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Posted by Eyeballing the N on September Tue 16th 3:59 PM - Never Expires
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  1. Eyeballing the NSA 037
  2.  
  3. VIEW FULL @ http://pastebin.furver.se/isp282xsr/
  4.    
  5.    
  6.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  7. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  8. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  9.  
  10.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  11.  
  12.  
  13. � New Zealand�s Prime Minister Isn�t Telling the Truth About
  14. Mass Surveillance ::
  15.  
  16. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/snowden-new-zealand-surveillance/
  17.  
  18. � New Zealand Launched Mass Surveillance Project While Publicly
  19. Denying It ::
  20.  
  21. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/15/new-zealand-gcsb-speargun-mass-surveillance/
  22.  
  23. � Snowden and Greenwald Reveal Prime Minister John Key Lied About
  24. Kiwi Mass Surveillance, Key Calls Greenwald �A Loser� ::
  25.  
  26. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140915/06175828518/snowden-greenwald-reveal-pm-john-key-lied-about-kiwi-mass-surveillance-key-hits-back-calling-greenwald-loser.shtml
  27.  
  28. � New Zealand Prime Minister Releases GCSB Spy Documents ::
  29.  
  30. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gcsb-nz-pm-nz-herald-14-0916.zip
  31. _______________________________________
  32. � NSA-GCHQ Breached Deutsche Telekom and Other German Firms ::
  33.  
  34.  According to top-secret documents from the NSA and the British
  35. agency GCHQ, the intelligence agencies are seeking to map the entire
  36. Internet, including end-user devices. In pursuing that goal, they
  37. have broken into networks belonging to Deutsche Telekom.
  38.  
  39. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-indicate-nsa-has-breached-deutsche-telekom-a-991503.html
  40.  
  41. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/14/nsa-stellar/
  42.  
  43. � GCHQ Satellite Teleport Knowledge ::
  44.  
  45. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/gchq-stellar-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  46.  
  47. � NSA Treasure Map New Release ::
  48.  
  49. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-new-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  50.  
  51. � NSA Treasure Map Slides ::
  52.  
  53. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-treasure-map-der-spiegel-14-0914.pdf
  54.  
  55. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1301057/tm-m-402.pdf
  56. _______________________________________
  57. � NSA Economic Espionage Benefits American Corporations ::
  58.  
  59. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/09/05/us-governments-plans-use-economic-espionage-benefit-american-corporations/
  60.  
  61. � Masterspy Quadrennial Report 2009 (Spy For US Corporations) ::
  62.  
  63. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-qicr-2009-the-intercept-14-0905.pdf
  64.  
  65. ? UPDATE: Obama Rubber Stamps Economic Espionage, Mass Spying ::
  66.  
  67. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/despite-obama-s-pledge-to-curb-it-nsa-mass-surveillance-wins-rubber-stamp-20140913
  68. _______________________________________
  69. � Bush-era Justification For Warrantless Wiretapping ::
  70.  
  71. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/legal-memos-released-on-bush-era-justification-for-warrantless-wiretapping/2014/09/05/91b86c52-356d-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html
  72. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/World/2014/Sep-06/269796-bush-era-memos-president-can-wiretap-americans-at-all-times.ashx
  73. http://mic.com/articles/98116/just-released-bush-administration-memos-explain-deeply-disturbing-government-spying
  74.  
  75. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (REDACTED) ::
  76.  
  77. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-wapo-14-0906.pdf
  78.  
  79. � NSA STELLAR WIND Assessed by DoJ 2004 (UNREDACTED) ::
  80.  
  81. Above DOJ assessment released by WaPo compared to ACLU document.
  82.  
  83. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-olc-stellar-wind-annotated.pdf
  84.  
  85. � NSA�s STELLAR WIND PROGRAM (DECLASSIFIED 2013) ::
  86.  
  87. RAGTIME was the codename for Stellar Wind.
  88.  
  89. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  90.  
  91. � NSA STELLARWIND Classification Marking ::
  92.  
  93. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/about-stellarwind-and-another.html
  94. _______________________________________
  95. � DNI Releases 47 FISC Yahoo Documents ::
  96.  
  97. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/dni-fisc-yahoo-14-0911.zip
  98. _______________________________________
  99. KILLCEN ; Eyeballing Snowden�s Info
  100.  
  101.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides and
  102. documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks so far,
  103. up to September 5th of 2014. I�m still collecting any
  104. information that comes out and will provide an updated
  105. archive twice per year.
  106.  
  107.  Due to the enormous size of this current archive, the
  108. archive has been split concurrent to the names of each
  109. file and directory in alphabetical order to facilitate
  110. the size limit while uploading to the file hosts below.
  111.  
  112.  After decompression, the first folder is titled �Eyeballing_
  113. Snowden_Info_Folder_01� and the second is titled �Eyeballing_
  114. Snowden_Info_Folder_02� , both holding a total of 1,668 files
  115. (1.37GB) after being decompressed and consolidated.
  116.  
  117.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without any
  118. WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is safe from
  119. being modified, exploited or stolen.
  120.  
  121. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  122. (589 files | ZIP | 686MB)
  123.  
  124. http://fileb.ag/ojvlj5rqihw2
  125. http://bitshare.com/files/pigqc2bo/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip.html
  126. http://fpsbay.com/download/64709X14099602822363X347361/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_01.zip
  127.  
  128. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  129. (1,079 files | ZIP | 476MB)
  130.  
  131. http://fileb.ag/xqtrujp8jcey
  132. http://bitshare.com/files/ztfcjdwg/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip.html
  133. http://fpsbay.com/download/64711X14099654782364X347381/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info_Folder_02.zip
  134. ���������������������������������������
  135. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Redacted) ::
  136.  
  137. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  138.  
  139. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  140.  
  141. � NSA ; Ask Zelda (Full, DECLASSIFIED) ::
  142.  
  143. http://cryptome.org/2014/09/nsa-ask-zelda-14-0828.pdf
  144. _______________________________________
  145. � NSA�s Foreign Partnerships ::
  146.  
  147. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/09/nsas-foreign-partnerships.html
  148. _______________________________________
  149. � Two-Faced Friendship: Turkey Is Partner and Target for NSA ::
  150.  
  151. http://www.spiegel.de/international/documents-show-nsa-and-gchq-spied-on-partner-turkey-a-989011.html
  152.  
  153. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/31/nsaturkeyspiegel/
  154.  
  155. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Original Links) ::
  156.  
  157. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34650.pdf
  158. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34651.pdf
  159. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34652.pdf
  160. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34653.pdf
  161. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34654.pdf
  162. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34655.pdf
  163. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34656.pdf
  164. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34657.pdf
  165. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34658.pdf
  166. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34659.pdf
  167. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34660.pdf
  168. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34661.pdf
  169. http://www.spiegel.de/media/media-34662.pdf
  170.  
  171. � NSA-GCHQ Eyeball Turkey (Mirrored) ::
  172.  
  173. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-spy-turkey-der-spiegel-14-0831.pdf
  174. _______________________________________
  175. � How the NSA Built Its Own Secret Google ::
  176.  
  177. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/25/icreach-nsa-cia-secret-google-crisscross-proton
  178.  
  179. � NSA ICREACH Slides ::
  180.  
  181. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-icreach.pdf
  182. _______________________________________
  183. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Program for Internet Colonization ::
  184.  
  185. http://www.heise.de/ct/artikel/NSA-GCHQ-The-HACIENDA-Program-for-Internet-Colonization-2292681.html
  186.  
  187. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (ZIP) ::
  188.  
  189. http://www.xup.to/dl,62909734/HACIENDA_Slides.zip/
  190.  
  191. � NSA-GCHQ-CSEC HACIENDA Slides (PDF) ::
  192.  
  193. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-gchq-csec-hacienda-heise-14-0816.pdf
  194. _______________________________________
  195. � Now US Corporations Admit They Profit From Spying ::
  196.  
  197. Beat them at their own game - lie.
  198.  
  199. http://www.forbes.com/sites/quickerbettertech/2014/08/18/the-other-sharing-economy-thats-about-to-change-the-world/
  200.  
  201. � Money And Power - The Real Reason For The NSA Spying On Everyone ::
  202.  
  203. Put out false information. Flood them with false data.
  204.  
  205. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140819/17104028259/money-power-real-reason-nsa-spying-everyone.shtml
  206. _______________________________________
  207. � Newly Declassified Documents Regarding the �Now-Discontinued� (?)
  208. NSA Bulk Electronic Communications Metadata Pursuant to Section 402
  209. of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ::
  210.  
  211. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  212. _______________________________________
  213. � GCHQ Covert Mobile Phone Security Tactics ::
  214.  
  215. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gchq-covert-mobiles-the-intercept-14-0812.pdf
  216.  
  217. � Compare GCHQ Security Tactics to Jihadist Tactics ::
  218.  
  219. https://prod01-cdn03.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/sites/1/2014/08/GCHQ-Jihadist-handbook.gif
  220. _______________________________________
  221. � Barack Obama�s Secret �Terrorist-Tracking� System ::
  222.  
  223.  Nearly half of the people on the US government�s widely shared
  224. database of terrorist suspects are not connected to any known
  225. terrorist group, according to classified government documents
  226. obtained by The Intercept.
  227.  
  228. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/08/05/watch-commander/
  229.  
  230. � NCTC Directorate of Terrorist Identities ::
  231.  
  232. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nctc-dti-the-intercept.pdf
  233.  
  234. � Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  235.  
  236.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  237. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  238. secret process that requires neither �concrete facts� nor
  239. �irrefutable evidence� to designate an American or foreigner
  240. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  241. by The Intercept.
  242.  
  243. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  244. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  245. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  246. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  247. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  248.  
  249. NOBODY notes
  250.  
  251.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  252. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  253. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  254. only these �dirty tricks� are now fully digitalized.
  255.  
  256. � Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  257.  
  258.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  259. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  260. and his approach to dissent. �Before I left the State
  261. Department, I filed a complaint with the department�s
  262. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  263. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  264. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  265. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,�
  266. Tye explained. �I have also brought my complaint to the
  267. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  268. inspector general of the NSA.�
  269.  
  270.  These steps � which many say Snowden should�ve taken �
  271. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  272. wouldn�t be garnering attention at all if not for
  273. Snowden�s leaks.
  274.  
  275. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  276.  
  277. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  278. _______________________________________
  279. � Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  280. Israeli Attack ::
  281.  
  282.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  283. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  284. crucial role in Israel�s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  285. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  286. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  287. enable Israel�s military assaults � such as the one on Gaza.
  288.  
  289. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  290.  
  291. � ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  292.  
  293. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  294.  
  295. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  296.  
  297. � US Empire Pays Israel $500,000 in 2004 ::
  298.  
  299. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-500k-2004.pdf
  300.  
  301. � (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  302.  
  303. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  304. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/08/04/374016/us-directly-enables-israeli-attacks-on-gaza/
  305. http://rt.com/news/177716-us-israel-funding-aggression/
  306.  
  307. � (RELATED) Gaza Natural Gas - Why Israel Kills for It ::
  308.  
  309. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/gaza-natural-gas.zip
  310. _______________________________________
  311. � USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  312.  
  313. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  314.  
  315. � NSA�s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia�s Brutal State Police ::
  316.  
  317.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  318. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  319. one of the world�s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  320. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  321. Snowden details the agency�s plans �to provide direct analytic and
  322. technical support� to the Saudis on �internal security� matters.
  323.  
  324.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior�referred to in the document as MOI
  325. � has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  326. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  327. that �Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  328. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,� specifically
  329. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly �poured an
  330. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat� of one human rights
  331. activist. The report also notes the MOI�s use of invasive surveillance
  332. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  333.  
  334.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  335. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  336. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  337. Administration�s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  338. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes �a
  339. period of rejuvenation� for the NSA�s relationship with the Saudi
  340. Ministry of Defense.
  341.  
  342.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  343. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  344. where the US �has [an] interest in regime continuity.�
  345.  
  346. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  347. _______________________________________
  348. � Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  349.  
  350. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  351. _______________________________________
  352. � NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  353.  
  354. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  355.  
  356. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  357. _______________________________________
  358. � Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  359.  
  360.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  361. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  362. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  363.  
  364. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  365.  
  366. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  367. _______________________________________
  368. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  369.  
  370.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  371. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  372. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  373. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  374. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  375. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  376. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  377.  
  378. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  379.  
  380. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  381.  
  382. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  383. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  384. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  385.  
  386. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  387.  
  388. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  389.  
  390. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  391.  
  392.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  393. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  394.  
  395. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  396.  
  397. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  398.  
  399. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  400.  
  401. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  402.  
  403.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  404. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  405. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  406. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  407.  
  408. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  409.  
  410. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  411.  
  412. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  413.  
  414. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  415.  
  416. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  417.  
  418. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  419.  
  420. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  421.  
  422. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  423.  
  424. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  425.  
  426. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  427.  
  428. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  429.  
  430. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  431.  
  432. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  433.  
  434. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  435. _______________________________________
  436. � NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  437.  
  438. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  439.  
  440. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  441. _______________________________________
  442. � The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  443. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  444.  
  445.  The contents of the surveillance files � almost half of which
  446. contained information from US citizens or residents � �tell
  447. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  448. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  449. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.�
  450.  
  451. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  452. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  453. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  454.  
  455. � Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  456. Been Spying On ::
  457.  
  458.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  459. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans�including
  460. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  461. academics, and lawyers�under secretive procedures intended
  462. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  463.  
  464.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  465. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  466. own government includes:
  467.  
  468.  � Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  469. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  470. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  471. Security under President George W. Bush;
  472.  
  473.  � Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  474. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  475.  
  476.  � Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  477. international relations at Rutgers University;
  478.  
  479.  � Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  480. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  481. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  482.  
  483.  � Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  484. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  485. rights organization in the country.
  486.  
  487. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  488. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  489. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  490.  
  491. � NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  492.  
  493. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  494.  
  495. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  496.  
  497. � Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  498.  
  499. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  500.  
  501. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  502.  
  503. ? NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  504.                               ���������
  505.  �The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  506. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  507. crime to law enforcement authorities.�
  508.  
  509. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  510.  
  511. ? US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  512.  
  513. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  514.  
  515. NOBODY responds
  516.  
  517.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  518. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  519. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  520.  
  521. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  522.  
  523.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  524. back in 2004 up till today.
  525.  
  526. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  527.  
  528.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  529. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  530.  
  531. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  532.  
  533.  Just like those in the �Department of Justice� they
  534. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  535. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  536. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  537.  
  538. � Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  539.  
  540. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  541.  
  542.  �So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  543. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  544. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  545. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  546.  
  547.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  548. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  549. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  550. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  551. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  552. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  553. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  554. first place.  Realistically, it�s not one or the other, it�s
  555. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  556. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  557. On one hand: it�s evidence, on the other, it�s private information
  558. on many thousands of people.
  559.  
  560.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  561. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  562. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  563. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  564. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  565. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  566. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  567. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  568. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  569. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  570. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  571. happen now. The US government�s dealings with brutal regimes
  572. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  573. their own people.
  574.  
  575.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  576. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  577. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  578. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  579. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  580. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  581. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  582. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  583. the Post�s story as a dud, it�s the first page of the next
  584. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  585. unpredictable consequences.�
  586.  
  587. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  588. _______________________________________
  589. � Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  590.  
  591. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  592. ���������������������������������������
  593. � Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  594. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  595.  
  596.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  597. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  598. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  599. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  600. �amplify� sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  601. content judged to be �extremist.� The capabilities, detailed
  602. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  603. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  604. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  605. together in a call.
  606.  
  607.  The tools were created by GCHQ�s Joint Threat Research
  608. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  609. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  610. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  611. documents have detailed JTRIG�s use of �fake victim blog
  612. posts,� �false flag operations,� �honey traps� and
  613. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  614. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  615. Facebook users.
  616.  
  617. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  618.  
  619. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  620.  
  621. � GCHQ�s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  622.  
  623. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  624. ---------------------------------------
  625. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  626.  
  627. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  628.  
  629.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  630. program run by the US Agency for International
  631. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  632. communications network� run through �secret shell
  633. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  634. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  635. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  636. �American contractors were gathering their private
  637. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  638. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  639. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  640. government. According to top-secret documents
  641. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  642. operation is frequently discussed at western
  643. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  644. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  645. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  646.  
  647. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  648.  
  649. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  650.  
  651. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  652.  
  653.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  654. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  655. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  656. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  657. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  658. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  659. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  660. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  661. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  662. Space Intelligence Center.�
  663.  
  664.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  665. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  666. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  667. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  668. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  669. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  670. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  671. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  672.  
  673.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  674. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  675. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  676. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  677. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  678. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  679. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  680. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  681. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  682.  
  683. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  684.  
  685. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  686. ---------------------------------------
  687. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  688.  
  689. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  690.  
  691. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  692.  
  693. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  694.  
  695. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  696.  
  697.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  698. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  699. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  700. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  701. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  702. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  703. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  704. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  705. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  706. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  707. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  708.  
  709.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  710. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  711. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  712. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  713. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  714. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  715.  
  716. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  717. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  718. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  719. ---------------------------------------
  720. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  721.  
  722. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  723.  
  724. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  725.  
  726. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  727.  
  728. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  729.  
  730. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  731.  
  732. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  733.  
  734. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  735.  
  736. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  737.  
  738. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  739. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  740. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  741.  
  742. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  743. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  744.  
  745. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  746. ---------------------------------------
  747. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  748.  
  749. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  750. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  751. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  752. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  753.  
  754. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  755.  
  756. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  757.  
  758. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  759.  
  760. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  761.  
  762. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  763.  
  764. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  765. ---------------------------------------
  766. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  767.  
  768. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  769. _______________________________________
  770. � Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  771.  
  772.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  773. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  774. Binney � that�s a �totalitarian mentality.�
  775.  
  776. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  777. _______________________________________
  778. � NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  779.  
  780. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  781.  
  782.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  783. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  784. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  785. Aussp�hprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  786.  
  787.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  788. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  789. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  790. investigate.
  791.  
  792.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  793. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  794. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  795. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  796. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  797. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  798.  
  799. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  800.  
  801. MP4 Video Format � http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  802.  
  803. � XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  804.  
  805. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  806.  
  807. � NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  808.  
  809. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  810. ---------------------------------------
  811. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  812.  
  813. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  814.  
  815. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  816.  
  817.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  818. using Tor.�
  819.  
  820. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  821.  
  822. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  823.  
  824. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  825.  
  826.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t mean that your
  827. browser isn�t storing cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman,
  828. a colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes in browser
  829. vulnerabilities.
  830.  
  831.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  832. aware of Tor�s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  833. wide surveillance.
  834.  
  835.  �The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  836. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  837. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  838. other Web users,� he wrote.
  839.  
  840.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  841. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  842. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,�
  843. he said.
  844.  
  845. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  846.  
  847. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  848. Traffic From Machines ::
  849.  
  850.  �Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  851. out large-scale �staining� as a means to identify individual
  852. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  853.  
  854.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  855. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  856. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  857. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  858. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  859. session.�
  860.  
  861. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  862.  
  863. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  864.  
  865. � Packet Staining ::
  866.  
  867. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  868. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  869. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  870. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  871.  
  872. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  873.  
  874. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  875. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  876. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  877. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  878.  
  879. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  880.  
  881.  �We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  882. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  883. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  884. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  885. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  886. which allows the user finer control.� ... ...
  887.  
  888.  �This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  889. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  890. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  891. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  892. server can be used to hide one�s location, but a single-hop
  893. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  894. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  895. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  896. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  897. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  898. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  899. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  900. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  901. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  902. order to trace requests back to the originating client.�
  903.  
  904. ... ...
  905.  
  906.  �In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  907. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  908. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  909. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  910. of Tor.�
  911.  
  912. ... ...
  913.  
  914.  �We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  915. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  916. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  917. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  918. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  919. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  920. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  921. be tried.�
  922.  
  923. ... ...
  924.  
  925.  �It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  926. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  927. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  928. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  929. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  930. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  931. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  932. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  933. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  934. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  935. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  936. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  937. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  938. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  939. who inspecting the directories.�
  940.  
  941. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  942. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  943. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  944.  
  945. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  946.  
  947. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  948.  
  949. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  950.  
  951. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  952.  
  953. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  954.  
  955.  �This document doesn�t give much insight into capabilities
  956. the IC has developed against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  957. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  958. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  959. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  960. investment. I�d expect there are other programs with more
  961. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  962.  
  963. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  964. _______________________________________
  965. � UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  966.  
  967. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  968.  
  969. � UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  970. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  971.  
  972.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  973. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany�s
  974. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  975. as a double agent for the US.
  976.  
  977.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  978. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  979. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country�s
  980. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  981. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  982.  
  983.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  984. week�s arrest of a 31-year-old BND �double agent� who spent
  985. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  986. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  987. of �10,000 (�7,940) per document. ...
  988.  
  989.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin�s
  990. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  991. in �co-operation�. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  992. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  993. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  994.  
  995.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  996. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin�s Russian
  997. embassy. The Germans had considered it �impossible� that one
  998. of their own intelligence men could be working as a �double agent�
  999. for the Americans.
  1000.  
  1001. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  1002. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  1003. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  1004. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  1005.  
  1006. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  1007.  
  1008. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  1009.  
  1010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  1011.  
  1012. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  1013.  
  1014. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  1015.  
  1016. � Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  1017.  
  1018. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  1019.  
  1020. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  1021.  
  1022. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  1023.  
  1024. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  1025.  
  1026. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  1027.  
  1028. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  1029.  
  1030. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  1031.  
  1032. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  1033.  
  1034. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  1035.  
  1036. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  1037.  
  1038. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  1039.  
  1040. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  1041.  
  1042.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  1043. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  1044. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  1045. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  1046. where she grew up.
  1047.  
  1048. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1049. _______________________________________
  1050. � NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  1051.  
  1052. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  1053. _______________________________________
  1054. � Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  1055.  
  1056. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  1057. _______________________________________
  1058. � Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  1059.  
  1060. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  1061. _______________________________________
  1062. � NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  1063.  
  1064. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  1065. _______________________________________
  1066. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  1067.  
  1068. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  1069. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  1070. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  1071. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  1072.  
  1073. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  1074.  
  1075. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  1076.  
  1077. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  1078.  
  1079. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  1080.  
  1081. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1082.  
  1083. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  1084.  
  1085. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  1086.  
  1087. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  1088.  
  1089. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  1090.  
  1091. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  1092. _______________________________________
  1093.  Keith Alexander�s talking points for strategic meeting
  1094. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  1095. Service (DDIS).
  1096.  
  1097. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  1098. _______________________________________
  1099. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1100.  
  1101. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  1102.  
  1103. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  1104.  
  1105. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  1106. _______________________________________
  1107. � Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  1108.  
  1109. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  1110. _______________________________________
  1111. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  1112. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  1113.  
  1114. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  1115. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  1116. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  1117.  
  1118.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  1119. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  1120. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  1121. user in the UK.
  1122.  
  1123. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  1124.  
  1125. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  1126. _______________________________________
  1127. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  1128. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  1129.  
  1130. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  1131. ---------------------------------------
  1132. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1133.  
  1134. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1135. _______________________________________
  1136. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  1137.  
  1138. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  1139. _______________________________________
  1140. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  1141.  
  1142. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  1143.  
  1144. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  1145. _______________________________________
  1146. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  1147. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  1148.  
  1149. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  1150. _______________________________________
  1151. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  1152.  
  1153. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  1154.  
  1155. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  1156.  
  1157. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  1158. _______________________________________
  1159. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  1160. to Tap Phones ::
  1161.  
  1162. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  1163. _______________________________________
  1164. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  1165.  
  1166. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  1167. _______________________________________
  1168. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  1169. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  1170. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  1171.  
  1172.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  1173. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  1174. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  1175. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  1176. they were spying on � was hidden?
  1177.  
  1178.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  1179. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  1180. everybody what they�re doing?
  1181.  
  1182.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  1183. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  1184. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  1185. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  1186. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  1187. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  1188. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  1189. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  1190. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  1191.  
  1192.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  1193. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  1194. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  1195. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  1196. was a specialist in, by the way.
  1197.  
  1198.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  1199. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  1200. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  1201. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  1202. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  1203. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  1204.  
  1205.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  1206. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  1207. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  1208. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  1209. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  1210. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  1211. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  1212. for the JWICS.
  1213.  
  1214.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  1215. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  1216. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  1217. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  1218. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  1219. that [clearance].
  1220.  
  1221.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  1222. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  1223. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  1224. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  1225.  
  1226.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  1227. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  1228. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  1229. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  1230. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  1231. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  1232. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1233. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1234.  
  1235.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  1236. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  1237. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  1238.  
  1239.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1240. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  1241. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  1242. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  1243. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  1244.  
  1245.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  1246. to placate the American people.
  1247.  
  1248.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  1249. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  1250. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  1251.  
  1252.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  1253. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  1254. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  1255. investigation.�
  1256.  
  1257. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  1258. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  1259. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  1260. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  1261. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  1262. _______________________________________
  1263. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  1264.  
  1265. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  1266.  
  1267. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  1268.  
  1269. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  1270.  
  1271. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  1272.  
  1273. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  1274.  
  1275. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  1276.  
  1277. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  1278.  
  1279. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  1280.  
  1281. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  1282.  
  1283. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  1284.  
  1285. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  1286.  
  1287. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  1288.  
  1289. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  1290. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  1291.  
  1292. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  1293.  
  1294. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  1295. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  1296.  
  1297. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  1298.  
  1299. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  1300. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  1301.  
  1302. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  1303. _______________________________________
  1304. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  1305.  
  1306.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  1307. agencies are now also using the same facial
  1308. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  1309. identification systems are being developed as well.
  1310. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  1311.  
  1312. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  1313.  
  1314. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  1315.  
  1316. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  1317.  
  1318. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  1319. _______________________________________
  1320. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  1321.  
  1322. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  1323. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  1324. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  1325. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  1326. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  1327. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  1328. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  1329. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  1330. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  1331. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  1332.  
  1333. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  1334.  
  1335. And a few more to think about,
  1336.  
  1337. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  1338. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  1339. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  1340. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  1341. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  1342. _______________________________________
  1343. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1344.  
  1345.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1346. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1347. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  1348. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1349. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  1350. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  1351.  
  1352.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  1353. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1354. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  1355. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  1356. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  1357. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1358. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1359. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1360. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  1361. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  1362. attention.��
  1363.  
  1364.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  1365. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1366. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  1367. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1368. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1369.  
  1370. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1371.  
  1372. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1373. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1374.  
  1375. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1376. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1377. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1378. ---------------------------------------
  1379. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1380.  
  1381. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1382.  
  1383. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1384. _______________________________________
  1385. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  1386.  
  1387. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  1388.  
  1389. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  1390.  
  1391. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  1392. _______________________________________
  1393. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  1394. Securely and Anonymously ::
  1395.  
  1396.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  1397. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  1398. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  1399. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  1400. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  1401. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  1402. internet somewhere or using a third party
  1403. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  1404. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  1405. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  1406. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  1407. download the file from you.
  1408.  
  1409. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  1410. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  1411.  
  1412. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  1413.  
  1414. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  1415.  
  1416. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  1417.  
  1418. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  1419. _______________________________________
  1420. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  1421. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  1422.  
  1423. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  1424.  
  1425. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  1426.  
  1427. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  1428. _______________________________________
  1429. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  1430.  
  1431. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  1432.  
  1433. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  1434.  
  1435. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  1436.  
  1437. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  1438.  
  1439. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  1440.  
  1441. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  1442.  
  1443. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  1444.  
  1445. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  1446. Online Next Week ::
  1447.  
  1448. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  1449. ---------------------------------------
  1450. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  1451.  
  1452. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  1453.  
  1454. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  1455.  
  1456. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  1457. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  1458.  
  1459. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  1460. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  1461.  
  1462. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  1463.  
  1464. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  1465. Infiltration by NSA ::
  1466.  
  1467. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  1468.  
  1469. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  1470.  
  1471. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  1472.  
  1473.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  1474. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  1475. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  1476. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  1477. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  1478. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  1479. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  1480. they�re delivered.
  1481.  
  1482. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  1483.  
  1484. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  1485.  
  1486. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  1487.  
  1488. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  1489.  
  1490. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  1491.  
  1492. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  1493. ______________________________________
  1494. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  1495. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  1496.  
  1497. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  1498. _______________________________________
  1499. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  1500. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  1501.  
  1502. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  1503. _______________________________________
  1504. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  1505.  
  1506. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  1507. _______________________________________
  1508. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1509.  
  1510. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1511.  
  1512. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  1513.  
  1514. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  1515. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  1516.  
  1517.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  1518. national security and other government officials will no
  1519. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  1520. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  1521.  
  1522. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  1523. _______________________________________
  1524. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  1525.  
  1526. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  1527.  
  1528. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  1529. ______________________________________
  1530. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  1531.  
  1532. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  1533. ______________________________________
  1534. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  1535. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  1536.  
  1537. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  1538. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  1539.  
  1540. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  1541.  
  1542. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  1543. ______________________________________
  1544. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  1545.  
  1546. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  1547.  
  1548. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  1549.  
  1550. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  1551.  
  1552. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  1553.  
  1554.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  1555. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  1556. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  1557. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  1558. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  1559. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  1560. industry which generates something in the
  1561. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  1562.  
  1563.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  1564.  
  1565. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  1566. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  1567. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  1568. _______________________________________
  1569. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  1570.  
  1571. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  1572. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  1573.  
  1574.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  1575. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  1576. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  1577. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  1578. activities and future plans.� � �
  1579.  
  1580.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  1581. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  1582. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  1583.  
  1584. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  1585.  
  1586. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  1587.  
  1588. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  1589.  
  1590. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  1591.  
  1592. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  1593.  
  1594. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  1595. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  1596.  
  1597.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  1598. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  1599. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  1600. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  1601. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  1602. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  1603. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  1604. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  1605.  
  1606.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  1607. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  1608. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  1609. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  1610. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  1611. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  1612. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  1613.  
  1614. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  1615. _______________________________________
  1616. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  1617.  
  1618. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  1619. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  1620. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  1621.  
  1622.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  1623. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  1624. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  1625. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  1626. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  1627. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  1628. Edward Snowden.
  1629.  
  1630.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  1631. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  1632. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  1633. for surveillance.
  1634.  
  1635.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  1636. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  1637. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  1638. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  1639. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  1640.  
  1641.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  1642. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  1643. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  1644. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  1645.  
  1646.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  1647. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  1648. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  1649. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  1650. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  1651. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  1652. and long-term storage.
  1653.  
  1654. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  1655.  
  1656. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  1657.  
  1658.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  1659. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  1660. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  1661. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  1662. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  1663. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  1664. but they won�t say.
  1665.  
  1666. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  1667.  
  1668. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  1669.  
  1670. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  1671.  
  1672. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  1673. _______________________________________
  1674. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  1675.  
  1676.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  1677. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  1678. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  1679. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  1680. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  1681. already been published previously. The second was
  1682. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  1683.  
  1684. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  1685.  
  1686. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  1687.  
  1688.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  1689. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  1690. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  1691. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  1692. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  1693. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  1694. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  1695. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  1696. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  1697.  
  1698.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  1699. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  1700.  
  1701.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  1702. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  1703. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  1704. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  1705. benefit� the document says.
  1706.  
  1707.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  1708. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  1709. company is working towards creating a so-called
  1710. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  1711. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  1712. per second.
  1713.  
  1714. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  1715. _______________________________________
  1716. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  1717.  
  1718. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  1719. _______________________________________
  1720. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  1721.  
  1722. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  1723. _______________________________________
  1724. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  1725.  
  1726. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  1727. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  1728. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  1729. _______________________________________
  1730. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  1731.  
  1732.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  1733. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  1734. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  1735. top human rights body.
  1736.  
  1737.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  1738. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  1739. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  1740. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  1741. Human Rights Watch.
  1742.  
  1743. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  1744.  
  1745. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  1746. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  1747.  
  1748. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  1749. _______________________________________
  1750. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  1751.  
  1752.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  1753. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  1754. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  1755.  
  1756.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  1757. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  1758. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  1759. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  1760. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  1761. high as two years. ... ...
  1762.  
  1763.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  1764. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  1765. by domestic courts.
  1766.  
  1767. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  1768. _______________________________________
  1769. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  1770.  
  1771. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  1772. _______________________________________
  1773. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  1774.  
  1775.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  1776. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  1777. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  1778. to create national-only electronic networks could
  1779. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  1780. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  1781. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  1782. the USTR said in its annual report.
  1783.  
  1784. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  1785. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  1786. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  1787. ���������������������������������������
  1788. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  1789.  
  1790. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  1791.  
  1792. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  1793.  
  1794. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1795. _______________________________________
  1796. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  1797.  
  1798.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  1799. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  1800. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  1801. any information that comes out and will provide an
  1802. updated archive from time to time.
  1803.  
  1804.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  1805. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  1806. 927MB decompressed.
  1807.  
  1808.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  1809. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  1810. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  1811.  
  1812. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1813. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  1814.  
  1815. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  1816. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1817. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  1818. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1819. _______________________________________
  1820. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  1821.  
  1822. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  1823. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  1824. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  1825. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  1826. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  1827. _______________________________________
  1828. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  1829.  
  1830. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  1831.  
  1832. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  1833.  
  1834. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  1835.  
  1836. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  1837.  
  1838. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  1839. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  1840. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  1841. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  1842.  
  1843. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  1844. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  1845.  
  1846. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  1847. _______________________________________
  1848. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  1849.  
  1850. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  1851.  
  1852. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  1853.  
  1854. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  1855.  
  1856. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  1857.  
  1858. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  1859.  
  1860. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  1861.  
  1862. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  1863. _______________________________________
  1864. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  1865.  
  1866.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  1867. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  1868. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  1869. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  1870. public as possible� as well helping the public
  1871. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  1872. how we�re protecting national security.�
  1873.  
  1874. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  1875. ���������������������������������������
  1876. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  1877.  
  1878. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  1879.  
  1880. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  1881.  
  1882. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  1883.  
  1884. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  1885.  
  1886. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  1887.  
  1888. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  1889.  
  1890. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  1891.  
  1892.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  1893. offensive against China, with targets including the
  1894. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  1895. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  1896. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  1897. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  1898. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  1899. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  1900. well as telecommunications companies.
  1901.  
  1902.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  1903. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  1904. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  1905. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  1906. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  1907. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  1908. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  1909. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  1910. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  1911. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  1912. battle for data supremacy.
  1913.  
  1914.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  1915. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  1916. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  1917. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  1918. among other things.
  1919.  
  1920. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  1921. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  1922. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  1923. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  1924.  
  1925. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  1926.  
  1927.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  1928. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  1929. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  1930. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  1931. has lodged representations with the American side on
  1932. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  1933. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  1934.  
  1935. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  1936. _______________________________________
  1937. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  1938.  
  1939.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  1940. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  1941. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  1942. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  1943. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  1944. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  1945. routers, the devices that connect computer
  1946. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  1947. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  1948. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  1949. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  1950. that flow over their networks.
  1951.  
  1952.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  1953. aspired to create a database that would function
  1954. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  1955. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  1956. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  1957. activity � they are targeted only because they
  1958. control access to networks the agency wants to
  1959. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  1960. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  1961. of the posts says.
  1962.  
  1963.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  1964. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  1965. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  1966. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  1967. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  1968. poses with amusing captions.�
  1969.  
  1970. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  1971. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  1972. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  1973. _______________________________________
  1974. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  1975.  
  1976. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  1977. _______________________________________
  1978. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  1979.  
  1980. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  1981.  
  1982. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  1983.  
  1984. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  1985.  
  1986. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  1987.  
  1988. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  1989.  
  1990. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  1991. _______________________________________
  1992. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  1993.  
  1994. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  1995. _______________________________________
  1996. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  1997.  
  1998. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  1999.  
  2000. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  2001. _______________________________________
  2002. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  2003.  
  2004. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  2005. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  2006. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  2007. _______________________________________
  2008. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  2009.  
  2010. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  2011.  
  2012. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  2013. _______________________________________
  2014. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  2015.  
  2016. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  2017. _______________________________________
  2018. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  2019.  
  2020. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  2021.  
  2022. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  2023.  
  2024. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  2025. _______________________________________
  2026. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  2027.  
  2028. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  2029. _______________________________________
  2030. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  2031.  
  2032. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  2033.  
  2034. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  2035.  
  2036. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2037.  
  2038. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  2039.  
  2040. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  2041. _______________________________________
  2042. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  2043.  
  2044. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  2045.  
  2046. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  2047.  
  2048. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  2049. _______________________________________
  2050. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  2051.  
  2052. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  2053. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  2054. _______________________________________
  2055. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  2056. With Malware ::
  2057.  
  2058.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  2059. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  2060. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  2061. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  2062. level of human oversight in the process.
  2063.  
  2064.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  2065. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  2066. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  2067. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  2068. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  2069. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  2070. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  2071. Internet and phone networks.
  2072.  
  2073. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  2074. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  2075. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  2076. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  2077. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  2078. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  2079. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  2080. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  2081. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  2082.  
  2083.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  2084. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  2085. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  2086. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  2087. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  2088. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  2089.  
  2090.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  2091. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  2092. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  2093. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  2094. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  2095. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  2096. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  2097. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  2098. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  2099. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  2100. instead of individually.�
  2101.  
  2102. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  2103.  
  2104. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  2105.  
  2106.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  2107. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  2108. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  2109. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  2110. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  2111. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  2112. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  2113. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  2114. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  2115. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  2116. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  2117. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  2118. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  2119. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  2120. execute endpoint operations.�
  2121.  
  2122. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2123.  
  2124.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  2125. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  2126. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  2127. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  2128.  
  2129.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  2130. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  2131. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  2132. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  2133. looks suspicious.
  2134.  
  2135.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  2136. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  2137. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  2138. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  2139. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  2140.  
  2141.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  2142. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  2143. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  2144. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  2145. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  2146. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  2147. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  2148.  
  2149.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  2150. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  2151. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  2152. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  2153. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  2154. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  2155. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  2156. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  2157. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  2158. in action.
  2159.  
  2160. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  2161. Computers for Surveillance ::
  2162.  
  2163. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  2164.  
  2165. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  2166.  
  2167. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  2168.  
  2169.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  2170. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  2171. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  2172. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  2173. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  2174. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  2175.  
  2176. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  2177.  
  2178. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  2179. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  2180. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  2181. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  2182. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  2183. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  2184. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  2185. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  2186. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  2187. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  2188.  
  2189. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  2190.  
  2191. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  2192.  
  2193. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  2194.  
  2195. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  2196. _______________________________________
  2197. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  2198.  
  2199. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  2200. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  2201. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  2202. _______________________________________
  2203. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  2204.  
  2205. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  2206. _______________________________________
  2207. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  2208.  
  2209.  Alliances between security services are usually
  2210. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  2211. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  2212. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  2213. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  2214. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  2215. internet traffic.
  2216.  
  2217.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  2218. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  2219. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  2220. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  2221. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  2222.  
  2223.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  2224. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  2225. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  2226. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  2227. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  2228. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  2229.  
  2230.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2231. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2232. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2233. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2234. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2235. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2236. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2237.  
  2238. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2239.  
  2240. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2241. _______________________________________
  2242. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  2243.  
  2244. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  2245.  
  2246. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  2247. ---------------------------------------
  2248. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  2249.  
  2250. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  2251.  
  2252. � NSA Spies Too ::
  2253.  
  2254. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2255. _______________________________________
  2256. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  2257.  
  2258. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  2259.  
  2260. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  2261.  
  2262.  The documents show that images were collected
  2263. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  2264. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  2265. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  2266. programs.
  2267.  
  2268. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  2269. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  2270. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  2271. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  2272.  
  2273. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  2274.  
  2275. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  2276. _______________________________________
  2277. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  2278.  
  2279. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  2280. _______________________________________
  2281. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  2282.  
  2283. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  2284.  
  2285. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  2286. _______________________________________
  2287. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  2288. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  2289.  
  2290. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  2291.  
  2292. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  2293. _______________________________________
  2294. � NSA Observer ::
  2295.  
  2296. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  2297. _______________________________________
  2298. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  2299.  
  2300. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2301.  
  2302. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  2303. _______________________________________
  2304. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  2305.  
  2306. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  2307.  
  2308. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  2309. _______________________________________
  2310. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  2311.  
  2312. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  2313.  
  2314. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  2315.  
  2316. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  2317.  
  2318. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  2319. _______________________________________
  2320. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  2321.  
  2322.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  2323. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  2324. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  2325. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  2326. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  2327. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  2328. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  2329. targets without confirming their veracity on
  2330. the ground.
  2331.  
  2332. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  2333. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  2334. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  2335. _______________________________________
  2336. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  2337.  
  2338.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  2339. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  2340. shows that an American law firm was
  2341. monitored while representing a foreign
  2342. government in trade disputes with the
  2343. United States. The disclosure offers a
  2344. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  2345. which Americans were ensnared by the
  2346. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  2347. interest because lawyers in the United
  2348. States with clients overseas have
  2349. expressed growing concern that their
  2350. confidential communications could be
  2351. compromised by such surveillance.
  2352.  
  2353. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  2354. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  2355. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  2356.  
  2357. NOBODY comments
  2358.  
  2359. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  2360.  
  2361.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  2362. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  2363. be declassified for research in public domain.
  2364. _______________________________________
  2365. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  2366.  
  2367. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  2368.  
  2369. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  2370.  
  2371. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  2372. _______________________________________
  2373. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  2374.  
  2375. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  2376. _______________________________________
  2377. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  2378. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  2379.  
  2380.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  2381. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  2382. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  2383. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  2384. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  2385.  
  2386. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  2387. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  2388. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  2389.  
  2390. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  2391. the German Chancellor ::
  2392.  
  2393. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  2394. _______________________________________
  2395. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  2396. Phone Call Spying ::
  2397.  
  2398. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  2399.  
  2400. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  2401. _______________________________________
  2402. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  2403.  
  2404. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  2405. _______________________________________
  2406. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  2407.  
  2408. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  2409. _______________________________________
  2410.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  2411. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  2412. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  2413. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  2414. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  2415. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  2416.  
  2417. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  2418. ���������������������������������������
  2419. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2420.  
  2421. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2422.  
  2423. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2424.  
  2425. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  2426.  
  2427. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  2428.  
  2429. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  2430.  
  2431.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  2432. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  2433. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  2434. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  2435. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  2436. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  2437. left the terminal.
  2438.  
  2439.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  2440. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  2441. clandestine operation by the Communications
  2442. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  2443. certainly illegal. ... ...
  2444.  
  2445.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  2446. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  2447. software program CSEC was developing with help
  2448. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  2449.  
  2450.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  2451. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  2452. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  2453. into other cities/regions.�
  2454.  
  2455. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  2456.  
  2457.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  2458. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  2459.  
  2460. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  2461.  
  2462. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  2463.  
  2464. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  2465.  
  2466. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  2467.  
  2468. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  2469. _______________________________________
  2470. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  2471.  
  2472. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  2473.  
  2474. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  2475.  
  2476. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  2477. _______________________________________
  2478. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  2479.  
  2480.  Documents taken from the National Security
  2481. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  2482. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  2483. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  2484. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  2485. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  2486. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  2487. information, for analysis. At the time the
  2488. documents were printed, they were also able to
  2489. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  2490.  
  2491.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  2492. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  2493. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  2494. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  2495. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  2496. visits. The monitoring program is called
  2497. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  2498.  
  2499.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  2500. British had to have been either physically able
  2501. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  2502. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  2503. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  2504. and would be able to extract some key data
  2505. about specific users as well.
  2506.  
  2507. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  2508. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  2509. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  2510. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  2511. _______________________________________
  2512. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  2513.  
  2514. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  2515. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  2516. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  2517.  
  2518. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  2519.  
  2520.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  2521. on the iPhone alone.�
  2522.  
  2523. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  2524.  
  2525. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  2526.  
  2527. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  2528.  
  2529. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  2530. _______________________________________
  2531. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  2532.  
  2533.  The National Security Agency program that
  2534. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  2535. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  2536. Thursday in a newly released report.
  2537.  
  2538. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  2539.  
  2540.  �We have not identified a single instance
  2541. involving a threat to the United States in
  2542. which the program made a concrete difference
  2543. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  2544. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  2545. report released Thursday.
  2546.  
  2547.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  2548. domestic spying will continue.
  2549.  
  2550. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  2551. _______________________________________
  2552. � Snowden Speaks ::
  2553.  
  2554. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  2555. _______________________________________
  2556. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  2557.  
  2558. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  2559.  
  2560. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  2561.          ���
  2562. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  2563.  
  2564. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  2565.  
  2566.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  2567. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  2568. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  2569. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  2570. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  2571. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  2572. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  2573. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  2574. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  2575. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  2576. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  2577. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  2578. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  2579. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  2580. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  2581.  
  2582. Reform?
  2583.  
  2584.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  2585. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  2586. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  2587. whether legal or not?
  2588.  
  2589. The reform will come from people taking action.
  2590.  
  2591.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  2592. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  2593. _______________________________________
  2594. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  2595.  
  2596. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  2597. _______________________________________
  2598. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  2599.  
  2600.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  2601. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  2602. main internet cables:
  2603.  
  2604.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  2605.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  2606.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  2607.  
  2608. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  2609. ---------------------------------------
  2610. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  2611. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  2612. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  2613. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  2614. _______________________________________
  2615. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  2616.  
  2617. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  2618.  
  2619. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  2620.  
  2621. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  2622. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  2623. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  2624. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  2625. ---------------------------------------
  2626. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  2627. _______________________________________
  2628. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  2629.  
  2630. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  2631.  
  2632. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  2633.  
  2634. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  2635.  
  2636.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  2637. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  2638. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  2639. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  2640.  
  2641.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  2642. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  2643. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  2644. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  2645.  
  2646.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  2647. text message database to extract information
  2648. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  2649. transactions and more � including of individuals
  2650. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  2651.  
  2652. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  2653. _______________________________________
  2654. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  2655.  
  2656. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  2657.  
  2658. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  2659.  
  2660.  The technology, which the agency has used
  2661. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  2662. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  2663. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  2664. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  2665. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  2666. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  2667. set up miles away from the target.
  2668.  
  2669.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  2670. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  2671. American intelligence agencies for years:
  2672. getting into computers that adversaries,
  2673. and some American partners, have tried to
  2674. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  2675. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  2676. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  2677. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  2678. ---------------------------------------
  2679. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  2680.  
  2681. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  2682. _______________________________________
  2683. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  2684.  
  2685. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  2686. ---------------------------------------
  2687. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  2688.  
  2689. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  2690. _______________________________________
  2691. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  2692.  
  2693. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  2694. _______________________________________
  2695. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  2696.  
  2697. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  2698. _______________________________________
  2699. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  2700.  
  2701. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  2702. _______________________________________
  2703. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  2704. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  2705.  
  2706. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  2707.  
  2708. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  2709. _______________________________________
  2710. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  2711. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  2712.  
  2713. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  2714. _______________________________________
  2715. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  2716. All Encryption ::
  2717.  
  2718.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  2719. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  2720. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  2721. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  2722. used to protect banking, medical, business
  2723. and government records around the world.
  2724.  
  2725.  According to documents provided by former
  2726. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  2727. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  2728. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  2729. than classical computers � is part of a
  2730. $79.7 million research program titled
  2731. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  2732. work is hosted under classified contracts
  2733. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  2734.  
  2735. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  2736. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  2737. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  2738. _______________________________________
  2739. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  2740.  
  2741. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  2742. _______________________________________
  2743. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  2744.  
  2745. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  2746. _______________________________________
  2747. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  2748.  
  2749. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  2750.  
  2751. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  2752.  
  2753. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  2754.  
  2755. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  2756.  
  2757. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  2758.  
  2759. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  2760. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  2761. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  2762.  
  2763. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  2764.  
  2765.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  2766. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  2767. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  2768. infiltrates computers around the world and
  2769. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  2770. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  2771. it is targeting. ... ...
  2772.  
  2773. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  2774.  
  2775.  The insert method and other variants of
  2776. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  2777. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  2778. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  2779. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  2780. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  2781. also incorporates routers and servers
  2782. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  2783. network by infecting these networks with
  2784. �implants� that then allow the government
  2785. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  2786.  
  2787.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  2788. to identify and track its targets based on
  2789. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  2790. could include certain email addresses or
  2791. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  2792. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  2793. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  2794. additional information like an email address.
  2795. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  2796. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  2797. ---------------------------------------
  2798. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  2799.  
  2800. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  2801.  
  2802. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  2803.  
  2804.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  2805. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  2806. that are being logged into on that computer
  2807. as long as the user does not clear browser
  2808. cookies.�
  2809.  
  2810. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  2811.  
  2812. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  2813.  
  2814. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  2815. ---------------------------------------
  2816. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  2817.  
  2818.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  2819. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  2820. could be described as master carpenters for
  2821. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  2822. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  2823. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  2824. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  2825. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  2826. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  2827. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  2828. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  2829. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  2830. ability to establish a global covert network
  2831. that operates alongside the Internet.
  2832.  
  2833.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  2834. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  2835. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  2836. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  2837. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  2838. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  2839. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  2840. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  2841. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  2842. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  2843. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  2844. over $1 million.
  2845.  
  2846.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  2847. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  2848. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  2849. clear preference for planting their malicious
  2850. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  2851. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  2852. to load when a computer is turned on.
  2853.  
  2854.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  2855. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  2856. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  2857. to virus protection and other security programs.
  2858. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  2859. computer has been completely erased and a new
  2860. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  2861. can continue to function and ensures that new
  2862. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  2863. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  2864. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  2865. this approach has provided them with the
  2866. possibility of permanent access.
  2867.  
  2868.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  2869. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  2870. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  2871. with the exception of latter, are American
  2872. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  2873. intelligence agency is compromising the
  2874. technology and products of American companies.
  2875.  
  2876. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  2877. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  2878. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  2879. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  2880. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  2881.  
  2882. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  2883.  
  2884. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  2885.  
  2886. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  2887.  
  2888. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  2889.  
  2890. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  2891.  
  2892. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  2893.  
  2894. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  2895.  
  2896. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  2897.  
  2898. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  2899.  
  2900. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  2901.  
  2902. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  2903.  
  2904. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  2905.  
  2906. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  2907.  
  2908. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  2909.  
  2910. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  2911.  
  2912. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  2913.  
  2914. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  2915.  
  2916. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  2917.  
  2918. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  2919.  
  2920. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  2921.  
  2922. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  2923.  
  2924. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  2925.  
  2926. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  2927.  
  2928. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  2929.  
  2930. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  2931.  
  2932. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  2933. ---------------------------------------
  2934. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  2935.  
  2936. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  2937.  
  2938. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  2939.  
  2940. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  2941.  
  2942. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  2943. ---------------------------------------
  2944. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  2945.  
  2946. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  2947.  
  2948. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  2949.  
  2950.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  2951. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  2952. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  2953.  
  2954. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  2955.  
  2956. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  2957. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  2958.  
  2959.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  2960. in its operating system had left devices open
  2961. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  2962. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  2963. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  2964. of its mass spying program.
  2965.  
  2966. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  2967. ---------------------------------------
  2968. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  2969. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  2970.  
  2971. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  2972.  
  2973. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  2974. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  2975.  
  2976. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  2977.  
  2978. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  2979.  
  2980. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  2981.  
  2982.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  2983. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  2984.  
  2985. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  2986. _______________________________________
  2987. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  2988.  
  2989. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  2990.  
  2991. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  2992.  
  2993. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  2994. _______________________________________
  2995. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  2996.  
  2997. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  2998.  
  2999.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  3000. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  3001. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  3002. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  3003. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  3004. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  3005. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  3006. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  3007. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  3008. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  3009.  
  3010.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  3011. learn we are collecting more in the United
  3012. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  3013. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  3014. troubled, he said, and several said they
  3015. did not want to know any more.
  3016. ---------------------------------------
  3017. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  3018.  
  3019. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  3020. _______________________________________
  3021. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  3022. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  3023.  
  3024. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  3025. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  3026. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  3027. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  3028. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  3029. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  3030. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  3031. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  3032.  
  3033. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  3034.  
  3035.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  3036. National Security Agency program which
  3037. collects information on nearly all telephone
  3038. calls made to, from or within the United
  3039. States is likely unconstitutional.
  3040.  
  3041.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  3042. that the program appears to violate the
  3043. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  3044. searches and seizures. He also said the
  3045. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  3046. that collecting the information had helped
  3047. to head off terrorist attacks.
  3048.  
  3049.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  3050. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  3051. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  3052. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  3053. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  3054. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  3055. the order to allow for an appeal.
  3056.  
  3057. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  3058. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  3059.  
  3060.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  3061. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  3062. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  3063. in June in news stories based on leaks
  3064. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  3065. For seven years, the metadata program has
  3066. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  3067. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  3068. Court and found constitutional by at least
  3069. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  3070.  
  3071. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  3072.  
  3073. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  3074.  
  3075. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  3076.  
  3077. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  3078.  
  3079. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  3080.  
  3081. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  3082. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  3083.  
  3084. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  3085.  
  3086. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  3087.  
  3088. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  3089. ---------------------------------------
  3090. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  3091.  
  3092. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  3093.  
  3094. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  3095.  
  3096. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  3097. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  3098.  
  3099. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  3100. Spying Programs ::
  3101.  
  3102. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  3103. ---------------------------------------
  3104. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  3105. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  3106.  
  3107. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  3108.  
  3109. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  3110.  
  3111. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  3112. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  3113.  
  3114. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  3115.  
  3116. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  3117. _______________________________________
  3118. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  3119.  
  3120.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  3121. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  3122. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  3123.  
  3124. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  3125.  
  3126. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  3127.  
  3128.  - Military Information
  3129.  - Economic Information
  3130.  - Information Operations Information
  3131.  - Political Information �
  3132. _______________________________________
  3133. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  3134. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  3135.  
  3136. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  3137. ���������������������������������������
  3138. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  3139.  
  3140. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  3141.  
  3142. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  3143.  
  3144. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  3145.  
  3146. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  3147.  
  3148. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  3149.  
  3150. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  3151.  
  3152. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  3153.  
  3154. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  3155.  
  3156. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  3157. _______________________________________
  3158. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  3159. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  3160.  
  3161.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  3162. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  3163. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  3164. government access in order to make network
  3165. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  3166. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  3167. in millions of homes and businesses within
  3168. the UK,� the paper states.
  3169.  
  3170.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  3171. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  3172. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  3173. assigns all their modems an extra address
  3174. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  3175. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  3176. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  3177. a second IP address for management, except
  3178. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  3179. assigned to the United States Department
  3180. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  3181. of speculation that this is actually a
  3182. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  3183. they can secretly monitor and control
  3184. peoples� home networks.
  3185.  
  3186.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  3187. The better explanation is that BT simply
  3188. chose this address space because it�s
  3189. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  3190. address, it�s only used inside the private
  3191. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  3192. that address space, you�ll see that your
  3193. packets go nowhere.
  3194.  
  3195. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  3196. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  3197. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  3198.  
  3199. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  3200.  
  3201.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  3202. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  3203. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  3204. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  3205. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  3206. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  3207. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  3208. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  3209. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  3210. It�s past time for something new.�
  3211.  
  3212. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  3213. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  3214. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  3215. ---------------------------------------
  3216. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  3217.  
  3218.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  3219. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  3220. worldwide with malicious software designed
  3221. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  3222. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  3223. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  3224.  
  3225.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  3226. explains how the NSA collects information
  3227. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  3228. shows that the intelligence service uses
  3229. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  3230. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3231. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3232. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3233. software.
  3234.  
  3235.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3236. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3237. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3238. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  3239. has been installing this malicious software
  3240. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3241. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  3242. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  3243. through a process of luring employees to a
  3244. false Linkedin page.
  3245.  
  3246. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  3247. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3248. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  3249. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  3250.  
  3251. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  3252.  
  3253.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  3254. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  3255. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  3256. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  3257. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  3258. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  3259. and citizens.
  3260.  
  3261.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  3262. will deter this bounty of profits for
  3263. the comsec industry, unless the public
  3264. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  3265. the nettle, and all those making money
  3266. from this deception operation decide to
  3267. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  3268.  
  3269.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  3270. lists, those participating in standards
  3271. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  3272. grants in think tanks and universities,
  3273. those in law firms and public interest
  3274. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  3275. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  3276. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  3277. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  3278. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  3279. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  3280. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  3281. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  3282. contracts, list lurking, online and
  3283. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  3284. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  3285. fulfilled.
  3286.  
  3287. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  3288.  
  3289. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3290.  
  3291. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3292.  
  3293. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3294. ���������������������������������������
  3295. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  3296. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  3297.  
  3298. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  3299. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  3300. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  3301. _______________________________________
  3302. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  3303.  
  3304. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  3305.  
  3306. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  3307.  
  3308. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  3309.  
  3310. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  3311.  
  3312. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  3313. _______________________________________
  3314. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  3315.  
  3316. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  3317. _______________________________________
  3318. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  3319. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  3320.  
  3321. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  3322.  
  3323. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  3324. _______________________________________
  3325. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  3326.  
  3327. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  3328. _______________________________________
  3329. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  3330. of Public Concerns ::
  3331.  
  3332. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  3333.  
  3334. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  3335.  
  3336. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  3337. _______________________________________
  3338. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3339.  
  3340.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  3341. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  3342. of metadata about the world�s secure
  3343. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  3344. certainly not a program through which
  3345. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  3346. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  3347. services like Google, as reported by others,
  3348. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  3349. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  3350. Google are based on a small piece of a
  3351. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  3352. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  3353. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  3354. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  3355. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  3356. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  3357. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  3358. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  3359. by providing information about a target.�
  3360.  
  3361. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  3362.  
  3363. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3364.  
  3365. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  3366. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  3367. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  3368. ���������������������������������������
  3369. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  3370.  
  3371. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  3372.  
  3373. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  3374. _______________________________________
  3375. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  3376.  
  3377. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  3378. ---------------------------------------
  3379. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  3380.  
  3381. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  3382.  
  3383.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  3384. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  3385. and later managed by big data corporations
  3386. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  3387.  
  3388.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  3389. large files across machines in a large
  3390. cluster.
  3391.  
  3392. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  3393.  
  3394.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  3395. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  3396. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  3397. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  3398.  
  3399.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  3400. major components, a central metadata server
  3401. and file servers from data.
  3402.  
  3403. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  3404.  
  3405. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  3406.  
  3407.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  3408. posted on public domain.
  3409.  
  3410. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  3411.  
  3412. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  3413. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  3414.  
  3415. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3416. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3417. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  3418.  
  3419. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3420.  
  3421. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3422. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3423. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3424. ---------------------------------------
  3425. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  3426. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  3427.  
  3428. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  3429.  
  3430. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  3431.  
  3432. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  3433.  
  3434. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  3435.  
  3436. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  3437.  
  3438. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  3439.  
  3440. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3441.  
  3442. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3443.  
  3444. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  3445.  
  3446.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  3447. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  3448. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  3449. content of all our communications have
  3450. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  3451. program since the 1990s.
  3452.  
  3453.  The new details concern how, �The National
  3454. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  3455. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  3456. of cellphones around the world.�
  3457.  
  3458.  However, the report reveals itself to
  3459. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  3460. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  3461. does not target Americans� location data
  3462. by design, but the agency acquires a
  3463. substantial amount of information on
  3464. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  3465. �incidentally.�
  3466.  
  3467.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  3468. happens to record the locations of Americans
  3469. using data from their cellphones, and is
  3470. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  3471. surveillance, is yet another example of
  3472. damage control by the establishment.
  3473.  
  3474. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  3475. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  3476. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  3477. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  3478. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  3479. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  3480. ---------------------------------------
  3481. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  3482. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  3483.  
  3484.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  3485. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  3486. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  3487. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  3488. targets for government hacking and to
  3489. bolster surveillance.
  3490.  
  3491. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  3492. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  3493. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  3494. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  3495. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  3496. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  3497. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  3498. ---------------------------------------
  3499. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  3500.  
  3501. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  3502. ---------------------------------------
  3503. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  3504. In a World Without Cookies ::
  3505.  
  3506. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  3507. _______________________________________
  3508. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  3509.  
  3510. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  3511. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  3512. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  3513.  
  3514. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  3515.  
  3516. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  3517. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  3518. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  3519. _______________________________________
  3520. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  3521. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  3522.  
  3523. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  3524. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  3525. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  3526. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  3527. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  3528. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  3529.  
  3530. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  3531.  
  3532. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  3533.  
  3534. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  3535.  
  3536. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  3537.  
  3538. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  3539.  
  3540. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  3541.  
  3542. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  3543.  
  3544. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  3545.  
  3546. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  3547.  
  3548. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  3549.  
  3550. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  3551.  
  3552. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  3553. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  3554. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  3555.  
  3556. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  3557.  
  3558. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  3559. ---------------------------------------
  3560. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  3561.  
  3562. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  3563. ---------------------------------------
  3564. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  3565.  
  3566. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  3567.  
  3568. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  3569.  
  3570. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  3571.  
  3572. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  3573.  
  3574. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  3575.  
  3576. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  3577.  
  3578. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  3579. _______________________________________
  3580.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  3581. worldwide was published by the German
  3582. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  3583. map was put online by accident, but before
  3584. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  3585. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  3586. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  3587. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  3588. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  3589. the names of all other cities were blurred
  3590. by Der Spiegel.�
  3591.  
  3592.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  3593.  
  3594. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  3595.  
  3596. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  3597.  
  3598. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  3599.  
  3600. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  3601.  
  3602. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  3603.  
  3604. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  3605. ---------------------------------------
  3606. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  3607.  
  3608. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  3609.  
  3610. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  3611. _______________________________________
  3612. � Five Eyes ::
  3613.  
  3614. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  3615. _______________________________________
  3616. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  3617.  
  3618. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  3619. _______________________________________
  3620. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  3621. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  3622.  
  3623. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  3624.  
  3625. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  3626. _______________________________________
  3627. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  3628.  
  3629. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  3630.  
  3631. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  3632. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  3633. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  3634. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  3635. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  3636. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  3637. _______________________________________
  3638. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  3639.  
  3640.  September 11th, which also happened to
  3641. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  3642. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  3643. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  3644. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  3645. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  3646. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  3647. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  3648. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  3649. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  3650. itself.
  3651.  
  3652.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  3653. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  3654. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  3655. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  3656. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  3657. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  3658. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  3659. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  3660. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  3661. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  3662. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  3663. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  3664. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  3665. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  3666. its workforce by one-third, to about
  3667. 33,000. The number of private companies
  3668. it depended upon more than tripled during
  3669. that time.
  3670.  
  3671.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  3672. and the increasing reliance on the private
  3673. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  3674. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  3675. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  3676. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  3677. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  3678. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  3679. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  3680. getting those clearances. So you had
  3681. this huge apparatus being built, and
  3682. the government was just managing it.
  3683. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  3684. doing that.� ... ...
  3685.  
  3686.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  3687. workforce, the surveillance he would
  3688. later expose was becoming not just
  3689. institutionalized but very big business.
  3690. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  3691. the full flower of that massive, massive
  3692. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  3693. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  3694. could go.� ... ...
  3695.  
  3696.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  3697. leaking government secrets when he was
  3698. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  3699. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  3700. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  3701. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  3702. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  3703. policies that I thought would be reined
  3704. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  3705. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  3706. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  3707. the more he read �true information,�
  3708. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  3709. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  3710. surveillance program � the more he realized
  3711. that there were actually two governments:
  3712. the one that was elected, and the other,
  3713. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  3714. �If the highest officials in government
  3715. can break the law without fearing punishment
  3716. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  3717. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  3718.  
  3719. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  3720. _______________________________________
  3721. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  3722.  
  3723. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  3724. _______________________________________
  3725. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  3726.  
  3727. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  3728. _______________________________________
  3729. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  3730. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  3731.  
  3732.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  3733. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  3734. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  3735. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  3736. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  3737. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  3738. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  3739. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  3740. in terrorism.
  3741.  
  3742.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  3743. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  3744. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  3745. threatening national security. It is
  3746. successfully restricting release of the
  3747. Snowden material and will likely become
  3748. more forceful as releases continue to the
  3749. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  3750. to criminalize release as a national
  3751. security threat.
  3752.  
  3753. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  3754. _______________________________________
  3755. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  3756.  
  3757.  Includes most reports, slides and
  3758. documents all related to the recent
  3759. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  3760. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  3761. any information that comes out and
  3762. will provide updated archives from
  3763. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  3764.  
  3765.  After decompression - the folder is
  3766. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  3767. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  3768.  
  3769. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3770. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  3771.  
  3772. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  3773. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  3774. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  3775. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3776. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3777. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  3778. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  3779. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3780. _______________________________________
  3781. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  3782.  
  3783. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3784. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3785. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3786.  
  3787. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  3788. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  3789.  
  3790.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  3791. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  3792. Australians, and hands over the material
  3793. to the US and its closest allies, according
  3794. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  3795. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  3796. Australia web site.
  3797.  
  3798.  The document obtained by the former US
  3799. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  3800. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  3801. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  3802. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  3803. as well as the people and governments of
  3804. many Asian countries.
  3805.  
  3806.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  3807. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  3808. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  3809. global partners so-called metadata of
  3810. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  3811. address books and social media posts of
  3812. millions of people.
  3813.  
  3814.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  3815. the recent revelations, also from documents
  3816. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  3817. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  3818. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  3819. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  3820. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  3821. operate as electronic listening posts
  3822. for the US-led spying network.
  3823.  
  3824. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  3825. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  3826. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  3827. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  3828. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  3829. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  3830.  
  3831. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  3832. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  3833.  
  3834.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  3835. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  3836. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  3837. political figures has been furiously
  3838. denounced by other media outlets for
  3839. breaching �national security� and the
  3840. �national interest.� The reaction
  3841. underscores the extent to which the
  3842. media establishment has been integrated
  3843. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  3844.  
  3845.  On November 18, after being approached
  3846. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  3847. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  3848. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  3849. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  3850. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  3851. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  3852. senior political figures. The report
  3853. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  3854. crisis for the Australian government, with
  3855. the Indonesian president suspending military
  3856. and intelligence cooperation.
  3857.  
  3858. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  3859. _______________________________________
  3860. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  3861.  
  3862.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  3863. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  3864. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  3865. allowed the largest American spy agency
  3866. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  3867. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  3868.  
  3869.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  3870. by CBC News.
  3871.  
  3872.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  3873. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  3874. a security command post during a six-day
  3875. spying operation by the National Security
  3876. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  3877. other foreign heads of government were on
  3878. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  3879.  
  3880.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  3881. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  3882.  
  3883.  The world was still struggling to climb
  3884. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  3885. were debating a wide array of possible
  3886. measures including a global tax on banks,
  3887. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  3888. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  3889. eventually scotched.
  3890.  
  3891. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  3892. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  3893. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  3894. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  3895. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  3896.  
  3897. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  3898. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  3899.  
  3900. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  3901.  
  3902.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  3903. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  3904.  
  3905. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  3906.  
  3907. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  3908.  
  3909. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  3910.  
  3911. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  3912. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  3913.  
  3914. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  3915.  
  3916. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  3917.  
  3918. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  3919.  
  3920. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  3921. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  3922.  
  3923. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  3924.  
  3925. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  3926.  
  3927.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  3928. believe that they have only �moved on� from discussing
  3929. CSEC�s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  3930. to worry about.
  3931.  
  3932.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  3933. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  3934. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  3935. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC�s
  3936. staff�it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  3937. military personnel assist its work�give an inkling of the
  3938. scale of its activities.
  3939.  
  3940.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  3941. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  3942. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  3943. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  3944. Of especial importance is the CSEC�s partnership with the NSA.
  3945. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  3946. the two organizations �have integrated personnel� i.e. swap
  3947. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  3948. Internet surveillance programs.
  3949.  
  3950.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  3951. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  3952. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  3953. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  3954. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  3955. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates�
  3956. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  3957.  
  3958. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  3959.  
  3960. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  3961.  
  3962. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  3963.  
  3964. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  3965. _______________________________________
  3966. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  3967.  
  3968. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  3969.  
  3970. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  3971.  
  3972. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  3973. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  3974. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  3975.  
  3976. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  3977.  
  3978. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  3979.  
  3980. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  3981.  
  3982. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  3983. _______________________________________
  3984.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  3985. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  3986. in theory � forbid local governments from
  3987. providing services to federal agencies
  3988. that collect electronic data from Americans
  3989. without a personalized warrant.
  3990.  
  3991.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  3992. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  3993. but at least one legislator has committed
  3994. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  3995. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  3996. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  3997. is introduced.
  3998.  
  3999.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  4000. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  4001. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  4002. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  4003. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  4004. and a handful of other groups.
  4005.  
  4006.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  4007. Maharrey adds.
  4008.  
  4009. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  4010. _______________________________________
  4011. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  4012. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  4013.  
  4014.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  4015. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  4016. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  4017. US and British intelligence � particularly
  4018. their cooperation in data collection and
  4019. snooping programs involving British citizens
  4020. and close allies on the European continent.
  4021.  
  4022.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  4023. to account by British authorities for
  4024. jeopardizing national security. The
  4025. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  4026. is being forced to appear before a
  4027. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  4028. the news outlet�s actions.
  4029.  
  4030. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4031. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  4032. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  4033.  
  4034. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  4035.  
  4036. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  4037.  
  4038. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  4039. as the British Dictatorship ::
  4040.  
  4041.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  4042. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  4043. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  4044. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  4045. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  4046. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  4047. seems the United States is reaching the event
  4048. horizon to a police state.
  4049.  
  4050. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  4051.  
  4052. Cryptome noted
  4053.  
  4054.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  4055. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  4056. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  4057. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  4058. UKG), although there could be some which have
  4059. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  4060. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  4061.  
  4062.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  4063. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  4064. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  4065. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  4066. deception, co-optation.
  4067.  
  4068.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  4069. had access, or suspected of access, are
  4070. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  4071. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  4072. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  4073. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  4074. standard coercive means of authorities.
  4075.  
  4076.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  4077. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  4078. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  4079. advised successive cooperators, usually
  4080. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  4081. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  4082. participation.
  4083.  
  4084.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  4085. disputes and disagreements among competing
  4086. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  4087. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  4088. along with threats against families, friends
  4089. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  4090. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  4091. with authorities, including use of rewards
  4092. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  4093.  
  4094. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  4095. _______________________________________
  4096. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  4097.  
  4098. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  4099. _______________________________________
  4100. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  4101. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  4102. Governments ::
  4103.  
  4104. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  4105. _______________________________________
  4106. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  4107. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  4108.  
  4109. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  4110. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  4111. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  4112. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  4113. _______________________________________
  4114. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  4115.  
  4116. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  4117.  
  4118. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  4119.  
  4120. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  4121.  
  4122. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  4123.  
  4124. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  4125.  
  4126. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  4127.  
  4128. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  4129.  
  4130. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  4131.  
  4132. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  4133.  
  4134. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  4135.  
  4136. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  4137.  
  4138. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  4139.  
  4140. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  4141.  
  4142. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  4143.  
  4144. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  4145.  
  4146. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  4147. Steal Email Metadata ::
  4148.  
  4149.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  4150. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  4151. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  4152. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  4153.  
  4154.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  4155. servers around the world, reducing the
  4156. chance of losing your information should
  4157. one fail. When you log in to an account
  4158. with these firms, the data sent between
  4159. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  4160. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  4161. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  4162. And because many of the transfers take place
  4163. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  4164. isn�t required to tap the information.
  4165.  
  4166.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  4167. broken into the main communications links
  4168. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  4169. around the world, according to documents
  4170. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  4171. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  4172. officials.
  4173.  
  4174.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  4175. positioned itself to collect at will from
  4176. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  4177. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  4178. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  4179. but it keeps a lot.
  4180.  
  4181.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  4182. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  4183. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  4184. counterpart, the Government Communications
  4185. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  4186. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  4187. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  4188. that carry information among the data
  4189. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  4190.  
  4191. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  4192. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  4193. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  4194. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  4195. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  4196.  
  4197. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  4198.  
  4199.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  4200. email collecting program �does not apply
  4201. to US citizens.�
  4202.  
  4203.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  4204. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  4205. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  4206. accounts around the world, many of them
  4207. belonging to Americans, according to
  4208. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  4209. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  4210. Edward Snowden.
  4211.  
  4212.  The collection program, which has not
  4213. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  4214. address books and �buddy lists� from
  4215. instant messaging services as they move
  4216. across global data links. Online services
  4217. often transmit those contacts when a user
  4218. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  4219. a computer or mobile device with information
  4220. stored on remote servers.
  4221.  
  4222. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  4223. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  4224. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  4225.  
  4226. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  4227.  
  4228. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  4229.  
  4230. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4231.  
  4232. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4233. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4234. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4235. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4236. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4237. ���������������������������������������
  4238. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  4239.  
  4240. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4241.  
  4242. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  4243. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  4244.  
  4245. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  4246.  
  4247. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  4248.  
  4249. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  4250.  
  4251. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4252.  
  4253. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  4254.  
  4255. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4256.  
  4257. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  4258.  
  4259. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  4260.  
  4261. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  4262.  
  4263. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  4264.  
  4265. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  4266.  
  4267. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  4268.  
  4269. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  4270. ---------------------------------------
  4271. NOBODY comments ?
  4272.  
  4273.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  4274. differs from the Guardians.
  4275.  
  4276. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4277.  
  4278. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  4279.  
  4280. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4281.  
  4282. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  4283.  
  4284.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  4285. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  4286. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  4287.  
  4288.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  4289. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  4290. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  4291. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  4292. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  4293. ---------------------------------------
  4294. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  4295.  
  4296. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  4297.  
  4298. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4299.  
  4300.  This was written from a person who purports
  4301. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  4302.  
  4303. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  4304.  
  4305. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4306.  
  4307. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  4308.  
  4309. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  4310. Misleading ::
  4311.  
  4312. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  4313.  
  4314. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  4315. on NSA Spying ::
  4316.  
  4317. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  4318.  
  4319.  �Recent articles published in the
  4320. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  4321. inaccurate and misleading information
  4322. regarding US foreign intelligence
  4323. activities. The allegation that the
  4324. National Security Agency collected more
  4325. than 70 million �recordings of French
  4326. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  4327.  
  4328.  While we are not going to discuss the
  4329. details of our activities, we have
  4330. repeatedly made it clear that the
  4331. United States gathers intelligence of
  4332. the type gathered by all nations. The
  4333. US collects intelligence to protect the
  4334. nation, its interests, and its allies
  4335. from, among other things, threats such
  4336. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  4337. weapons of mass destruction.
  4338.  
  4339.  The United States values our longstanding
  4340. friendship and alliance with France and
  4341. we will continue to cooperate on security
  4342. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  4343.  
  4344. James R. Clapper
  4345. Director of National Intelligence
  4346. ---------------------------------------
  4347. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  4348.  
  4349. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  4350.  
  4351.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  4352. a call without leaving a record with the
  4353. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  4354. or leaves America without passing through
  4355. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  4356. statement Thursday.
  4357.  
  4358.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  4359. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  4360. _______________________________________
  4361. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  4362. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  4363.  
  4364.  US and British intelligence officials
  4365. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  4366. collection of highly classified, heavily
  4367. encrypted materials they believe former
  4368. National Security Agency contractor
  4369. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  4370.  
  4371.  One source saw the cache of documents
  4372. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  4373. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  4374. other harm. ... ...
  4375.  
  4376.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  4377. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  4378. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  4379. that �if anything happens at all to
  4380. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  4381. to get access to the full archives.�
  4382.  
  4383. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  4384. _______________________________________
  4385. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  4386. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  4387.  
  4388.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  4389. government surveillance policies. But he
  4390. is not disclosing those changes to the
  4391. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  4392. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  4393. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  4394. World Bank and the International Monetary
  4395. Fund? He won�t say.
  4396.  
  4397.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  4398. to review and recommend changes to his
  4399. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  4400.  
  4401. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  4402. _______________________________________
  4403. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  4404.  
  4405.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  4406. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  4407. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  4408. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  4409. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  4410.  
  4411.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  4412. broad goals, the five-page document said
  4413. that existing American laws were not adequate
  4414. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  4415. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  4416. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  4417. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  4418. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  4419. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4420. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4421. and target environments, or the operational
  4422. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  4423. document concluded.
  4424.  
  4425. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  4426. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  4427. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  4428. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  4429. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  4430.  
  4431. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  4432.  
  4433.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  4434. called Treasure Map and describes its
  4435. capabilities but does not publish visual
  4436. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  4437. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  4438. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  4439.  
  4440. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  4441. _______________________________________
  4442. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  4443.  
  4444. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  4445. _______________________________________
  4446. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  4447.  
  4448. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  4449.  
  4450. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  4451.  
  4452. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  4453.  
  4454.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  4455. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  4456. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  4457. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  4458. the door to a variety of spying options.
  4459.  
  4460. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  4461. _______________________________________
  4462. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  4463.  
  4464.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  4465. collection of solely domestic communications
  4466. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  4467. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  4468. request each week until we receive your
  4469. response,� EPIC said.
  4470.  
  4471.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  4472. said this week that it would not be hearing
  4473. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  4474. early Monday in which the high court listed
  4475. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  4476. as denied.
  4477.  
  4478. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  4479.  
  4480. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  4481. _______________________________________
  4482. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  4483.  
  4484. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  4485.  
  4486. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  4487. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  4488.  
  4489. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  4490.  
  4491. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  4492.  
  4493. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  4494. No Privacy ::
  4495.  
  4496. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  4497.  
  4498. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  4499. Spying Programs ::
  4500.  
  4501. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  4502.  
  4503. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  4504.  
  4505. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  4506.  
  4507. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  4508. _______________________________________
  4509. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  4510.  
  4511. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4512.  
  4513. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  4514.  
  4515. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  4516.  
  4517. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4518.  
  4519. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  4520.  
  4521. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  4522.  
  4523. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4524.  
  4525.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  4526. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  4527. or indigenous cryptographic information
  4528. security devices or systems in order to
  4529. make them exploitable.�
  4530.  
  4531. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4532.  
  4533.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  4534. successfully exploits cryptographic
  4535. components of commercial information
  4536. security devices or systems when the
  4537. device or system specified.�
  4538.  
  4539. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4540.  
  4541. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  4542.  
  4543. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  4544.  
  4545. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4546. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4547. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  4548.  
  4549. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  4550.  
  4551.  US and British intelligence agencies
  4552. have successfully cracked much of the
  4553. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  4554. of millions of people to protect the
  4555. privacy of their personal data, online
  4556. transactions and emails, according to
  4557. top-secret documents revealed by former
  4558. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  4559.  
  4560.  Those methods include covert measures
  4561. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  4562. international encryption standards, the
  4563. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  4564. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  4565. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  4566. technology companies and internet service
  4567. providers themselves.
  4568.  
  4569.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  4570. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  4571. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  4572. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  4573.  
  4574.  Independent security experts have long
  4575. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  4576. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  4577. confirmed for the first time by another
  4578. secret document. It shows the agency
  4579. worked covertly to get its own version
  4580. of a draft security standard issued by
  4581. the US National Institute of Standards
  4582. and Technology approved for worldwide
  4583. use in 2006.
  4584.  
  4585. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  4586.  
  4587. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  4588.  
  4589. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4590.  
  4591. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  4592.  
  4593. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  4594.  
  4595. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  4596.  
  4597. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4598.  
  4599. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4600.  
  4601. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  4602. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  4603. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  4604.  
  4605. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4606.  
  4607. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  4608. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  4609.  
  4610. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4611.  
  4612. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  4613.  
  4614. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  4615.  
  4616. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  4617.  
  4618. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  4619. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  4620.  
  4621. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  4622.  
  4623. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  4624.  
  4625.  A range of US hardware and software
  4626. companies are in danger of being dragged
  4627. into the widening scandal over internet
  4628. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  4629. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  4630. Security Agency contractor.
  4631.  
  4632.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  4633. that it has collaborated with technology
  4634. companies to plant �back doors� into
  4635. their systems � or ways for the agency
  4636. secretly to penetrate systems without
  4637. the users� knowledge.
  4638.  
  4639. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  4640.  
  4641. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  4642.  
  4643. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  4644. _______________________________________
  4645. � SSL Inspector ::
  4646.  
  4647. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  4648.  
  4649. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  4650.  
  4651. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  4652. _______________________________________
  4653. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  4654. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  4655.  
  4656. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  4657.  
  4658. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  4659.  
  4660. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  4661.  
  4662. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  4663.  
  4664. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  4665.  
  4666. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  4667.  
  4668. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  4669.  
  4670. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  4671.  
  4672. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  4673. ���������������������������������������
  4674. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  4675. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  4676.  
  4677. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  4678. ���������������������������������������
  4679. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  4680.  
  4681.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  4682. activities is an obscure organization called
  4683. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  4684. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  4685. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  4686. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  4687. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  4688. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  4689. presentation given to journalists by former
  4690. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  4691. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  4692. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  4693. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  4694. be collected, which is then gathered and
  4695. delivered by the DITU.
  4696.  
  4697.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  4698. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  4699. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  4700. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  4701. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  4702. collection, processing, and reporting.
  4703.  
  4704. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  4705.  
  4706. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  4707.  
  4708. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  4709. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  4710. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4711.  
  4712.  
  4713. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  4714.  
  4715. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4716. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4717. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4718.  
  4719. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  4720.  
  4721. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  4722.  
  4723. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  4724.  
  4725. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  4726.  
  4727. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  4728.  
  4729. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  4730.  
  4731.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  4732. by the NSA.
  4733.  
  4734.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  4735. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  4736. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  4737. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  4738. also now has access to some of these documents.
  4739.  
  4740.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  4741. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  4742. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  4743. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  4744. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  4745. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  4746.  
  4747.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  4748. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  4749. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  4750. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  4751. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  4752. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  4753. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  4754. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  4755. Facebook and Microsoft.
  4756.  
  4757. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  4758.  
  4759.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  4760. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  4761. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  4762. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  4763. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  4764. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  4765. and unilateral access to their servers.
  4766.  
  4767.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  4768. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  4769. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  4770. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  4771. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  4772. diving.
  4773.  
  4774.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  4775. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  4776.  
  4777.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  4778. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  4779. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  4780. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  4781. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  4782. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  4783. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  4784. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  4785. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  4786. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  4787. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  4788. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  4789. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  4790. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  4791. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  4792. major US carriers.
  4793.  
  4794. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  4795.  
  4796.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  4797. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  4798. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  4799. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  4800. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  4801. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  4802. engines.
  4803.  
  4804.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  4805. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  4806. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  4807. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  4808. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  4809.  
  4810.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  4811. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  4812. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  4813. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  4814. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  4815. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  4816. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  4817. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  4818. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  4819. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  4820. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  4821. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  4822. companies have been targeted.
  4823.  
  4824.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  4825. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  4826. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  4827. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  4828. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  4829. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  4830. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  4831. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  4832. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  4833. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  4834. _______________________________________
  4835. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  4836.  
  4837. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  4838.  
  4839. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  4840.  
  4841. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  4842.  
  4843. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  4844. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  4845.  
  4846. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  4847.  
  4848. NOBODY comments
  4849.  
  4850.  100% expected. They will continue to
  4851. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  4852. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  4853. We must adjust to it by learning how
  4854. to counter their surveillance.
  4855.  
  4856. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  4857. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  4858.  
  4859.  The United States and its key intelligence
  4860. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  4861. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  4862. Nations to promote a universal human right
  4863. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  4864. sources and an internal American government
  4865. document obtained by The Cable.
  4866.  
  4867.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  4868. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  4869. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  4870. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  4871. internet surveillance by the National
  4872. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  4873. services. American representatives have made
  4874. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  4875. checks on their global surveillance network.
  4876. The stakes are high, particularly in
  4877. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  4878. an international backlash against NSA
  4879. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  4880. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  4881. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  4882.  
  4883. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  4884.  
  4885. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  4886. _______________________________________
  4887. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  4888. Public News Coverage ::
  4889.  
  4890. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  4891. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  4892. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  4893. _______________________________________
  4894. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  4895. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  4896.  
  4897. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  4898. _______________________________________
  4899. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  4900.  
  4901.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  4902. a division for particularly difficult
  4903. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  4904. (TAO), this department devises special
  4905. methods for special targets.
  4906.  
  4907.  That category includes surveillance of
  4908. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  4909. the division reported its mission
  4910. accomplished. A report classified as
  4911. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  4912. exploited a key mail server in the
  4913. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  4914. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  4915. first-ever access to President Felipe
  4916. Calderon�s public email account.�
  4917.  
  4918. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  4919.  
  4920. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  4921.  
  4922. Cryptome comments ?
  4923.  
  4924.  This spying was apparently done from
  4925. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  4926. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  4927. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  4928. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  4929.  
  4930. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  4931.  
  4932. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  4933. _______________________________________
  4934. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  4935.  
  4936. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  4937.  
  4938. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  4939.  
  4940. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4941.  
  4942. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  4943.  
  4944. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4945.  
  4946. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  4947.  
  4948. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  4949.  
  4950. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  4951.  
  4952. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  4953.  
  4954. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  4955.  
  4956. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  4957.  
  4958.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  4959. thought that the NSA should use its
  4960. technology to intercept emails and
  4961. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  4962. terminal to another, and was upset to
  4963. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  4964. That was a line he would only cross,
  4965. deliberately, with court and congressional
  4966. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  4967. but as we now know, the agency added
  4968. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  4969. suspicious communications that transited
  4970. the border of the United States, and
  4971. later began to collect reams of metadata
  4972. in order to analyze it.
  4973.  
  4974.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  4975. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  4976. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  4977. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  4978. in order to provide policymakers with a
  4979. decision advantage. The advantage the
  4980. NSA provided was accurate information
  4981. about what people who interacted with
  4982. the United States said in private about
  4983. their intentions; that gap between saying
  4984. and doing, and the ability to predict
  4985. action from it, allows the president of
  4986. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  4987.  
  4988.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  4989. States� actions don�t always match up
  4990. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  4991. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  4992. our moral authority wanes and our
  4993. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  4994.  
  4995.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  4996. countries are any purer. They never have
  4997. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  4998. purer than others, so the amount of
  4999. resources the intelligence community
  5000. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  5001. to correspond with how honest our allies
  5002. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  5003. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  5004. can we figure out which allies are more
  5005. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  5006. correspondence between public and private
  5007. words and actions.
  5008.  
  5009.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  5010. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  5011. want their leaders to gain a decision
  5012. advantage in the give and take between
  5013. countries. They want to know what US
  5014. policymakers will do before the Americans
  5015. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  5016. France, they aggressively spy on the
  5017. United States, on US citizens and
  5018. politicians, in order to collect that
  5019. information. The difference lies in the
  5020. scale of intelligence collection: The
  5021. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  5022. most sophisticated intelligence community
  5023. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  5024. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  5025. envious.
  5026. _______________________________________
  5027. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  5028.  
  5029. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  5030. _______________________________________
  5031. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  5032.  
  5033. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  5034. ���������������������������������������
  5035. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  5036. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  5037.  
  5038. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  5039. _______________________________________
  5040. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  5041. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  5042.  
  5043. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  5044. _______________________________________
  5045.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  5046. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  5047. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  5048. from the award ceremony are the first of
  5049. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  5050. Russia.
  5051.  
  5052. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  5053. ���������������������������������������
  5054. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  5055.  
  5056.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  5057. of the Security Service, said the
  5058. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  5059. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  5060. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  5061. agencies.
  5062.  
  5063. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  5064.  
  5065. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  5066.  
  5067.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  5068. they are not using Tor.�
  5069.  
  5070. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  5071.  
  5072. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  5073. ---------------------------------------
  5074.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  5075. old bleach log.
  5076.  
  5077. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  5078. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  5079. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  5080. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  5081.  
  5082. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  5083.  
  5084.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  5085. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  5086. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  5087. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  5088. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  5089. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  5090. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  5091. function.
  5092.  
  5093.  There are also various third party
  5094. programs that can produce files in
  5095. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  5096. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  5097.  
  5098.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  5099. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  5100. data stored on the system running the
  5101. Flash player.�
  5102. ---------------------------------------
  5103. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  5104.  
  5105.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  5106. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  5107. It can be found within Windows systems
  5108. and can be wiped out here ;
  5109.  
  5110. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5111. Application Data\Macromedia\
  5112.  
  5113. and may also be cloned here ;
  5114.  
  5115. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  5116.  
  5117.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  5118. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  5119.  
  5120. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  5121.  
  5122. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  5123. Local Settings\Temp\
  5124. ---------------------------------------
  5125. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  5126.  
  5127. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  5128.  
  5129. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  5130.  
  5131. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  5132.  
  5133. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  5134.  
  5135. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  5136.  
  5137. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  5138.  
  5139. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  5140.  
  5141. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  5142.  
  5143. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  5144.  
  5145. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  5146.  
  5147. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  5148.  
  5149. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  5150.  
  5151. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  5152.  
  5153. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  5154. ---------------------------------------
  5155. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  5156.  
  5157.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  5158. application created by Samy Kamkar
  5159. which produces zombie cookies in a
  5160. web browser that are intentionally
  5161. difficult to delete. ... ...
  5162.  
  5163.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  5164. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  5165. by copying itself in different forms on
  5166. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  5167. itself if it notices that some of the
  5168. copies are missing or expired.
  5169.  
  5170.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  5171. Evercookie uses the following storage
  5172. mechanisms when available:
  5173.  
  5174. � Standard HTTP cookies
  5175. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  5176. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  5177. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  5178. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  5179. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  5180. (cookies) back out
  5181. � Storing cookies in Web history
  5182. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  5183. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  5184. � window.name caching
  5185. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  5186. � HTML5 Session Storage
  5187. � HTML5 Local Storage
  5188. � HTML5 Global Storage
  5189. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  5190. ---------------------------------------
  5191. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  5192.  
  5193.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  5194. mean that your browser isn't storing
  5195. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  5196. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  5197. in browser vulnerabilities.
  5198.  
  5199.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  5200. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  5201. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  5202. wide surveillance.
  5203.  
  5204.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  5205. powerful anonymity service, and the
  5206. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  5207. the Internet, makes it easy to
  5208. differentiate Tor users from other
  5209. Web users,� he wrote.
  5210.  
  5211.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  5212. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  5213. identifies you. Even though your IP
  5214. address changed [because of Tor], the
  5215. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  5216.  
  5217. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  5218. ---------------------------------------
  5219. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  5220. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  5221.  
  5222.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  5223. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  5224. �staining� as a means to identify
  5225. individual machines linked to that
  5226. IP address. ... ...
  5227.  
  5228.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  5229. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  5230. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  5231. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  5232. and is stamped into every packet, which
  5233. enables all the events from that stained
  5234. machine to be brought back together to
  5235. recreate a browsing session.�
  5236.  
  5237. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  5238.  
  5239. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  5240.  
  5241. � Packet Staining ::
  5242.  
  5243. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  5244. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  5245. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  5246. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  5247.  
  5248. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  5249.  
  5250. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  5251. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  5252. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  5253. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  5254.  
  5255. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  5256.  
  5257.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  5258. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  5259. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  5260. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  5261. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  5262. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  5263. identify it. We also worked to create
  5264. a custom Tor client which allows the
  5265. user finer control.� ... ...
  5266.  
  5267.  �This accomplishes several things.
  5268. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  5269. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  5270. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  5271. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  5272. be excessively complex, as a single
  5273. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  5274. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  5275. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  5276. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  5277. going to and from the proxy server,
  5278. it is possible to deduce which clients
  5279. are making which requests. Second, if
  5280. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  5281. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  5282. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  5283. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  5284. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  5285. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  5286. must be coordinated across several machines,
  5287. and an attacker must own all the hops
  5288. along the circuit in order to trace
  5289. requests back to the originating client.�
  5290.  
  5291. ... ...
  5292.  
  5293.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  5294. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  5295. a hidden service will turn up the port
  5296. that the hidden service is using to deal
  5297. with incoming connections. It can then be
  5298. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  5299.  
  5300. ... ...
  5301.  
  5302.  �We would have to try to connect to
  5303. each of the ports we see open on a
  5304. machine to determine if there is a
  5305. hidden service being run. We would not
  5306. even know which protocol the hidden
  5307. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  5308. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  5309. etc. The only thing we know is that
  5310. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  5311. not enough to attempt to connect once
  5312. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  5313. Several protocols must be tried.�
  5314.  
  5315. ... ...
  5316.  
  5317.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  5318. directory servers in more detail. Our
  5319. work focused solely on the client, but
  5320. many attacks would be much easier with
  5321. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  5322. servers ultimately control which Tor
  5323. servers are used by clients. We have found
  5324. that a server can put itself on a directory
  5325. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  5326. server running several Tor processes, each
  5327. having a different nickname, open port,
  5328. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  5329. requires different configuration files
  5330. for the different processes, which are
  5331. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  5332. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  5333. since it is listed several times. This
  5334. increases the density of friendly servers
  5335. in the cloud without increasing the number
  5336. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  5337. each listing has the same IP address,
  5338. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  5339. who inspecting the directories.�
  5340.  
  5341. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  5342. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  5343. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  5344.  
  5345. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  5346.  
  5347. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  5348.  
  5349. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  5350.  
  5351. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  5352.  
  5353. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  5354.  
  5355.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  5356. into capabilities the IC has developed
  5357. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  5358. to run multiple research teams (either
  5359. known or unknown to each other) against
  5360. a single target, and a few summer students
  5361. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  5362. small investment. I�d expect there are
  5363. other programs with more sophisticated
  5364. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  5365.  
  5366. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  5367. _______________________________________
  5368. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  5369.  
  5370. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  5371. _______________________________________
  5372. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  5373. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  5374.  
  5375. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  5376.  
  5377.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  5378. the past several months, I�d also thought
  5379. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  5380. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  5381. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  5382. Sasso of The Hill.
  5383.  
  5384.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  5385. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  5386. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  5387. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  5388. help you with that.�
  5389.  
  5390. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  5391.  
  5392.  The conversation then turned specifically
  5393. to the government�s use of targeted
  5394. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  5395. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  5396. hope they make full use of the capacities
  5397. of the National Security Agency when we
  5398. do that.�
  5399.  
  5400.  Hayden was responding to a question
  5401. about a new project announced by journalists
  5402. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  5403. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  5404. assassinations.
  5405.  
  5406. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  5407. _______________________________________
  5408. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  5409.  
  5410. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  5411.  
  5412. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  5413.  
  5414. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  5415. _______________________________________
  5416. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  5417. Breaches ::
  5418.  
  5419. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  5420.  
  5421. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  5422.  
  5423. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  5424. _______________________________________
  5425. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  5426. of US Citizens ::
  5427.  
  5428.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  5429. body of knowledge in recent months about
  5430. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  5431. information concerning Americans, prompting
  5432. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  5433. in the agency and President Obama to order
  5434. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  5435. Almost everything about the agency�s
  5436. operations is hidden, and the decision
  5437. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  5438. was made in secret, without review by the
  5439. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  5440. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  5441. Department memo warned of the potential
  5442. for the �misuse� of such information
  5443. without adequate safeguards.
  5444.  
  5445. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  5446. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  5447. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  5448.  
  5449. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  5450. From American Social Networks ::
  5451.  
  5452. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  5453. _______________________________________
  5454. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  5455. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  5456.  
  5457. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  5458. _______________________________________
  5459. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  5460. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  5461.  
  5462.  Led by the German government, a loose
  5463. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  5464. across the world is pushing to update an
  5465. influential international human rights
  5466. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  5467.  
  5468. ... ...
  5469.  
  5470.  The annual conference was attended by a
  5471. diverse selection of privacy and data
  5472. protection officials from across the
  5473. world, with representatives attending
  5474. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  5475. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  5476. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  5477. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  5478. United Kingdom.
  5479.  
  5480.  During a closed session at the conference
  5481. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  5482. resolution was put forward for a vote
  5483. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  5484. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  5485. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  5486. globally applicable standards for data
  5487. protection and the protection of privacy
  5488. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  5489.  
  5490.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  5491. of the resolution ... the United States.
  5492.  
  5493.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  5494. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  5495. eventually need to be put forward at the
  5496. United Nations and voted on by member
  5497. states, and that could take time. But
  5498. the growing appetite to amend the
  5499. international treaty in light of the
  5500. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  5501. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  5502. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  5503. technology in the digital age to trample
  5504. over basic universal privacy rights.
  5505.  
  5506. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  5507.  
  5508. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  5509.  
  5510. NOBODY comments
  5511.  
  5512.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  5513. all secret agencies around the world,
  5514. in general. All secret agencies and
  5515. their third-party vendors or allies
  5516. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  5517. backdoors in electronic communication
  5518. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  5519. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  5520. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  5521. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  5522. you must kill any trust in security.
  5523.  
  5524.  Security does not exist on the web.
  5525. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  5526. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  5527. _______________________________________
  5528. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  5529.  
  5530. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  5531.  
  5532. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  5533.  
  5534. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  5535. _______________________________________
  5536. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  5537.  
  5538. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  5539. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  5540. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  5541. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  5542. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  5543.  
  5544. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  5545. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  5546.  
  5547. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  5548. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  5549. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  5550.  
  5551.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are tapping the
  5552. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  5553. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  5554. of this) as opposed to �downstream� collection, which
  5555. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  5556.  
  5557. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  5558.  
  5559. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  5560.  
  5561. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  5562.  
  5563. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  5564. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  5565. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  5566. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  5567. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  5568. _______________________________________
  5569. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  5570. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  5571. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  5572.  
  5573. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  5574. _______________________________________
  5575. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  5576.  
  5577.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  5578. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  5579. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  5580. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  5581. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  5582. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  5583. file transfer and social networking services.
  5584.  
  5585.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  5586. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  5587. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  5588. officials.
  5589.  
  5590.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India�s
  5591. domestic politics and the country�s strategic and commercial
  5592. interests.
  5593.  
  5594. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  5595.  
  5596.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  5597. document about �Close Access SIGADs�, the offices of Indian
  5598. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  5599. at these important posts were targets of four different
  5600. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  5601.  
  5602.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  5603. of computers.
  5604.  
  5605. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  5606.  
  5607. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  5608.  
  5609. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  5610.  
  5611. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  5612. _______________________________________
  5613. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  5614.  
  5615.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  5616. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  5617. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  5618. in some cases plan the destruction of, �more than 10,000
  5619. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  5620. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  5621. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  5622. that could threaten US or allied interests.�
  5623.  
  5624. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  5625. _______________________________________
  5626. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  5627.  
  5628. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  5629. _______________________________________
  5630. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  5631. NSA Leaks ::
  5632.  
  5633. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  5634. _______________________________________
  5635. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  5636.  
  5637. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  5638. _______________________________________
  5639. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  5640. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  5641.  
  5642. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  5643. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  5644. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  5645.  
  5646. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  5647. Under United States Control ::
  5648.  
  5649.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  5650. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  5651. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  5652.  
  5653.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  5654. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  5655. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  5656. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  5657. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  5658. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  5659. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it�s,
  5660. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  5661.  
  5662.  �The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  5663. severe in coming months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  5664. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  5665. America Foundation think-tank. �This notion of national
  5666. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  5667. issue around the globe.�
  5668.  
  5669. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  5670. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  5671. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  5672. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  5673.  
  5674. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  5675.  
  5676.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  5677. optic cable system.
  5678.  
  5679. http://www.bricscable.com/
  5680.  
  5681. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  5682. _______________________________________
  5683. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  5684.  
  5685.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  5686. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court�s
  5687. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  5688. PATRIOT Act that�s used to justify the National Security
  5689. Agency�s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  5690. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  5691. orders has ever challenged one.
  5692.  
  5693. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  5694. _______________________________________
  5695. � Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  5696. Revelations ::
  5697.  
  5698.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  5699. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA�s
  5700. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  5701. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  5702. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  5703. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  5704.  
  5705.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  5706. the agency�s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  5707. and its �partnerships� with software and hardware vendors
  5708. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  5709. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  5710. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  5711. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  5712. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  5713. But one thing that�s become clear is that when the government
  5714. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn�t
  5715. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  5716.  
  5717. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  5718.  
  5719. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  5720.  
  5721.  The security community didn�t invent the concept of fear,
  5722. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  5723. it to the level of religion. It�s the way that security products
  5724. are marketed and sold, but it�s also the way that the intelligence
  5725. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  5726. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  5727. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  5728. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  5729. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  5730. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  5731. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  5732. fundamental building blocks of security.
  5733.  
  5734.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  5735. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  5736. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  5737. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  5738. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company�s
  5739. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  5740. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  5741. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  5742.  
  5743. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  5744. _______________________________________
  5745. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  5746.  
  5747.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  5748. President approximately every 45 days,
  5749. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  5750. the activities carried out under these
  5751. Authorizations are referred to as the
  5752. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  5753. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  5754. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  5755. the content of communications into and out
  5756. of the United States where there was a
  5757. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  5758. party to the communication was a member
  5759. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  5760.  
  5761.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  5762. acknowledged and described by the President,
  5763. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  5764. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  5765. a series of articles published in The New York
  5766. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  5767. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  5768. intelligence activities were also authorized
  5769. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  5770. but the details of those activities remain
  5771. classified.� ... ...
  5772.  
  5773.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  5774. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  5775. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  5776. as the principal governing authorities for
  5777. conducting electronic surveillance for
  5778. national security purposes. The Foreign
  5779. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  5780. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  5781. "provide legislative authorization and
  5782. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  5783. conducted within the United States for
  5784. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  5785.  
  5786. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  5787.  
  5788. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  5789. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  5790.  
  5791. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  5792.  
  5793. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  5794.  
  5795.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  5796. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  5797. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  5798. require special approval. Therefore, just
  5799. another gap. Also take in consideration
  5800. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  5801. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  5802. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  5803. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  5804. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  5805. _______________________________________
  5806. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  5807. Firm ::
  5808.  
  5809.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  5810. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  5811. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  5812. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  5813. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  5814. A �top secret� Government Communications
  5815. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  5816. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  5817. conducted under the codename �Operation
  5818. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  5819. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  5820. improve understanding of the provider�s
  5821. infrastructure. ... ...
  5822.  
  5823.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  5824. presentation, the attack was directed
  5825. at several Belgacom employees and
  5826. involved the planting of a highly
  5827. developed attack technology referred
  5828. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  5829. appears to be a method with which the
  5830. person being targeted, without their
  5831. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  5832. that then plant malware on their
  5833. computers that can then manipulate
  5834. them. Some of the employees whose
  5835. computers were infiltrated had �good
  5836. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  5837. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  5838. please the British spies, according
  5839. to the slides.
  5840.    
  5841. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  5842. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  5843. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  5844. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  5845. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  5846. _______________________________________
  5847. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  5848.  
  5849. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  5850.  
  5851. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  5852. _______________________________________
  5853. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  5854.  
  5855. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  5856. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  5857. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  5858. _______________________________________
  5859. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  5860. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  5861.  
  5862. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  5863. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  5864. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  5865. _______________________________________
  5866. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  5867.  
  5868. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  5869. ���������������������������������������
  5870. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  5871. Allocated to One Release ::
  5872.  
  5873. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  5874.  
  5875. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  5876.  
  5877. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  5878.  
  5879. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  5880. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  5881.  
  5882. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  5883.  
  5884. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  5885. Schedule ::
  5886.  
  5887. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5888.  
  5889. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5890.  
  5891. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5892.  
  5893. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5894.  
  5895. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5896.  
  5897. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5898.  
  5899. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5900. ���������������������������������������
  5901. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  5902.  
  5903.  In response to a FOIA request from
  5904. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  5905. its ethics office never looked into
  5906. complaints from two federal judges
  5907. that they had been misled about NSA
  5908. surveillance.
  5909.  
  5910. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  5911. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  5912. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  5913. ���������������������������������������
  5914.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  5915. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  5916. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  5917. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  5918. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  5919.  
  5920. Livestream will be at:
  5921.  
  5922. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  5923. _______________________________________
  5924. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  5925. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  5926.  
  5927. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  5928.  
  5929. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  5930. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  5931. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  5932.  
  5933. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  5934.  
  5935.  The Director of National Intelligence
  5936. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  5937. pages of documents related to the
  5938. government�s secret interpretation of
  5939. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  5940. (mis)use of its massive database of
  5941. every American�s phone records. The
  5942. documents were released as a result
  5943. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  5944. Act lawsuit.
  5945.  
  5946.  We�ve posted links to each document
  5947. below. While the government also posted
  5948. many of the documents here ...
  5949.  
  5950. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  5951.  
  5952. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  5953.  
  5954. Links to the documents ;
  5955.  
  5956. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  5957. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  5958.  
  5959. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5960.  
  5961. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  5962. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5963. Court
  5964.  
  5965. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5966.  
  5967. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  5968. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  5969. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5970. Court
  5971.  
  5972. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5973.  
  5974. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  5975. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  5976. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5977. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  5978.  
  5979. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5980.  
  5981. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  5982. Incident
  5983.  
  5984. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5985.  
  5986. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  5987. Intelligence Court
  5988.  
  5989. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5990.  
  5991. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  5992. Intelligence Court
  5993.  
  5994. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5995.  
  5996. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  5997. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  5998. Business Records FISA
  5999.  
  6000. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6001.  
  6002. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  6003. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  6004.  
  6005. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  6006.  
  6007. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  6008. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  6009.  
  6010. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6011.  
  6012. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  6013. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  6014. Surveillance Court
  6015.  
  6016. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6017.  
  6018. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  6019. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  6020. Surveillance Court
  6021.  
  6022. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  6023.  
  6024. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  6025. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  6026.  
  6027. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  6028.  
  6029. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  6030. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  6031.  
  6032. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  6033. _______________________________________
  6034. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  6035.  
  6036. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  6037.  
  6038. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  6039.  
  6040. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  6041. ���������������������������������������
  6042. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  6043.  
  6044. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  6045. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  6046. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  6047. _______________________________________
  6048. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  6049. Over Data to the NSA ::
  6050.  
  6051.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6052. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  6053. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  6054. media report. The revelation comes as
  6055. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  6056. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  6057. troves of data with the US and UK.
  6058.  
  6059.  Citing secret government documents,
  6060. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  6061. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  6062. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  6063. with domestic security, works closely
  6064. with the US and regularly sends them
  6065. information.
  6066.  
  6067.  The security service gathers intelligence
  6068. on internal security threats. The documents
  6069. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  6070. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  6071. well as regular meetings between officers
  6072. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  6073.  
  6074. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  6075. _______________________________________
  6076. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  6077. Revelations ::
  6078.  
  6079. This is an unofficial translation.
  6080.  
  6081. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  6082.  
  6083.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  6084. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  6085. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  6086.  
  6087. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  6088.  
  6089. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  6090. _______________________________________
  6091. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  6092.  
  6093. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  6094. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  6095. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  6096. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  6097. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  6098. _______________________________________
  6099. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  6100.  
  6101. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  6102.  
  6103. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  6104.  
  6105. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  6106. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  6107.  
  6108. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  6109.  
  6110. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  6111.  
  6112.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  6113. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  6114. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  6115. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  6116. and control over natural resources.
  6117. _______________________________________
  6118. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  6119.  
  6120.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  6121. machines to read.
  6122.  
  6123. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  6124. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  6125. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  6126. _______________________________________
  6127. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  6128.  
  6129. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  6130.  
  6131. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  6132. _______________________________________
  6133. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  6134. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  6135. National Unit ::
  6136.  
  6137.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  6138. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  6139. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  6140. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  6141. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  6142. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  6143. it Wednesday.
  6144.  
  6145.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  6146. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  6147. raw signals intelligence, referred
  6148. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  6149. swathes of digital data traffic that
  6150. the agency gathers under secret court
  6151. authority from US Internet providers.
  6152.  
  6153.  So sensitive is this data that even
  6154. before being disseminated to other US
  6155. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  6156. to a court-mandated process called
  6157. minimization, under which the names
  6158. of any Americans are removed unless
  6159. they are essential for foreign
  6160. intelligence interest.
  6161.  
  6162.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  6163. that the data shared with Israel
  6164. �includes, but is not limited to,
  6165. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  6166. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  6167. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  6168. and content.�
  6169.  
  6170.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  6171. and unminimized raw collection associated
  6172. with selectors from multiple Target office
  6173. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  6174. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  6175. relationship between the two organizations.�
  6176.  
  6177. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  6178. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  6179. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  6180. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  6181. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  6182. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  6183.  
  6184.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  6185. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  6186. that spy most aggressively against the
  6187. United States.
  6188.  
  6189.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6190. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6191. insider threat detection capabilities
  6192. across the Community. In addition, we
  6193. are investing in target surveillance
  6194. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6195. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6196. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  6197.  
  6198. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6199. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6200. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6201.  
  6202. NOBODY comments
  6203.  
  6204.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  6205. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  6206. plenty of inside information.
  6207.  
  6208.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  6209. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  6210. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  6211.  
  6212. This reminds of a quote ;
  6213.  
  6214.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  6215. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  6216. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  6217. to play out one big game of destruction
  6218. and domination with humans as the visible
  6219. and spiritual puppets?�
  6220. _______________________________________
  6221. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  6222.  
  6223. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  6224. _______________________________________
  6225. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  6226.  
  6227. (EN)
  6228. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6229.  
  6230. (DE)
  6231. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  6232.  
  6233. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  6234.  
  6235.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  6236. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  6237. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  6238. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  6239. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  6240. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  6241. deployed in a government intelligence
  6242. agency presentation.
  6243.  
  6244. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6245. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  6246. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  6247. ���������������������������������������
  6248. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  6249. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  6250.  
  6251.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  6252. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  6253. reverse restrictions on the National
  6254. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  6255. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  6256. the agency to search deliberately for
  6257. Americans� communications in its massive
  6258. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  6259. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  6260. �declassified material� - (which, by
  6261. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  6262. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  6263. of which agency it came from and most
  6264. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  6265.  
  6266. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  6267.  
  6268.  In addition, the court extended the
  6269. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  6270. to retain intercepted US communications
  6271. from five years to six years � and more
  6272. under special circumstances, according
  6273. to the documents, which include a
  6274. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  6275. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  6276. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6277. Surveillance Court.
  6278.  
  6279. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6280.  
  6281. NOBODY comments
  6282.  
  6283.  The document which was declassified by
  6284. US intelligence officials explains the
  6285. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6286. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  6287. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  6288.  
  6289. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6290. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6291. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6292.  
  6293.  National Security Agency analysts
  6294. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6295. their authority to spy on Americans.
  6296.  
  6297. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6298.  
  6299.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  6300. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  6301.  
  6302. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6303.  
  6304. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6305.  
  6306.  And this is not the first attempt to
  6307. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  6308.  
  6309. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6310.  
  6311. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6312.  
  6313.  The new Washington Post report has
  6314. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  6315. (press) release exposing yet another
  6316. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  6317. or take responsibility for the abuses
  6318. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  6319.  
  6320. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6321.  
  6322.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  6323. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  6324.  
  6325.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  6326. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  6327.  
  6328.  All of this information is backed up
  6329. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  6330. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  6331. 2,776 violations one year after the
  6332. FISA Court order.
  6333.  
  6334. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6335.  
  6336.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  6337. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  6338. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  6339. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  6340. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  6341. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  6342. them out of office come next election.
  6343. _______________________________________
  6344. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  6345.  
  6346. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  6347. _______________________________________
  6348. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  6349.  
  6350. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  6351.  
  6352.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  6353. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  6354. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  6355.  
  6356. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  6357.  
  6358. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  6359.  
  6360. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  6361.  
  6362. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  6363.  
  6364. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  6365.  
  6366. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  6367.  
  6368. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  6369.  
  6370. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6371. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6372. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  6373. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  6374.  
  6375. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  6376.  
  6377.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  6378. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  6379. reports that the US National Security Agency
  6380. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  6381.  
  6382.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  6383. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  6384. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  6385. Tuesday.
  6386.  
  6387.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  6388. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  6389. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  6390. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  6391. several of her top aides, and tapped
  6392. her phone.
  6393.  
  6394. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  6395.  
  6396. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  6397. Impacted ::
  6398.  
  6399.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  6400. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  6401. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  6402. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  6403. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  6404. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  6405.  
  6406.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  6407. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  6408. visit to Washington in October, the
  6409. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  6410. year, or will take action on digital
  6411. security that may affect US companies
  6412. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  6413.  
  6414.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  6415. a proposal that would suspend operations
  6416. of companies that cooperate with the
  6417. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  6418.  
  6419. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  6420. _______________________________________
  6421. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  6422.  
  6423. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  6424.  
  6425. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  6426.  
  6427. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  6428. ���������������������������������������
  6429. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  6430.  
  6431.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6432. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6433. collect against high priority targets,
  6434. including foreign leadership targets.
  6435. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6436. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6437. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6438. internet traffic.�
  6439.  
  6440. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6441.  
  6442. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6443.  
  6444. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  6445.  
  6446. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  6447.  
  6448. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  6449.  
  6450. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  6451.  
  6452.  �The Post is withholding some information
  6453. after consultation with US officials who
  6454. expressed concerns about the risk to
  6455. intelligence sources and methods.
  6456. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  6457. the documents that The Post is publishing
  6458. only summary tables and charts online.�
  6459.  
  6460. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  6461.  
  6462. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6463. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  6464.  
  6465. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  6466.  
  6467. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  6468.  
  6469. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6470. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  6471.  
  6472. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  6473.  
  6474. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  6475.  
  6476. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  6477.  
  6478.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  6479. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  6480. intelligence services, leaked documents
  6481. reveal.
  6482.  
  6483.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  6484. to have an aggressive intelligence
  6485. collection operations against the
  6486. United States,� Pillar said. While
  6487. much information is collected through
  6488. traditional political contacts, �I
  6489. would personally have no doubt that
  6490. that is supplemented by whatever means
  6491. they can use to find out as much as
  6492. they can about what we�re doing,
  6493. thinking, deciding on anything of
  6494. interest to Israel, which would include
  6495. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  6496.  
  6497. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6498.  
  6499. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  6500.  
  6501.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6502. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6503. insider threat detection capabilities
  6504. across the Community. In addition, we
  6505. are investing in target surveillance
  6506. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6507. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6508. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  6509. _______________________________________
  6510. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  6511.  
  6512.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  6513. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  6514. the worst part is the Received headers.
  6515. Everyone should look at their own headers
  6516. -- especially people on this list and
  6517. at least comprehend that your email
  6518. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  6519. the Mailman archive.
  6520.  
  6521.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  6522. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  6523. the actual separators in MIME part
  6524. breaks, and so on.
  6525.  
  6526.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  6527. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  6528. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  6529. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  6530. don�t do it all the time.
  6531.  
  6532.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  6533. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  6534. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  6535. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  6536. is that this tells us that the crypto
  6537. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  6538. for quite some time.
  6539.  
  6540.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  6541. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  6542. that works being deployed everywhere.
  6543. What do you do? You just be patient and
  6544. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  6545. analysis.
  6546.  
  6547. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  6548.  
  6549. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  6550.  
  6551. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  6552.  
  6553.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  6554. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  6555. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  6556. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  6557. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  6558. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  6559. reveal.
  6560.  
  6561. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  6562.  
  6563.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6564. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6565. collect against high priority targets,
  6566. including foreign leadership targets.
  6567. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6568. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6569. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6570. internet traffic.� ... ...
  6571.  
  6572. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  6573.  
  6574.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  6575. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  6576. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  6577. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  6578. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  6579. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  6580.  
  6581.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  6582. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  6583.  
  6584. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6585.  
  6586. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6587.  
  6588. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  6589.  
  6590. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  6591.  
  6592. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  6593.  
  6594.  The US government has attempted to
  6595. obtain the master encryption keys that
  6596. Internet companies use to shield millions
  6597. of users� private web communications
  6598. from eavesdropping.
  6599.  
  6600.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  6601. which have not been disclosed previously,
  6602. represent a technological escalation in
  6603. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  6604. the National Security Agency employ when
  6605. conducting electronic surveillance against
  6606. Internet users. ... ...
  6607.  
  6608.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  6609. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  6610. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  6611. communications are typically destroyed
  6612. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  6613. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  6614. of all communications that are enciphered�
  6615. is permissible.
  6616.  
  6617. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  6618. _______________________________________
  6619. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  6620. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  6621.  
  6622.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  6623. intercepts well before 2001, former
  6624. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  6625. secretive Special Services Office,
  6626. these types of programs were at first
  6627. designed to intercept communications
  6628. overseas through arrangements with
  6629. foreign Internet providers, the former
  6630. officials say. NSA still has such
  6631. arrangements in many countries,
  6632. particularly in the Middle East and
  6633. Europe, the former officials say.�
  6634.  
  6635. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  6636.  
  6637. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  6638.  
  6639. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  6640. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  6641. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  6642. ���������������������������������������
  6643. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  6644. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  6645.  
  6646.  A common hacking technique can be used
  6647. to make emails look as if they came from
  6648. outside the United States.
  6649.  
  6650. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  6651. _______________________________________
  6652. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  6653. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  6654.  
  6655. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  6656.  
  6657. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  6658.  
  6659. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  6660.  
  6661. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  6662. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  6663. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  6664. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  6665. ���������������������������������������
  6666. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  6667. Patrick Leahy ::
  6668.  
  6669. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  6670.  
  6671. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  6672.  
  6673. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  6674. _______________________________________
  6675. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  6676.  
  6677.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  6678. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6679. their authority to spy on Americans
  6680. multiple times in the past decade,
  6681. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  6682. and lawmakers� statements that no
  6683. willful violations occurred. ...
  6684.  
  6685.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  6686. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  6687. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  6688. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  6689. of having links to terrorism, before a
  6690. secret court that oversees surveillance
  6691. found the operation unconstitutional
  6692. in 2011.
  6693.  
  6694. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6695.  
  6696. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  6697. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  6698. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  6699.  
  6700.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  6701. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  6702. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  6703. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  6704. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  6705.  
  6706.  The documents were released in response
  6707. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  6708. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  6709.  
  6710.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  6711. litigation and the most significant leak
  6712. in American history to finally get them
  6713. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  6714. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  6715. �but I�m happy that the administration
  6716. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  6717.  
  6718. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6719. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6720. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6721.  
  6722. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  6723.  
  6724. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6725.  
  6726. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6727.  
  6728. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  6729.  
  6730. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6731.  
  6732. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6733.  
  6734. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  6735. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  6736.  
  6737. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6738. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  6739. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  6740. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  6741. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  6742. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  6743.  
  6744.  The account is based on top-secret
  6745. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  6746. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  6747. including unauthorized collection,
  6748. storage, access to or distribution of
  6749. legally protected communications � in
  6750. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  6751. originally only meant to be seen by top
  6752. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  6753. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  6754. and other locations in the Washington DC
  6755. region.
  6756.  
  6757. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  6758.  
  6759.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  6760. and other things, there�s people talking
  6761. about privacy violations or abuses or
  6762. willful or violations, right, it is
  6763. important for people to understand,
  6764. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  6765. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  6766. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  6767.  
  6768.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  6769. We detect them, as early as we can.
  6770. We correct them, right. None of the
  6771. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  6772. the document released were willful.
  6773. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  6774. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  6775. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  6776.  
  6777. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  6778.  
  6779. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  6780. Database Queries Per Month ::
  6781.  
  6782. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  6783.  
  6784. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  6785.  
  6786. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  6787. _______________________________________
  6788. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  6789.  
  6790.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  6791. station in the Middle East to intercept
  6792. and process vast quantities of emails,
  6793. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  6794. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  6795. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  6796.  
  6797.  The information is then processed for
  6798. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  6799. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  6800. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  6801. The Government claims the station is a
  6802. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  6803. and provides a vital �early warning�
  6804. system for potential attacks around
  6805. the world.
  6806.  
  6807.  The Independent is not revealing the
  6808. precise location of the station but
  6809. information on its activities was
  6810. contained in the leaked documents
  6811. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  6812. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  6813. these documents in recent months has
  6814. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  6815. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  6816. the destruction of hard drives containing
  6817. the data. ... ...
  6818.  
  6819.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  6820. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  6821. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  6822. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  6823. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  6824. the global interception of digital
  6825. communications, such as emails and text
  6826. messages.
  6827.  
  6828.  Across three sites, communications �
  6829. including telephone calls � are tracked
  6830. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  6831. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  6832.  
  6833. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  6834. ���������������������������������������
  6835. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  6836.  
  6837. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  6838. _______________________________________
  6839. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  6840. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  6841. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  6842. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  6843. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  6844. E Grassley ::
  6845.  
  6846. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  6847.  
  6848. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  6849.  
  6850. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  6851.  
  6852. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  6853.  
  6854. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  6855.  
  6856. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  6857.  
  6858. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  6859.  
  6860. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  6861.  
  6862. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  6863.  
  6864. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  6865.  
  6866. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  6867. Congress ::
  6868.  
  6869.  �I can now confirm that the House
  6870. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  6871. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  6872. available to Representatives in Congress,
  6873. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  6874. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  6875. the now declassified documents detailing
  6876. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  6877.  
  6878. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  6879.  
  6880. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  6881.  
  6882. ?
  6883.  
  6884. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  6885.  
  6886.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  6887. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  6888. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  6889. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  6890. discussions with the president when he
  6891. first came on board we talked to him about
  6892. these programs and the issue was how do
  6893. we know the compliance is there and what
  6894. more could we do? We stood up working with
  6895. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  6896. of compliance. This directorate of
  6897. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  6898. and information specialists that can look
  6899. at everything that we do in these programs
  6900. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  6901. orders but we also have oversight from
  6902. the Director of National Intelligence,
  6903. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  6904. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  6905. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  6906. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  6907. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  6908. _______________________________________
  6909. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  6910.  
  6911.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  6912. public so far.
  6913.  
  6914. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  6915. _______________________________________
  6916. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  6917.  
  6918. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  6919. _______________________________________
  6920. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  6921. Data Lab ::
  6922.  
  6923. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  6924.  
  6925. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  6926. _______________________________________
  6927. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  6928. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  6929.  
  6930. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  6931. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  6932. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  6933. _______________________________________
  6934. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  6935.  
  6936.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  6937. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  6938. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  6939. there since he assumed the position
  6940. of Secretary of State. He has already
  6941. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  6942. � where officials demanded an explanation
  6943. to reports that Washington had collected
  6944. vast amounts of internet data there.
  6945. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  6946. which allegedly was the top regional
  6947. target of the surveillance program.
  6948.  
  6949. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  6950.  
  6951. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  6952.  
  6953. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  6954. Surveillance ::
  6955.  
  6956. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  6957.  
  6958. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  6959.  
  6960. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  6961. _______________________________________
  6962. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  6963.  
  6964. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  6965. ���������������������������������������
  6966. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  6967.  
  6968. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  6969.  
  6970. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  6971.  
  6972. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  6973.  
  6974. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  6975.  
  6976. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  6977. _______________________________________
  6978. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  6979.  
  6980. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  6981.  
  6982. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  6983. _______________________________________
  6984. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  6985.  
  6986. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  6987.  
  6988.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  6989. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  6990. use of certain United States person names
  6991. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  6992. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  6993. implement any USP queries until an effective
  6994. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  6995. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  6996. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  6997. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  6998. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  6999. databases).�
  7000.  
  7001. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  7002.  
  7003. NOBODY comments
  7004.  
  7005. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  7006.  
  7007. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7008.  
  7009.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7010. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7011. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7012. communications not related to foreign
  7013. information or foreign activity for up
  7014. to five years.
  7015.  
  7016.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  7017. acquired communications of or concerning a
  7018. United States person may be retained no
  7019. longer than five years in any event.�
  7020.  
  7021.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  7022. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  7023. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  7024. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  7025. communications that have been stored.
  7026. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  7027. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  7028. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  7029. to �communications security vulnerability�
  7030. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  7031. _______________________________________
  7032. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  7033.  
  7034. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  7035. _______________________________________
  7036. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  7037.  
  7038. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  7039. _______________________________________
  7040. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  7041. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  7042.  
  7043.  As the steady stream of revelations
  7044. continues, the White House has choosen
  7045. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  7046. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  7047.  
  7048. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  7049. _______________________________________
  7050. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  7051.  
  7052. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  7053.  
  7054. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  7055. Spying Press Conference ::
  7056.  
  7057.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  7058. Presidential press conference in which the
  7059. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  7060. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  7061. that Obama told today about the program
  7062. by citing multiple articles with information
  7063. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  7064.  
  7065. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  7066. ���������������������������������������
  7067. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  7068. Partners ::
  7069.  
  7070. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  7071. ���������������������������������������
  7072. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  7073. Metadata ::
  7074.  
  7075. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  7076. ���������������������������������������
  7077. � National Security Run Amok ::
  7078.  
  7079. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  7080. _______________________________________
  7081.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  7082. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  7083. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  7084. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  7085.  
  7086. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  7087.  
  7088.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  7089. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  7090. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  7091. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  7092. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  7093. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  7094. for including former senators Hillary
  7095. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  7096.  
  7097. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  7098.  
  7099. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  7100. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  7101.  
  7102. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  7103.  
  7104. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7105.  
  7106. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  7107. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  7108.  
  7109. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  7110.  
  7111.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  7112. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  7113.  
  7114. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  7115. ���������������������������������������
  7116. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  7117.  
  7118. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  7119.  
  7120. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  7121.  
  7122. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  7123.  
  7124. NOBODY comments
  7125.  
  7126. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  7127.  
  7128.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  7129. the document was still classified. It was
  7130. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  7131.  
  7132. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7133.  
  7134.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  7135. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  7136. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  7137. many of these operations being leaked.
  7138. _______________________________________
  7139. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  7140. on Brazilian Television ::
  7141.  
  7142. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  7143. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  7144. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  7145.  
  7146. NOBODY comments
  7147.  
  7148.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  7149. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  7150.  
  7151.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  7152. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  7153. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  7154.  
  7155. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  7156. ���������������������������������������
  7157. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7158. English Report ::
  7159.  
  7160.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  7161. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  7162. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  7163. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  7164. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  7165. matters is also much closer than first
  7166. thought. ... ...
  7167.  
  7168.  Day after day and month after month,
  7169. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  7170. amounts of connection data relating
  7171. to the communications it had placed
  7172. under surveillance. The so-called
  7173. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  7174. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  7175. into the Americans� giant databases.
  7176.  
  7177. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  7178.  
  7179. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  7180. Deutsch Report ::
  7181.  
  7182. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  7183.  
  7184. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  7185.  
  7186. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  7187. ���������������������������������������
  7188. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  7189.  
  7190. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  7191. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  7192. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  7193.  
  7194. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  7195.  
  7196. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  7197.  
  7198.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  7199. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  7200. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  7201. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  7202. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  7203. the Guardian�s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  7204. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  7205.  
  7206. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  7207. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  7208. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  7209. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  7210.  
  7211. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  7212.  
  7213. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  7214.  
  7215. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  7216.  
  7217. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  7218.  
  7219. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  7220.  
  7221. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  7222.  
  7223. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  7224.  
  7225. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  7226.  
  7227. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  7228.  
  7229. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  7230.  
  7231. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  7232.  
  7233. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  7234.  
  7235. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  7236.  
  7237. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  7238.  
  7239.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  7240. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  7241. they are shunted off to various �production
  7242. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  7243. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  7244. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  7245. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  7246. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  7247. stored in a database called MARINA and
  7248. is generally retained for five years.
  7249.  
  7250. ... ...
  7251.  
  7252.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  7253. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  7254. to change the surveillance laws once the
  7255. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  7256. This was for a simple reason: they did
  7257. not want to be responsible for a program
  7258. that was not legal.�
  7259.  
  7260. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  7261.  
  7262. NOBODY comments
  7263.  
  7264.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7265. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7266. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7267. communications not related to foreign
  7268. information or foreign activity for up
  7269. to five years.
  7270.  
  7271.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  7272. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  7273. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  7274. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  7275. ���������������������������������������
  7276. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  7277. for GCHQ Bude ::
  7278.  
  7279. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  7280. _______________________________________
  7281. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  7282. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  7283.  
  7284.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  7285. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  7286. counterfeiting and even copyright
  7287. infringement complain that their
  7288. attempts to exploit the security
  7289. agency�s vast resources have often
  7290. been turned down because their own
  7291. investigations are not considered a
  7292. high enough priority, current and
  7293. former government officials say.
  7294.  
  7295.  Intelligence officials say they have
  7296. been careful to limit the use of the
  7297. security agency�s troves of data and
  7298. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  7299. could be misused in ways that violate
  7300. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  7301.  
  7302.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  7303. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  7304. senior intelligence official at the
  7305. White House and at the office of the
  7306. director of national intelligence.
  7307. �They collect all this information,
  7308. but it�s difficult for the other
  7309. agencies to get access to what
  7310. they want.�
  7311.  
  7312. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  7313. _______________________________________
  7314. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  7315. Security Forum ::
  7316.  
  7317. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  7318.  
  7319. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  7320. Conference ::
  7321.  
  7322. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  7323.  
  7324. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  7325. Conference ::
  7326.  
  7327. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7328. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  7329. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  7330.  
  7331.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7332. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7333. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7334. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7335. discussions with the president when he
  7336. first came on board we talked to him about
  7337. these programs and the issue was how do
  7338. we know the compliance is there and what
  7339. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7340. the committees in Congress a directorate
  7341. of compliance. This directorate of
  7342. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7343. and information specialists that can look
  7344. at everything that we do in these programs
  7345. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7346. orders but we also have oversight from
  7347. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7348. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7349. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7350. from the White House, from Congress, the
  7351. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7352. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7353.  
  7354. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  7355. Blackhat Conference ::
  7356.  
  7357. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  7358.  
  7359. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  7360.  
  7361. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  7362.  
  7363. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  7364.  
  7365. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  7366.  
  7367. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  7368.  
  7369. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  7370. _______________________________________
  7371. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  7372.  
  7373. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  7374.  
  7375. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  7376. All Domestic Calls ::
  7377.  
  7378.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  7379. three documents related to the National
  7380. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  7381. records, including briefings to Congress
  7382. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  7383. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  7384. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7385. Court that outlines rules that must be
  7386. followed when accessing data provided by
  7387. a Verizon subsidiary.
  7388.  
  7389. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  7390.  
  7391.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  7392. what the government was doing with the
  7393. Patriot Act program, several senators
  7394. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  7395. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  7396. the law in a twisted way to do something
  7397. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  7398. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  7399. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  7400. Act to obtain that document.
  7401.  
  7402. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  7403. _______________________________________
  7404. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  7405.  
  7406. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  7407.  
  7408. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  7409. _______________________________________
  7410. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  7411.  
  7412.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  7413. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  7414. two or three years ago.�
  7415.  
  7416. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  7417. _______________________________________
  7418. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7419. Received Dox ::
  7420.  
  7421. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  7422. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  7423. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  7424. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  7425. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  7426.  
  7427. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  7428.  
  7429. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  7430.  
  7431. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7432. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  7433.  
  7434.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  7435. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  7436. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  7437. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  7438. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  7439. twice as much campaign financing from
  7440. the defense and intelligence industry
  7441. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  7442.  
  7443. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  7444.  
  7445. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  7446. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  7447.  
  7448. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  7449. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  7450. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  7451.  
  7452. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  7453.  
  7454. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  7455.  
  7456. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  7457. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  7458.  
  7459. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  7460. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  7461. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  7462. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  7463.  
  7464. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  7465. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  7466.  
  7467.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  7468. disclosures, the President has said
  7469. that he welcomes a debate about how
  7470. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  7471. our national security and the privacy
  7472. of our citizens.  The Administration
  7473. has taken various proactive steps to
  7474. advance this debate including the
  7475. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  7476. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  7477. his public statements on the disclosed
  7478. programs, the Office of the Director
  7479. of National Intelligence�s release of
  7480. its own public statements, ODNI General
  7481. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  7482. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  7483. disclose publicly that the Administration
  7484. filed an application with the Foreign
  7485. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  7486. look forward to continuing to discuss
  7487. these critical issues with the American
  7488. people and the Congress.
  7489.  
  7490.  However, we oppose the current effort
  7491. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  7492. of our Intelligence Community�s
  7493. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  7494. approach is not the product of an
  7495. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  7496. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  7497. Amendment, and instead move forward
  7498. with an approach that appropriately
  7499. takes into account the need for a
  7500. reasoned review of what tools can
  7501. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  7502.  
  7503. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  7504.  
  7505. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  7506.  
  7507. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  7508. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  7509.  
  7510. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  7511.  
  7512. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  7513. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  7514. to Defund NSA ::
  7515.  
  7516. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  7517. _______________________________________
  7518.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  7519. official letter from the NSA, which was
  7520. sent to the German government to clarify
  7521. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  7522. because German media and politics were
  7523. heavily confused after it became clear
  7524. that there�s more than one program named
  7525. PRISM.
  7526.  
  7527.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  7528. data collection program is about and
  7529. then confirms that this program is
  7530. different from a more common military
  7531. web tool called "Planning tool for
  7532. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  7533. and Management" (PRISM).
  7534.  
  7535.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  7536. there�s even a third program called
  7537. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  7538. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  7539. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  7540. apparently an internal NSA information
  7541. sharing program. It was unknown until
  7542. now, probably because it�s used in the
  7543. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  7544. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  7545.  
  7546.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  7547. different PRISM programs:
  7548.  
  7549. 1. PRISM
  7550.  
  7551.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  7552. of collecting information about foreign
  7553. targets from data of nine major US
  7554. internet companies. This program started
  7555. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  7556. in June 2013.
  7557.  
  7558. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  7559. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  7560.  
  7561.  This is a web tool used by US military
  7562. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  7563. to data collection platforms deployed to
  7564. military operations. This program is
  7565. not very secret and was first mentioned
  7566. in 2002.
  7567.  
  7568. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  7569. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  7570.  
  7571.  This is an internal NSA program for
  7572. real-time sharing of information,
  7573. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  7574. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  7575. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  7576.  
  7577. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  7578.  
  7579. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  7580. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  7581.  
  7582.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  7583. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  7584. surveillance activities in Germany.
  7585. It only added to the mystery. A US
  7586. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  7587. that there are actually three unrelated
  7588. Prism programs. ... ...
  7589.  
  7590.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  7591. and Maassen, officials also read a
  7592. written statement from the NSA in
  7593. response to a query from the German
  7594. government. According to the statement,
  7595. there are three separate Prism programs,
  7596. all of them unconnected to each other.
  7597. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  7598. said that one of the Prism programs was
  7599. only used internally. That program had
  7600. thus far remained secret. Another of
  7601. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  7602. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  7603. -- vaguely described in the statement
  7604. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  7605. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  7606. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  7607. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  7608.  
  7609. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  7610.  
  7611. NOBODY comments
  7612.  
  7613.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  7614. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  7615. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  7616. _______________________________________
  7617. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  7618.  
  7619. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  7620.  
  7621. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  7622.  
  7623. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  7624.  
  7625.  Description and drawings by US Army
  7626. Corps of Engineers.
  7627.  
  7628. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  7629. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  7630. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  7631. _______________________________________
  7632. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  7633.  
  7634. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  7635.  
  7636. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  7637.  
  7638. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  7639. ���������������������������������������
  7640. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  7641.  
  7642. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  7643.  
  7644. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  7645.  
  7646. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  7647.  
  7648. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  7649.  
  7650. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  7651. _______________________________________
  7652. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  7653.  
  7654.  �First, the United States would not seek
  7655. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  7656. return to the United States. The charges
  7657. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  7658. and the United States would not seek the
  7659. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  7660. charged with additional, death penalty-
  7661. eligible crimes.�
  7662.  
  7663. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  7664.  
  7665. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  7666. _______________________________________
  7667. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  7668. Peace Prize ::
  7669.  
  7670.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  7671. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  7672. agency�s data collection program, has
  7673. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  7674.  
  7675.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  7676. at great personal cost � revealed the
  7677. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  7678. the US government devotes electronic
  7679. communications worldwide,� read the
  7680. nomination. �By putting light on this
  7681. monitoring program � conducted in
  7682. contravention of national laws and
  7683. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  7684. has helped to make the world a little
  7685. bit better and safer.� ...
  7686.  
  7687.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  7688. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  7689. to being well justified in itself �
  7690. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  7691. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  7692. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  7693. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  7694. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  7695.  
  7696. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  7697. _______________________________________
  7698. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  7699. Komsomolets News ::
  7700.  
  7701. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  7702. ���������������������������������������
  7703. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  7704. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  7705.  
  7706.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  7707. his experience when he received a Foreign
  7708. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  7709. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  7710. federal government to monitor a customer
  7711. of his.
  7712.  
  7713.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  7714. contained a broad gag order, which still
  7715. prevents him from telling all the details.
  7716.  
  7717.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  7718. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  7719. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  7720. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  7721.  
  7722.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  7723. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  7724. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  7725. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  7726.  
  7727.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  7728. facility that was capturing all of the
  7729. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  7730. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  7731. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  7732. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  7733.  
  7734. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  7735. _______________________________________
  7736. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  7737.  
  7738. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  7739. _______________________________________
  7740. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  7741.  
  7742. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  7743. ���������������������������������������
  7744. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  7745. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  7746.  
  7747.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  7748. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  7749. representative rather casually indicated
  7750. that the government looks at data from
  7751. a universe of far, far more people than
  7752. previously indicated.
  7753.  
  7754.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  7755. was one of several government representatives
  7756. �including from the FBI and the office of
  7757. the Director of National Intelligence�
  7758. testifying before the House Judiciary
  7759. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  7760. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  7761. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  7762. surveillance, including a retread of the
  7763. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  7764. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7765. Act had stopped terror events.
  7766.  
  7767.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  7768. look �two or three hops� from terror
  7769. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  7770. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  7771. how surveillance was extended had been
  7772. described as two hops. This meant that
  7773. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  7774. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  7775. could also look at the calls from the
  7776. people that suspect has spoken with one
  7777. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  7778. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  7779. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  7780. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  7781.  
  7782. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  7783.  
  7784.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  7785. them or not - two hops.
  7786.  
  7787.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  7788. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  7789.  
  7790. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  7791. ���������������������������������������
  7792. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  7793.  
  7794.  It is a good thing that people are
  7795. becoming aware of the fact that they
  7796. are being monitored - it is not only
  7797. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  7798. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  7799. made to collect information and to store
  7800. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  7801. resources that PRISM used and how it
  7802. could combine these resources to multiple
  7803. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  7804.  
  7805. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  7806. _______________________________________
  7807. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  7808.  
  7809. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  7810. ���������������������������������������
  7811. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  7812. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  7813.  
  7814.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  7815. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  7816. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  7817. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  7818. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  7819. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  7820. stories about the US government�s vast
  7821. foreign and domestic spying programs
  7822. will stop. ... ...
  7823.  
  7824.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  7825. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  7826. the United States by releasing more
  7827. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  7828.  
  7829.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  7830. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  7831. since he has already said that he gave
  7832. all of his classified information --
  7833. thousands of documents -- to several
  7834. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  7835. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  7836. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  7837. half done with the stories he plans to
  7838. write based on the secret information.
  7839.  
  7840. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  7841. ���������������������������������������
  7842. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  7843.  
  7844. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  7845. _______________________________________
  7846. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  7847.  
  7848. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  7849. ���������������������������������������
  7850. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  7851.  
  7852.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  7853. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  7854. typewriters. What do they know that
  7855. we don�t?
  7856.  
  7857. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  7858. ���������������������������������������
  7859. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  7860. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  7861.  
  7862.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  7863. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  7864. has existed since at least 2002. The
  7865. following document refers to it directly.
  7866. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  7867. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  7868. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  7869. limitation of it and similar projects.
  7870.  
  7871. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  7872.  
  7873. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  7874. _______________________________________
  7875. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  7876. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  7877.  
  7878. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  7879.  
  7880. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  7881. in Latin America ::
  7882.  
  7883. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  7884. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  7885. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  7886. _______________________________________
  7887. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  7888. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  7889.  
  7890. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  7891.  
  7892. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  7893.  
  7894. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  7895. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  7896.  
  7897. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  7898. _______________________________________
  7899. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  7900.  
  7901. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  7902. _______________________________________
  7903. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  7904. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  7905.  
  7906. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  7907. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  7908. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  7909. ���������������������������������������
  7910. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  7911.  
  7912. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  7913.  
  7914. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  7915.  
  7916. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  7917. _______________________________________
  7918. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  7919. Metadata ::
  7920.  
  7921. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  7922. _______________________________________
  7923. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  7924. by US Citizens ::
  7925.  
  7926. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  7927. ���������������������������������������
  7928. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  7929.  
  7930. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  7931.  
  7932.  �This may look like a small release, but
  7933. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  7934. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  7935. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  7936. sending encrypted data to and from the
  7937. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  7938. those servers. If you crash these servers
  7939. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  7940. "broken". We are also planning to release
  7941. some of that data (which we have access
  7942. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  7943. ���������������������������������������
  7944. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  7945. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  7946.  
  7947.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  7948. Snowden�s employer.
  7949.  
  7950. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  7951.  
  7952. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  7953.  
  7954. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  7955. _______________________________________
  7956. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  7957.  
  7958. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  7959. _______________________________________
  7960. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  7961.  
  7962.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  7963. it became clear that my freedom and
  7964. safety were under threat for revealing
  7965. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  7966. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  7967. old, family, and others who I have never
  7968. met and probably never will. I trusted
  7969. them with my life and they returned that
  7970. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  7971. always be thankful.
  7972.  
  7973.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  7974. before the world that he would not permit
  7975. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  7976. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  7977. after promising not to do so, the President
  7978. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  7979. leaders of nations from which I have
  7980. requested protection to deny my asylum
  7981. petitions.
  7982.  
  7983.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  7984. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  7985. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  7986. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  7987. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  7988. come after me.
  7989.  
  7990.  For decades the United States of America
  7991. have been one of the strongest defenders
  7992. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  7993. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  7994. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  7995. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  7996. the current government of my country. The
  7997. Obama administration has now adopted the
  7998. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  7999. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  8000. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  8001. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  8002. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  8003. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  8004. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  8005. asylum.
  8006.  
  8007.  In the end the Obama administration is
  8008. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  8009. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  8010. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  8011. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  8012. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  8013. demanding the constitutional government
  8014. it was promised � and it should be.
  8015.  
  8016.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  8017. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  8018. many.�
  8019.  
  8020. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  8021. ���������������������������������������
  8022. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  8023.  
  8024. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  8025.  
  8026. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  8027.  
  8028. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  8029. _______________________________________
  8030. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  8031.  
  8032. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  8033. ���������������������������������������
  8034. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  8035.  
  8036. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8037. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  8038. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  8039. _______________________________________
  8040. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  8041.  
  8042. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  8043. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  8044. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  8045. _______________________________________
  8046. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  8047.  
  8048. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  8049.  
  8050.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  8051. over private data to America.
  8052.  
  8053.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  8054. according to new claims by former US defence
  8055. analyst.
  8056.  
  8057.  At least six European Union countries in
  8058. addition to Britain have been colluding
  8059. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  8060. personal communications data, according
  8061. to a former contractor to America�s
  8062. National Security Agency, who said the
  8063. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  8064.  
  8065.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  8066. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  8067. and over the next 12 years held several
  8068. sensitive positions within the agency,
  8069. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  8070. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  8071. deals with the US.
  8072.  
  8073.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  8074. second and third party status� under
  8075. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  8076. that compels them to hand over data,
  8077. including mobile phone and internet
  8078. information to the NSA if requested.
  8079.  
  8080.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  8081. confirmed by declassified documents,
  8082. nations are categorised by the US according
  8083. to their trust level. The US is first party
  8084. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  8085. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  8086. Germany and France have third party
  8087. relationships.
  8088.  
  8089.  In an interview published last night
  8090. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  8091. who has been attacked for holding
  8092. controversial views on espionage issues,
  8093. said he had decided to speak out after
  8094. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  8095. told by EU politicians regarding the
  8096. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  8097.  
  8098.  He said that under the agreements,
  8099. which were drawn up after the second
  8100. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  8101. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  8102. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  8103. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  8104.  
  8105.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  8106. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  8107. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  8108. about the spying operations while staying
  8109. silent about their own arrangements
  8110. with the US, and was particularly
  8111. concerned that senior German politicians
  8112. had accused the UK of spying when their
  8113. country had a similar third-party deal
  8114. with the NSA.
  8115.  
  8116.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  8117. by other European countries to the NSA is
  8118. not on the same scale as that provided by
  8119. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  8120. embarrassing.
  8121.  
  8122.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  8123. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  8124. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  8125. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  8126. Madsen said.
  8127.  
  8128.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  8129. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  8130. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  8131. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  8132. confirmed that the entire system for
  8133. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  8134. because the EU was unable to intervene
  8135. in intelligence matters, which remained
  8136. the exclusive concern of national
  8137. governments.
  8138.  
  8139.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  8140. these contradictions and no one is really
  8141. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  8142. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  8143. democracy.�
  8144.  
  8145.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  8146. for European governments to come clean
  8147. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  8148. �There needs to be transparency as to
  8149. whether or not it is legal for the US
  8150. or any other security service to
  8151. interrogate private material,� said
  8152. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  8153. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  8154. is that none of these arrangements has
  8155. been debated in any democratic arena.
  8156. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  8157. things have to be done in secret, but you
  8158. don�t break the law in secret.�
  8159.  
  8160.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  8161. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  8162. fibre-optic cable network running between
  8163. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  8164. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  8165. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  8166. including phone calls, emails and records
  8167. of users� access to websites.
  8168.  
  8169.  He said the public needed to be made
  8170. aware of the full scale of the communication
  8171. -sharing arrangements between European
  8172. countries and the US, which predate the
  8173. internet and became of strategic importance
  8174. during the cold war.
  8175.  
  8176.  The covert relationship between the
  8177. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  8178. report by the European parliament, but
  8179. their explicit connection with the NSA
  8180. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  8181. to speak out.
  8182.  
  8183.  The European parliament�s report followed
  8184. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  8185. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  8186. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  8187. established the framework for European
  8188. member states to collaborate with the US.
  8189.  
  8190.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  8191. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  8192. that governments have chosen to keep the
  8193. public in the dark about it. The days
  8194. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  8195. of silence are over.�
  8196.  
  8197.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  8198. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  8199. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  8200. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  8201. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  8202. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  8203. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  8204. ���������������������������������������
  8205. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  8206. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  8207.  
  8208.  A former contractor to the US National
  8209. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  8210. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  8211. intelligence arrangements between the
  8212. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  8213. murky and far reaching� than the public
  8214. has been led to believe. ...
  8215.  
  8216.  He was particularly concerned about the
  8217. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  8218. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  8219. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  8220. while staying silent about their own role
  8221. in global interception arrangements with
  8222. the United States. ...
  8223.  
  8224.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  8225. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  8226.  
  8227.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  8228. many who say he had no authority or right
  8229. to provide the public with details of
  8230. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  8231. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  8232. have to provide information on NSA
  8233. surveillance at five meetings of the
  8234. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  8235. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  8236. Spain and Switzerland?�
  8237.  
  8238.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  8239. American people from a constantly changing
  8240. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  8241. is providing information to elites on
  8242. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  8243. student, religious and progressive
  8244. organizations.�
  8245.  
  8246.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  8247. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  8248. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  8249.  
  8250. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  8251. _______________________________________
  8252. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  8253.  
  8254. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  8255. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  8256. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  8257. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  8258. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  8259. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  8260. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  8261.  
  8262. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  8263.  
  8264. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  8265. ���������������������������������������
  8266. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  8267.  
  8268. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  8269. _______________________________________
  8270. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  8271.  
  8272. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  8273. _______________________________________
  8274. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  8275.  
  8276. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  8277. _______________________________________
  8278. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  8279.  
  8280. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  8281. _______________________________________
  8282. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  8283.  
  8284. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  8285. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  8286. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  8287.  
  8288. � Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  8289.  
  8290. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  8291. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8292. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  8293. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  8294. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  8295. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  8296. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  8297. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  8298. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  8299. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  8300. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  8301. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  8302. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  8303. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  8304. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  8305. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  8306. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  8307. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  8308. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  8309. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  8310. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  8311. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  8312. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  8313. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  8314. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  8315. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  8316. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  8317. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  8318. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  8319. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  8320. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  8321. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  8322. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  8323. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  8324. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  8325. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  8326. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  8327. _______________________________________
  8328. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  8329. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  8330.  
  8331. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  8332. _______________________________________
  8333. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  8334.  
  8335. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  8336.  
  8337. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  8338.  
  8339. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  8340.  
  8341. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  8342. _______________________________________
  8343. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  8344.  
  8345. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  8346.  
  8347. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  8348. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  8349. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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