The
  8514. Obama administration has now adopted the
  8515. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  8516. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  8517. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  8518. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  8519. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  8520. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  8521. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  8522. asylum.
  8523.  
  8524.  In the end the Obama administration is
  8525. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  8526. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  8527. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  8528. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  8529. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  8530. demanding the constitutional government
  8531. it was promised � and it should be.
  8532.  
  8533.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  8534. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  8535. many.�
  8536.  
  8537. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  8538. ���������������������������������������
  8539. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  8540.  
  8541. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  8542.  
  8543. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  8544.  
  8545. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  8546. _______________________________________
  8547. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  8548.  
  8549. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  8550. ���������������������������������������
  8551. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  8552.  
  8553. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8554. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  8555. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  8556. _______________________________________
  8557. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  8558.  
  8559. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  8560. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  8561. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  8562. _______________________________________
  8563. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  8564.  
  8565. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  8566.  
  8567.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  8568. over private data to America.
  8569.  
  8570.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  8571. according to new claims by former US defence
  8572. analyst.
  8573.  
  8574.  At least six European Union countries in
  8575. addition to Britain have been colluding
  8576. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  8577. personal communications data, according
  8578. to a former contractor to America�s
  8579. National Security Agency, who said the
  8580. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  8581.  
  8582.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  8583. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  8584. and over the next 12 years held several
  8585. sensitive positions within the agency,
  8586. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  8587. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  8588. deals with the US.
  8589.  
  8590.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  8591. second and third party status� under
  8592. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  8593. that compels them to hand over data,
  8594. including mobile phone and internet
  8595. information to the NSA if requested.
  8596.  
  8597.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  8598. confirmed by declassified documents,
  8599. nations are categorised by the US according
  8600. to their trust level. The US is first party
  8601. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  8602. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  8603. Germany and France have third party
  8604. relationships.
  8605.  
  8606.  In an interview published last night
  8607. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  8608. who has been attacked for holding
  8609. controversial views on espionage issues,
  8610. said he had decided to speak out after
  8611. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  8612. told by EU politicians regarding the
  8613. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  8614.  
  8615.  He said that under the agreements,
  8616. which were drawn up after the second
  8617. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  8618. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  8619. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  8620. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  8621.  
  8622.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  8623. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  8624. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  8625. about the spying operations while staying
  8626. silent about their own arrangements
  8627. with the US, and was particularly
  8628. concerned that senior German politicians
  8629. had accused the UK of spying when their
  8630. country had a similar third-party deal
  8631. with the NSA.
  8632.  
  8633.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  8634. by other European countries to the NSA is
  8635. not on the same scale as that provided by
  8636. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  8637. embarrassing.
  8638.  
  8639.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  8640. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  8641. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  8642. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  8643. Madsen said.
  8644.  
  8645.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  8646. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  8647. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  8648. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  8649. confirmed that the entire system for
  8650. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  8651. because the EU was unable to intervene
  8652. in intelligence matters, which remained
  8653. the exclusive concern of national
  8654. governments.
  8655.  
  8656.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  8657. these contradictions and no one is really
  8658. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  8659. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  8660. democracy.�
  8661.  
  8662.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  8663. for European governments to come clean
  8664. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  8665. �There needs to be transparency as to
  8666. whether or not it is legal for the US
  8667. or any other security service to
  8668. interrogate private material,� said
  8669. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  8670. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  8671. is that none of these arrangements has
  8672. been debated in any democratic arena.
  8673. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  8674. things have to be done in secret, but you
  8675. don�t break the law in secret.�
  8676.  
  8677.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  8678. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  8679. fibre-optic cable network running between
  8680. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  8681. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  8682. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  8683. including phone calls, emails and records
  8684. of users� access to websites.
  8685.  
  8686.  He said the public needed to be made
  8687. aware of the full scale of the communication
  8688. -sharing arrangements between European
  8689. countries and the US, which predate the
  8690. internet and became of strategic importance
  8691. during the cold war.
  8692.  
  8693.  The covert relationship between the
  8694. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  8695. report by the European parliament, but
  8696. their explicit connection with the NSA
  8697. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  8698. to speak out.
  8699.  
  8700.  The European parliament�s report followed
  8701. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  8702. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  8703. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  8704. established the framework for European
  8705. member states to collaborate with the US.
  8706.  
  8707.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  8708. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  8709. that governments have chosen to keep the
  8710. public in the dark about it. The days
  8711. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  8712. of silence are over.�
  8713.  
  8714.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  8715. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  8716. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  8717. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  8718. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  8719. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  8720. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  8721. ���������������������������������������
  8722. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  8723. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  8724.  
  8725.  A former contractor to the US National
  8726. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  8727. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  8728. intelligence arrangements between the
  8729. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  8730. murky and far reaching� than the public
  8731. has been led to believe. ...
  8732.  
  8733.  He was particularly concerned about the
  8734. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  8735. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  8736. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  8737. while staying silent about their own role
  8738. in global interception arrangements with
  8739. the United States. ...
  8740.  
  8741.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  8742. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  8743.  
  8744.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  8745. many who say he had no authority or right
  8746. to provide the public with details of
  8747. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  8748. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  8749. have to provide information on NSA
  8750. surveillance at five meetings of the
  8751. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  8752. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  8753. Spain and Switzerland?�
  8754.  
  8755.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  8756. American people from a constantly changing
  8757. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  8758. is providing information to elites on
  8759. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  8760. student, religious and progressive
  8761. organizations.�
  8762.  
  8763.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  8764. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  8765. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  8766.  
  8767. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  8768. _______________________________________
  8769. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  8770.  
  8771. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  8772. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  8773. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  8774. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  8775. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  8776. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  8777. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  8778.  
  8779. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  8780.  
  8781. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  8782. ���������������������������������������
  8783. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  8784.  
  8785. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  8786. _______________________________________
  8787. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  8788.  
  8789. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  8790. _______________________________________
  8791. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  8792.  
  8793. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  8794. _______________________________________
  8795. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  8796.  
  8797. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  8798. _______________________________________
  8799. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  8800.  
  8801. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  8802. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  8803. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  8804.  
  8805. � Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  8806.  
  8807. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  8808. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8809. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  8810. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  8811. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  8812. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  8813. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  8814. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  8815. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  8816. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  8817. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  8818. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  8819. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  8820. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  8821. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  8822. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  8823. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  8824. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  8825. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  8826. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  8827. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  8828. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  8829. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  8830. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  8831. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  8832. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  8833. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  8834. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  8835. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  8836. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  8837. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  8838. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  8839. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  8840. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  8841. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  8842. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  8843. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  8844. _______________________________________
  8845. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  8846. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  8847.  
  8848. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  8849. _______________________________________
  8850. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  8851.  
  8852. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  8853.  
  8854. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  8855.  
  8856. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  8857.  
  8858. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  8859. _______________________________________
  8860. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  8861.  
  8862. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  8863.  
  8864. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  8865. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  8866. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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