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Posted by Eyeballing the N on December Thu 4th 4:41 PM - Never Expires
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  1.    
  2. Eyeballing the NSA 039 (HTML & UTF-8 Embedded) �
  3.  
  4. http://paste.oneb1t.cz/view/faf7932e
  5.  
  6. Eyeballing the NSA 039 (PDF) �
  7.  
  8. http://megaswf.com/f/2706305
  9.    
  10.    
  11.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  12. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  13. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  14.  
  15.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  16.  
  17.  
  18. � Operation AURORAGOLD: How the NSA Hacks Cellphone Networks Worldwide ::
  19.  
  20.  Codenamed AURORAGOLD, the covert operation has monitored the content of
  21. messages sent and received by more than 1,200 email accounts associated
  22. with major cellphone network operators, intercepting confidential company
  23. planning papers that help the NSA hack into phone networks.
  24.  
  25.  One high-profile surveillance target is the GSM Association, an influential
  26. UK-headquartered trade group that works closely with large US-based firms
  27. including Microsoft, Facebook, AT&T, and Cisco, and is currently being
  28. funded by the US government to develop privacy-enhancing technologies.
  29.  
  30.  Karsten Nohl, a leading cellphone security expert and cryptographer who
  31. was consulted by The Intercept about details contained in the AURORAGOLD
  32. documents, said that the broad scope of information swept up in the operation
  33. appears aimed at ensuring virtually every cellphone network in the world is
  34. NSA accessible.
  35.  
  36. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/12/04/nsa-auroragold-hack-cellphones/
  37.  
  38. � NSA Operation AURORAGOLD Slides ::
  39.  
  40. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-aurora-gold-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  41.  
  42. � NSA OPULANT PUP Circumventing Strong Cryptography ::
  43.  
  44.  Last year, the Washington Post reported that the NSA had already managed
  45. to break the most commonly used cellphone encryption algorithm in the world,
  46. known as A5/1. But the information collected under AURORAGOLD allows the
  47. agency to focus on circumventing newer and stronger versions of A5 cellphone
  48. encryption, such as A5/3.
  49.  
  50. http://cryptome.org/2014/12/nsa-opulant-pup-intercept-14-1203.pdf
  51. _______________________________________
  52. � Germany�s Intelligence Agency, the BND, Spies On Civilians Too ::
  53.  
  54.  German MPs examining the surveillance activities the US National
  55. Security Agency have found a legal loophole that allows the Berlin�s
  56. foreign intelligence agency to spy on its own citizens.
  57.  
  58.  The agency, known by its German acronym BND, is not usually allowed
  59. to intercept communications made by Germans or German companies, but a
  60. former BND lawyer told parliament this week that citizens working abroad
  61. for foreign companies were not protected.
  62.  
  63.  The German government confirmed on Saturday that work-related calls
  64. or emails were attributed to the employer. As a result, if the employer
  65. is foreign, the BND could legally intercept them.
  66.  
  67.  Angela Merkel pretends to be outraged about industrial espionage by
  68. the NSA while condoning illegal surveillance itself.
  69.  
  70. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/29/german-loophole-allows-bnd-agency-spy-own-people
  71. http://www.infowars.com/like-the-nsa-and-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-a-legal-loophole-to-spy-on-its-own-citizens/
  72. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20141202/09513729296/like-nsa-gchq-germanys-foreign-intelligence-agency-uses-legal-loophole-to-spy-its-own-citizens.shtml
  73. _______________________________________
  74. � How Vodafone-Subsidiary Telecom Aided GCHQ�s Spying Efforts ::
  75.  
  76.  Previously unpublished documents show how the UK telecom firm Cable
  77. & Wireless, acquired by Vodafone in 2012, played a key role in
  78. establishing one of the Government Communications Headquarters�
  79. (GCHQ) most controversial surveillance programs.
  80.  
  81.  A joint investigation by NDR, WDR, S�ddeutsche Zeitung and Channel 4
  82. based on documents leaked by whistleblower Edward Snowden, reveals
  83. that Cable & Wireless actively shaped and provided the most data to
  84. GCHQ mass surveillance programs, and received millions of pounds in
  85. compensation. The documents also suggest that Cable & Wireless
  86. assisted GCHQ in breaking into a competitor�s network.
  87.  
  88.  In response to these allegations, Vodafone said that an internal
  89. investigation found no evidence of unlawful conduct, but the company
  90. would not deny it happened.
  91.  
  92. http://www.channel4.com/news/spy-cable-revealed-how-telecoms-firm-worked-with-gchq
  93. http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/snowden-vodafone-101.html
  94. http://www1.wdr.de/daserste/monitor/videos/videovodafonederlangearmdesbritischengeheimdienstes100.html
  95. http://international.sueddeutsche.de/post/103543418200/snowden-leaks-how-vodafone-subsidiary-cable
  96.  
  97. � GCHQ�s Vodafone Cable Master List ::
  98.  
  99. https://netzpolitik.org/2014/cable-master-list-wir-spiegeln-die-snowden-dokumente-ueber-angezapfte-glasfasern-auch-von-vodafone/
  100.  
  101. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ::
  102.  
  103. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-slides.pdf
  104. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-slides-14-1125.pdf
  105. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/vodafone-gchq-netzpolitik-cables-14-1125.pdf
  106.  
  107. � GCHQ Vodafone Gerontic Cables & Slides ZIPPED ::
  108.  
  109. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/Gerontic_GCHQ_SZ.zip
  110.  
  111. � INCENSER: How NSA and GCHQ Are Tapping Internet Cables ::
  112.  
  113. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fi/2014/11/incenser-or-how-nsa-and-gchq-are.html
  114. _______________________________________
  115. � Microsoft SkyDrive (aka OneDrive) Gateway Into NSA PRISM ::
  116.  
  117. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/ms-onedrive-nsa-prism.htm
  118.  
  119.  NOTE: Anything uploaded to �the cloud� is going to be available
  120. for the government to snoop through, the new Apple iphone gadgets
  121. automatically upload all users� personal files into �the cloud�
  122. and yes, looks like Microsoft is also doing it as well.
  123.  
  124.  You might want to avoid using these new systems, go back to using
  125. older desktop computers which are rather easy to fortify. As for
  126. phones, you can buy an old jitterbug phone - it�s a basic cellphone
  127. without all the other crap included - just plain oldschool, mofos!
  128. And add one more thing - a �Blockit Pocket.� ;)
  129. _______________________________________
  130. � German Investigation of the Cooperation Between NSA-BND Part 1 ::
  131.  
  132. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/11/german-investigation-of-cooperation.html
  133. _______________________________________
  134. � UK Lawyers Spied by GCHQ Spies ::
  135.  
  136. http://cryptome.org/2014/11/uk-lawyers-spies-intercept-14-1106.pdf
  137.  
  138. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/06/uk-surveillance-of-lawyers-journalists-gchq/
  139. _______________________________________
  140. � The German Operation Eikonal Part of NSA�s RAMPART-A Program ::
  141.  
  142.  Just over a week ago, the regional German paper S�ddeutsche Zeitung
  143. and the regional broadcasters NDR and WDR came with a story saying that
  144. between 2004 and 2008, the German foreign intelligence service BND had
  145. tapped into the Frankfurt internet exchange DE-CIX and shared the
  146. intercepted data with the NSA. As not all communications of German
  147. citizens could be filtered out, this is considered a violation of the
  148. constitution.
  149.  
  150.  Here we will give a summary of what is currently known about this BND
  151. operation and we will combine this with information from earlier reports.
  152. This will show that it was most likely part of the RAMPART-A program of
  153. the NSA, which includes similar interception efforts by foreign partner
  154. agencies. Finally, we will look at where exactly the BND interception
  155. might have taken place.
  156.  
  157. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/10/the-german-operation-eikonal-as-part-of.html
  158. ---------------------------------------
  159. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  160.  
  161. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  162. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  163. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  164. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  165.  
  166. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  167.  
  168. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  169.  
  170. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  171.  
  172. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  173.  
  174. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  175.  
  176. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  177.  
  178. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  179.  
  180. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  181.  
  182. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  183.  
  184. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  185. _______________________________________
  186. � Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
  187.  
  188.  The National Security Agency has had agents in China, Germany,
  189. and South Korea working on programs that use �physical subversion�
  190. to infiltrate and compromise networks and devices, according to
  191. documents obtained by The Intercept.
  192.  
  193.  The documents, leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, also
  194. indicate that the agency has used �under cover� operatives to gain
  195. access to sensitive data and systems in the global communications
  196. industry, and that these secret agents may have even dealt with
  197. American firms. The documents describe a range of clandestine field
  198. activities that are among the agency�s �core secrets� when it comes
  199. to computer network attacks, details of which are apparently shared
  200. with only a small number of officials outside the NSA.
  201.  
  202.  �It�s something that many people have been wondering about for a
  203. long time,� said Chris Soghoian, principal technologist for the
  204. American Civil Liberties Union, after reviewing the documents.
  205. �I�ve had conversations with executives at tech companies about
  206. this precise thing. How do you know the NSA is not sending people
  207. into your data centers?�
  208.  
  209.  Previous disclosures about the NSA�s corporate partnerships have
  210. focused largely on US companies providing the agency with vast amounts
  211. of customer data, including phone records and email traffic. But
  212. documents published today by The Intercept suggest that even as the
  213. agency uses secret operatives to penetrate them, companies have also
  214. cooperated more broadly to undermine the physical infrastructure of
  215. the internet than has been previously confirmed.
  216.  
  217.  In addition to so-called �close access� operations, the NSA�s �core
  218. secrets� include the fact that the agency works with US and foreign
  219. companies to weaken their encryption systems; the fact that the NSA
  220. spends �hundreds of millions of dollars� on technology to defeat
  221. commercial encryption; and the fact that the agency works with US
  222. and foreign companies to penetrate computer networks, possibly without
  223. the knowledge of the host countries. Many of the NSA�s core secrets
  224. concern its relationships to domestic and foreign corporations.
  225.  
  226.  Some of the documents in this article appear in a new documentary,
  227. CITIZENFOUR, which tells the story of the Snowden disclosures and is
  228. directed by Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras. The documents describe
  229. a panoply of programs classified with the rare designation of
  230. �Exceptionally Compartmented Information,� or ECI, which are only
  231. disclosed to a �very select� number of government officials.
  232.  
  233. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
  234.  
  235. � Top Secret Special Source Operations Classification Guides ::
  236.  
  237. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-whipgenie-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  238.  
  239. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-tarex-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  240.  
  241. � Operation Sentry Eagle (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  242.  
  243. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  244.  
  245. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  246.  
  247. � NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information ::
  248.  
  249. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  250.  
  251. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-pawleys-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  252.  
  253. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-compartments-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  254.  
  255. � NSA National Initiative Task Security (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  256.  
  257. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  258.  
  259. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  260.  
  261. � NSA Computer Network Exploitation ::
  262.  
  263. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-cne-declass-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  264.  
  265. � Following 10 NSA Releases (8.5MB | ZIP) ::
  266.  
  267. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-releases-the-intercept-14-1010.zip
  268. _______________________________________
  269. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides ::
  270.  
  271. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wb/binney.html
  272.  
  273. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides (ZIP) ::
  274.  
  275. Includes the report and the slides.
  276.  
  277. http://fileb.ag/i627vr7a6bkx
  278. _______________________________________
  279. � ACLU�s FOIA Documents Shed Light on One of the NSA�s Most
  280. Powerful Tools (Other Agencies and Legal Loopholes) ::
  281.  
  282. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/new-documents-shed-light-one-nsas-most-powerful-tools
  283.  
  284. � Overview of (Other) Signals Intelligence Authorities ::
  285.  
  286. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Overview%20of%20Signals%20Intelligence%20Authorities.pdf
  287.  
  288. � DoD-DIA�s 16 Legal Loopholes to Spy On US Persons ::
  289.  
  290. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/DoD%20HUMINT%20Legal%20Workshop%20Fundamentals%20of%20HUMINT%20Targeting.pdf
  291.  
  292. � Intelligence Law Handbook Defense HUMINT Service ::
  293.  
  294. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/Intelligence%20Law%20Handbook%20Defense%20HUMINT%20Service.pdf
  295. _______________________________________
  296. � NSA Spies on UN in Vienna ::
  297.  
  298. http://fm4.orf.at/stories/1746596/
  299. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28666/intelligence/nsa-spying-un-vienna.html
  300. http://www.techworm.net/2014/09/erich-mochel-leaks-photos-nsa-spying-united-nations.html
  301. ���������������������������������������
  302. � How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive,
  303. and Destroy Reputations ::
  304.  
  305. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  306.  
  307. http://www.infowars.com/cointelrpo-revisited-greenwald-exposes-nsa-agenda-to-destroy-journalists/
  308.  
  309.  One of the many pressing stories that remains to be told from the
  310. Snowden archive is how western intelligence agencies are attempting
  311. to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of
  312. deception and reputation-destruction. It�s time to tell a chunk of
  313. that story, complete with the relevant documents.
  314.  
  315.  Over the last several weeks, I worked with NBC News to publish a
  316. series of articles about �dirty trick� tactics used by GCHQ�s previously
  317. secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group). These
  318. were based on four classified GCHQ documents presented to the NSA
  319. and the other three partners in the English-speaking �Five Eyes�
  320. alliance. Today, we at the Intercept are publishing another new
  321. JTRIG document, in full, entitled �The Art of Deception: Training
  322. for Online Covert Operations.�
  323.  
  324. � GCHQ ; The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations ::
  325.  
  326. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/02/24/art-deception-training-new-generation-online-covert-operations/
  327.  
  328. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1021430/the-art-of-deception-training-for-a-new.pdf
  329. ---------------------------------------
  330. � Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  331. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  332.  
  333.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  334. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  335. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  336. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  337. �amplify� sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  338. content judged to be �extremist.� The capabilities, detailed
  339. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  340. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  341. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  342. together in a call.
  343.  
  344.  The tools were created by GCHQ�s Joint Threat Research
  345. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  346. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  347. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  348. documents have detailed JTRIG�s use of �fake victim blog
  349. posts,� �false flag operations,� �honey traps� and
  350. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  351. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  352. Facebook users.
  353.  
  354. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  355.  
  356. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  357.  
  358. � GCHQ�s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  359.  
  360. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  361. ---------------------------------------
  362. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  363.  
  364. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  365.  
  366.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  367. program run by the US Agency for International
  368. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  369. communications network� run through �secret shell
  370. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  371. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  372. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  373. �American contractors were gathering their private
  374. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  375. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  376. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  377. government. According to top-secret documents
  378. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  379. operation is frequently discussed at western
  380. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  381. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  382. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  383.  
  384. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  385.  
  386. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  387.  
  388. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  389.  
  390.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  391. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  392. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  393. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  394. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  395. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  396. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  397. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  398. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  399. Space Intelligence Center.�
  400.  
  401.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  402. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  403. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  404. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  405. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  406. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  407. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  408. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  409.  
  410.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  411. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  412. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  413. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  414. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  415. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  416. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  417. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  418. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  419.  
  420. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  421.  
  422. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  423. ---------------------------------------
  424. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  425.  
  426. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  427.  
  428. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  429.  
  430. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  431.  
  432. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  433.  
  434.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  435. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  436. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  437. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  438. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  439. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  440. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  441. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  442. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  443. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  444. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  445.  
  446.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  447. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  448. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  449. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  450. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  451. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  452.  
  453. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  454. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  455. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  456. ---------------------------------------
  457. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  458.  
  459. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  460.  
  461. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  462.  
  463. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  464.  
  465. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  466.  
  467. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  468.  
  469. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  470.  
  471. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  472.  
  473. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  474.  
  475. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  476. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  477. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  478.  
  479. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  480. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  481.  
  482. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  483. ---------------------------------------
  484. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  485.  
  486. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  487. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  488. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  489. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  490.  
  491. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  492.  
  493. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  494.  
  495. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  496.  
  497. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  498.  
  499. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  500.  
  501. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  502. ---------------------------------------
  503. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  504.  
  505. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  506. _______________________________________
  507. � Unraveling NSA�s TURBULENCE Programs ::
  508.  
  509. https://robert.sesek.com/2014/9/unraveling_nsa_s_turbulence_programs.html
  510. _______________________________________
  511. � New Zealand�s Prime Minister Isn�t Telling the Truth About
  512. Mass Surveillance ::
  513.  
  514. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  515.  
  516. � New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  517. Denying It ::
  518.  
  519. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  520.  
  521. � Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  522. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald �A Loser� ::
  523.  
  524. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  525.  
  526. � New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  527.  
  528. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  529.  
  530. � NSA Visit by New Zealand Spy PM Ferguson ::
  531.  
  532. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-nz-ferguson-visit-the-intercept-14-0915.pdf
  533.  
  534. � The Questions for New Zealand on Mass Surveillance ::
  535.  
  536. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/questions-new-zealand-mass-surveillance/
  537. _______________________________________
  538. ? NSA Spooks Deny The Evidence (Provided Below) Exists ::
  539.  
  540.  Did the NSA forget Ed Snowden contacted NBC and released
  541. the evidence contacting authorities regarding his concerns?
  542.  
  543. https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsa-has-revealed-new-details-about-its-exhaustive-search-of-edward-snowdens-emails
  544.  
  545. ? FLASHBACK! Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  546.  
  547.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  548. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  549. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  550. activity before he began leaking government documents
  551. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  552. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  553.  
  554.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  555. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  556. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  557. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  558. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  559. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  560. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  561. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  562. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  563. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  564. attention.��
  565.  
  566.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  567. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  568. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  569. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  570. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  571.  
  572. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  573.  
  574. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  575. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  576.  
  577. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  578. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  579. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  580. ---------------------------------------
  581. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  582.  
  583. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  584.  
  585. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  586. _______________________________________
  587. � NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  588.  
  589.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  590. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  591. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  592. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  593.  
  594. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  595.  
  596. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  597.  
  598. � GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  599.  
  600. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  601.  
  602. � NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  603.  
  604. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  605.  
  606. � NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  607.  
  608. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  609.  
  610. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  611. _______________________________________
  612. � NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  613.  
  614. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  615.  
  616. � Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  617.  
  618. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  619.  
  620. ? UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  621.  
  622. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  623. _______________________________________
  624. � Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  625.  
  626. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  627. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  628. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  629.  
  630. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  631.  
  632. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  633.  
  634. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  635.  
  636. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  637.  
  638. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  639.  
  640. � NSA�s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  641.  
  642. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  643.  
  644. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  645.  
  646. � NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  647.  
  648. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  649. _______________________________________
  650. � DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  651.  
  652. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  653. _______________________________________
  654. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden�s Info
  655.  
  656.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  657. documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks so far,
  658. up to September 5th of 2014. I�m still collecting any
  659. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  660. archive twice per year.
  661.  
  662.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  663. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  664. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  665. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  666.  
  667.  After decompression, the first folder is titled �Eyeballing_
  668. Snowden_Info_Folder_01� and the second is titled �Eyeballing_
  669. Snowden_Info_Folder_02� , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  670. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  671.  
  672.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  673. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  674. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  675.  
  676. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  677. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  678.  
  679. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  680. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  681. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  682.  
  683. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  684. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  685.  
  686. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  687. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  688. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  689. ���������������������������������������
  690. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  691.  
  692. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  693.  
  694. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  695.  
  696. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  697.  
  698. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  699. _______________________________________
  700. � NSA�s Foreign Partnerships ::
  701.  
  702. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  703. _______________________________________
  704. � Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  705.  
  706. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  707.  
  708. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  709.  
  710. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  711.  
  712. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  713. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  714. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  715. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  716. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  717. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  718. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  719. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  720. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  721. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  722. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  723. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  724. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  725.  
  726. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  727.  
  728. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  729. _______________________________________
  730. � How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  731.  
  732. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  733.  
  734. � NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  735.  
  736. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  737. _______________________________________
  738. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  739.  
  740. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  741.  
  742. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  743.  
  744. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  745.  
  746. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  747.  
  748. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  749. _______________________________________
  750. � Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  751.  
  752. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  753.  
  754. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  755.  
  756. � Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  757.  
  758. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  759.  
  760. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  761. _______________________________________
  762. � Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the �Now-Discontinued� (?)
  763. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  764. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  765.  
  766. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  767. _______________________________________
  768. � GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  769.  
  770. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  771.  
  772. � Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  773.  
  774. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  775. _______________________________________
  776. � Barack Obama�s Secret �Terrorist-Tracking� System ::
  777.  
  778.  Nearly half of the people on the US government�s widely shared
  779. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  780. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  781. obtained by The Intercept.
  782.  
  783. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  784.  
  785. � NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  786.  
  787. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  788.  
  789. � Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  790.  
  791.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  792. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  793. secret process that requires neither �concrete facts� nor
  794. �irrefutable evidence� to designate an American or foreigner
  795. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  796. by The Intercept.
  797.  
  798. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  799. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  800. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  801. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  802. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  803.  
  804. NOBODY notes
  805.  
  806.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  807. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  808. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  809. only these �dirty tricks� are now fully digitalized.
  810.  
  811. � Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  812.  
  813.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  814. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  815. and his approach to dissent. �Before I left the State
  816. Department, I filed a complaint with the department�s
  817. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  818. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  819. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  820. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,�
  821. Tye explained. �I have also brought my complaint to the
  822. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  823. inspector general of the NSA.�
  824.  
  825.  These steps � which many say Snowden should�ve taken �
  826. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  827. wouldn�t be garnering attention at all if not for
  828. Snowden�s leaks.
  829.  
  830. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  831.  
  832. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  833. _______________________________________
  834. � Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  835. Israeli Attack ::
  836.  
  837.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  838. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  839. crucial role in Israel�s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  840. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  841. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  842. enable Israel�s military assaults � such as the one on Gaza.
  843.  
  844. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  845.  
  846. � ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  847.  
  848. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  849.  
  850. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  851.  
  852. � US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  853.  
  854. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  855.  
  856. � (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  857.  
  858. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  859. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  860. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  861.  
  862. � (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  863.  
  864. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  865. _______________________________________
  866. � USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  867.  
  868. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  869.  
  870. � NSA�s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia�s Brutal State Police ::
  871.  
  872.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  873. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  874. one of the world�s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  875. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  876. Snowden details the agency�s plans �to provide direct analytic and
  877. technical support� to the Saudis on �internal security� matters.
  878.  
  879.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior�referred to in the document as MOI
  880. � has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  881. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  882. that �Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  883. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,� specifically
  884. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly �poured an
  885. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat� of one human rights
  886. activist. The report also notes the MOI�s use of invasive surveillance
  887. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  888.  
  889.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  890. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  891. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  892. Administration�s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  893. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes �a
  894. period of rejuvenation� for the NSA�s relationship with the Saudi
  895. Ministry of Defense.
  896.  
  897.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  898. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  899. where the US �has [an] interest in regime continuity.�
  900.  
  901. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  902. _______________________________________
  903. � Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  904.  
  905. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  906. _______________________________________
  907. � NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  908.  
  909. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  910.  
  911. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  912. _______________________________________
  913. � Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  914.  
  915.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  916. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  917. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  918.  
  919. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  920.  
  921. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  922. _______________________________________
  923. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  924.  
  925.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  926. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  927. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  928. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  929. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  930. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  931. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  932.  
  933. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  934.  
  935. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  936.  
  937. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  938. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  939. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  940.  
  941. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  942.  
  943. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  944.  
  945. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  946.  
  947.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  948. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  949.  
  950. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  951.  
  952. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  953.  
  954. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  955.  
  956. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  957.  
  958.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  959. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  960. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  961. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  962.  
  963. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  964.  
  965. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  966.  
  967. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  968.  
  969. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  970.  
  971. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  972.  
  973. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  974.  
  975. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  976.  
  977. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  978.  
  979. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  980.  
  981. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  982.  
  983. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  984.  
  985. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  986.  
  987. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  988.  
  989. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  990. _______________________________________
  991. � NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  992.  
  993. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  994.  
  995. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  996. _______________________________________
  997. � The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  998. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  999.  
  1000.  The contents of the surveillance files � almost half of which
  1001. contained information from US citizens or residents � �tell
  1002. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  1003. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  1004. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.�
  1005.  
  1006. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  1007. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  1008. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  1009.  
  1010. � Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  1011. Been Spying On ::
  1012.  
  1013.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  1014. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans�including
  1015. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  1016. academics, and lawyers�under secretive procedures intended
  1017. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  1018.  
  1019.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  1020. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  1021. own government includes:
  1022.  
  1023.  � Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  1024. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  1025. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  1026. Security under President George W. Bush;
  1027.  
  1028.  � Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  1029. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  1030.  
  1031.  � Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  1032. international relations at Rutgers University;
  1033.  
  1034.  � Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  1035. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  1036. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  1037.  
  1038.  � Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  1039. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  1040. rights organization in the country.
  1041.  
  1042. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  1043. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  1044. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  1045.  
  1046. � NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  1047.  
  1048. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  1049.  
  1050. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  1051.  
  1052. � Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  1053.  
  1054. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  1055.  
  1056. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  1057.  
  1058. ? NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  1059.                               ���������
  1060.  �The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  1061. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  1062. crime to law enforcement authorities.�
  1063.  
  1064. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  1065.  
  1066. ? US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  1067.  
  1068. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  1069.  
  1070. NOBODY responds
  1071.  
  1072.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  1073. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  1074. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  1075.  
  1076. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  1077.  
  1078.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  1079. back in 2004 up till today.
  1080.  
  1081. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  1082.  
  1083.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  1084. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  1085.  
  1086. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  1087.  
  1088.  Just like those in the �Department of Justice� they
  1089. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  1090. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  1091. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  1092.  
  1093. � Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  1094.  
  1095. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  1096.  
  1097.  �So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  1098. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  1099. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  1100. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  1101.  
  1102.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  1103. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  1104. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  1105. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  1106. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  1107. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  1108. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  1109. first place.  Realistically, it�s not one or the other, it�s
  1110. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  1111. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  1112. On one hand: it�s evidence, on the other, it�s private information
  1113. on many thousands of people.
  1114.  
  1115.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  1116. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  1117. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  1118. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  1119. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  1120. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  1121. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  1122. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  1123. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  1124. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  1125. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  1126. happen now. The US government�s dealings with brutal regimes
  1127. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  1128. their own people.
  1129.  
  1130.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  1131. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  1132. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  1133. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  1134. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  1135. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  1136. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  1137. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  1138. the Post�s story as a dud, it�s the first page of the next
  1139. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  1140. unpredictable consequences.�
  1141.  
  1142. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  1143. _______________________________________
  1144. � Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  1145.  
  1146. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  1147. ���������������������������������������
  1148. � Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  1149.  
  1150.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  1151. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  1152. Binney � that�s a �totalitarian mentality.�
  1153.  
  1154. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  1155. _______________________________________
  1156. � NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  1157.  
  1158. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  1159.  
  1160.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  1161. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  1162. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  1163. Aussp�hprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  1164.  
  1165.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  1166. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  1167. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  1168. investigate.
  1169.  
  1170.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  1171. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  1172. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  1173. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  1174. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  1175. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  1176.  
  1177. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  1178.  
  1179. MP4 Video Format � http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  1180.  
  1181. � XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  1182.  
  1183. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  1184.  
  1185. � NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  1186.  
  1187. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  1188. ---------------------------------------
  1189. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1190.  
  1191. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1192.  
  1193. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  1194.  
  1195.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  1196. using Tor.�
  1197.  
  1198. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  1199.  
  1200. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  1201.  
  1202. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  1203.  
  1204.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t mean that your
  1205. browser isn�t storing cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman,
  1206. a colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes in browser
  1207. vulnerabilities.
  1208.  
  1209.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  1210. aware of Tor�s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  1211. wide surveillance.
  1212.  
  1213.  �The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  1214. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  1215. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  1216. other Web users,� he wrote.
  1217.  
  1218.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  1219. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  1220. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,�
  1221. he said.
  1222.  
  1223. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  1224.  
  1225. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  1226. Traffic From Machines ::
  1227.  
  1228.  �Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  1229. out large-scale �staining� as a means to identify individual
  1230. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  1231.  
  1232.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  1233. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  1234. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  1235. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  1236. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  1237. session.�
  1238.  
  1239. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  1240.  
  1241. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  1242.  
  1243. � Packet Staining ::
  1244.  
  1245. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  1246. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  1247. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  1248. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  1249.  
  1250. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  1251.  
  1252. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  1253. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  1254. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  1255. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  1256.  
  1257. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  1258.  
  1259.  �We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  1260. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  1261. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  1262. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  1263. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  1264. which allows the user finer control.� ... ...
  1265.  
  1266.  �This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  1267. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  1268. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  1269. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  1270. server can be used to hide one�s location, but a single-hop
  1271. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  1272. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  1273. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  1274. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  1275. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  1276. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  1277. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  1278. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  1279. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  1280. order to trace requests back to the originating client.�
  1281.  
  1282. ... ...
  1283.  
  1284.  �In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  1285. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  1286. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  1287. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  1288. of Tor.�
  1289.  
  1290. ... ...
  1291.  
  1292.  �We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  1293. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  1294. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  1295. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  1296. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  1297. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  1298. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  1299. be tried.�
  1300.  
  1301. ... ...
  1302.  
  1303.  �It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  1304. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  1305. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  1306. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  1307. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  1308. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  1309. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  1310. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  1311. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  1312. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  1313. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  1314. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  1315. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  1316. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  1317. who inspecting the directories.�
  1318.  
  1319. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  1320. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  1321. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  1322.  
  1323. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  1324.  
  1325. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  1326.  
  1327. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  1328.  
  1329. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  1330.  
  1331. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  1332.  
  1333.  �This document doesn�t give much insight into capabilities
  1334. the IC has developed against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  1335. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  1336. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  1337. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  1338. investment. I�d expect there are other programs with more
  1339. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  1340.  
  1341. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  1342. _______________________________________
  1343. � UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  1344.  
  1345. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  1346.  
  1347. � UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  1348. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  1349.  
  1350.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  1351. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany�s
  1352. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  1353. as a double agent for the US.
  1354.  
  1355.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  1356. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  1357. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country�s
  1358. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  1359. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  1360.  
  1361.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  1362. week�s arrest of a 31-year-old BND �double agent� who spent
  1363. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  1364. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  1365. of �10,000 (�7,940) per document. ...
  1366.  
  1367.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin�s
  1368. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  1369. in �co-operation�. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  1370. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  1371. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  1372.  
  1373.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  1374. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin�s Russian
  1375. embassy. The Germans had considered it �impossible� that one
  1376. of their own intelligence men could be working as a �double agent�
  1377. for the Americans.
  1378.  
  1379. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1380. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1381. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1382. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1383.  
  1384. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1385.  
  1386. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1387.  
  1388. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1389.  
  1390. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1391.  
  1392. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1393.  
  1394. � Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1395.  
  1396. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1397.  
  1398. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1399.  
  1400. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1401.  
  1402. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1403.  
  1404. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1405.  
  1406. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1407.  
  1408. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1409.  
  1410. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1411.  
  1412. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1413.  
  1414. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1415.  
  1416. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1417.  
  1418. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  1419.  
  1420.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  1421. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  1422. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  1423. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  1424. where she grew up.
  1425.  
  1426. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1427. _______________________________________
  1428. � NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  1429.  
  1430. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  1431. _______________________________________
  1432. � Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  1433.  
  1434. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  1435. _______________________________________
  1436. � Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  1437.  
  1438. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  1439. _______________________________________
  1440. � NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  1441.  
  1442. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  1443. _______________________________________
  1444. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  1445.  
  1446. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  1447. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  1448. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  1449. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  1450.  
  1451. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  1452.  
  1453. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  1454.  
  1455. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  1456.  
  1457. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  1458.  
  1459. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1460.  
  1461. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  1462.  
  1463. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  1464.  
  1465. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  1466.  
  1467. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1468.  
  1469. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  1470. _______________________________________
  1471.  Keith Alexander�s talking points for strategic meeting
  1472. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  1473. Service (DDIS).
  1474.  
  1475. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  1476. _______________________________________
  1477. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1478.  
  1479. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  1480.  
  1481. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1482.  
  1483. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  1484. _______________________________________
  1485. � Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  1486.  
  1487. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  1488. _______________________________________
  1489. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  1490. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  1491.  
  1492. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  1493. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  1494. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  1495.  
  1496.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  1497. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  1498. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  1499. user in the UK.
  1500.  
  1501. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  1502.  
  1503. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  1504. _______________________________________
  1505. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  1506. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  1507.  
  1508. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  1509. ---------------------------------------
  1510. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1511.  
  1512. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1513. _______________________________________
  1514. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  1515.  
  1516. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  1517. _______________________________________
  1518. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  1519.  
  1520. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  1521.  
  1522. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  1523. _______________________________________
  1524. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  1525. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  1526.  
  1527. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  1528. _______________________________________
  1529. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  1530.  
  1531. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  1532.  
  1533. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  1534.  
  1535. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  1536. _______________________________________
  1537. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  1538. to Tap Phones ::
  1539.  
  1540. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  1541. _______________________________________
  1542. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  1543.  
  1544. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  1545. _______________________________________
  1546. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  1547. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  1548. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  1549.  
  1550.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  1551. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  1552. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  1553. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  1554. they were spying on � was hidden?
  1555.  
  1556.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  1557. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  1558. everybody what they�re doing?
  1559.  
  1560.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  1561. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  1562. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  1563. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  1564. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  1565. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  1566. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  1567. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  1568. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  1569.  
  1570.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  1571. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  1572. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  1573. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  1574. was a specialist in, by the way.
  1575.  
  1576.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  1577. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  1578. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  1579. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  1580. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  1581. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  1582.  
  1583.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  1584. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  1585. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  1586. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  1587. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  1588. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  1589. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  1590. for the JWICS.
  1591.  
  1592.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  1593. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  1594. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  1595. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  1596. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  1597. that [clearance].
  1598.  
  1599.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  1600. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  1601. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  1602. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  1603.  
  1604.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  1605. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  1606. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  1607. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  1608. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  1609. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  1610. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1611. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1612.  
  1613.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  1614. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  1615. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  1616.  
  1617.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1618. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  1619. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  1620. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  1621. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  1622.  
  1623.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  1624. to placate the American people.
  1625.  
  1626.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  1627. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  1628. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  1629.  
  1630.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  1631. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  1632. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  1633. investigation.�
  1634.  
  1635. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  1636. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  1637. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  1638. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  1639. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  1640. _______________________________________
  1641. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  1642.  
  1643. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  1644.  
  1645. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  1646.  
  1647. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  1648.  
  1649. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  1650.  
  1651. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  1652.  
  1653. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  1654.  
  1655. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  1656.  
  1657. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  1658.  
  1659. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  1660.  
  1661. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  1662.  
  1663. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  1664.  
  1665. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  1666.  
  1667. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  1668. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  1669.  
  1670. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  1671.  
  1672. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  1673. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  1674.  
  1675. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  1676.  
  1677. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  1678. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  1679.  
  1680. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  1681. _______________________________________
  1682. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  1683.  
  1684.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  1685. agencies are now also using the same facial
  1686. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  1687. identification systems are being developed as well.
  1688. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  1689.  
  1690. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  1691.  
  1692. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  1693.  
  1694. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  1695.  
  1696. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  1697. _______________________________________
  1698. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  1699.  
  1700. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  1701. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  1702. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  1703. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  1704. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  1705. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  1706. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  1707. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  1708. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  1709. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  1710.  
  1711. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  1712.  
  1713. And a few more to think about,
  1714.  
  1715. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  1716. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  1717. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  1718. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  1719. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  1720. _______________________________________
  1721. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1722.  
  1723.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1724. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1725. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  1726. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1727. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  1728. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  1729.  
  1730.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  1731. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1732. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  1733. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  1734. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  1735. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1736. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1737. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1738. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  1739. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  1740. attention.��
  1741.  
  1742.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  1743. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1744. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  1745. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1746. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1747.  
  1748. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1749.  
  1750. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1751. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1752.  
  1753. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1754. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1755. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1756. ---------------------------------------
  1757. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1758.  
  1759. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1760.  
  1761. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1762. _______________________________________
  1763. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  1764.  
  1765. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  1766.  
  1767. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  1768.  
  1769. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  1770. _______________________________________
  1771. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  1772. Securely and Anonymously ::
  1773.  
  1774.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  1775. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  1776. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  1777. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  1778. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  1779. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  1780. internet somewhere or using a third party
  1781. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  1782. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  1783. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  1784. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  1785. download the file from you.
  1786.  
  1787. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  1788. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  1789.  
  1790. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  1791.  
  1792. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  1793.  
  1794. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  1795.  
  1796. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  1797. _______________________________________
  1798. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  1799. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  1800.  
  1801. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  1802.  
  1803. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  1804.  
  1805. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  1806. _______________________________________
  1807. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  1808.  
  1809. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  1810.  
  1811. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  1812.  
  1813. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  1814.  
  1815. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  1816.  
  1817. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  1818.  
  1819. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  1820.  
  1821. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  1822.  
  1823. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  1824. Online Next Week ::
  1825.  
  1826. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  1827. ---------------------------------------
  1828. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  1829.  
  1830. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  1831.  
  1832. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  1833.  
  1834. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  1835. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  1836.  
  1837. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  1838. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  1839.  
  1840. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  1841.  
  1842. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  1843. Infiltration by NSA ::
  1844.  
  1845. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  1846.  
  1847. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  1848.  
  1849. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  1850.  
  1851.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  1852. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  1853. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  1854. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  1855. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  1856. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  1857. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  1858. they�re delivered.
  1859.  
  1860. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  1861.  
  1862. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  1863.  
  1864. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  1865.  
  1866. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  1867.  
  1868. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  1869.  
  1870. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  1871. ______________________________________
  1872. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  1873. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  1874.  
  1875. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  1876. _______________________________________
  1877. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  1878. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  1879.  
  1880. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  1881. _______________________________________
  1882. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  1883.  
  1884. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  1885. _______________________________________
  1886. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1887.  
  1888. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1889.  
  1890. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  1891.  
  1892. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  1893. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  1894.  
  1895.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  1896. national security and other government officials will no
  1897. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  1898. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  1899.  
  1900. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  1901. _______________________________________
  1902. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  1903.  
  1904. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  1905.  
  1906. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  1907. ______________________________________
  1908. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  1909.  
  1910. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  1911. ______________________________________
  1912. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  1913. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  1914.  
  1915. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  1916. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  1917.  
  1918. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  1919.  
  1920. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  1921. ______________________________________
  1922. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  1923.  
  1924. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  1925.  
  1926. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  1927.  
  1928. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  1929.  
  1930. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  1931.  
  1932.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  1933. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  1934. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  1935. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  1936. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  1937. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  1938. industry which generates something in the
  1939. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  1940.  
  1941.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  1942.  
  1943. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  1944. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  1945. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  1946. _______________________________________
  1947. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  1948.  
  1949. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  1950. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  1951.  
  1952.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  1953. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  1954. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  1955. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  1956. activities and future plans.� � �
  1957.  
  1958.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  1959. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  1960. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  1961.  
  1962. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  1963.  
  1964. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  1965.  
  1966. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  1967.  
  1968. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  1969.  
  1970. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  1971.  
  1972. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  1973. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  1974.  
  1975.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  1976. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  1977. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  1978. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  1979. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  1980. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  1981. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  1982. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  1983.  
  1984.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  1985. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  1986. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  1987. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  1988. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  1989. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  1990. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  1991.  
  1992. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  1993. _______________________________________
  1994. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  1995.  
  1996. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  1997. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  1998. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  1999.  
  2000.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  2001. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  2002. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  2003. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  2004. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  2005. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  2006. Edward Snowden.
  2007.  
  2008.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  2009. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  2010. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  2011. for surveillance.
  2012.  
  2013.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  2014. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  2015. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  2016. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  2017. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  2018.  
  2019.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  2020. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  2021. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  2022. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  2023.  
  2024.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  2025. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  2026. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  2027. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  2028. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  2029. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  2030. and long-term storage.
  2031.  
  2032. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  2033.  
  2034. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  2035.  
  2036.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  2037. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  2038. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  2039. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  2040. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  2041. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  2042. but they won�t say.
  2043.  
  2044. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  2045.  
  2046. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  2047.  
  2048. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  2049.  
  2050. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  2051. _______________________________________
  2052. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  2053.  
  2054.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  2055. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  2056. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  2057. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  2058. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  2059. already been published previously. The second was
  2060. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  2061.  
  2062. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  2063.  
  2064. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  2065.  
  2066.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  2067. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  2068. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  2069. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  2070. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  2071. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  2072. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  2073. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  2074. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  2075.  
  2076.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  2077. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  2078.  
  2079.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  2080. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  2081. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  2082. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  2083. benefit� the document says.
  2084.  
  2085.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  2086. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  2087. company is working towards creating a so-called
  2088. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  2089. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  2090. per second.
  2091.  
  2092. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  2093. _______________________________________
  2094. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  2095.  
  2096. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  2097. _______________________________________
  2098. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  2099.  
  2100. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  2101. _______________________________________
  2102. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  2103.  
  2104. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  2105. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  2106. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  2107. _______________________________________
  2108. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  2109.  
  2110.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  2111. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  2112. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  2113. top human rights body.
  2114.  
  2115.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  2116. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  2117. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  2118. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  2119. Human Rights Watch.
  2120.  
  2121. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  2122.  
  2123. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  2124. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  2125.  
  2126. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  2127. _______________________________________
  2128. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  2129.  
  2130.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  2131. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  2132. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  2133.  
  2134.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  2135. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  2136. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  2137. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  2138. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  2139. high as two years. ... ...
  2140.  
  2141.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  2142. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  2143. by domestic courts.
  2144.  
  2145. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  2146. _______________________________________
  2147. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  2148.  
  2149. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  2150. _______________________________________
  2151. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  2152.  
  2153.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  2154. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  2155. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  2156. to create national-only electronic networks could
  2157. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  2158. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  2159. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  2160. the USTR said in its annual report.
  2161.  
  2162. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  2163. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  2164. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  2165. ���������������������������������������
  2166. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  2167.  
  2168. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  2169.  
  2170. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  2171.  
  2172. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2173. _______________________________________
  2174. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  2175.  
  2176.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  2177. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  2178. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  2179. any information that comes out and will provide an
  2180. updated archive from time to time.
  2181.  
  2182.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  2183. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  2184. 927MB decompressed.
  2185.  
  2186.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  2187. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  2188. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  2189.  
  2190. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2191. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  2192.  
  2193. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  2194. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2195. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  2196. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2197. _______________________________________
  2198. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  2199.  
  2200. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  2201. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  2202. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  2203. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  2204. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  2205. _______________________________________
  2206. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  2207.  
  2208. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  2209.  
  2210. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  2211.  
  2212. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  2213.  
  2214. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  2215.  
  2216. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  2217. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  2218. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  2219. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  2220.  
  2221. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  2222. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  2223.  
  2224. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  2225. _______________________________________
  2226. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  2227.  
  2228. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  2229.  
  2230. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  2231.  
  2232. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  2233.  
  2234. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  2235.  
  2236. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  2237.  
  2238. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  2239.  
  2240. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  2241. _______________________________________
  2242. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  2243.  
  2244.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  2245. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  2246. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  2247. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  2248. public as possible� as well helping the public
  2249. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  2250. how we�re protecting national security.�
  2251.  
  2252. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  2253. ���������������������������������������
  2254. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  2255.  
  2256. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  2257.  
  2258. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  2259.  
  2260. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  2261.  
  2262. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  2263.  
  2264. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  2265.  
  2266. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  2267.  
  2268. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  2269.  
  2270.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  2271. offensive against China, with targets including the
  2272. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  2273. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  2274. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  2275. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  2276. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  2277. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  2278. well as telecommunications companies.
  2279.  
  2280.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  2281. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  2282. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  2283. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  2284. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  2285. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  2286. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  2287. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  2288. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  2289. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  2290. battle for data supremacy.
  2291.  
  2292.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  2293. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  2294. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  2295. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  2296. among other things.
  2297.  
  2298. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  2299. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  2300. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  2301. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  2302.  
  2303. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  2304.  
  2305.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  2306. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  2307. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  2308. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  2309. has lodged representations with the American side on
  2310. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  2311. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  2312.  
  2313. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  2314. _______________________________________
  2315. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  2316.  
  2317.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  2318. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  2319. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  2320. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  2321. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  2322. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  2323. routers, the devices that connect computer
  2324. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  2325. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  2326. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  2327. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  2328. that flow over their networks.
  2329.  
  2330.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  2331. aspired to create a database that would function
  2332. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  2333. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  2334. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  2335. activity � they are targeted only because they
  2336. control access to networks the agency wants to
  2337. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  2338. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  2339. of the posts says.
  2340.  
  2341.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  2342. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  2343. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  2344. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  2345. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  2346. poses with amusing captions.�
  2347.  
  2348. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  2349. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  2350. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  2351. _______________________________________
  2352. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  2353.  
  2354. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  2355. _______________________________________
  2356. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  2357.  
  2358. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  2359.  
  2360. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  2361.  
  2362. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  2363.  
  2364. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  2365.  
  2366. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  2367.  
  2368. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  2369. _______________________________________
  2370. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  2371.  
  2372. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  2373. _______________________________________
  2374. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  2375.  
  2376. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  2377.  
  2378. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2379. _______________________________________
  2380. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2381.  
  2382. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2383. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2384. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2385. _______________________________________
  2386. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2387.  
  2388. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2389.  
  2390. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2391. _______________________________________
  2392. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2393.  
  2394. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2395. _______________________________________
  2396. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2397.  
  2398. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2399.  
  2400. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2401.  
  2402. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2403. _______________________________________
  2404. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2405.  
  2406. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2407. _______________________________________
  2408. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2409.  
  2410. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2411.  
  2412. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2413.  
  2414. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2415.  
  2416. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2417.  
  2418. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  2419. _______________________________________
  2420. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  2421.  
  2422. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  2423.  
  2424. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  2425.  
  2426. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  2427. _______________________________________
  2428. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  2429.  
  2430. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  2431. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  2432. _______________________________________
  2433. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  2434. With Malware ::
  2435.  
  2436.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  2437. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  2438. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  2439. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  2440. level of human oversight in the process.
  2441.  
  2442.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  2443. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  2444. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  2445. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  2446. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  2447. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  2448. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  2449. Internet and phone networks.
  2450.  
  2451. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  2452. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  2453. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  2454. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  2455. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  2456. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  2457. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  2458. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  2459. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  2460.  
  2461.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  2462. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  2463. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  2464. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  2465. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  2466. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  2467.  
  2468.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  2469. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  2470. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  2471. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  2472. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  2473. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  2474. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  2475. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  2476. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  2477. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  2478. instead of individually.�
  2479.  
  2480. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  2481.  
  2482. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  2483.  
  2484.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  2485. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  2486. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  2487. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  2488. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  2489. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  2490. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  2491. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  2492. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  2493. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  2494. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  2495. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  2496. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  2497. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  2498. execute endpoint operations.�
  2499.  
  2500. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2501.  
  2502.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  2503. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  2504. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  2505. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  2506.  
  2507.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  2508. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  2509. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  2510. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  2511. looks suspicious.
  2512.  
  2513.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  2514. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  2515. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  2516. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  2517. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  2518.  
  2519.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  2520. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  2521. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  2522. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  2523. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  2524. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  2525. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  2526.  
  2527.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  2528. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  2529. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  2530. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  2531. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  2532. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  2533. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  2534. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  2535. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  2536. in action.
  2537.  
  2538. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  2539. Computers for Surveillance ::
  2540.  
  2541. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  2542.  
  2543. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  2544.  
  2545. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  2546.  
  2547.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  2548. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  2549. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  2550. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  2551. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  2552. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  2553.  
  2554. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  2555.  
  2556. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  2557. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  2558. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  2559. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  2560. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2561. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  2562. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  2563. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  2564. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  2565. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  2566.  
  2567. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  2568.  
  2569. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  2570.  
  2571. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  2572.  
  2573. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  2574. _______________________________________
  2575. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  2576.  
  2577. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  2578. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  2579. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  2580. _______________________________________
  2581. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  2582.  
  2583. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  2584. _______________________________________
  2585. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  2586.  
  2587.  Alliances between security services are usually
  2588. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  2589. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  2590. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  2591. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  2592. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  2593. internet traffic.
  2594.  
  2595.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  2596. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  2597. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  2598. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  2599. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  2600.  
  2601.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  2602. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  2603. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  2604. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  2605. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  2606. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  2607.  
  2608.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2609. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2610. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2611. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2612. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2613. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2614. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2615.  
  2616. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2617.  
  2618. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2619. _______________________________________
  2620. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  2621.  
  2622. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  2623.  
  2624. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  2625. ---------------------------------------
  2626. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  2627.  
  2628. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  2629.  
  2630. � NSA Spies Too ::
  2631.  
  2632. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2633. _______________________________________
  2634. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  2635.  
  2636. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  2637.  
  2638. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  2639.  
  2640.  The documents show that images were collected
  2641. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  2642. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  2643. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  2644. programs.
  2645.  
  2646. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  2647. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  2648. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  2649. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  2650.  
  2651. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  2652.  
  2653. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  2654. _______________________________________
  2655. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  2656.  
  2657. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  2658. _______________________________________
  2659. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  2660.  
  2661. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  2662.  
  2663. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  2664. _______________________________________
  2665. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  2666. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  2667.  
  2668. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  2669.  
  2670. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  2671. _______________________________________
  2672. � NSA Observer ::
  2673.  
  2674. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  2675. _______________________________________
  2676. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  2677.  
  2678. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2679.  
  2680. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  2681. _______________________________________
  2682. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  2683.  
  2684. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  2685.  
  2686. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  2687. _______________________________________
  2688. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  2689.  
  2690. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  2691.  
  2692. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  2693.  
  2694. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  2695.  
  2696. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  2697. _______________________________________
  2698. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  2699.  
  2700.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  2701. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  2702. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  2703. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  2704. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  2705. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  2706. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  2707. targets without confirming their veracity on
  2708. the ground.
  2709.  
  2710. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  2711. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  2712. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  2713. _______________________________________
  2714. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  2715.  
  2716.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  2717. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  2718. shows that an American law firm was
  2719. monitored while representing a foreign
  2720. government in trade disputes with the
  2721. United States. The disclosure offers a
  2722. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  2723. which Americans were ensnared by the
  2724. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  2725. interest because lawyers in the United
  2726. States with clients overseas have
  2727. expressed growing concern that their
  2728. confidential communications could be
  2729. compromised by such surveillance.
  2730.  
  2731. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  2732. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  2733. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  2734.  
  2735. NOBODY comments
  2736.  
  2737. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  2738.  
  2739.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  2740. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  2741. be declassified for research in public domain.
  2742. _______________________________________
  2743. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  2744.  
  2745. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  2746.  
  2747. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  2748.  
  2749. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  2750. _______________________________________
  2751. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  2752.  
  2753. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  2754. _______________________________________
  2755. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  2756. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  2757.  
  2758.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  2759. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  2760. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  2761. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  2762. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  2763.  
  2764. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  2765. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  2766. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  2767.  
  2768. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  2769. the German Chancellor ::
  2770.  
  2771. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  2772. _______________________________________
  2773. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  2774. Phone Call Spying ::
  2775.  
  2776. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  2777.  
  2778. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  2779. _______________________________________
  2780. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  2781.  
  2782. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  2783. _______________________________________
  2784. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  2785.  
  2786. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  2787. _______________________________________
  2788.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  2789. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  2790. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  2791. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  2792. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  2793. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  2794.  
  2795. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  2796. ���������������������������������������
  2797. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2798.  
  2799. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2800.  
  2801. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2802.  
  2803. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  2804.  
  2805. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  2806.  
  2807. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  2808.  
  2809.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  2810. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  2811. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  2812. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  2813. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  2814. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  2815. left the terminal.
  2816.  
  2817.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  2818. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  2819. clandestine operation by the Communications
  2820. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  2821. certainly illegal. ... ...
  2822.  
  2823.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  2824. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  2825. software program CSEC was developing with help
  2826. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  2827.  
  2828.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  2829. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  2830. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  2831. into other cities/regions.�
  2832.  
  2833. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  2834.  
  2835.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  2836. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  2837.  
  2838. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  2839.  
  2840. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  2841.  
  2842. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  2843.  
  2844. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  2845.  
  2846. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  2847. _______________________________________
  2848. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  2849.  
  2850. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  2851.  
  2852. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  2853.  
  2854. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  2855. _______________________________________
  2856. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  2857.  
  2858.  Documents taken from the National Security
  2859. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  2860. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  2861. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  2862. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  2863. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  2864. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  2865. information, for analysis. At the time the
  2866. documents were printed, they were also able to
  2867. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  2868.  
  2869.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  2870. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  2871. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  2872. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  2873. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  2874. visits. The monitoring program is called
  2875. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  2876.  
  2877.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  2878. British had to have been either physically able
  2879. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  2880. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  2881. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  2882. and would be able to extract some key data
  2883. about specific users as well.
  2884.  
  2885. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  2886. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  2887. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  2888. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  2889. _______________________________________
  2890. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  2891.  
  2892. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  2893. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  2894. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  2895.  
  2896. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  2897.  
  2898.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  2899. on the iPhone alone.�
  2900.  
  2901. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  2902.  
  2903. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  2904.  
  2905. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  2906.  
  2907. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  2908. _______________________________________
  2909. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  2910.  
  2911.  The National Security Agency program that
  2912. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  2913. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  2914. Thursday in a newly released report.
  2915.  
  2916. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  2917.  
  2918.  �We have not identified a single instance
  2919. involving a threat to the United States in
  2920. which the program made a concrete difference
  2921. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  2922. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  2923. report released Thursday.
  2924.  
  2925.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  2926. domestic spying will continue.
  2927.  
  2928. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  2929. _______________________________________
  2930. � Snowden Speaks ::
  2931.  
  2932. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  2933. _______________________________________
  2934. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  2935.  
  2936. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  2937.  
  2938. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  2939.          ���
  2940. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  2941.  
  2942. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  2943.  
  2944.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  2945. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  2946. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  2947. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  2948. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  2949. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  2950. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  2951. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  2952. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  2953. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  2954. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  2955. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  2956. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  2957. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  2958. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  2959.  
  2960. Reform?
  2961.  
  2962.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  2963. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  2964. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  2965. whether legal or not?
  2966.  
  2967. The reform will come from people taking action.
  2968.  
  2969.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  2970. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  2971. _______________________________________
  2972. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  2973.  
  2974. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  2975. _______________________________________
  2976. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  2977.  
  2978.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  2979. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  2980. main internet cables:
  2981.  
  2982.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  2983.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  2984.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  2985.  
  2986. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  2987. ---------------------------------------
  2988. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  2989. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  2990. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  2991. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  2992. _______________________________________
  2993. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  2994.  
  2995. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  2996.  
  2997. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  2998.  
  2999. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  3000. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  3001. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  3002. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  3003. ---------------------------------------
  3004. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  3005. _______________________________________
  3006. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  3007.  
  3008. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  3009.  
  3010. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  3011.  
  3012. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  3013.  
  3014.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  3015. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  3016. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  3017. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  3018.  
  3019.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  3020. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  3021. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  3022. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  3023.  
  3024.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  3025. text message database to extract information
  3026. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  3027. transactions and more � including of individuals
  3028. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  3029.  
  3030. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  3031. _______________________________________
  3032. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  3033.  
  3034. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  3035.  
  3036. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  3037.  
  3038.  The technology, which the agency has used
  3039. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  3040. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  3041. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  3042. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  3043. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  3044. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  3045. set up miles away from the target.
  3046.  
  3047.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  3048. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  3049. American intelligence agencies for years:
  3050. getting into computers that adversaries,
  3051. and some American partners, have tried to
  3052. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  3053. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  3054. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  3055. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  3056. ---------------------------------------
  3057. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  3058.  
  3059. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  3060. _______________________________________
  3061. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  3062.  
  3063. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  3064. ---------------------------------------
  3065. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  3066.  
  3067. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  3068. _______________________________________
  3069. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  3070.  
  3071. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  3072. _______________________________________
  3073. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  3074.  
  3075. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  3076. _______________________________________
  3077. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  3078.  
  3079. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  3080. _______________________________________
  3081. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  3082. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  3083.  
  3084. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  3085.  
  3086. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  3087. _______________________________________
  3088. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  3089. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  3090.  
  3091. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  3092. _______________________________________
  3093. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  3094. All Encryption ::
  3095.  
  3096.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  3097. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  3098. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  3099. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  3100. used to protect banking, medical, business
  3101. and government records around the world.
  3102.  
  3103.  According to documents provided by former
  3104. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  3105. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  3106. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  3107. than classical computers � is part of a
  3108. $79.7 million research program titled
  3109. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  3110. work is hosted under classified contracts
  3111. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  3112.  
  3113. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  3114. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  3115. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  3116. _______________________________________
  3117. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  3118.  
  3119. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  3120. _______________________________________
  3121. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  3122.  
  3123. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  3124. _______________________________________
  3125. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  3126.  
  3127. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  3128.  
  3129. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  3130.  
  3131. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  3132.  
  3133. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  3134.  
  3135. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  3136.  
  3137. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  3138. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  3139. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  3140.  
  3141. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  3142.  
  3143.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  3144. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  3145. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  3146. infiltrates computers around the world and
  3147. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  3148. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  3149. it is targeting. ... ...
  3150.  
  3151. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  3152.  
  3153.  The insert method and other variants of
  3154. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  3155. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  3156. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  3157. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  3158. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  3159. also incorporates routers and servers
  3160. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  3161. network by infecting these networks with
  3162. �implants� that then allow the government
  3163. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  3164.  
  3165.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  3166. to identify and track its targets based on
  3167. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  3168. could include certain email addresses or
  3169. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  3170. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  3171. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  3172. additional information like an email address.
  3173. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  3174. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  3175. ---------------------------------------
  3176. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  3177.  
  3178. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  3179.  
  3180. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  3181.  
  3182.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  3183. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  3184. that are being logged into on that computer
  3185. as long as the user does not clear browser
  3186. cookies.�
  3187.  
  3188. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  3189.  
  3190. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  3191.  
  3192. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  3193. ---------------------------------------
  3194. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  3195.  
  3196.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  3197. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  3198. could be described as master carpenters for
  3199. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  3200. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  3201. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  3202. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  3203. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  3204. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  3205. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  3206. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  3207. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  3208. ability to establish a global covert network
  3209. that operates alongside the Internet.
  3210.  
  3211.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  3212. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  3213. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  3214. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  3215. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  3216. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  3217. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  3218. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  3219. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  3220. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  3221. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  3222. over $1 million.
  3223.  
  3224.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  3225. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  3226. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  3227. clear preference for planting their malicious
  3228. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  3229. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  3230. to load when a computer is turned on.
  3231.  
  3232.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  3233. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  3234. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  3235. to virus protection and other security programs.
  3236. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  3237. computer has been completely erased and a new
  3238. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  3239. can continue to function and ensures that new
  3240. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  3241. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  3242. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  3243. this approach has provided them with the
  3244. possibility of permanent access.
  3245.  
  3246.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  3247. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  3248. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  3249. with the exception of latter, are American
  3250. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  3251. intelligence agency is compromising the
  3252. technology and products of American companies.
  3253.  
  3254. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  3255. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  3256. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  3257. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  3258. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  3259.  
  3260. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  3261.  
  3262. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  3263.  
  3264. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  3265.  
  3266. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  3267.  
  3268. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  3269.  
  3270. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  3271.  
  3272. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  3273.  
  3274. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  3275.  
  3276. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  3277.  
  3278. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  3279.  
  3280. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  3281.  
  3282. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  3283.  
  3284. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  3285.  
  3286. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  3287.  
  3288. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  3289.  
  3290. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  3291.  
  3292. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  3293.  
  3294. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  3295.  
  3296. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  3297.  
  3298. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  3299.  
  3300. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  3301.  
  3302. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  3303.  
  3304. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  3305.  
  3306. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  3307.  
  3308. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  3309.  
  3310. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  3311. ---------------------------------------
  3312. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  3313.  
  3314. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3315.  
  3316. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  3317.  
  3318. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  3319.  
  3320. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  3321. ---------------------------------------
  3322. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  3323.  
  3324. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  3325.  
  3326. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  3327.  
  3328.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  3329. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  3330. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  3331.  
  3332. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  3333.  
  3334. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  3335. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  3336.  
  3337.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  3338. in its operating system had left devices open
  3339. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  3340. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  3341. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  3342. of its mass spying program.
  3343.  
  3344. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  3345. ---------------------------------------
  3346. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  3347. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  3348.  
  3349. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  3350.  
  3351. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  3352. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  3353.  
  3354. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  3355.  
  3356. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  3357.  
  3358. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  3359.  
  3360.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  3361. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  3362.  
  3363. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  3364. _______________________________________
  3365. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  3366.  
  3367. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  3368.  
  3369. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  3370.  
  3371. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  3372. _______________________________________
  3373. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  3374.  
  3375. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  3376.  
  3377.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3378. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3379. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  3380. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3381. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3382. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3383. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3384. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3385. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  3386. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3387.  
  3388.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  3389. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3390. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3391. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  3392. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3393. did not want to know any more.
  3394. ---------------------------------------
  3395. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3396.  
  3397. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3398. _______________________________________
  3399. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3400. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3401.  
  3402. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3403. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3404. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3405. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3406. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3407. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3408. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3409. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3410.  
  3411. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3412.  
  3413.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3414. National Security Agency program which
  3415. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3416. calls made to, from or within the United
  3417. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3418.  
  3419.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  3420. that the program appears to violate the
  3421. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  3422. searches and seizures. He also said the
  3423. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  3424. that collecting the information had helped
  3425. to head off terrorist attacks.
  3426.  
  3427.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  3428. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  3429. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  3430. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  3431. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  3432. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  3433. the order to allow for an appeal.
  3434.  
  3435. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  3436. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  3437.  
  3438.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  3439. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  3440. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  3441. in June in news stories based on leaks
  3442. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  3443. For seven years, the metadata program has
  3444. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  3445. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  3446. Court and found constitutional by at least
  3447. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  3448.  
  3449. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  3450.  
  3451. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  3452.  
  3453. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  3454.  
  3455. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  3456.  
  3457. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  3458.  
  3459. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  3460. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  3461.  
  3462. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  3463.  
  3464. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  3465.  
  3466. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  3467. ---------------------------------------
  3468. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  3469.  
  3470. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  3471.  
  3472. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  3473.  
  3474. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  3475. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  3476.  
  3477. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  3478. Spying Programs ::
  3479.  
  3480. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  3481. ---------------------------------------
  3482. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  3483. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  3484.  
  3485. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  3486.  
  3487. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  3488.  
  3489. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  3490. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  3491.  
  3492. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  3493.  
  3494. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  3495. _______________________________________
  3496. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  3497.  
  3498.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  3499. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  3500. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  3501.  
  3502. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  3503.  
  3504. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  3505.  
  3506.  - Military Information
  3507.  - Economic Information
  3508.  - Information Operations Information
  3509.  - Political Information �
  3510. _______________________________________
  3511. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  3512. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  3513.  
  3514. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  3515. ���������������������������������������
  3516. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  3517.  
  3518. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  3519.  
  3520. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  3521.  
  3522. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  3523.  
  3524. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  3525.  
  3526. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  3527.  
  3528. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  3529.  
  3530. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  3531.  
  3532. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  3533.  
  3534. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  3535. _______________________________________
  3536. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  3537. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  3538.  
  3539.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  3540. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  3541. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  3542. government access in order to make network
  3543. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  3544. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  3545. in millions of homes and businesses within
  3546. the UK,� the paper states.
  3547.  
  3548.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  3549. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  3550. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  3551. assigns all their modems an extra address
  3552. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  3553. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  3554. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  3555. a second IP address for management, except
  3556. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  3557. assigned to the United States Department
  3558. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  3559. of speculation that this is actually a
  3560. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  3561. they can secretly monitor and control
  3562. peoples� home networks.
  3563.  
  3564.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  3565. The better explanation is that BT simply
  3566. chose this address space because it�s
  3567. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  3568. address, it�s only used inside the private
  3569. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  3570. that address space, you�ll see that your
  3571. packets go nowhere.
  3572.  
  3573. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  3574. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  3575. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  3576.  
  3577. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  3578.  
  3579.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  3580. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  3581. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  3582. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  3583. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  3584. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  3585. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  3586. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  3587. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  3588. It�s past time for something new.�
  3589.  
  3590. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  3591. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  3592. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  3593. ---------------------------------------
  3594. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  3595.  
  3596.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  3597. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  3598. worldwide with malicious software designed
  3599. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  3600. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  3601. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  3602.  
  3603.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  3604. explains how the NSA collects information
  3605. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  3606. shows that the intelligence service uses
  3607. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  3608. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3609. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3610. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3611. software.
  3612.  
  3613.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3614. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3615. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3616. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  3617. has been installing this malicious software
  3618. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3619. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  3620. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  3621. through a process of luring employees to a
  3622. false Linkedin page.
  3623.  
  3624. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  3625. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3626. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  3627. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  3628.  
  3629. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  3630.  
  3631.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  3632. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  3633. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  3634. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  3635. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  3636. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  3637. and citizens.
  3638.  
  3639.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  3640. will deter this bounty of profits for
  3641. the comsec industry, unless the public
  3642. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  3643. the nettle, and all those making money
  3644. from this deception operation decide to
  3645. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  3646.  
  3647.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  3648. lists, those participating in standards
  3649. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  3650. grants in think tanks and universities,
  3651. those in law firms and public interest
  3652. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  3653. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  3654. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  3655. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  3656. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  3657. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  3658. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  3659. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  3660. contracts, list lurking, online and
  3661. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  3662. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  3663. fulfilled.
  3664.  
  3665. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  3666.  
  3667. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3668.  
  3669. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3670.  
  3671. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3672. ���������������������������������������
  3673. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  3674. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  3675.  
  3676. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  3677. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  3678. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  3679. _______________________________________
  3680. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  3681.  
  3682. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  3683.  
  3684. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  3685.  
  3686. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  3687.  
  3688. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  3689.  
  3690. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  3691. _______________________________________
  3692. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  3693.  
  3694. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  3695. _______________________________________
  3696. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  3697. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  3698.  
  3699. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  3700.  
  3701. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  3702. _______________________________________
  3703. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  3704.  
  3705. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  3706. _______________________________________
  3707. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  3708. of Public Concerns ::
  3709.  
  3710. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  3711.  
  3712. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  3713.  
  3714. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  3715. _______________________________________
  3716. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3717.  
  3718.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  3719. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  3720. of metadata about the world�s secure
  3721. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  3722. certainly not a program through which
  3723. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  3724. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  3725. services like Google, as reported by others,
  3726. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  3727. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  3728. Google are based on a small piece of a
  3729. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  3730. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  3731. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  3732. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  3733. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  3734. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  3735. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  3736. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  3737. by providing information about a target.�
  3738.  
  3739. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  3740.  
  3741. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3742.  
  3743. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  3744. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  3745. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  3746. ���������������������������������������
  3747. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  3748.  
  3749. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  3750.  
  3751. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  3752. _______________________________________
  3753. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  3754.  
  3755. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  3756. ---------------------------------------
  3757. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  3758.  
  3759. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  3760.  
  3761.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  3762. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  3763. and later managed by big data corporations
  3764. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  3765.  
  3766.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  3767. large files across machines in a large
  3768. cluster.
  3769.  
  3770. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  3771.  
  3772.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  3773. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  3774. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  3775. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  3776.  
  3777.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  3778. major components, a central metadata server
  3779. and file servers from data.
  3780.  
  3781. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  3782.  
  3783. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  3784.  
  3785.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  3786. posted on public domain.
  3787.  
  3788. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  3789.  
  3790. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  3791. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  3792.  
  3793. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3794. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3795. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  3796.  
  3797. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3798.  
  3799. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3800. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3801. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3802. ---------------------------------------
  3803. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  3804. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  3805.  
  3806. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  3807.  
  3808. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  3809.  
  3810. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  3811.  
  3812. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  3813.  
  3814. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  3815.  
  3816. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  3817.  
  3818. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3819.  
  3820. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3821.  
  3822. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  3823.  
  3824.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  3825. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  3826. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  3827. content of all our communications have
  3828. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  3829. program since the 1990s.
  3830.  
  3831.  The new details concern how, �The National
  3832. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  3833. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  3834. of cellphones around the world.�
  3835.  
  3836.  However, the report reveals itself to
  3837. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  3838. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  3839. does not target Americans� location data
  3840. by design, but the agency acquires a
  3841. substantial amount of information on
  3842. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  3843. �incidentally.�
  3844.  
  3845.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  3846. happens to record the locations of Americans
  3847. using data from their cellphones, and is
  3848. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  3849. surveillance, is yet another example of
  3850. damage control by the establishment.
  3851.  
  3852. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  3853. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  3854. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  3855. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  3856. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  3857. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  3858. ---------------------------------------
  3859. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  3860. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  3861.  
  3862.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  3863. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  3864. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  3865. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  3866. targets for government hacking and to
  3867. bolster surveillance.
  3868.  
  3869. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  3870. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  3871. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  3872. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  3873. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  3874. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  3875. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  3876. ---------------------------------------
  3877. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  3878.  
  3879. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  3880. ---------------------------------------
  3881. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  3882. In a World Without Cookies ::
  3883.  
  3884. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  3885. _______________________________________
  3886. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  3887.  
  3888. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  3889. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  3890. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  3891.  
  3892. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  3893.  
  3894. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  3895. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  3896. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  3897. _______________________________________
  3898. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  3899. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  3900.  
  3901. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  3902. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  3903. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  3904. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  3905. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  3906. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  3907.  
  3908. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  3909.  
  3910. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  3911.  
  3912. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  3913.  
  3914. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  3915.  
  3916. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  3917.  
  3918. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  3919.  
  3920. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  3921.  
  3922. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  3923.  
  3924. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  3925.  
  3926. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  3927.  
  3928. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  3929.  
  3930. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  3931. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  3932. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  3933.  
  3934. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  3935.  
  3936. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  3937. ---------------------------------------
  3938. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  3939.  
  3940. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  3941. ---------------------------------------
  3942. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  3943.  
  3944. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  3945.  
  3946. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  3947.  
  3948. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  3949.  
  3950. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  3951.  
  3952. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  3953.  
  3954. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  3955.  
  3956. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  3957. _______________________________________
  3958.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  3959. worldwide was published by the German
  3960. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  3961. map was put online by accident, but before
  3962. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  3963. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  3964. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  3965. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  3966. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  3967. the names of all other cities were blurred
  3968. by Der Spiegel.�
  3969.  
  3970.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  3971.  
  3972. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  3973.  
  3974. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  3975.  
  3976. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  3977.  
  3978. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  3979.  
  3980. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  3981.  
  3982. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  3983. ---------------------------------------
  3984. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  3985.  
  3986. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  3987.  
  3988. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  3989. _______________________________________
  3990. � Five Eyes ::
  3991.  
  3992. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  3993. _______________________________________
  3994. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  3995.  
  3996. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  3997. _______________________________________
  3998. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  3999. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  4000.  
  4001. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  4002.  
  4003. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  4004. _______________________________________
  4005. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  4006.  
  4007. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  4008.  
  4009. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  4010. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  4011. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  4012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  4013. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  4014. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  4015. _______________________________________
  4016. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  4017.  
  4018.  September 11th, which also happened to
  4019. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  4020. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  4021. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  4022. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  4023. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  4024. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  4025. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  4026. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  4027. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  4028. itself.
  4029.  
  4030.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  4031. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  4032. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  4033. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  4034. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  4035. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  4036. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  4037. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  4038. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  4039. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  4040. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  4041. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  4042. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  4043. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  4044. its workforce by one-third, to about
  4045. 33,000. The number of private companies
  4046. it depended upon more than tripled during
  4047. that time.
  4048.  
  4049.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  4050. and the increasing reliance on the private
  4051. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  4052. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  4053. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  4054. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  4055. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  4056. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  4057. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  4058. getting those clearances. So you had
  4059. this huge apparatus being built, and
  4060. the government was just managing it.
  4061. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  4062. doing that.� ... ...
  4063.  
  4064.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  4065. workforce, the surveillance he would
  4066. later expose was becoming not just
  4067. institutionalized but very big business.
  4068. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  4069. the full flower of that massive, massive
  4070. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  4071. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  4072. could go.� ... ...
  4073.  
  4074.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  4075. leaking government secrets when he was
  4076. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  4077. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  4078. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  4079. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  4080. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  4081. policies that I thought would be reined
  4082. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  4083. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  4084. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  4085. the more he read �true information,�
  4086. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  4087. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  4088. surveillance program � the more he realized
  4089. that there were actually two governments:
  4090. the one that was elected, and the other,
  4091. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  4092. �If the highest officials in government
  4093. can break the law without fearing punishment
  4094. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  4095. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  4096.  
  4097. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  4098. _______________________________________
  4099. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  4100.  
  4101. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  4102. _______________________________________
  4103. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  4104.  
  4105. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  4106. _______________________________________
  4107. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  4108. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  4109.  
  4110.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  4111. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  4112. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  4113. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  4114. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  4115. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  4116. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  4117. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  4118. in terrorism.
  4119.  
  4120.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  4121. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  4122. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  4123. threatening national security. It is
  4124. successfully restricting release of the
  4125. Snowden material and will likely become
  4126. more forceful as releases continue to the
  4127. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  4128. to criminalize release as a national
  4129. security threat.
  4130.  
  4131. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  4132. _______________________________________
  4133. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  4134.  
  4135.  Includes most reports, slides and
  4136. documents all related to the recent
  4137. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  4138. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  4139. any information that comes out and
  4140. will provide updated archives from
  4141. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  4142.  
  4143.  After decompression - the folder is
  4144. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  4145. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  4146.  
  4147. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4148. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  4149.  
  4150. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  4151. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  4152. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  4153. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4154. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  4155. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  4156. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  4157. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  4158. _______________________________________
  4159. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  4160.  
  4161. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4162. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4163. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  4164.  
  4165. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  4166. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  4167.  
  4168.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  4169. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  4170. Australians, and hands over the material
  4171. to the US and its closest allies, according
  4172. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  4173. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  4174. Australia web site.
  4175.  
  4176.  The document obtained by the former US
  4177. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  4178. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  4179. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  4180. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  4181. as well as the people and governments of
  4182. many Asian countries.
  4183.  
  4184.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  4185. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  4186. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  4187. global partners so-called metadata of
  4188. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  4189. address books and social media posts of
  4190. millions of people.
  4191.  
  4192.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  4193. the recent revelations, also from documents
  4194. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  4195. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  4196. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  4197. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  4198. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  4199. operate as electronic listening posts
  4200. for the US-led spying network.
  4201.  
  4202. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  4203. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  4204. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  4205. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  4206. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  4207. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  4208.  
  4209. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  4210. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  4211.  
  4212.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  4213. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  4214. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  4215. political figures has been furiously
  4216. denounced by other media outlets for
  4217. breaching �national security� and the
  4218. �national interest.� The reaction
  4219. underscores the extent to which the
  4220. media establishment has been integrated
  4221. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  4222.  
  4223.  On November 18, after being approached
  4224. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  4225. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  4226. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  4227. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  4228. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  4229. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  4230. senior political figures. The report
  4231. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  4232. crisis for the Australian government, with
  4233. the Indonesian president suspending military
  4234. and intelligence cooperation.
  4235.  
  4236. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  4237. _______________________________________
  4238. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  4239.  
  4240.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  4241. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  4242. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  4243. allowed the largest American spy agency
  4244. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  4245. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  4246.  
  4247.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  4248. by CBC News.
  4249.  
  4250.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  4251. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  4252. a security command post during a six-day
  4253. spying operation by the National Security
  4254. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  4255. other foreign heads of government were on
  4256. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  4257.  
  4258.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  4259. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  4260.  
  4261.  The world was still struggling to climb
  4262. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  4263. were debating a wide array of possible
  4264. measures including a global tax on banks,
  4265. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  4266. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  4267. eventually scotched.
  4268.  
  4269. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  4270. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  4271. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  4272. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  4273. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  4274.  
  4275. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  4276. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  4277.  
  4278. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  4279.  
  4280.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  4281. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  4282.  
  4283. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  4284.  
  4285. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  4286.  
  4287. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  4288.  
  4289. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  4290. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  4291.  
  4292. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  4293.  
  4294. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  4295.  
  4296. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  4297.  
  4298. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  4299. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  4300.  
  4301. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  4302.  
  4303. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  4304.  
  4305.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  4306. believe that they have only �moved on� from discussing
  4307. CSEC�s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  4308. to worry about.
  4309.  
  4310.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  4311. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  4312. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  4313. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC�s
  4314. staff�it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  4315. military personnel assist its work�give an inkling of the
  4316. scale of its activities.
  4317.  
  4318.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  4319. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  4320. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  4321. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  4322. Of especial importance is the CSEC�s partnership with the NSA.
  4323. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  4324. the two organizations �have integrated personnel� i.e. swap
  4325. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  4326. Internet surveillance programs.
  4327.  
  4328.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  4329. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  4330. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  4331. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  4332. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  4333. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates�
  4334. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  4335.  
  4336. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  4337.  
  4338. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  4339.  
  4340. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  4341.  
  4342. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  4343. _______________________________________
  4344. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  4345.  
  4346. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  4347.  
  4348. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  4349.  
  4350. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  4351. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  4352. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  4353.  
  4354. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  4355.  
  4356. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  4357.  
  4358. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  4359.  
  4360. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  4361. _______________________________________
  4362.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  4363. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  4364. in theory � forbid local governments from
  4365. providing services to federal agencies
  4366. that collect electronic data from Americans
  4367. without a personalized warrant.
  4368.  
  4369.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  4370. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  4371. but at least one legislator has committed
  4372. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  4373. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  4374. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  4375. is introduced.
  4376.  
  4377.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  4378. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  4379. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  4380. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  4381. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  4382. and a handful of other groups.
  4383.  
  4384.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  4385. Maharrey adds.
  4386.  
  4387. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  4388. _______________________________________
  4389. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  4390. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  4391.  
  4392.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  4393. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  4394. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  4395. US and British intelligence � particularly
  4396. their cooperation in data collection and
  4397. snooping programs involving British citizens
  4398. and close allies on the European continent.
  4399.  
  4400.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  4401. to account by British authorities for
  4402. jeopardizing national security. The
  4403. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  4404. is being forced to appear before a
  4405. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  4406. the news outlet�s actions.
  4407.  
  4408. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4409. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  4410. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  4411.  
  4412. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  4413.  
  4414. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4415.  
  4416. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  4417. as the British Dictatorship ::
  4418.  
  4419.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  4420. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  4421. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  4422. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  4423. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  4424. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  4425. seems the United States is reaching the event
  4426. horizon to a police state.
  4427.  
  4428. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  4429.  
  4430. Cryptome noted
  4431.  
  4432.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  4433. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  4434. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  4435. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  4436. UKG), although there could be some which have
  4437. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  4438. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  4439.  
  4440.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  4441. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  4442. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  4443. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  4444. deception, co-optation.
  4445.  
  4446.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  4447. had access, or suspected of access, are
  4448. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  4449. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  4450. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  4451. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  4452. standard coercive means of authorities.
  4453.  
  4454.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  4455. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  4456. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  4457. advised successive cooperators, usually
  4458. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  4459. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  4460. participation.
  4461.  
  4462.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  4463. disputes and disagreements among competing
  4464. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  4465. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  4466. along with threats against families, friends
  4467. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  4468. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  4469. with authorities, including use of rewards
  4470. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  4471.  
  4472. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  4473. _______________________________________
  4474. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  4475.  
  4476. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  4477. _______________________________________
  4478. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  4479. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  4480. Governments ::
  4481.  
  4482. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  4483. _______________________________________
  4484. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  4485. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  4486.  
  4487. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  4488. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  4489. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  4490. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  4491. _______________________________________
  4492. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  4493.  
  4494. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  4495.  
  4496. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  4497.  
  4498. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  4499.  
  4500. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  4501.  
  4502. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  4503.  
  4504. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  4505.  
  4506. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  4507.  
  4508. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  4509.  
  4510. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  4511.  
  4512. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  4513.  
  4514. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  4515.  
  4516. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  4517.  
  4518. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  4519.  
  4520. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  4521.  
  4522. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  4523.  
  4524. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  4525. Steal Email Metadata ::
  4526.  
  4527.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  4528. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  4529. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  4530. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  4531.  
  4532.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  4533. servers around the world, reducing the
  4534. chance of losing your information should
  4535. one fail. When you log in to an account
  4536. with these firms, the data sent between
  4537. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  4538. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  4539. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  4540. And because many of the transfers take place
  4541. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  4542. isn�t required to tap the information.
  4543.  
  4544.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  4545. broken into the main communications links
  4546. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  4547. around the world, according to documents
  4548. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  4549. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  4550. officials.
  4551.  
  4552.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  4553. positioned itself to collect at will from
  4554. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  4555. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  4556. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  4557. but it keeps a lot.
  4558.  
  4559.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  4560. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  4561. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  4562. counterpart, the Government Communications
  4563. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  4564. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  4565. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  4566. that carry information among the data
  4567. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  4568.  
  4569. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  4570. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  4571. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  4572. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  4573. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  4574.  
  4575. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  4576.  
  4577.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  4578. email collecting program �does not apply
  4579. to US citizens.�
  4580.  
  4581.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  4582. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  4583. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  4584. accounts around the world, many of them
  4585. belonging to Americans, according to
  4586. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  4587. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  4588. Edward Snowden.
  4589.  
  4590.  The collection program, which has not
  4591. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  4592. address books and �buddy lists� from
  4593. instant messaging services as they move
  4594. across global data links. Online services
  4595. often transmit those contacts when a user
  4596. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  4597. a computer or mobile device with information
  4598. stored on remote servers.
  4599.  
  4600. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  4601. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  4602. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  4603.  
  4604. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  4605.  
  4606. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  4607.  
  4608. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4609.  
  4610. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4611. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4612. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4613. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4614. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4615. ���������������������������������������
  4616. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  4617.  
  4618. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4619.  
  4620. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  4621. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  4622.  
  4623. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  4624.  
  4625. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  4626.  
  4627. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  4628.  
  4629. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4630.  
  4631. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  4632.  
  4633. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4634.  
  4635. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  4636.  
  4637. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  4638.  
  4639. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  4640.  
  4641. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  4642.  
  4643. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  4644.  
  4645. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  4646.  
  4647. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  4648. ---------------------------------------
  4649. NOBODY comments ?
  4650.  
  4651.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  4652. differs from the Guardians.
  4653.  
  4654. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4655.  
  4656. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  4657.  
  4658. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4659.  
  4660. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  4661.  
  4662.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  4663. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  4664. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  4665.  
  4666.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  4667. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  4668. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  4669. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  4670. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  4671. ---------------------------------------
  4672. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  4673.  
  4674. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  4675.  
  4676. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4677.  
  4678.  This was written from a person who purports
  4679. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  4680.  
  4681. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  4682.  
  4683. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4684.  
  4685. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  4686.  
  4687. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  4688. Misleading ::
  4689.  
  4690. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  4691.  
  4692. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  4693. on NSA Spying ::
  4694.  
  4695. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  4696.  
  4697.  �Recent articles published in the
  4698. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  4699. inaccurate and misleading information
  4700. regarding US foreign intelligence
  4701. activities. The allegation that the
  4702. National Security Agency collected more
  4703. than 70 million �recordings of French
  4704. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  4705.  
  4706.  While we are not going to discuss the
  4707. details of our activities, we have
  4708. repeatedly made it clear that the
  4709. United States gathers intelligence of
  4710. the type gathered by all nations. The
  4711. US collects intelligence to protect the
  4712. nation, its interests, and its allies
  4713. from, among other things, threats such
  4714. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  4715. weapons of mass destruction.
  4716.  
  4717.  The United States values our longstanding
  4718. friendship and alliance with France and
  4719. we will continue to cooperate on security
  4720. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  4721.  
  4722. James R. Clapper
  4723. Director of National Intelligence
  4724. ---------------------------------------
  4725. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  4726.  
  4727. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  4728.  
  4729.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  4730. a call without leaving a record with the
  4731. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  4732. or leaves America without passing through
  4733. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  4734. statement Thursday.
  4735.  
  4736.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  4737. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  4738. _______________________________________
  4739. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  4740. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  4741.  
  4742.  US and British intelligence officials
  4743. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  4744. collection of highly classified, heavily
  4745. encrypted materials they believe former
  4746. National Security Agency contractor
  4747. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  4748.  
  4749.  One source saw the cache of documents
  4750. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  4751. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  4752. other harm. ... ...
  4753.  
  4754.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  4755. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  4756. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  4757. that �if anything happens at all to
  4758. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  4759. to get access to the full archives.�
  4760.  
  4761. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  4762. _______________________________________
  4763. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  4764. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  4765.  
  4766.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  4767. government surveillance policies. But he
  4768. is not disclosing those changes to the
  4769. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  4770. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  4771. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  4772. World Bank and the International Monetary
  4773. Fund? He won�t say.
  4774.  
  4775.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  4776. to review and recommend changes to his
  4777. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  4778.  
  4779. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  4780. _______________________________________
  4781. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  4782.  
  4783.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  4784. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  4785. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  4786. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  4787. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  4788.  
  4789.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  4790. broad goals, the five-page document said
  4791. that existing American laws were not adequate
  4792. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  4793. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  4794. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  4795. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  4796. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  4797. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4798. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4799. and target environments, or the operational
  4800. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  4801. document concluded.
  4802.  
  4803. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  4804. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  4805. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  4806. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  4807. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  4808.  
  4809. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  4810.  
  4811.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  4812. called Treasure Map and describes its
  4813. capabilities but does not publish visual
  4814. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  4815. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  4816. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  4817.  
  4818. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  4819. _______________________________________
  4820. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  4821.  
  4822. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  4823. _______________________________________
  4824. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  4825.  
  4826. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  4827.  
  4828. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  4829.  
  4830. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  4831.  
  4832.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  4833. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  4834. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  4835. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  4836. the door to a variety of spying options.
  4837.  
  4838. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  4839. _______________________________________
  4840. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  4841.  
  4842.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  4843. collection of solely domestic communications
  4844. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  4845. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  4846. request each week until we receive your
  4847. response,� EPIC said.
  4848.  
  4849.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  4850. said this week that it would not be hearing
  4851. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  4852. early Monday in which the high court listed
  4853. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  4854. as denied.
  4855.  
  4856. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  4857.  
  4858. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  4859. _______________________________________
  4860. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  4861.  
  4862. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  4863.  
  4864. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  4865. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  4866.  
  4867. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  4868.  
  4869. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  4870.  
  4871. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  4872. No Privacy ::
  4873.  
  4874. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  4875.  
  4876. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  4877. Spying Programs ::
  4878.  
  4879. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  4880.  
  4881. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  4882.  
  4883. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  4884.  
  4885. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  4886. _______________________________________
  4887. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  4888.  
  4889. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4890.  
  4891. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  4892.  
  4893. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  4894.  
  4895. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4896.  
  4897. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  4898.  
  4899. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  4900.  
  4901. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4902.  
  4903.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  4904. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  4905. or indigenous cryptographic information
  4906. security devices or systems in order to
  4907. make them exploitable.�
  4908.  
  4909. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4910.  
  4911.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  4912. successfully exploits cryptographic
  4913. components of commercial information
  4914. security devices or systems when the
  4915. device or system specified.�
  4916.  
  4917. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4918.  
  4919. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  4920.  
  4921. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  4922.  
  4923. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4924. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4925. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  4926.  
  4927. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  4928.  
  4929.  US and British intelligence agencies
  4930. have successfully cracked much of the
  4931. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  4932. of millions of people to protect the
  4933. privacy of their personal data, online
  4934. transactions and emails, according to
  4935. top-secret documents revealed by former
  4936. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  4937.  
  4938.  Those methods include covert measures
  4939. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  4940. international encryption standards, the
  4941. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  4942. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  4943. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  4944. technology companies and internet service
  4945. providers themselves.
  4946.  
  4947.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  4948. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  4949. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  4950. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  4951.  
  4952.  Independent security experts have long
  4953. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  4954. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  4955. confirmed for the first time by another
  4956. secret document. It shows the agency
  4957. worked covertly to get its own version
  4958. of a draft security standard issued by
  4959. the US National Institute of Standards
  4960. and Technology approved for worldwide
  4961. use in 2006.
  4962.  
  4963. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  4964.  
  4965. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  4966.  
  4967. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4968.  
  4969. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  4970.  
  4971. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  4972.  
  4973. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  4974.  
  4975. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4976.  
  4977. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4978.  
  4979. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  4980. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  4981. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  4982.  
  4983. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4984.  
  4985. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  4986. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  4987.  
  4988. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4989.  
  4990. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  4991.  
  4992. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  4993.  
  4994. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  4995.  
  4996. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  4997. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  4998.  
  4999. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  5000.  
  5001. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  5002.  
  5003.  A range of US hardware and software
  5004. companies are in danger of being dragged
  5005. into the widening scandal over internet
  5006. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  5007. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  5008. Security Agency contractor.
  5009.  
  5010.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  5011. that it has collaborated with technology
  5012. companies to plant �back doors� into
  5013. their systems � or ways for the agency
  5014. secretly to penetrate systems without
  5015. the users� knowledge.
  5016.  
  5017. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  5018.  
  5019. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  5020.  
  5021. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  5022. _______________________________________
  5023. � SSL Inspector ::
  5024.  
  5025. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  5026.  
  5027. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  5028.  
  5029. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  5030. _______________________________________
  5031. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  5032. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  5033.  
  5034. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  5035.  
  5036. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  5037.  
  5038. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  5039.  
  5040. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  5041.  
  5042. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  5043.  
  5044. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  5045.  
  5046. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  5047.  
  5048. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  5049.  
  5050. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  5051. ���������������������������������������
  5052. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  5053. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  5054.  
  5055. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  5056. ���������������������������������������
  5057. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  5058.  
  5059.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  5060. activities is an obscure organization called
  5061. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  5062. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  5063. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  5064. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  5065. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  5066. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  5067. presentation given to journalists by former
  5068. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  5069. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  5070. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  5071. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  5072. be collected, which is then gathered and
  5073. delivered by the DITU.
  5074.  
  5075.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  5076. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  5077. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  5078. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  5079. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  5080. collection, processing, and reporting.
  5081.  
  5082. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  5083.  
  5084. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  5085.  
  5086. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  5087. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  5088. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5089.  
  5090.  
  5091. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  5092.  
  5093. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5094. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  5095. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  5096.  
  5097. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  5098.  
  5099. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  5100.  
  5101. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  5102.  
  5103. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  5104.  
  5105. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  5106.  
  5107. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  5108.  
  5109.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  5110. by the NSA.
  5111.  
  5112.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  5113. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  5114. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  5115. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  5116. also now has access to some of these documents.
  5117.  
  5118.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  5119. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  5120. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  5121. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  5122. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  5123. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  5124.  
  5125.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  5126. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  5127. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  5128. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  5129. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  5130. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  5131. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  5132. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  5133. Facebook and Microsoft.
  5134.  
  5135. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  5136.  
  5137.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  5138. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  5139. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  5140. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  5141. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  5142. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  5143. and unilateral access to their servers.
  5144.  
  5145.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  5146. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  5147. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  5148. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  5149. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  5150. diving.
  5151.  
  5152.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  5153. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  5154.  
  5155.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  5156. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  5157. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  5158. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  5159. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  5160. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  5161. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  5162. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  5163. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  5164. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  5165. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  5166. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  5167. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  5168. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  5169. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  5170. major US carriers.
  5171.  
  5172. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  5173.  
  5174.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  5175. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  5176. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  5177. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  5178. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  5179. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  5180. engines.
  5181.  
  5182.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  5183. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  5184. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  5185. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  5186. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  5187.  
  5188.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  5189. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  5190. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  5191. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  5192. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  5193. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  5194. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  5195. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  5196. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  5197. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  5198. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  5199. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  5200. companies have been targeted.
  5201.  
  5202.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  5203. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  5204. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  5205. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  5206. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  5207. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  5208. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  5209. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  5210. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  5211. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  5212. _______________________________________
  5213. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  5214.  
  5215. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  5216.  
  5217. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  5218.  
  5219. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  5220.  
  5221. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  5222. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  5223.  
  5224. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  5225.  
  5226. NOBODY comments
  5227.  
  5228.  100% expected. They will continue to
  5229. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  5230. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  5231. We must adjust to it by learning how
  5232. to counter their surveillance.
  5233.  
  5234. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  5235. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  5236.  
  5237.  The United States and its key intelligence
  5238. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  5239. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  5240. Nations to promote a universal human right
  5241. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  5242. sources and an internal American government
  5243. document obtained by The Cable.
  5244.  
  5245.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  5246. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  5247. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  5248. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  5249. internet surveillance by the National
  5250. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  5251. services. American representatives have made
  5252. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  5253. checks on their global surveillance network.
  5254. The stakes are high, particularly in
  5255. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  5256. an international backlash against NSA
  5257. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  5258. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  5259. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  5260.  
  5261. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  5262.  
  5263. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  5264. _______________________________________
  5265. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  5266. Public News Coverage ::
  5267.  
  5268. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  5269. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  5270. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  5271. _______________________________________
  5272. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  5273. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  5274.  
  5275. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  5276. _______________________________________
  5277. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  5278.  
  5279.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  5280. a division for particularly difficult
  5281. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  5282. (TAO), this department devises special
  5283. methods for special targets.
  5284.  
  5285.  That category includes surveillance of
  5286. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  5287. the division reported its mission
  5288. accomplished. A report classified as
  5289. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  5290. exploited a key mail server in the
  5291. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  5292. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  5293. first-ever access to President Felipe
  5294. Calderon�s public email account.�
  5295.  
  5296. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  5297.  
  5298. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  5299.  
  5300. Cryptome comments ?
  5301.  
  5302.  This spying was apparently done from
  5303. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  5304. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  5305. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  5306. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  5307.  
  5308. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  5309.  
  5310. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  5311. _______________________________________
  5312. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  5313.  
  5314. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  5315.  
  5316. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  5317.  
  5318. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5319.  
  5320. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  5321.  
  5322. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5323.  
  5324. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  5325.  
  5326. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  5327.  
  5328. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  5329.  
  5330. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  5331.  
  5332. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  5333.  
  5334. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  5335.  
  5336.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  5337. thought that the NSA should use its
  5338. technology to intercept emails and
  5339. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  5340. terminal to another, and was upset to
  5341. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  5342. That was a line he would only cross,
  5343. deliberately, with court and congressional
  5344. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  5345. but as we now know, the agency added
  5346. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  5347. suspicious communications that transited
  5348. the border of the United States, and
  5349. later began to collect reams of metadata
  5350. in order to analyze it.
  5351.  
  5352.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  5353. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  5354. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  5355. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  5356. in order to provide policymakers with a
  5357. decision advantage. The advantage the
  5358. NSA provided was accurate information
  5359. about what people who interacted with
  5360. the United States said in private about
  5361. their intentions; that gap between saying
  5362. and doing, and the ability to predict
  5363. action from it, allows the president of
  5364. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  5365.  
  5366.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  5367. States� actions don�t always match up
  5368. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  5369. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  5370. our moral authority wanes and our
  5371. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  5372.  
  5373.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  5374. countries are any purer. They never have
  5375. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  5376. purer than others, so the amount of
  5377. resources the intelligence community
  5378. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  5379. to correspond with how honest our allies
  5380. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  5381. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  5382. can we figure out which allies are more
  5383. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  5384. correspondence between public and private
  5385. words and actions.
  5386.  
  5387.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  5388. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  5389. want their leaders to gain a decision
  5390. advantage in the give and take between
  5391. countries. They want to know what US
  5392. policymakers will do before the Americans
  5393. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  5394. France, they aggressively spy on the
  5395. United States, on US citizens and
  5396. politicians, in order to collect that
  5397. information. The difference lies in the
  5398. scale of intelligence collection: The
  5399. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  5400. most sophisticated intelligence community
  5401. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  5402. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  5403. envious.
  5404. _______________________________________
  5405. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  5406.  
  5407. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  5408. _______________________________________
  5409. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  5410.  
  5411. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  5412. ���������������������������������������
  5413. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  5414. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  5415.  
  5416. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  5417. _______________________________________
  5418. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  5419. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  5420.  
  5421. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  5422. _______________________________________
  5423.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  5424. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  5425. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  5426. from the award ceremony are the first of
  5427. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  5428. Russia.
  5429.  
  5430. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  5431. ���������������������������������������
  5432. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  5433.  
  5434.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  5435. of the Security Service, said the
  5436. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  5437. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  5438. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  5439. agencies.
  5440.  
  5441. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  5442.  
  5443. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  5444.  
  5445.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  5446. they are not using Tor.�
  5447.  
  5448. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  5449.  
  5450. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  5451. ---------------------------------------
  5452.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  5453. old bleach log.
  5454.  
  5455. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  5456. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  5457. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  5458. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  5459.  
  5460. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  5461.  
  5462.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  5463. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  5464. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  5465. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  5466. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  5467. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  5468. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  5469. function.
  5470.  
  5471.  There are also various third party
  5472. programs that can produce files in
  5473. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  5474. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  5475.  
  5476.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  5477. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  5478. data stored on the system running the
  5479. Flash player.�
  5480. ---------------------------------------
  5481. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  5482.  
  5483.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  5484. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  5485. It can be found within Windows systems
  5486. and can be wiped out here ;
  5487.  
  5488. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5489. Application Data\Macromedia\
  5490.  
  5491. and may also be cloned here ;
  5492.  
  5493. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  5494.  
  5495.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  5496. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  5497.  
  5498. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  5499.  
  5500. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5501. Local Settings\Temp\
  5502. ---------------------------------------
  5503. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  5504.  
  5505. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  5506.  
  5507. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  5508.  
  5509. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  5510.  
  5511. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  5512.  
  5513. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  5514.  
  5515. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  5516.  
  5517. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  5518.  
  5519. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  5520.  
  5521. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  5522.  
  5523. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  5524.  
  5525. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  5526.  
  5527. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  5528.  
  5529. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  5530.  
  5531. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  5532. ---------------------------------------
  5533. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  5534.  
  5535.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  5536. application created by Samy Kamkar
  5537. which produces zombie cookies in a
  5538. web browser that are intentionally
  5539. difficult to delete. ... ...
  5540.  
  5541.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  5542. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  5543. by copying itself in different forms on
  5544. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  5545. itself if it notices that some of the
  5546. copies are missing or expired.
  5547.  
  5548.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  5549. Evercookie uses the following storage
  5550. mechanisms when available:
  5551.  
  5552. � Standard HTTP cookies
  5553. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  5554. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  5555. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  5556. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  5557. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  5558. (cookies) back out
  5559. � Storing cookies in Web history
  5560. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  5561. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  5562. � window.name caching
  5563. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  5564. � HTML5 Session Storage
  5565. � HTML5 Local Storage
  5566. � HTML5 Global Storage
  5567. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  5568. ---------------------------------------
  5569. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  5570.  
  5571.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  5572. mean that your browser isn't storing
  5573. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  5574. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  5575. in browser vulnerabilities.
  5576.  
  5577.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  5578. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  5579. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  5580. wide surveillance.
  5581.  
  5582.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  5583. powerful anonymity service, and the
  5584. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  5585. the Internet, makes it easy to
  5586. differentiate Tor users from other
  5587. Web users,� he wrote.
  5588.  
  5589.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  5590. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  5591. identifies you. Even though your IP
  5592. address changed [because of Tor], the
  5593. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  5594.  
  5595. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  5596. ---------------------------------------
  5597. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  5598. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  5599.  
  5600.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  5601. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  5602. �staining� as a means to identify
  5603. individual machines linked to that
  5604. IP address. ... ...
  5605.  
  5606.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  5607. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  5608. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  5609. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  5610. and is stamped into every packet, which
  5611. enables all the events from that stained
  5612. machine to be brought back together to
  5613. recreate a browsing session.�
  5614.  
  5615. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  5616.  
  5617. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  5618.  
  5619. � Packet Staining ::
  5620.  
  5621. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  5622. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  5623. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  5624. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  5625.  
  5626. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  5627.  
  5628. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  5629. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  5630. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  5631. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  5632.  
  5633. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  5634.  
  5635.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  5636. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  5637. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  5638. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  5639. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  5640. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  5641. identify it. We also worked to create
  5642. a custom Tor client which allows the
  5643. user finer control.� ... ...
  5644.  
  5645.  �This accomplishes several things.
  5646. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  5647. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  5648. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  5649. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  5650. be excessively complex, as a single
  5651. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  5652. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  5653. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  5654. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  5655. going to and from the proxy server,
  5656. it is possible to deduce which clients
  5657. are making which requests. Second, if
  5658. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  5659. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  5660. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  5661. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  5662. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  5663. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  5664. must be coordinated across several machines,
  5665. and an attacker must own all the hops
  5666. along the circuit in order to trace
  5667. requests back to the originating client.�
  5668.  
  5669. ... ...
  5670.  
  5671.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  5672. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  5673. a hidden service will turn up the port
  5674. that the hidden service is using to deal
  5675. with incoming connections. It can then be
  5676. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  5677.  
  5678. ... ...
  5679.  
  5680.  �We would have to try to connect to
  5681. each of the ports we see open on a
  5682. machine to determine if there is a
  5683. hidden service being run. We would not
  5684. even know which protocol the hidden
  5685. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  5686. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  5687. etc. The only thing we know is that
  5688. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  5689. not enough to attempt to connect once
  5690. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  5691. Several protocols must be tried.�
  5692.  
  5693. ... ...
  5694.  
  5695.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  5696. directory servers in more detail. Our
  5697. work focused solely on the client, but
  5698. many attacks would be much easier with
  5699. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  5700. servers ultimately control which Tor
  5701. servers are used by clients. We have found
  5702. that a server can put itself on a directory
  5703. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  5704. server running several Tor processes, each
  5705. having a different nickname, open port,
  5706. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  5707. requires different configuration files
  5708. for the different processes, which are
  5709. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  5710. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  5711. since it is listed several times. This
  5712. increases the density of friendly servers
  5713. in the cloud without increasing the number
  5714. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  5715. each listing has the same IP address,
  5716. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  5717. who inspecting the directories.�
  5718.  
  5719. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  5720. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  5721. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  5722.  
  5723. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  5724.  
  5725. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  5726.  
  5727. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  5728.  
  5729. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  5730.  
  5731. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  5732.  
  5733.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  5734. into capabilities the IC has developed
  5735. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  5736. to run multiple research teams (either
  5737. known or unknown to each other) against
  5738. a single target, and a few summer students
  5739. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  5740. small investment. I�d expect there are
  5741. other programs with more sophisticated
  5742. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  5743.  
  5744. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  5745. _______________________________________
  5746. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  5747.  
  5748. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  5749. _______________________________________
  5750. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  5751. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  5752.  
  5753. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  5754.  
  5755.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  5756. the past several months, I�d also thought
  5757. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  5758. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  5759. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  5760. Sasso of The Hill.
  5761.  
  5762.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  5763. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  5764. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  5765. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  5766. help you with that.�
  5767.  
  5768. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  5769.  
  5770.  The conversation then turned specifically
  5771. to the government�s use of targeted
  5772. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  5773. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  5774. hope they make full use of the capacities
  5775. of the National Security Agency when we
  5776. do that.�
  5777.  
  5778.  Hayden was responding to a question
  5779. about a new project announced by journalists
  5780. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  5781. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  5782. assassinations.
  5783.  
  5784. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  5785. _______________________________________
  5786. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  5787.  
  5788. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  5789.  
  5790. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  5791.  
  5792. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  5793. _______________________________________
  5794. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  5795. Breaches ::
  5796.  
  5797. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  5798.  
  5799. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  5800.  
  5801. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  5802. _______________________________________
  5803. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  5804. of US Citizens ::
  5805.  
  5806.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  5807. body of knowledge in recent months about
  5808. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  5809. information concerning Americans, prompting
  5810. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  5811. in the agency and President Obama to order
  5812. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  5813. Almost everything about the agency�s
  5814. operations is hidden, and the decision
  5815. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  5816. was made in secret, without review by the
  5817. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  5818. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  5819. Department memo warned of the potential
  5820. for the �misuse� of such information
  5821. without adequate safeguards.
  5822.  
  5823. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  5824. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  5825. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  5826.  
  5827. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  5828. From American Social Networks ::
  5829.  
  5830. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  5831. _______________________________________
  5832. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  5833. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  5834.  
  5835. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  5836. _______________________________________
  5837. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  5838. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  5839.  
  5840.  Led by the German government, a loose
  5841. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  5842. across the world is pushing to update an
  5843. influential international human rights
  5844. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  5845.  
  5846. ... ...
  5847.  
  5848.  The annual conference was attended by a
  5849. diverse selection of privacy and data
  5850. protection officials from across the
  5851. world, with representatives attending
  5852. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  5853. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  5854. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  5855. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  5856. United Kingdom.
  5857.  
  5858.  During a closed session at the conference
  5859. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  5860. resolution was put forward for a vote
  5861. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  5862. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  5863. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  5864. globally applicable standards for data
  5865. protection and the protection of privacy
  5866. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  5867.  
  5868.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  5869. of the resolution ... the United States.
  5870.  
  5871.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  5872. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  5873. eventually need to be put forward at the
  5874. United Nations and voted on by member
  5875. states, and that could take time. But
  5876. the growing appetite to amend the
  5877. international treaty in light of the
  5878. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  5879. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  5880. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  5881. technology in the digital age to trample
  5882. over basic universal privacy rights.
  5883.  
  5884. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  5885.  
  5886. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  5887.  
  5888. NOBODY comments
  5889.  
  5890.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  5891. all secret agencies around the world,
  5892. in general. All secret agencies and
  5893. their third-party vendors or allies
  5894. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  5895. backdoors in electronic communication
  5896. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  5897. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  5898. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  5899. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  5900. you must kill any trust in security.
  5901.  
  5902.  Security does not exist on the web.
  5903. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  5904. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  5905. _______________________________________
  5906. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  5907.  
  5908. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  5909.  
  5910. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  5911.  
  5912. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  5913. _______________________________________
  5914. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  5915.  
  5916. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  5917. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  5918. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  5919. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  5920. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  5921.  
  5922. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  5923. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  5924.  
  5925. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  5926. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  5927. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  5928.  
  5929.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are tapping the
  5930. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  5931. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  5932. of this) as opposed to �downstream� collection, which
  5933. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  5934.  
  5935. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  5936.  
  5937. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  5938.  
  5939. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  5940.  
  5941. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  5942. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  5943. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  5944. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  5945. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  5946. _______________________________________
  5947. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  5948. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  5949. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  5950.  
  5951. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  5952. _______________________________________
  5953. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  5954.  
  5955.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  5956. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  5957. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  5958. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  5959. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  5960. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  5961. file transfer and social networking services.
  5962.  
  5963.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  5964. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  5965. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  5966. officials.
  5967.  
  5968.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India�s
  5969. domestic politics and the country�s strategic and commercial
  5970. interests.
  5971.  
  5972. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  5973.  
  5974.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  5975. document about �Close Access SIGADs�, the offices of Indian
  5976. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  5977. at these important posts were targets of four different
  5978. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  5979.  
  5980.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  5981. of computers.
  5982.  
  5983. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  5984.  
  5985. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  5986.  
  5987. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  5988.  
  5989. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  5990. _______________________________________
  5991. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  5992.  
  5993.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  5994. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  5995. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  5996. in some cases plan the destruction of, �more than 10,000
  5997. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  5998. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  5999. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  6000. that could threaten US or allied interests.�
  6001.  
  6002. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  6003. _______________________________________
  6004. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  6005.  
  6006. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  6007. _______________________________________
  6008. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  6009. NSA Leaks ::
  6010.  
  6011. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  6012. _______________________________________
  6013. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  6014.  
  6015. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  6016. _______________________________________
  6017. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  6018. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  6019.  
  6020. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  6021. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  6022. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  6023.  
  6024. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  6025. Under United States Control ::
  6026.  
  6027.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  6028. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  6029. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  6030.  
  6031.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  6032. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  6033. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  6034. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  6035. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  6036. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  6037. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it�s,
  6038. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  6039.  
  6040.  �The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  6041. severe in coming months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  6042. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  6043. America Foundation think-tank. �This notion of national
  6044. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  6045. issue around the globe.�
  6046.  
  6047. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  6048. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  6049. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  6050. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  6051.  
  6052. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  6053.  
  6054.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  6055. optic cable system.
  6056.  
  6057. http://www.bricscable.com/
  6058.  
  6059. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  6060. _______________________________________
  6061. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  6062.  
  6063.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  6064. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court�s
  6065. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  6066. PATRIOT Act that�s used to justify the National Security
  6067. Agency�s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  6068. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  6069. orders has ever challenged one.
  6070.  
  6071. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  6072. _______________________________________
  6073. � Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  6074. Revelations ::
  6075.  
  6076.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  6077. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA�s
  6078. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  6079. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  6080. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  6081. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  6082.  
  6083.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  6084. the agency�s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  6085. and its �partnerships� with software and hardware vendors
  6086. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  6087. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  6088. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  6089. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  6090. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  6091. But one thing that�s become clear is that when the government
  6092. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn�t
  6093. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  6094.  
  6095. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  6096.  
  6097. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  6098.  
  6099.  The security community didn�t invent the concept of fear,
  6100. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  6101. it to the level of religion. It�s the way that security products
  6102. are marketed and sold, but it�s also the way that the intelligence
  6103. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  6104. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  6105. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  6106. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  6107. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  6108. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  6109. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  6110. fundamental building blocks of security.
  6111.  
  6112.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  6113. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  6114. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  6115. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  6116. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company�s
  6117. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  6118. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  6119. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  6120.  
  6121. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  6122. _______________________________________
  6123. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  6124.  
  6125.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  6126. President approximately every 45 days,
  6127. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  6128. the activities carried out under these
  6129. Authorizations are referred to as the
  6130. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  6131. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  6132. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  6133. the content of communications into and out
  6134. of the United States where there was a
  6135. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  6136. party to the communication was a member
  6137. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  6138.  
  6139.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  6140. acknowledged and described by the President,
  6141. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  6142. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  6143. a series of articles published in The New York
  6144. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  6145. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  6146. intelligence activities were also authorized
  6147. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  6148. but the details of those activities remain
  6149. classified.� ... ...
  6150.  
  6151.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  6152. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  6153. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  6154. as the principal governing authorities for
  6155. conducting electronic surveillance for
  6156. national security purposes. The Foreign
  6157. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  6158. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  6159. "provide legislative authorization and
  6160. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  6161. conducted within the United States for
  6162. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  6163.  
  6164. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  6165.  
  6166. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  6167. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  6168.  
  6169. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  6170.  
  6171. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  6172.  
  6173.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  6174. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  6175. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  6176. require special approval. Therefore, just
  6177. another gap. Also take in consideration
  6178. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  6179. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  6180. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  6181. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  6182. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  6183. _______________________________________
  6184. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  6185. Firm ::
  6186.  
  6187.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  6188. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  6189. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  6190. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  6191. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  6192. A �top secret� Government Communications
  6193. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  6194. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  6195. conducted under the codename �Operation
  6196. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  6197. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  6198. improve understanding of the provider�s
  6199. infrastructure. ... ...
  6200.  
  6201.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  6202. presentation, the attack was directed
  6203. at several Belgacom employees and
  6204. involved the planting of a highly
  6205. developed attack technology referred
  6206. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  6207. appears to be a method with which the
  6208. person being targeted, without their
  6209. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  6210. that then plant malware on their
  6211. computers that can then manipulate
  6212. them. Some of the employees whose
  6213. computers were infiltrated had �good
  6214. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  6215. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  6216. please the British spies, according
  6217. to the slides.
  6218.    
  6219. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  6220. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  6221. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  6222. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  6223. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  6224. _______________________________________
  6225. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  6226.  
  6227. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  6228.  
  6229. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  6230. _______________________________________
  6231. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  6232.  
  6233. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  6234. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  6235. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  6236. _______________________________________
  6237. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  6238. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  6239.  
  6240. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  6241. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  6242. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  6243. _______________________________________
  6244. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  6245.  
  6246. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  6247. ���������������������������������������
  6248. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  6249. Allocated to One Release ::
  6250.  
  6251. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  6252.  
  6253. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  6254.  
  6255. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  6256.  
  6257. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  6258. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  6259.  
  6260. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  6261.  
  6262. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  6263. Schedule ::
  6264.  
  6265. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6266.  
  6267. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6268.  
  6269. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6270.  
  6271. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6272.  
  6273. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6274.  
  6275. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6276.  
  6277. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6278. ���������������������������������������
  6279. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  6280.  
  6281.  In response to a FOIA request from
  6282. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  6283. its ethics office never looked into
  6284. complaints from two federal judges
  6285. that they had been misled about NSA
  6286. surveillance.
  6287.  
  6288. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  6289. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  6290. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  6291. ���������������������������������������
  6292.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  6293. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  6294. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  6295. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  6296. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  6297.  
  6298. Livestream will be at:
  6299.  
  6300. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  6301. _______________________________________
  6302. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  6303. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  6304.  
  6305. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  6306.  
  6307. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  6308. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  6309. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  6310.  
  6311. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  6312.  
  6313.  The Director of National Intelligence
  6314. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  6315. pages of documents related to the
  6316. government�s secret interpretation of
  6317. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  6318. (mis)use of its massive database of
  6319. every American�s phone records. The
  6320. documents were released as a result
  6321. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  6322. Act lawsuit.
  6323.  
  6324.  We�ve posted links to each document
  6325. below. While the government also posted
  6326. many of the documents here ...
  6327.  
  6328. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  6329.  
  6330. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  6331.  
  6332. Links to the documents ;
  6333.  
  6334. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  6335. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6336.  
  6337. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6338.  
  6339. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  6340. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6341. Court
  6342.  
  6343. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6344.  
  6345. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6346. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6347. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6348. Court
  6349.  
  6350. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6351.  
  6352. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6353. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6354. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6355. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  6356.  
  6357. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6358.  
  6359. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  6360. Incident
  6361.  
  6362. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6363.  
  6364. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6365. Intelligence Court
  6366.  
  6367. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6368.  
  6369. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6370. Intelligence Court
  6371.  
  6372. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6373.  
  6374. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  6375. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  6376. Business Records FISA
  6377.  
  6378. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6379.  
  6380. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  6381. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  6382.  
  6383. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6384.  
  6385. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  6386. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6387.  
  6388. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6389.  
  6390. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  6391. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  6392. Surveillance Court
  6393.  
  6394. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6395.  
  6396. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  6397. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  6398. Surveillance Court
  6399.  
  6400. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6401.  
  6402. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  6403. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  6404.  
  6405. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  6406.  
  6407. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  6408. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  6409.  
  6410. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  6411. _______________________________________
  6412. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  6413.  
  6414. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  6415.  
  6416. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  6417.  
  6418. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  6419. ���������������������������������������
  6420. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  6421.  
  6422. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  6423. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  6424. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  6425. _______________________________________
  6426. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  6427. Over Data to the NSA ::
  6428.  
  6429.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6430. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  6431. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  6432. media report. The revelation comes as
  6433. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  6434. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  6435. troves of data with the US and UK.
  6436.  
  6437.  Citing secret government documents,
  6438. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  6439. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6440. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  6441. with domestic security, works closely
  6442. with the US and regularly sends them
  6443. information.
  6444.  
  6445.  The security service gathers intelligence
  6446. on internal security threats. The documents
  6447. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  6448. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  6449. well as regular meetings between officers
  6450. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  6451.  
  6452. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  6453. _______________________________________
  6454. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  6455. Revelations ::
  6456.  
  6457. This is an unofficial translation.
  6458.  
  6459. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  6460.  
  6461.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  6462. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  6463. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  6464.  
  6465. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  6466.  
  6467. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  6468. _______________________________________
  6469. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  6470.  
  6471. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  6472. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  6473. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  6474. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  6475. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  6476. _______________________________________
  6477. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  6478.  
  6479. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  6480.  
  6481. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  6482.  
  6483. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  6484. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  6485.  
  6486. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  6487.  
  6488. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  6489.  
  6490.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  6491. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  6492. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  6493. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  6494. and control over natural resources.
  6495. _______________________________________
  6496. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  6497.  
  6498.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  6499. machines to read.
  6500.  
  6501. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  6502. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  6503. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  6504. _______________________________________
  6505. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  6506.  
  6507. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  6508.  
  6509. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  6510. _______________________________________
  6511. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  6512. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  6513. National Unit ::
  6514.  
  6515.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  6516. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  6517. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  6518. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  6519. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  6520. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  6521. it Wednesday.
  6522.  
  6523.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  6524. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  6525. raw signals intelligence, referred
  6526. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  6527. swathes of digital data traffic that
  6528. the agency gathers under secret court
  6529. authority from US Internet providers.
  6530.  
  6531.  So sensitive is this data that even
  6532. before being disseminated to other US
  6533. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  6534. to a court-mandated process called
  6535. minimization, under which the names
  6536. of any Americans are removed unless
  6537. they are essential for foreign
  6538. intelligence interest.
  6539.  
  6540.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  6541. that the data shared with Israel
  6542. �includes, but is not limited to,
  6543. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  6544. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  6545. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  6546. and content.�
  6547.  
  6548.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  6549. and unminimized raw collection associated
  6550. with selectors from multiple Target office
  6551. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  6552. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  6553. relationship between the two organizations.�
  6554.  
  6555. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  6556. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  6557. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  6558. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  6559. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  6560. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  6561.  
  6562.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  6563. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  6564. that spy most aggressively against the
  6565. United States.
  6566.  
  6567.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6568. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6569. insider threat detection capabilities
  6570. across the Community. In addition, we
  6571. are investing in target surveillance
  6572. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6573. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6574. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  6575.  
  6576. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6577. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6578. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6579.  
  6580. NOBODY comments
  6581.  
  6582.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  6583. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  6584. plenty of inside information.
  6585.  
  6586.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  6587. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  6588. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  6589.  
  6590. This reminds of a quote ;
  6591.  
  6592.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  6593. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  6594. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  6595. to play out one big game of destruction
  6596. and domination with humans as the visible
  6597. and spiritual puppets?�
  6598. _______________________________________
  6599. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  6600.  
  6601. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  6602. _______________________________________
  6603. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  6604.  
  6605. (EN)
  6606. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6607.  
  6608. (DE)
  6609. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  6610.  
  6611. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  6612.  
  6613.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  6614. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  6615. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  6616. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  6617. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  6618. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  6619. deployed in a government intelligence
  6620. agency presentation.
  6621.  
  6622. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6623. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  6624. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  6625. ���������������������������������������
  6626. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  6627. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  6628.  
  6629.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  6630. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  6631. reverse restrictions on the National
  6632. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  6633. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  6634. the agency to search deliberately for
  6635. Americans� communications in its massive
  6636. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  6637. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  6638. �declassified material� - (which, by
  6639. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  6640. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  6641. of which agency it came from and most
  6642. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  6643.  
  6644. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  6645.  
  6646.  In addition, the court extended the
  6647. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  6648. to retain intercepted US communications
  6649. from five years to six years � and more
  6650. under special circumstances, according
  6651. to the documents, which include a
  6652. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  6653. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  6654. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6655. Surveillance Court.
  6656.  
  6657. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6658.  
  6659. NOBODY comments
  6660.  
  6661.  The document which was declassified by
  6662. US intelligence officials explains the
  6663. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6664. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  6665. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  6666.  
  6667. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6668. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6669. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6670.  
  6671.  National Security Agency analysts
  6672. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6673. their authority to spy on Americans.
  6674.  
  6675. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6676.  
  6677.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  6678. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  6679.  
  6680. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6681.  
  6682. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6683.  
  6684.  And this is not the first attempt to
  6685. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  6686.  
  6687. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6688.  
  6689. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6690.  
  6691.  The new Washington Post report has
  6692. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  6693. (press) release exposing yet another
  6694. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  6695. or take responsibility for the abuses
  6696. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  6697.  
  6698. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6699.  
  6700.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  6701. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  6702.  
  6703.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  6704. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  6705.  
  6706.  All of this information is backed up
  6707. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  6708. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  6709. 2,776 violations one year after the
  6710. FISA Court order.
  6711.  
  6712. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6713.  
  6714.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  6715. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  6716. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  6717. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  6718. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  6719. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  6720. them out of office come next election.
  6721. _______________________________________
  6722. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  6723.  
  6724. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  6725. _______________________________________
  6726. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  6727.  
  6728. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  6729.  
  6730.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  6731. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  6732. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  6733.  
  6734. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  6735.  
  6736. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  6737.  
  6738. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  6739.  
  6740. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  6741.  
  6742. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  6743.  
  6744. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  6745.  
  6746. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  6747.  
  6748. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6749. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6750. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  6751. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  6752.  
  6753. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  6754.  
  6755.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  6756. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  6757. reports that the US National Security Agency
  6758. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  6759.  
  6760.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  6761. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  6762. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  6763. Tuesday.
  6764.  
  6765.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  6766. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  6767. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  6768. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  6769. several of her top aides, and tapped
  6770. her phone.
  6771.  
  6772. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  6773.  
  6774. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  6775. Impacted ::
  6776.  
  6777.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  6778. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  6779. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  6780. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  6781. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  6782. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  6783.  
  6784.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  6785. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  6786. visit to Washington in October, the
  6787. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  6788. year, or will take action on digital
  6789. security that may affect US companies
  6790. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  6791.  
  6792.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  6793. a proposal that would suspend operations
  6794. of companies that cooperate with the
  6795. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  6796.  
  6797. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  6798. _______________________________________
  6799. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  6800.  
  6801. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  6802.  
  6803. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  6804.  
  6805. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  6806. ���������������������������������������
  6807. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  6808.  
  6809.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6810. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6811. collect against high priority targets,
  6812. including foreign leadership targets.
  6813. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6814. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6815. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6816. internet traffic.�
  6817.  
  6818. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6819.  
  6820. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6821.  
  6822. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  6823.  
  6824. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  6825.  
  6826. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  6827.  
  6828. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  6829.  
  6830.  �The Post is withholding some information
  6831. after consultation with US officials who
  6832. expressed concerns about the risk to
  6833. intelligence sources and methods.
  6834. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  6835. the documents that The Post is publishing
  6836. only summary tables and charts online.�
  6837.  
  6838. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  6839.  
  6840. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6841. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  6842.  
  6843. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  6844.  
  6845. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  6846.  
  6847. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6848. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  6849.  
  6850. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  6851.  
  6852. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  6853.  
  6854. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  6855.  
  6856.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  6857. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  6858. intelligence services, leaked documents
  6859. reveal.
  6860.  
  6861.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  6862. to have an aggressive intelligence
  6863. collection operations against the
  6864. United States,� Pillar said. While
  6865. much information is collected through
  6866. traditional political contacts, �I
  6867. would personally have no doubt that
  6868. that is supplemented by whatever means
  6869. they can use to find out as much as
  6870. they can about what we�re doing,
  6871. thinking, deciding on anything of
  6872. interest to Israel, which would include
  6873. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  6874.  
  6875. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6876.  
  6877. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  6878.  
  6879.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6880. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6881. insider threat detection capabilities
  6882. across the Community. In addition, we
  6883. are investing in target surveillance
  6884. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6885. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6886. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  6887. _______________________________________
  6888. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  6889.  
  6890.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  6891. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  6892. the worst part is the Received headers.
  6893. Everyone should look at their own headers
  6894. -- especially people on this list and
  6895. at least comprehend that your email
  6896. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  6897. the Mailman archive.
  6898.  
  6899.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  6900. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  6901. the actual separators in MIME part
  6902. breaks, and so on.
  6903.  
  6904.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  6905. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  6906. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  6907. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  6908. don�t do it all the time.
  6909.  
  6910.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  6911. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  6912. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  6913. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  6914. is that this tells us that the crypto
  6915. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  6916. for quite some time.
  6917.  
  6918.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  6919. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  6920. that works being deployed everywhere.
  6921. What do you do? You just be patient and
  6922. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  6923. analysis.
  6924.  
  6925. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  6926.  
  6927. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  6928.  
  6929. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  6930.  
  6931.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  6932. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  6933. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  6934. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  6935. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  6936. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  6937. reveal.
  6938.  
  6939. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  6940.  
  6941.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6942. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6943. collect against high priority targets,
  6944. including foreign leadership targets.
  6945. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6946. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6947. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6948. internet traffic.� ... ...
  6949.  
  6950. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  6951.  
  6952.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  6953. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  6954. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  6955. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  6956. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  6957. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  6958.  
  6959.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  6960. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  6961.  
  6962. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6963.  
  6964. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6965.  
  6966. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  6967.  
  6968. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  6969.  
  6970. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  6971.  
  6972.  The US government has attempted to
  6973. obtain the master encryption keys that
  6974. Internet companies use to shield millions
  6975. of users� private web communications
  6976. from eavesdropping.
  6977.  
  6978.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  6979. which have not been disclosed previously,
  6980. represent a technological escalation in
  6981. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  6982. the National Security Agency employ when
  6983. conducting electronic surveillance against
  6984. Internet users. ... ...
  6985.  
  6986.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  6987. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  6988. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  6989. communications are typically destroyed
  6990. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  6991. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  6992. of all communications that are enciphered�
  6993. is permissible.
  6994.  
  6995. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  6996. _______________________________________
  6997. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  6998. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  6999.  
  7000.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  7001. intercepts well before 2001, former
  7002. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  7003. secretive Special Services Office,
  7004. these types of programs were at first
  7005. designed to intercept communications
  7006. overseas through arrangements with
  7007. foreign Internet providers, the former
  7008. officials say. NSA still has such
  7009. arrangements in many countries,
  7010. particularly in the Middle East and
  7011. Europe, the former officials say.�
  7012.  
  7013. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  7014.  
  7015. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  7016.  
  7017. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  7018. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  7019. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  7020. ���������������������������������������
  7021. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  7022. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  7023.  
  7024.  A common hacking technique can be used
  7025. to make emails look as if they came from
  7026. outside the United States.
  7027.  
  7028. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  7029. _______________________________________
  7030. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  7031. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  7032.  
  7033. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  7034.  
  7035. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  7036.  
  7037. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  7038.  
  7039. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7040. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7041. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  7042. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  7043. ���������������������������������������
  7044. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  7045. Patrick Leahy ::
  7046.  
  7047. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  7048.  
  7049. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  7050.  
  7051. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  7052. _______________________________________
  7053. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  7054.  
  7055.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  7056. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  7057. their authority to spy on Americans
  7058. multiple times in the past decade,
  7059. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  7060. and lawmakers� statements that no
  7061. willful violations occurred. ...
  7062.  
  7063.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  7064. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  7065. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  7066. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  7067. of having links to terrorism, before a
  7068. secret court that oversees surveillance
  7069. found the operation unconstitutional
  7070. in 2011.
  7071.  
  7072. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  7073.  
  7074. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  7075. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  7076. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  7077.  
  7078.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  7079. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  7080. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  7081. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  7082. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  7083.  
  7084.  The documents were released in response
  7085. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  7086. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  7087.  
  7088.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  7089. litigation and the most significant leak
  7090. in American history to finally get them
  7091. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  7092. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  7093. �but I�m happy that the administration
  7094. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  7095.  
  7096. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  7097. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  7098. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  7099.  
  7100. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  7101.  
  7102. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  7103.  
  7104. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7105.  
  7106. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  7107.  
  7108. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  7109.  
  7110. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  7111.  
  7112. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  7113. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  7114.  
  7115. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  7116. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  7117. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  7118. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  7119. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  7120. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  7121.  
  7122.  The account is based on top-secret
  7123. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  7124. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  7125. including unauthorized collection,
  7126. storage, access to or distribution of
  7127. legally protected communications � in
  7128. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  7129. originally only meant to be seen by top
  7130. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  7131. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  7132. and other locations in the Washington DC
  7133. region.
  7134.  
  7135. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  7136.  
  7137.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  7138. and other things, there�s people talking
  7139. about privacy violations or abuses or
  7140. willful or violations, right, it is
  7141. important for people to understand,
  7142. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  7143. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  7144. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  7145.  
  7146.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  7147. We detect them, as early as we can.
  7148. We correct them, right. None of the
  7149. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  7150. the document released were willful.
  7151. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  7152. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  7153. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  7154.  
  7155. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  7156.  
  7157. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  7158. Database Queries Per Month ::
  7159.  
  7160. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  7161.  
  7162. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  7163.  
  7164. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  7165. _______________________________________
  7166. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  7167.  
  7168.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  7169. station in the Middle East to intercept
  7170. and process vast quantities of emails,
  7171. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  7172. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  7173. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  7174.  
  7175.  The information is then processed for
  7176. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  7177. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  7178. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  7179. The Government claims the station is a
  7180. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  7181. and provides a vital �early warning�
  7182. system for potential attacks around
  7183. the world.
  7184.  
  7185.  The Independent is not revealing the
  7186. precise location of the station but
  7187. information on its activities was
  7188. contained in the leaked documents
  7189. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  7190. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  7191. these documents in recent months has
  7192. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  7193. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  7194. the destruction of hard drives containing
  7195. the data. ... ...
  7196.  
  7197.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  7198. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  7199. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  7200. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  7201. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  7202. the global interception of digital
  7203. communications, such as emails and text
  7204. messages.
  7205.  
  7206.  Across three sites, communications �
  7207. including telephone calls � are tracked
  7208. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  7209. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  7210.  
  7211. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  7212. ���������������������������������������
  7213. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  7214.  
  7215. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  7216. _______________________________________
  7217. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  7218. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  7219. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  7220. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  7221. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  7222. E Grassley ::
  7223.  
  7224. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  7225.  
  7226. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  7227.  
  7228. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  7229.  
  7230. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  7231.  
  7232. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  7233.  
  7234. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  7235.  
  7236. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  7237.  
  7238. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  7239.  
  7240. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  7241.  
  7242. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  7243.  
  7244. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  7245. Congress ::
  7246.  
  7247.  �I can now confirm that the House
  7248. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  7249. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  7250. available to Representatives in Congress,
  7251. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  7252. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  7253. the now declassified documents detailing
  7254. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  7255.  
  7256. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  7257.  
  7258. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  7259.  
  7260. ?
  7261.  
  7262. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7263.  
  7264.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7265. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7266. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7267. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7268. discussions with the president when he
  7269. first came on board we talked to him about
  7270. these programs and the issue was how do
  7271. we know the compliance is there and what
  7272. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7273. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  7274. of compliance. This directorate of
  7275. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7276. and information specialists that can look
  7277. at everything that we do in these programs
  7278. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7279. orders but we also have oversight from
  7280. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7281. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7282. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7283. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  7284. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7285. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7286. _______________________________________
  7287. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  7288.  
  7289.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  7290. public so far.
  7291.  
  7292. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  7293. _______________________________________
  7294. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  7295.  
  7296. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  7297. _______________________________________
  7298. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  7299. Data Lab ::
  7300.  
  7301. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  7302.  
  7303. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  7304. _______________________________________
  7305. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  7306. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  7307.  
  7308. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  7309. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  7310. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  7311. _______________________________________
  7312. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  7313.  
  7314.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  7315. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  7316. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  7317. there since he assumed the position
  7318. of Secretary of State. He has already
  7319. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  7320. � where officials demanded an explanation
  7321. to reports that Washington had collected
  7322. vast amounts of internet data there.
  7323. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  7324. which allegedly was the top regional
  7325. target of the surveillance program.
  7326.  
  7327. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  7328.  
  7329. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  7330.  
  7331. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  7332. Surveillance ::
  7333.  
  7334. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  7335.  
  7336. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  7337.  
  7338. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  7339. _______________________________________
  7340. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  7341.  
  7342. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  7343. ���������������������������������������
  7344. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  7345.  
  7346. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  7347.  
  7348. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  7349.  
  7350. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  7351.  
  7352. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  7353.  
  7354. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  7355. _______________________________________
  7356. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  7357.  
  7358. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  7359.  
  7360. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  7361. _______________________________________
  7362. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  7363.  
  7364. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  7365.  
  7366.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  7367. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  7368. use of certain United States person names
  7369. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  7370. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  7371. implement any USP queries until an effective
  7372. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  7373. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  7374. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  7375. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  7376. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  7377. databases).�
  7378.  
  7379. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  7380.  
  7381. NOBODY comments
  7382.  
  7383. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  7384.  
  7385. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7386.  
  7387.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7388. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7389. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7390. communications not related to foreign
  7391. information or foreign activity for up
  7392. to five years.
  7393.  
  7394.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  7395. acquired communications of or concerning a
  7396. United States person may be retained no
  7397. longer than five years in any event.�
  7398.  
  7399.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  7400. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  7401. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  7402. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  7403. communications that have been stored.
  7404. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  7405. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  7406. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  7407. to �communications security vulnerability�
  7408. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  7409. _______________________________________
  7410. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  7411.  
  7412. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  7413. _______________________________________
  7414. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  7415.  
  7416. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  7417. _______________________________________
  7418. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  7419. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  7420.  
  7421.  As the steady stream of revelations
  7422. continues, the White House has choosen
  7423. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  7424. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  7425.  
  7426. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  7427. _______________________________________
  7428. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  7429.  
  7430. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  7431.  
  7432. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  7433. Spying Press Conference ::
  7434.  
  7435.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  7436. Presidential press conference in which the
  7437. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  7438. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  7439. that Obama told today about the program
  7440. by citing multiple articles with information
  7441. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  7442.  
  7443. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  7444. ���������������������������������������
  7445. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  7446. Partners ::
  7447.  
  7448. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  7449. ���������������������������������������
  7450. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  7451. Metadata ::
  7452.  
  7453. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  7454. ���������������������������������������
  7455. � National Security Run Amok ::
  7456.  
  7457. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  7458. _______________________________________
  7459.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  7460. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  7461. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  7462. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  7463.  
  7464. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  7465.  
  7466.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  7467. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  7468. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  7469. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  7470. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  7471. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  7472. for including former senators Hillary
  7473. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  7474.  
  7475. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  7476.  
  7477. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  7478. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  7479.  
  7480. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  7481.  
  7482. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7483.  
  7484. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  7485. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  7486.  
  7487. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  7488.  
  7489.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  7490. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  7491.  
  7492. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  7493. ���������������������������������������
  7494. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  7495.  
  7496. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  7497.  
  7498. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  7499.  
  7500. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  7501.  
  7502. NOBODY comments
  7503.  
  7504. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  7505.  
  7506.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  7507. the document was still classified. It was
  7508. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  7509.  
  7510. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7511.  
  7512.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  7513. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  7514. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  7515. many of these operations being leaked.
  7516. _______________________________________
  7517. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  7518. on Brazilian Television ::
  7519.  
  7520. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  7521. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  7522. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  7523.  
  7524. NOBODY comments
  7525.  
  7526.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  7527. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  7528.  
  7529.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  7530. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  7531. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  7532.  
  7533. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  7534. ���������������������������������������
  7535. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7536. English Report ::
  7537.  
  7538.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  7539. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  7540. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  7541. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  7542. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  7543. matters is also much closer than first
  7544. thought. ... ...
  7545.  
  7546.  Day after day and month after month,
  7547. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  7548. amounts of connection data relating
  7549. to the communications it had placed
  7550. under surveillance. The so-called
  7551. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  7552. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  7553. into the Americans� giant databases.
  7554.  
  7555. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  7556.  
  7557. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7558. Deutsch Report ::
  7559.  
  7560. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  7561.  
  7562. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  7563.  
  7564. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  7565. ���������������������������������������
  7566. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  7567.  
  7568. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  7569. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  7570. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  7571.  
  7572. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  7573.  
  7574. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  7575.  
  7576.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  7577. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  7578. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  7579. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  7580. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  7581. the Guardian�s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  7582. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  7583.  
  7584. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  7585. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  7586. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  7587. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  7588.  
  7589. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  7590.  
  7591. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  7592.  
  7593. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  7594.  
  7595. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  7596.  
  7597. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  7598.  
  7599. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  7600.  
  7601. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  7602.  
  7603. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  7604.  
  7605. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  7606.  
  7607. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  7608.  
  7609. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  7610.  
  7611. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  7612.  
  7613. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  7614.  
  7615. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  7616.  
  7617.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  7618. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  7619. they are shunted off to various �production
  7620. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  7621. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  7622. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  7623. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  7624. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  7625. stored in a database called MARINA and
  7626. is generally retained for five years.
  7627.  
  7628. ... ...
  7629.  
  7630.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  7631. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  7632. to change the surveillance laws once the
  7633. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  7634. This was for a simple reason: they did
  7635. not want to be responsible for a program
  7636. that was not legal.�
  7637.  
  7638. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  7639.  
  7640. NOBODY comments
  7641.  
  7642.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7643. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7644. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7645. communications not related to foreign
  7646. information or foreign activity for up
  7647. to five years.
  7648.  
  7649.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  7650. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  7651. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  7652. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  7653. ���������������������������������������
  7654. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  7655. for GCHQ Bude ::
  7656.  
  7657. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  7658. _______________________________________
  7659. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  7660. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  7661.  
  7662.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  7663. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  7664. counterfeiting and even copyright
  7665. infringement complain that their
  7666. attempts to exploit the security
  7667. agency�s vast resources have often
  7668. been turned down because their own
  7669. investigations are not considered a
  7670. high enough priority, current and
  7671. former government officials say.
  7672.  
  7673.  Intelligence officials say they have
  7674. been careful to limit the use of the
  7675. security agency�s troves of data and
  7676. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  7677. could be misused in ways that violate
  7678. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  7679.  
  7680.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  7681. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  7682. senior intelligence official at the
  7683. White House and at the office of the
  7684. director of national intelligence.
  7685. �They collect all this information,
  7686. but it�s difficult for the other
  7687. agencies to get access to what
  7688. they want.�
  7689.  
  7690. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  7691. _______________________________________
  7692. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  7693. Security Forum ::
  7694.  
  7695. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  7696.  
  7697. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  7698. Conference ::
  7699.  
  7700. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  7701.  
  7702. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  7703. Conference ::
  7704.  
  7705. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7706. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  7707. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  7708.  
  7709.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7710. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7711. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7712. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7713. discussions with the president when he
  7714. first came on board we talked to him about
  7715. these programs and the issue was how do
  7716. we know the compliance is there and what
  7717. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7718. the committees in Congress a directorate
  7719. of compliance. This directorate of
  7720. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7721. and information specialists that can look
  7722. at everything that we do in these programs
  7723. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7724. orders but we also have oversight from
  7725. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7726. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7727. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7728. from the White House, from Congress, the
  7729. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7730. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7731.  
  7732. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  7733. Blackhat Conference ::
  7734.  
  7735. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  7736.  
  7737. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  7738.  
  7739. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  7740.  
  7741. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  7742.  
  7743. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  7744.  
  7745. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  7746.  
  7747. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  7748. _______________________________________
  7749. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  7750.  
  7751. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  7752.  
  7753. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  7754. All Domestic Calls ::
  7755.  
  7756.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  7757. three documents related to the National
  7758. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  7759. records, including briefings to Congress
  7760. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  7761. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  7762. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7763. Court that outlines rules that must be
  7764. followed when accessing data provided by
  7765. a Verizon subsidiary.
  7766.  
  7767. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  7768.  
  7769.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  7770. what the government was doing with the
  7771. Patriot Act program, several senators
  7772. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  7773. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  7774. the law in a twisted way to do something
  7775. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  7776. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  7777. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  7778. Act to obtain that document.
  7779.  
  7780. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  7781. _______________________________________
  7782. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  7783.  
  7784. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  7785.  
  7786. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  7787. _______________________________________
  7788. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  7789.  
  7790.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  7791. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  7792. two or three years ago.�
  7793.  
  7794. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  7795. _______________________________________
  7796. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7797. Received Dox ::
  7798.  
  7799. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  7800. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  7801. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  7802. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  7803. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  7804.  
  7805. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  7806.  
  7807. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  7808.  
  7809. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7810. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  7811.  
  7812.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  7813. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  7814. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  7815. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  7816. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  7817. twice as much campaign financing from
  7818. the defense and intelligence industry
  7819. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  7820.  
  7821. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  7822.  
  7823. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  7824. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  7825.  
  7826. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  7827. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  7828. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  7829.  
  7830. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  7831.  
  7832. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  7833.  
  7834. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  7835. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  7836.  
  7837. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  7838. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  7839. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  7840. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  7841.  
  7842. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  7843. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  7844.  
  7845.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  7846. disclosures, the President has said
  7847. that he welcomes a debate about how
  7848. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  7849. our national security and the privacy
  7850. of our citizens.  The Administration
  7851. has taken various proactive steps to
  7852. advance this debate including the
  7853. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  7854. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  7855. his public statements on the disclosed
  7856. programs, the Office of the Director
  7857. of National Intelligence�s release of
  7858. its own public statements, ODNI General
  7859. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  7860. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  7861. disclose publicly that the Administration
  7862. filed an application with the Foreign
  7863. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  7864. look forward to continuing to discuss
  7865. these critical issues with the American
  7866. people and the Congress.
  7867.  
  7868.  However, we oppose the current effort
  7869. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  7870. of our Intelligence Community�s
  7871. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  7872. approach is not the product of an
  7873. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  7874. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  7875. Amendment, and instead move forward
  7876. with an approach that appropriately
  7877. takes into account the need for a
  7878. reasoned review of what tools can
  7879. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  7880.  
  7881. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  7882.  
  7883. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  7884.  
  7885. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  7886. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  7887.  
  7888. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  7889.  
  7890. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  7891. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  7892. to Defund NSA ::
  7893.  
  7894. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  7895. _______________________________________
  7896.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  7897. official letter from the NSA, which was
  7898. sent to the German government to clarify
  7899. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  7900. because German media and politics were
  7901. heavily confused after it became clear
  7902. that there�s more than one program named
  7903. PRISM.
  7904.  
  7905.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  7906. data collection program is about and
  7907. then confirms that this program is
  7908. different from a more common military
  7909. web tool called "Planning tool for
  7910. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  7911. and Management" (PRISM).
  7912.  
  7913.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  7914. there�s even a third program called
  7915. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  7916. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  7917. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  7918. apparently an internal NSA information
  7919. sharing program. It was unknown until
  7920. now, probably because it�s used in the
  7921. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  7922. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  7923.  
  7924.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  7925. different PRISM programs:
  7926.  
  7927. 1. PRISM
  7928.  
  7929.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  7930. of collecting information about foreign
  7931. targets from data of nine major US
  7932. internet companies. This program started
  7933. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  7934. in June 2013.
  7935.  
  7936. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  7937. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  7938.  
  7939.  This is a web tool used by US military
  7940. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  7941. to data collection platforms deployed to
  7942. military operations. This program is
  7943. not very secret and was first mentioned
  7944. in 2002.
  7945.  
  7946. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  7947. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  7948.  
  7949.  This is an internal NSA program for
  7950. real-time sharing of information,
  7951. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  7952. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  7953. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  7954.  
  7955. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  7956.  
  7957. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  7958. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  7959.  
  7960.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  7961. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  7962. surveillance activities in Germany.
  7963. It only added to the mystery. A US
  7964. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  7965. that there are actually three unrelated
  7966. Prism programs. ... ...
  7967.  
  7968.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  7969. and Maassen, officials also read a
  7970. written statement from the NSA in
  7971. response to a query from the German
  7972. government. According to the statement,
  7973. there are three separate Prism programs,
  7974. all of them unconnected to each other.
  7975. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  7976. said that one of the Prism programs was
  7977. only used internally. That program had
  7978. thus far remained secret. Another of
  7979. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  7980. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  7981. -- vaguely described in the statement
  7982. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  7983. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  7984. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  7985. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  7986.  
  7987. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  7988.  
  7989. NOBODY comments
  7990.  
  7991.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  7992. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  7993. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  7994. _______________________________________
  7995. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  7996.  
  7997. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  7998.  
  7999. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  8000.  
  8001. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  8002.  
  8003.  Description and drawings by US Army
  8004. Corps of Engineers.
  8005.  
  8006. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  8007. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  8008. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  8009. _______________________________________
  8010. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  8011.  
  8012. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  8013.  
  8014. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  8015.  
  8016. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  8017. ���������������������������������������
  8018. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  8019.  
  8020. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  8021.  
  8022. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  8023.  
  8024. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  8025.  
  8026. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  8027.  
  8028. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  8029. _______________________________________
  8030. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  8031.  
  8032.  �First, the United States would not seek
  8033. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  8034. return to the United States. The charges
  8035. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  8036. and the United States would not seek the
  8037. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  8038. charged with additional, death penalty-
  8039. eligible crimes.�
  8040.  
  8041. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  8042.  
  8043. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  8044. _______________________________________
  8045. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  8046. Peace Prize ::
  8047.  
  8048.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  8049. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  8050. agency�s data collection program, has
  8051. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  8052.  
  8053.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  8054. at great personal cost � revealed the
  8055. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  8056. the US government devotes electronic
  8057. communications worldwide,� read the
  8058. nomination. �By putting light on this
  8059. monitoring program � conducted in
  8060. contravention of national laws and
  8061. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  8062. has helped to make the world a little
  8063. bit better and safer.� ...
  8064.  
  8065.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  8066. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  8067. to being well justified in itself �
  8068. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  8069. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  8070. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  8071. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  8072. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  8073.  
  8074. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  8075. _______________________________________
  8076. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  8077. Komsomolets News ::
  8078.  
  8079. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  8080. ���������������������������������������
  8081. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  8082. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  8083.  
  8084.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  8085. his experience when he received a Foreign
  8086. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  8087. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  8088. federal government to monitor a customer
  8089. of his.
  8090.  
  8091.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  8092. contained a broad gag order, which still
  8093. prevents him from telling all the details.
  8094.  
  8095.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  8096. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  8097. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  8098. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  8099.  
  8100.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  8101. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  8102. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  8103. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  8104.  
  8105.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  8106. facility that was capturing all of the
  8107. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  8108. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  8109. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  8110. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  8111.  
  8112. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  8113. _______________________________________
  8114. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  8115.  
  8116. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  8117. _______________________________________
  8118. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  8119.  
  8120. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  8121. ���������������������������������������
  8122. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  8123. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  8124.  
  8125.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  8126. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  8127. representative rather casually indicated
  8128. that the government looks at data from
  8129. a universe of far, far more people than
  8130. previously indicated.
  8131.  
  8132.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  8133. was one of several government representatives
  8134. �including from the FBI and the office of
  8135. the Director of National Intelligence�
  8136. testifying before the House Judiciary
  8137. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  8138. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  8139. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  8140. surveillance, including a retread of the
  8141. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  8142. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  8143. Act had stopped terror events.
  8144.  
  8145.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  8146. look �two or three hops� from terror
  8147. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  8148. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  8149. how surveillance was extended had been
  8150. described as two hops. This meant that
  8151. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  8152. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  8153. could also look at the calls from the
  8154. people that suspect has spoken with one
  8155. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  8156. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  8157. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  8158. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  8159.  
  8160. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  8161.  
  8162.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  8163. them or not - two hops.
  8164.  
  8165.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  8166. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  8167.  
  8168. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  8169. ���������������������������������������
  8170. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  8171.  
  8172.  It is a good thing that people are
  8173. becoming aware of the fact that they
  8174. are being monitored - it is not only
  8175. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  8176. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  8177. made to collect information and to store
  8178. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  8179. resources that PRISM used and how it
  8180. could combine these resources to multiple
  8181. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  8182.  
  8183. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  8184. _______________________________________
  8185. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  8186.  
  8187. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  8188. ���������������������������������������
  8189. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  8190. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  8191.  
  8192.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  8193. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  8194. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  8195. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  8196. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  8197. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  8198. stories about the US government�s vast
  8199. foreign and domestic spying programs
  8200. will stop. ... ...
  8201.  
  8202.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  8203. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  8204. the United States by releasing more
  8205. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  8206.  
  8207.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  8208. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  8209. since he has already said that he gave
  8210. all of his classified information --
  8211. thousands of documents -- to several
  8212. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  8213. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  8214. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  8215. half done with the stories he plans to
  8216. write based on the secret information.
  8217.  
  8218. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  8219. ���������������������������������������
  8220. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  8221.  
  8222. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  8223. _______________________________________
  8224. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  8225.  
  8226. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  8227. ���������������������������������������
  8228. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  8229.  
  8230.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  8231. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  8232. typewriters. What do they know that
  8233. we don�t?
  8234.  
  8235. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  8236. ���������������������������������������
  8237. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  8238. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  8239.  
  8240.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  8241. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  8242. has existed since at least 2002. The
  8243. following document refers to it directly.
  8244. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  8245. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  8246. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  8247. limitation of it and similar projects.
  8248.  
  8249. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  8250.  
  8251. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  8252. _______________________________________
  8253. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  8254. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  8255.  
  8256. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  8257.  
  8258. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  8259. in Latin America ::
  8260.  
  8261. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  8262. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  8263. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  8264. _______________________________________
  8265. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  8266. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  8267.  
  8268. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  8269.  
  8270. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  8271.  
  8272. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  8273. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  8274.  
  8275. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  8276. _______________________________________
  8277. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  8278.  
  8279. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  8280. _______________________________________
  8281. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  8282. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  8283.  
  8284. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  8285. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  8286. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  8287. ���������������������������������������
  8288. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  8289.  
  8290. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  8291.  
  8292. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  8293.  
  8294. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  8295. _______________________________________
  8296. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  8297. Metadata ::
  8298.  
  8299. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  8300. _______________________________________
  8301. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  8302. by US Citizens ::
  8303.  
  8304. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  8305. ���������������������������������������
  8306. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  8307.  
  8308. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  8309.  
  8310.  �This may look like a small release, but
  8311. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  8312. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  8313. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  8314. sending encrypted data to and from the
  8315. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  8316. those servers. If you crash these servers
  8317. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  8318. "broken". We are also planning to release
  8319. some of that data (which we have access
  8320. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  8321. ���������������������������������������
  8322. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  8323. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  8324.  
  8325.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  8326. Snowden�s employer.
  8327.  
  8328. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  8329.  
  8330. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  8331.  
  8332. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  8333. _______________________________________
  8334. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  8335.  
  8336. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  8337. _______________________________________
  8338. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  8339.  
  8340.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  8341. it became clear that my freedom and
  8342. safety were under threat for revealing
  8343. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  8344. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  8345. old, family, and others who I have never
  8346. met and probably never will. I trusted
  8347. them with my life and they returned that
  8348. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  8349. always be thankful.
  8350.  
  8351.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  8352. before the world that he would not permit
  8353. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  8354. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  8355. after promising not to do so, the President
  8356. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  8357. leaders of nations from which I have
  8358. requested protection to deny my asylum
  8359. petitions.
  8360.  
  8361.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  8362. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  8363. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  8364. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  8365. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  8366. come after me.
  8367.  
  8368.  For decades the United States of America
  8369. have been one of the strongest defenders
  8370. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  8371. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  8372. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  8373. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  8374. the current government of my country. The
  8375. Obama administration has now adopted the
  8376. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  8377. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  8378. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  8379. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  8380. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  8381. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  8382. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  8383. asylum.
  8384.  
  8385.  In the end the Obama administration is
  8386. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  8387. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  8388. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  8389. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  8390. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  8391. demanding the constitutional government
  8392. it was promised � and it should be.
  8393.  
  8394.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  8395. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  8396. many.�
  8397.  
  8398. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  8399. ���������������������������������������
  8400. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  8401.  
  8402. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  8403.  
  8404. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  8405.  
  8406. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  8407. _______________________________________
  8408. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  8409.  
  8410. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  8411. ���������������������������������������
  8412. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  8413.  
  8414. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8415. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  8416. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  8417. _______________________________________
  8418. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  8419.  
  8420. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  8421. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  8422. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  8423. _______________________________________
  8424. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  8425.  
  8426. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  8427.  
  8428.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  8429. over private data to America.
  8430.  
  8431.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  8432. according to new claims by former US defence
  8433. analyst.
  8434.  
  8435.  At least six European Union countries in
  8436. addition to Britain have been colluding
  8437. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  8438. personal communications data, according
  8439. to a former contractor to America�s
  8440. National Security Agency, who said the
  8441. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  8442.  
  8443.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  8444. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  8445. and over the next 12 years held several
  8446. sensitive positions within the agency,
  8447. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  8448. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  8449. deals with the US.
  8450.  
  8451.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  8452. second and third party status� under
  8453. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  8454. that compels them to hand over data,
  8455. including mobile phone and internet
  8456. information to the NSA if requested.
  8457.  
  8458.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  8459. confirmed by declassified documents,
  8460. nations are categorised by the US according
  8461. to their trust level. The US is first party
  8462. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  8463. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  8464. Germany and France have third party
  8465. relationships.
  8466.  
  8467.  In an interview published last night
  8468. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  8469. who has been attacked for holding
  8470. controversial views on espionage issues,
  8471. said he had decided to speak out after
  8472. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  8473. told by EU politicians regarding the
  8474. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  8475.  
  8476.  He said that under the agreements,
  8477. which were drawn up after the second
  8478. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  8479. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  8480. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  8481. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  8482.  
  8483.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  8484. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  8485. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  8486. about the spying operations while staying
  8487. silent about their own arrangements
  8488. with the US, and was particularly
  8489. concerned that senior German politicians
  8490. had accused the UK of spying when their
  8491. country had a similar third-party deal
  8492. with the NSA.
  8493.  
  8494.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  8495. by other European countries to the NSA is
  8496. not on the same scale as that provided by
  8497. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  8498. embarrassing.
  8499.  
  8500.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  8501. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  8502. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  8503. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  8504. Madsen said.
  8505.  
  8506.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  8507. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  8508. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  8509. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  8510. confirmed that the entire system for
  8511. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  8512. because the EU was unable to intervene
  8513. in intelligence matters, which remained
  8514. the exclusive concern of national
  8515. governments.
  8516.  
  8517.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  8518. these contradictions and no one is really
  8519. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  8520. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  8521. democracy.�
  8522.  
  8523.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  8524. for European governments to come clean
  8525. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  8526. �There needs to be transparency as to
  8527. whether or not it is legal for the US
  8528. or any other security service to
  8529. interrogate private material,� said
  8530. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  8531. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  8532. is that none of these arrangements has
  8533. been debated in any democratic arena.
  8534. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  8535. things have to be done in secret, but you
  8536. don�t break the law in secret.�
  8537.  
  8538.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  8539. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  8540. fibre-optic cable network running between
  8541. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  8542. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  8543. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  8544. including phone calls, emails and records
  8545. of users� access to websites.
  8546.  
  8547.  He said the public needed to be made
  8548. aware of the full scale of the communication
  8549. -sharing arrangements between European
  8550. countries and the US, which predate the
  8551. internet and became of strategic importance
  8552. during the cold war.
  8553.  
  8554.  The covert relationship between the
  8555. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  8556. report by the European parliament, but
  8557. their explicit connection with the NSA
  8558. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  8559. to speak out.
  8560.  
  8561.  The European parliament�s report followed
  8562. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  8563. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  8564. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  8565. established the framework for European
  8566. member states to collaborate with the US.
  8567.  
  8568.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  8569. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  8570. that governments have chosen to keep the
  8571. public in the dark about it. The days
  8572. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  8573. of silence are over.�
  8574.  
  8575.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  8576. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  8577. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  8578. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  8579. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  8580. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  8581. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  8582. ���������������������������������������
  8583. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  8584. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  8585.  
  8586.  A former contractor to the US National
  8587. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  8588. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  8589. intelligence arrangements between the
  8590. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  8591. murky and far reaching� than the public
  8592. has been led to believe. ...
  8593.  
  8594.  He was particularly concerned about the
  8595. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  8596. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  8597. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  8598. while staying silent about their own role
  8599. in global interception arrangements with
  8600. the United States. ...
  8601.  
  8602.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  8603. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  8604.  
  8605.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  8606. many who say he had no authority or right
  8607. to provide the public with details of
  8608. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  8609. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  8610. have to provide information on NSA
  8611. surveillance at five meetings of the
  8612. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  8613. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  8614. Spain and Switzerland?�
  8615.  
  8616.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  8617. American people from a constantly changing
  8618. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  8619. is providing information to elites on
  8620. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  8621. student, religious and progressive
  8622. organizations.�
  8623.  
  8624.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  8625. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  8626. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  8627.  
  8628. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  8629. _______________________________________
  8630. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  8631.  
  8632. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  8633. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  8634. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  8635. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  8636. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  8637. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  8638. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  8639.  
  8640. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  8641.  
  8642. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  8643. ���������������������������������������
  8644. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  8645.  
  8646. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  8647. _______________________________________
  8648. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  8649.  
  8650. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  8651. _______________________________________
  8652. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  8653.  
  8654. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  8655. _______________________________________
  8656. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  8657.  
  8658. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  8659. _______________________________________
  8660. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  8661.  
  8662. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  8663. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  8664. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  8665.  
  8666. � Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  8667.  
  8668. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  8669. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8670. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  8671. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  8672. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  8673. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  8674. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  8675. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  8676. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  8677. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  8678. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  8679. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  8680. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  8681. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  8682. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  8683. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  8684. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  8685. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  8686. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  8687. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  8688. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  8689. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  8690. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  8691. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  8692. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  8693. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  8694. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  8695. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  8696. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  8697. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  8698. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  8699. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  8700. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  8701. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  8702. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  8703. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  8704. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  8705. _______________________________________
  8706. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  8707. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  8708.  
  8709. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  8710. _______________________________________
  8711. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  8712.  
  8713. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  8714.  
  8715. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  8716.  
  8717. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  8718.  
  8719. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  8720. _______________________________________
  8721. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  8722.  
  8723. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  8724.  
  8725. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  8726. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  8727. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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