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Posted by Eyeballing the N on August Mon 4th 1:50 PM - Never Expires
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  1. Eyeballing the NSA 035
  2.  
  3. VIEW FULL @ http://c897fb6581593df6.paste.se/
  4.    
  5.    
  6.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  7. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  8. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  9.  
  10.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  11.  
  12.  
  13. � Cash, Weapons, Surveillance - The US is a Key Party to Every
  14. Israeli Attack ::
  15.  
  16.  The US government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel,
  17. providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a
  18. crucial role in Israel�s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret
  19. documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed
  20. substantial new light on how the US and its partners directly
  21. enable Israel�s military assaults � such as the one on Gaza.
  22.  
  23. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08/04/cash-weapons-surveillance/
  24.  
  25. � ISNU-NSA Spying Pact (1999 & 2013) ::
  26.  
  27. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/israel-us-1999-the-intercept.pdf
  28.  
  29. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-israel-2013-the-intercept.pdf
  30.  
  31. � (RELATED) Terrorism in the Israeli Attack on Gaza ::
  32.  
  33. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/29/terrorism-israelgaza-context/
  34. _______________________________________
  35. � USA-Saudi Arabia Spy Partnership ::
  36.  
  37. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-saudi-arabia-intercept-14-0725.pdf
  38.  
  39. � NSA�s New Partner in Spying ; Saudi Arabia�s Brutal State Police ::
  40.  
  41.  The National Security Agency last year significantly expanded
  42. its cooperative relationship with the Saudi Ministry of Interior,
  43. one of the world�s most repressive and abusive government agencies.
  44. An April 2013 top secret memo provided by NSA whistleblower Edward
  45. Snowden details the agency�s plans �to provide direct analytic and
  46. technical support� to the Saudis on �internal security� matters.
  47.  
  48.  The Saudi Ministry of Interior�referred to in the document as MOI
  49. � has been condemned for years as one of the most brutal human rights
  50. violators in the world. In 2013, the U.S. State Department reported
  51. that �Ministry of Interior officials sometimes subjected prisoners
  52. and detainees to torture and other physical abuse,� specifically
  53. mentioning a 2011 episode in which MOI agents allegedly �poured an
  54. antiseptic cleaning liquid down [the] throat� of one human rights
  55. activist. The report also notes the MOI�s use of invasive surveillance
  56. targeted at political and religious dissidents.
  57.  
  58.  But as the State Department publicly catalogued those very abuses,
  59. the NSA worked to provide increased surveillance assistance to the
  60. ministry that perpetrated them. The move is part of the Obama
  61. Administration�s increasingly close ties with the Saudi regime;
  62. beyond the new cooperation with the MOI, the memo describes �a
  63. period of rejuvenation� for the NSA�s relationship with the Saudi
  64. Ministry of Defense.
  65.  
  66.  In general, US support for the Saudi regime is long-standing. One
  67. secret 2007 NSA memo lists Saudi Arabia as one of four countries
  68. where the US �has [an] interest in regime continuity.�
  69.  
  70. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/25/nsas-new-partner-spying-saudi-arabias-brutal-state-police/
  71. _______________________________________
  72. � Senate Bill Spy Funding FY 2015 ::
  73.  
  74. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/spy-funding-fy2015.pdf
  75. _______________________________________
  76. � NSA Spying Costs to US Businesses ::
  77.  
  78. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-naf-spy-costs.pdf
  79.  
  80. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-29/tech-companies-reel-as-nsa-spying-mars-image-for-clients.html
  81. _______________________________________
  82. � Insider - Intelligence Agencies Are Running Governments ::
  83.  
  84.  Alex Jones talks with NSA whistleblower William Binney about the
  85. growing corruption and power of the NSA and how they abuse their
  86. power behind the scenes to pull strings.
  87.  
  88. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DERMBOJBDCk
  89.  
  90. http://www.infowars.com/insider-says-intelligence-agencies-are-running-the-government/
  91. _______________________________________
  92. � Secret Government Rulebook For Labeling You a Terrorist ::
  93.  
  94.  The Obama administration has quietly approved a substantial
  95. expansion of the terrorist watchlist system, authorizing a
  96. secret process that requires neither �concrete facts� nor
  97. �irrefutable evidence� to designate an American or foreigner
  98. as a terrorist, according to a key government document obtained
  99. by The Intercept.
  100.  
  101. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nctc-watchlist-intercept-14-0723.pdf
  102. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/23/blacklisted/
  103. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-facts-and-evidence-not-considered-when-adding-americans-to-terror-lists/
  104. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14232027979/intercept-reveals-us-governments-guidebook-declaring-your-terrorist-putting-you-no-fly-list.shtml
  105. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140723/14321427980/revealed-what-kind-extra-scrutiny-government-gives-to-folks-terrorist-watchlist.shtml
  106.  
  107. NOBODY notes
  108.  
  109.  Sounds much like the (now defunct) COINTELPRO operation the
  110. FBI once was launched to target, blacklist and harrass US
  111. civil rights activists and whistleblowers back in the day -
  112. only these �dirty tricks� are now fully digitalized.
  113.  
  114. � Executive Order 12333: They Do Spy on Americans ::
  115.  
  116.  John Tye is but the latest surveillance whistleblower,
  117. though he took pains to distinguish himself from Snowden
  118. and his approach to dissent. �Before I left the State
  119. Department, I filed a complaint with the department�s
  120. inspector general, arguing that the current system of
  121. collection and storage of communications by US persons
  122. under Executive Order 12333 violates the Fourth Amendment,
  123. which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures,�
  124. Tye explained. �I have also brought my complaint to the
  125. House and Senate intelligence committees and to the
  126. inspector general of the NSA.�
  127.  
  128.  These steps � which many say Snowden should�ve taken �
  129. produced no changes to the objectionable NSA spying and
  130. wouldn�t be garnering attention at all if not for
  131. Snowden�s leaks.
  132.  
  133. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  134.  
  135. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-new-surveillance-whistleblower-emerges/374722/
  136. _______________________________________
  137. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  138.  
  139.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  140. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  141. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  142. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  143. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  144. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  145. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  146.  
  147. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  148.  
  149. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  150.  
  151. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  152. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  153. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  154.  
  155. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  156.  
  157. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  158.  
  159. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  160.  
  161.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  162. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  163.  
  164. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  165.  
  166. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  167.  
  168. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  169.  
  170. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  171.  
  172.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  173. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  174. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  175. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  176.  
  177. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  178.  
  179. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  180.  
  181. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  182.  
  183. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  184.  
  185. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  186.  
  187. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised 2009) ::
  188.  
  189. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-css-policy-1-23-nyt-14-0727.pdf
  190.  
  191. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  192.  
  193. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  194.  
  195. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  196.  
  197. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  198.  
  199. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  200.  
  201. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  202.  
  203. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  204. _______________________________________
  205. � NSA SIGINT Records Disposition Schedule ::
  206.  
  207. http://cryptome.org/2014/08/nsa-sigint-rds.pdf
  208.  
  209. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/records_management/index.shtml
  210. _______________________________________
  211. � The NSA Said Edward Snowden Had No Access to Surveillance
  212. Intercepts, They Lied ::
  213.  
  214.  The contents of the surveillance files � almost half of which
  215. contained information from US citizens or residents � �tell
  216. stories of love and heartbreak, illicit sexual liaisons,
  217. mental-health crises, political and religious conversions,
  218. financial anxieties and disappointed hopes.�
  219.  
  220. http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/07/a-devastating-leak-for-edward-snowdens-critics/373991/
  221. http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2014/07/nsa-said-edward-snowden-had-no-access-surveillance-intercepts-they-lied
  222. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/snowden-undermines-presidential-panel-s-defense-of-nsa-spying-20140708
  223.  
  224. � Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have
  225. Been Spying On ::
  226.  
  227.  The National Security Agency and FBI have covertly
  228. monitored the emails of prominent Muslim-Americans�including
  229. a political candidate and several civil rights activists,
  230. academics, and lawyers�under secretive procedures intended
  231. to target terrorists and foreign spies.
  232.  
  233.  According to documents provided by NSA whistleblower
  234. Edward Snowden, the list of Americans monitored by their
  235. own government includes:
  236.  
  237.  � Faisal Gill, a longtime Republican Party operative and
  238. one-time candidate for public office who held a top-secret
  239. security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland
  240. Security under President George W. Bush;
  241.  
  242.  � Asim Ghafoor, a prominent attorney who has represented
  243. clients in terrorism-related cases;
  244.  
  245.  � Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor of
  246. international relations at Rutgers University;
  247.  
  248.  � Agha Saeed, a former political science professor at
  249. California State University who champions Muslim civil
  250. liberties and Palestinian rights;
  251.  
  252.  � Nihad Awad, the executive director of the Council on
  253. American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil
  254. rights organization in the country.
  255.  
  256. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/07/09/under-surveillance/
  257. http://www.infowars.com/fbi-directly-spying-on-prominent-muslim-american-politicians-lawyers-and-civil-rights-activists/
  258. http://electrospaces.blogspot.ca/2014/07/document-shows-that-it-was-not-nsa-but.html
  259.  
  260. � NSA FISA Accounts and Emails ::
  261.  
  262. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-fisa-accounts.pdf
  263.  
  264. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-emails.pdf
  265.  
  266. � Those Not Targeted Far Outnumber Foreigners Who Are ::
  267.  
  268. NSA targeted domestic communications as well as foreign.
  269.  
  270. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-4b1b969b6322_story.html
  271.  
  272. ? NSA OKs Domestic Spying for Suspected Criminals ::
  273.                               ���������
  274.  �The FBI is also permitted to disseminate US person
  275. information that reasonably appears to be evidence of a
  276. crime to law enforcement authorities.�
  277.  
  278. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/pclob-14-0702.pdf
  279.  
  280. ? US Government Denies Spying US Persons ::
  281.  
  282. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/dni-doj-14-0709.pdf
  283.  
  284. NOBODY responds
  285.  
  286.  Compare the new DoJ memo (dni-doj-14-0709.pdf)
  287. with the one during 2007, before any of the NSA
  288. documents were ever leaked (doj-nsa-memo.pdf)
  289.  
  290. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  291.  
  292.  Now compare the arrogance of the political class
  293. back in 2004 up till today.
  294.  
  295. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  296.  
  297.  Notice their lack of oversight during the Bush regime
  298. now stuck in continuum under the Obama regime?
  299.  
  300. http://www.infowars.com/senate-committee-passes-cisa-cybersecurity-bill-that-could-broaden-nsa-powers/
  301.  
  302.  Just like those in the �Department of Justice� they
  303. never learn from their mistakes, they are stuck in a
  304. state of blissful ignorance, they lie and when the truth
  305. comes out (as it often does), then they deny it happened.
  306.  
  307. � Some New Thoughts on the Snowden Cache ::
  308.  
  309. http://members.efn.org/~paulmd/SomeNewThoughtsontheSnowdenCache.html
  310.  
  311.  �So, apparently the Snowden cache contains quite a large number
  312. of intercepted communications, not just technical documents,
  313. PowerPoint slides, and memos. This opens up a whole can of worms,
  314. and some new possibilities for the cache.
  315.  
  316.  Worms first: several journalists have access to an incredibly
  317. sensitive cache of personal information. According to some NSA
  318. defenders: Snowden has committed a horrible privacy violation
  319. of thousands of innocent Americans. This is a big problem, but
  320. it requires some mental gymnastics not to recognize that if
  321. Snowden had violated the privacy of innocents by giving this
  322. information to journalists, so had the NSA by storing it in the
  323. first place.  Realistically, it�s not one or the other, it�s
  324. both. Now that we know what it contains, the long term storage
  325. of that portion cache by journalists becomes very problematic.
  326. On one hand: it�s evidence, on the other, it�s private information
  327. on many thousands of people.
  328.  
  329.  While there are some problems, there are also new possibilities.
  330. First, it could be a boon for defendants, and those facing legal
  331. jeopardy, to confront the evidence against them, to receive a
  332. genuinely fair trial. This is doubly important for drug cases,
  333. particularly those with DEA involvement, because of the highly
  334. questionably practice of Parallel Reconstruction, wherein
  335. classified evidence is laundered, and is reconstructed using
  336. traditional methods. In effect: perjury. Second, it is prima
  337. facie evidence to use in lawsuits against the NSA, proof that
  338. a plaintiff had been spied on. Third, one of the wilder stories:
  339. Snowden to Reveal the Secrets of Arab Dictators, really can
  340. happen now. The US government�s dealings with brutal regimes
  341. are newsworthy, so are the dealings of those regimes against
  342. their own people.
  343.  
  344.  One of the things that makes Cablegate so powerful, and
  345. simultaneously controversial, is the ability of ordinary
  346. citizens to query it, and learn what the government had kept
  347. hidden. In at least one case, it allowed a rendition victim
  348. to seek justice. I am not suggesting leaking it out in full,
  349. but ways of allowing ordinary citizens the ability to get
  350. their own communications, and broadening access, should be
  351. considered. Contrary to the opinions of those who described
  352. the Post�s story as a dud, it�s the first page of the next
  353. chapter of the Snowden Saga, with wide-reaching, and
  354. unpredictable consequences.�
  355.  
  356. By Paul Dietrich, Jul 8, 2014
  357. _______________________________________
  358. � Networks vs. Hierarchies: Which Will Win? ::
  359.  
  360. http://libertyblitzkrieg.com/2014/06/22/networks-vs-hierarchies-which-will-win-niall-furguson-weighs-in/
  361. ���������������������������������������
  362. � Hacking Online Polls and Other Ways British Spies
  363. Seek to Control the Internet ::
  364.  
  365.  The secretive British spy agency GCHQ has developed
  366. covert tools to seed the internet with false information,
  367. including the ability to manipulate the results of online
  368. polls, artificially inflate pageview counts on web sites,
  369. �amplify� sanctioned messages on YouTube, and censor video
  370. content judged to be �extremist.� The capabilities, detailed
  371. in documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden,
  372. even include an old standby for pre-adolescent prank callers
  373. everywhere: A way to connect two unsuspecting phone users
  374. together in a call.
  375.  
  376.  The tools were created by GCHQ�s Joint Threat Research
  377. Intelligence Group (JTRIG), and constitute some of the most
  378. startling methods of propaganda and internet deception
  379. contained within the Snowden archive. Previously disclosed
  380. documents have detailed JTRIG�s use of �fake victim blog
  381. posts,� �false flag operations,� �honey traps� and
  382. psychological manipulation to target online activists,
  383. monitor visitors to WikiLeaks, and spy on YouTube and
  384. Facebook users.
  385.  
  386. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/14/manipulating-online-polls-ways-british-spies-seek-control-internet/
  387.  
  388. http://www.infowars.com/what-exactly-are-the-spy-agencies-actually-doing-with-their-bag-of-dirty-tricks/
  389.  
  390. � GCHQ�s JTRIG Tools and Techniques ::
  391.  
  392. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-jtrigall-intercept-14-0714.pdf
  393. ---------------------------------------
  394. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  395.  
  396. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  397.  
  398.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  399. program run by the US Agency for International
  400. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  401. communications network� run through �secret shell
  402. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  403. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  404. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  405. �American contractors were gathering their private
  406. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  407. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  408. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  409. government. According to top-secret documents
  410. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  411. operation is frequently discussed at western
  412. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  413. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  414. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  415.  
  416. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  417.  
  418. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  419.  
  420. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  421.  
  422.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  423. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  424. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  425. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  426. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  427. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  428. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  429. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  430. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  431. Space Intelligence Center.�
  432.  
  433.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  434. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  435. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  436. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  437. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  438. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  439. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  440. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  441.  
  442.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  443. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  444. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  445. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  446. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  447. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  448. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  449. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  450. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  451.  
  452. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  453.  
  454. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  455. ---------------------------------------
  456. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  457.  
  458. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  459.  
  460. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  461.  
  462. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  463.  
  464. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  465.  
  466.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  467. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  468. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  469. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  470. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  471. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  472. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  473. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  474. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  475. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  476. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  477.  
  478.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  479. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  480. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  481. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  482. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  483. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  484.  
  485. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  486. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  487. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  488. ---------------------------------------
  489. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  490.  
  491. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  492.  
  493. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  494.  
  495. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  496.  
  497. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  498.  
  499. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  500.  
  501. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  502.  
  503. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  504.  
  505. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  506.  
  507. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  508. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  509. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  510.  
  511. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  512. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  513.  
  514. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  515. ---------------------------------------
  516. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  517.  
  518. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  519. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  520. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  521. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  522.  
  523. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  524.  
  525. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  526.  
  527. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  528.  
  529. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  530.  
  531. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  532.  
  533. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  534. ---------------------------------------
  535. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  536.  
  537. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  538. _______________________________________
  539. � Ultimate Goal of the NSA ; Total Population Control ::
  540.  
  541.  At least 80% of all audio calls, not just metadata, are
  542. recorded and stored in the US, says whistleblower William
  543. Binney � that�s a �totalitarian mentality.�
  544.  
  545. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/11/the-ultimate-goal-of-the-nsa-is-total-population-control
  546. _______________________________________
  547. � NSA Hacks TOR in Germany, Calls Users Extremists ::
  548.  
  549. http://cryptome.org/2014/07/nsa-tor-de.htm
  550.  
  551.  It is one of the most sensitive secrets of the NSA,
  552. the engine of the global monitoring machine: the source
  553. code of the XKeyscore program, the most comprehensive
  554. Aussp�hprogramm of US foreign intelligence.
  555.  
  556.  NDR and WDR have excerpts of the source code. Parts of
  557. the collection infrastructure ie, so-called software rules
  558. that define the intelligence, what or who they want to
  559. investigate.
  560.  
  561.  There are only a few numbers and characters to string
  562. together the programmer. But when the program executes
  563. XKeyscore these rules, get people and their data in their
  564. sights. The connections from computers to the Internet
  565. are identified and stored in a database type. The users
  566. are quasi marked. It is the dragnet of the 21st century.
  567.  
  568. http://download.media.tagesschau.de/video/2014/0703/TV-20140703-0546-2401.webl.webm
  569.  
  570. MP4 Video Format � http://fileb.ag/u12my0tpvr8y
  571.  
  572. � XKeyscore Targets Tor ::
  573.  
  574. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/xkeyscorerules100.txt
  575.  
  576. � NSA Targets the Privacy-conscious Using Tor ::
  577.  
  578. http://daserste.ndr.de/panorama/aktuell/nsa230_page-1.html
  579. ---------------------------------------
  580. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  581.  
  582. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  583.  
  584. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  585.  
  586.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when they are not
  587. using Tor.�
  588.  
  589. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  590.  
  591. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  592.  
  593. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  594.  
  595.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t mean that your
  596. browser isn�t storing cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman,
  597. a colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes in browser
  598. vulnerabilities.
  599.  
  600.  As Grossman described the procedure to CNET, the NSA is
  601. aware of Tor�s entry and exit nodes because of its Internet
  602. wide surveillance.
  603.  
  604.  �The very feature that makes Tor a powerful anonymity
  605. service, and the fact that all Tor users look alike on the
  606. Internet, makes it easy to differentiate Tor users from
  607. other Web users,� he wrote.
  608.  
  609.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that every time you go
  610. to a site, the cookie identifies you. Even though your IP
  611. address changed [because of Tor], the cookies gave you away,�
  612. he said.
  613.  
  614. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  615.  
  616. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and Identify Packet
  617. Traffic From Machines ::
  618.  
  619.  �Working together, CT and CNE have devised a method to carry
  620. out large-scale �staining� as a means to identify individual
  621. machines linked to that IP address. ... ...
  622.  
  623.  User Agent Staining is a technique that involves writing a
  624. unique marker (or stain) onto a target machine. Each stain
  625. is visible in passively collected SIGINT and is stamped into
  626. every packet, which enables all the events from that stained
  627. machine to be brought back together to recreate a browsing
  628. session.�
  629.  
  630. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  631.  
  632. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  633.  
  634. � Packet Staining ::
  635.  
  636. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  637. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  638. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  639. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  640.  
  641. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  642.  
  643. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  644. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  645. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  646. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  647.  
  648. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  649.  
  650.  �We have seen several targets using Tor. Our goal was to
  651. analyze Tor source code and determine any vulnerabilities
  652. in the system. We set up an internal Tor network to analyze
  653. Tor traffic, in the hopes of discovering ways to passively
  654. identify it. We also worked to create a custom Tor client
  655. which allows the user finer control.� ... ...
  656.  
  657.  �This accomplishes several things. Most basically, the Tor
  658. servers, many of which are listed on publicly advertised
  659. directory servers, are chosen to act as a series of proxies.
  660. This may seem to be excessively complex, as a single proxy
  661. server can be used to hide one�s location, but a single-hop
  662. proxy is vulnerable in two ways. First, by analyzing the
  663. pattern of the traffic going to and from the proxy server,
  664. it is possible to deduce which clients are making which requests.
  665. Second, if an attacker owns the proxy server, then it certainly
  666. knows who is asking for what, and anonymization is ruined. By
  667. using multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant to both of
  668. these attacks. Traffic analysis becomes extraordinarily
  669. difficult, as it must be coordinated across several machines,
  670. and an attacker must own all the hops along the circuit in
  671. order to trace requests back to the originating client.�
  672.  
  673. ... ...
  674.  
  675.  �In our time in the lab, we found that running an nmap on a
  676. node that is offering a hidden service will turn up the port
  677. that the hidden service is using to deal with incoming
  678. connections. It can then be directly connected to, outside
  679. of Tor.�
  680.  
  681. ... ...
  682.  
  683.  �We would have to try to connect to each of the ports we see
  684. open on a machine to determine if there is a hidden service
  685. being run. We would not even know which protocol the hidden
  686. service is running. It may be an HTTP server, an FTP server,
  687. an SMTP server, etc. The only thing we know is that the protocol
  688. must run over TCP. It is not enough to attempt to connect once
  689. to each port, using an HTTP GET request. Several protocols must
  690. be tried.�
  691.  
  692. ... ...
  693.  
  694.  �It may also be useful to study Tor directory servers in more
  695. detail. Our work focused solely on the client, but many attacks
  696. would be much easier with access to more Tor servers. The
  697. directory servers ultimately control which Tor servers are
  698. used by clients. We have found that a server can put itself on
  699. a directory server multiple times; all it takes is the server
  700. running several Tor processes, each having a different nickname,
  701. open port, fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only requires different
  702. configuration files for the different processes, which are easy
  703. to set up. That machine will handle a disproportionate amount of
  704. traffic, since it is listed several times. This increases the
  705. density of friendly servers in the cloud without increasing the
  706. number of servers we have set up. Unfortunately, each listing
  707. has the same IP address, which would be very noticeable to anyone
  708. who inspecting the directories.�
  709.  
  710. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  711. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  712. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  713.  
  714. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  715.  
  716. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  717.  
  718. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  719.  
  720. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  721.  
  722. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  723.  
  724.  �This document doesn�t give much insight into capabilities
  725. the IC has developed against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  726. to run multiple research teams (either known or unknown to
  727. each other) against a single target, and a few summer
  728. students with a dozen lab machines is a pretty small
  729. investment. I�d expect there are other programs with more
  730. sophisticated attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  731.  
  732. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  733. _______________________________________
  734. � UPDATE ; German CIA Agent Arrested ::
  735.  
  736. http://cryptocomb.org/?p=869
  737.  
  738. � UPDATE ; Der Spiegel Exposed Spy Scandle Between US-Germany, ;
  739. Angela Merkel Plans to Scrap No-spy Agreement with US-Britain ::
  740.  
  741.  A new surveillance scandal is threatening to unsettle US-German
  742. relations after it emerged that an employee of Germany�s
  743. intelligence agency has been arrested under suspicion of acting
  744. as a double agent for the US.
  745.  
  746.  According to several reports in the German media, a 31-year-old
  747. member of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) administration
  748. department in Pullach was on Wednesday arrested by the country�s
  749. federal prosecutor, originally under suspicion of passing on
  750. information to Russian intelligence services. ... ...
  751.  
  752.  The plan is in response to the scandal resulting from last
  753. week�s arrest of a 31-year-old BND �double agent� who spent
  754. at least two years selling top-secret German intelligence
  755. documents to his US spymasters in return for cash payments
  756. of �10,000 (�7,940) per document. ...
  757.  
  758.  The double agent is reported to have simply emailed Berlin�s
  759. American embassy and asked whether officials were interested
  760. in �co-operation�. He subsequently downloaded at least 300
  761. secret documents on to USB sticks that he handed to his
  762. American spymasters at secret location in Austria.
  763.  
  764.  He was caught by German counter-espionage agents only after
  765. he was found offering similar BND documents to Berlin�s Russian
  766. embassy. The Germans had considered it �impossible� that one
  767. of their own intelligence men could be working as a �double agent�
  768. for the Americans.
  769.  
  770. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-to-spy-on-us-for-first-time-since-1945-after-double-agentscandal-9590645.html
  771. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/07/nsa-chancellor-double-agent-german-us-relations
  772. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/04/germany-arrest-bnd-spying-allegations-double-agent-us
  773. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/11/world/europe/germany-expels-top-us-intelligence-officer.html?_r=0
  774.  
  775. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  776.  
  777. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  778.  
  779. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  780.  
  781. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  782.  
  783. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  784.  
  785. � Der Spiegel Release on German SIGADs ::
  786.  
  787. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-german-sigads.pdf
  788.  
  789. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  790.  
  791. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  792.  
  793. http://www.dw.de/new-leaks-show-germanys-collusion-with-nsa/a-17726141
  794.  
  795. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  796.  
  797. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  798.  
  799. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  800.  
  801. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  802.  
  803. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  804.  
  805. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  806.  
  807. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  808.  
  809. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  810.  
  811.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  812. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  813. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  814. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  815. where she grew up.
  816.  
  817. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  818. _______________________________________
  819. � NSA FORNSAT Intercept in 2002 and Economic Motives ::
  820.  
  821. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/07/the-national-security-agency-in-2002.html
  822. _______________________________________
  823. � Look Out for Falling Redactions ::
  824.  
  825. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-falling-redactions.pdf
  826. _______________________________________
  827. � Dump of BOUNDLESSINFORMANT IP Data ::
  828.  
  829. https://gist.github.com/9b/de3f0510cccbd5dbfdf0
  830. _______________________________________
  831. � NSA Playset ; Tailored Access for Hackers ::
  832.  
  833. http://www.nsaplayset.org/
  834. _______________________________________
  835. � How Secret Partners Expand NSA�s Surveillance Dragnet ::
  836.  
  837. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partners-revealed-rampart-a/
  838. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140619/08062627624/nsa-working-with-denmark-germany-to-access-three-terabits-data-per-second-overseas-cables.shtml
  839. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-uses-33-countries-to-intercept-web-traffic-snowden-files/
  840. http://gigaom.com/2014/06/20/governments-let-nsa-tap-cables-on-their-territory-latest-snowden-revelations-show/
  841.  
  842. � Foreign Partner Access to Black Budget FY 2013 ::
  843.  
  844. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200866/foreignpartneraccessbudgetfy2013-redacted.pdf
  845.  
  846. � Overview Presenting the RAMPART-A Spy Program ::
  847.  
  848. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200860/odd-s3-overviewnov2011-v1-0-redacted-information.pdf
  849.  
  850. � Three RAMPART-A Slides ::
  851.  
  852. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200865/uodds2overview-v1-1-redacted-information-dk.pdf
  853.  
  854. � Black Budget FY 2013 / RAMPART-A Slides (Mirror) ::
  855.  
  856. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-intercept-14-0618.pdf
  857.  
  858. � Update ; Intercept Releases More RAMPART-A Slides ::
  859.  
  860. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-information-intercept-14-0619.pdf
  861. _______________________________________
  862.  Keith Alexander�s talking points for strategic meeting
  863. between the NSA and the Danish Defense Intelligence
  864. Service (DDIS).
  865.  
  866. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1200859/diropeningremarksguidancefordp1-v1-1-v1-0.pdf
  867. _______________________________________
  868. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  869.  
  870. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  871.  
  872. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  873.  
  874. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  875. _______________________________________
  876. � Head of GCHQ Very Pissed Off Over Media Coverage ::
  877.  
  878. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10910212/Head-of-GCHQ-launches-thinly-veiled-attack-on-The-Guardian.html
  879. _______________________________________
  880. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  881. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  882.  
  883. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  884. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  885. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  886.  
  887.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  888. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  889. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  890. user in the UK.
  891.  
  892. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  893.  
  894. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  895. _______________________________________
  896. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  897. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  898.  
  899. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  900. ---------------------------------------
  901. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  902.  
  903. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  904. _______________________________________
  905. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  906.  
  907. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  908. _______________________________________
  909. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  910.  
  911. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  912.  
  913. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  914. _______________________________________
  915. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  916. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  917.  
  918. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  919. _______________________________________
  920. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  921.  
  922. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  923.  
  924. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  925.  
  926. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  927. _______________________________________
  928. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  929. to Tap Phones ::
  930.  
  931. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  932. _______________________________________
  933. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  934.  
  935. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  936. _______________________________________
  937. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  938. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  939. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  940.  
  941.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  942. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  943. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  944. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  945. they were spying on � was hidden?
  946.  
  947.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  948. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  949. everybody what they�re doing?
  950.  
  951.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  952. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  953. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  954. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  955. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  956. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  957. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  958. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  959. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  960.  
  961.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  962. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  963. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  964. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  965. was a specialist in, by the way.
  966.  
  967.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  968. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  969. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  970. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  971. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  972. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  973.  
  974.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  975. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  976. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  977. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  978. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  979. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  980. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  981. for the JWICS.
  982.  
  983.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  984. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  985. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  986. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  987. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  988. that [clearance].
  989.  
  990.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  991. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  992. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  993. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  994.  
  995.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  996. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  997. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  998. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  999. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  1000. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  1001. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  1002. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  1003.  
  1004.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  1005. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  1006. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  1007.  
  1008.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  1009. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  1010. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  1011. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  1012. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  1013.  
  1014.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  1015. to placate the American people.
  1016.  
  1017.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  1018. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  1019. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  1020.  
  1021.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  1022. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  1023. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  1024. investigation.�
  1025.  
  1026. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  1027. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  1028. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  1029. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  1030. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  1031. _______________________________________
  1032. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  1033.  
  1034. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  1035.  
  1036. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  1037.  
  1038. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  1039.  
  1040. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  1041.  
  1042. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  1043.  
  1044. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  1045.  
  1046. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  1047.  
  1048. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  1049.  
  1050. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  1051.  
  1052. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  1053.  
  1054. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  1055.  
  1056. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  1057.  
  1058. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  1059. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  1060.  
  1061. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  1062.  
  1063. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  1064. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  1065.  
  1066. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  1067.  
  1068. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  1069. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  1070.  
  1071. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  1072. _______________________________________
  1073. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  1074.  
  1075.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  1076. agencies are now also using the same facial
  1077. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  1078. identification systems are being developed as well.
  1079. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  1080.  
  1081. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  1082.  
  1083. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  1084.  
  1085. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  1086.  
  1087. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  1088. _______________________________________
  1089. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  1090.  
  1091. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  1092. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  1093. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  1094. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  1095. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  1096. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  1097. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  1098. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  1099. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  1100. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  1101.  
  1102. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  1103.  
  1104. And a few more to think about,
  1105.  
  1106. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  1107. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  1108. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  1109. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  1110. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  1111. _______________________________________
  1112. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  1113.  
  1114.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  1115. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  1116. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  1117. activity before he began leaking government documents
  1118. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  1119. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  1120.  
  1121.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  1122. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  1123. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  1124. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  1125. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  1126. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  1127. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  1128. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  1129. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  1130. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  1131. attention.��
  1132.  
  1133.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  1134. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  1135. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  1136. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  1137. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  1138.  
  1139. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  1140.  
  1141. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  1142. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  1143.  
  1144. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  1145. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  1146. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  1147. ---------------------------------------
  1148. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  1149.  
  1150. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  1151.  
  1152. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  1153. _______________________________________
  1154. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  1155.  
  1156. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  1157.  
  1158. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  1159.  
  1160. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  1161. _______________________________________
  1162. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  1163. Securely and Anonymously ::
  1164.  
  1165.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  1166. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  1167. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  1168. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  1169. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  1170. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  1171. internet somewhere or using a third party
  1172. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  1173. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  1174. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  1175. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  1176. download the file from you.
  1177.  
  1178. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  1179. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  1180.  
  1181. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  1182.  
  1183. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  1184.  
  1185. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  1186.  
  1187. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  1188. _______________________________________
  1189. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  1190. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  1191.  
  1192. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  1193.  
  1194. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  1195.  
  1196. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  1197. _______________________________________
  1198. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  1199.  
  1200. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  1201.  
  1202. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  1203.  
  1204. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  1205.  
  1206. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  1207.  
  1208. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  1209.  
  1210. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  1211.  
  1212. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  1213.  
  1214. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  1215. Online Next Week ::
  1216.  
  1217. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  1218. ---------------------------------------
  1219. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  1220.  
  1221. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  1222.  
  1223. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  1224.  
  1225. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  1226. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  1227.  
  1228. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  1229. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  1230.  
  1231. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  1232.  
  1233. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  1234. Infiltration by NSA ::
  1235.  
  1236. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  1237.  
  1238. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  1239.  
  1240. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  1241.  
  1242.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  1243. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  1244. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  1245. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  1246. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  1247. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  1248. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  1249. they�re delivered.
  1250.  
  1251. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  1252.  
  1253. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  1254.  
  1255. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  1256.  
  1257. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  1258.  
  1259. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  1260.  
  1261. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  1262. ______________________________________
  1263. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  1264. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  1265.  
  1266. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  1267. _______________________________________
  1268. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  1269. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  1270.  
  1271. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  1272. _______________________________________
  1273. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  1274.  
  1275. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  1276. _______________________________________
  1277. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  1278.  
  1279. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  1280.  
  1281. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  1282.  
  1283. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  1284. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  1285.  
  1286.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  1287. national security and other government officials will no
  1288. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  1289. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  1290.  
  1291. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  1292. _______________________________________
  1293. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  1294.  
  1295. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  1296.  
  1297. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  1298. ______________________________________
  1299. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  1300.  
  1301. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  1302. ______________________________________
  1303. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  1304. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  1305.  
  1306. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  1307. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  1308.  
  1309. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  1310.  
  1311. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  1312. ______________________________________
  1313. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  1314.  
  1315. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  1316.  
  1317. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  1318.  
  1319. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  1320.  
  1321. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  1322.  
  1323.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  1324. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  1325. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  1326. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  1327. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  1328. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  1329. industry which generates something in the
  1330. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  1331.  
  1332.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  1333.  
  1334. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  1335. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  1336. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  1337. _______________________________________
  1338. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  1339.  
  1340. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  1341. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  1342.  
  1343.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  1344. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  1345. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  1346. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  1347. activities and future plans.� � �
  1348.  
  1349.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  1350. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  1351. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  1352.  
  1353. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  1354.  
  1355. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  1356.  
  1357. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  1358.  
  1359. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  1360.  
  1361. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  1362.  
  1363. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  1364. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  1365.  
  1366.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  1367. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  1368. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  1369. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  1370. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  1371. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  1372. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  1373. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  1374.  
  1375.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  1376. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  1377. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  1378. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  1379. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  1380. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  1381. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  1382.  
  1383. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  1384. _______________________________________
  1385. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  1386.  
  1387. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  1388. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  1389. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  1390.  
  1391.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  1392. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  1393. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  1394. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  1395. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  1396. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  1397. Edward Snowden.
  1398.  
  1399.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  1400. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  1401. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  1402. for surveillance.
  1403.  
  1404.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  1405. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  1406. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  1407. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  1408. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  1409.  
  1410.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  1411. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  1412. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  1413. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  1414.  
  1415.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  1416. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  1417. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  1418. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  1419. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  1420. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  1421. and long-term storage.
  1422.  
  1423. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  1424.  
  1425. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  1426.  
  1427.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  1428. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  1429. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  1430. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  1431. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  1432. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  1433. but they won�t say.
  1434.  
  1435. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  1436.  
  1437. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  1438.  
  1439. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  1440.  
  1441. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  1442. _______________________________________
  1443. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  1444.  
  1445.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  1446. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  1447. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  1448. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  1449. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  1450. already been published previously. The second was
  1451. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  1452.  
  1453. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  1454.  
  1455. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  1456.  
  1457.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  1458. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  1459. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  1460. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  1461. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  1462. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  1463. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  1464. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  1465. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  1466.  
  1467.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  1468. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  1469.  
  1470.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  1471. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  1472. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  1473. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  1474. benefit� the document says.
  1475.  
  1476.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  1477. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  1478. company is working towards creating a so-called
  1479. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  1480. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  1481. per second.
  1482.  
  1483. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  1484. _______________________________________
  1485. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  1486.  
  1487. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  1488. _______________________________________
  1489. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  1490.  
  1491. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  1492. _______________________________________
  1493. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  1494.  
  1495. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  1496. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  1497. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  1498. _______________________________________
  1499. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  1500.  
  1501.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  1502. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  1503. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  1504. top human rights body.
  1505.  
  1506.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  1507. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  1508. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  1509. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  1510. Human Rights Watch.
  1511.  
  1512. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  1513.  
  1514. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  1515. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  1516.  
  1517. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  1518. _______________________________________
  1519. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  1520.  
  1521.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  1522. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  1523. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  1524.  
  1525.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  1526. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  1527. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  1528. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  1529. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  1530. high as two years. ... ...
  1531.  
  1532.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  1533. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  1534. by domestic courts.
  1535.  
  1536. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  1537. _______________________________________
  1538. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  1539.  
  1540. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  1541. _______________________________________
  1542. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  1543.  
  1544.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  1545. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  1546. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  1547. to create national-only electronic networks could
  1548. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  1549. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  1550. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  1551. the USTR said in its annual report.
  1552.  
  1553. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  1554. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  1555. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  1556. ���������������������������������������
  1557. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  1558.  
  1559. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  1560.  
  1561. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  1562.  
  1563. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1564. _______________________________________
  1565. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  1566.  
  1567.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  1568. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  1569. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  1570. any information that comes out and will provide an
  1571. updated archive from time to time.
  1572.  
  1573.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  1574. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  1575. 927MB decompressed.
  1576.  
  1577.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  1578. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  1579. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  1580.  
  1581. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1582. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  1583.  
  1584. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  1585. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1586. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  1587. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  1588. _______________________________________
  1589. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  1590.  
  1591. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  1592. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  1593. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  1594. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  1595. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  1596. _______________________________________
  1597. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  1598.  
  1599. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  1600.  
  1601. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  1602.  
  1603. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  1604.  
  1605. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  1606.  
  1607. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  1608. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  1609. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  1610. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  1611.  
  1612. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  1613. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  1614.  
  1615. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  1616. _______________________________________
  1617. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  1618.  
  1619. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  1620.  
  1621. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  1622.  
  1623. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  1624.  
  1625. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  1626.  
  1627. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  1628.  
  1629. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  1630.  
  1631. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  1632. _______________________________________
  1633. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  1634.  
  1635.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  1636. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  1637. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  1638. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  1639. public as possible� as well helping the public
  1640. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  1641. how we�re protecting national security.�
  1642.  
  1643. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  1644. ���������������������������������������
  1645. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  1646.  
  1647. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  1648.  
  1649. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  1650.  
  1651. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  1652.  
  1653. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  1654.  
  1655. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  1656.  
  1657. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  1658.  
  1659. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  1660.  
  1661.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  1662. offensive against China, with targets including the
  1663. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  1664. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  1665. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  1666. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  1667. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  1668. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  1669. well as telecommunications companies.
  1670.  
  1671.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  1672. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  1673. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  1674. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  1675. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  1676. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  1677. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  1678. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  1679. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  1680. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  1681. battle for data supremacy.
  1682.  
  1683.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  1684. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  1685. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  1686. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  1687. among other things.
  1688.  
  1689. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  1690. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  1691. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  1692. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  1693.  
  1694. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  1695.  
  1696.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  1697. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  1698. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  1699. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  1700. has lodged representations with the American side on
  1701. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  1702. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  1703.  
  1704. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  1705. _______________________________________
  1706. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  1707.  
  1708.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  1709. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  1710. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  1711. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  1712. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  1713. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  1714. routers, the devices that connect computer
  1715. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  1716. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  1717. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  1718. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  1719. that flow over their networks.
  1720.  
  1721.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  1722. aspired to create a database that would function
  1723. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  1724. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  1725. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  1726. activity � they are targeted only because they
  1727. control access to networks the agency wants to
  1728. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  1729. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  1730. of the posts says.
  1731.  
  1732.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  1733. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  1734. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  1735. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  1736. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  1737. poses with amusing captions.�
  1738.  
  1739. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  1740. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  1741. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  1742. _______________________________________
  1743. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  1744.  
  1745. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  1746. _______________________________________
  1747. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  1748.  
  1749. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  1750.  
  1751. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  1752.  
  1753. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  1754.  
  1755. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  1756.  
  1757. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  1758.  
  1759. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  1760. _______________________________________
  1761. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  1762.  
  1763. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  1764. _______________________________________
  1765. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  1766.  
  1767. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  1768.  
  1769. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  1770. _______________________________________
  1771. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  1772.  
  1773. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  1774. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  1775. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  1776. _______________________________________
  1777. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  1778.  
  1779. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1780.  
  1781. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1782. _______________________________________
  1783. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  1784.  
  1785. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  1786. _______________________________________
  1787. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  1788.  
  1789. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  1790.  
  1791. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  1792.  
  1793. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  1794. _______________________________________
  1795. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  1796.  
  1797. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  1798. _______________________________________
  1799. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  1800.  
  1801. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  1802.  
  1803. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  1804.  
  1805. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  1806.  
  1807. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  1808.  
  1809. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  1810. _______________________________________
  1811. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  1812.  
  1813. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  1814.  
  1815. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  1816.  
  1817. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1818. _______________________________________
  1819. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  1820.  
  1821. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  1822. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  1823. _______________________________________
  1824. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  1825. With Malware ::
  1826.  
  1827.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  1828. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  1829. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  1830. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  1831. level of human oversight in the process.
  1832.  
  1833.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  1834. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  1835. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  1836. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  1837. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  1838. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  1839. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  1840. Internet and phone networks.
  1841.  
  1842. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  1843. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  1844. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  1845. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  1846. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  1847. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  1848. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  1849. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  1850. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  1851.  
  1852.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  1853. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  1854. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  1855. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  1856. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  1857. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  1858.  
  1859.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  1860. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  1861. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  1862. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  1863. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  1864. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  1865. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  1866. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  1867. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  1868. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  1869. instead of individually.�
  1870.  
  1871. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  1872.  
  1873. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  1874.  
  1875.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  1876. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  1877. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  1878. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  1879. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  1880. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  1881. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  1882. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  1883. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  1884. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  1885. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  1886. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  1887. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  1888. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  1889. execute endpoint operations.�
  1890.  
  1891. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1892.  
  1893.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  1894. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  1895. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  1896. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  1897.  
  1898.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  1899. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  1900. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  1901. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  1902. looks suspicious.
  1903.  
  1904.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  1905. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  1906. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  1907. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  1908. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  1909.  
  1910.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  1911. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  1912. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  1913. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  1914. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  1915. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  1916. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  1917.  
  1918.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  1919. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  1920. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  1921. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  1922. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  1923. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  1924. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  1925. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  1926. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  1927. in action.
  1928.  
  1929. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  1930. Computers for Surveillance ::
  1931.  
  1932. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  1933.  
  1934. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  1935.  
  1936. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  1937.  
  1938.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  1939. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  1940. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  1941. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  1942. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  1943. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  1944.  
  1945. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  1946.  
  1947. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  1948. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  1949. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  1950. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  1951. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1952. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  1953. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  1954. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  1955. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  1956. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  1957.  
  1958. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  1959.  
  1960. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  1961.  
  1962. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  1963.  
  1964. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  1965. _______________________________________
  1966. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  1967.  
  1968. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  1969. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  1970. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  1971. _______________________________________
  1972. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  1973.  
  1974. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  1975. _______________________________________
  1976. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  1977.  
  1978.  Alliances between security services are usually
  1979. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  1980. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  1981. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  1982. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  1983. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  1984. internet traffic.
  1985.  
  1986.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  1987. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  1988. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  1989. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  1990. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  1991.  
  1992.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  1993. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  1994. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  1995. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  1996. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  1997. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  1998.  
  1999.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  2000. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  2001. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  2002. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  2003. Americans may possibly use the information for
  2004. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  2005. by attacking them with armed drones.
  2006.  
  2007. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  2008.  
  2009. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  2010. _______________________________________
  2011. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  2012.  
  2013. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  2014.  
  2015. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  2016. ---------------------------------------
  2017. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  2018.  
  2019. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  2020.  
  2021. � NSA Spies Too ::
  2022.  
  2023. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2024. _______________________________________
  2025. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  2026.  
  2027. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  2028.  
  2029. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  2030.  
  2031.  The documents show that images were collected
  2032. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  2033. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  2034. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  2035. programs.
  2036.  
  2037. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  2038. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  2039. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  2040. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  2041.  
  2042. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  2043.  
  2044. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  2045. _______________________________________
  2046. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  2047.  
  2048. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  2049. _______________________________________
  2050. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  2051.  
  2052. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  2053.  
  2054. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  2055. _______________________________________
  2056. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  2057. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  2058.  
  2059. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  2060.  
  2061. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  2062. _______________________________________
  2063. � NSA Observer ::
  2064.  
  2065. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  2066. _______________________________________
  2067. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  2068.  
  2069. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  2070.  
  2071. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  2072. _______________________________________
  2073. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  2074.  
  2075. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  2076.  
  2077. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  2078. _______________________________________
  2079. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  2080.  
  2081. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  2082.  
  2083. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  2084.  
  2085. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  2086.  
  2087. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  2088. _______________________________________
  2089. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  2090.  
  2091.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  2092. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  2093. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  2094. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  2095. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  2096. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  2097. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  2098. targets without confirming their veracity on
  2099. the ground.
  2100.  
  2101. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  2102. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  2103. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  2104. _______________________________________
  2105. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  2106.  
  2107.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  2108. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  2109. shows that an American law firm was
  2110. monitored while representing a foreign
  2111. government in trade disputes with the
  2112. United States. The disclosure offers a
  2113. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  2114. which Americans were ensnared by the
  2115. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  2116. interest because lawyers in the United
  2117. States with clients overseas have
  2118. expressed growing concern that their
  2119. confidential communications could be
  2120. compromised by such surveillance.
  2121.  
  2122. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  2123. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  2124. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  2125.  
  2126. NOBODY comments
  2127.  
  2128. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  2129.  
  2130.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  2131. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  2132. be declassified for research in public domain.
  2133. _______________________________________
  2134. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  2135.  
  2136. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  2137.  
  2138. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  2139.  
  2140. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  2141. _______________________________________
  2142. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  2143.  
  2144. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  2145. _______________________________________
  2146. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  2147. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  2148.  
  2149.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  2150. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  2151. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  2152. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  2153. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  2154.  
  2155. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  2156. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  2157. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  2158.  
  2159. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  2160. the German Chancellor ::
  2161.  
  2162. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  2163. _______________________________________
  2164. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  2165. Phone Call Spying ::
  2166.  
  2167. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  2168.  
  2169. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  2170. _______________________________________
  2171. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  2172.  
  2173. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  2174. _______________________________________
  2175. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  2176.  
  2177. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  2178. _______________________________________
  2179.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  2180. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  2181. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  2182. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  2183. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  2184. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  2185.  
  2186. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  2187. ���������������������������������������
  2188. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  2189.  
  2190. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  2191.  
  2192. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  2193.  
  2194. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  2195.  
  2196. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  2197.  
  2198. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  2199.  
  2200.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  2201. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  2202. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  2203. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  2204. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  2205. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  2206. left the terminal.
  2207.  
  2208.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  2209. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  2210. clandestine operation by the Communications
  2211. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  2212. certainly illegal. ... ...
  2213.  
  2214.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  2215. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  2216. software program CSEC was developing with help
  2217. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  2218.  
  2219.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  2220. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  2221. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  2222. into other cities/regions.�
  2223.  
  2224. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  2225.  
  2226.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  2227. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  2228.  
  2229. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  2230.  
  2231. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  2232.  
  2233. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  2234.  
  2235. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  2236.  
  2237. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  2238. _______________________________________
  2239. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  2240.  
  2241. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  2242.  
  2243. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  2244.  
  2245. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  2246. _______________________________________
  2247. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  2248.  
  2249.  Documents taken from the National Security
  2250. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  2251. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  2252. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  2253. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  2254. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  2255. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  2256. information, for analysis. At the time the
  2257. documents were printed, they were also able to
  2258. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  2259.  
  2260.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  2261. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  2262. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  2263. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  2264. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  2265. visits. The monitoring program is called
  2266. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  2267.  
  2268.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  2269. British had to have been either physically able
  2270. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  2271. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  2272. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  2273. and would be able to extract some key data
  2274. about specific users as well.
  2275.  
  2276. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  2277. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  2278. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  2279. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  2280. _______________________________________
  2281. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  2282.  
  2283. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  2284. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  2285. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  2286.  
  2287. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  2288.  
  2289.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  2290. on the iPhone alone.�
  2291.  
  2292. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  2293.  
  2294. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  2295.  
  2296. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  2297.  
  2298. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  2299. _______________________________________
  2300. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  2301.  
  2302.  The National Security Agency program that
  2303. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  2304. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  2305. Thursday in a newly released report.
  2306.  
  2307. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  2308.  
  2309.  �We have not identified a single instance
  2310. involving a threat to the United States in
  2311. which the program made a concrete difference
  2312. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  2313. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  2314. report released Thursday.
  2315.  
  2316.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  2317. domestic spying will continue.
  2318.  
  2319. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  2320. _______________________________________
  2321. � Snowden Speaks ::
  2322.  
  2323. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  2324. _______________________________________
  2325. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  2326.  
  2327. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  2328.  
  2329. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  2330.          ���
  2331. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  2332.  
  2333. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  2334.  
  2335.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  2336. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  2337. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  2338. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  2339. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  2340. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  2341. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  2342. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  2343. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  2344. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  2345. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  2346. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  2347. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  2348. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  2349. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  2350.  
  2351. Reform?
  2352.  
  2353.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  2354. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  2355. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  2356. whether legal or not?
  2357.  
  2358. The reform will come from people taking action.
  2359.  
  2360.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  2361. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  2362. _______________________________________
  2363. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  2364.  
  2365. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  2366. _______________________________________
  2367. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  2368.  
  2369.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  2370. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  2371. main internet cables:
  2372.  
  2373.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  2374.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  2375.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  2376.  
  2377. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  2378. ---------------------------------------
  2379. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  2380. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  2381. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  2382. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  2383. _______________________________________
  2384. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  2385.  
  2386. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  2387.  
  2388. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  2389.  
  2390. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  2391. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  2392. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  2393. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  2394. ---------------------------------------
  2395. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  2396. _______________________________________
  2397. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  2398.  
  2399. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  2400.  
  2401. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  2402.  
  2403. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  2404.  
  2405.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  2406. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  2407. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  2408. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  2409.  
  2410.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  2411. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  2412. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  2413. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  2414.  
  2415.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  2416. text message database to extract information
  2417. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  2418. transactions and more � including of individuals
  2419. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  2420.  
  2421. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  2422. _______________________________________
  2423. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  2424.  
  2425. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  2426.  
  2427. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  2428.  
  2429.  The technology, which the agency has used
  2430. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  2431. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  2432. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  2433. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  2434. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  2435. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  2436. set up miles away from the target.
  2437.  
  2438.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  2439. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  2440. American intelligence agencies for years:
  2441. getting into computers that adversaries,
  2442. and some American partners, have tried to
  2443. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  2444. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  2445. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  2446. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  2447. ---------------------------------------
  2448. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  2449.  
  2450. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  2451. _______________________________________
  2452. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  2453.  
  2454. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  2455. ---------------------------------------
  2456. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  2457.  
  2458. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  2459. _______________________________________
  2460. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  2461.  
  2462. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  2463. _______________________________________
  2464. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  2465.  
  2466. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  2467. _______________________________________
  2468. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  2469.  
  2470. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  2471. _______________________________________
  2472. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  2473. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  2474.  
  2475. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  2476.  
  2477. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  2478. _______________________________________
  2479. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  2480. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  2481.  
  2482. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  2483. _______________________________________
  2484. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  2485. All Encryption ::
  2486.  
  2487.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  2488. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  2489. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  2490. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  2491. used to protect banking, medical, business
  2492. and government records around the world.
  2493.  
  2494.  According to documents provided by former
  2495. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  2496. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  2497. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  2498. than classical computers � is part of a
  2499. $79.7 million research program titled
  2500. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  2501. work is hosted under classified contracts
  2502. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  2503.  
  2504. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  2505. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  2506. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  2507. _______________________________________
  2508. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  2509.  
  2510. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  2511. _______________________________________
  2512. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  2513.  
  2514. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  2515. _______________________________________
  2516. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  2517.  
  2518. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  2519.  
  2520. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  2521.  
  2522. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  2523.  
  2524. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  2525.  
  2526. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  2527.  
  2528. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  2529. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  2530. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  2531.  
  2532. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  2533.  
  2534.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  2535. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  2536. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  2537. infiltrates computers around the world and
  2538. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  2539. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  2540. it is targeting. ... ...
  2541.  
  2542. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  2543.  
  2544.  The insert method and other variants of
  2545. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  2546. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  2547. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  2548. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  2549. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  2550. also incorporates routers and servers
  2551. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  2552. network by infecting these networks with
  2553. �implants� that then allow the government
  2554. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  2555.  
  2556.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  2557. to identify and track its targets based on
  2558. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  2559. could include certain email addresses or
  2560. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  2561. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  2562. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  2563. additional information like an email address.
  2564. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  2565. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  2566. ---------------------------------------
  2567. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  2568.  
  2569. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  2570.  
  2571. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  2572.  
  2573.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  2574. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  2575. that are being logged into on that computer
  2576. as long as the user does not clear browser
  2577. cookies.�
  2578.  
  2579. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  2580.  
  2581. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  2582.  
  2583. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  2584. ---------------------------------------
  2585. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  2586.  
  2587.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  2588. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  2589. could be described as master carpenters for
  2590. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  2591. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  2592. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  2593. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  2594. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  2595. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  2596. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  2597. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  2598. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  2599. ability to establish a global covert network
  2600. that operates alongside the Internet.
  2601.  
  2602.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  2603. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  2604. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  2605. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  2606. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  2607. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  2608. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  2609. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  2610. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  2611. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  2612. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  2613. over $1 million.
  2614.  
  2615.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  2616. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  2617. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  2618. clear preference for planting their malicious
  2619. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  2620. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  2621. to load when a computer is turned on.
  2622.  
  2623.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  2624. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  2625. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  2626. to virus protection and other security programs.
  2627. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  2628. computer has been completely erased and a new
  2629. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  2630. can continue to function and ensures that new
  2631. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  2632. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  2633. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  2634. this approach has provided them with the
  2635. possibility of permanent access.
  2636.  
  2637.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  2638. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  2639. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  2640. with the exception of latter, are American
  2641. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  2642. intelligence agency is compromising the
  2643. technology and products of American companies.
  2644.  
  2645. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  2646. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  2647. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  2648. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  2649. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  2650.  
  2651. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  2652.  
  2653. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  2654.  
  2655. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  2656.  
  2657. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  2658.  
  2659. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  2660.  
  2661. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  2662.  
  2663. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  2664.  
  2665. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  2666.  
  2667. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  2668.  
  2669. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  2670.  
  2671. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  2672.  
  2673. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  2674.  
  2675. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  2676.  
  2677. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  2678.  
  2679. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  2680.  
  2681. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  2682.  
  2683. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  2684.  
  2685. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  2686.  
  2687. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  2688.  
  2689. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  2690.  
  2691. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  2692.  
  2693. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  2694.  
  2695. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  2696.  
  2697. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  2698.  
  2699. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  2700.  
  2701. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  2702. ---------------------------------------
  2703. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  2704.  
  2705. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  2706.  
  2707. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  2708.  
  2709. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  2710.  
  2711. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  2712. ---------------------------------------
  2713. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  2714.  
  2715. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  2716.  
  2717. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  2718.  
  2719.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  2720. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  2721. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  2722.  
  2723. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  2724.  
  2725. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  2726. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  2727.  
  2728.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  2729. in its operating system had left devices open
  2730. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  2731. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  2732. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  2733. of its mass spying program.
  2734.  
  2735. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  2736. ---------------------------------------
  2737. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  2738. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  2739.  
  2740. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  2741.  
  2742. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  2743. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  2744.  
  2745. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  2746.  
  2747. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  2748.  
  2749. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  2750.  
  2751.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  2752. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  2753.  
  2754. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  2755. _______________________________________
  2756. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  2757.  
  2758. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  2759.  
  2760. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  2761.  
  2762. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  2763. _______________________________________
  2764. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  2765.  
  2766. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  2767.  
  2768.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  2769. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  2770. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  2771. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  2772. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  2773. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  2774. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  2775. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  2776. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  2777. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  2778.  
  2779.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  2780. learn we are collecting more in the United
  2781. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  2782. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  2783. troubled, he said, and several said they
  2784. did not want to know any more.
  2785. ---------------------------------------
  2786. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  2787.  
  2788. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  2789. _______________________________________
  2790. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  2791. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  2792.  
  2793. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  2794. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  2795. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  2796. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  2797. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  2798. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  2799. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  2800. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  2801.  
  2802. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  2803.  
  2804.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  2805. National Security Agency program which
  2806. collects information on nearly all telephone
  2807. calls made to, from or within the United
  2808. States is likely unconstitutional.
  2809.  
  2810.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  2811. that the program appears to violate the
  2812. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  2813. searches and seizures. He also said the
  2814. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  2815. that collecting the information had helped
  2816. to head off terrorist attacks.
  2817.  
  2818.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  2819. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  2820. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  2821. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  2822. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  2823. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  2824. the order to allow for an appeal.
  2825.  
  2826. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  2827. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  2828.  
  2829.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  2830. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  2831. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  2832. in June in news stories based on leaks
  2833. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  2834. For seven years, the metadata program has
  2835. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  2836. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  2837. Court and found constitutional by at least
  2838. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  2839.  
  2840. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  2841.  
  2842. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  2843.  
  2844. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  2845.  
  2846. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  2847.  
  2848. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  2849.  
  2850. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  2851. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  2852.  
  2853. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  2854.  
  2855. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  2856.  
  2857. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  2858. ---------------------------------------
  2859. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  2860.  
  2861. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  2862.  
  2863. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  2864.  
  2865. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  2866. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  2867.  
  2868. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  2869. Spying Programs ::
  2870.  
  2871. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  2872. ---------------------------------------
  2873. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  2874. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  2875.  
  2876. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  2877.  
  2878. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  2879.  
  2880. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  2881. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  2882.  
  2883. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  2884.  
  2885. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  2886. _______________________________________
  2887. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  2888.  
  2889.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  2890. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  2891. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  2892.  
  2893. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  2894.  
  2895. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  2896.  
  2897.  - Military Information
  2898.  - Economic Information
  2899.  - Information Operations Information
  2900.  - Political Information �
  2901. _______________________________________
  2902. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  2903. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  2904.  
  2905. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  2906. ���������������������������������������
  2907. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  2908.  
  2909. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  2910.  
  2911. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  2912.  
  2913. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  2914.  
  2915. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  2916.  
  2917. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  2918.  
  2919. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  2920.  
  2921. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  2922.  
  2923. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  2924.  
  2925. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  2926. _______________________________________
  2927. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  2928. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  2929.  
  2930.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  2931. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  2932. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  2933. government access in order to make network
  2934. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  2935. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  2936. in millions of homes and businesses within
  2937. the UK,� the paper states.
  2938.  
  2939.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  2940. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  2941. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  2942. assigns all their modems an extra address
  2943. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  2944. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  2945. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  2946. a second IP address for management, except
  2947. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  2948. assigned to the United States Department
  2949. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  2950. of speculation that this is actually a
  2951. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  2952. they can secretly monitor and control
  2953. peoples� home networks.
  2954.  
  2955.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  2956. The better explanation is that BT simply
  2957. chose this address space because it�s
  2958. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  2959. address, it�s only used inside the private
  2960. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  2961. that address space, you�ll see that your
  2962. packets go nowhere.
  2963.  
  2964. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  2965. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  2966. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  2967.  
  2968. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  2969.  
  2970.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  2971. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  2972. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  2973. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  2974. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  2975. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  2976. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  2977. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  2978. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  2979. It�s past time for something new.�
  2980.  
  2981. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  2982. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  2983. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  2984. ---------------------------------------
  2985. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  2986.  
  2987.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  2988. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  2989. worldwide with malicious software designed
  2990. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  2991. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  2992. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  2993.  
  2994.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  2995. explains how the NSA collects information
  2996. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  2997. shows that the intelligence service uses
  2998. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  2999. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  3000. secret infiltration of computer systems
  3001. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  3002. software.
  3003.  
  3004.  One example of this type of hacking was
  3005. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  3006. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  3007. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  3008. has been installing this malicious software
  3009. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  3010. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  3011. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  3012. through a process of luring employees to a
  3013. false Linkedin page.
  3014.  
  3015. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  3016. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3017. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  3018. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  3019.  
  3020. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  3021.  
  3022.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  3023. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  3024. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  3025. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  3026. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  3027. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  3028. and citizens.
  3029.  
  3030.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  3031. will deter this bounty of profits for
  3032. the comsec industry, unless the public
  3033. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  3034. the nettle, and all those making money
  3035. from this deception operation decide to
  3036. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  3037.  
  3038.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  3039. lists, those participating in standards
  3040. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  3041. grants in think tanks and universities,
  3042. those in law firms and public interest
  3043. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  3044. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  3045. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  3046. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  3047. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  3048. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  3049. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  3050. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  3051. contracts, list lurking, online and
  3052. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  3053. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  3054. fulfilled.
  3055.  
  3056. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  3057.  
  3058. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  3059.  
  3060. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3061.  
  3062. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3063. ���������������������������������������
  3064. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  3065. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  3066.  
  3067. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  3068. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  3069. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  3070. _______________________________________
  3071. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  3072.  
  3073. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  3074.  
  3075. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  3076.  
  3077. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  3078.  
  3079. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  3080.  
  3081. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  3082. _______________________________________
  3083. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  3084.  
  3085. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  3086. _______________________________________
  3087. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  3088. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  3089.  
  3090. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  3091.  
  3092. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  3093. _______________________________________
  3094. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  3095.  
  3096. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  3097. _______________________________________
  3098. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  3099. of Public Concerns ::
  3100.  
  3101. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  3102.  
  3103. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  3104.  
  3105. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  3106. _______________________________________
  3107. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3108.  
  3109.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  3110. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  3111. of metadata about the world�s secure
  3112. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  3113. certainly not a program through which
  3114. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  3115. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  3116. services like Google, as reported by others,
  3117. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  3118. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  3119. Google are based on a small piece of a
  3120. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  3121. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  3122. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  3123. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  3124. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  3125. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  3126. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  3127. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  3128. by providing information about a target.�
  3129.  
  3130. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  3131.  
  3132. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  3133.  
  3134. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  3135. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  3136. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  3137. ���������������������������������������
  3138. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  3139.  
  3140. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  3141.  
  3142. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  3143. _______________________________________
  3144. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  3145.  
  3146. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  3147. ---------------------------------------
  3148. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  3149.  
  3150. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  3151.  
  3152.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  3153. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  3154. and later managed by big data corporations
  3155. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  3156.  
  3157.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  3158. large files across machines in a large
  3159. cluster.
  3160.  
  3161. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  3162.  
  3163.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  3164. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  3165. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  3166. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  3167.  
  3168.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  3169. major components, a central metadata server
  3170. and file servers from data.
  3171.  
  3172. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  3173.  
  3174. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  3175.  
  3176.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  3177. posted on public domain.
  3178.  
  3179. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  3180.  
  3181. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  3182. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  3183.  
  3184. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3185. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  3186. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  3187.  
  3188. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  3189.  
  3190. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  3191. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  3192. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  3193. ---------------------------------------
  3194. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  3195. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  3196.  
  3197. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  3198.  
  3199. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  3200.  
  3201. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  3202.  
  3203. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  3204.  
  3205. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  3206.  
  3207. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  3208.  
  3209. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  3210.  
  3211. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  3212.  
  3213. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  3214.  
  3215.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  3216. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  3217. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  3218. content of all our communications have
  3219. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  3220. program since the 1990s.
  3221.  
  3222.  The new details concern how, �The National
  3223. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  3224. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  3225. of cellphones around the world.�
  3226.  
  3227.  However, the report reveals itself to
  3228. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  3229. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  3230. does not target Americans� location data
  3231. by design, but the agency acquires a
  3232. substantial amount of information on
  3233. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  3234. �incidentally.�
  3235.  
  3236.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  3237. happens to record the locations of Americans
  3238. using data from their cellphones, and is
  3239. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  3240. surveillance, is yet another example of
  3241. damage control by the establishment.
  3242.  
  3243. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  3244. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  3245. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  3246. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  3247. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  3248. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  3249. ---------------------------------------
  3250. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  3251. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  3252.  
  3253.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  3254. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  3255. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  3256. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  3257. targets for government hacking and to
  3258. bolster surveillance.
  3259.  
  3260. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  3261. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  3262. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  3263. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  3264. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  3265. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  3266. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  3267. ---------------------------------------
  3268. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  3269.  
  3270. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  3271. ---------------------------------------
  3272. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  3273. In a World Without Cookies ::
  3274.  
  3275. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  3276. _______________________________________
  3277. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  3278.  
  3279. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  3280. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  3281. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  3282.  
  3283. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  3284.  
  3285. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  3286. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  3287. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  3288. _______________________________________
  3289. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  3290. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  3291.  
  3292. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  3293. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  3294. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  3295. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  3296. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  3297. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  3298.  
  3299. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  3300.  
  3301. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  3302.  
  3303. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  3304.  
  3305. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  3306.  
  3307. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  3308.  
  3309. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  3310.  
  3311. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  3312.  
  3313. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  3314.  
  3315. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  3316.  
  3317. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  3318.  
  3319. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  3320.  
  3321. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  3322. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  3323. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  3324.  
  3325. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  3326.  
  3327. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  3328. ---------------------------------------
  3329. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  3330.  
  3331. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  3332. ---------------------------------------
  3333. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  3334.  
  3335. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  3336.  
  3337. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  3338.  
  3339. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  3340.  
  3341. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  3342.  
  3343. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  3344.  
  3345. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  3346.  
  3347. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  3348. _______________________________________
  3349.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  3350. worldwide was published by the German
  3351. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  3352. map was put online by accident, but before
  3353. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  3354. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  3355. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  3356. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  3357. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  3358. the names of all other cities were blurred
  3359. by Der Spiegel.�
  3360.  
  3361.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  3362.  
  3363. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  3364.  
  3365. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  3366.  
  3367. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  3368.  
  3369. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  3370.  
  3371. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  3372.  
  3373. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  3374. ---------------------------------------
  3375. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  3376.  
  3377. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  3378.  
  3379. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  3380. _______________________________________
  3381. � Five Eyes ::
  3382.  
  3383. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  3384. _______________________________________
  3385. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  3386.  
  3387. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  3388. _______________________________________
  3389. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  3390. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  3391.  
  3392. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  3393.  
  3394. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  3395. _______________________________________
  3396. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  3397.  
  3398. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  3399.  
  3400. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  3401. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  3402. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  3403. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  3404. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  3405. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  3406. _______________________________________
  3407. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  3408.  
  3409.  September 11th, which also happened to
  3410. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  3411. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  3412. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  3413. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  3414. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  3415. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  3416. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  3417. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  3418. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  3419. itself.
  3420.  
  3421.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  3422. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  3423. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  3424. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  3425. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  3426. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  3427. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  3428. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  3429. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  3430. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  3431. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  3432. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  3433. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  3434. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  3435. its workforce by one-third, to about
  3436. 33,000. The number of private companies
  3437. it depended upon more than tripled during
  3438. that time.
  3439.  
  3440.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  3441. and the increasing reliance on the private
  3442. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  3443. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  3444. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  3445. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  3446. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  3447. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  3448. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  3449. getting those clearances. So you had
  3450. this huge apparatus being built, and
  3451. the government was just managing it.
  3452. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  3453. doing that.� ... ...
  3454.  
  3455.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  3456. workforce, the surveillance he would
  3457. later expose was becoming not just
  3458. institutionalized but very big business.
  3459. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  3460. the full flower of that massive, massive
  3461. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  3462. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  3463. could go.� ... ...
  3464.  
  3465.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  3466. leaking government secrets when he was
  3467. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  3468. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  3469. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  3470. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  3471. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  3472. policies that I thought would be reined
  3473. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  3474. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  3475. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  3476. the more he read �true information,�
  3477. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  3478. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  3479. surveillance program � the more he realized
  3480. that there were actually two governments:
  3481. the one that was elected, and the other,
  3482. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  3483. �If the highest officials in government
  3484. can break the law without fearing punishment
  3485. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  3486. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  3487.  
  3488. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  3489. _______________________________________
  3490. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  3491.  
  3492. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  3493. _______________________________________
  3494. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  3495.  
  3496. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  3497. _______________________________________
  3498. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  3499. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  3500.  
  3501.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  3502. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  3503. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  3504. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  3505. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  3506. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  3507. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  3508. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  3509. in terrorism.
  3510.  
  3511.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  3512. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  3513. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  3514. threatening national security. It is
  3515. successfully restricting release of the
  3516. Snowden material and will likely become
  3517. more forceful as releases continue to the
  3518. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  3519. to criminalize release as a national
  3520. security threat.
  3521.  
  3522. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  3523. _______________________________________
  3524. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  3525.  
  3526.  Includes most reports, slides and
  3527. documents all related to the recent
  3528. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  3529. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  3530. any information that comes out and
  3531. will provide updated archives from
  3532. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  3533.  
  3534.  After decompression - the folder is
  3535. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  3536. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  3537.  
  3538. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3539. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  3540.  
  3541. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  3542. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  3543. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  3544. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3545. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  3546. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  3547. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  3548. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  3549. _______________________________________
  3550. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  3551.  
  3552. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3553. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3554. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  3555.  
  3556. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  3557. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  3558.  
  3559.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  3560. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  3561. Australians, and hands over the material
  3562. to the US and its closest allies, according
  3563. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  3564. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  3565. Australia web site.
  3566.  
  3567.  The document obtained by the former US
  3568. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  3569. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  3570. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  3571. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  3572. as well as the people and governments of
  3573. many Asian countries.
  3574.  
  3575.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  3576. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  3577. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  3578. global partners so-called metadata of
  3579. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  3580. address books and social media posts of
  3581. millions of people.
  3582.  
  3583.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  3584. the recent revelations, also from documents
  3585. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  3586. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  3587. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  3588. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  3589. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  3590. operate as electronic listening posts
  3591. for the US-led spying network.
  3592.  
  3593. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  3594. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  3595. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  3596. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  3597. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  3598. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  3599.  
  3600. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  3601. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  3602.  
  3603.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  3604. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  3605. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  3606. political figures has been furiously
  3607. denounced by other media outlets for
  3608. breaching �national security� and the
  3609. �national interest.� The reaction
  3610. underscores the extent to which the
  3611. media establishment has been integrated
  3612. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  3613.  
  3614.  On November 18, after being approached
  3615. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  3616. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  3617. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  3618. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  3619. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  3620. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  3621. senior political figures. The report
  3622. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  3623. crisis for the Australian government, with
  3624. the Indonesian president suspending military
  3625. and intelligence cooperation.
  3626.  
  3627. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  3628. _______________________________________
  3629. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  3630.  
  3631.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  3632. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  3633. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  3634. allowed the largest American spy agency
  3635. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  3636. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  3637.  
  3638.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  3639. by CBC News.
  3640.  
  3641.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  3642. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  3643. a security command post during a six-day
  3644. spying operation by the National Security
  3645. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  3646. other foreign heads of government were on
  3647. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  3648.  
  3649.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  3650. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  3651.  
  3652.  The world was still struggling to climb
  3653. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  3654. were debating a wide array of possible
  3655. measures including a global tax on banks,
  3656. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  3657. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  3658. eventually scotched.
  3659.  
  3660. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  3661. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  3662. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  3663. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  3664. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  3665.  
  3666. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  3667. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  3668.  
  3669. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  3670.  
  3671.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  3672. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  3673.  
  3674. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  3675.  
  3676. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  3677.  
  3678. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  3679.  
  3680. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  3681. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  3682.  
  3683. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  3684.  
  3685. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  3686.  
  3687. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  3688.  
  3689. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  3690. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  3691.  
  3692. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  3693.  
  3694. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  3695.  
  3696.  The politicians and corporate media would have Canadians
  3697. believe that they have only �moved on� from discussing
  3698. CSEC�s activities because there is nothing for Canadians
  3699. to worry about.
  3700.  
  3701.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool of the Canadian ruling
  3702. class that plays an important role in the pursuit of its
  3703. imperialist foreign policy and in the surveillance and
  3704. suppression of opposition at home. The size of CSEC�s
  3705. staff�it employs almost 2,000 people and a further thousand
  3706. military personnel assist its work�give an inkling of the
  3707. scale of its activities.
  3708.  
  3709.  These include everything from supporting the overseas
  3710. operations of the Canadian military, to spying on governments
  3711. that are reputed allies of Canada and assisting CSIS and the
  3712. RCMP in conducting a vast program of domestic surveillance.
  3713. Of especial importance is the CSEC�s partnership with the NSA.
  3714. According to former NSA technical director William Binney,
  3715. the two organizations �have integrated personnel� i.e. swap
  3716. personnel to improve seamless collaboration. They also share
  3717. Internet surveillance programs.
  3718.  
  3719.  As a further element of its collaboration with the Five Eyes
  3720. alliance, CSEC was relied on in the project of spying on
  3721. diplomats and officials during the 2009 London G20 meeting
  3722. according to a report in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  3723. which was based on documents supplied by Snowden. The highly
  3724. sensitive operation involved the penetration of delegates�
  3725. smartphones to monitor their email messages and calls.
  3726.  
  3727. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  3728.  
  3729. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  3730.  
  3731. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  3732.  
  3733. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  3734. _______________________________________
  3735. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  3736.  
  3737. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  3738.  
  3739. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  3740.  
  3741. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  3742. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  3743. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  3744.  
  3745. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  3746.  
  3747. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  3748.  
  3749. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  3750.  
  3751. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  3752. _______________________________________
  3753.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  3754. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  3755. in theory � forbid local governments from
  3756. providing services to federal agencies
  3757. that collect electronic data from Americans
  3758. without a personalized warrant.
  3759.  
  3760.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  3761. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  3762. but at least one legislator has committed
  3763. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  3764. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  3765. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  3766. is introduced.
  3767.  
  3768.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  3769. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  3770. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  3771. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  3772. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  3773. and a handful of other groups.
  3774.  
  3775.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  3776. Maharrey adds.
  3777.  
  3778. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  3779. _______________________________________
  3780. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  3781. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  3782.  
  3783.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  3784. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  3785. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  3786. US and British intelligence � particularly
  3787. their cooperation in data collection and
  3788. snooping programs involving British citizens
  3789. and close allies on the European continent.
  3790.  
  3791.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  3792. to account by British authorities for
  3793. jeopardizing national security. The
  3794. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  3795. is being forced to appear before a
  3796. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  3797. the news outlet�s actions.
  3798.  
  3799. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3800. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  3801. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  3802.  
  3803. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  3804.  
  3805. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3806.  
  3807. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  3808. as the British Dictatorship ::
  3809.  
  3810.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  3811. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  3812. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  3813. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  3814. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  3815. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  3816. seems the United States is reaching the event
  3817. horizon to a police state.
  3818.  
  3819. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  3820.  
  3821. Cryptome noted
  3822.  
  3823.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  3824. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  3825. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  3826. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  3827. UKG), although there could be some which have
  3828. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  3829. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  3830.  
  3831.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  3832. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  3833. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  3834. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  3835. deception, co-optation.
  3836.  
  3837.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  3838. had access, or suspected of access, are
  3839. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  3840. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  3841. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  3842. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  3843. standard coercive means of authorities.
  3844.  
  3845.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  3846. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  3847. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  3848. advised successive cooperators, usually
  3849. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  3850. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  3851. participation.
  3852.  
  3853.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  3854. disputes and disagreements among competing
  3855. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  3856. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  3857. along with threats against families, friends
  3858. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  3859. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  3860. with authorities, including use of rewards
  3861. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  3862.  
  3863. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  3864. _______________________________________
  3865. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  3866.  
  3867. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  3868. _______________________________________
  3869. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  3870. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  3871. Governments ::
  3872.  
  3873. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  3874. _______________________________________
  3875. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  3876. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  3877.  
  3878. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  3879. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  3880. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  3881. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  3882. _______________________________________
  3883. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  3884.  
  3885. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  3886.  
  3887. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  3888.  
  3889. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  3890.  
  3891. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  3892.  
  3893. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  3894.  
  3895. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  3896.  
  3897. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  3898.  
  3899. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  3900.  
  3901. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  3902.  
  3903. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  3904.  
  3905. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  3906.  
  3907. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  3908.  
  3909. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  3910.  
  3911. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  3912.  
  3913. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  3914.  
  3915. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  3916. Steal Email Metadata ::
  3917.  
  3918.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  3919. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  3920. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  3921. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  3922.  
  3923.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  3924. servers around the world, reducing the
  3925. chance of losing your information should
  3926. one fail. When you log in to an account
  3927. with these firms, the data sent between
  3928. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  3929. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  3930. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  3931. And because many of the transfers take place
  3932. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  3933. isn�t required to tap the information.
  3934.  
  3935.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  3936. broken into the main communications links
  3937. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  3938. around the world, according to documents
  3939. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  3940. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  3941. officials.
  3942.  
  3943.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  3944. positioned itself to collect at will from
  3945. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  3946. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  3947. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  3948. but it keeps a lot.
  3949.  
  3950.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  3951. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  3952. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  3953. counterpart, the Government Communications
  3954. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  3955. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  3956. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  3957. that carry information among the data
  3958. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  3959.  
  3960. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  3961. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  3962. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  3963. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  3964. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  3965.  
  3966. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  3967.  
  3968.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  3969. email collecting program �does not apply
  3970. to US citizens.�
  3971.  
  3972.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  3973. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  3974. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  3975. accounts around the world, many of them
  3976. belonging to Americans, according to
  3977. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  3978. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  3979. Edward Snowden.
  3980.  
  3981.  The collection program, which has not
  3982. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  3983. address books and �buddy lists� from
  3984. instant messaging services as they move
  3985. across global data links. Online services
  3986. often transmit those contacts when a user
  3987. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  3988. a computer or mobile device with information
  3989. stored on remote servers.
  3990.  
  3991. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  3992. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  3993. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  3994.  
  3995. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  3996.  
  3997. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  3998.  
  3999. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  4000.  
  4001. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  4002. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  4003. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  4004. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  4005. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  4006. ���������������������������������������
  4007. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  4008.  
  4009. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  4010.  
  4011. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  4012. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  4013.  
  4014. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  4015.  
  4016. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  4017.  
  4018. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  4019.  
  4020. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4021.  
  4022. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  4023.  
  4024. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  4025.  
  4026. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  4027.  
  4028. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  4029.  
  4030. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  4031.  
  4032. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  4033.  
  4034. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  4035.  
  4036. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  4037.  
  4038. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  4039. ---------------------------------------
  4040. NOBODY comments ?
  4041.  
  4042.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  4043. differs from the Guardians.
  4044.  
  4045. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4046.  
  4047. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  4048.  
  4049. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  4050.  
  4051. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  4052.  
  4053.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  4054. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  4055. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  4056.  
  4057.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  4058. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  4059. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  4060. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  4061. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  4062. ---------------------------------------
  4063. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  4064.  
  4065. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  4066.  
  4067. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4068.  
  4069.  This was written from a person who purports
  4070. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  4071.  
  4072. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  4073.  
  4074. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  4075.  
  4076. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  4077.  
  4078. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  4079. Misleading ::
  4080.  
  4081. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  4082.  
  4083. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  4084. on NSA Spying ::
  4085.  
  4086. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  4087.  
  4088.  �Recent articles published in the
  4089. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  4090. inaccurate and misleading information
  4091. regarding US foreign intelligence
  4092. activities. The allegation that the
  4093. National Security Agency collected more
  4094. than 70 million �recordings of French
  4095. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  4096.  
  4097.  While we are not going to discuss the
  4098. details of our activities, we have
  4099. repeatedly made it clear that the
  4100. United States gathers intelligence of
  4101. the type gathered by all nations. The
  4102. US collects intelligence to protect the
  4103. nation, its interests, and its allies
  4104. from, among other things, threats such
  4105. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  4106. weapons of mass destruction.
  4107.  
  4108.  The United States values our longstanding
  4109. friendship and alliance with France and
  4110. we will continue to cooperate on security
  4111. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  4112.  
  4113. James R. Clapper
  4114. Director of National Intelligence
  4115. ---------------------------------------
  4116. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  4117.  
  4118. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  4119.  
  4120.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  4121. a call without leaving a record with the
  4122. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  4123. or leaves America without passing through
  4124. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  4125. statement Thursday.
  4126.  
  4127.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  4128. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  4129. _______________________________________
  4130. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  4131. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  4132.  
  4133.  US and British intelligence officials
  4134. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  4135. collection of highly classified, heavily
  4136. encrypted materials they believe former
  4137. National Security Agency contractor
  4138. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  4139.  
  4140.  One source saw the cache of documents
  4141. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  4142. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  4143. other harm. ... ...
  4144.  
  4145.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  4146. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  4147. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  4148. that �if anything happens at all to
  4149. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  4150. to get access to the full archives.�
  4151.  
  4152. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  4153. _______________________________________
  4154. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  4155. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  4156.  
  4157.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  4158. government surveillance policies. But he
  4159. is not disclosing those changes to the
  4160. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  4161. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  4162. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  4163. World Bank and the International Monetary
  4164. Fund? He won�t say.
  4165.  
  4166.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  4167. to review and recommend changes to his
  4168. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  4169.  
  4170. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  4171. _______________________________________
  4172. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  4173.  
  4174.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  4175. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  4176. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  4177. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  4178. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  4179.  
  4180.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  4181. broad goals, the five-page document said
  4182. that existing American laws were not adequate
  4183. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  4184. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  4185. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  4186. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  4187. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  4188. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  4189. pace with the complexity of the technology
  4190. and target environments, or the operational
  4191. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  4192. document concluded.
  4193.  
  4194. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  4195. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  4196. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  4197. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  4198. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  4199.  
  4200. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  4201.  
  4202.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  4203. called Treasure Map and describes its
  4204. capabilities but does not publish visual
  4205. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  4206. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  4207. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  4208.  
  4209. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  4210. _______________________________________
  4211. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  4212.  
  4213. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  4214. _______________________________________
  4215. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  4216.  
  4217. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  4218.  
  4219. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  4220.  
  4221. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  4222.  
  4223.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  4224. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  4225. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  4226. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  4227. the door to a variety of spying options.
  4228.  
  4229. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  4230. _______________________________________
  4231. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  4232.  
  4233.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  4234. collection of solely domestic communications
  4235. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  4236. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  4237. request each week until we receive your
  4238. response,� EPIC said.
  4239.  
  4240.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  4241. said this week that it would not be hearing
  4242. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  4243. early Monday in which the high court listed
  4244. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  4245. as denied.
  4246.  
  4247. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  4248.  
  4249. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  4250. _______________________________________
  4251. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  4252.  
  4253. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  4254.  
  4255. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  4256. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  4257.  
  4258. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  4259.  
  4260. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  4261.  
  4262. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  4263. No Privacy ::
  4264.  
  4265. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  4266.  
  4267. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  4268. Spying Programs ::
  4269.  
  4270. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  4271.  
  4272. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  4273.  
  4274. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  4275.  
  4276. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  4277. _______________________________________
  4278. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  4279.  
  4280. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4281.  
  4282. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  4283.  
  4284. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  4285.  
  4286. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4287.  
  4288. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  4289.  
  4290. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  4291.  
  4292. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4293.  
  4294.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  4295. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  4296. or indigenous cryptographic information
  4297. security devices or systems in order to
  4298. make them exploitable.�
  4299.  
  4300. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  4301.  
  4302.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  4303. successfully exploits cryptographic
  4304. components of commercial information
  4305. security devices or systems when the
  4306. device or system specified.�
  4307.  
  4308. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4309.  
  4310. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  4311.  
  4312. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  4313.  
  4314. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4315. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4316. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  4317.  
  4318. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  4319.  
  4320.  US and British intelligence agencies
  4321. have successfully cracked much of the
  4322. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  4323. of millions of people to protect the
  4324. privacy of their personal data, online
  4325. transactions and emails, according to
  4326. top-secret documents revealed by former
  4327. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  4328.  
  4329.  Those methods include covert measures
  4330. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  4331. international encryption standards, the
  4332. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  4333. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  4334. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  4335. technology companies and internet service
  4336. providers themselves.
  4337.  
  4338.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  4339. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  4340. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  4341. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  4342.  
  4343.  Independent security experts have long
  4344. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  4345. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  4346. confirmed for the first time by another
  4347. secret document. It shows the agency
  4348. worked covertly to get its own version
  4349. of a draft security standard issued by
  4350. the US National Institute of Standards
  4351. and Technology approved for worldwide
  4352. use in 2006.
  4353.  
  4354. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  4355.  
  4356. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  4357.  
  4358. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  4359.  
  4360. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  4361.  
  4362. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  4363.  
  4364. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  4365.  
  4366. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  4367.  
  4368. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4369.  
  4370. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  4371. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  4372. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  4373.  
  4374. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4375.  
  4376. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  4377. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  4378.  
  4379. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  4380.  
  4381. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  4382.  
  4383. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  4384.  
  4385. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  4386.  
  4387. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  4388. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  4389.  
  4390. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  4391.  
  4392. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  4393.  
  4394.  A range of US hardware and software
  4395. companies are in danger of being dragged
  4396. into the widening scandal over internet
  4397. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  4398. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  4399. Security Agency contractor.
  4400.  
  4401.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  4402. that it has collaborated with technology
  4403. companies to plant �back doors� into
  4404. their systems � or ways for the agency
  4405. secretly to penetrate systems without
  4406. the users� knowledge.
  4407.  
  4408. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  4409.  
  4410. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  4411.  
  4412. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  4413. _______________________________________
  4414. � SSL Inspector ::
  4415.  
  4416. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  4417.  
  4418. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  4419.  
  4420. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  4421. _______________________________________
  4422. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  4423. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  4424.  
  4425. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  4426.  
  4427. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  4428.  
  4429. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  4430.  
  4431. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  4432.  
  4433. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  4434.  
  4435. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  4436.  
  4437. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  4438.  
  4439. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  4440.  
  4441. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  4442. ���������������������������������������
  4443. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  4444. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  4445.  
  4446. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  4447. ���������������������������������������
  4448. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  4449.  
  4450.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  4451. activities is an obscure organization called
  4452. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  4453. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  4454. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  4455. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  4456. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  4457. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  4458. presentation given to journalists by former
  4459. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  4460. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  4461. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  4462. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  4463. be collected, which is then gathered and
  4464. delivered by the DITU.
  4465.  
  4466.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  4467. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  4468. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  4469. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  4470. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  4471. collection, processing, and reporting.
  4472.  
  4473. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  4474.  
  4475. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  4476.  
  4477. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  4478. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  4479. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4480.  
  4481.  
  4482. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  4483.  
  4484. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4485. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  4486. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  4487.  
  4488. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  4489.  
  4490. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  4491.  
  4492. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  4493.  
  4494. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  4495.  
  4496. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  4497.  
  4498. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  4499.  
  4500.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  4501. by the NSA.
  4502.  
  4503.  During the summer, the documents provided to the Guardian
  4504. and the Washington Post by former NSA employee Edward
  4505. Snowden helped unveil the extent of surveillance and
  4506. espionage carried out by the NSA and its allies. Le Monde
  4507. also now has access to some of these documents.
  4508.  
  4509.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most secretive intelligence
  4510. agencies of the United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  4511. who was granted an asylum for a year in Russia. Wanting to
  4512. denounce "the largest program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  4513. history," the American working for a subcontractor of the NSA
  4514. has obtained several thousands of highly confidential documents.
  4515.  
  4516.  In early June, the first secrets of the National Security
  4517. Agency in these parts start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  4518. that the telephone operator Verizon provides NSA phone data
  4519. of several million Americans, according to a court order secret.
  4520. Then it was the turn of the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  4521. allows the US Secret Service, and first and foremost to the
  4522. NSA, to access a privileged manner, since December 2007,
  4523. data from nine major Internet companies, including Google,
  4524. Facebook and Microsoft.
  4525.  
  4526. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  4527.  
  4528.  A document providing internal training on Prism, which Le
  4529. Monde has also had access, how the NSA analysts can query
  4530. the databases of Web giants, research documents, emails or
  4531. instant discussions. All within a legal framework that
  4532. overcomes the request of an individual mandate. The companies
  4533. named in the documents have denied that the NSA had a direct
  4534. and unilateral access to their servers.
  4535.  
  4536.  In addition to this targeted surveillance, Snowden records
  4537. reveal another method of massive collection of the NSA called
  4538. Upstream. This system can collect data from the submarine
  4539. cable and Internet infrastructures. A logical strategy, when
  4540. we know that 99% of global communications now pass through
  4541. diving.
  4542.  
  4543.  To learn more about the context of the revelations of the
  4544. World, the editorial read : "Fight Big Brother"
  4545.  
  4546.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the Government Communications
  4547. Headquarters (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system, because
  4548. of the historical proximity of Great Britain and the United States,
  4549. confidentiality agreements and a financial dependence of those
  4550. services from London to Washington. There are also technical
  4551. reasons : a significant portion of submarine cables linking
  4552. Europe to America through Britain. With Edward Snowden, the
  4553. Tempora program , which aims to "control the Internet" by
  4554. monitoring these cables, has been revealed. "You're in an
  4555. enviable position, says a document presenting Tempora, presented
  4556. by the Guardian, have fun and pull in the best." Turning a page
  4557. of the document presenting the Prism program, we discover Upstream
  4558. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview, and oakstar Stormbrew)
  4559. which we know to date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  4560. would largely on intercepted telephone conversations via the
  4561. major US carriers.
  4562.  
  4563. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  4564.  
  4565.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass of intercepted data.
  4566. One of them is called XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  4567. detailed in the columns of the Guardian. The extreme precision
  4568. of the data are clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  4569. the content of e-mails to a list of websites visited by their
  4570. target or the keywords entered by the latter in the search
  4571. engines.
  4572.  
  4573.  The framework for this research is not binding, as the Guardian
  4574. explained, and many Americans are data made available to agents.
  4575. According to the presentation materials, to promote the
  4576. capabilities of the tool, three hundred terrorists have been
  4577. arrested since 2008 thanks to XKeyscore.
  4578.  
  4579.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their considerable resources
  4580. monitoring the fight against terrorism, but also to spy allies.
  4581. At the G20 summit in London in 2009, computers of diplomats
  4582. and heads of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well as some of
  4583. their phone calls. NSA, she focused on the European Union (EU),
  4584. as revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the basis of documents
  4585. Snowden. NSA has installed cookies on the premises of the EU
  4586. representation in Washington. The EU delegation to the UN in
  4587. New York, and the building of the Council of the European Union
  4588. in Brussels were also scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil is
  4589. also one of the countries affected by this intelligence. According
  4590. to Brazilian media group O Globo, its political leaders as some
  4591. companies have been targeted.
  4592.  
  4593.  The Snowden documents have informed the considerable efforts
  4594. made by the United States to start listening to Internet, in a
  4595. sometimes unclear legal framework and often away from real
  4596. democratic debate. Interviewed by Le Monde, the US authorities
  4597. have assured that the Prism program was the subject of a
  4598. parliamentary debate in the United States and was working
  4599. in a strictly regulated legal framework. Asked on September 12
  4600. revelations Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director of National
  4601. Intelligence, said: "What happened - and that is harmful - sparked
  4602. conversation and debate that it probably was necessary."
  4603. _______________________________________
  4604. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  4605.  
  4606. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  4607.  
  4608. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  4609.  
  4610. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  4611.  
  4612. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  4613. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  4614.  
  4615. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  4616.  
  4617. NOBODY comments
  4618.  
  4619.  100% expected. They will continue to
  4620. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  4621. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  4622. We must adjust to it by learning how
  4623. to counter their surveillance.
  4624.  
  4625. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  4626. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  4627.  
  4628.  The United States and its key intelligence
  4629. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  4630. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  4631. Nations to promote a universal human right
  4632. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  4633. sources and an internal American government
  4634. document obtained by The Cable.
  4635.  
  4636.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  4637. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  4638. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  4639. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  4640. internet surveillance by the National
  4641. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  4642. services. American representatives have made
  4643. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  4644. checks on their global surveillance network.
  4645. The stakes are high, particularly in
  4646. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  4647. an international backlash against NSA
  4648. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  4649. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  4650. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  4651.  
  4652. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  4653.  
  4654. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  4655. _______________________________________
  4656. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  4657. Public News Coverage ::
  4658.  
  4659. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  4660. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  4661. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  4662. _______________________________________
  4663. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  4664. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  4665.  
  4666. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  4667. _______________________________________
  4668. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  4669.  
  4670.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  4671. a division for particularly difficult
  4672. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  4673. (TAO), this department devises special
  4674. methods for special targets.
  4675.  
  4676.  That category includes surveillance of
  4677. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  4678. the division reported its mission
  4679. accomplished. A report classified as
  4680. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  4681. exploited a key mail server in the
  4682. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  4683. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  4684. first-ever access to President Felipe
  4685. Calderon�s public email account.�
  4686.  
  4687. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  4688.  
  4689. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  4690.  
  4691. Cryptome comments ?
  4692.  
  4693.  This spying was apparently done from
  4694. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  4695. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  4696. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  4697. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  4698.  
  4699. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  4700.  
  4701. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  4702. _______________________________________
  4703. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  4704.  
  4705. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  4706.  
  4707. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  4708.  
  4709. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4710.  
  4711. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  4712.  
  4713. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4714.  
  4715. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  4716.  
  4717. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  4718.  
  4719. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  4720.  
  4721. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  4722.  
  4723. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  4724.  
  4725. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  4726.  
  4727.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  4728. thought that the NSA should use its
  4729. technology to intercept emails and
  4730. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  4731. terminal to another, and was upset to
  4732. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  4733. That was a line he would only cross,
  4734. deliberately, with court and congressional
  4735. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  4736. but as we now know, the agency added
  4737. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  4738. suspicious communications that transited
  4739. the border of the United States, and
  4740. later began to collect reams of metadata
  4741. in order to analyze it.
  4742.  
  4743.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  4744. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  4745. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  4746. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  4747. in order to provide policymakers with a
  4748. decision advantage. The advantage the
  4749. NSA provided was accurate information
  4750. about what people who interacted with
  4751. the United States said in private about
  4752. their intentions; that gap between saying
  4753. and doing, and the ability to predict
  4754. action from it, allows the president of
  4755. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  4756.  
  4757.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  4758. States� actions don�t always match up
  4759. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  4760. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  4761. our moral authority wanes and our
  4762. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  4763.  
  4764.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  4765. countries are any purer. They never have
  4766. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  4767. purer than others, so the amount of
  4768. resources the intelligence community
  4769. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  4770. to correspond with how honest our allies
  4771. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  4772. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  4773. can we figure out which allies are more
  4774. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  4775. correspondence between public and private
  4776. words and actions.
  4777.  
  4778.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  4779. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  4780. want their leaders to gain a decision
  4781. advantage in the give and take between
  4782. countries. They want to know what US
  4783. policymakers will do before the Americans
  4784. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  4785. France, they aggressively spy on the
  4786. United States, on US citizens and
  4787. politicians, in order to collect that
  4788. information. The difference lies in the
  4789. scale of intelligence collection: The
  4790. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  4791. most sophisticated intelligence community
  4792. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  4793. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  4794. envious.
  4795. _______________________________________
  4796. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  4797.  
  4798. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  4799. _______________________________________
  4800. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  4801.  
  4802. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  4803. ���������������������������������������
  4804. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  4805. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  4806.  
  4807. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  4808. _______________________________________
  4809. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  4810. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  4811.  
  4812. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  4813. _______________________________________
  4814.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  4815. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  4816. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  4817. from the award ceremony are the first of
  4818. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  4819. Russia.
  4820.  
  4821. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  4822. ���������������������������������������
  4823. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  4824.  
  4825.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  4826. of the Security Service, said the
  4827. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  4828. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  4829. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  4830. agencies.
  4831.  
  4832. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  4833.  
  4834. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  4835.  
  4836.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  4837. they are not using Tor.�
  4838.  
  4839. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  4840.  
  4841. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  4842. ---------------------------------------
  4843.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  4844. old bleach log.
  4845.  
  4846. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  4847. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  4848. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  4849. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  4850.  
  4851. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  4852.  
  4853.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  4854. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  4855. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  4856. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  4857. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  4858. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  4859. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  4860. function.
  4861.  
  4862.  There are also various third party
  4863. programs that can produce files in
  4864. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  4865. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  4866.  
  4867.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  4868. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  4869. data stored on the system running the
  4870. Flash player.�
  4871. ---------------------------------------
  4872. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  4873.  
  4874.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  4875. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  4876. It can be found within Windows systems
  4877. and can be wiped out here ;
  4878.  
  4879. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4880. Application Data\Macromedia\
  4881.  
  4882. and may also be cloned here ;
  4883.  
  4884. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  4885.  
  4886.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  4887. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  4888.  
  4889. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  4890.  
  4891. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4892. Local Settings\Temp\
  4893. ---------------------------------------
  4894. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  4895.  
  4896. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  4897.  
  4898. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  4899.  
  4900. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  4901.  
  4902. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  4903.  
  4904. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  4905.  
  4906. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  4907.  
  4908. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  4909.  
  4910. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  4911.  
  4912. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  4913.  
  4914. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  4915.  
  4916. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  4917.  
  4918. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  4919.  
  4920. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  4921.  
  4922. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  4923. ---------------------------------------
  4924. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  4925.  
  4926.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  4927. application created by Samy Kamkar
  4928. which produces zombie cookies in a
  4929. web browser that are intentionally
  4930. difficult to delete. ... ...
  4931.  
  4932.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  4933. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  4934. by copying itself in different forms on
  4935. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  4936. itself if it notices that some of the
  4937. copies are missing or expired.
  4938.  
  4939.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  4940. Evercookie uses the following storage
  4941. mechanisms when available:
  4942.  
  4943. � Standard HTTP cookies
  4944. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  4945. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  4946. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  4947. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  4948. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  4949. (cookies) back out
  4950. � Storing cookies in Web history
  4951. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  4952. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  4953. � window.name caching
  4954. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  4955. � HTML5 Session Storage
  4956. � HTML5 Local Storage
  4957. � HTML5 Global Storage
  4958. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  4959. ---------------------------------------
  4960. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  4961.  
  4962.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  4963. mean that your browser isn't storing
  4964. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  4965. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  4966. in browser vulnerabilities.
  4967.  
  4968.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  4969. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  4970. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  4971. wide surveillance.
  4972.  
  4973.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  4974. powerful anonymity service, and the
  4975. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  4976. the Internet, makes it easy to
  4977. differentiate Tor users from other
  4978. Web users,� he wrote.
  4979.  
  4980.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  4981. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  4982. identifies you. Even though your IP
  4983. address changed [because of Tor], the
  4984. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  4985.  
  4986. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  4987. ---------------------------------------
  4988. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  4989. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  4990.  
  4991.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  4992. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  4993. �staining� as a means to identify
  4994. individual machines linked to that
  4995. IP address. ... ...
  4996.  
  4997.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  4998. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  4999. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  5000. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  5001. and is stamped into every packet, which
  5002. enables all the events from that stained
  5003. machine to be brought back together to
  5004. recreate a browsing session.�
  5005.  
  5006. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  5007.  
  5008. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  5009.  
  5010. � Packet Staining ::
  5011.  
  5012. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  5013. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  5014. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  5015. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  5016.  
  5017. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  5018.  
  5019. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  5020. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  5021. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  5022. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  5023.  
  5024. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  5025.  
  5026.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  5027. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  5028. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  5029. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  5030. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  5031. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  5032. identify it. We also worked to create
  5033. a custom Tor client which allows the
  5034. user finer control.� ... ...
  5035.  
  5036.  �This accomplishes several things.
  5037. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  5038. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  5039. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  5040. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  5041. be excessively complex, as a single
  5042. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  5043. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  5044. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  5045. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  5046. going to and from the proxy server,
  5047. it is possible to deduce which clients
  5048. are making which requests. Second, if
  5049. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  5050. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  5051. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  5052. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  5053. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  5054. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  5055. must be coordinated across several machines,
  5056. and an attacker must own all the hops
  5057. along the circuit in order to trace
  5058. requests back to the originating client.�
  5059.  
  5060. ... ...
  5061.  
  5062.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  5063. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  5064. a hidden service will turn up the port
  5065. that the hidden service is using to deal
  5066. with incoming connections. It can then be
  5067. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  5068.  
  5069. ... ...
  5070.  
  5071.  �We would have to try to connect to
  5072. each of the ports we see open on a
  5073. machine to determine if there is a
  5074. hidden service being run. We would not
  5075. even know which protocol the hidden
  5076. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  5077. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  5078. etc. The only thing we know is that
  5079. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  5080. not enough to attempt to connect once
  5081. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  5082. Several protocols must be tried.�
  5083.  
  5084. ... ...
  5085.  
  5086.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  5087. directory servers in more detail. Our
  5088. work focused solely on the client, but
  5089. many attacks would be much easier with
  5090. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  5091. servers ultimately control which Tor
  5092. servers are used by clients. We have found
  5093. that a server can put itself on a directory
  5094. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  5095. server running several Tor processes, each
  5096. having a different nickname, open port,
  5097. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  5098. requires different configuration files
  5099. for the different processes, which are
  5100. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  5101. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  5102. since it is listed several times. This
  5103. increases the density of friendly servers
  5104. in the cloud without increasing the number
  5105. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  5106. each listing has the same IP address,
  5107. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  5108. who inspecting the directories.�
  5109.  
  5110. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  5111. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  5112. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  5113.  
  5114. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  5115.  
  5116. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  5117.  
  5118. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  5119.  
  5120. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  5121.  
  5122. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  5123.  
  5124.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  5125. into capabilities the IC has developed
  5126. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  5127. to run multiple research teams (either
  5128. known or unknown to each other) against
  5129. a single target, and a few summer students
  5130. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  5131. small investment. I�d expect there are
  5132. other programs with more sophisticated
  5133. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  5134.  
  5135. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  5136. _______________________________________
  5137. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  5138.  
  5139. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  5140. _______________________________________
  5141. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  5142. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  5143.  
  5144. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  5145.  
  5146.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  5147. the past several months, I�d also thought
  5148. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  5149. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  5150. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  5151. Sasso of The Hill.
  5152.  
  5153.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  5154. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  5155. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  5156. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  5157. help you with that.�
  5158.  
  5159. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  5160.  
  5161.  The conversation then turned specifically
  5162. to the government�s use of targeted
  5163. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  5164. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  5165. hope they make full use of the capacities
  5166. of the National Security Agency when we
  5167. do that.�
  5168.  
  5169.  Hayden was responding to a question
  5170. about a new project announced by journalists
  5171. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  5172. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  5173. assassinations.
  5174.  
  5175. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  5176. _______________________________________
  5177. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  5178.  
  5179. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  5180.  
  5181. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  5182.  
  5183. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  5184. _______________________________________
  5185. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  5186. Breaches ::
  5187.  
  5188. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  5189.  
  5190. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  5191.  
  5192. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  5193. _______________________________________
  5194. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  5195. of US Citizens ::
  5196.  
  5197.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  5198. body of knowledge in recent months about
  5199. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  5200. information concerning Americans, prompting
  5201. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  5202. in the agency and President Obama to order
  5203. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  5204. Almost everything about the agency�s
  5205. operations is hidden, and the decision
  5206. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  5207. was made in secret, without review by the
  5208. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  5209. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  5210. Department memo warned of the potential
  5211. for the �misuse� of such information
  5212. without adequate safeguards.
  5213.  
  5214. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  5215. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  5216. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  5217.  
  5218. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  5219. From American Social Networks ::
  5220.  
  5221. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  5222. _______________________________________
  5223. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  5224. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  5225.  
  5226. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  5227. _______________________________________
  5228. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  5229. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  5230.  
  5231.  Led by the German government, a loose
  5232. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  5233. across the world is pushing to update an
  5234. influential international human rights
  5235. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  5236.  
  5237. ... ...
  5238.  
  5239.  The annual conference was attended by a
  5240. diverse selection of privacy and data
  5241. protection officials from across the
  5242. world, with representatives attending
  5243. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  5244. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  5245. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  5246. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  5247. United Kingdom.
  5248.  
  5249.  During a closed session at the conference
  5250. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  5251. resolution was put forward for a vote
  5252. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  5253. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  5254. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  5255. globally applicable standards for data
  5256. protection and the protection of privacy
  5257. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  5258.  
  5259.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  5260. of the resolution ... the United States.
  5261.  
  5262.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  5263. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  5264. eventually need to be put forward at the
  5265. United Nations and voted on by member
  5266. states, and that could take time. But
  5267. the growing appetite to amend the
  5268. international treaty in light of the
  5269. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  5270. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  5271. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  5272. technology in the digital age to trample
  5273. over basic universal privacy rights.
  5274.  
  5275. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  5276.  
  5277. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  5278.  
  5279. NOBODY comments
  5280.  
  5281.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  5282. all secret agencies around the world,
  5283. in general. All secret agencies and
  5284. their third-party vendors or allies
  5285. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  5286. backdoors in electronic communication
  5287. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  5288. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  5289. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  5290. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  5291. you must kill any trust in security.
  5292.  
  5293.  Security does not exist on the web.
  5294. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  5295. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  5296. _______________________________________
  5297. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  5298.  
  5299. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  5300.  
  5301. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  5302.  
  5303. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  5304. _______________________________________
  5305. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  5306.  
  5307. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  5308. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  5309. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  5310. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  5311. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  5312.  
  5313. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  5314. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  5315.  
  5316. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  5317. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  5318. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  5319.  
  5320.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are tapping the
  5321. backbone itself, via the willing assistance of the
  5322. telcos (who still have remained mostly silent on all
  5323. of this) as opposed to �downstream� collection, which
  5324. requires going to the internet companies directly.
  5325.  
  5326. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  5327.  
  5328. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  5329.  
  5330. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  5331.  
  5332. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  5333. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  5334. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  5335. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  5336. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  5337. _______________________________________
  5338. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  5339. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  5340. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  5341.  
  5342. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  5343. _______________________________________
  5344. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  5345.  
  5346.  According to a top secret document disclosed by NSA
  5347. whistleblower Edward Snowden and obtained by The Hindu,
  5348. the PRISM programme was deployed by the American agency
  5349. to gather key information from India by tapping directly
  5350. into the servers of tech giants which provide services
  5351. such as email, video sharing, voice-over-IPs, online chats,
  5352. file transfer and social networking services.
  5353.  
  5354.  And, according to the PRISM document seen by The Hindu,
  5355. much of the communication targeted by the NSA is unrelated
  5356. to terrorism, contrary to claims of Indian and American
  5357. officials.
  5358.  
  5359.  Instead, much of the surveillance was focused on India�s
  5360. domestic politics and the country�s strategic and commercial
  5361. interests.
  5362.  
  5363. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  5364.  
  5365.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication intelligence)
  5366. document about �Close Access SIGADs�, the offices of Indian
  5367. diplomats and high-ranking military officials stationed
  5368. at these important posts were targets of four different
  5369. kinds of electronic snooping devices:
  5370.  
  5371.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of the hard drive
  5372. of computers.
  5373.  
  5374. Highlands, which makes digital collection from implants.
  5375.  
  5376. Vagrant, which collects data of open computer screens.
  5377.  
  5378. Magnetic, which is a collection of digital signals.
  5379.  
  5380. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  5381. _______________________________________
  5382. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US Intelligence ::
  5383.  
  5384.  Accessing archived government documents, the National
  5385. Security Archive, an anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  5386. decades-long effort by the US to detect, monitor, and
  5387. in some cases plan the destruction of, �more than 10,000
  5388. such facilities worldwide, many of them in hostile territory,
  5389. and many presumably intended to hide or protect lethal military
  5390. equipment and activities, including weapons of mass destruction,
  5391. that could threaten US or allied interests.�
  5392.  
  5393. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  5394. _______________________________________
  5395. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  5396.  
  5397. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  5398. _______________________________________
  5399. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the Inside Story of
  5400. NSA Leaks ::
  5401.  
  5402. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  5403. _______________________________________
  5404. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  5405.  
  5406. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  5407. _______________________________________
  5408. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  5409. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  5410.  
  5411. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  5412. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  5413. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  5414.  
  5415. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  5416. Under United States Control ::
  5417.  
  5418.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff announces publicly
  5419. the creation of a world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  5420. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  5421.  
  5422.  Not many understand that, while the immediate trigger for
  5423. the decision (coupled with the cancellation of a summit with
  5424. the US president) was the revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  5425. why Rousseff can take such a historic step is that the
  5426. alternative infrastructure: The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  5427. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai, India to Cape Town,
  5428. South Africa to Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and it�s,
  5429. actually, in its final phase of implementation.
  5430.  
  5431.  �The global backlash is only beginning and will get far more
  5432. severe in coming months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  5433. of the Open Technology Institute at the Washington-based New
  5434. America Foundation think-tank. �This notion of national
  5435. privacy sovereignty is going to be an increasingly salient
  5436. issue around the globe.�
  5437.  
  5438. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  5439. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  5440. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  5441. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  5442.  
  5443. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  5444.  
  5445.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s capacity, fibre
  5446. optic cable system.
  5447.  
  5448. http://www.bricscable.com/
  5449.  
  5450. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  5451. _______________________________________
  5452. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA Spying ::
  5453.  
  5454.  A newly declassified opinion from the Foreign Intelligence
  5455. Surveillance Court from this summer shows the court�s
  5456. interpretation of the controversial Section 215 of the USA
  5457. PATRIOT Act that�s used to justify the National Security
  5458. Agency�s bulk telephone metadata collections, and reveals
  5459. that none of the companies that have been served with such
  5460. orders has ever challenged one.
  5461.  
  5462. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  5463. _______________________________________
  5464. � Corporations Worry About Long-Term Blowback of NSA
  5465. Revelations ::
  5466.  
  5467.  With all of the disturbing revelations that have come
  5468. to light in the last few weeks regarding the NSA�s
  5469. collection methods and its efforts to weaken cryptographic
  5470. protocols and security products, experts say that perhaps
  5471. the most worrisome result of all of this is that no one
  5472. knows who or what they can trust anymore.
  5473.  
  5474.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA leaks, which revealed
  5475. the agency�s ability to subvert some cryptographic standards
  5476. and its �partnerships� with software and hardware vendors
  5477. to insert backdoors into various unnamed products, has
  5478. continued to accumulate over the course of the last couple
  5479. of weeks. Cryptographers and security researchers have been
  5480. eager to determine which products and protocols are suspect,
  5481. and the discussion has veered in a lot of different directions.
  5482. But one thing that�s become clear is that when the government
  5483. lost the so-called Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA didn�t
  5484. just go back to Fort Meade and tend to its knitting.
  5485.  
  5486. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  5487.  
  5488. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  5489.  
  5490.  The security community didn�t invent the concept of fear,
  5491. uncertainty and doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  5492. it to the level of religion. It�s the way that security products
  5493. are marketed and sold, but it�s also the way that the intelligence
  5494. community justifies its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  5495. unconstitutional, data-gathering practices. Just as vendors
  5496. use the specter of catastrophic hacks, data loss and public
  5497. embarrassment to push their wares, the NSA and its allies
  5498. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and global terrorism to
  5499. justify their increasingly aggressive practices, some of which
  5500. have now been shown to have deliberately weakened some of the
  5501. fundamental building blocks of security.
  5502.  
  5503.  The most damning bit of string in this ball is the news that
  5504. the NSA likely inserted a back door into a key cryptographic
  5505. algorithm known as DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  5506. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning to its developer
  5507. customers warning them to immediately stop using the company�s
  5508. BSAFE library because it uses the compromised random number
  5509. generator. That means that untold numbers of products that
  5510. include the BSAFE crypto libraries are compromised.
  5511.  
  5512. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  5513. _______________________________________
  5514. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  5515.  
  5516.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  5517. President approximately every 45 days,
  5518. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  5519. the activities carried out under these
  5520. Authorizations are referred to as the
  5521. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  5522. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  5523. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  5524. the content of communications into and out
  5525. of the United States where there was a
  5526. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  5527. party to the communication was a member
  5528. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  5529.  
  5530.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  5531. acknowledged and described by the President,
  5532. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  5533. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  5534. a series of articles published in The New York
  5535. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  5536. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  5537. intelligence activities were also authorized
  5538. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  5539. but the details of those activities remain
  5540. classified.� ... ...
  5541.  
  5542.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  5543. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  5544. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  5545. as the principal governing authorities for
  5546. conducting electronic surveillance for
  5547. national security purposes. The Foreign
  5548. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  5549. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  5550. "provide legislative authorization and
  5551. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  5552. conducted within the United States for
  5553. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  5554.  
  5555. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  5556.  
  5557. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  5558. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  5559.  
  5560. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  5561.  
  5562. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  5563.  
  5564.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  5565. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  5566. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  5567. require special approval. Therefore, just
  5568. another gap. Also take in consideration
  5569. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  5570. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  5571. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  5572. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  5573. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  5574. _______________________________________
  5575. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  5576. Firm ::
  5577.  
  5578.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  5579. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  5580. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  5581. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  5582. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  5583. A �top secret� Government Communications
  5584. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  5585. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  5586. conducted under the codename �Operation
  5587. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  5588. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  5589. improve understanding of the provider�s
  5590. infrastructure. ... ...
  5591.  
  5592.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  5593. presentation, the attack was directed
  5594. at several Belgacom employees and
  5595. involved the planting of a highly
  5596. developed attack technology referred
  5597. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  5598. appears to be a method with which the
  5599. person being targeted, without their
  5600. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  5601. that then plant malware on their
  5602. computers that can then manipulate
  5603. them. Some of the employees whose
  5604. computers were infiltrated had �good
  5605. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  5606. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  5607. please the British spies, according
  5608. to the slides.
  5609.    
  5610. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  5611. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  5612. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  5613. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  5614. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  5615. _______________________________________
  5616. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  5617.  
  5618. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  5619.  
  5620. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  5621. _______________________________________
  5622. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  5623.  
  5624. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  5625. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  5626. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  5627. _______________________________________
  5628. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  5629. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  5630.  
  5631. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  5632. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  5633. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  5634. _______________________________________
  5635. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  5636.  
  5637. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  5638. ���������������������������������������
  5639. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  5640. Allocated to One Release ::
  5641.  
  5642. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  5643.  
  5644. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  5645.  
  5646. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  5647.  
  5648. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  5649. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  5650.  
  5651. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  5652.  
  5653. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  5654. Schedule ::
  5655.  
  5656. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5657.  
  5658. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5659.  
  5660. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5661.  
  5662. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5663.  
  5664. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5665.  
  5666. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5667.  
  5668. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5669. ���������������������������������������
  5670. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  5671.  
  5672.  In response to a FOIA request from
  5673. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  5674. its ethics office never looked into
  5675. complaints from two federal judges
  5676. that they had been misled about NSA
  5677. surveillance.
  5678.  
  5679. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  5680. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  5681. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  5682. ���������������������������������������
  5683.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  5684. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  5685. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  5686. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  5687. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  5688.  
  5689. Livestream will be at:
  5690.  
  5691. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  5692. _______________________________________
  5693. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  5694. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  5695.  
  5696. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  5697.  
  5698. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  5699. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  5700. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  5701.  
  5702. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  5703.  
  5704.  The Director of National Intelligence
  5705. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  5706. pages of documents related to the
  5707. government�s secret interpretation of
  5708. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  5709. (mis)use of its massive database of
  5710. every American�s phone records. The
  5711. documents were released as a result
  5712. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  5713. Act lawsuit.
  5714.  
  5715.  We�ve posted links to each document
  5716. below. While the government also posted
  5717. many of the documents here ...
  5718.  
  5719. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  5720.  
  5721. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  5722.  
  5723. Links to the documents ;
  5724.  
  5725. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  5726. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  5727.  
  5728. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5729.  
  5730. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  5731. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5732. Court
  5733.  
  5734. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5735.  
  5736. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  5737. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  5738. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5739. Court
  5740.  
  5741. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5742.  
  5743. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  5744. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  5745. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5746. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  5747.  
  5748. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5749.  
  5750. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  5751. Incident
  5752.  
  5753. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5754.  
  5755. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  5756. Intelligence Court
  5757.  
  5758. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5759.  
  5760. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  5761. Intelligence Court
  5762.  
  5763. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5764.  
  5765. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  5766. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  5767. Business Records FISA
  5768.  
  5769. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5770.  
  5771. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  5772. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  5773.  
  5774. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5775.  
  5776. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  5777. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  5778.  
  5779. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5780.  
  5781. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  5782. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  5783. Surveillance Court
  5784.  
  5785. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5786.  
  5787. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  5788. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  5789. Surveillance Court
  5790.  
  5791. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5792.  
  5793. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  5794. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  5795.  
  5796. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  5797.  
  5798. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  5799. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  5800.  
  5801. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  5802. _______________________________________
  5803. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  5804.  
  5805. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  5806.  
  5807. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  5808.  
  5809. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  5810. ���������������������������������������
  5811. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  5812.  
  5813. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  5814. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  5815. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  5816. _______________________________________
  5817. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  5818. Over Data to the NSA ::
  5819.  
  5820.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  5821. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  5822. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  5823. media report. The revelation comes as
  5824. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  5825. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  5826. troves of data with the US and UK.
  5827.  
  5828.  Citing secret government documents,
  5829. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  5830. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  5831. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  5832. with domestic security, works closely
  5833. with the US and regularly sends them
  5834. information.
  5835.  
  5836.  The security service gathers intelligence
  5837. on internal security threats. The documents
  5838. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  5839. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  5840. well as regular meetings between officers
  5841. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  5842.  
  5843. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  5844. _______________________________________
  5845. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  5846. Revelations ::
  5847.  
  5848. This is an unofficial translation.
  5849.  
  5850. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  5851.  
  5852.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  5853. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  5854. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  5855.  
  5856. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  5857.  
  5858. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  5859. _______________________________________
  5860. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  5861.  
  5862. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  5863. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  5864. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  5865. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  5866. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  5867. _______________________________________
  5868. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  5869.  
  5870. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  5871.  
  5872. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  5873.  
  5874. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  5875. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  5876.  
  5877. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  5878.  
  5879. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  5880.  
  5881.  (1) The US wants to maintain global economic power,
  5882. (2) the US wants to maintain control over major natural
  5883. resources and (3) the US is afraid the new economic powers
  5884. (within the BRICS) may destabilize their economic power
  5885. and control over natural resources.
  5886. _______________________________________
  5887. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  5888.  
  5889.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult for
  5890. machines to read.
  5891.  
  5892. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  5893. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  5894. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  5895. _______________________________________
  5896. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  5897.  
  5898. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  5899.  
  5900. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  5901. _______________________________________
  5902. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  5903. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  5904. National Unit ::
  5905.  
  5906.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  5907. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  5908. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  5909. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  5910. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  5911. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  5912. it Wednesday.
  5913.  
  5914.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  5915. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  5916. raw signals intelligence, referred
  5917. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  5918. swathes of digital data traffic that
  5919. the agency gathers under secret court
  5920. authority from US Internet providers.
  5921.  
  5922.  So sensitive is this data that even
  5923. before being disseminated to other US
  5924. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  5925. to a court-mandated process called
  5926. minimization, under which the names
  5927. of any Americans are removed unless
  5928. they are essential for foreign
  5929. intelligence interest.
  5930.  
  5931.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  5932. that the data shared with Israel
  5933. �includes, but is not limited to,
  5934. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  5935. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  5936. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  5937. and content.�
  5938.  
  5939.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  5940. and unminimized raw collection associated
  5941. with selectors from multiple Target office
  5942. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  5943. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  5944. relationship between the two organizations.�
  5945.  
  5946. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  5947. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  5948. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  5949. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  5950. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  5951. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  5952.  
  5953.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  5954. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  5955. that spy most aggressively against the
  5956. United States.
  5957.  
  5958.  �To further safeguard our classified
  5959. networks, we continue to strengthen
  5960. insider threat detection capabilities
  5961. across the Community. In addition, we
  5962. are investing in target surveillance
  5963. and offensive CI against key targets,
  5964. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  5965. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  5966.  
  5967. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5968. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5969. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  5970.  
  5971. NOBODY comments
  5972.  
  5973.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  5974. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  5975. plenty of inside information.
  5976.  
  5977.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  5978. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  5979. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  5980.  
  5981. This reminds of a quote ;
  5982.  
  5983.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  5984. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  5985. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  5986. to play out one big game of destruction
  5987. and domination with humans as the visible
  5988. and spiritual puppets?�
  5989. _______________________________________
  5990. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  5991.  
  5992. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  5993. _______________________________________
  5994. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  5995.  
  5996. (EN)
  5997. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  5998.  
  5999. (DE)
  6000. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  6001.  
  6002. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  6003.  
  6004.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  6005. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  6006. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  6007. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  6008. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  6009. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  6010. deployed in a government intelligence
  6011. agency presentation.
  6012.  
  6013. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  6014. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  6015. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  6016. ���������������������������������������
  6017. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  6018. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  6019.  
  6020.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  6021. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  6022. reverse restrictions on the National
  6023. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  6024. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  6025. the agency to search deliberately for
  6026. Americans� communications in its massive
  6027. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  6028. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  6029. �declassified material� - (which, by
  6030. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  6031. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  6032. of which agency it came from and most
  6033. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  6034.  
  6035. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  6036.  
  6037.  In addition, the court extended the
  6038. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  6039. to retain intercepted US communications
  6040. from five years to six years � and more
  6041. under special circumstances, according
  6042. to the documents, which include a
  6043. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  6044. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  6045. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6046. Surveillance Court.
  6047.  
  6048. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6049.  
  6050. NOBODY comments
  6051.  
  6052.  The document which was declassified by
  6053. US intelligence officials explains the
  6054. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  6055. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  6056. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  6057.  
  6058. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6059. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6060. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6061.  
  6062.  National Security Agency analysts
  6063. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6064. their authority to spy on Americans.
  6065.  
  6066. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6067.  
  6068.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  6069. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  6070.  
  6071. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6072.  
  6073. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6074.  
  6075.  And this is not the first attempt to
  6076. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  6077.  
  6078. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6079.  
  6080. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6081.  
  6082.  The new Washington Post report has
  6083. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  6084. (press) release exposing yet another
  6085. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  6086. or take responsibility for the abuses
  6087. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  6088.  
  6089. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  6090.  
  6091.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  6092. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  6093.  
  6094.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  6095. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  6096.  
  6097.  All of this information is backed up
  6098. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  6099. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  6100. 2,776 violations one year after the
  6101. FISA Court order.
  6102.  
  6103. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6104.  
  6105.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  6106. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  6107. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  6108. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  6109. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  6110. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  6111. them out of office come next election.
  6112. _______________________________________
  6113. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence? ::
  6114.  
  6115. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  6116. _______________________________________
  6117. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  6118.  
  6119. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  6120.  
  6121.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  6122. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  6123. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  6124.  
  6125. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  6126.  
  6127. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  6128.  
  6129. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  6130.  
  6131. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  6132.  
  6133. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  6134.  
  6135. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  6136.  
  6137. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  6138.  
  6139. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6140. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  6141. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  6142. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  6143.  
  6144. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  6145.  
  6146.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  6147. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  6148. reports that the US National Security Agency
  6149. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  6150.  
  6151.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  6152. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  6153. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  6154. Tuesday.
  6155.  
  6156.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  6157. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  6158. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  6159. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  6160. several of her top aides, and tapped
  6161. her phone.
  6162.  
  6163. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  6164.  
  6165. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  6166. Impacted ::
  6167.  
  6168.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  6169. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  6170. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  6171. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  6172. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  6173. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  6174.  
  6175.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  6176. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  6177. visit to Washington in October, the
  6178. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  6179. year, or will take action on digital
  6180. security that may affect US companies
  6181. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  6182.  
  6183.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  6184. a proposal that would suspend operations
  6185. of companies that cooperate with the
  6186. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  6187.  
  6188. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  6189. _______________________________________
  6190. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  6191.  
  6192. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  6193.  
  6194. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  6195.  
  6196. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  6197. ���������������������������������������
  6198. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  6199.  
  6200.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6201. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6202. collect against high priority targets,
  6203. including foreign leadership targets.
  6204. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6205. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6206. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6207. internet traffic.�
  6208.  
  6209. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6210.  
  6211. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6212.  
  6213. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  6214.  
  6215. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  6216.  
  6217. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  6218.  
  6219. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  6220.  
  6221.  �The Post is withholding some information
  6222. after consultation with US officials who
  6223. expressed concerns about the risk to
  6224. intelligence sources and methods.
  6225. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  6226. the documents that The Post is publishing
  6227. only summary tables and charts online.�
  6228.  
  6229. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  6230.  
  6231. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6232. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  6233.  
  6234. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  6235.  
  6236. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  6237.  
  6238. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  6239. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  6240.  
  6241. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  6242.  
  6243. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  6244.  
  6245. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  6246.  
  6247.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  6248. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  6249. intelligence services, leaked documents
  6250. reveal.
  6251.  
  6252.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  6253. to have an aggressive intelligence
  6254. collection operations against the
  6255. United States,� Pillar said. While
  6256. much information is collected through
  6257. traditional political contacts, �I
  6258. would personally have no doubt that
  6259. that is supplemented by whatever means
  6260. they can use to find out as much as
  6261. they can about what we�re doing,
  6262. thinking, deciding on anything of
  6263. interest to Israel, which would include
  6264. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  6265.  
  6266. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  6267.  
  6268. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  6269.  
  6270.  �To further safeguard our classified
  6271. networks, we continue to strengthen
  6272. insider threat detection capabilities
  6273. across the Community. In addition, we
  6274. are investing in target surveillance
  6275. and offensive CI against key targets,
  6276. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  6277. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  6278. _______________________________________
  6279. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  6280.  
  6281.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  6282. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  6283. the worst part is the Received headers.
  6284. Everyone should look at their own headers
  6285. -- especially people on this list and
  6286. at least comprehend that your email
  6287. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  6288. the Mailman archive.
  6289.  
  6290.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  6291. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  6292. the actual separators in MIME part
  6293. breaks, and so on.
  6294.  
  6295.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  6296. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  6297. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  6298. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  6299. don�t do it all the time.
  6300.  
  6301.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  6302. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  6303. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  6304. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  6305. is that this tells us that the crypto
  6306. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  6307. for quite some time.
  6308.  
  6309.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  6310. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  6311. that works being deployed everywhere.
  6312. What do you do? You just be patient and
  6313. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  6314. analysis.
  6315.  
  6316. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  6317.  
  6318. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  6319.  
  6320. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  6321.  
  6322.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  6323. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  6324. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  6325. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  6326. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  6327. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  6328. reveal.
  6329.  
  6330. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  6331.  
  6332.  �We are bolstering our support for
  6333. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  6334. collect against high priority targets,
  6335. including foreign leadership targets.
  6336. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  6337. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  6338. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  6339. internet traffic.� ... ...
  6340.  
  6341. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  6342.  
  6343.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  6344. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  6345. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  6346. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  6347. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  6348. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  6349.  
  6350.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  6351. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  6352.  
  6353. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  6354.  
  6355. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  6356.  
  6357. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  6358.  
  6359. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  6360.  
  6361. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  6362.  
  6363.  The US government has attempted to
  6364. obtain the master encryption keys that
  6365. Internet companies use to shield millions
  6366. of users� private web communications
  6367. from eavesdropping.
  6368.  
  6369.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  6370. which have not been disclosed previously,
  6371. represent a technological escalation in
  6372. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  6373. the National Security Agency employ when
  6374. conducting electronic surveillance against
  6375. Internet users. ... ...
  6376.  
  6377.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  6378. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  6379. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  6380. communications are typically destroyed
  6381. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  6382. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  6383. of all communications that are enciphered�
  6384. is permissible.
  6385.  
  6386. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  6387. _______________________________________
  6388. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  6389. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  6390.  
  6391.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  6392. intercepts well before 2001, former
  6393. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  6394. secretive Special Services Office,
  6395. these types of programs were at first
  6396. designed to intercept communications
  6397. overseas through arrangements with
  6398. foreign Internet providers, the former
  6399. officials say. NSA still has such
  6400. arrangements in many countries,
  6401. particularly in the Middle East and
  6402. Europe, the former officials say.�
  6403.  
  6404. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  6405.  
  6406. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  6407.  
  6408. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  6409. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  6410. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  6411. ���������������������������������������
  6412. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  6413. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  6414.  
  6415.  A common hacking technique can be used
  6416. to make emails look as if they came from
  6417. outside the United States.
  6418.  
  6419. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  6420. _______________________________________
  6421. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  6422. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  6423.  
  6424. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  6425.  
  6426. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  6427.  
  6428. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  6429.  
  6430. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  6431. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  6432. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  6433. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  6434. ���������������������������������������
  6435. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  6436. Patrick Leahy ::
  6437.  
  6438. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  6439.  
  6440. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  6441.  
  6442. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  6443. _______________________________________
  6444. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  6445.  
  6446.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  6447. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  6448. their authority to spy on Americans
  6449. multiple times in the past decade,
  6450. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  6451. and lawmakers� statements that no
  6452. willful violations occurred. ...
  6453.  
  6454.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  6455. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  6456. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  6457. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  6458. of having links to terrorism, before a
  6459. secret court that oversees surveillance
  6460. found the operation unconstitutional
  6461. in 2011.
  6462.  
  6463. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6464.  
  6465. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  6466. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  6467. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  6468.  
  6469.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  6470. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  6471. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  6472. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  6473. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  6474.  
  6475.  The documents were released in response
  6476. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  6477. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  6478.  
  6479.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  6480. litigation and the most significant leak
  6481. in American history to finally get them
  6482. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  6483. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  6484. �but I�m happy that the administration
  6485. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  6486.  
  6487. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6488. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6489. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6490.  
  6491. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  6492.  
  6493. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6494.  
  6495. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6496.  
  6497. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  6498.  
  6499. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6500.  
  6501. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6502.  
  6503. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  6504. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  6505.  
  6506. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6507. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  6508. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  6509. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  6510. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  6511. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  6512.  
  6513.  The account is based on top-secret
  6514. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  6515. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  6516. including unauthorized collection,
  6517. storage, access to or distribution of
  6518. legally protected communications � in
  6519. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  6520. originally only meant to be seen by top
  6521. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  6522. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  6523. and other locations in the Washington DC
  6524. region.
  6525.  
  6526. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  6527.  
  6528.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  6529. and other things, there�s people talking
  6530. about privacy violations or abuses or
  6531. willful or violations, right, it is
  6532. important for people to understand,
  6533. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  6534. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  6535. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  6536.  
  6537.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  6538. We detect them, as early as we can.
  6539. We correct them, right. None of the
  6540. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  6541. the document released were willful.
  6542. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  6543. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  6544. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  6545.  
  6546. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  6547.  
  6548. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  6549. Database Queries Per Month ::
  6550.  
  6551. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  6552.  
  6553. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  6554.  
  6555. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  6556. _______________________________________
  6557. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  6558.  
  6559.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  6560. station in the Middle East to intercept
  6561. and process vast quantities of emails,
  6562. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  6563. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  6564. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  6565.  
  6566.  The information is then processed for
  6567. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  6568. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  6569. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  6570. The Government claims the station is a
  6571. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  6572. and provides a vital �early warning�
  6573. system for potential attacks around
  6574. the world.
  6575.  
  6576.  The Independent is not revealing the
  6577. precise location of the station but
  6578. information on its activities was
  6579. contained in the leaked documents
  6580. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  6581. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  6582. these documents in recent months has
  6583. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  6584. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  6585. the destruction of hard drives containing
  6586. the data. ... ...
  6587.  
  6588.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  6589. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  6590. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  6591. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  6592. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  6593. the global interception of digital
  6594. communications, such as emails and text
  6595. messages.
  6596.  
  6597.  Across three sites, communications �
  6598. including telephone calls � are tracked
  6599. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  6600. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  6601.  
  6602. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  6603. ���������������������������������������
  6604. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  6605.  
  6606. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  6607. _______________________________________
  6608. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  6609. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  6610. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  6611. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  6612. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  6613. E Grassley ::
  6614.  
  6615. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  6616.  
  6617. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  6618.  
  6619. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  6620.  
  6621. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  6622.  
  6623. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  6624.  
  6625. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  6626.  
  6627. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  6628.  
  6629. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  6630.  
  6631. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  6632.  
  6633. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  6634.  
  6635. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  6636. Congress ::
  6637.  
  6638.  �I can now confirm that the House
  6639. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  6640. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  6641. available to Representatives in Congress,
  6642. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  6643. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  6644. the now declassified documents detailing
  6645. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  6646.  
  6647. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  6648.  
  6649. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  6650.  
  6651. ?
  6652.  
  6653. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  6654.  
  6655.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  6656. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  6657. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  6658. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  6659. discussions with the president when he
  6660. first came on board we talked to him about
  6661. these programs and the issue was how do
  6662. we know the compliance is there and what
  6663. more could we do? We stood up working with
  6664. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  6665. of compliance. This directorate of
  6666. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  6667. and information specialists that can look
  6668. at everything that we do in these programs
  6669. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  6670. orders but we also have oversight from
  6671. the Director of National Intelligence,
  6672. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  6673. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  6674. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  6675. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  6676. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  6677. _______________________________________
  6678. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  6679.  
  6680.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  6681. public so far.
  6682.  
  6683. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  6684. _______________________________________
  6685. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  6686.  
  6687. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  6688. _______________________________________
  6689. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  6690. Data Lab ::
  6691.  
  6692. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  6693.  
  6694. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  6695. _______________________________________
  6696. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  6697. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  6698.  
  6699. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  6700. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  6701. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  6702. _______________________________________
  6703. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  6704.  
  6705.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  6706. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  6707. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  6708. there since he assumed the position
  6709. of Secretary of State. He has already
  6710. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  6711. � where officials demanded an explanation
  6712. to reports that Washington had collected
  6713. vast amounts of internet data there.
  6714. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  6715. which allegedly was the top regional
  6716. target of the surveillance program.
  6717.  
  6718. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  6719.  
  6720. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  6721.  
  6722. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  6723. Surveillance ::
  6724.  
  6725. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  6726.  
  6727. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  6728.  
  6729. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  6730. _______________________________________
  6731. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  6732.  
  6733. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  6734. ���������������������������������������
  6735. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  6736.  
  6737. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  6738.  
  6739. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  6740.  
  6741. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  6742.  
  6743. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  6744.  
  6745. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  6746. _______________________________________
  6747. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  6748.  
  6749. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  6750.  
  6751. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  6752. _______________________________________
  6753. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  6754.  
  6755. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  6756.  
  6757.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  6758. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  6759. use of certain United States person names
  6760. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  6761. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  6762. implement any USP queries until an effective
  6763. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  6764. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  6765. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  6766. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  6767. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  6768. databases).�
  6769.  
  6770. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  6771.  
  6772. NOBODY comments
  6773.  
  6774. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  6775.  
  6776. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  6777.  
  6778.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  6779. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  6780. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  6781. communications not related to foreign
  6782. information or foreign activity for up
  6783. to five years.
  6784.  
  6785.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  6786. acquired communications of or concerning a
  6787. United States person may be retained no
  6788. longer than five years in any event.�
  6789.  
  6790.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  6791. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  6792. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  6793. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  6794. communications that have been stored.
  6795. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  6796. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  6797. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  6798. to �communications security vulnerability�
  6799. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  6800. _______________________________________
  6801. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  6802.  
  6803. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  6804. _______________________________________
  6805. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  6806.  
  6807. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  6808. _______________________________________
  6809. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  6810. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  6811.  
  6812.  As the steady stream of revelations
  6813. continues, the White House has choosen
  6814. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  6815. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  6816.  
  6817. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  6818. _______________________________________
  6819. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  6820.  
  6821. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  6822.  
  6823. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  6824. Spying Press Conference ::
  6825.  
  6826.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  6827. Presidential press conference in which the
  6828. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  6829. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  6830. that Obama told today about the program
  6831. by citing multiple articles with information
  6832. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  6833.  
  6834. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  6835. ���������������������������������������
  6836. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  6837. Partners ::
  6838.  
  6839. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  6840. ���������������������������������������
  6841. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  6842. Metadata ::
  6843.  
  6844. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  6845. ���������������������������������������
  6846. � National Security Run Amok ::
  6847.  
  6848. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  6849. _______________________________________
  6850.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  6851. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  6852. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  6853. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  6854.  
  6855. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  6856.  
  6857.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  6858. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  6859. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  6860. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  6861. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  6862. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  6863. for including former senators Hillary
  6864. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  6865.  
  6866. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  6867.  
  6868. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  6869. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  6870.  
  6871. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  6872.  
  6873. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  6874.  
  6875. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  6876. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  6877.  
  6878. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  6879.  
  6880.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  6881. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  6882.  
  6883. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  6884. ���������������������������������������
  6885. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  6886.  
  6887. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  6888.  
  6889. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  6890.  
  6891. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  6892.  
  6893. NOBODY comments
  6894.  
  6895. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  6896.  
  6897.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  6898. the document was still classified. It was
  6899. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  6900.  
  6901. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  6902.  
  6903.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  6904. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  6905. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  6906. many of these operations being leaked.
  6907. _______________________________________
  6908. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  6909. on Brazilian Television ::
  6910.  
  6911. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  6912. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  6913. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  6914.  
  6915. NOBODY comments
  6916.  
  6917.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  6918. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  6919.  
  6920.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  6921. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  6922. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  6923.  
  6924. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  6925. ���������������������������������������
  6926. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  6927. English Report ::
  6928.  
  6929.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  6930. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  6931. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  6932. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  6933. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  6934. matters is also much closer than first
  6935. thought. ... ...
  6936.  
  6937.  Day after day and month after month,
  6938. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  6939. amounts of connection data relating
  6940. to the communications it had placed
  6941. under surveillance. The so-called
  6942. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  6943. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  6944. into the Americans� giant databases.
  6945.  
  6946. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  6947.  
  6948. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  6949. Deutsch Report ::
  6950.  
  6951. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  6952.  
  6953. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  6954.  
  6955. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  6956. ���������������������������������������
  6957. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  6958.  
  6959. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  6960. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  6961. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  6962.  
  6963. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  6964.  
  6965. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  6966.  
  6967.  The latest revelations will add to the intense public
  6968. and congressional debate around the extent of NSA
  6969. surveillance programs. They come as senior intelligence
  6970. officials testify to the Senate judiciary committee on
  6971. Wednesday, releasing classified documents in response to
  6972. the Guardian�s earlier stories on bulk collection of
  6973. phone records and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  6974.  
  6975. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  6976. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  6977. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  6978. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  6979.  
  6980. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  6981.  
  6982. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  6983.  
  6984. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  6985.  
  6986. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  6987.  
  6988. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  6989.  
  6990. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  6991.  
  6992. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  6993.  
  6994. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  6995.  
  6996. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  6997.  
  6998. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  6999.  
  7000. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  7001.  
  7002. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  7003.  
  7004. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  7005.  
  7006. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  7007.  
  7008.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  7009. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  7010. they are shunted off to various �production
  7011. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  7012. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  7013. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  7014. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  7015. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  7016. stored in a database called MARINA and
  7017. is generally retained for five years.
  7018.  
  7019. ... ...
  7020.  
  7021.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  7022. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  7023. to change the surveillance laws once the
  7024. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  7025. This was for a simple reason: they did
  7026. not want to be responsible for a program
  7027. that was not legal.�
  7028.  
  7029. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  7030.  
  7031. NOBODY comments
  7032.  
  7033.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  7034. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  7035. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  7036. communications not related to foreign
  7037. information or foreign activity for up
  7038. to five years.
  7039.  
  7040.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  7041. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  7042. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  7043. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  7044. ���������������������������������������
  7045. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  7046. for GCHQ Bude ::
  7047.  
  7048. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  7049. _______________________________________
  7050. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  7051. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  7052.  
  7053.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  7054. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  7055. counterfeiting and even copyright
  7056. infringement complain that their
  7057. attempts to exploit the security
  7058. agency�s vast resources have often
  7059. been turned down because their own
  7060. investigations are not considered a
  7061. high enough priority, current and
  7062. former government officials say.
  7063.  
  7064.  Intelligence officials say they have
  7065. been careful to limit the use of the
  7066. security agency�s troves of data and
  7067. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  7068. could be misused in ways that violate
  7069. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  7070.  
  7071.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  7072. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  7073. senior intelligence official at the
  7074. White House and at the office of the
  7075. director of national intelligence.
  7076. �They collect all this information,
  7077. but it�s difficult for the other
  7078. agencies to get access to what
  7079. they want.�
  7080.  
  7081. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  7082. _______________________________________
  7083. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  7084. Security Forum ::
  7085.  
  7086. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  7087.  
  7088. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  7089. Conference ::
  7090.  
  7091. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  7092.  
  7093. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  7094. Conference ::
  7095.  
  7096. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  7097. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  7098. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  7099.  
  7100.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  7101. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  7102. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  7103. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  7104. discussions with the president when he
  7105. first came on board we talked to him about
  7106. these programs and the issue was how do
  7107. we know the compliance is there and what
  7108. more could we do? We stood up working with
  7109. the committees in Congress a directorate
  7110. of compliance. This directorate of
  7111. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  7112. and information specialists that can look
  7113. at everything that we do in these programs
  7114. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  7115. orders but we also have oversight from
  7116. the Director of National Intelligence,
  7117. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  7118. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  7119. from the White House, from Congress, the
  7120. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  7121. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  7122.  
  7123. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  7124. Blackhat Conference ::
  7125.  
  7126. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  7127.  
  7128. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  7129.  
  7130. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  7131.  
  7132. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  7133.  
  7134. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  7135.  
  7136. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  7137.  
  7138. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  7139. _______________________________________
  7140. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  7141.  
  7142. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  7143.  
  7144. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  7145. All Domestic Calls ::
  7146.  
  7147.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  7148. three documents related to the National
  7149. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  7150. records, including briefings to Congress
  7151. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  7152. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  7153. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7154. Court that outlines rules that must be
  7155. followed when accessing data provided by
  7156. a Verizon subsidiary.
  7157.  
  7158. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  7159.  
  7160.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  7161. what the government was doing with the
  7162. Patriot Act program, several senators
  7163. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  7164. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  7165. the law in a twisted way to do something
  7166. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  7167. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  7168. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  7169. Act to obtain that document.
  7170.  
  7171. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  7172. _______________________________________
  7173. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  7174.  
  7175. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  7176.  
  7177. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  7178. _______________________________________
  7179. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  7180.  
  7181.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  7182. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  7183. two or three years ago.�
  7184.  
  7185. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  7186. _______________________________________
  7187. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7188. Received Dox ::
  7189.  
  7190. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  7191. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  7192. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  7193. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  7194. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  7195.  
  7196. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  7197.  
  7198. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  7199.  
  7200. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  7201. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  7202.  
  7203.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  7204. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  7205. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  7206. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  7207. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  7208. twice as much campaign financing from
  7209. the defense and intelligence industry
  7210. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  7211.  
  7212. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  7213.  
  7214. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  7215. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  7216.  
  7217. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  7218. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  7219. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  7220.  
  7221. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  7222.  
  7223. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  7224.  
  7225. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  7226. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  7227.  
  7228. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  7229. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  7230. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  7231. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  7232.  
  7233. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  7234. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  7235.  
  7236.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  7237. disclosures, the President has said
  7238. that he welcomes a debate about how
  7239. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  7240. our national security and the privacy
  7241. of our citizens.  The Administration
  7242. has taken various proactive steps to
  7243. advance this debate including the
  7244. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  7245. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  7246. his public statements on the disclosed
  7247. programs, the Office of the Director
  7248. of National Intelligence�s release of
  7249. its own public statements, ODNI General
  7250. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  7251. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  7252. disclose publicly that the Administration
  7253. filed an application with the Foreign
  7254. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  7255. look forward to continuing to discuss
  7256. these critical issues with the American
  7257. people and the Congress.
  7258.  
  7259.  However, we oppose the current effort
  7260. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  7261. of our Intelligence Community�s
  7262. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  7263. approach is not the product of an
  7264. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  7265. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  7266. Amendment, and instead move forward
  7267. with an approach that appropriately
  7268. takes into account the need for a
  7269. reasoned review of what tools can
  7270. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  7271.  
  7272. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  7273.  
  7274. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  7275.  
  7276. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  7277. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  7278.  
  7279. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  7280.  
  7281. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  7282. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  7283. to Defund NSA ::
  7284.  
  7285. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  7286. _______________________________________
  7287.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  7288. official letter from the NSA, which was
  7289. sent to the German government to clarify
  7290. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  7291. because German media and politics were
  7292. heavily confused after it became clear
  7293. that there�s more than one program named
  7294. PRISM.
  7295.  
  7296.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  7297. data collection program is about and
  7298. then confirms that this program is
  7299. different from a more common military
  7300. web tool called "Planning tool for
  7301. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  7302. and Management" (PRISM).
  7303.  
  7304.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  7305. there�s even a third program called
  7306. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  7307. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  7308. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  7309. apparently an internal NSA information
  7310. sharing program. It was unknown until
  7311. now, probably because it�s used in the
  7312. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  7313. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  7314.  
  7315.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  7316. different PRISM programs:
  7317.  
  7318. 1. PRISM
  7319.  
  7320.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  7321. of collecting information about foreign
  7322. targets from data of nine major US
  7323. internet companies. This program started
  7324. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  7325. in June 2013.
  7326.  
  7327. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  7328. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  7329.  
  7330.  This is a web tool used by US military
  7331. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  7332. to data collection platforms deployed to
  7333. military operations. This program is
  7334. not very secret and was first mentioned
  7335. in 2002.
  7336.  
  7337. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  7338. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  7339.  
  7340.  This is an internal NSA program for
  7341. real-time sharing of information,
  7342. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  7343. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  7344. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  7345.  
  7346. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  7347.  
  7348. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  7349. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  7350.  
  7351.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  7352. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  7353. surveillance activities in Germany.
  7354. It only added to the mystery. A US
  7355. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  7356. that there are actually three unrelated
  7357. Prism programs. ... ...
  7358.  
  7359.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  7360. and Maassen, officials also read a
  7361. written statement from the NSA in
  7362. response to a query from the German
  7363. government. According to the statement,
  7364. there are three separate Prism programs,
  7365. all of them unconnected to each other.
  7366. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  7367. said that one of the Prism programs was
  7368. only used internally. That program had
  7369. thus far remained secret. Another of
  7370. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  7371. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  7372. -- vaguely described in the statement
  7373. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  7374. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  7375. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  7376. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  7377.  
  7378. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  7379.  
  7380. NOBODY comments
  7381.  
  7382.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  7383. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  7384. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  7385. _______________________________________
  7386. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  7387.  
  7388. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  7389.  
  7390. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  7391.  
  7392. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  7393.  
  7394.  Description and drawings by US Army
  7395. Corps of Engineers.
  7396.  
  7397. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  7398. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  7399. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  7400. _______________________________________
  7401. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  7402.  
  7403. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  7404.  
  7405. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  7406.  
  7407. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  7408. ���������������������������������������
  7409. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  7410.  
  7411. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  7412.  
  7413. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  7414.  
  7415. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  7416.  
  7417. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  7418.  
  7419. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  7420. _______________________________________
  7421. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  7422.  
  7423.  �First, the United States would not seek
  7424. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  7425. return to the United States. The charges
  7426. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  7427. and the United States would not seek the
  7428. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  7429. charged with additional, death penalty-
  7430. eligible crimes.�
  7431.  
  7432. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  7433.  
  7434. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  7435. _______________________________________
  7436. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  7437. Peace Prize ::
  7438.  
  7439.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  7440. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  7441. agency�s data collection program, has
  7442. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  7443.  
  7444.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  7445. at great personal cost � revealed the
  7446. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  7447. the US government devotes electronic
  7448. communications worldwide,� read the
  7449. nomination. �By putting light on this
  7450. monitoring program � conducted in
  7451. contravention of national laws and
  7452. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  7453. has helped to make the world a little
  7454. bit better and safer.� ...
  7455.  
  7456.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  7457. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  7458. to being well justified in itself �
  7459. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  7460. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  7461. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  7462. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  7463. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  7464.  
  7465. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  7466. _______________________________________
  7467. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  7468. Komsomolets News ::
  7469.  
  7470. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  7471. ���������������������������������������
  7472. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  7473. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  7474.  
  7475.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  7476. his experience when he received a Foreign
  7477. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  7478. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  7479. federal government to monitor a customer
  7480. of his.
  7481.  
  7482.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  7483. contained a broad gag order, which still
  7484. prevents him from telling all the details.
  7485.  
  7486.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  7487. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  7488. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  7489. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  7490.  
  7491.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  7492. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  7493. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  7494. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  7495.  
  7496.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  7497. facility that was capturing all of the
  7498. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  7499. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  7500. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  7501. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  7502.  
  7503. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  7504. _______________________________________
  7505. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  7506.  
  7507. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  7508. _______________________________________
  7509. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  7510.  
  7511. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  7512. ���������������������������������������
  7513. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  7514. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  7515.  
  7516.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  7517. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  7518. representative rather casually indicated
  7519. that the government looks at data from
  7520. a universe of far, far more people than
  7521. previously indicated.
  7522.  
  7523.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  7524. was one of several government representatives
  7525. �including from the FBI and the office of
  7526. the Director of National Intelligence�
  7527. testifying before the House Judiciary
  7528. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  7529. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  7530. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  7531. surveillance, including a retread of the
  7532. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  7533. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7534. Act had stopped terror events.
  7535.  
  7536.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  7537. look �two or three hops� from terror
  7538. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  7539. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  7540. how surveillance was extended had been
  7541. described as two hops. This meant that
  7542. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  7543. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  7544. could also look at the calls from the
  7545. people that suspect has spoken with one
  7546. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  7547. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  7548. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  7549. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  7550.  
  7551. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  7552.  
  7553.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  7554. them or not - two hops.
  7555.  
  7556.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  7557. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  7558.  
  7559. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  7560. ���������������������������������������
  7561. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  7562.  
  7563.  It is a good thing that people are
  7564. becoming aware of the fact that they
  7565. are being monitored - it is not only
  7566. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  7567. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  7568. made to collect information and to store
  7569. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  7570. resources that PRISM used and how it
  7571. could combine these resources to multiple
  7572. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  7573.  
  7574. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  7575. _______________________________________
  7576. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  7577.  
  7578. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  7579. ���������������������������������������
  7580. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  7581. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  7582.  
  7583.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  7584. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  7585. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  7586. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  7587. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  7588. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  7589. stories about the US government�s vast
  7590. foreign and domestic spying programs
  7591. will stop. ... ...
  7592.  
  7593.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  7594. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  7595. the United States by releasing more
  7596. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  7597.  
  7598.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  7599. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  7600. since he has already said that he gave
  7601. all of his classified information --
  7602. thousands of documents -- to several
  7603. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  7604. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  7605. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  7606. half done with the stories he plans to
  7607. write based on the secret information.
  7608.  
  7609. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  7610. ���������������������������������������
  7611. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  7612.  
  7613. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  7614. _______________________________________
  7615. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  7616.  
  7617. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  7618. ���������������������������������������
  7619. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  7620.  
  7621.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  7622. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  7623. typewriters. What do they know that
  7624. we don�t?
  7625.  
  7626. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  7627. ���������������������������������������
  7628. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  7629. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  7630.  
  7631.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  7632. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  7633. has existed since at least 2002. The
  7634. following document refers to it directly.
  7635. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  7636. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  7637. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  7638. limitation of it and similar projects.
  7639.  
  7640. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  7641.  
  7642. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  7643. _______________________________________
  7644. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  7645. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  7646.  
  7647. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  7648.  
  7649. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  7650. in Latin America ::
  7651.  
  7652. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  7653. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  7654. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  7655. _______________________________________
  7656. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  7657. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  7658.  
  7659. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  7660.  
  7661. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  7662.  
  7663. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  7664. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  7665.  
  7666. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  7667. _______________________________________
  7668. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  7669.  
  7670. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  7671. _______________________________________
  7672. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  7673. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  7674.  
  7675. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  7676. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  7677. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  7678. ���������������������������������������
  7679. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  7680.  
  7681. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  7682.  
  7683. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  7684.  
  7685. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  7686. _______________________________________
  7687. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  7688. Metadata ::
  7689.  
  7690. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  7691. _______________________________________
  7692. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  7693. by US Citizens ::
  7694.  
  7695. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  7696. ���������������������������������������
  7697. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  7698.  
  7699. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  7700.  
  7701.  �This may look like a small release, but
  7702. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  7703. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  7704. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  7705. sending encrypted data to and from the
  7706. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  7707. those servers. If you crash these servers
  7708. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  7709. "broken". We are also planning to release
  7710. some of that data (which we have access
  7711. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  7712. ���������������������������������������
  7713. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  7714. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  7715.  
  7716.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  7717. Snowden�s employer.
  7718.  
  7719. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  7720.  
  7721. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  7722.  
  7723. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  7724. _______________________________________
  7725. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  7726.  
  7727. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  7728. _______________________________________
  7729. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  7730.  
  7731.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  7732. it became clear that my freedom and
  7733. safety were under threat for revealing
  7734. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  7735. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  7736. old, family, and others who I have never
  7737. met and probably never will. I trusted
  7738. them with my life and they returned that
  7739. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  7740. always be thankful.
  7741.  
  7742.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  7743. before the world that he would not permit
  7744. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  7745. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  7746. after promising not to do so, the President
  7747. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  7748. leaders of nations from which I have
  7749. requested protection to deny my asylum
  7750. petitions.
  7751.  
  7752.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  7753. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  7754. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  7755. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  7756. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  7757. come after me.
  7758.  
  7759.  For decades the United States of America
  7760. have been one of the strongest defenders
  7761. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  7762. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  7763. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  7764. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  7765. the current government of my country. The
  7766. Obama administration has now adopted the
  7767. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  7768. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  7769. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  7770. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  7771. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  7772. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  7773. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  7774. asylum.
  7775.  
  7776.  In the end the Obama administration is
  7777. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  7778. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  7779. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  7780. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  7781. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  7782. demanding the constitutional government
  7783. it was promised � and it should be.
  7784.  
  7785.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  7786. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  7787. many.�
  7788.  
  7789. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  7790. ���������������������������������������
  7791. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  7792.  
  7793. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  7794.  
  7795. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  7796.  
  7797. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  7798. _______________________________________
  7799. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  7800.  
  7801. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  7802. ���������������������������������������
  7803. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  7804.  
  7805. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  7806. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  7807. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  7808. _______________________________________
  7809. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  7810.  
  7811. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  7812. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  7813. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  7814. _______________________________________
  7815. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  7816.  
  7817. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  7818.  
  7819.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  7820. over private data to America.
  7821.  
  7822.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  7823. according to new claims by former US defence
  7824. analyst.
  7825.  
  7826.  At least six European Union countries in
  7827. addition to Britain have been colluding
  7828. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  7829. personal communications data, according
  7830. to a former contractor to America�s
  7831. National Security Agency, who said the
  7832. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  7833.  
  7834.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  7835. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  7836. and over the next 12 years held several
  7837. sensitive positions within the agency,
  7838. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  7839. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  7840. deals with the US.
  7841.  
  7842.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  7843. second and third party status� under
  7844. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  7845. that compels them to hand over data,
  7846. including mobile phone and internet
  7847. information to the NSA if requested.
  7848.  
  7849.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  7850. confirmed by declassified documents,
  7851. nations are categorised by the US according
  7852. to their trust level. The US is first party
  7853. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  7854. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  7855. Germany and France have third party
  7856. relationships.
  7857.  
  7858.  In an interview published last night
  7859. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  7860. who has been attacked for holding
  7861. controversial views on espionage issues,
  7862. said he had decided to speak out after
  7863. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  7864. told by EU politicians regarding the
  7865. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  7866.  
  7867.  He said that under the agreements,
  7868. which were drawn up after the second
  7869. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  7870. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  7871. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  7872. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  7873.  
  7874.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  7875. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  7876. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  7877. about the spying operations while staying
  7878. silent about their own arrangements
  7879. with the US, and was particularly
  7880. concerned that senior German politicians
  7881. had accused the UK of spying when their
  7882. country had a similar third-party deal
  7883. with the NSA.
  7884.  
  7885.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  7886. by other European countries to the NSA is
  7887. not on the same scale as that provided by
  7888. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  7889. embarrassing.
  7890.  
  7891.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  7892. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  7893. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  7894. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  7895. Madsen said.
  7896.  
  7897.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  7898. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  7899. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  7900. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  7901. confirmed that the entire system for
  7902. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  7903. because the EU was unable to intervene
  7904. in intelligence matters, which remained
  7905. the exclusive concern of national
  7906. governments.
  7907.  
  7908.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  7909. these contradictions and no one is really
  7910. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  7911. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  7912. democracy.�
  7913.  
  7914.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  7915. for European governments to come clean
  7916. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  7917. �There needs to be transparency as to
  7918. whether or not it is legal for the US
  7919. or any other security service to
  7920. interrogate private material,� said
  7921. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  7922. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  7923. is that none of these arrangements has
  7924. been debated in any democratic arena.
  7925. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  7926. things have to be done in secret, but you
  7927. don�t break the law in secret.�
  7928.  
  7929.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  7930. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  7931. fibre-optic cable network running between
  7932. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  7933. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  7934. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  7935. including phone calls, emails and records
  7936. of users� access to websites.
  7937.  
  7938.  He said the public needed to be made
  7939. aware of the full scale of the communication
  7940. -sharing arrangements between European
  7941. countries and the US, which predate the
  7942. internet and became of strategic importance
  7943. during the cold war.
  7944.  
  7945.  The covert relationship between the
  7946. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  7947. report by the European parliament, but
  7948. their explicit connection with the NSA
  7949. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  7950. to speak out.
  7951.  
  7952.  The European parliament�s report followed
  7953. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  7954. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  7955. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  7956. established the framework for European
  7957. member states to collaborate with the US.
  7958.  
  7959.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  7960. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  7961. that governments have chosen to keep the
  7962. public in the dark about it. The days
  7963. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  7964. of silence are over.�
  7965.  
  7966.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  7967. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  7968. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  7969. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  7970. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  7971. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  7972. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  7973. ���������������������������������������
  7974. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  7975. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  7976.  
  7977.  A former contractor to the US National
  7978. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  7979. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  7980. intelligence arrangements between the
  7981. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  7982. murky and far reaching� than the public
  7983. has been led to believe. ...
  7984.  
  7985.  He was particularly concerned about the
  7986. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  7987. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  7988. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  7989. while staying silent about their own role
  7990. in global interception arrangements with
  7991. the United States. ...
  7992.  
  7993.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  7994. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  7995.  
  7996.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  7997. many who say he had no authority or right
  7998. to provide the public with details of
  7999. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  8000. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  8001. have to provide information on NSA
  8002. surveillance at five meetings of the
  8003. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  8004. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  8005. Spain and Switzerland?�
  8006.  
  8007.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  8008. American people from a constantly changing
  8009. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  8010. is providing information to elites on
  8011. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  8012. student, religious and progressive
  8013. organizations.�
  8014.  
  8015.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  8016. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  8017. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  8018.  
  8019. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  8020. _______________________________________
  8021. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  8022.  
  8023. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  8024. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  8025. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  8026. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  8027. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  8028. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  8029. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  8030.  
  8031. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  8032.  
  8033. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  8034. ���������������������������������������
  8035. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data Collection ::
  8036.  
  8037. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  8038. _______________________________________
  8039. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ ::
  8040.  
  8041. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  8042. _______________________________________
  8043. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in the Dark on NSA Spying ::
  8044.  
  8045. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  8046. _______________________________________
  8047. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on Americans 2007 ::
  8048.  
  8049. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  8050. _______________________________________
  8051. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  8052.  
  8053. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  8054. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  8055. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  8056.  
  8057. � Mass Spying of All Telecommunication via FISA ::
  8058.  
  8059. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  8060. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  8061. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  8062. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  8063. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  8064. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  8065. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  8066. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  8067. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  8068. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  8069. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  8070. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  8071. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  8072. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  8073. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  8074. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  8075. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  8076. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  8077. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  8078. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  8079. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  8080. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  8081. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  8082. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  8083. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  8084. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  8085. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  8086. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  8087. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  8088. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  8089. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  8090. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  8091. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  8092. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  8093. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  8094. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  8095. http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-executive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html
  8096. _______________________________________
  8097. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  8098. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  8099.  
  8100. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  8101. _______________________________________
  8102. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable Tapping 1 & 2 ::
  8103.  
  8104. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  8105.  
  8106. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  8107.  
  8108. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic Tapping ::
  8109.  
  8110. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  8111. _______________________________________
  8112. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip ::
  8113.  
  8114. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  8115.  
  8116. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  8117. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  8118. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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