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Posted by Eyeballing the N on October Sat 11th 4:22 PM - Never Expires
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  1.  
  2. Eyeballing the NSA 038 (HTML & UTF-8 Embedded) �
  3.  
  4. http://paste.oneb1t.cz/view/7f2dc0be
  5.  
  6. Eyeballing the NSA 038 (PDF) �
  7.  
  8. http://megaswf.com/f/2694150
  9.    
  10.    
  11.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  12. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  13. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  14.  
  15.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  16.  
  17.  
  18. � Core Secrets: NSA Saboteurs in China and Germany
  19.  
  20.  The National Security Agency has had agents in China, Germany,
  21. and South Korea working on programs that use �physical subversion�
  22. to infiltrate and compromise networks and devices, according to
  23. documents obtained by The Intercept.
  24.  
  25.  The documents, leaked by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, also
  26. indicate that the agency has used �under cover� operatives to gain
  27. access to sensitive data and systems in the global communications
  28. industry, and that these secret agents may have even dealt with
  29. American firms. The documents describe a range of clandestine field
  30. activities that are among the agency�s �core secrets� when it comes
  31. to computer network attacks, details of which are apparently shared
  32. with only a small number of officials outside the NSA.
  33.  
  34.  �It�s something that many people have been wondering about for a
  35. long time,� said Chris Soghoian, principal technologist for the
  36. American Civil Liberties Union, after reviewing the documents.
  37. �I�ve had conversations with executives at tech companies about
  38. this precise thing. How do you know the NSA is not sending people
  39. into your data centers?�
  40.  
  41.  Previous disclosures about the NSA�s corporate partnerships have
  42. focused largely on US companies providing the agency with vast amounts
  43. of customer data, including phone records and email traffic. But
  44. documents published today by The Intercept suggest that even as the
  45. agency uses secret operatives to penetrate them, companies have also
  46. cooperated more broadly to undermine the physical infrastructure of
  47. the internet than has been previously confirmed.
  48.  
  49.  In addition to so-called �close access� operations, the NSA�s �core
  50. secrets� include the fact that the agency works with US and foreign
  51. companies to weaken their encryption systems; the fact that the NSA
  52. spends �hundreds of millions of dollars� on technology to defeat
  53. commercial encryption; and the fact that the agency works with US
  54. and foreign companies to penetrate computer networks, possibly without
  55. the knowledge of the host countries. Many of the NSA�s core secrets
  56. concern its relationships to domestic and foreign corporations.
  57.  
  58.  Some of the documents in this article appear in a new documentary,
  59. CITIZENFOUR, which tells the story of the Snowden disclosures and is
  60. directed by Intercept co-founder Laura Poitras. The documents describe
  61. a panoply of programs classified with the rare designation of
  62. �Exceptionally Compartmented Information,� or ECI, which are only
  63. disclosed to a �very select� number of government officials.
  64.  
  65. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/10/10/core-secrets/
  66.  
  67. � Top Secret Special Source Operations Classification Guides ::
  68.  
  69. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-whipgenie-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  70.  
  71. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-tarex-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  72.  
  73. � Operation Sentry Eagle (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  74.  
  75. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  76.  
  77. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-sentry-eagle-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  78.  
  79. � NSA Exceptionally Controlled Information ::
  80.  
  81. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  82.  
  83. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-pawleys-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  84.  
  85. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-eci-compartments-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  86.  
  87. � NSA National Initiative Task Security (Parts 1 & 2) ::
  88.  
  89. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  90.  
  91. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-nit-2-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  92.  
  93. � NSA Computer Network Exploitation ::
  94.  
  95. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-cne-declass-the-intercept-14-1010.pdf
  96.  
  97. � Following 10 NSA Releases (8.5MB | ZIP) ::
  98.  
  99. http://cryptome.org/2014/10/nsa-releases-the-intercept-14-1010.zip
  100. _______________________________________
  101. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides ::
  102.  
  103. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.alexaobrien.com/secondsight/wb/binney.html
  104.  
  105. � Retired NSA Technical Director Explains NSA Slides (ZIP) ::
  106.  
  107. Includes the report and the slides.
  108.  
  109. http://fileb.ag/i627vr7a6bkx
  110. _______________________________________
  111. � ACLU�s FOIA Documents Shed Light on One of the NSA�s Most
  112. Powerful Tools (Other Agencies and Legal Loopholes) ::
  113.  
  114. https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/new-documents-shed-light-one-nsas-most-powerful-tools
  115.  
  116. � Overview of (Other) Signals Intelligence Authorities ::
  117.  
  118. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Overview%20of%20Signals%20Intelligence%20Authorities.pdf
  119.  
  120. � DoD-DIA�s 16 Legal Loopholes to Spy On US Persons ::
  121.  
  122. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/DoD%20HUMINT%20Legal%20Workshop%20Fundamentals%20of%20HUMINT%20Targeting.pdf
  123.  
  124. � Intelligence Law Handbook Defense HUMINT Service ::
  125.  
  126. https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/DIA/Intelligence%20Law%20Handbook%20Defense%20HUMINT%20Service.pdf
  127. _______________________________________
  128. � NSA Spies on UN in Vienna ::
  129.  
  130. http://fm4.orf.at/stories/1746596/
  131. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/28666/intelligence/nsa-spying-un-vienna.html
  132. http://www.techworm.net/2014/09/erich-mochel-leaks-photos-nsa-spying-united-nations.html
  133. ���������������������������������������
  134. � How Covert Agents Infiltrate the Internet to Manipulate, Deceive,
  135. and Destroy Reputations ::
  136.  
  137. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  138.  
  139. http://www.infowars.com/cointelrpo-revisited-greenwald-exposes-nsa-agenda-to-destroy-journalists/
  140.  
  141.  One of the many pressing stories that remains to be told from the
  142. Snowden archive is how western intelligence agencies are attempting
  143. to manipulate and control online discourse with extreme tactics of
  144. deception and reputation-destruction. It�s time to tell a chunk of
  145. that story, complete with the relevant documents.
  146.  
  147.  Over the last several weeks, I worked with NBC News to publish a
  148. series of articles about �dirty trick� tactics used by GCHQ�s previously
  149. secret unit, JTRIG (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group). These
  150. were based on four classified GCHQ documents presented to the NSA
  151. and the other three partners in the English-speaking �Five Eyes�
  152. alliance. Today, we at the Intercept are publishing another new
  153. JTRIG document, in full, entitled �The Art of Deception: Training
  154. for Online Covert Operations.�
  155.  
  156. � GCHQ ; The Art of Deception: Training for Online Covert Operations ::
  157.  
  158. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/02/24/art-deception-training-new-generation-online-covert-operations/
  159.  
  160. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1021430/the-art-of-deception-training-for-a-new.pdf
  161. ---------------------------------------
  162. � Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  163. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  164.  
  165.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  166. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  167. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  168. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  169. �amplify� sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  170. content judged to be �extremist.� The capabilities, detailed
  171. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  172. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  173. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  174. together in a call.
  175.  
  176.  The tools were created by GCHQ�s Joint Threat Research
  177. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  178. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  179. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  180. documents have detailed JTRIG�s use of �fake victim blog
  181. posts,� �false flag operations,� �honey traps� and
  182. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  183. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  184. Facebook users.
  185.  
  186. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  187.  
  188. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  189.  
  190. � GCHQ�s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  191.  
  192. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  193. ---------------------------------------
  194. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  195.  
  196. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  197.  
  198.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  199. program run by the US Agency for International
  200. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  201. communications network� run through �secret shell
  202. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  203. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  204. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  205. �American contractors were gathering their private
  206. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  207. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  208. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  209. government. According to top-secret documents
  210. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  211. operation is frequently discussed at western
  212. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  213. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  214. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  215.  
  216. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  217.  
  218. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  219.  
  220. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  221.  
  222.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  223. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  224. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  225. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  226. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  227. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  228. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  229. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  230. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  231. Space Intelligence Center.�
  232.  
  233.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  234. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  235. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  236. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  237. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  238. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  239. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  240. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  241.  
  242.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  243. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  244. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  245. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  246. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  247. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  248. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  249. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  250. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  251.  
  252. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  253.  
  254. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  255. ---------------------------------------
  256. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  257.  
  258. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  259.  
  260. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  261.  
  262. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  263.  
  264. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  265.  
  266.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  267. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  268. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  269. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  270. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  271. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  272. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  273. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  274. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  275. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  276. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  277.  
  278.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  279. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  280. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  281. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  282. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  283. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  284.  
  285. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  286. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  287. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  288. ---------------------------------------
  289. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  290.  
  291. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  292.  
  293. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  294.  
  295. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  296.  
  297. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  298.  
  299. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  300.  
  301. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  302.  
  303. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  304.  
  305. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  306.  
  307. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  308. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  309. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  310.  
  311. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  312. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  313.  
  314. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  315. ---------------------------------------
  316. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  317.  
  318. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  319. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  320. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  321. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  322.  
  323. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  324.  
  325. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  326.  
  327. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  328.  
  329. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  330.  
  331. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  332.  
  333. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  334. ---------------------------------------
  335. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  336.  
  337. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  338. _______________________________________
  339. � Unraveling NSA�s TURBULENCE Programs ::
  340.  
  341. https://robert.sesek.com/2014/9/unraveling_nsa_s_turbulence_programs.html
  342. _______________________________________
  343. � New Zealand�s Prime Minister Isn�t Telling the Truth About
  344. Mass Surveillance ::
  345.  
  346. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  347.  
  348. � New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  349. Denying It ::
  350.  
  351. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  352.  
  353. � Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  354. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald �A Loser� ::
  355.  
  356. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  357.  
  358. � New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  359.  
  360. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  361.  
  362. � NSA Visit by New Zealand Spy PM Ferguson ::
  363.  
  364. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-nz-ferguson-visit-the-intercept-14-0915.pdf
  365.  
  366. � The Questions for New Zealand on Mass Surveillance ::
  367.  
  368. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/questions-new-zealand-mass-surveillance/
  369. _______________________________________
  370. ? NSA Spooks Deny The Evidence (Provided Below) Exists ::
  371.  
  372.  Did the NSA forget Ed Snowden contacted NBC and released
  373. the evidence contacting authorities regarding his concerns?
  374.  
  375. https://news.vice.com/article/the-nsa-has-revealed-new-details-about-its-exhaustive-search-of-edward-snowdens-emails
  376.  
  377. ? FLASHBACK! Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  378.  
  379.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  380. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  381. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  382. activity before he began leaking government documents
  383. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  384. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  385.  
  386.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  387. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  388. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  389. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  390. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  391. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  392. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  393. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  394. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  395. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  396. attention.��
  397.  
  398.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  399. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  400. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  401. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  402. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  403.  
  404. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  405.  
  406. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  407. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  408.  
  409. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  410. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  411. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  412. ---------------------------------------
  413. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  414.  
  415. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  416.  
  417. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  418. _______________________________________
  419. � NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  420.  
  421.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  422. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  423. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  424. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  425.  
  426. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  427.  
  428. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  429.  
  430. � GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  431.  
  432. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  433.  
  434. � NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  435.  
  436. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  437.  
  438. � NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  439.  
  440. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  441.  
  442. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  443. _______________________________________
  444. � NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  445.  
  446. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  447.  
  448. � Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  449.  
  450. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  451.  
  452. ? UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  453.  
  454. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  455. _______________________________________
  456. � Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  457.  
  458. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  459. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  460. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  461.  
  462. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  463.  
  464. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  465.  
  466. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  467.  
  468. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  469.  
  470. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  471.  
  472. � NSA�s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  473.  
  474. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  475.  
  476. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  477.  
  478. � NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  479.  
  480. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  481. _______________________________________
  482. � DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  483.  
  484. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  485. _______________________________________
  486. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden�s Info
  487.  
  488.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  489. documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks so far,
  490. up to September 5th of 2014. I�m still collecting any
  491. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  492. archive twice per year.
  493.  
  494.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  495. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  496. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  497. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  498.  
  499.  After decompression, the first folder is titled �Eyeballing_
  500. Snowden_Info_Folder_01� and the second is titled �Eyeballing_
  501. Snowden_Info_Folder_02� , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  502. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  503.  
  504.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  505. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  506. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  507.  
  508. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  509. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  510.  
  511. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  512. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  513. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  514.  
  515. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  516. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  517.  
  518. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  519. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  520. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  521. ���������������������������������������
  522. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  523.  
  524. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  525.  
  526. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  527.  
  528. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  529.  
  530. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  531. _______________________________________
  532. � NSA�s Foreign Partnerships ::
  533.  
  534. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  535. _______________________________________
  536. � Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  537.  
  538. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  539.  
  540. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  541.  
  542. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  543.  
  544. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  545. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  546. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  547. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  548. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  549. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  550. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  551. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  552. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  553. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  554. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  555. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  556. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  557.  
  558. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  559.  
  560. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  561. _______________________________________
  562. � How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  563.  
  564. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  565.  
  566. � NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  567.  
  568. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  569. _______________________________________
  570. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  571.  
  572. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  573.  
  574. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  575.  
  576. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  577.  
  578. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  579.  
  580. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  581. _______________________________________
  582. � Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  583.  
  584. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  585.  
  586. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  587.  
  588. � Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  589.  
  590. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  591.  
  592. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  593. _______________________________________
  594. � Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the �Now-Discontinued� (?)
  595. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  596. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  597.  
  598. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  599. _______________________________________
  600. � GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  601.  
  602. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  603.  
  604. � Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  605.  
  606. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  607. _______________________________________
  608. � Barack Obama�s Secret �Terrorist-Tracking� System ::
  609.  
  610.  Nearly half of the people on the US government�s widely shared
  611. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  612. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  613. obtained by The Intercept.
  614.  
  615. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  616.  
  617. � NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  618.  
  619. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  620.  
  621. � Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  622.  
  623.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  624. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  625. secret process that requires neither �concrete facts� nor
  626. �irrefutable evidence� to designate an American or foreigner
  627. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  628. by The Intercept.
  629.  
  630. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  631. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  632. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  633. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  634. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  635.  
  636. NOBODY notes
  637.  
  638.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  639. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  640. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  641. only these �dirty tricks� are now fully digitalized.
  642.  
  643. � Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  644.  
  645.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  646. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  647. and his approach to dissent. �Before I left the State
  648. Department, I filed a complaint with the department�s
  649. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  650. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  651. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  652. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,�
  653. Tye explained. �I have also brought my complaint to the
  654. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  655. inspector general of the NSA.�
  656.  
  657.  These steps � which many say Snowden should�ve taken �
  658. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  659. wouldn�t be garnering attention at all if not for
  660. Snowden�s leaks.
  661.  
  662. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  663.  
  664. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  665. _______________________________________
  666. � Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  667. Israeli Attack ::
  668.  
  669.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  670. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  671. crucial role in Israel�s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  672. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  673. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  674. enable Israel�s military assaults � such as the one on Gaza.
  675.  
  676. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  677.  
  678. � ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  679.  
  680. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  681.  
  682. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  683.  
  684. � US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  685.  
  686. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  687.  
  688. � (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  689.  
  690. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  691. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  692. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  693.  
  694. � (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  695.  
  696. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  697. _______________________________________
  698. � USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  699.  
  700. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  701.  
  702. � NSA�s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia�s Brutal State Police ::
  703.  
  704.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  705. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  706. one of the world�s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  707. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  708. Snowden details the agency�s plans �to provide direct analytic and
  709. technical support� to the Saudis on �internal security� matters.
  710.  
  711.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior�referred to in the document as MOI
  712. � has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  713. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  714. that �Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  715. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,� specifically
  716. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly �poured an
  717. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat� of one human rights
  718. activist. The report also notes the MOI�s use of invasive surveillance
  719. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  720.  
  721.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  722. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  723. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  724. Administration�s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  725. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes �a
  726. period of rejuvenation� for the NSA�s relationship with the Saudi
  727. Ministry of Defense.
  728.  
  729.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  730. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  731. where the US �has [an] interest in regime continuity.�
  732.  
  733. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  734. _______________________________________
  735. � Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  736.  
  737. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  738. _______________________________________
  739. � NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  740.  
  741. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  742.  
  743. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  744. _______________________________________
  745. � Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  746.  
  747.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  748. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  749. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  750.  
  751. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  752.  
  753. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  754. _______________________________________
  755. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  756.  
  757.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  758. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  759. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  760. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  761. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  762. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  763. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  764.  
  765. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  766.  
  767. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  768.  
  769. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  770. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  771. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  772.  
  773. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  774.  
  775. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  776.  
  777. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  778.  
  779.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  780. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  781.  
  782. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  783.  
  784. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  785.  
  786. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  787.  
  788. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  789.  
  790.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  791. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  792. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  793. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  794.  
  795. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  796.  
  797. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  798.  
  799. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  800.  
  801. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  802.  
  803. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  804.  
  805. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  806.  
  807. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  808.  
  809. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  810.  
  811. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  812.  
  813. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  814.  
  815. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  816.  
  817. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  818.  
  819. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  820.  
  821. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  822. _______________________________________
  823. � NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  824.  
  825. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  826.  
  827. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  828. _______________________________________
  829. � The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  830. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  831.  
  832.  The contents of the surveillance files � almost half of which
  833. contained information from US citizens or residents � �tell
  834. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  835. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  836. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.�
  837.  
  838. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  839. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  840. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  841.  
  842. � Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  843. Been Spying On ::
  844.  
  845.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  846. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans�including
  847. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  848. academics, and lawyers�under secretive procedures intended
  849. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  850.  
  851.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  852. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  853. own government includes:
  854.  
  855.  � Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  856. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  857. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  858. Security under President George W. Bush;
  859.  
  860.  � Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  861. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  862.  
  863.  � Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  864. international relations at Rutgers University;
  865.  
  866.  � Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  867. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  868. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  869.  
  870.  � Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  871. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  872. rights organization in the country.
  873.  
  874. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  875. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  876. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  877.  
  878. � NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  879.  
  880. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  881.  
  882. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  883.  
  884. � Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  885.  
  886. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  887.  
  888. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  889.  
  890. ? NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  891.                               ���������
  892.  �The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  893. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  894. crime to law enforcement authorities.�
  895.  
  896. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  897.  
  898. ? US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  899.  
  900. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  901.  
  902. NOBODY responds
  903.  
  904.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  905. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  906. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  907.  
  908. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  909.  
  910.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  911. back in 2004 up till today.
  912.  
  913. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  914.  
  915.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  916. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  917.  
  918. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  919.  
  920.  Just like those in the �Department of Justice� they
  921. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  922. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  923. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  924.  
  925. � Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  926.  
  927. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  928.  
  929.  �So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  930. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  931. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  932. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  933.  
  934.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  935. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  936. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  937. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  938. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  939. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  940. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  941. first place.  Realistically, it�s not one or the other, it�s
  942. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  943. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  944. On one hand: it�s evidence, on the other, it�s private information
  945. on many thousands of people.
  946.  
  947.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  948. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  949. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  950. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  951. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  952. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  953. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  954. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  955. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  956. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  957. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  958. happen now. The US government�s dealings with brutal regimes
  959. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  960. their own people.
  961.  
  962.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  963. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  964. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  965. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  966. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  967. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  968. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  969. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  970. the Post�s story as a dud, it�s the first page of the next
  971. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  972. unpredictable consequences.�
  973.  
  974. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  975. _______________________________________
  976. � Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  977.  
  978. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  979. ���������������������������������������
  980. � Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  981.  
  982.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  983. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  984. Binney � that�s a �totalitarian mentality.�
  985.  
  986. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  987. _______________________________________
  988. � NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  989.  
  990. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  991.  
  992.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  993. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  994. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  995. Aussp�hprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  996.  
  997.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  998. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  999. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  1000. investigate.
  1001.  
  1002.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  1003. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  1004. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  1005. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  1006. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  1007. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  1008.  
  1009. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  1010.  
  1011. MP4 Video Format � http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  1012.  
  1013. � XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  1014.  
  1015. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  1016.  
  1017. � NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  1018.  
  1019. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  1020. ---------------------------------------
  1021. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1022.  
  1023. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1024.  
  1025. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  1026.  
  1027.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  1028. using Tor.�
  1029.  
  1030. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  1031.  
  1032. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  1033.  
  1034. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  1035.  
  1036.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t mean that your
  1037. browser isn�t storing cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman,
  1038. a colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes in browser
  1039. vulnerabilities.
  1040.  
  1041.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  1042. aware of Tor�s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  1043. wide surveillance.
  1044.  
  1045.  �The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  1046. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  1047. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  1048. other Web users,� he wrote.
  1049.  
  1050.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  1051. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  1052. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,�
  1053. he said.
  1054.  
  1055. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  1056.  
  1057. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  1058. Traffic From Machines ::
  1059.  
  1060.  �Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  1061. out large-scale �staining� as a means to identify individual
  1062. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  1063.  
  1064.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  1065. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  1066. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  1067. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  1068. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  1069. session.�
  1070.  
  1071. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  1072.  
  1073. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  1074.  
  1075. � Packet Staining ::
  1076.  
  1077. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  1078. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  1079. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  1080. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  1081.  
  1082. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  1083.  
  1084. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  1085. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  1086. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  1087. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  1088.  
  1089. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  1090.  
  1091.  �We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  1092. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  1093. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  1094. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  1095. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  1096. which allows the user finer control.� ... ...
  1097.  
  1098.  �This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  1099. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  1100. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  1101. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  1102. server can be used to hide one�s location, but a single-hop
  1103. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  1104. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  1105. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  1106. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  1107. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  1108. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  1109. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  1110. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  1111. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  1112. order to trace requests back to the originating client.�
  1113.  
  1114. ... ...
  1115.  
  1116.  �In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  1117. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  1118. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  1119. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  1120. of Tor.�
  1121.  
  1122. ... ...
  1123.  
  1124.  �We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  1125. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  1126. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  1127. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  1128. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  1129. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  1130. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  1131. be tried.�
  1132.  
  1133. ... ...
  1134.  
  1135.  �It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  1136. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  1137. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  1138. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  1139. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  1140. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  1141. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  1142. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  1143. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  1144. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  1145. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  1146. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  1147. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  1148. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  1149. who inspecting the directories.�
  1150.  
  1151. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  1152. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  1153. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  1154.  
  1155. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  1156.  
  1157. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  1158.  
  1159. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  1160.  
  1161. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  1162.  
  1163. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  1164.  
  1165.  �This document doesn�t give much insight into capabilities
  1166. the IC has developed against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  1167. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  1168. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  1169. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  1170. investment. I�d expect there are other programs with more
  1171. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  1172.  
  1173. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  1174. _______________________________________
  1175. � UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  1176.  
  1177. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  1178.  
  1179. � UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  1180. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  1181.  
  1182.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  1183. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany�s
  1184. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  1185. as a double agent for the US.
  1186.  
  1187.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  1188. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  1189. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country�s
  1190. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  1191. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  1192.  
  1193.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  1194. week�s arrest of a 31-year-old BND �double agent� who spent
  1195. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  1196. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  1197. of �10,000 (�7,940) per document. ...
  1198.  
  1199.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin�s
  1200. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  1201. in �co-operation�. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  1202. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  1203. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  1204.  
  1205.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  1206. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin�s Russian
  1207. embassy. The Germans had considered it �impossible� that one
  1208. of their own intelligence men could be working as a �double agent�
  1209. for the Americans.
  1210.  
  1211. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1212. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1213. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1214. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1215.  
  1216. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1217.  
  1218. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1219.  
  1220. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1221.  
  1222. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1223.  
  1224. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1225.  
  1226. � Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1227.  
  1228. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1229.  
  1230. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1231.  
  1232. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1233.  
  1234. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1235.  
  1236. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1237.  
  1238. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1239.  
  1240. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1241.  
  1242. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1243.  
  1244. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1245.  
  1246. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1247.  
  1248. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1249.  
  1250. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  1251.  
  1252.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  1253. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  1254. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  1255. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  1256. where she grew up.
  1257.  
  1258. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1259. _______________________________________
  1260. � NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  1261.  
  1262. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  1263. _______________________________________
  1264. � Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  1265.  
  1266. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  1267. _______________________________________
  1268. � Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  1269.  
  1270. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  1271. _______________________________________
  1272. � NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  1273.  
  1274. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  1275. _______________________________________
  1276. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  1277.  
  1278. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  1279. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  1280. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  1281. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  1282.  
  1283. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  1284.  
  1285. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  1286.  
  1287. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  1288.  
  1289. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  1290.  
  1291. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1292.  
  1293. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  1294.  
  1295. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  1296.  
  1297. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  1298.  
  1299. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1300.  
  1301. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  1302. _______________________________________
  1303.  Keith Alexander�s talking points for strategic meeting
  1304. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  1305. Service (DDIS).
  1306.  
  1307. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  1308. _______________________________________
  1309. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1310.  
  1311. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  1312.  
  1313. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1314.  
  1315. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  1316. _______________________________________
  1317. � Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  1318.  
  1319. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  1320. _______________________________________
  1321. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  1322. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  1323.  
  1324. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  1325. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  1326. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  1327.  
  1328.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  1329. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  1330. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  1331. user in the UK.
  1332.  
  1333. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  1334.  
  1335. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  1336. _______________________________________
  1337. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  1338. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  1339.  
  1340. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  1341. ---------------------------------------
  1342. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1343.  
  1344. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1345. _______________________________________
  1346. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  1347.  
  1348. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  1349. _______________________________________
  1350. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  1351.  
  1352. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  1353.  
  1354. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  1355. _______________________________________
  1356. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  1357. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  1358.  
  1359. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  1360. _______________________________________
  1361. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  1362.  
  1363. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  1364.  
  1365. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  1366.  
  1367. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  1368. _______________________________________
  1369. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  1370. to Tap Phones ::
  1371.  
  1372. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  1373. _______________________________________
  1374. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  1375.  
  1376. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  1377. _______________________________________
  1378. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  1379. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  1380. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  1381.  
  1382.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  1383. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  1384. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  1385. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  1386. they were spying on � was hidden?
  1387.  
  1388.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  1389. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  1390. everybody what they�re doing?
  1391.  
  1392.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  1393. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  1394. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  1395. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  1396. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  1397. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  1398. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  1399. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  1400. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  1401.  
  1402.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  1403. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  1404. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  1405. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  1406. was a specialist in, by the way.
  1407.  
  1408.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  1409. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  1410. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  1411. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  1412. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  1413. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  1414.  
  1415.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  1416. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  1417. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  1418. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  1419. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  1420. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  1421. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  1422. for the JWICS.
  1423.  
  1424.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  1425. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  1426. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  1427. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  1428. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  1429. that [clearance].
  1430.  
  1431.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  1432. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  1433. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  1434. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  1435.  
  1436.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  1437. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  1438. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  1439. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  1440. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  1441. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  1442. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1443. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1444.  
  1445.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  1446. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  1447. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  1448.  
  1449.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1450. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  1451. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  1452. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  1453. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  1454.  
  1455.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  1456. to placate the American people.
  1457.  
  1458.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  1459. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  1460. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  1461.  
  1462.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  1463. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  1464. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  1465. investigation.�
  1466.  
  1467. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  1468. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  1469. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  1470. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  1471. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  1472. _______________________________________
  1473. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  1474.  
  1475. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  1476.  
  1477. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  1478.  
  1479. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  1480.  
  1481. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  1482.  
  1483. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  1484.  
  1485. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  1486.  
  1487. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  1488.  
  1489. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  1490.  
  1491. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  1492.  
  1493. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  1494.  
  1495. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  1496.  
  1497. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  1498.  
  1499. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  1500. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  1501.  
  1502. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  1503.  
  1504. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  1505. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  1506.  
  1507. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  1508.  
  1509. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  1510. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  1511.  
  1512. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  1513. _______________________________________
  1514. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  1515.  
  1516.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  1517. agencies are now also using the same facial
  1518. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  1519. identification systems are being developed as well.
  1520. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  1521.  
  1522. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  1523.  
  1524. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  1525.  
  1526. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  1527.  
  1528. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  1529. _______________________________________
  1530. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  1531.  
  1532. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  1533. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  1534. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  1535. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  1536. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  1537. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  1538. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  1539. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  1540. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  1541. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  1542.  
  1543. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  1544.  
  1545. And a few more to think about,
  1546.  
  1547. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  1548. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  1549. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  1550. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  1551. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  1552. _______________________________________
  1553. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1554.  
  1555.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1556. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1557. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  1558. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1559. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  1560. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  1561.  
  1562.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  1563. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1564. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  1565. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  1566. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  1567. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1568. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1569. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1570. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  1571. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  1572. attention.��
  1573.  
  1574.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  1575. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1576. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  1577. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1578. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1579.  
  1580. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1581.  
  1582. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1583. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1584.  
  1585. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1586. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1587. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1588. ---------------------------------------
  1589. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1590.  
  1591. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1592.  
  1593. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1594. _______________________________________
  1595. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  1596.  
  1597. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  1598.  
  1599. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  1600.  
  1601. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  1602. _______________________________________
  1603. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  1604. Securely and Anonymously ::
  1605.  
  1606.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  1607. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  1608. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  1609. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  1610. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  1611. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  1612. internet somewhere or using a third party
  1613. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  1614. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  1615. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  1616. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  1617. download the file from you.
  1618.  
  1619. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  1620. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  1621.  
  1622. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  1623.  
  1624. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  1625.  
  1626. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  1627.  
  1628. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  1629. _______________________________________
  1630. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  1631. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  1632.  
  1633. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  1634.  
  1635. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  1636.  
  1637. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  1638. _______________________________________
  1639. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  1640.  
  1641. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  1642.  
  1643. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  1644.  
  1645. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  1646.  
  1647. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  1648.  
  1649. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  1650.  
  1651. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  1652.  
  1653. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  1654.  
  1655. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  1656. Online Next Week ::
  1657.  
  1658. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  1659. ---------------------------------------
  1660. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  1661.  
  1662. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  1663.  
  1664. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  1665.  
  1666. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  1667. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  1668.  
  1669. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  1670. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  1671.  
  1672. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  1673.  
  1674. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  1675. Infiltration by NSA ::
  1676.  
  1677. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  1678.  
  1679. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  1680.  
  1681. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  1682.  
  1683.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  1684. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  1685. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  1686. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  1687. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  1688. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  1689. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  1690. they�re delivered.
  1691.  
  1692. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  1693.  
  1694. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  1695.  
  1696. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  1697.  
  1698. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  1699.  
  1700. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  1701.  
  1702. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  1703. ______________________________________
  1704. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  1705. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  1706.  
  1707. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  1708. _______________________________________
  1709. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  1710. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  1711.  
  1712. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  1713. _______________________________________
  1714. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  1715.  
  1716. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  1717. _______________________________________
  1718. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1719.  
  1720. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1721.  
  1722. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  1723.  
  1724. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  1725. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  1726.  
  1727.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  1728. national security and other government officials will no
  1729. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  1730. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  1731.  
  1732. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  1733. _______________________________________
  1734. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  1735.  
  1736. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  1737.  
  1738. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  1739. ______________________________________
  1740. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  1741.  
  1742. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  1743. ______________________________________
  1744. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  1745. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  1746.  
  1747. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  1748. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  1749.  
  1750. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  1751.  
  1752. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  1753. ______________________________________
  1754. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  1755.  
  1756. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  1757.  
  1758. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  1759.  
  1760. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  1761.  
  1762. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  1763.  
  1764.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  1765. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  1766. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  1767. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  1768. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  1769. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  1770. industry which generates something in the
  1771. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  1772.  
  1773.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  1774.  
  1775. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  1776. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  1777. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  1778. _______________________________________
  1779. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  1780.  
  1781. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  1782. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  1783.  
  1784.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  1785. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  1786. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  1787. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  1788. activities and future plans.� � �
  1789.  
  1790.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  1791. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  1792. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  1793.  
  1794. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  1795.  
  1796. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  1797.  
  1798. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  1799.  
  1800. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  1801.  
  1802. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  1803.  
  1804. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  1805. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  1806.  
  1807.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  1808. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  1809. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  1810. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  1811. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  1812. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  1813. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  1814. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  1815.  
  1816.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  1817. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  1818. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  1819. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  1820. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  1821. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  1822. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  1823.  
  1824. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  1825. _______________________________________
  1826. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  1827.  
  1828. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  1829. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  1830. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  1831.  
  1832.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  1833. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  1834. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  1835. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  1836. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  1837. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  1838. Edward Snowden.
  1839.  
  1840.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  1841. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  1842. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  1843. for surveillance.
  1844.  
  1845.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  1846. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  1847. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  1848. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  1849. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  1850.  
  1851.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  1852. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  1853. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  1854. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  1855.  
  1856.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  1857. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  1858. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  1859. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  1860. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  1861. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  1862. and long-term storage.
  1863.  
  1864. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  1865.  
  1866. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  1867.  
  1868.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  1869. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  1870. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  1871. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  1872. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  1873. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  1874. but they won�t say.
  1875.  
  1876. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  1877.  
  1878. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  1879.  
  1880. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  1881.  
  1882. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  1883. _______________________________________
  1884. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  1885.  
  1886.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  1887. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  1888. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  1889. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  1890. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  1891. already been published previously. The second was
  1892. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  1893.  
  1894. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  1895.  
  1896. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  1897.  
  1898.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  1899. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  1900. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  1901. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  1902. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  1903. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  1904. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  1905. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  1906. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  1907.  
  1908.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  1909. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  1910.  
  1911.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  1912. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  1913. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  1914. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  1915. benefit� the document says.
  1916.  
  1917.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  1918. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  1919. company is working towards creating a so-called
  1920. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  1921. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  1922. per second.
  1923.  
  1924. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  1925. _______________________________________
  1926. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  1927.  
  1928. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  1929. _______________________________________
  1930. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  1931.  
  1932. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  1933. _______________________________________
  1934. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  1935.  
  1936. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  1937. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  1938. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  1939. _______________________________________
  1940. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  1941.  
  1942.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  1943. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  1944. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  1945. top human rights body.
  1946.  
  1947.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  1948. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  1949. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  1950. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  1951. Human Rights Watch.
  1952.  
  1953. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  1954.  
  1955. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  1956. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  1957.  
  1958. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  1959. _______________________________________
  1960. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  1961.  
  1962.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  1963. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  1964. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  1965.  
  1966.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  1967. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  1968. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  1969. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  1970. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  1971. high as two years. ... ...
  1972.  
  1973.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  1974. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  1975. by domestic courts.
  1976.  
  1977. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  1978. _______________________________________
  1979. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  1980.  
  1981. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  1982. _______________________________________
  1983. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  1984.  
  1985.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  1986. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  1987. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  1988. to create national-only electronic networks could
  1989. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  1990. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  1991. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  1992. the USTR said in its annual report.
  1993.  
  1994. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  1995. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  1996. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  1997. ���������������������������������������
  1998. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  1999.  
  2000. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  2001.  
  2002. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  2003.  
  2004. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2005. _______________________________________
  2006. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  2007.  
  2008.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  2009. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  2010. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  2011. any information that comes out and will provide an
  2012. updated archive from time to time.
  2013.  
  2014.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  2015. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  2016. 927MB decompressed.
  2017.  
  2018.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  2019. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  2020. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  2021.  
  2022. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2023. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  2024.  
  2025. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  2026. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2027. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  2028. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  2029. _______________________________________
  2030. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  2031.  
  2032. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  2033. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  2034. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  2035. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  2036. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  2037. _______________________________________
  2038. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  2039.  
  2040. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  2041.  
  2042. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  2043.  
  2044. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  2045.  
  2046. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  2047.  
  2048. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  2049. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  2050. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  2051. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  2052.  
  2053. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  2054. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  2055.  
  2056. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  2057. _______________________________________
  2058. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  2059.  
  2060. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  2061.  
  2062. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  2063.  
  2064. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  2065.  
  2066. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  2067.  
  2068. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  2069.  
  2070. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  2071.  
  2072. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  2073. _______________________________________
  2074. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  2075.  
  2076.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  2077. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  2078. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  2079. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  2080. public as possible� as well helping the public
  2081. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  2082. how we�re protecting national security.�
  2083.  
  2084. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  2085. ���������������������������������������
  2086. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  2087.  
  2088. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  2089.  
  2090. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  2091.  
  2092. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  2093.  
  2094. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  2095.  
  2096. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  2097.  
  2098. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  2099.  
  2100. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  2101.  
  2102.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  2103. offensive against China, with targets including the
  2104. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  2105. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  2106. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  2107. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  2108. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  2109. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  2110. well as telecommunications companies.
  2111.  
  2112.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  2113. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  2114. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  2115. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  2116. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  2117. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  2118. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  2119. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  2120. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  2121. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  2122. battle for data supremacy.
  2123.  
  2124.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  2125. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  2126. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  2127. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  2128. among other things.
  2129.  
  2130. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  2131. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  2132. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  2133. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  2134.  
  2135. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  2136.  
  2137.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  2138. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  2139. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  2140. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  2141. has lodged representations with the American side on
  2142. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  2143. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  2144.  
  2145. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  2146. _______________________________________
  2147. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  2148.  
  2149.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  2150. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  2151. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  2152. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  2153. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  2154. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  2155. routers, the devices that connect computer
  2156. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  2157. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  2158. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  2159. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  2160. that flow over their networks.
  2161.  
  2162.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  2163. aspired to create a database that would function
  2164. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  2165. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  2166. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  2167. activity � they are targeted only because they
  2168. control access to networks the agency wants to
  2169. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  2170. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  2171. of the posts says.
  2172.  
  2173.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  2174. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  2175. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  2176. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  2177. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  2178. poses with amusing captions.�
  2179.  
  2180. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  2181. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  2182. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  2183. _______________________________________
  2184. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  2185.  
  2186. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  2187. _______________________________________
  2188. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  2189.  
  2190. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  2191.  
  2192. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  2193.  
  2194. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  2195.  
  2196. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  2197.  
  2198. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  2199.  
  2200. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  2201. _______________________________________
  2202. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  2203.  
  2204. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  2205. _______________________________________
  2206. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  2207.  
  2208. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  2209.  
  2210. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2211. _______________________________________
  2212. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2213.  
  2214. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2215. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2216. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2217. _______________________________________
  2218. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2219.  
  2220. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2221.  
  2222. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2223. _______________________________________
  2224. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2225.  
  2226. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2227. _______________________________________
  2228. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2229.  
  2230. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2231.  
  2232. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2233.  
  2234. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2235. _______________________________________
  2236. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2237.  
  2238. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2239. _______________________________________
  2240. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2241.  
  2242. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2243.  
  2244. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2245.  
  2246. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2247.  
  2248. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2249.  
  2250. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  2251. _______________________________________
  2252. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  2253.  
  2254. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  2255.  
  2256. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  2257.  
  2258. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  2259. _______________________________________
  2260. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  2261.  
  2262. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  2263. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  2264. _______________________________________
  2265. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  2266. With Malware ::
  2267.  
  2268.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  2269. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  2270. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  2271. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  2272. level of human oversight in the process.
  2273.  
  2274.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  2275. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  2276. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  2277. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  2278. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  2279. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  2280. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  2281. Internet and phone networks.
  2282.  
  2283. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  2284. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  2285. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  2286. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  2287. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  2288. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  2289. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  2290. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  2291. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  2292.  
  2293.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  2294. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  2295. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  2296. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  2297. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  2298. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  2299.  
  2300.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  2301. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  2302. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  2303. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  2304. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  2305. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  2306. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  2307. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  2308. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  2309. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  2310. instead of individually.�
  2311.  
  2312. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  2313.  
  2314. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  2315.  
  2316.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  2317. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  2318. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  2319. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  2320. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  2321. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  2322. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  2323. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  2324. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  2325. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  2326. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  2327. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  2328. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  2329. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  2330. execute endpoint operations.�
  2331.  
  2332. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2333.  
  2334.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  2335. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  2336. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  2337. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  2338.  
  2339.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  2340. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  2341. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  2342. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  2343. looks suspicious.
  2344.  
  2345.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  2346. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  2347. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  2348. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  2349. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  2350.  
  2351.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  2352. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  2353. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  2354. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  2355. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  2356. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  2357. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  2358.  
  2359.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  2360. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  2361. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  2362. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  2363. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  2364. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  2365. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  2366. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  2367. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  2368. in action.
  2369.  
  2370. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  2371. Computers for Surveillance ::
  2372.  
  2373. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  2374.  
  2375. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  2376.  
  2377. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  2378.  
  2379.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  2380. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  2381. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  2382. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  2383. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  2384. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  2385.  
  2386. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  2387.  
  2388. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  2389. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  2390. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  2391. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  2392. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2393. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  2394. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  2395. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  2396. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  2397. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  2398.  
  2399. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  2400.  
  2401. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  2402.  
  2403. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  2404.  
  2405. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  2406. _______________________________________
  2407. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  2408.  
  2409. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  2410. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  2411. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  2412. _______________________________________
  2413. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  2414.  
  2415. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  2416. _______________________________________
  2417. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  2418.  
  2419.  Alliances between security services are usually
  2420. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  2421. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  2422. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  2423. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  2424. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  2425. internet traffic.
  2426.  
  2427.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  2428. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  2429. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  2430. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  2431. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  2432.  
  2433.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  2434. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  2435. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  2436. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  2437. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  2438. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  2439.  
  2440.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2441. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2442. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2443. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2444. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2445. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2446. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2447.  
  2448. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2449.  
  2450. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2451. _______________________________________
  2452. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  2453.  
  2454. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  2455.  
  2456. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  2457. ---------------------------------------
  2458. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  2459.  
  2460. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  2461.  
  2462. � NSA Spies Too ::
  2463.  
  2464. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2465. _______________________________________
  2466. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  2467.  
  2468. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  2469.  
  2470. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  2471.  
  2472.  The documents show that images were collected
  2473. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  2474. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  2475. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  2476. programs.
  2477.  
  2478. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  2479. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  2480. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  2481. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  2482.  
  2483. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  2484.  
  2485. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  2486. _______________________________________
  2487. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  2488.  
  2489. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  2490. _______________________________________
  2491. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  2492.  
  2493. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  2494.  
  2495. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  2496. _______________________________________
  2497. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  2498. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  2499.  
  2500. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  2501.  
  2502. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  2503. _______________________________________
  2504. � NSA Observer ::
  2505.  
  2506. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  2507. _______________________________________
  2508. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  2509.  
  2510. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2511.  
  2512. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  2513. _______________________________________
  2514. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  2515.  
  2516. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  2517.  
  2518. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  2519. _______________________________________
  2520. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  2521.  
  2522. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  2523.  
  2524. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  2525.  
  2526. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  2527.  
  2528. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  2529. _______________________________________
  2530. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  2531.  
  2532.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  2533. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  2534. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  2535. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  2536. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  2537. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  2538. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  2539. targets without confirming their veracity on
  2540. the ground.
  2541.  
  2542. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  2543. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  2544. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  2545. _______________________________________
  2546. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  2547.  
  2548.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  2549. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  2550. shows that an American law firm was
  2551. monitored while representing a foreign
  2552. government in trade disputes with the
  2553. United States. The disclosure offers a
  2554. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  2555. which Americans were ensnared by the
  2556. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  2557. interest because lawyers in the United
  2558. States with clients overseas have
  2559. expressed growing concern that their
  2560. confidential communications could be
  2561. compromised by such surveillance.
  2562.  
  2563. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  2564. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  2565. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  2566.  
  2567. NOBODY comments
  2568.  
  2569. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  2570.  
  2571.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  2572. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  2573. be declassified for research in public domain.
  2574. _______________________________________
  2575. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  2576.  
  2577. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  2578.  
  2579. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  2580.  
  2581. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  2582. _______________________________________
  2583. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  2584.  
  2585. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  2586. _______________________________________
  2587. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  2588. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  2589.  
  2590.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  2591. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  2592. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  2593. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  2594. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  2595.  
  2596. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  2597. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  2598. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  2599.  
  2600. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  2601. the German Chancellor ::
  2602.  
  2603. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  2604. _______________________________________
  2605. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  2606. Phone Call Spying ::
  2607.  
  2608. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  2609.  
  2610. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  2611. _______________________________________
  2612. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  2613.  
  2614. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  2615. _______________________________________
  2616. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  2617.  
  2618. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  2619. _______________________________________
  2620.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  2621. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  2622. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  2623. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  2624. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  2625. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  2626.  
  2627. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  2628. ���������������������������������������
  2629. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2630.  
  2631. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2632.  
  2633. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2634.  
  2635. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  2636.  
  2637. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  2638.  
  2639. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  2640.  
  2641.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  2642. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  2643. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  2644. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  2645. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  2646. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  2647. left the terminal.
  2648.  
  2649.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  2650. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  2651. clandestine operation by the Communications
  2652. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  2653. certainly illegal. ... ...
  2654.  
  2655.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  2656. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  2657. software program CSEC was developing with help
  2658. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  2659.  
  2660.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  2661. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  2662. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  2663. into other cities/regions.�
  2664.  
  2665. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  2666.  
  2667.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  2668. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  2669.  
  2670. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  2671.  
  2672. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  2673.  
  2674. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  2675.  
  2676. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  2677.  
  2678. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  2679. _______________________________________
  2680. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  2681.  
  2682. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  2683.  
  2684. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  2685.  
  2686. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  2687. _______________________________________
  2688. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  2689.  
  2690.  Documents taken from the National Security
  2691. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  2692. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  2693. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  2694. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  2695. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  2696. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  2697. information, for analysis. At the time the
  2698. documents were printed, they were also able to
  2699. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  2700.  
  2701.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  2702. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  2703. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  2704. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  2705. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  2706. visits. The monitoring program is called
  2707. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  2708.  
  2709.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  2710. British had to have been either physically able
  2711. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  2712. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  2713. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  2714. and would be able to extract some key data
  2715. about specific users as well.
  2716.  
  2717. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  2718. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  2719. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  2720. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  2721. _______________________________________
  2722. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  2723.  
  2724. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  2725. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  2726. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  2727.  
  2728. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  2729.  
  2730.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  2731. on the iPhone alone.�
  2732.  
  2733. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  2734.  
  2735. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  2736.  
  2737. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  2738.  
  2739. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  2740. _______________________________________
  2741. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  2742.  
  2743.  The National Security Agency program that
  2744. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  2745. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  2746. Thursday in a newly released report.
  2747.  
  2748. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  2749.  
  2750.  �We have not identified a single instance
  2751. involving a threat to the United States in
  2752. which the program made a concrete difference
  2753. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  2754. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  2755. report released Thursday.
  2756.  
  2757.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  2758. domestic spying will continue.
  2759.  
  2760. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  2761. _______________________________________
  2762. � Snowden Speaks ::
  2763.  
  2764. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  2765. _______________________________________
  2766. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  2767.  
  2768. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  2769.  
  2770. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  2771.          ���
  2772. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  2773.  
  2774. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  2775.  
  2776.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  2777. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  2778. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  2779. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  2780. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  2781. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  2782. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  2783. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  2784. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  2785. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  2786. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  2787. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  2788. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  2789. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  2790. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  2791.  
  2792. Reform?
  2793.  
  2794.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  2795. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  2796. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  2797. whether legal or not?
  2798.  
  2799. The reform will come from people taking action.
  2800.  
  2801.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  2802. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  2803. _______________________________________
  2804. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  2805.  
  2806. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  2807. _______________________________________
  2808. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  2809.  
  2810.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  2811. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  2812. main internet cables:
  2813.  
  2814.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  2815.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  2816.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  2817.  
  2818. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  2819. ---------------------------------------
  2820. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  2821. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  2822. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  2823. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  2824. _______________________________________
  2825. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  2826.  
  2827. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  2828.  
  2829. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  2830.  
  2831. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  2832. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  2833. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  2834. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  2835. ---------------------------------------
  2836. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  2837. _______________________________________
  2838. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  2839.  
  2840. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  2841.  
  2842. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  2843.  
  2844. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  2845.  
  2846.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  2847. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  2848. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  2849. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  2850.  
  2851.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  2852. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  2853. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  2854. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  2855.  
  2856.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  2857. text message database to extract information
  2858. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  2859. transactions and more � including of individuals
  2860. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  2861.  
  2862. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  2863. _______________________________________
  2864. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  2865.  
  2866. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  2867.  
  2868. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  2869.  
  2870.  The technology, which the agency has used
  2871. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  2872. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  2873. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  2874. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  2875. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  2876. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  2877. set up miles away from the target.
  2878.  
  2879.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  2880. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  2881. American intelligence agencies for years:
  2882. getting into computers that adversaries,
  2883. and some American partners, have tried to
  2884. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  2885. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  2886. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  2887. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  2888. ---------------------------------------
  2889. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  2890.  
  2891. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  2892. _______________________________________
  2893. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  2894.  
  2895. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  2896. ---------------------------------------
  2897. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  2898.  
  2899. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  2900. _______________________________________
  2901. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  2902.  
  2903. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  2904. _______________________________________
  2905. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  2906.  
  2907. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  2908. _______________________________________
  2909. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  2910.  
  2911. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  2912. _______________________________________
  2913. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  2914. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  2915.  
  2916. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  2917.  
  2918. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  2919. _______________________________________
  2920. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  2921. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  2922.  
  2923. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  2924. _______________________________________
  2925. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  2926. All Encryption ::
  2927.  
  2928.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  2929. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  2930. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  2931. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  2932. used to protect banking, medical, business
  2933. and government records around the world.
  2934.  
  2935.  According to documents provided by former
  2936. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  2937. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  2938. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  2939. than classical computers � is part of a
  2940. $79.7 million research program titled
  2941. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  2942. work is hosted under classified contracts
  2943. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  2944.  
  2945. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  2946. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  2947. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  2948. _______________________________________
  2949. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  2950.  
  2951. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  2952. _______________________________________
  2953. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  2954.  
  2955. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  2956. _______________________________________
  2957. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  2958.  
  2959. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  2960.  
  2961. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  2962.  
  2963. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  2964.  
  2965. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  2966.  
  2967. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  2968.  
  2969. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  2970. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  2971. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  2972.  
  2973. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  2974.  
  2975.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  2976. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  2977. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  2978. infiltrates computers around the world and
  2979. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  2980. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  2981. it is targeting. ... ...
  2982.  
  2983. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  2984.  
  2985.  The insert method and other variants of
  2986. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  2987. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  2988. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  2989. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  2990. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  2991. also incorporates routers and servers
  2992. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  2993. network by infecting these networks with
  2994. �implants� that then allow the government
  2995. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  2996.  
  2997.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  2998. to identify and track its targets based on
  2999. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  3000. could include certain email addresses or
  3001. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  3002. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  3003. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  3004. additional information like an email address.
  3005. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  3006. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  3007. ---------------------------------------
  3008. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  3009.  
  3010. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  3011.  
  3012. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  3013.  
  3014.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  3015. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  3016. that are being logged into on that computer
  3017. as long as the user does not clear browser
  3018. cookies.�
  3019.  
  3020. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  3021.  
  3022. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  3023.  
  3024. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  3025. ---------------------------------------
  3026. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  3027.  
  3028.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  3029. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  3030. could be described as master carpenters for
  3031. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  3032. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  3033. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  3034. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  3035. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  3036. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  3037. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  3038. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  3039. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  3040. ability to establish a global covert network
  3041. that operates alongside the Internet.
  3042.  
  3043.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  3044. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  3045. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  3046. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  3047. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  3048. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  3049. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  3050. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  3051. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  3052. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  3053. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  3054. over $1 million.
  3055.  
  3056.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  3057. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  3058. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  3059. clear preference for planting their malicious
  3060. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  3061. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  3062. to load when a computer is turned on.
  3063.  
  3064.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  3065. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  3066. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  3067. to virus protection and other security programs.
  3068. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  3069. computer has been completely erased and a new
  3070. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  3071. can continue to function and ensures that new
  3072. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  3073. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  3074. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  3075. this approach has provided them with the
  3076. possibility of permanent access.
  3077.  
  3078.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  3079. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  3080. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  3081. with the exception of latter, are American
  3082. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  3083. intelligence agency is compromising the
  3084. technology and products of American companies.
  3085.  
  3086. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  3087. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  3088. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  3089. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  3090. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  3091.  
  3092. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  3093.  
  3094. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  3095.  
  3096. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  3097.  
  3098. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  3099.  
  3100. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  3101.  
  3102. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  3103.  
  3104. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  3105.  
  3106. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  3107.  
  3108. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  3109.  
  3110. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  3111.  
  3112. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  3113.  
  3114. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  3115.  
  3116. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  3117.  
  3118. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  3119.  
  3120. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  3121.  
  3122. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  3123.  
  3124. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  3125.  
  3126. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  3127.  
  3128. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  3129.  
  3130. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  3131.  
  3132. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  3133.  
  3134. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  3135.  
  3136. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  3137.  
  3138. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  3139.  
  3140. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  3141.  
  3142. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  3143. ---------------------------------------
  3144. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  3145.  
  3146. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3147.  
  3148. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  3149.  
  3150. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  3151.  
  3152. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  3153. ---------------------------------------
  3154. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  3155.  
  3156. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  3157.  
  3158. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  3159.  
  3160.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  3161. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  3162. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  3163.  
  3164. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  3165.  
  3166. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  3167. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  3168.  
  3169.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  3170. in its operating system had left devices open
  3171. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  3172. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  3173. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  3174. of its mass spying program.
  3175.  
  3176. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  3177. ---------------------------------------
  3178. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  3179. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  3180.  
  3181. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  3182.  
  3183. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  3184. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  3185.  
  3186. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  3187.  
  3188. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  3189.  
  3190. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  3191.  
  3192.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  3193. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  3194.  
  3195. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  3196. _______________________________________
  3197. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  3198.  
  3199. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  3200.  
  3201. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  3202.  
  3203. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  3204. _______________________________________
  3205. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  3206.  
  3207. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  3208.  
  3209.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3210. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3211. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  3212. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3213. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3214. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3215. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3216. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3217. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  3218. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3219.  
  3220.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  3221. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3222. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3223. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  3224. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3225. did not want to know any more.
  3226. ---------------------------------------
  3227. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3228.  
  3229. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3230. _______________________________________
  3231. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3232. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3233.  
  3234. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3235. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3236. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3237. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3238. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3239. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3240. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3241. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3242.  
  3243. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3244.  
  3245.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3246. National Security Agency program which
  3247. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3248. calls made to, from or within the United
  3249. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3250.  
  3251.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  3252. that the program appears to violate the
  3253. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  3254. searches and seizures. He also said the
  3255. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  3256. that collecting the information had helped
  3257. to head off terrorist attacks.
  3258.  
  3259.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  3260. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  3261. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  3262. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  3263. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  3264. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  3265. the order to allow for an appeal.
  3266.  
  3267. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  3268. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  3269.  
  3270.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  3271. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  3272. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  3273. in June in news stories based on leaks
  3274. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  3275. For seven years, the metadata program has
  3276. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  3277. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  3278. Court and found constitutional by at least
  3279. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  3280.  
  3281. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  3282.  
  3283. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  3284.  
  3285. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  3286.  
  3287. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  3288.  
  3289. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  3290.  
  3291. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  3292. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  3293.  
  3294. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  3295.  
  3296. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  3297.  
  3298. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  3299. ---------------------------------------
  3300. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  3301.  
  3302. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  3303.  
  3304. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  3305.  
  3306. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  3307. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  3308.  
  3309. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  3310. Spying Programs ::
  3311.  
  3312. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  3313. ---------------------------------------
  3314. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  3315. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  3316.  
  3317. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  3318.  
  3319. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  3320.  
  3321. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  3322. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  3323.  
  3324. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  3325.  
  3326. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  3327. _______________________________________
  3328. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  3329.  
  3330.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  3331. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  3332. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  3333.  
  3334. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  3335.  
  3336. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  3337.  
  3338.  - Military Information
  3339.  - Economic Information
  3340.  - Information Operations Information
  3341.  - Political Information �
  3342. _______________________________________
  3343. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  3344. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  3345.  
  3346. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  3347. ���������������������������������������
  3348. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  3349.  
  3350. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  3351.  
  3352. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  3353.  
  3354. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  3355.  
  3356. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  3357.  
  3358. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  3359.  
  3360. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  3361.  
  3362. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  3363.  
  3364. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  3365.  
  3366. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  3367. _______________________________________
  3368. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  3369. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  3370.  
  3371.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  3372. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  3373. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  3374. government access in order to make network
  3375. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  3376. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  3377. in millions of homes and businesses within
  3378. the UK,� the paper states.
  3379.  
  3380.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  3381. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  3382. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  3383. assigns all their modems an extra address
  3384. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  3385. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  3386. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  3387. a second IP address for management, except
  3388. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  3389. assigned to the United States Department
  3390. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  3391. of speculation that this is actually a
  3392. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  3393. they can secretly monitor and control
  3394. peoples� home networks.
  3395.  
  3396.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  3397. The better explanation is that BT simply
  3398. chose this address space because it�s
  3399. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  3400. address, it�s only used inside the private
  3401. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  3402. that address space, you�ll see that your
  3403. packets go nowhere.
  3404.  
  3405. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  3406. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  3407. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  3408.  
  3409. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  3410.  
  3411.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  3412. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  3413. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  3414. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  3415. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  3416. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  3417. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  3418. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  3419. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  3420. It�s past time for something new.�
  3421.  
  3422. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  3423. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  3424. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  3425. ---------------------------------------
  3426. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  3427.  
  3428.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  3429. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  3430. worldwide with malicious software designed
  3431. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  3432. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  3433. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  3434.  
  3435.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  3436. explains how the NSA collects information
  3437. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  3438. shows that the intelligence service uses
  3439. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  3440. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3441. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3442. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3443. software.
  3444.  
  3445.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3446. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3447. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3448. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  3449. has been installing this malicious software
  3450. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3451. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  3452. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  3453. through a process of luring employees to a
  3454. false Linkedin page.
  3455.  
  3456. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  3457. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3458. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  3459. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  3460.  
  3461. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  3462.  
  3463.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  3464. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  3465. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  3466. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  3467. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  3468. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  3469. and citizens.
  3470.  
  3471.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  3472. will deter this bounty of profits for
  3473. the comsec industry, unless the public
  3474. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  3475. the nettle, and all those making money
  3476. from this deception operation decide to
  3477. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  3478.  
  3479.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  3480. lists, those participating in standards
  3481. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  3482. grants in think tanks and universities,
  3483. those in law firms and public interest
  3484. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  3485. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  3486. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  3487. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  3488. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  3489. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  3490. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  3491. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  3492. contracts, list lurking, online and
  3493. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  3494. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  3495. fulfilled.
  3496.  
  3497. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  3498.  
  3499. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3500.  
  3501. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3502.  
  3503. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3504. ���������������������������������������
  3505. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  3506. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  3507.  
  3508. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  3509. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  3510. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  3511. _______________________________________
  3512. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  3513.  
  3514. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  3515.  
  3516. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  3517.  
  3518. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  3519.  
  3520. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  3521.  
  3522. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  3523. _______________________________________
  3524. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  3525.  
  3526. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  3527. _______________________________________
  3528. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  3529. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  3530.  
  3531. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  3532.  
  3533. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  3534. _______________________________________
  3535. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  3536.  
  3537. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  3538. _______________________________________
  3539. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  3540. of Public Concerns ::
  3541.  
  3542. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  3543.  
  3544. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  3545.  
  3546. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  3547. _______________________________________
  3548. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3549.  
  3550.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  3551. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  3552. of metadata about the world�s secure
  3553. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  3554. certainly not a program through which
  3555. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  3556. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  3557. services like Google, as reported by others,
  3558. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  3559. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  3560. Google are based on a small piece of a
  3561. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  3562. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  3563. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  3564. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  3565. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  3566. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  3567. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  3568. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  3569. by providing information about a target.�
  3570.  
  3571. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  3572.  
  3573. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3574.  
  3575. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  3576. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  3577. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  3578. ���������������������������������������
  3579. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  3580.  
  3581. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  3582.  
  3583. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  3584. _______________________________________
  3585. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  3586.  
  3587. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  3588. ---------------------------------------
  3589. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  3590.  
  3591. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  3592.  
  3593.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  3594. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  3595. and later managed by big data corporations
  3596. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  3597.  
  3598.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  3599. large files across machines in a large
  3600. cluster.
  3601.  
  3602. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  3603.  
  3604.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  3605. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  3606. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  3607. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  3608.  
  3609.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  3610. major components, a central metadata server
  3611. and file servers from data.
  3612.  
  3613. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  3614.  
  3615. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  3616.  
  3617.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  3618. posted on public domain.
  3619.  
  3620. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  3621.  
  3622. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  3623. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  3624.  
  3625. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3626. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3627. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  3628.  
  3629. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3630.  
  3631. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3632. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3633. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3634. ---------------------------------------
  3635. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  3636. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  3637.  
  3638. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  3639.  
  3640. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  3641.  
  3642. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  3643.  
  3644. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  3645.  
  3646. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  3647.  
  3648. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  3649.  
  3650. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3651.  
  3652. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3653.  
  3654. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  3655.  
  3656.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  3657. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  3658. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  3659. content of all our communications have
  3660. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  3661. program since the 1990s.
  3662.  
  3663.  The new details concern how, �The National
  3664. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  3665. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  3666. of cellphones around the world.�
  3667.  
  3668.  However, the report reveals itself to
  3669. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  3670. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  3671. does not target Americans� location data
  3672. by design, but the agency acquires a
  3673. substantial amount of information on
  3674. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  3675. �incidentally.�
  3676.  
  3677.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  3678. happens to record the locations of Americans
  3679. using data from their cellphones, and is
  3680. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  3681. surveillance, is yet another example of
  3682. damage control by the establishment.
  3683.  
  3684. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  3685. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  3686. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  3687. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  3688. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  3689. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  3690. ---------------------------------------
  3691. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  3692. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  3693.  
  3694.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  3695. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  3696. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  3697. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  3698. targets for government hacking and to
  3699. bolster surveillance.
  3700.  
  3701. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  3702. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  3703. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  3704. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  3705. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  3706. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  3707. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  3708. ---------------------------------------
  3709. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  3710.  
  3711. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  3712. ---------------------------------------
  3713. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  3714. In a World Without Cookies ::
  3715.  
  3716. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  3717. _______________________________________
  3718. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  3719.  
  3720. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  3721. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  3722. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  3723.  
  3724. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  3725.  
  3726. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  3727. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  3728. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  3729. _______________________________________
  3730. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  3731. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  3732.  
  3733. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  3734. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  3735. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  3736. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  3737. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  3738. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  3739.  
  3740. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  3741.  
  3742. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  3743.  
  3744. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  3745.  
  3746. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  3747.  
  3748. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  3749.  
  3750. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  3751.  
  3752. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  3753.  
  3754. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  3755.  
  3756. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  3757.  
  3758. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  3759.  
  3760. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  3761.  
  3762. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  3763. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  3764. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  3765.  
  3766. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  3767.  
  3768. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  3769. ---------------------------------------
  3770. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  3771.  
  3772. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  3773. ---------------------------------------
  3774. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  3775.  
  3776. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  3777.  
  3778. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  3779.  
  3780. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  3781.  
  3782. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  3783.  
  3784. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  3785.  
  3786. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  3787.  
  3788. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  3789. _______________________________________
  3790.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  3791. worldwide was published by the German
  3792. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  3793. map was put online by accident, but before
  3794. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  3795. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  3796. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  3797. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  3798. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  3799. the names of all other cities were blurred
  3800. by Der Spiegel.�
  3801.  
  3802.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  3803.  
  3804. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  3805.  
  3806. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  3807.  
  3808. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  3809.  
  3810. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  3811.  
  3812. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  3813.  
  3814. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  3815. ---------------------------------------
  3816. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  3817.  
  3818. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  3819.  
  3820. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  3821. _______________________________________
  3822. � Five Eyes ::
  3823.  
  3824. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  3825. _______________________________________
  3826. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  3827.  
  3828. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  3829. _______________________________________
  3830. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  3831. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  3832.  
  3833. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  3834.  
  3835. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  3836. _______________________________________
  3837. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  3838.  
  3839. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  3840.  
  3841. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  3842. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  3843. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  3844. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  3845. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  3846. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  3847. _______________________________________
  3848. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  3849.  
  3850.  September 11th, which also happened to
  3851. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  3852. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  3853. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  3854. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  3855. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  3856. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  3857. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  3858. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  3859. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  3860. itself.
  3861.  
  3862.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  3863. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  3864. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  3865. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  3866. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  3867. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  3868. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  3869. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  3870. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  3871. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  3872. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  3873. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  3874. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  3875. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  3876. its workforce by one-third, to about
  3877. 33,000. The number of private companies
  3878. it depended upon more than tripled during
  3879. that time.
  3880.  
  3881.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  3882. and the increasing reliance on the private
  3883. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  3884. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  3885. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  3886. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  3887. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  3888. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  3889. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  3890. getting those clearances. So you had
  3891. this huge apparatus being built, and
  3892. the government was just managing it.
  3893. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  3894. doing that.� ... ...
  3895.  
  3896.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  3897. workforce, the surveillance he would
  3898. later expose was becoming not just
  3899. institutionalized but very big business.
  3900. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  3901. the full flower of that massive, massive
  3902. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  3903. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  3904. could go.� ... ...
  3905.  
  3906.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  3907. leaking government secrets when he was
  3908. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  3909. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  3910. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  3911. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  3912. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  3913. policies that I thought would be reined
  3914. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  3915. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  3916. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  3917. the more he read �true information,�
  3918. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  3919. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  3920. surveillance program � the more he realized
  3921. that there were actually two governments:
  3922. the one that was elected, and the other,
  3923. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  3924. �If the highest officials in government
  3925. can break the law without fearing punishment
  3926. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  3927. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  3928.  
  3929. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  3930. _______________________________________
  3931. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  3932.  
  3933. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  3934. _______________________________________
  3935. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  3936.  
  3937. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  3938. _______________________________________
  3939. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  3940. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  3941.  
  3942.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  3943. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  3944. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  3945. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  3946. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  3947. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  3948. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  3949. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  3950. in terrorism.
  3951.  
  3952.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  3953. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  3954. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  3955. threatening national security. It is
  3956. successfully restricting release of the
  3957. Snowden material and will likely become
  3958. more forceful as releases continue to the
  3959. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  3960. to criminalize release as a national
  3961. security threat.
  3962.  
  3963. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  3964. _______________________________________
  3965. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  3966.  
  3967.  Includes most reports, slides and
  3968. documents all related to the recent
  3969. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  3970. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  3971. any information that comes out and
  3972. will provide updated archives from
  3973. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  3974.  
  3975.  After decompression - the folder is
  3976. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  3977. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  3978.  
  3979. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3980. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  3981.  
  3982. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  3983. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  3984. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  3985. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3986. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3987. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  3988. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  3989. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3990. _______________________________________
  3991. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  3992.  
  3993. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3994. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3995. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3996.  
  3997. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  3998. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  3999.  
  4000.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  4001. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  4002. Australians, and hands over the material
  4003. to the US and its closest allies, according
  4004. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  4005. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  4006. Australia web site.
  4007.  
  4008.  The document obtained by the former US
  4009. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  4010. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  4011. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  4012. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  4013. as well as the people and governments of
  4014. many Asian countries.
  4015.  
  4016.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  4017. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  4018. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  4019. global partners so-called metadata of
  4020. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  4021. address books and social media posts of
  4022. millions of people.
  4023.  
  4024.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  4025. the recent revelations, also from documents
  4026. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  4027. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  4028. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  4029. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  4030. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  4031. operate as electronic listening posts
  4032. for the US-led spying network.
  4033.  
  4034. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  4035. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  4036. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  4037. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  4038. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  4039. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  4040.  
  4041. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  4042. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  4043.  
  4044.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  4045. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  4046. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  4047. political figures has been furiously
  4048. denounced by other media outlets for
  4049. breaching �national security� and the
  4050. �national interest.� The reaction
  4051. underscores the extent to which the
  4052. media establishment has been integrated
  4053. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  4054.  
  4055.  On November 18, after being approached
  4056. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  4057. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  4058. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  4059. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  4060. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  4061. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  4062. senior political figures. The report
  4063. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  4064. crisis for the Australian government, with
  4065. the Indonesian president suspending military
  4066. and intelligence cooperation.
  4067.  
  4068. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  4069. _______________________________________
  4070. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  4071.  
  4072.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  4073. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  4074. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  4075. allowed the largest American spy agency
  4076. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  4077. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  4078.  
  4079.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  4080. by CBC News.
  4081.  
  4082.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  4083. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  4084. a security command post during a six-day
  4085. spying operation by the National Security
  4086. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  4087. other foreign heads of government were on
  4088. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  4089.  
  4090.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  4091. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  4092.  
  4093.  The world was still struggling to climb
  4094. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  4095. were debating a wide array of possible
  4096. measures including a global tax on banks,
  4097. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  4098. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  4099. eventually scotched.
  4100.  
  4101. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  4102. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  4103. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  4104. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  4105. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  4106.  
  4107. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  4108. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  4109.  
  4110. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  4111.  
  4112.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  4113. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  4114.  
  4115. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  4116.  
  4117. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  4118.  
  4119. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  4120.  
  4121. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  4122. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  4123.  
  4124. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  4125.  
  4126. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  4127.  
  4128. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  4129.  
  4130. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  4131. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  4132.  
  4133. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  4134.  
  4135. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  4136.  
  4137.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  4138. believe that they have only �moved on� from discussing
  4139. CSEC�s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  4140. to worry about.
  4141.  
  4142.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  4143. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  4144. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  4145. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC�s
  4146. staff�it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  4147. military personnel assist its work�give an inkling of the
  4148. scale of its activities.
  4149.  
  4150.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  4151. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  4152. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  4153. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  4154. Of especial importance is the CSEC�s partnership with the NSA.
  4155. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  4156. the two organizations �have integrated personnel� i.e. swap
  4157. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  4158. Internet surveillance programs.
  4159.  
  4160.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  4161. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  4162. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  4163. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  4164. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  4165. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates�
  4166. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  4167.  
  4168. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  4169.  
  4170. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  4171.  
  4172. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  4173.  
  4174. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  4175. _______________________________________
  4176. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  4177.  
  4178. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  4179.  
  4180. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  4181.  
  4182. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  4183. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  4184. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  4185.  
  4186. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  4187.  
  4188. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  4189.  
  4190. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  4191.  
  4192. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  4193. _______________________________________
  4194.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  4195. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  4196. in theory � forbid local governments from
  4197. providing services to federal agencies
  4198. that collect electronic data from Americans
  4199. without a personalized warrant.
  4200.  
  4201.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  4202. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  4203. but at least one legislator has committed
  4204. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  4205. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  4206. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  4207. is introduced.
  4208.  
  4209.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  4210. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  4211. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  4212. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  4213. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  4214. and a handful of other groups.
  4215.  
  4216.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  4217. Maharrey adds.
  4218.  
  4219. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  4220. _______________________________________
  4221. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  4222. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  4223.  
  4224.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  4225. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  4226. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  4227. US and British intelligence � particularly
  4228. their cooperation in data collection and
  4229. snooping programs involving British citizens
  4230. and close allies on the European continent.
  4231.  
  4232.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  4233. to account by British authorities for
  4234. jeopardizing national security. The
  4235. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  4236. is being forced to appear before a
  4237. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  4238. the news outlet�s actions.
  4239.  
  4240. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4241. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  4242. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  4243.  
  4244. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  4245.  
  4246. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4247.  
  4248. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  4249. as the British Dictatorship ::
  4250.  
  4251.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  4252. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  4253. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  4254. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  4255. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  4256. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  4257. seems the United States is reaching the event
  4258. horizon to a police state.
  4259.  
  4260. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  4261.  
  4262. Cryptome noted
  4263.  
  4264.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  4265. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  4266. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  4267. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  4268. UKG), although there could be some which have
  4269. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  4270. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  4271.  
  4272.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  4273. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  4274. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  4275. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  4276. deception, co-optation.
  4277.  
  4278.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  4279. had access, or suspected of access, are
  4280. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  4281. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  4282. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  4283. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  4284. standard coercive means of authorities.
  4285.  
  4286.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  4287. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  4288. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  4289. advised successive cooperators, usually
  4290. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  4291. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  4292. participation.
  4293.  
  4294.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  4295. disputes and disagreements among competing
  4296. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  4297. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  4298. along with threats against families, friends
  4299. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  4300. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  4301. with authorities, including use of rewards
  4302. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  4303.  
  4304. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  4305. _______________________________________
  4306. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  4307.  
  4308. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  4309. _______________________________________
  4310. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  4311. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  4312. Governments ::
  4313.  
  4314. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  4315. _______________________________________
  4316. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  4317. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  4318.  
  4319. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  4320. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  4321. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  4322. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  4323. _______________________________________
  4324. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  4325.  
  4326. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  4327.  
  4328. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  4329.  
  4330. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  4331.  
  4332. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  4333.  
  4334. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  4335.  
  4336. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  4337.  
  4338. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  4339.  
  4340. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  4341.  
  4342. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  4343.  
  4344. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  4345.  
  4346. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  4347.  
  4348. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  4349.  
  4350. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  4351.  
  4352. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  4353.  
  4354. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  4355.  
  4356. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  4357. Steal Email Metadata ::
  4358.  
  4359.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  4360. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  4361. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  4362. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  4363.  
  4364.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  4365. servers around the world, reducing the
  4366. chance of losing your information should
  4367. one fail. When you log in to an account
  4368. with these firms, the data sent between
  4369. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  4370. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  4371. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  4372. And because many of the transfers take place
  4373. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  4374. isn�t required to tap the information.
  4375.  
  4376.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  4377. broken into the main communications links
  4378. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  4379. around the world, according to documents
  4380. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  4381. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  4382. officials.
  4383.  
  4384.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  4385. positioned itself to collect at will from
  4386. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  4387. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  4388. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  4389. but it keeps a lot.
  4390.  
  4391.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  4392. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  4393. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  4394. counterpart, the Government Communications
  4395. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  4396. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  4397. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  4398. that carry information among the data
  4399. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  4400.  
  4401. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  4402. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  4403. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  4404. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  4405. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  4406.  
  4407. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  4408.  
  4409.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  4410. email collecting program �does not apply
  4411. to US citizens.�
  4412.  
  4413.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  4414. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  4415. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  4416. accounts around the world, many of them
  4417. belonging to Americans, according to
  4418. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  4419. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  4420. Edward Snowden.
  4421.  
  4422.  The collection program, which has not
  4423. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  4424. address books and �buddy lists� from
  4425. instant messaging services as they move
  4426. across global data links. Online services
  4427. often transmit those contacts when a user
  4428. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  4429. a computer or mobile device with information
  4430. stored on remote servers.
  4431.  
  4432. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  4433. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  4434. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  4435.  
  4436. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  4437.  
  4438. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  4439.  
  4440. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4441.  
  4442. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4443. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4444. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4445. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4446. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4447. ���������������������������������������
  4448. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  4449.  
  4450. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4451.  
  4452. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  4453. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  4454.  
  4455. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  4456.  
  4457. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  4458.  
  4459. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  4460.  
  4461. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4462.  
  4463. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  4464.  
  4465. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4466.  
  4467. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  4468.  
  4469. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  4470.  
  4471. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  4472.  
  4473. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  4474.  
  4475. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  4476.  
  4477. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  4478.  
  4479. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  4480. ---------------------------------------
  4481. NOBODY comments ?
  4482.  
  4483.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  4484. differs from the Guardians.
  4485.  
  4486. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4487.  
  4488. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  4489.  
  4490. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4491.  
  4492. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  4493.  
  4494.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  4495. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  4496. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  4497.  
  4498.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  4499. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  4500. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  4501. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  4502. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  4503. ---------------------------------------
  4504. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  4505.  
  4506. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  4507.  
  4508. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4509.  
  4510.  This was written from a person who purports
  4511. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  4512.  
  4513. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  4514.  
  4515. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4516.  
  4517. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  4518.  
  4519. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  4520. Misleading ::
  4521.  
  4522. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  4523.  
  4524. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  4525. on NSA Spying ::
  4526.  
  4527. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  4528.  
  4529.  �Recent articles published in the
  4530. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  4531. inaccurate and misleading information
  4532. regarding US foreign intelligence
  4533. activities. The allegation that the
  4534. National Security Agency collected more
  4535. than 70 million �recordings of French
  4536. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  4537.  
  4538.  While we are not going to discuss the
  4539. details of our activities, we have
  4540. repeatedly made it clear that the
  4541. United States gathers intelligence of
  4542. the type gathered by all nations. The
  4543. US collects intelligence to protect the
  4544. nation, its interests, and its allies
  4545. from, among other things, threats such
  4546. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  4547. weapons of mass destruction.
  4548.  
  4549.  The United States values our longstanding
  4550. friendship and alliance with France and
  4551. we will continue to cooperate on security
  4552. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  4553.  
  4554. James R. Clapper
  4555. Director of National Intelligence
  4556. ---------------------------------------
  4557. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  4558.  
  4559. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  4560.  
  4561.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  4562. a call without leaving a record with the
  4563. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  4564. or leaves America without passing through
  4565. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  4566. statement Thursday.
  4567.  
  4568.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  4569. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  4570. _______________________________________
  4571. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  4572. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  4573.  
  4574.  US and British intelligence officials
  4575. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  4576. collection of highly classified, heavily
  4577. encrypted materials they believe former
  4578. National Security Agency contractor
  4579. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  4580.  
  4581.  One source saw the cache of documents
  4582. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  4583. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  4584. other harm. ... ...
  4585.  
  4586.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  4587. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  4588. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  4589. that �if anything happens at all to
  4590. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  4591. to get access to the full archives.�
  4592.  
  4593. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  4594. _______________________________________
  4595. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  4596. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  4597.  
  4598.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  4599. government surveillance policies. But he
  4600. is not disclosing those changes to the
  4601. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  4602. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  4603. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  4604. World Bank and the International Monetary
  4605. Fund? He won�t say.
  4606.  
  4607.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  4608. to review and recommend changes to his
  4609. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  4610.  
  4611. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  4612. _______________________________________
  4613. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  4614.  
  4615.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  4616. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  4617. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  4618. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  4619. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  4620.  
  4621.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  4622. broad goals, the five-page document said
  4623. that existing American laws were not adequate
  4624. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  4625. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  4626. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  4627. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  4628. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  4629. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4630. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4631. and target environments, or the operational
  4632. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  4633. document concluded.
  4634.  
  4635. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  4636. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  4637. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  4638. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  4639. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  4640.  
  4641. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  4642.  
  4643.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  4644. called Treasure Map and describes its
  4645. capabilities but does not publish visual
  4646. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  4647. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  4648. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  4649.  
  4650. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  4651. _______________________________________
  4652. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  4653.  
  4654. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  4655. _______________________________________
  4656. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  4657.  
  4658. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  4659.  
  4660. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  4661.  
  4662. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  4663.  
  4664.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  4665. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  4666. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  4667. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  4668. the door to a variety of spying options.
  4669.  
  4670. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  4671. _______________________________________
  4672. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  4673.  
  4674.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  4675. collection of solely domestic communications
  4676. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  4677. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  4678. request each week until we receive your
  4679. response,� EPIC said.
  4680.  
  4681.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  4682. said this week that it would not be hearing
  4683. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  4684. early Monday in which the high court listed
  4685. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  4686. as denied.
  4687.  
  4688. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  4689.  
  4690. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  4691. _______________________________________
  4692. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  4693.  
  4694. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  4695.  
  4696. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  4697. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  4698.  
  4699. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  4700.  
  4701. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  4702.  
  4703. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  4704. No Privacy ::
  4705.  
  4706. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  4707.  
  4708. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  4709. Spying Programs ::
  4710.  
  4711. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  4712.  
  4713. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  4714.  
  4715. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  4716.  
  4717. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  4718. _______________________________________
  4719. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  4720.  
  4721. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4722.  
  4723. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  4724.  
  4725. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  4726.  
  4727. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4728.  
  4729. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  4730.  
  4731. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  4732.  
  4733. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4734.  
  4735.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  4736. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  4737. or indigenous cryptographic information
  4738. security devices or systems in order to
  4739. make them exploitable.�
  4740.  
  4741. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4742.  
  4743.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  4744. successfully exploits cryptographic
  4745. components of commercial information
  4746. security devices or systems when the
  4747. device or system specified.�
  4748.  
  4749. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4750.  
  4751. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  4752.  
  4753. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  4754.  
  4755. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4756. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4757. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  4758.  
  4759. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  4760.  
  4761.  US and British intelligence agencies
  4762. have successfully cracked much of the
  4763. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  4764. of millions of people to protect the
  4765. privacy of their personal data, online
  4766. transactions and emails, according to
  4767. top-secret documents revealed by former
  4768. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  4769.  
  4770.  Those methods include covert measures
  4771. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  4772. international encryption standards, the
  4773. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  4774. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  4775. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  4776. technology companies and internet service
  4777. providers themselves.
  4778.  
  4779.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  4780. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  4781. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  4782. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  4783.  
  4784.  Independent security experts have long
  4785. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  4786. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  4787. confirmed for the first time by another
  4788. secret document. It shows the agency
  4789. worked covertly to get its own version
  4790. of a draft security standard issued by
  4791. the US National Institute of Standards
  4792. and Technology approved for worldwide
  4793. use in 2006.
  4794.  
  4795. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  4796.  
  4797. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  4798.  
  4799. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4800.  
  4801. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  4802.  
  4803. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  4804.  
  4805. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  4806.  
  4807. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4808.  
  4809. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4810.  
  4811. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  4812. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  4813. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  4814.  
  4815. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4816.  
  4817. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  4818. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  4819.  
  4820. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4821.  
  4822. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  4823.  
  4824. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  4825.  
  4826. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  4827.  
  4828. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  4829. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  4830.  
  4831. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  4832.  
  4833. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  4834.  
  4835.  A range of US hardware and software
  4836. companies are in danger of being dragged
  4837. into the widening scandal over internet
  4838. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  4839. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  4840. Security Agency contractor.
  4841.  
  4842.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  4843. that it has collaborated with technology
  4844. companies to plant �back doors� into
  4845. their systems � or ways for the agency
  4846. secretly to penetrate systems without
  4847. the users� knowledge.
  4848.  
  4849. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  4850.  
  4851. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  4852.  
  4853. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  4854. _______________________________________
  4855. � SSL Inspector ::
  4856.  
  4857. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  4858.  
  4859. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  4860.  
  4861. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  4862. _______________________________________
  4863. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  4864. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  4865.  
  4866. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  4867.  
  4868. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  4869.  
  4870. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  4871.  
  4872. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  4873.  
  4874. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  4875.  
  4876. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  4877.  
  4878. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  4879.  
  4880. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  4881.  
  4882. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  4883. ���������������������������������������
  4884. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  4885. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  4886.  
  4887. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  4888. ���������������������������������������
  4889. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  4890.  
  4891.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  4892. activities is an obscure organization called
  4893. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  4894. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  4895. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  4896. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  4897. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  4898. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  4899. presentation given to journalists by former
  4900. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  4901. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  4902. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  4903. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  4904. be collected, which is then gathered and
  4905. delivered by the DITU.
  4906.  
  4907.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  4908. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  4909. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  4910. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  4911. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  4912. collection, processing, and reporting.
  4913.  
  4914. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  4915.  
  4916. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  4917.  
  4918. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  4919. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  4920. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4921.  
  4922.  
  4923. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  4924.  
  4925. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4926. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4927. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4928.  
  4929. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  4930.  
  4931. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  4932.  
  4933. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  4934.  
  4935. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  4936.  
  4937. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  4938.  
  4939. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  4940.  
  4941.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  4942. by the NSA.
  4943.  
  4944.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  4945. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  4946. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  4947. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  4948. also now has access to some of these documents.
  4949.  
  4950.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  4951. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  4952. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  4953. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  4954. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  4955. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  4956.  
  4957.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  4958. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  4959. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  4960. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  4961. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  4962. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  4963. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  4964. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  4965. Facebook and Microsoft.
  4966.  
  4967. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  4968.  
  4969.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  4970. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  4971. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  4972. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  4973. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  4974. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  4975. and unilateral access to their servers.
  4976.  
  4977.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  4978. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  4979. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  4980. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  4981. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  4982. diving.
  4983.  
  4984.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  4985. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  4986.  
  4987.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  4988. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  4989. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  4990. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  4991. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  4992. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  4993. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  4994. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  4995. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  4996. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  4997. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  4998. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  4999. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  5000. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  5001. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  5002. major US carriers.
  5003.  
  5004. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  5005.  
  5006.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  5007. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  5008. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  5009. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  5010. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  5011. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  5012. engines.
  5013.  
  5014.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  5015. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  5016. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  5017. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  5018. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  5019.  
  5020.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  5021. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  5022. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  5023. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  5024. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  5025. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  5026. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  5027. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  5028. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  5029. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  5030. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  5031. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  5032. companies have been targeted.
  5033.  
  5034.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  5035. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  5036. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  5037. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  5038. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  5039. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  5040. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  5041. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  5042. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  5043. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  5044. _______________________________________
  5045. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  5046.  
  5047. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  5048.  
  5049. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  5050.  
  5051. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  5052.  
  5053. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  5054. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  5055.  
  5056. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  5057.  
  5058. NOBODY comments
  5059.  
  5060.  100% expected. They will continue to
  5061. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  5062. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  5063. We must adjust to it by learning how
  5064. to counter their surveillance.
  5065.  
  5066. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  5067. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  5068.  
  5069.  The United States and its key intelligence
  5070. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  5071. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  5072. Nations to promote a universal human right
  5073. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  5074. sources and an internal American government
  5075. document obtained by The Cable.
  5076.  
  5077.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  5078. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  5079. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  5080. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  5081. internet surveillance by the National
  5082. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  5083. services. American representatives have made
  5084. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  5085. checks on their global surveillance network.
  5086. The stakes are high, particularly in
  5087. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  5088. an international backlash against NSA
  5089. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  5090. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  5091. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  5092.  
  5093. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  5094.  
  5095. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  5096. _______________________________________
  5097. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  5098. Public News Coverage ::
  5099.  
  5100. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  5101. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  5102. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  5103. _______________________________________
  5104. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  5105. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  5106.  
  5107. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  5108. _______________________________________
  5109. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  5110.  
  5111.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  5112. a division for particularly difficult
  5113. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  5114. (TAO), this department devises special
  5115. methods for special targets.
  5116.  
  5117.  That category includes surveillance of
  5118. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  5119. the division reported its mission
  5120. accomplished. A report classified as
  5121. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  5122. exploited a key mail server in the
  5123. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  5124. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  5125. first-ever access to President Felipe
  5126. Calderon�s public email account.�
  5127.  
  5128. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  5129.  
  5130. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  5131.  
  5132. Cryptome comments ?
  5133.  
  5134.  This spying was apparently done from
  5135. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  5136. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  5137. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  5138. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  5139.  
  5140. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  5141.  
  5142. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  5143. _______________________________________
  5144. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  5145.  
  5146. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  5147.  
  5148. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  5149.  
  5150. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5151.  
  5152. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  5153.  
  5154. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  5155.  
  5156. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  5157.  
  5158. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  5159.  
  5160. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  5161.  
  5162. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  5163.  
  5164. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  5165.  
  5166. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  5167.  
  5168.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  5169. thought that the NSA should use its
  5170. technology to intercept emails and
  5171. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  5172. terminal to another, and was upset to
  5173. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  5174. That was a line he would only cross,
  5175. deliberately, with court and congressional
  5176. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  5177. but as we now know, the agency added
  5178. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  5179. suspicious communications that transited
  5180. the border of the United States, and
  5181. later began to collect reams of metadata
  5182. in order to analyze it.
  5183.  
  5184.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  5185. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  5186. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  5187. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  5188. in order to provide policymakers with a
  5189. decision advantage. The advantage the
  5190. NSA provided was accurate information
  5191. about what people who interacted with
  5192. the United States said in private about
  5193. their intentions; that gap between saying
  5194. and doing, and the ability to predict
  5195. action from it, allows the president of
  5196. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  5197.  
  5198.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  5199. States� actions don�t always match up
  5200. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  5201. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  5202. our moral authority wanes and our
  5203. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  5204.  
  5205.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  5206. countries are any purer. They never have
  5207. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  5208. purer than others, so the amount of
  5209. resources the intelligence community
  5210. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  5211. to correspond with how honest our allies
  5212. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  5213. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  5214. can we figure out which allies are more
  5215. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  5216. correspondence between public and private
  5217. words and actions.
  5218.  
  5219.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  5220. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  5221. want their leaders to gain a decision
  5222. advantage in the give and take between
  5223. countries. They want to know what US
  5224. policymakers will do before the Americans
  5225. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  5226. France, they aggressively spy on the
  5227. United States, on US citizens and
  5228. politicians, in order to collect that
  5229. information. The difference lies in the
  5230. scale of intelligence collection: The
  5231. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  5232. most sophisticated intelligence community
  5233. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  5234. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  5235. envious.
  5236. _______________________________________
  5237. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  5238.  
  5239. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  5240. _______________________________________
  5241. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  5242.  
  5243. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  5244. ���������������������������������������
  5245. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  5246. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  5247.  
  5248. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  5249. _______________________________________
  5250. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  5251. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  5252.  
  5253. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  5254. _______________________________________
  5255.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  5256. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  5257. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  5258. from the award ceremony are the first of
  5259. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  5260. Russia.
  5261.  
  5262. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  5263. ���������������������������������������
  5264. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  5265.  
  5266.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  5267. of the Security Service, said the
  5268. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  5269. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  5270. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  5271. agencies.
  5272.  
  5273. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  5274.  
  5275. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  5276.  
  5277.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  5278. they are not using Tor.�
  5279.  
  5280. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  5281.  
  5282. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  5283. ---------------------------------------
  5284.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  5285. old bleach log.
  5286.  
  5287. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  5288. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  5289. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  5290. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  5291.  
  5292. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  5293.  
  5294.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  5295. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  5296. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  5297. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  5298. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  5299. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  5300. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  5301. function.
  5302.  
  5303.  There are also various third party
  5304. programs that can produce files in
  5305. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  5306. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  5307.  
  5308.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  5309. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  5310. data stored on the system running the
  5311. Flash player.�
  5312. ---------------------------------------
  5313. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  5314.  
  5315.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  5316. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  5317. It can be found within Windows systems
  5318. and can be wiped out here ;
  5319.  
  5320. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5321. Application Data\Macromedia\
  5322.  
  5323. and may also be cloned here ;
  5324.  
  5325. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  5326.  
  5327.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  5328. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  5329.  
  5330. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  5331.  
  5332. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5333. Local Settings\Temp\
  5334. ---------------------------------------
  5335. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  5336.  
  5337. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  5338.  
  5339. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  5340.  
  5341. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  5342.  
  5343. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  5344.  
  5345. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  5346.  
  5347. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  5348.  
  5349. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  5350.  
  5351. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  5352.  
  5353. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  5354.  
  5355. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  5356.  
  5357. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  5358.  
  5359. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  5360.  
  5361. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  5362.  
  5363. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  5364. ---------------------------------------
  5365. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  5366.  
  5367.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  5368. application created by Samy Kamkar
  5369. which produces zombie cookies in a
  5370. web browser that are intentionally
  5371. difficult to delete. ... ...
  5372.  
  5373.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  5374. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  5375. by copying itself in different forms on
  5376. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  5377. itself if it notices that some of the
  5378. copies are missing or expired.
  5379.  
  5380.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  5381. Evercookie uses the following storage
  5382. mechanisms when available:
  5383.  
  5384. � Standard HTTP cookies
  5385. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  5386. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  5387. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  5388. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  5389. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  5390. (cookies) back out
  5391. � Storing cookies in Web history
  5392. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  5393. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  5394. � window.name caching
  5395. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  5396. � HTML5 Session Storage
  5397. � HTML5 Local Storage
  5398. � HTML5 Global Storage
  5399. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  5400. ---------------------------------------
  5401. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  5402.  
  5403.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  5404. mean that your browser isn't storing
  5405. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  5406. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  5407. in browser vulnerabilities.
  5408.  
  5409.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  5410. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  5411. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  5412. wide surveillance.
  5413.  
  5414.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  5415. powerful anonymity service, and the
  5416. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  5417. the Internet, makes it easy to
  5418. differentiate Tor users from other
  5419. Web users,� he wrote.
  5420.  
  5421.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  5422. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  5423. identifies you. Even though your IP
  5424. address changed [because of Tor], the
  5425. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  5426.  
  5427. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  5428. ---------------------------------------
  5429. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  5430. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  5431.  
  5432.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  5433. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  5434. �staining� as a means to identify
  5435. individual machines linked to that
  5436. IP address. ... ...
  5437.  
  5438.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  5439. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  5440. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  5441. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  5442. and is stamped into every packet, which
  5443. enables all the events from that stained
  5444. machine to be brought back together to
  5445. recreate a browsing session.�
  5446.  
  5447. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  5448.  
  5449. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  5450.  
  5451. � Packet Staining ::
  5452.  
  5453. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  5454. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  5455. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  5456. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  5457.  
  5458. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  5459.  
  5460. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  5461. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  5462. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  5463. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  5464.  
  5465. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  5466.  
  5467.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  5468. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  5469. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  5470. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  5471. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  5472. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  5473. identify it. We also worked to create
  5474. a custom Tor client which allows the
  5475. user finer control.� ... ...
  5476.  
  5477.  �This accomplishes several things.
  5478. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  5479. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  5480. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  5481. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  5482. be excessively complex, as a single
  5483. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  5484. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  5485. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  5486. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  5487. going to and from the proxy server,
  5488. it is possible to deduce which clients
  5489. are making which requests. Second, if
  5490. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  5491. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  5492. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  5493. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  5494. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  5495. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  5496. must be coordinated across several machines,
  5497. and an attacker must own all the hops
  5498. along the circuit in order to trace
  5499. requests back to the originating client.�
  5500.  
  5501. ... ...
  5502.  
  5503.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  5504. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  5505. a hidden service will turn up the port
  5506. that the hidden service is using to deal
  5507. with incoming connections. It can then be
  5508. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  5509.  
  5510. ... ...
  5511.  
  5512.  �We would have to try to connect to
  5513. each of the ports we see open on a
  5514. machine to determine if there is a
  5515. hidden service being run. We would not
  5516. even know which protocol the hidden
  5517. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  5518. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  5519. etc. The only thing we know is that
  5520. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  5521. not enough to attempt to connect once
  5522. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  5523. Several protocols must be tried.�
  5524.  
  5525. ... ...
  5526.  
  5527.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  5528. directory servers in more detail. Our
  5529. work focused solely on the client, but
  5530. many attacks would be much easier with
  5531. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  5532. servers ultimately control which Tor
  5533. servers are used by clients. We have found
  5534. that a server can put itself on a directory
  5535. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  5536. server running several Tor processes, each
  5537. having a different nickname, open port,
  5538. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  5539. requires different configuration files
  5540. for the different processes, which are
  5541. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  5542. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  5543. since it is listed several times. This
  5544. increases the density of friendly servers
  5545. in the cloud without increasing the number
  5546. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  5547. each listing has the same IP address,
  5548. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  5549. who inspecting the directories.�
  5550.  
  5551. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  5552. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  5553. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  5554.  
  5555. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  5556.  
  5557. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  5558.  
  5559. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  5560.  
  5561. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  5562.  
  5563. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  5564.  
  5565.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  5566. into capabilities the IC has developed
  5567. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  5568. to run multiple research teams (either
  5569. known or unknown to each other) against
  5570. a single target, and a few summer students
  5571. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  5572. small investment. I�d expect there are
  5573. other programs with more sophisticated
  5574. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  5575.  
  5576. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  5577. _______________________________________
  5578. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  5579.  
  5580. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  5581. _______________________________________
  5582. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  5583. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  5584.  
  5585. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  5586.  
  5587.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  5588. the past several months, I�d also thought
  5589. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  5590. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  5591. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  5592. Sasso of The Hill.
  5593.  
  5594.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  5595. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  5596. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  5597. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  5598. help you with that.�
  5599.  
  5600. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  5601.  
  5602.  The conversation then turned specifically
  5603. to the government�s use of targeted
  5604. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  5605. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  5606. hope they make full use of the capacities
  5607. of the National Security Agency when we
  5608. do that.�
  5609.  
  5610.  Hayden was responding to a question
  5611. about a new project announced by journalists
  5612. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  5613. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  5614. assassinations.
  5615.  
  5616. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  5617. _______________________________________
  5618. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  5619.  
  5620. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  5621.  
  5622. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  5623.  
  5624. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  5625. _______________________________________
  5626. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  5627. Breaches ::
  5628.  
  5629. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  5630.  
  5631. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  5632.  
  5633. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  5634. _______________________________________
  5635. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  5636. of US Citizens ::
  5637.  
  5638.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  5639. body of knowledge in recent months about
  5640. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  5641. information concerning Americans, prompting
  5642. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  5643. in the agency and President Obama to order
  5644. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  5645. Almost everything about the agency�s
  5646. operations is hidden, and the decision
  5647. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  5648. was made in secret, without review by the
  5649. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  5650. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  5651. Department memo warned of the potential
  5652. for the �misuse� of such information
  5653. without adequate safeguards.
  5654.  
  5655. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  5656. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  5657. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  5658.  
  5659. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  5660. From American Social Networks ::
  5661.  
  5662. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  5663. _______________________________________
  5664. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  5665. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  5666.  
  5667. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  5668. _______________________________________
  5669. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  5670. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  5671.  
  5672.  Led by the German government, a loose
  5673. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  5674. across the world is pushing to update an
  5675. influential international human rights
  5676. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  5677.  
  5678. ... ...
  5679.  
  5680.  The annual conference was attended by a
  5681. diverse selection of privacy and data
  5682. protection officials from across the
  5683. world, with representatives attending
  5684. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  5685. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  5686. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  5687. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  5688. United Kingdom.
  5689.  
  5690.  During a closed session at the conference
  5691. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  5692. resolution was put forward for a vote
  5693. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  5694. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  5695. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  5696. globally applicable standards for data
  5697. protection and the protection of privacy
  5698. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  5699.  
  5700.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  5701. of the resolution ... the United States.
  5702.  
  5703.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  5704. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  5705. eventually need to be put forward at the
  5706. United Nations and voted on by member
  5707. states, and that could take time. But
  5708. the growing appetite to amend the
  5709. international treaty in light of the
  5710. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  5711. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  5712. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  5713. technology in the digital age to trample
  5714. over basic universal privacy rights.
  5715.  
  5716. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  5717.  
  5718. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  5719.  
  5720. NOBODY comments
  5721.  
  5722.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  5723. all secret agencies around the world,
  5724. in general. All secret agencies and
  5725. their third-party vendors or allies
  5726. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  5727. backdoors in electronic communication
  5728. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  5729. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  5730. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  5731. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  5732. you must kill any trust in security.
  5733.  
  5734.  Security does not exist on the web.
  5735. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  5736. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  5737. _______________________________________
  5738. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  5739.  
  5740. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  5741.  
  5742. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  5743.  
  5744. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  5745. _______________________________________
  5746. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  5747.  
  5748. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  5749. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  5750. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  5751. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  5752. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  5753.  
  5754. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  5755. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  5756.  
  5757. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  5758. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  5759. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  5760.  
  5761.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are tapping the
  5762. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  5763. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  5764. of this) as opposed to �downstream� collection, which
  5765. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  5766.  
  5767. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  5768.  
  5769. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  5770.  
  5771. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  5772.  
  5773. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  5774. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  5775. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  5776. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  5777. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  5778. _______________________________________
  5779. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  5780. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  5781. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  5782.  
  5783. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  5784. _______________________________________
  5785. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  5786.  
  5787.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  5788. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  5789. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  5790. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  5791. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  5792. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  5793. file transfer and social networking services.
  5794.  
  5795.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  5796. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  5797. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  5798. officials.
  5799.  
  5800.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India�s
  5801. domestic politics and the country�s strategic and commercial
  5802. interests.
  5803.  
  5804. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  5805.  
  5806.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  5807. document about �Close Access SIGADs�, the offices of Indian
  5808. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  5809. at these important posts were targets of four different
  5810. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  5811.  
  5812.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  5813. of computers.
  5814.  
  5815. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  5816.  
  5817. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  5818.  
  5819. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  5820.  
  5821. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  5822. _______________________________________
  5823. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  5824.  
  5825.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  5826. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  5827. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  5828. in some cases plan the destruction of, �more than 10,000
  5829. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  5830. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  5831. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  5832. that could threaten US or allied interests.�
  5833.  
  5834. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  5835. _______________________________________
  5836. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  5837.  
  5838. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  5839. _______________________________________
  5840. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  5841. NSA Leaks ::
  5842.  
  5843. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  5844. _______________________________________
  5845. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  5846.  
  5847. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  5848. _______________________________________
  5849. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  5850. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  5851.  
  5852. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  5853. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  5854. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  5855.  
  5856. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  5857. Under United States Control ::
  5858.  
  5859.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  5860. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  5861. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  5862.  
  5863.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  5864. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  5865. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  5866. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  5867. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  5868. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  5869. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it�s,
  5870. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  5871.  
  5872.  �The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  5873. severe in coming months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  5874. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  5875. America Foundation think-tank. �This notion of national
  5876. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  5877. issue around the globe.�
  5878.  
  5879. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  5880. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  5881. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  5882. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  5883.  
  5884. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  5885.  
  5886.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  5887. optic cable system.
  5888.  
  5889. http://www.bricscable.com/
  5890.  
  5891. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  5892. _______________________________________
  5893. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  5894.  
  5895.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  5896. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court�s
  5897. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  5898. PATRIOT Act that�s used to justify the National Security
  5899. Agency�s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  5900. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  5901. orders has ever challenged one.
  5902.  
  5903. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  5904. _______________________________________
  5905. � Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  5906. Revelations ::
  5907.  
  5908.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  5909. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA�s
  5910. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  5911. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  5912. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  5913. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  5914.  
  5915.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  5916. the agency�s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  5917. and its �partnerships� with software and hardware vendors
  5918. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  5919. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  5920. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  5921. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  5922. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  5923. But one thing that�s become clear is that when the government
  5924. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn�t
  5925. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  5926.  
  5927. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  5928.  
  5929. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  5930.  
  5931.  The security community didn�t invent the concept of fear,
  5932. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  5933. it to the level of religion. It�s the way that security products
  5934. are marketed and sold, but it�s also the way that the intelligence
  5935. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  5936. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  5937. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  5938. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  5939. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  5940. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  5941. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  5942. fundamental building blocks of security.
  5943.  
  5944.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  5945. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  5946. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  5947. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  5948. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company�s
  5949. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  5950. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  5951. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  5952.  
  5953. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  5954. _______________________________________
  5955. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  5956.  
  5957.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  5958. President approximately every 45 days,
  5959. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  5960. the activities carried out under these
  5961. Authorizations are referred to as the
  5962. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  5963. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  5964. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  5965. the content of communications into and out
  5966. of the United States where there was a
  5967. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  5968. party to the communication was a member
  5969. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  5970.  
  5971.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  5972. acknowledged and described by the President,
  5973. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  5974. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  5975. a series of articles published in The New York
  5976. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  5977. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  5978. intelligence activities were also authorized
  5979. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  5980. but the details of those activities remain
  5981. classified.� ... ...
  5982.  
  5983.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  5984. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  5985. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  5986. as the principal governing authorities for
  5987. conducting electronic surveillance for
  5988. national security purposes. The Foreign
  5989. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  5990. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  5991. "provide legislative authorization and
  5992. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  5993. conducted within the United States for
  5994. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  5995.  
  5996. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  5997.  
  5998. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  5999. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  6000.  
  6001. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  6002.  
  6003. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  6004.  
  6005.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  6006. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  6007. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  6008. require special approval. Therefore, just
  6009. another gap. Also take in consideration
  6010. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  6011. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  6012. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  6013. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  6014. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  6015. _______________________________________
  6016. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  6017. Firm ::
  6018.  
  6019.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  6020. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  6021. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  6022. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  6023. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  6024. A �top secret� Government Communications
  6025. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  6026. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  6027. conducted under the codename �Operation
  6028. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  6029. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  6030. improve understanding of the provider�s
  6031. infrastructure. ... ...
  6032.  
  6033.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  6034. presentation, the attack was directed
  6035. at several Belgacom employees and
  6036. involved the planting of a highly
  6037. developed attack technology referred
  6038. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  6039. appears to be a method with which the
  6040. person being targeted, without their
  6041. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  6042. that then plant malware on their
  6043. computers that can then manipulate
  6044. them. Some of the employees whose
  6045. computers were infiltrated had �good
  6046. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  6047. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  6048. please the British spies, according
  6049. to the slides.
  6050.    
  6051. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  6052. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  6053. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  6054. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  6055. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  6056. _______________________________________
  6057. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  6058.  
  6059. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  6060.  
  6061. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  6062. _______________________________________
  6063. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  6064.  
  6065. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  6066. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  6067. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  6068. _______________________________________
  6069. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  6070. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  6071.  
  6072. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  6073. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  6074. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  6075. _______________________________________
  6076. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  6077.  
  6078. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  6079. ���������������������������������������
  6080. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  6081. Allocated to One Release ::
  6082.  
  6083. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  6084.  
  6085. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  6086.  
  6087. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  6088.  
  6089. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  6090. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  6091.  
  6092. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  6093.  
  6094. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  6095. Schedule ::
  6096.  
  6097. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6098.  
  6099. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6100.  
  6101. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6102.  
  6103. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6104.  
  6105. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6106.  
  6107. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  6108.  
  6109. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  6110. ���������������������������������������
  6111. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  6112.  
  6113.  In response to a FOIA request from
  6114. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  6115. its ethics office never looked into
  6116. complaints from two federal judges
  6117. that they had been misled about NSA
  6118. surveillance.
  6119.  
  6120. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  6121. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  6122. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  6123. ���������������������������������������
  6124.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  6125. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  6126. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  6127. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  6128. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  6129.  
  6130. Livestream will be at:
  6131.  
  6132. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  6133. _______________________________________
  6134. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  6135. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  6136.  
  6137. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  6138.  
  6139. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  6140. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  6141. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  6142.  
  6143. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  6144.  
  6145.  The Director of National Intelligence
  6146. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  6147. pages of documents related to the
  6148. government�s secret interpretation of
  6149. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  6150. (mis)use of its massive database of
  6151. every American�s phone records. The
  6152. documents were released as a result
  6153. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  6154. Act lawsuit.
  6155.  
  6156.  We�ve posted links to each document
  6157. below. While the government also posted
  6158. many of the documents here ...
  6159.  
  6160. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  6161.  
  6162. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  6163.  
  6164. Links to the documents ;
  6165.  
  6166. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  6167. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6168.  
  6169. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6170.  
  6171. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  6172. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6173. Court
  6174.  
  6175. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6176.  
  6177. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6178. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6179. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6180. Court
  6181.  
  6182. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6183.  
  6184. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  6185. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  6186. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6187. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  6188.  
  6189. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6190.  
  6191. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  6192. Incident
  6193.  
  6194. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6195.  
  6196. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6197. Intelligence Court
  6198.  
  6199. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6200.  
  6201. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  6202. Intelligence Court
  6203.  
  6204. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6205.  
  6206. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  6207. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  6208. Business Records FISA
  6209.  
  6210. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6211.  
  6212. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  6213. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  6214.  
  6215. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6216.  
  6217. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  6218. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6219.  
  6220. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6221.  
  6222. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  6223. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  6224. Surveillance Court
  6225.  
  6226. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6227.  
  6228. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  6229. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  6230. Surveillance Court
  6231.  
  6232. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6233.  
  6234. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  6235. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  6236.  
  6237. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  6238.  
  6239. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  6240. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  6241.  
  6242. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  6243. _______________________________________
  6244. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  6245.  
  6246. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  6247.  
  6248. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  6249.  
  6250. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  6251. ���������������������������������������
  6252. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  6253.  
  6254. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  6255. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  6256. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  6257. _______________________________________
  6258. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  6259. Over Data to the NSA ::
  6260.  
  6261.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6262. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  6263. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  6264. media report. The revelation comes as
  6265. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  6266. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  6267. troves of data with the US and UK.
  6268.  
  6269.  Citing secret government documents,
  6270. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  6271. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6272. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  6273. with domestic security, works closely
  6274. with the US and regularly sends them
  6275. information.
  6276.  
  6277.  The security service gathers intelligence
  6278. on internal security threats. The documents
  6279. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  6280. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  6281. well as regular meetings between officers
  6282. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  6283.  
  6284. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  6285. _______________________________________
  6286. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  6287. Revelations ::
  6288.  
  6289. This is an unofficial translation.
  6290.  
  6291. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  6292.  
  6293.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  6294. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  6295. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  6296.  
  6297. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  6298.  
  6299. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  6300. _______________________________________
  6301. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  6302.  
  6303. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  6304. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  6305. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  6306. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  6307. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  6308. _______________________________________
  6309. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  6310.  
  6311. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  6312.  
  6313. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  6314.  
  6315. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  6316. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  6317.  
  6318. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  6319.  
  6320. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  6321.  
  6322.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  6323. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  6324. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  6325. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  6326. and control over natural resources.
  6327. _______________________________________
  6328. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  6329.  
  6330.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  6331. machines to read.
  6332.  
  6333. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  6334. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  6335. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  6336. _______________________________________
  6337. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  6338.  
  6339. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  6340.  
  6341. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  6342. _______________________________________
  6343. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  6344. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  6345. National Unit ::
  6346.  
  6347.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  6348. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  6349. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  6350. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  6351. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  6352. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  6353. it Wednesday.
  6354.  
  6355.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  6356. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  6357. raw signals intelligence, referred
  6358. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  6359. swathes of digital data traffic that
  6360. the agency gathers under secret court
  6361. authority from US Internet providers.
  6362.  
  6363.  So sensitive is this data that even
  6364. before being disseminated to other US
  6365. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  6366. to a court-mandated process called
  6367. minimization, under which the names
  6368. of any Americans are removed unless
  6369. they are essential for foreign
  6370. intelligence interest.
  6371.  
  6372.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  6373. that the data shared with Israel
  6374. �includes, but is not limited to,
  6375. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  6376. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  6377. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  6378. and content.�
  6379.  
  6380.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  6381. and unminimized raw collection associated
  6382. with selectors from multiple Target office
  6383. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  6384. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  6385. relationship between the two organizations.�
  6386.  
  6387. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  6388. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  6389. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  6390. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  6391. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  6392. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  6393.  
  6394.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  6395. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  6396. that spy most aggressively against the
  6397. United States.
  6398.  
  6399.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6400. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6401. insider threat detection capabilities
  6402. across the Community. In addition, we
  6403. are investing in target surveillance
  6404. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6405. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6406. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  6407.  
  6408. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6409. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6410. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6411.  
  6412. NOBODY comments
  6413.  
  6414.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  6415. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  6416. plenty of inside information.
  6417.  
  6418.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  6419. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  6420. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  6421.  
  6422. This reminds of a quote ;
  6423.  
  6424.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  6425. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  6426. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  6427. to play out one big game of destruction
  6428. and domination with humans as the visible
  6429. and spiritual puppets?�
  6430. _______________________________________
  6431. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  6432.  
  6433. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  6434. _______________________________________
  6435. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  6436.  
  6437. (EN)
  6438. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6439.  
  6440. (DE)
  6441. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  6442.  
  6443. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  6444.  
  6445.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  6446. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  6447. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  6448. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  6449. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  6450. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  6451. deployed in a government intelligence
  6452. agency presentation.
  6453.  
  6454. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6455. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  6456. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  6457. ���������������������������������������
  6458. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  6459. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  6460.  
  6461.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  6462. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  6463. reverse restrictions on the National
  6464. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  6465. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  6466. the agency to search deliberately for
  6467. Americans� communications in its massive
  6468. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  6469. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  6470. �declassified material� - (which, by
  6471. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  6472. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  6473. of which agency it came from and most
  6474. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  6475.  
  6476. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  6477.  
  6478.  In addition, the court extended the
  6479. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  6480. to retain intercepted US communications
  6481. from five years to six years � and more
  6482. under special circumstances, according
  6483. to the documents, which include a
  6484. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  6485. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  6486. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6487. Surveillance Court.
  6488.  
  6489. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6490.  
  6491. NOBODY comments
  6492.  
  6493.  The document which was declassified by
  6494. US intelligence officials explains the
  6495. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6496. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  6497. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  6498.  
  6499. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6500. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6501. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6502.  
  6503.  National Security Agency analysts
  6504. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6505. their authority to spy on Americans.
  6506.  
  6507. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6508.  
  6509.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  6510. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  6511.  
  6512. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6513.  
  6514. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6515.  
  6516.  And this is not the first attempt to
  6517. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  6518.  
  6519. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6520.  
  6521. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6522.  
  6523.  The new Washington Post report has
  6524. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  6525. (press) release exposing yet another
  6526. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  6527. or take responsibility for the abuses
  6528. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  6529.  
  6530. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6531.  
  6532.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  6533. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  6534.  
  6535.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  6536. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  6537.  
  6538.  All of this information is backed up
  6539. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  6540. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  6541. 2,776 violations one year after the
  6542. FISA Court order.
  6543.  
  6544. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6545.  
  6546.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  6547. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  6548. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  6549. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  6550. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  6551. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  6552. them out of office come next election.
  6553. _______________________________________
  6554. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  6555.  
  6556. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  6557. _______________________________________
  6558. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  6559.  
  6560. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  6561.  
  6562.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  6563. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  6564. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  6565.  
  6566. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  6567.  
  6568. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  6569.  
  6570. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  6571.  
  6572. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  6573.  
  6574. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  6575.  
  6576. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  6577.  
  6578. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  6579.  
  6580. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6581. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6582. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  6583. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  6584.  
  6585. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  6586.  
  6587.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  6588. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  6589. reports that the US National Security Agency
  6590. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  6591.  
  6592.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  6593. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  6594. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  6595. Tuesday.
  6596.  
  6597.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  6598. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  6599. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  6600. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  6601. several of her top aides, and tapped
  6602. her phone.
  6603.  
  6604. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  6605.  
  6606. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  6607. Impacted ::
  6608.  
  6609.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  6610. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  6611. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  6612. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  6613. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  6614. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  6615.  
  6616.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  6617. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  6618. visit to Washington in October, the
  6619. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  6620. year, or will take action on digital
  6621. security that may affect US companies
  6622. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  6623.  
  6624.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  6625. a proposal that would suspend operations
  6626. of companies that cooperate with the
  6627. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  6628.  
  6629. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  6630. _______________________________________
  6631. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  6632.  
  6633. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  6634.  
  6635. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  6636.  
  6637. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  6638. ���������������������������������������
  6639. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  6640.  
  6641.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6642. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6643. collect against high priority targets,
  6644. including foreign leadership targets.
  6645. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6646. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6647. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6648. internet traffic.�
  6649.  
  6650. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6651.  
  6652. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6653.  
  6654. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  6655.  
  6656. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  6657.  
  6658. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  6659.  
  6660. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  6661.  
  6662.  �The Post is withholding some information
  6663. after consultation with US officials who
  6664. expressed concerns about the risk to
  6665. intelligence sources and methods.
  6666. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  6667. the documents that The Post is publishing
  6668. only summary tables and charts online.�
  6669.  
  6670. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  6671.  
  6672. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6673. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  6674.  
  6675. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  6676.  
  6677. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  6678.  
  6679. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6680. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  6681.  
  6682. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  6683.  
  6684. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  6685.  
  6686. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  6687.  
  6688.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  6689. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  6690. intelligence services, leaked documents
  6691. reveal.
  6692.  
  6693.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  6694. to have an aggressive intelligence
  6695. collection operations against the
  6696. United States,� Pillar said. While
  6697. much information is collected through
  6698. traditional political contacts, �I
  6699. would personally have no doubt that
  6700. that is supplemented by whatever means
  6701. they can use to find out as much as
  6702. they can about what we�re doing,
  6703. thinking, deciding on anything of
  6704. interest to Israel, which would include
  6705. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  6706.  
  6707. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6708.  
  6709. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  6710.  
  6711.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6712. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6713. insider threat detection capabilities
  6714. across the Community. In addition, we
  6715. are investing in target surveillance
  6716. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6717. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6718. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  6719. _______________________________________
  6720. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  6721.  
  6722.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  6723. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  6724. the worst part is the Received headers.
  6725. Everyone should look at their own headers
  6726. -- especially people on this list and
  6727. at least comprehend that your email
  6728. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  6729. the Mailman archive.
  6730.  
  6731.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  6732. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  6733. the actual separators in MIME part
  6734. breaks, and so on.
  6735.  
  6736.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  6737. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  6738. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  6739. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  6740. don�t do it all the time.
  6741.  
  6742.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  6743. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  6744. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  6745. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  6746. is that this tells us that the crypto
  6747. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  6748. for quite some time.
  6749.  
  6750.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  6751. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  6752. that works being deployed everywhere.
  6753. What do you do? You just be patient and
  6754. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  6755. analysis.
  6756.  
  6757. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  6758.  
  6759. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  6760.  
  6761. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  6762.  
  6763.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  6764. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  6765. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  6766. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  6767. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  6768. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  6769. reveal.
  6770.  
  6771. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  6772.  
  6773.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6774. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6775. collect against high priority targets,
  6776. including foreign leadership targets.
  6777. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6778. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6779. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6780. internet traffic.� ... ...
  6781.  
  6782. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  6783.  
  6784.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  6785. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  6786. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  6787. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  6788. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  6789. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  6790.  
  6791.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  6792. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  6793.  
  6794. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6795.  
  6796. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6797.  
  6798. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  6799.  
  6800. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  6801.  
  6802. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  6803.  
  6804.  The US government has attempted to
  6805. obtain the master encryption keys that
  6806. Internet companies use to shield millions
  6807. of users� private web communications
  6808. from eavesdropping.
  6809.  
  6810.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  6811. which have not been disclosed previously,
  6812. represent a technological escalation in
  6813. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  6814. the National Security Agency employ when
  6815. conducting electronic surveillance against
  6816. Internet users. ... ...
  6817.  
  6818.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  6819. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  6820. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  6821. communications are typically destroyed
  6822. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  6823. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  6824. of all communications that are enciphered�
  6825. is permissible.
  6826.  
  6827. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  6828. _______________________________________
  6829. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  6830. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  6831.  
  6832.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  6833. intercepts well before 2001, former
  6834. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  6835. secretive Special Services Office,
  6836. these types of programs were at first
  6837. designed to intercept communications
  6838. overseas through arrangements with
  6839. foreign Internet providers, the former
  6840. officials say. NSA still has such
  6841. arrangements in many countries,
  6842. particularly in the Middle East and
  6843. Europe, the former officials say.�
  6844.  
  6845. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  6846.  
  6847. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  6848.  
  6849. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  6850. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  6851. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  6852. ���������������������������������������
  6853. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  6854. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  6855.  
  6856.  A common hacking technique can be used
  6857. to make emails look as if they came from
  6858. outside the United States.
  6859.  
  6860. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  6861. _______________________________________
  6862. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  6863. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  6864.  
  6865. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  6866.  
  6867. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  6868.  
  6869. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  6870.  
  6871. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  6872. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  6873. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  6874. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  6875. ���������������������������������������
  6876. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  6877. Patrick Leahy ::
  6878.  
  6879. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  6880.  
  6881. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  6882.  
  6883. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  6884. _______________________________________
  6885. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  6886.  
  6887.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  6888. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6889. their authority to spy on Americans
  6890. multiple times in the past decade,
  6891. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  6892. and lawmakers� statements that no
  6893. willful violations occurred. ...
  6894.  
  6895.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  6896. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  6897. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  6898. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  6899. of having links to terrorism, before a
  6900. secret court that oversees surveillance
  6901. found the operation unconstitutional
  6902. in 2011.
  6903.  
  6904. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6905.  
  6906. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  6907. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  6908. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  6909.  
  6910.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  6911. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  6912. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  6913. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  6914. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  6915.  
  6916.  The documents were released in response
  6917. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  6918. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  6919.  
  6920.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  6921. litigation and the most significant leak
  6922. in American history to finally get them
  6923. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  6924. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  6925. �but I�m happy that the administration
  6926. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  6927.  
  6928. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6929. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6930. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6931.  
  6932. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  6933.  
  6934. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6935.  
  6936. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6937.  
  6938. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  6939.  
  6940. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6941.  
  6942. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6943.  
  6944. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  6945. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  6946.  
  6947. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6948. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  6949. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  6950. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  6951. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  6952. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  6953.  
  6954.  The account is based on top-secret
  6955. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  6956. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  6957. including unauthorized collection,
  6958. storage, access to or distribution of
  6959. legally protected communications � in
  6960. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  6961. originally only meant to be seen by top
  6962. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  6963. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  6964. and other locations in the Washington DC
  6965. region.
  6966.  
  6967. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  6968.  
  6969.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  6970. and other things, there�s people talking
  6971. about privacy violations or abuses or
  6972. willful or violations, right, it is
  6973. important for people to understand,
  6974. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  6975. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  6976. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  6977.  
  6978.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  6979. We detect them, as early as we can.
  6980. We correct them, right. None of the
  6981. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  6982. the document released were willful.
  6983. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  6984. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  6985. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  6986.  
  6987. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  6988.  
  6989. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  6990. Database Queries Per Month ::
  6991.  
  6992. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  6993.  
  6994. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  6995.  
  6996. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  6997. _______________________________________
  6998. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  6999.  
  7000.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  7001. station in the Middle East to intercept
  7002. and process vast quantities of emails,
  7003. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  7004. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  7005. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  7006.  
  7007.  The information is then processed for
  7008. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  7009. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  7010. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  7011. The Government claims the station is a
  7012. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  7013. and provides a vital �early warning�
  7014. system for potential attacks around
  7015. the world.
  7016.  
  7017.  The Independent is not revealing the
  7018. precise location of the station but
  7019. information on its activities was
  7020. contained in the leaked documents
  7021. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  7022. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  7023. these documents in recent months has
  7024. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  7025. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  7026. the destruction of hard drives containing
  7027. the data. ... ...
  7028.  
  7029.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  7030. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  7031. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  7032. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  7033. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  7034. the global interception of digital
  7035. communications, such as emails and text
  7036. messages.
  7037.  
  7038.  Across three sites, communications �
  7039. including telephone calls � are tracked
  7040. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  7041. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  7042.  
  7043. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  7044. ���������������������������������������
  7045. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  7046.  
  7047. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  7048. _______________________________________
  7049. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  7050. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  7051. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  7052. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  7053. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  7054. E Grassley ::
  7055.  
  7056. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  7057.  
  7058. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  7059.  
  7060. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  7061.  
  7062. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  7063.  
  7064. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  7065.  
  7066. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  7067.  
  7068. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  7069.  
  7070. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  7071.  
  7072. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  7073.  
  7074. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  7075.  
  7076. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  7077. Congress ::
  7078.  
  7079.  �I can now confirm that the House
  7080. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  7081. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  7082. available to Representatives in Congress,
  7083. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  7084. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  7085. the now declassified documents detailing
  7086. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  7087.  
  7088. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  7089.  
  7090. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  7091.  
  7092. ?
  7093.  
  7094. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7095.  
  7096.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7097. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7098. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7099. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7100. discussions with the president when he
  7101. first came on board we talked to him about
  7102. these programs and the issue was how do
  7103. we know the compliance is there and what
  7104. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7105. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  7106. of compliance. This directorate of
  7107. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7108. and information specialists that can look
  7109. at everything that we do in these programs
  7110. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7111. orders but we also have oversight from
  7112. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7113. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7114. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7115. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  7116. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7117. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7118. _______________________________________
  7119. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  7120.  
  7121.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  7122. public so far.
  7123.  
  7124. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  7125. _______________________________________
  7126. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  7127.  
  7128. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  7129. _______________________________________
  7130. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  7131. Data Lab ::
  7132.  
  7133. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  7134.  
  7135. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  7136. _______________________________________
  7137. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  7138. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  7139.  
  7140. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  7141. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  7142. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  7143. _______________________________________
  7144. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  7145.  
  7146.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  7147. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  7148. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  7149. there since he assumed the position
  7150. of Secretary of State. He has already
  7151. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  7152. � where officials demanded an explanation
  7153. to reports that Washington had collected
  7154. vast amounts of internet data there.
  7155. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  7156. which allegedly was the top regional
  7157. target of the surveillance program.
  7158.  
  7159. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  7160.  
  7161. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  7162.  
  7163. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  7164. Surveillance ::
  7165.  
  7166. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  7167.  
  7168. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  7169.  
  7170. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  7171. _______________________________________
  7172. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  7173.  
  7174. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  7175. ���������������������������������������
  7176. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  7177.  
  7178. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  7179.  
  7180. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  7181.  
  7182. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  7183.  
  7184. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  7185.  
  7186. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  7187. _______________________________________
  7188. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  7189.  
  7190. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  7191.  
  7192. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  7193. _______________________________________
  7194. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  7195.  
  7196. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  7197.  
  7198.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  7199. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  7200. use of certain United States person names
  7201. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  7202. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  7203. implement any USP queries until an effective
  7204. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  7205. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  7206. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  7207. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  7208. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  7209. databases).�
  7210.  
  7211. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  7212.  
  7213. NOBODY comments
  7214.  
  7215. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  7216.  
  7217. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7218.  
  7219.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7220. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7221. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7222. communications not related to foreign
  7223. information or foreign activity for up
  7224. to five years.
  7225.  
  7226.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  7227. acquired communications of or concerning a
  7228. United States person may be retained no
  7229. longer than five years in any event.�
  7230.  
  7231.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  7232. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  7233. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  7234. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  7235. communications that have been stored.
  7236. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  7237. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  7238. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  7239. to �communications security vulnerability�
  7240. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  7241. _______________________________________
  7242. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  7243.  
  7244. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  7245. _______________________________________
  7246. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  7247.  
  7248. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  7249. _______________________________________
  7250. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  7251. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  7252.  
  7253.  As the steady stream of revelations
  7254. continues, the White House has choosen
  7255. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  7256. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  7257.  
  7258. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  7259. _______________________________________
  7260. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  7261.  
  7262. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  7263.  
  7264. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  7265. Spying Press Conference ::
  7266.  
  7267.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  7268. Presidential press conference in which the
  7269. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  7270. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  7271. that Obama told today about the program
  7272. by citing multiple articles with information
  7273. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  7274.  
  7275. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  7276. ���������������������������������������
  7277. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  7278. Partners ::
  7279.  
  7280. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  7281. ���������������������������������������
  7282. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  7283. Metadata ::
  7284.  
  7285. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  7286. ���������������������������������������
  7287. � National Security Run Amok ::
  7288.  
  7289. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  7290. _______________________________________
  7291.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  7292. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  7293. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  7294. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  7295.  
  7296. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  7297.  
  7298.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  7299. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  7300. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  7301. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  7302. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  7303. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  7304. for including former senators Hillary
  7305. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  7306.  
  7307. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  7308.  
  7309. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  7310. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  7311.  
  7312. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  7313.  
  7314. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7315.  
  7316. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  7317. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  7318.  
  7319. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  7320.  
  7321.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  7322. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  7323.  
  7324. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  7325. ���������������������������������������
  7326. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  7327.  
  7328. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  7329.  
  7330. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  7331.  
  7332. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  7333.  
  7334. NOBODY comments
  7335.  
  7336. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  7337.  
  7338.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  7339. the document was still classified. It was
  7340. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  7341.  
  7342. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7343.  
  7344.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  7345. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  7346. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  7347. many of these operations being leaked.
  7348. _______________________________________
  7349. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  7350. on Brazilian Television ::
  7351.  
  7352. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  7353. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  7354. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  7355.  
  7356. NOBODY comments
  7357.  
  7358.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  7359. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  7360.  
  7361.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  7362. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  7363. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  7364.  
  7365. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  7366. ���������������������������������������
  7367. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7368. English Report ::
  7369.  
  7370.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  7371. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  7372. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  7373. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  7374. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  7375. matters is also much closer than first
  7376. thought. ... ...
  7377.  
  7378.  Day after day and month after month,
  7379. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  7380. amounts of connection data relating
  7381. to the communications it had placed
  7382. under surveillance. The so-called
  7383. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  7384. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  7385. into the Americans� giant databases.
  7386.  
  7387. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  7388.  
  7389. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7390. Deutsch Report ::
  7391.  
  7392. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  7393.  
  7394. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  7395.  
  7396. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  7397. ���������������������������������������
  7398. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  7399.  
  7400. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  7401. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  7402. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  7403.  
  7404. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  7405.  
  7406. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  7407.  
  7408.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  7409. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  7410. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  7411. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  7412. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  7413. the Guardian�s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  7414. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  7415.  
  7416. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  7417. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  7418. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  7419. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  7420.  
  7421. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  7422.  
  7423. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  7424.  
  7425. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  7426.  
  7427. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  7428.  
  7429. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  7430.  
  7431. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  7432.  
  7433. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  7434.  
  7435. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  7436.  
  7437. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  7438.  
  7439. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  7440.  
  7441. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  7442.  
  7443. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  7444.  
  7445. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  7446.  
  7447. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  7448.  
  7449.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  7450. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  7451. they are shunted off to various �production
  7452. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  7453. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  7454. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  7455. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  7456. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  7457. stored in a database called MARINA and
  7458. is generally retained for five years.
  7459.  
  7460. ... ...
  7461.  
  7462.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  7463. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  7464. to change the surveillance laws once the
  7465. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  7466. This was for a simple reason: they did
  7467. not want to be responsible for a program
  7468. that was not legal.�
  7469.  
  7470. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  7471.  
  7472. NOBODY comments
  7473.  
  7474.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7475. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7476. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7477. communications not related to foreign
  7478. information or foreign activity for up
  7479. to five years.
  7480.  
  7481.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  7482. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  7483. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  7484. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  7485. ���������������������������������������
  7486. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  7487. for GCHQ Bude ::
  7488.  
  7489. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  7490. _______________________________________
  7491. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  7492. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  7493.  
  7494.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  7495. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  7496. counterfeiting and even copyright
  7497. infringement complain that their
  7498. attempts to exploit the security
  7499. agency�s vast resources have often
  7500. been turned down because their own
  7501. investigations are not considered a
  7502. high enough priority, current and
  7503. former government officials say.
  7504.  
  7505.  Intelligence officials say they have
  7506. been careful to limit the use of the
  7507. security agency�s troves of data and
  7508. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  7509. could be misused in ways that violate
  7510. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  7511.  
  7512.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  7513. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  7514. senior intelligence official at the
  7515. White House and at the office of the
  7516. director of national intelligence.
  7517. �They collect all this information,
  7518. but it�s difficult for the other
  7519. agencies to get access to what
  7520. they want.�
  7521.  
  7522. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  7523. _______________________________________
  7524. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  7525. Security Forum ::
  7526.  
  7527. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  7528.  
  7529. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  7530. Conference ::
  7531.  
  7532. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  7533.  
  7534. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  7535. Conference ::
  7536.  
  7537. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7538. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  7539. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  7540.  
  7541.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7542. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7543. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7544. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7545. discussions with the president when he
  7546. first came on board we talked to him about
  7547. these programs and the issue was how do
  7548. we know the compliance is there and what
  7549. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7550. the committees in Congress a directorate
  7551. of compliance. This directorate of
  7552. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7553. and information specialists that can look
  7554. at everything that we do in these programs
  7555. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7556. orders but we also have oversight from
  7557. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7558. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7559. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7560. from the White House, from Congress, the
  7561. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7562. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7563.  
  7564. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  7565. Blackhat Conference ::
  7566.  
  7567. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  7568.  
  7569. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  7570.  
  7571. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  7572.  
  7573. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  7574.  
  7575. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  7576.  
  7577. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  7578.  
  7579. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  7580. _______________________________________
  7581. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  7582.  
  7583. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  7584.  
  7585. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  7586. All Domestic Calls ::
  7587.  
  7588.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  7589. three documents related to the National
  7590. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  7591. records, including briefings to Congress
  7592. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  7593. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  7594. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7595. Court that outlines rules that must be
  7596. followed when accessing data provided by
  7597. a Verizon subsidiary.
  7598.  
  7599. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  7600.  
  7601.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  7602. what the government was doing with the
  7603. Patriot Act program, several senators
  7604. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  7605. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  7606. the law in a twisted way to do something
  7607. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  7608. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  7609. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  7610. Act to obtain that document.
  7611.  
  7612. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  7613. _______________________________________
  7614. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  7615.  
  7616. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  7617.  
  7618. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  7619. _______________________________________
  7620. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  7621.  
  7622.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  7623. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  7624. two or three years ago.�
  7625.  
  7626. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  7627. _______________________________________
  7628. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7629. Received Dox ::
  7630.  
  7631. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  7632. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  7633. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  7634. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  7635. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  7636.  
  7637. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  7638.  
  7639. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  7640.  
  7641. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7642. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  7643.  
  7644.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  7645. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  7646. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  7647. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  7648. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  7649. twice as much campaign financing from
  7650. the defense and intelligence industry
  7651. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  7652.  
  7653. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  7654.  
  7655. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  7656. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  7657.  
  7658. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  7659. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  7660. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  7661.  
  7662. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  7663.  
  7664. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  7665.  
  7666. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  7667. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  7668.  
  7669. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  7670. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  7671. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  7672. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  7673.  
  7674. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  7675. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  7676.  
  7677.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  7678. disclosures, the President has said
  7679. that he welcomes a debate about how
  7680. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  7681. our national security and the privacy
  7682. of our citizens.  The Administration
  7683. has taken various proactive steps to
  7684. advance this debate including the
  7685. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  7686. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  7687. his public statements on the disclosed
  7688. programs, the Office of the Director
  7689. of National Intelligence�s release of
  7690. its own public statements, ODNI General
  7691. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  7692. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  7693. disclose publicly that the Administration
  7694. filed an application with the Foreign
  7695. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  7696. look forward to continuing to discuss
  7697. these critical issues with the American
  7698. people and the Congress.
  7699.  
  7700.  However, we oppose the current effort
  7701. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  7702. of our Intelligence Community�s
  7703. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  7704. approach is not the product of an
  7705. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  7706. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  7707. Amendment, and instead move forward
  7708. with an approach that appropriately
  7709. takes into account the need for a
  7710. reasoned review of what tools can
  7711. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  7712.  
  7713. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  7714.  
  7715. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  7716.  
  7717. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  7718. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  7719.  
  7720. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  7721.  
  7722. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  7723. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  7724. to Defund NSA ::
  7725.  
  7726. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  7727. _______________________________________
  7728.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  7729. official letter from the NSA, which was
  7730. sent to the German government to clarify
  7731. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  7732. because German media and politics were
  7733. heavily confused after it became clear
  7734. that there�s more than one program named
  7735. PRISM.
  7736.  
  7737.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  7738. data collection program is about and
  7739. then confirms that this program is
  7740. different from a more common military
  7741. web tool called "Planning tool for
  7742. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  7743. and Management" (PRISM).
  7744.  
  7745.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  7746. there�s even a third program called
  7747. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  7748. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  7749. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  7750. apparently an internal NSA information
  7751. sharing program. It was unknown until
  7752. now, probably because it�s used in the
  7753. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  7754. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  7755.  
  7756.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  7757. different PRISM programs:
  7758.  
  7759. 1. PRISM
  7760.  
  7761.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  7762. of collecting information about foreign
  7763. targets from data of nine major US
  7764. internet companies. This program started
  7765. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  7766. in June 2013.
  7767.  
  7768. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  7769. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  7770.  
  7771.  This is a web tool used by US military
  7772. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  7773. to data collection platforms deployed to
  7774. military operations. This program is
  7775. not very secret and was first mentioned
  7776. in 2002.
  7777.  
  7778. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  7779. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  7780.  
  7781.  This is an internal NSA program for
  7782. real-time sharing of information,
  7783. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  7784. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  7785. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  7786.  
  7787. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  7788.  
  7789. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  7790. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  7791.  
  7792.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  7793. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  7794. surveillance activities in Germany.
  7795. It only added to the mystery. A US
  7796. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  7797. that there are actually three unrelated
  7798. Prism programs. ... ...
  7799.  
  7800.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  7801. and Maassen, officials also read a
  7802. written statement from the NSA in
  7803. response to a query from the German
  7804. government. According to the statement,
  7805. there are three separate Prism programs,
  7806. all of them unconnected to each other.
  7807. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  7808. said that one of the Prism programs was
  7809. only used internally. That program had
  7810. thus far remained secret. Another of
  7811. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  7812. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  7813. -- vaguely described in the statement
  7814. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  7815. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  7816. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  7817. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  7818.  
  7819. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  7820.  
  7821. NOBODY comments
  7822.  
  7823.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  7824. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  7825. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  7826. _______________________________________
  7827. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  7828.  
  7829. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  7830.  
  7831. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  7832.  
  7833. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  7834.  
  7835.  Description and drawings by US Army
  7836. Corps of Engineers.
  7837.  
  7838. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  7839. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  7840. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  7841. _______________________________________
  7842. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  7843.  
  7844. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  7845.  
  7846. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  7847.  
  7848. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  7849. ���������������������������������������
  7850. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  7851.  
  7852. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  7853.  
  7854. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  7855.  
  7856. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  7857.  
  7858. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  7859.  
  7860. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  7861. _______________________________________
  7862. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  7863.  
  7864.  �First, the United States would not seek
  7865. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  7866. return to the United States. The charges
  7867. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  7868. and the United States would not seek the
  7869. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  7870. charged with additional, death penalty-
  7871. eligible crimes.�
  7872.  
  7873. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  7874.  
  7875. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  7876. _______________________________________
  7877. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  7878. Peace Prize ::
  7879.  
  7880.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  7881. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  7882. agency�s data collection program, has
  7883. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  7884.  
  7885.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  7886. at great personal cost � revealed the
  7887. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  7888. the US government devotes electronic
  7889. communications worldwide,� read the
  7890. nomination. �By putting light on this
  7891. monitoring program � conducted in
  7892. contravention of national laws and
  7893. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  7894. has helped to make the world a little
  7895. bit better and safer.� ...
  7896.  
  7897.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  7898. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  7899. to being well justified in itself �
  7900. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  7901. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  7902. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  7903. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  7904. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  7905.  
  7906. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  7907. _______________________________________
  7908. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  7909. Komsomolets News ::
  7910.  
  7911. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  7912. ���������������������������������������
  7913. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  7914. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  7915.  
  7916.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  7917. his experience when he received a Foreign
  7918. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  7919. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  7920. federal government to monitor a customer
  7921. of his.
  7922.  
  7923.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  7924. contained a broad gag order, which still
  7925. prevents him from telling all the details.
  7926.  
  7927.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  7928. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  7929. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  7930. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  7931.  
  7932.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  7933. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  7934. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  7935. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  7936.  
  7937.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  7938. facility that was capturing all of the
  7939. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  7940. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  7941. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  7942. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  7943.  
  7944. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  7945. _______________________________________
  7946. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  7947.  
  7948. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  7949. _______________________________________
  7950. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  7951.  
  7952. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  7953. ���������������������������������������
  7954. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  7955. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  7956.  
  7957.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  7958. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  7959. representative rather casually indicated
  7960. that the government looks at data from
  7961. a universe of far, far more people than
  7962. previously indicated.
  7963.  
  7964.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  7965. was one of several government representatives
  7966. �including from the FBI and the office of
  7967. the Director of National Intelligence�
  7968. testifying before the House Judiciary
  7969. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  7970. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  7971. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  7972. surveillance, including a retread of the
  7973. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  7974. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7975. Act had stopped terror events.
  7976.  
  7977.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  7978. look �two or three hops� from terror
  7979. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  7980. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  7981. how surveillance was extended had been
  7982. described as two hops. This meant that
  7983. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  7984. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  7985. could also look at the calls from the
  7986. people that suspect has spoken with one
  7987. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  7988. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  7989. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  7990. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  7991.  
  7992. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  7993.  
  7994.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  7995. them or not - two hops.
  7996.  
  7997.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  7998. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  7999.  
  8000. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  8001. ���������������������������������������
  8002. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  8003.  
  8004.  It is a good thing that people are
  8005. becoming aware of the fact that they
  8006. are being monitored - it is not only
  8007. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  8008. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  8009. made to collect information and to store
  8010. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  8011. resources that PRISM used and how it
  8012. could combine these resources to multiple
  8013. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  8014.  
  8015. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  8016. _______________________________________
  8017. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  8018.  
  8019. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  8020. ���������������������������������������
  8021. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  8022. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  8023.  
  8024.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  8025. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  8026. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  8027. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  8028. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  8029. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  8030. stories about the US government�s vast
  8031. foreign and domestic spying programs
  8032. will stop. ... ...
  8033.  
  8034.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  8035. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  8036. the United States by releasing more
  8037. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  8038.  
  8039.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  8040. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  8041. since he has already said that he gave
  8042. all of his classified information --
  8043. thousands of documents -- to several
  8044. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  8045. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  8046. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  8047. half done with the stories he plans to
  8048. write based on the secret information.
  8049.  
  8050. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  8051. ���������������������������������������
  8052. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  8053.  
  8054. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  8055. _______________________________________
  8056. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  8057.  
  8058. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  8059. ���������������������������������������
  8060. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  8061.  
  8062.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  8063. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  8064. typewriters. What do they know that
  8065. we don�t?
  8066.  
  8067. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  8068. ���������������������������������������
  8069. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  8070. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  8071.  
  8072.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  8073. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  8074. has existed since at least 2002. The
  8075. following document refers to it directly.
  8076. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  8077. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  8078. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  8079. limitation of it and similar projects.
  8080.  
  8081. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  8082.  
  8083. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  8084. _______________________________________
  8085. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  8086. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  8087.  
  8088. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  8089.  
  8090. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  8091. in Latin America ::
  8092.  
  8093. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  8094. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  8095. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  8096. _______________________________________
  8097. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  8098. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  8099.  
  8100. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  8101.  
  8102. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  8103.  
  8104. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  8105. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  8106.  
  8107. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  8108. _______________________________________
  8109. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  8110.  
  8111. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  8112. _______________________________________
  8113. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  8114. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  8115.  
  8116. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  8117. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  8118. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  8119. ���������������������������������������
  8120. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  8121.  
  8122. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  8123.  
  8124. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  8125.  
  8126. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  8127. _______________________________________
  8128. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  8129. Metadata ::
  8130.  
  8131. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  8132. _______________________________________
  8133. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  8134. by US Citizens ::
  8135.  
  8136. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  8137. ���������������������������������������
  8138. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  8139.  
  8140. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  8141.  
  8142.  �This may look like a small release, but
  8143. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  8144. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  8145. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  8146. sending encrypted data to and from the
  8147. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  8148. those servers. If you crash these servers
  8149. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  8150. "broken". We are also planning to release
  8151. some of that data (which we have access
  8152. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  8153. ���������������������������������������
  8154. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  8155. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  8156.  
  8157.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  8158. Snowden�s employer.
  8159.  
  8160. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  8161.  
  8162. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  8163.  
  8164. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  8165. _______________________________________
  8166. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  8167.  
  8168. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  8169. _______________________________________
  8170. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  8171.  
  8172.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  8173. it became clear that my freedom and
  8174. safety were under threat for revealing
  8175. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  8176. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  8177. old, family, and others who I have never
  8178. met and probably never will. I trusted
  8179. them with my life and they returned that
  8180. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  8181. always be thankful.
  8182.  
  8183.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  8184. before the world that he would not permit
  8185. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  8186. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  8187. after promising not to do so, the President
  8188. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  8189. leaders of nations from which I have
  8190. requested protection to deny my asylum
  8191. petitions.
  8192.  
  8193.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  8194. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  8195. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  8196. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  8197. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  8198. come after me.
  8199.  
  8200.  For decades the United States of America
  8201. have been one of the strongest defenders
  8202. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  8203. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  8204. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  8205. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  8206. the current government of my country. The
  8207. Obama administration has now adopted the
  8208. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  8209. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  8210. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  8211. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  8212. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  8213. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  8214. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  8215. asylum.
  8216.  
  8217.  In the end the Obama administration is
  8218. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  8219. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  8220. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  8221. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  8222. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  8223. demanding the constitutional government
  8224. it was promised � and it should be.
  8225.  
  8226.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  8227. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  8228. many.�
  8229.  
  8230. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  8231. ���������������������������������������
  8232. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  8233.  
  8234. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  8235.  
  8236. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  8237.  
  8238. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  8239. _______________________________________
  8240. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  8241.  
  8242. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  8243. ���������������������������������������
  8244. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  8245.  
  8246. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8247. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  8248. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  8249. _______________________________________
  8250. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  8251.  
  8252. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  8253. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  8254. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  8255. _______________________________________
  8256. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  8257.  
  8258. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  8259.  
  8260.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  8261. over private data to America.
  8262.  
  8263.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  8264. according to new claims by former US defence
  8265. analyst.
  8266.  
  8267.  At least six European Union countries in
  8268. addition to Britain have been colluding
  8269. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  8270. personal communications data, according
  8271. to a former contractor to America�s
  8272. National Security Agency, who said the
  8273. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  8274.  
  8275.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  8276. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  8277. and over the next 12 years held several
  8278. sensitive positions within the agency,
  8279. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  8280. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  8281. deals with the US.
  8282.  
  8283.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  8284. second and third party status� under
  8285. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  8286. that compels them to hand over data,
  8287. including mobile phone and internet
  8288. information to the NSA if requested.
  8289.  
  8290.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  8291. confirmed by declassified documents,
  8292. nations are categorised by the US according
  8293. to their trust level. The US is first party
  8294. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  8295. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  8296. Germany and France have third party
  8297. relationships.
  8298.  
  8299.  In an interview published last night
  8300. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  8301. who has been attacked for holding
  8302. controversial views on espionage issues,
  8303. said he had decided to speak out after
  8304. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  8305. told by EU politicians regarding the
  8306. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  8307.  
  8308.  He said that under the agreements,
  8309. which were drawn up after the second
  8310. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  8311. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  8312. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  8313. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  8314.  
  8315.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  8316. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  8317. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  8318. about the spying operations while staying
  8319. silent about their own arrangements
  8320. with the US, and was particularly
  8321. concerned that senior German politicians
  8322. had accused the UK of spying when their
  8323. country had a similar third-party deal
  8324. with the NSA.
  8325.  
  8326.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  8327. by other European countries to the NSA is
  8328. not on the same scale as that provided by
  8329. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  8330. embarrassing.
  8331.  
  8332.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  8333. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  8334. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  8335. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  8336. Madsen said.
  8337.  
  8338.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  8339. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  8340. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  8341. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  8342. confirmed that the entire system for
  8343. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  8344. because the EU was unable to intervene
  8345. in intelligence matters, which remained
  8346. the exclusive concern of national
  8347. governments.
  8348.  
  8349.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  8350. these contradictions and no one is really
  8351. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  8352. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  8353. democracy.�
  8354.  
  8355.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  8356. for European governments to come clean
  8357. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  8358. �There needs to be transparency as to
  8359. whether or not it is legal for the US
  8360. or any other security service to
  8361. interrogate private material,� said
  8362. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  8363. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  8364. is that none of these arrangements has
  8365. been debated in any democratic arena.
  8366. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  8367. things have to be done in secret, but you
  8368. don�t break the law in secret.�
  8369.  
  8370.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  8371. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  8372. fibre-optic cable network running between
  8373. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  8374. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  8375. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  8376. including phone calls, emails and records
  8377. of users� access to websites.
  8378.  
  8379.  He said the public needed to be made
  8380. aware of the full scale of the communication
  8381. -sharing arrangements between European
  8382. countries and the US, which predate the
  8383. internet and became of strategic importance
  8384. during the cold war.
  8385.  
  8386.  The covert relationship between the
  8387. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  8388. report by the European parliament, but
  8389. their explicit connection with the NSA
  8390. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  8391. to speak out.
  8392.  
  8393.  The European parliament�s report followed
  8394. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  8395. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  8396. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  8397. established the framework for European
  8398. member states to collaborate with the US.
  8399.  
  8400.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  8401. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  8402. that governments have chosen to keep the
  8403. public in the dark about it. The days
  8404. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  8405. of silence are over.�
  8406.  
  8407.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  8408. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  8409. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  8410. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  8411. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  8412. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  8413. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  8414. ���������������������������������������
  8415. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  8416. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  8417.  
  8418.  A former contractor to the US National
  8419. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  8420. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  8421. intelligence arrangements between the
  8422. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  8423. murky and far reaching� than the public
  8424. has been led to believe. ...
  8425.  
  8426.  He was particularly concerned about the
  8427. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  8428. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  8429. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  8430. while staying silent about their own role
  8431. in global interception arrangements with
  8432. the United States. ...
  8433.  
  8434.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  8435. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  8436.  
  8437.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  8438. many who say he had no authority or right
  8439. to provide the public with details of
  8440. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  8441. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  8442. have to provide information on NSA
  8443. surveillance at five meetings of the
  8444. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  8445. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  8446. Spain and Switzerland?�
  8447.  
  8448.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  8449. American people from a constantly changing
  8450. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  8451. is providing information to elites on
  8452. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  8453. student, religious and progressive
  8454. organizations.�
  8455.  
  8456.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  8457. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  8458. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  8459.  
  8460. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  8461. _______________________________________
  8462. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  8463.  
  8464. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  8465. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  8466. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  8467. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  8468. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  8469. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  8470. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  8471.  
  8472. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  8473.  
  8474. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  8475. ���������������������������������������
  8476. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  8477.  
  8478. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  8479. _______________________________________
  8480. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  8481.  
  8482. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  8483. _______________________________________
  8484. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  8485.  
  8486. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  8487. _______________________________________
  8488. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  8489.  
  8490. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  8491. _______________________________________
  8492. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  8493.  
  8494. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  8495. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  8496. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  8497.  
  8498. � Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  8499.  
  8500. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  8501. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8502. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  8503. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  8504. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  8505. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  8506. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  8507. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  8508. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  8509. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  8510. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  8511. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  8512. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  8513. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  8514. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  8515. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  8516. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  8517. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  8518. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  8519. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  8520. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  8521. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  8522. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  8523. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  8524. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  8525. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  8526. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  8527. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  8528. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  8529. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  8530. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  8531. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  8532. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  8533. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  8534. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  8535. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  8536. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  8537. _______________________________________
  8538. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  8539. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  8540.  
  8541. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  8542. _______________________________________
  8543. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  8544.  
  8545. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  8546.  
  8547. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  8548.  
  8549. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  8550.  
  8551. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  8552. _______________________________________
  8553. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  8554.  
  8555. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  8556.  
  8557. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  8558. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  8559. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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