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Posted by Eyeballing the N on June Wed 18th 8:13 PM - Never Expires
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  1. VIEW FULL @ http://www.divu.in/paste/view/59bbe286
  2.    
  3. DOWNLOAD TXT/HTML @ fileb.ag/sxxc1ugonor5
  4.    
  5.    
  6.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  7. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  8. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  9.  
  10.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  11.  
  12.  
  13. � Der Spiegel Releases NSA-BND Spy Documents ::
  14.  
  15. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-spiegel-snowden-14-0618.pdf
  16.  
  17. http://www.spiegel.de/international/the-germany-file-of-edward-snowden-documents-available-for-download-a-975917.html
  18.  
  19. � NSA-BND_Spy_Documents_2014.zip (Mirror) ::
  20.  
  21. http://filedump.org/files/epVgbFV91403117533.html
  22.  
  23. � Inside the New NSA-BND Revelations ::
  24.  
  25. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/new-snowden-revelations-on-nsa-spying-in-germany-a-975441.html
  26.  
  27. � NSA and BND Spying Telecommunications ::
  28.  
  29. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-german-spying.pdf
  30.  
  31. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-der-spiegel-14-0616.pdf
  32.  
  33. � Germany Cooperates Closely with NSA ::
  34.  
  35. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-reveals-cooperation-between-nsa-and-german-bnd-a-909954.html
  36.  
  37. � Key Partners ; Secret Links Between BND and NSA ::
  38.  
  39. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-worked-closely-with-nsa-on-data-surveillance-a-912355.html
  40.  
  41. ? FLASHBACK ; Angela Merkel Compares NSA to Stasi ::
  42.  
  43.  In an angry exchange with Barack Obama, Angela Merkel
  44. has compared the snooping practices of the US with those
  45. of the Stasi, the ubiquitous and all-powerful secret
  46. police of the communist dictatorship in East Germany,
  47. where she grew up.
  48.  
  49. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  50. _______________________________________
  51. � GCHQ Forced to Reveal Secret Policy for Mass Spying
  52. of Residents� Facebook and Google Use ::
  53.  
  54. https://www.privacyinternational.org/press-releases/uk-intelligence-forced-to-reveal-secret-policy-for-mass-surveillance-of-residents
  55. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/business/international/british-spy-agencies-said-to-assert-broad-power-to-intercept-web-traffic.html?_r=0
  56. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_BRITAIN_ONLINE_SURVEILLANCE
  57.  
  58.  Britain�s top counter-terrorism official has been forced
  59. to reveal a secret Government policy justifying the mass
  60. surveillance of every Facebook, Twitter, Youtube and Google
  61. user in the UK.
  62.  
  63. https://www.privacyinternational.org/sites/privacyinternational.org/files/downloads/press-releases/witness_st_of_charles_blandford_farr.pdf
  64.  
  65. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/gchq-farr-pi.pdf (mirror)
  66. _______________________________________
  67. � THIS IS HOW THE US GOVERNMENT TREATS WHISTLEBLOWERS ;
  68. CIA Rendition Jet Was Waiting in Europe to Blackbag Snowden ::
  69.  
  70. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/13/cia_rendition_jet_was_waiting_in_europe_to_snatch_snowden/
  71. ---------------------------------------
  72. � Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  73.  
  74. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  75. _______________________________________
  76. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  77.  
  78. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  79.  
  80. � NSA Admits They Keep All Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  81.  
  82. http://dailycaller.com/2014/06/10/nsa-our-systems-are-too-complex-to-stop-deleting-evidence/
  83. _______________________________________
  84. � PRISM FOIA Request Highly Censored ::
  85.  
  86. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-prism-foia-email.pdf
  87. _______________________________________
  88. � DEA-NSA SANDKEY Voice Intercepts ::
  89.  
  90. http://cryptomeorg.siteprotect.net/dea-nsa-sandkey.pdf
  91.  
  92. Mirrored � http://fileb.ag/pmu6ugcxsxq1
  93. _______________________________________
  94. � How Governments Around The World Responded To
  95. Snowden�s Revelations ::
  96.  
  97. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140612/03532827554/how-have-governments-around-world-responded-to-snowdens-revelations.shtml
  98. _______________________________________
  99. � GCHQ�s Beyond Top Secret Middle Eastern Spy Base ::
  100.  
  101. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_intelligence_middleeast_internet_spy_base/
  102.  
  103. � GCHQ�s Middle Eastern Spy Base Eyeball ::
  104.  
  105. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/gchq-seeb/gchq-seeb.htm
  106. _______________________________________
  107. � UK Teleco Admits Governments Used Secret Cables
  108. to Tap Phones ::
  109.  
  110. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/internet-security/10880208/Vodafone-governments-use-secret-cables-to-tap-phones.html
  111. _______________________________________
  112. � Some Numbers About NSA�s Data Collection ::
  113.  
  114. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com.br/2014/06/some-numbers-about-nsas-data-collection.html
  115. _______________________________________
  116. � NSA Whistleblower Russel Tice Reveals NSA Has
  117. Documents �Above Top Secret� and Many Are Burned
  118. After Covert Operations, Routinely ::
  119.  
  120.  �Think of it this way. Remember I told you about the
  121. NSA doing everything they could to make sure that the
  122. information from 40 years ago � from spying on Frank
  123. Church and Lord knows how many other Congressman that
  124. they were spying on � was hidden?
  125.  
  126.  Now do you think they�re going to put that information
  127. into Powerpoint slides that are easy to explain to
  128. everybody what they�re doing?
  129.  
  130.  They would not even put their own NSA designators on
  131. the reports [so that no one would know that] it came
  132. from the NSA. They made the reports look like they were
  133. Humint (human intelligence) reports. They did it to
  134. hide the fact that they were NSA and they were doing
  135. the collection. That�s 40 years ago. [The NSA and other
  136. agencies are still doing "parallel construction",
  137. "laundering" information to hide the fact that the
  138. information is actually from mass NSA surveillance.]
  139.  
  140.  Now, what NSA is doing right now is that they�re taking
  141. the information and they�re putting it in a much higher
  142. security level. It�s called �ECI� � Exceptionally Controlled
  143. Information � and it�s called the black program � which I
  144. was a specialist in, by the way.
  145.  
  146.  I specialized in black world � DOD and IC (Intelligence
  147. Community) � programs, operations and missions � in �VRKs�,
  148. �ECIs�, and �SAPs�, �STOs�. SAP equals Special Access
  149. Program. It�s highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access
  150. to these. STO equals Special Technical Operations It�s
  151. highly unlikely Mr. Snowden had any access to these.
  152.  
  153.  Now in that world � the ECI/VRK world � everything in that
  154. system is classified at a higher level and it has its own
  155. computer systems that house it. It�s totally separate than
  156. the system which Mr. Snowden was privy to, which was called
  157. the �JWICS�: Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
  158. System. The JWICS system is what everybody at NSA has access
  159. to. Mr Snowden had Sys Admin [systems administrator] authority
  160. for the JWICS.
  161.  
  162.  And you still have to have TS/SCI clearance [i.e. Top Secret/
  163. Sensitive Compartmented Information - also known as �code word�
  164. - clearance] to get on the JWICS. But the ECI/VRK systems are
  165. much higher[levels of special compartmentalized clearance]
  166. than the JWICS. And you have to be in the black world to get
  167. that [clearance].
  168.  
  169.  ECI = Exceptionally Controlled Information. I do not believe
  170. Mr. Snowden had any access to these ECI controlled networks).
  171. VRK = Very Restricted Knowledge. I do not believe Mr. Snowden
  172. had any access to these VRK controlled networks.
  173.  
  174.  These programs typically have, at the least, a requirement of
  175. 100 year or until death, �till the person first being �read in�
  176. [i.e. sworn to secrecy as part of access to the higher
  177. classification program] can talk about them. [As an interesting
  178. sidenote, the Washington Times reported in 2006 that � when Tice
  179. offered to testify to Congress about this illegal spying � he
  180. was informed by the NSA that the Senate and House intelligence
  181. committees were not cleared to hear such information.]
  182.  
  183.  It�s very compartmentalized and � even with stuff that they had
  184. � you might have something at NSA, that there�s literally 40
  185. people at NSA that know that it�s going on in the entire agency.
  186.  
  187.  When the stuff came out in the New York Times [the first big
  188. spying story, which broke in 2005] � and I was a source of
  189. information for the New York Times � that�s when President Bush
  190. made up that nonsense about the �terrorist surveillance program.�
  191. By the way, that never existed. That was made up.
  192.  
  193.  There was no such thing beforehand. It was made up � to try
  194. to placate the American people.
  195.  
  196.  The NSA IG (Inspector General) � who was not cleared for this �
  197. all of a sudden is told he has to do an investigation on this;
  198. something he has no information or knowledge of.
  199.  
  200.  So what they did, is they took a few documents and they
  201. downgraded [he classification level of the documents] � just
  202. a few � and gave them to them to placate this basic whitewash
  203. investigation.�
  204.  
  205. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/tice-shoot-snowden.pdf
  206. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2014/06/original-nsa-whistleblower-snowden-
  207. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-whistleblower-snowden-never-had-access-to-the-juiciest-documents/
  208. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=az-YWMNWQuU
  209. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GJS7F-mShpI
  210. _______________________________________
  211. � NSA MYSTIC SIGAD Reporting Tabulation ::
  212.  
  213. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-sigad-reporting.pdf
  214.  
  215. � NSA SOMALGET Spy Programme ::
  216.  
  217. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164088/somalget.pdf
  218.  
  219. � SOMALGET SSO Dictionary Excerpt ::
  220.  
  221. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1164086/sso-dictionary-excerpt.pdf
  222.  
  223. � MYSTIC/SOMALGET Spy Documents ::
  224.  
  225. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-intercept-14-0519.pdf
  226.  
  227. � Toward the Identity of �Country X� in MYSTIC ::
  228.  
  229. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-mystic-identity.pdf
  230.  
  231. � Wikileaks Releases Identity of �Country X� ::
  232.  
  233. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-statement-on-the-mass.html
  234.  
  235. http://www.infowars.com/country-x-wikileaks-reveals-nsa-recording-nearly-all-phone-calls-in-afghanistan/
  236.  
  237. � Google Idea�s Director Jared Cohen Was Tasked With
  238. Getting Afghan Telcos to Move Towers to US Bases ::
  239.  
  240. https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09KABUL2020_a.html
  241.  
  242. � Data Pirates of the Caribbean ; The NSA Is
  243. Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas ::
  244.  
  245. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/05/19/data-pirates-caribbean-nsa-recording-every-cell-phone-call-bahamas/
  246.  
  247. � UPDATE ; The Bahamas Wants to Know Why the NSA is
  248. Recording Its Phone Calls ::
  249.  
  250. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/05/20/bahamas-wants-know-nsa-recording-phone-calls/
  251. _______________________________________
  252. � NSA Collecting Millions of Faces From Web Images ::
  253.  
  254.  The FBI, DHS, state and local law enforcement
  255. agencies are now also using the same facial
  256. recognition systems as the NSA. Other biometric
  257. identification systems are being developed as well.
  258. A panopticon for endless spying in the police state.
  259.  
  260. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-images.html
  261.  
  262. http://rt.com/usa/162868-nsa-snowden-social-facial/
  263.  
  264. � NSA Identity Spying ::
  265.  
  266. http://cryptome.org/2014/06/nsa-identity-spy.pdf
  267. _______________________________________
  268. � 10 Things (Most People) Didn�t Know Before Snowden ::
  269.  
  270. 1. Everything you do online can be monitored.
  271. 2. What you do offline can be monitored!
  272. 3. They are collecting your phone records, too.
  273. 4. In some countries, it is not just metadata.
  274. 5. Or ordinary citizens for that matter.
  275. 6. The NSA engages in industrial espionage.
  276. 7. The NSA is also hacking the global financial system.
  277. 8. The NSA is also hacking into online video games.
  278. 9. The NSA uses pornography to honeytrap targets.
  279. 10. The NSA dragnet is collecting facial images.
  280.  
  281. http://rt.com/usa/163700-year-whistleblower-before-snowden/
  282.  
  283. And a few more to think about,
  284.  
  285. 11. The NSA has access to crypto-breaking supercomputers.
  286. 12. The NSA spied on human rights activists, organizations.
  287. 13. Google does in fact have personal relations in the NSA.
  288. 14. All electronic products are manufactured with backdoors.
  289. 15. NSA tampers with electronics being shipped by mail.
  290. _______________________________________
  291. ? Snowden Strikes Back at NSA, Emails NBC News ::
  292.  
  293.  Fugitive Edward Snowden on Friday challenged the
  294. NSA�s insistence that it has no evidence he tried
  295. to raise concerns about the agency�s surveillance
  296. activity before he began leaking government documents
  297. to reporters, calling the response a �clearly tailored
  298. and incomplete leak ... for a political advantage.�
  299.  
  300.  �The NSA�s new discovery of written contact between
  301. me and its lawyers -- after more than a year of denying
  302. any such contact existed - raises serious concerns,�
  303. Snowden said in an email Friday to NBC News. �It
  304. reveals as false the NSA�s claim to Barton Gellman
  305. of the Washington Post in December of last year, that
  306. �after extensive investigation, including interviews
  307. with his former NSA supervisors and co-workers, we
  308. have not found any evidence to support Mr. Snowden�s
  309. contention that he brought these matters to anyone�s
  310. attention.��
  311.  
  312.  Snowden�s email followed Thursday�s release by the US
  313. Office of the Director of Intelligence of an email
  314. exchange between Snowden and the NSA�s Office of the
  315. General Counsel. The Washington Post received and
  316. published a similar response from Snowden on Thursday.
  317.  
  318. http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview/snowden-strikes-back-nsa-emails-nbc-news-n118821
  319.  
  320. ? NSA Oversight Training, OVSC1800 Minimization Training,
  321. NSA OGC Snowden Emails on OVSC1800 Course ::
  322.  
  323. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-oversight.pdf
  324. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ovsc1800.pdf
  325. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-ogc-snowden.pdf
  326. ---------------------------------------
  327. � NBC Interviews Edward Snowden (Full) ::
  328.  
  329. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yNhMXyAdjp8
  330.  
  331. Mirror here � http://upstore.net/62ocku
  332. _______________________________________
  333. � What Does GCHQ Know About Our Devices We Don�t? ::
  334.  
  335. https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/what-does-gchq-know-about-our-devices-that-we-dont
  336.  
  337. � A Hint? ; �Flashdrive Cache Paths� (Repost) ::
  338.  
  339. http://paste.security-portal.cz/view/b30bffb6
  340. _______________________________________
  341. � Onionshare App Lets the Next Snowden Send Big Files
  342. Securely and Anonymously ::
  343.  
  344.  OnionShare lets you securely and anonymously
  345. share a file of any size with someone. It works
  346. by starting a web server, making it accessible
  347. as a Tor hidden service, and generating an
  348. unguessable URL to access and download the file.
  349. It doesn�t require setting up a server on the
  350. internet somewhere or using a third party
  351. filesharing service. You host the file on your
  352. own computer and use a Tor hidden service to
  353. make it temporarily accessible over the internet.
  354. The other user just needs to use Tor Browser to
  355. download the file from you.
  356.  
  357. https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare
  358. http://www.wired.com/2014/05/onionshare/
  359.  
  360. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (ZIP) ::
  361.  
  362. https://anonfiles.com/file/9805fddaf90e3ecf37b957e5bed3f474
  363.  
  364. � Mirrored Onionshare App w/ Report (RAR) ::
  365.  
  366. https://anonfiles.com/file/ea22d9e866875e02a5a0c95e2f69b5d4
  367. _______________________________________
  368. � Former NSA-CIA Director Michael Hayden Admits
  369. Metadata SIGINT Collection Used to Kill People ::
  370.  
  371. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaTGkSoI8Ic
  372.  
  373. � The Price of Privacy Debate - Re-Evaluating the NSA ::
  374.  
  375. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kV2HDM86XgI
  376. _______________________________________
  377. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (EPUB) ::
  378.  
  379. magnet:?xt=urn:btih:2d1ace5d3b854a9afffc4c2b576cdadc4a0e2718
  380.  
  381. http://torrage.com/torrent/2D1ACE5D3B854A9AFFFC4C2B576CDADC4A0E2718.torrent
  382.  
  383. � Glenn Greenwald - �No Place To Hide� (PDF) ::
  384.  
  385. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth.7z
  386.  
  387. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  388.  
  389. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  390.  
  391. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  392.  
  393. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  394. Online Next Week ::
  395.  
  396. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  397. ---------------------------------------
  398. � NSA�s Largest Cable Tapping Program ::
  399.  
  400. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/05/nsas-largest-cable-tapping-program.html
  401.  
  402. � Glenn Greenwald On Democracy Now ::
  403.  
  404. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0513.mp4
  405. http://publish.dvlabs.com/democracynow/ipod/dn2014-0514.mp4
  406.  
  407. � New Snowden Document Implies NSA May Be Putting
  408. Israel�s Security Ahead of America�s ::
  409.  
  410. http://www.infowars.com/new-snowden-document-implies-nsa-may-be-putting-israels-security-ahead-of-americas/
  411.  
  412. � New Snowden Documents Reveal Depth Of Facebook
  413. Infiltration by NSA ::
  414.  
  415. http://revolution-news.com/new-snowden-documents-reveal-depth-of-facebook-infiltration-by-nsa/
  416.  
  417. http://www.infowars.com/how-the-nsa-fbi-made-facebook-the-perfect-mass-surveillance-tool/
  418.  
  419. � Leaked Photos of the NSA�s TAO Factory ::
  420.  
  421.  A document included in the trove of National Security
  422. Agency files released with Glenn Greenwald�s book
  423. �No Place To Hide� details how the agency�s Tailored
  424. Access Operations (TAO) unit and other NSA employees
  425. intercept servers, routers, and other network gear
  426. being shipped to organizations targeted for surveillance
  427. and install covert implant firmware onto them before
  428. they�re delivered.
  429.  
  430. http://govtslaves.info/leaked-photos-nsas-router-upgrade-factory/
  431.  
  432. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-customs.htm
  433.  
  434. � Cisco Letter to Obama Objecting to NSA Implants ::
  435.  
  436. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/cisco-implant.pdf
  437.  
  438. � No Place to Hide Documents Compared to Previous ::
  439.  
  440. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/npth-docs-compare.pdf
  441. ______________________________________
  442. � House Leaders and Obama Regime Water Down
  443. Surveillance Reform Bill ::
  444.  
  445. http://newamerica.net/node/110983
  446. _______________________________________
  447. � US Justice Department Told Supreme Court to Dismiss
  448. NSA Spying Cases? ::
  449.  
  450. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/17/government-lies-nsa-justice-department-supreme-court
  451. _______________________________________
  452. � The New Yorker Interviews Keith Alexander ::
  453.  
  454. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/05/were-at-greater-risk-q-a-with-general-keith-alexander.html
  455. _______________________________________
  456. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  457.  
  458. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  459.  
  460. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  461.  
  462. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  463. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  464.  
  465.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  466. national security and other government officials will no
  467. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  468. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  469.  
  470. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  471. _______________________________________
  472. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  473.  
  474. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  475.  
  476. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  477. ______________________________________
  478. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  479.  
  480. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  481. ______________________________________
  482. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  483. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  484.  
  485. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  486. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  487.  
  488. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  489.  
  490. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  491. ______________________________________
  492. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  493.  
  494. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  495.  
  496. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  497.  
  498. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  499.  
  500. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  501.  
  502.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  503. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  504. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  505. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  506. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  507. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  508. industry which generates something in the
  509. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  510.  
  511.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  512.  
  513. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  514. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  515. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  516. _______________________________________
  517. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  518.  
  519. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  520. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  521.  
  522.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  523. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  524. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  525. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  526. activities and future plans.� � �
  527.  
  528.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  529. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  530. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  531.  
  532. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  533.  
  534. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  535.  
  536. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  537.  
  538. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  539.  
  540. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  541.  
  542. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  543. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  544.  
  545.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  546. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  547. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  548. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  549. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  550. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  551. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  552. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  553.  
  554.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  555. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  556. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  557. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  558. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  559. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  560. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  561.  
  562. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  563. _______________________________________
  564. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  565.  
  566. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  567. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  568. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  569.  
  570.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  571. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  572. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  573. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  574. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  575. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  576. Edward Snowden.
  577.  
  578.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  579. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  580. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  581. for surveillance.
  582.  
  583.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  584. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  585. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  586. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  587. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  588.  
  589.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  590. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  591. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  592. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  593.  
  594.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  595. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  596. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  597. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  598. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  599. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  600. and long-term storage.
  601.  
  602. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  603.  
  604. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  605.  
  606.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  607. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  608. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  609. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  610. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  611. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  612. but they won�t say.
  613.  
  614. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  615.  
  616. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  617.  
  618. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  619.  
  620. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  621. _______________________________________
  622. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  623.  
  624.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  625. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  626. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  627. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  628. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  629. already been published previously. The second was
  630. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  631.  
  632. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  633.  
  634. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  635.  
  636.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  637. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  638. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  639. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  640. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  641. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  642. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  643. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  644. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  645.  
  646.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  647. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  648.  
  649.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  650. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  651. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  652. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  653. benefit� the document says.
  654.  
  655.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  656. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  657. company is working towards creating a so-called
  658. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  659. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  660. per second.
  661.  
  662. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  663. _______________________________________
  664. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  665.  
  666. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  667. _______________________________________
  668. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  669.  
  670. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  671. _______________________________________
  672. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  673.  
  674. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  675. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  676. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  677. _______________________________________
  678. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  679.  
  680.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  681. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  682. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  683. top human rights body.
  684.  
  685.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  686. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  687. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  688. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  689. Human Rights Watch.
  690.  
  691. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  692.  
  693. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  694. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  695.  
  696. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  697. _______________________________________
  698. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  699.  
  700.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  701. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  702. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  703.  
  704.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  705. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  706. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  707. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  708. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  709. high as two years. ... ...
  710.  
  711.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  712. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  713. by domestic courts.
  714.  
  715. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  716. _______________________________________
  717. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  718.  
  719. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  720. _______________________________________
  721. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  722.  
  723.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  724. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  725. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  726. to create national-only electronic networks could
  727. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  728. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  729. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  730. the USTR said in its annual report.
  731.  
  732. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  733. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  734. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  735. ���������������������������������������
  736. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  737.  
  738. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  739.  
  740.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  741. program run by the US Agency for International
  742. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  743. communications network� run through �secret shell
  744. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  745. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  746. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  747. �American contractors were gathering their private
  748. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  749. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  750. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  751. government. According to top-secret documents
  752. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  753. operation is frequently discussed at western
  754. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  755. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  756. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  757.  
  758. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  759.  
  760. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  761.  
  762. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  763.  
  764.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  765. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  766. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  767. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  768. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  769. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  770. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  771. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  772. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  773. Space Intelligence Center.�
  774.  
  775.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  776. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  777. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  778. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  779. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  780. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  781. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  782. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  783.  
  784.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  785. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  786. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  787. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  788. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  789. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  790. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  791. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  792. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  793.  
  794. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  795.  
  796. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  797. ---------------------------------------
  798. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  799.  
  800. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  801.  
  802. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  803.  
  804. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  805.  
  806. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  807.  
  808.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  809. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  810. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  811. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  812. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  813. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  814. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  815. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  816. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  817. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  818. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  819.  
  820.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  821. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  822. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  823. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  824. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  825. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  826.  
  827. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  828. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  829. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  830. ---------------------------------------
  831. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  832.  
  833. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  834.  
  835. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  836.  
  837. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  838.  
  839. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  840.  
  841. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  842.  
  843. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  844.  
  845. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  846.  
  847. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  848.  
  849. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  850. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  851. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  852.  
  853. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  854. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  855.  
  856. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  857. ---------------------------------------
  858. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  859.  
  860. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  861. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  862. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  863. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  864.  
  865. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  866.  
  867. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  868.  
  869. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  870.  
  871. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  872.  
  873. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  874.  
  875. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  876. ---------------------------------------
  877. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  878.  
  879. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  880. _______________________________________
  881. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  882.  
  883. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  884.  
  885. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  886.  
  887. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  888. _______________________________________
  889. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  890.  
  891.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  892. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  893. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  894. any information that comes out and will provide an
  895. updated archive from time to time.
  896.  
  897.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  898. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  899. 927MB decompressed.
  900.  
  901.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  902. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  903. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  904.  
  905. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  906. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  907.  
  908. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  909. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  910. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  911. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  912. _______________________________________
  913. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  914.  
  915. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  916. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  917. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  918. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  919. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  920. _______________________________________
  921. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  922.  
  923. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  924.  
  925. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  926.  
  927. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  928.  
  929. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  930.  
  931. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  932. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  933. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  934. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  935.  
  936. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  937. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  938.  
  939. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  940. _______________________________________
  941. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  942.  
  943. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  944.  
  945. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  946.  
  947. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  948.  
  949. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  950.  
  951. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  952.  
  953. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  954.  
  955. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  956. _______________________________________
  957. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  958.  
  959.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  960. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  961. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  962. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  963. public as possible� as well helping the public
  964. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  965. how we�re protecting national security.�
  966.  
  967. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  968. ���������������������������������������
  969. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  970.  
  971. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  972.  
  973. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  974.  
  975. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  976.  
  977. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  978.  
  979. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  980.  
  981. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  982.  
  983. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  984.  
  985.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  986. offensive against China, with targets including the
  987. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  988. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  989. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  990. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  991. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  992. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  993. well as telecommunications companies.
  994.  
  995.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  996. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  997. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  998. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  999. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  1000. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  1001. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  1002. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  1003. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  1004. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  1005. battle for data supremacy.
  1006.  
  1007.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  1008. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  1009. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  1010. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  1011. among other things.
  1012.  
  1013. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  1014. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  1015. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  1016. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  1017.  
  1018. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  1019.  
  1020.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  1021. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  1022. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  1023. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  1024. has lodged representations with the American side on
  1025. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  1026. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  1027.  
  1028. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  1029. _______________________________________
  1030. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  1031.  
  1032.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  1033. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  1034. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  1035. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  1036. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  1037. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  1038. routers, the devices that connect computer
  1039. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  1040. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  1041. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  1042. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  1043. that flow over their networks.
  1044.  
  1045.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  1046. aspired to create a database that would function
  1047. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  1048. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  1049. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  1050. activity � they are targeted only because they
  1051. control access to networks the agency wants to
  1052. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  1053. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  1054. of the posts says.
  1055.  
  1056.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  1057. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  1058. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  1059. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  1060. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  1061. poses with amusing captions.�
  1062.  
  1063. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  1064. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  1065. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  1066. _______________________________________
  1067. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  1068.  
  1069. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  1070. _______________________________________
  1071. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  1072.  
  1073. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  1074.  
  1075. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  1076.  
  1077. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  1078.  
  1079. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  1080.  
  1081. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  1082.  
  1083. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  1084. _______________________________________
  1085. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  1086.  
  1087. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  1088. _______________________________________
  1089. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  1090.  
  1091. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  1092.  
  1093. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  1094. _______________________________________
  1095. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  1096.  
  1097. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  1098. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  1099. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  1100. _______________________________________
  1101. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  1102.  
  1103. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  1104.  
  1105. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  1106. _______________________________________
  1107. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  1108.  
  1109. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  1110. _______________________________________
  1111. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  1112.  
  1113. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  1114.  
  1115. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  1116.  
  1117. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  1118. _______________________________________
  1119. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  1120.  
  1121.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  1122. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  1123. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  1124. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  1125. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  1126. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  1127. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  1128.  
  1129. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  1130.  
  1131. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  1132.  
  1133. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  1134. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  1135. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  1136.  
  1137. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  1138.  
  1139. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  1140.  
  1141. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  1142.  
  1143.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  1144. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  1145.  
  1146. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  1147.  
  1148. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  1149.  
  1150. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  1151.  
  1152. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  1153.  
  1154.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  1155. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  1156. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  1157. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  1158.  
  1159. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  1160.  
  1161. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  1162.  
  1163. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  1164.  
  1165. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  1166.  
  1167. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  1168.  
  1169. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  1170.  
  1171. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  1172.  
  1173. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  1174.  
  1175. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  1176.  
  1177. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  1178.  
  1179. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  1180.  
  1181. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  1182. _______________________________________
  1183. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  1184.  
  1185. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  1186. _______________________________________
  1187. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  1188.  
  1189. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  1190.  
  1191. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  1192.  
  1193. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  1194.  
  1195. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  1196.  
  1197. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  1198. _______________________________________
  1199. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  1200.  
  1201. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  1202.  
  1203. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  1204.  
  1205. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  1206. _______________________________________
  1207. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  1208.  
  1209. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  1210. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  1211. _______________________________________
  1212. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  1213. With Malware ::
  1214.  
  1215.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  1216. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  1217. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  1218. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  1219. level of human oversight in the process.
  1220.  
  1221.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  1222. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  1223. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  1224. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  1225. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  1226. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  1227. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  1228. Internet and phone networks.
  1229.  
  1230. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  1231. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  1232. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  1233. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  1234. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  1235. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  1236. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  1237. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  1238. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  1239.  
  1240.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  1241. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  1242. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  1243. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  1244. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  1245. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  1246.  
  1247.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  1248. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  1249. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  1250. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  1251. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  1252. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  1253. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  1254. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  1255. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  1256. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  1257. instead of individually.�
  1258.  
  1259. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  1260.  
  1261. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  1262.  
  1263.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  1264. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  1265. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  1266. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  1267. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  1268. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  1269. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  1270. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  1271. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  1272. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  1273. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  1274. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  1275. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  1276. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  1277. execute endpoint operations.�
  1278.  
  1279. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1280.  
  1281.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  1282. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  1283. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  1284. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  1285.  
  1286.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  1287. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  1288. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  1289. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  1290. looks suspicious.
  1291.  
  1292.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  1293. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  1294. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  1295. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  1296. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  1297.  
  1298.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  1299. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  1300. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  1301. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  1302. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  1303. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  1304. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  1305.  
  1306.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  1307. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  1308. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  1309. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  1310. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  1311. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  1312. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  1313. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  1314. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  1315. in action.
  1316.  
  1317. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  1318. Computers for Surveillance ::
  1319.  
  1320. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  1321.  
  1322. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  1323.  
  1324. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  1325.  
  1326.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  1327. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  1328. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  1329. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  1330. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  1331. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  1332.  
  1333. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  1334.  
  1335. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  1336. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  1337. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  1338. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  1339. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  1340. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  1341. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  1342. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  1343. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  1344. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  1345.  
  1346. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  1347.  
  1348. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  1349.  
  1350. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  1351.  
  1352. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  1353. _______________________________________
  1354. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  1355.  
  1356. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  1357. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  1358. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  1359. _______________________________________
  1360. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  1361.  
  1362. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  1363. _______________________________________
  1364. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  1365.  
  1366.  Alliances between security services are usually
  1367. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  1368. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  1369. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  1370. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  1371. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  1372. internet traffic.
  1373.  
  1374.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  1375. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  1376. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  1377. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  1378. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  1379.  
  1380.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  1381. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  1382. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  1383. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  1384. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  1385. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  1386.  
  1387.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  1388. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  1389. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  1390. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  1391. Americans may possibly use the information for
  1392. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  1393. by attacking them with armed drones.
  1394.  
  1395. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  1396.  
  1397. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  1398. _______________________________________
  1399. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  1400.  
  1401. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  1402.  
  1403. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  1404. ---------------------------------------
  1405. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  1406.  
  1407. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  1408.  
  1409. � NSA Spies Too ::
  1410.  
  1411. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1412. _______________________________________
  1413. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  1414.  
  1415. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  1416.  
  1417. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  1418.  
  1419.  The documents show that images were collected
  1420. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  1421. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  1422. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  1423. programs.
  1424.  
  1425. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  1426. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  1427. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  1428. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  1429.  
  1430. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  1431.  
  1432. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  1433. _______________________________________
  1434. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  1435.  
  1436. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  1437. _______________________________________
  1438. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  1439.  
  1440. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  1441.  
  1442. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  1443. _______________________________________
  1444. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  1445. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  1446.  
  1447. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  1448.  
  1449. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  1450. _______________________________________
  1451. � NSA Observer ::
  1452.  
  1453. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  1454. _______________________________________
  1455. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  1456.  
  1457. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1458.  
  1459. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  1460. _______________________________________
  1461. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  1462.  
  1463. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  1464.  
  1465. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  1466. _______________________________________
  1467. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  1468.  
  1469. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  1470.  
  1471. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  1472.  
  1473. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  1474.  
  1475. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  1476. _______________________________________
  1477. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  1478.  
  1479.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  1480. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  1481. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  1482. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  1483. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  1484. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  1485. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  1486. targets without confirming their veracity on
  1487. the ground.
  1488.  
  1489. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  1490. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  1491. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  1492. _______________________________________
  1493. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  1494.  
  1495.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  1496. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  1497. shows that an American law firm was
  1498. monitored while representing a foreign
  1499. government in trade disputes with the
  1500. United States. The disclosure offers a
  1501. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  1502. which Americans were ensnared by the
  1503. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  1504. interest because lawyers in the United
  1505. States with clients overseas have
  1506. expressed growing concern that their
  1507. confidential communications could be
  1508. compromised by such surveillance.
  1509.  
  1510. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  1511. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  1512. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  1513.  
  1514. NOBODY comments
  1515.  
  1516. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  1517.  
  1518.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  1519. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  1520. be declassified for research in public domain.
  1521. _______________________________________
  1522. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  1523.  
  1524. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  1525.  
  1526. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  1527.  
  1528. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  1529. _______________________________________
  1530. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  1531.  
  1532. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  1533. _______________________________________
  1534. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  1535. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  1536.  
  1537.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  1538. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  1539. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  1540. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  1541. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  1542.  
  1543. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  1544. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  1545. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  1546.  
  1547. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  1548. the German Chancellor ::
  1549.  
  1550. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  1551. _______________________________________
  1552. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  1553. Phone Call Spying ::
  1554.  
  1555. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  1556.  
  1557. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  1558. _______________________________________
  1559. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  1560.  
  1561. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  1562. _______________________________________
  1563. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  1564.  
  1565. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  1566. _______________________________________
  1567.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  1568. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  1569. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  1570. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  1571. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  1572. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  1573.  
  1574. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  1575. ���������������������������������������
  1576. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  1577.  
  1578. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  1579.  
  1580. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  1581.  
  1582. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  1583.  
  1584. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  1585.  
  1586. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  1587.  
  1588.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  1589. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  1590. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  1591. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  1592. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  1593. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  1594. left the terminal.
  1595.  
  1596.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  1597. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  1598. clandestine operation by the Communications
  1599. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  1600. certainly illegal. ... ...
  1601.  
  1602.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  1603. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  1604. software program CSEC was developing with help
  1605. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  1606.  
  1607.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  1608. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  1609. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  1610. into other cities/regions.�
  1611.  
  1612. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  1613.  
  1614.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  1615. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  1616.  
  1617. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  1618.  
  1619. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  1620.  
  1621. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  1622.  
  1623. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  1624.  
  1625. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  1626. _______________________________________
  1627. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  1628.  
  1629. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  1630.  
  1631. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  1632.  
  1633. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  1634. _______________________________________
  1635. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  1636.  
  1637.  Documents taken from the National Security
  1638. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  1639. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  1640. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  1641. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  1642. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  1643. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  1644. information, for analysis. At the time the
  1645. documents were printed, they were also able to
  1646. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  1647.  
  1648.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  1649. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  1650. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  1651. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  1652. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  1653. visits. The monitoring program is called
  1654. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  1655.  
  1656.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  1657. British had to have been either physically able
  1658. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  1659. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  1660. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  1661. and would be able to extract some key data
  1662. about specific users as well.
  1663.  
  1664. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  1665. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  1666. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  1667. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  1668. _______________________________________
  1669. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  1670.  
  1671. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  1672. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  1673. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  1674.  
  1675. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  1676.  
  1677.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  1678. on the iPhone alone.�
  1679.  
  1680. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  1681.  
  1682. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  1683.  
  1684. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  1685.  
  1686. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  1687. _______________________________________
  1688. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  1689.  
  1690.  The National Security Agency program that
  1691. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  1692. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  1693. Thursday in a newly released report.
  1694.  
  1695. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  1696.  
  1697.  �We have not identified a single instance
  1698. involving a threat to the United States in
  1699. which the program made a concrete difference
  1700. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  1701. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  1702. report released Thursday.
  1703.  
  1704.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  1705. domestic spying will continue.
  1706.  
  1707. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  1708. _______________________________________
  1709. � Snowden Speaks ::
  1710.  
  1711. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  1712. _______________________________________
  1713. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  1714.  
  1715. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  1716.  
  1717. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  1718.          ���
  1719. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  1720.  
  1721. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  1722.  
  1723.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  1724. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  1725. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  1726. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  1727. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  1728. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  1729. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  1730. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  1731. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  1732. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  1733. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  1734. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  1735. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  1736. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  1737. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  1738.  
  1739. Reform?
  1740.  
  1741.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  1742. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  1743. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  1744. whether legal or not?
  1745.  
  1746. The reform will come from people taking action.
  1747.  
  1748.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  1749. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  1750. _______________________________________
  1751. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  1752.  
  1753. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  1754. _______________________________________
  1755. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  1756.  
  1757.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  1758. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  1759. main internet cables:
  1760.  
  1761.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  1762.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  1763.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  1764.  
  1765. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  1766. ---------------------------------------
  1767. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  1768. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  1769. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  1770. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  1771. _______________________________________
  1772. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  1773.  
  1774. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  1775.  
  1776. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  1777.  
  1778. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  1779. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  1780. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  1781. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  1782. ---------------------------------------
  1783. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1784. _______________________________________
  1785. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  1786.  
  1787. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  1788.  
  1789. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  1790.  
  1791. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  1792.  
  1793.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  1794. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  1795. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  1796. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  1797.  
  1798.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  1799. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  1800. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  1801. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  1802.  
  1803.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  1804. text message database to extract information
  1805. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  1806. transactions and more � including of individuals
  1807. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  1808.  
  1809. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  1810. _______________________________________
  1811. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  1812.  
  1813. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  1814.  
  1815. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  1816.  
  1817.  The technology, which the agency has used
  1818. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  1819. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  1820. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  1821. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  1822. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  1823. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  1824. set up miles away from the target.
  1825.  
  1826.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  1827. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  1828. American intelligence agencies for years:
  1829. getting into computers that adversaries,
  1830. and some American partners, have tried to
  1831. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  1832. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  1833. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  1834. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  1835. ---------------------------------------
  1836. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  1837.  
  1838. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  1839. _______________________________________
  1840. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  1841.  
  1842. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  1843. ---------------------------------------
  1844. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  1845.  
  1846. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  1847. _______________________________________
  1848. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  1849.  
  1850. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  1851. _______________________________________
  1852. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  1853.  
  1854. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  1855. _______________________________________
  1856. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  1857.  
  1858. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  1859. _______________________________________
  1860. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  1861. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  1862.  
  1863. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  1864.  
  1865. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  1866. _______________________________________
  1867. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  1868. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  1869.  
  1870. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  1871. _______________________________________
  1872. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  1873. All Encryption ::
  1874.  
  1875.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  1876. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  1877. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  1878. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  1879. used to protect banking, medical, business
  1880. and government records around the world.
  1881.  
  1882.  According to documents provided by former
  1883. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  1884. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  1885. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  1886. than classical computers � is part of a
  1887. $79.7 million research program titled
  1888. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  1889. work is hosted under classified contracts
  1890. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  1891.  
  1892. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  1893. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  1894. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  1895. _______________________________________
  1896. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  1897.  
  1898. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  1899. _______________________________________
  1900. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  1901.  
  1902. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  1903. _______________________________________
  1904. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  1905.  
  1906. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  1907.  
  1908. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  1909.  
  1910. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  1911.  
  1912. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  1913.  
  1914. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  1915.  
  1916. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  1917. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  1918. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  1919.  
  1920. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  1921.  
  1922.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  1923. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  1924. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  1925. infiltrates computers around the world and
  1926. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  1927. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  1928. it is targeting. ... ...
  1929.  
  1930. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  1931.  
  1932.  The insert method and other variants of
  1933. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  1934. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  1935. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  1936. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  1937. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  1938. also incorporates routers and servers
  1939. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  1940. network by infecting these networks with
  1941. �implants� that then allow the government
  1942. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  1943.  
  1944.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  1945. to identify and track its targets based on
  1946. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  1947. could include certain email addresses or
  1948. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  1949. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  1950. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  1951. additional information like an email address.
  1952. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  1953. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  1954. ---------------------------------------
  1955. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  1956.  
  1957. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  1958.  
  1959. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  1960.  
  1961.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  1962. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  1963. that are being logged into on that computer
  1964. as long as the user does not clear browser
  1965. cookies.�
  1966.  
  1967. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  1968.  
  1969. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  1970.  
  1971. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  1972. ---------------------------------------
  1973. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  1974.  
  1975.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  1976. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  1977. could be described as master carpenters for
  1978. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  1979. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  1980. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  1981. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  1982. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  1983. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  1984. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  1985. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  1986. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  1987. ability to establish a global covert network
  1988. that operates alongside the Internet.
  1989.  
  1990.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  1991. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  1992. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  1993. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  1994. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  1995. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  1996. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  1997. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  1998. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  1999. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  2000. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  2001. over $1 million.
  2002.  
  2003.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  2004. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  2005. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  2006. clear preference for planting their malicious
  2007. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  2008. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  2009. to load when a computer is turned on.
  2010.  
  2011.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  2012. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  2013. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  2014. to virus protection and other security programs.
  2015. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  2016. computer has been completely erased and a new
  2017. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  2018. can continue to function and ensures that new
  2019. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  2020. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  2021. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  2022. this approach has provided them with the
  2023. possibility of permanent access.
  2024.  
  2025.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  2026. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  2027. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  2028. with the exception of latter, are American
  2029. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  2030. intelligence agency is compromising the
  2031. technology and products of American companies.
  2032.  
  2033. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  2034. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  2035. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  2036. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  2037. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  2038.  
  2039. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  2040.  
  2041. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  2042.  
  2043. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  2044.  
  2045. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  2046.  
  2047. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  2048.  
  2049. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  2050.  
  2051. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  2052.  
  2053. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  2054.  
  2055. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  2056.  
  2057. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  2058.  
  2059. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  2060.  
  2061. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  2062.  
  2063. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  2064.  
  2065. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  2066.  
  2067. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  2068.  
  2069. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  2070.  
  2071. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  2072.  
  2073. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  2074.  
  2075. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  2076.  
  2077. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  2078.  
  2079. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  2080.  
  2081. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  2082.  
  2083. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  2084.  
  2085. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  2086.  
  2087. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  2088.  
  2089. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  2090. ---------------------------------------
  2091. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  2092.  
  2093. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  2094.  
  2095. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  2096.  
  2097. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  2098.  
  2099. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  2100. ---------------------------------------
  2101. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  2102.  
  2103. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  2104.  
  2105. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  2106.  
  2107.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  2108. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  2109. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  2110.  
  2111. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  2112.  
  2113. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  2114. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  2115.  
  2116.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  2117. in its operating system had left devices open
  2118. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  2119. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  2120. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  2121. of its mass spying program.
  2122.  
  2123. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  2124. ---------------------------------------
  2125. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  2126. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  2127.  
  2128. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  2129.  
  2130. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  2131. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  2132.  
  2133. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  2134.  
  2135. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  2136.  
  2137. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  2138.  
  2139.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  2140. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  2141.  
  2142. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  2143. _______________________________________
  2144. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  2145.  
  2146. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  2147.  
  2148. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  2149.  
  2150. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  2151. _______________________________________
  2152. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  2153.  
  2154. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  2155.  
  2156.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  2157. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  2158. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  2159. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  2160. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  2161. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  2162. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  2163. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  2164. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  2165. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  2166.  
  2167.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  2168. learn we are collecting more in the United
  2169. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  2170. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  2171. troubled, he said, and several said they
  2172. did not want to know any more.
  2173. ---------------------------------------
  2174. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  2175.  
  2176. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  2177. _______________________________________
  2178. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  2179. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  2180.  
  2181. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  2182. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  2183. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  2184. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  2185. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  2186. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  2187. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  2188. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  2189.  
  2190. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  2191.  
  2192.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  2193. National Security Agency program which
  2194. collects information on nearly all telephone
  2195. calls made to, from or within the United
  2196. States is likely unconstitutional.
  2197.  
  2198.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  2199. that the program appears to violate the
  2200. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  2201. searches and seizures. He also said the
  2202. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  2203. that collecting the information had helped
  2204. to head off terrorist attacks.
  2205.  
  2206.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  2207. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  2208. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  2209. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  2210. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  2211. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  2212. the order to allow for an appeal.
  2213.  
  2214. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  2215. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  2216.  
  2217.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  2218. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  2219. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  2220. in June in news stories based on leaks
  2221. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  2222. For seven years, the metadata program has
  2223. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  2224. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  2225. Court and found constitutional by at least
  2226. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  2227.  
  2228. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  2229.  
  2230. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  2231.  
  2232. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  2233.  
  2234. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  2235.  
  2236. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  2237.  
  2238. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  2239. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  2240.  
  2241. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  2242.  
  2243. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  2244.  
  2245. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  2246. ---------------------------------------
  2247. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  2248.  
  2249. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  2250.  
  2251. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  2252.  
  2253. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  2254. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  2255.  
  2256. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  2257. Spying Programs ::
  2258.  
  2259. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  2260. ---------------------------------------
  2261. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  2262. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  2263.  
  2264. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  2265.  
  2266. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  2267.  
  2268. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  2269. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  2270.  
  2271. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  2272.  
  2273. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  2274. _______________________________________
  2275. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  2276.  
  2277.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  2278. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  2279. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  2280.  
  2281. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  2282.  
  2283. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  2284.  
  2285.  - Military Information
  2286.  - Economic Information
  2287.  - Information Operations Information
  2288.  - Political Information �
  2289. _______________________________________
  2290. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  2291. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  2292.  
  2293. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  2294. ���������������������������������������
  2295. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  2296.  
  2297. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  2298.  
  2299. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  2300.  
  2301. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  2302.  
  2303. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  2304.  
  2305. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  2306.  
  2307. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  2308.  
  2309. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  2310.  
  2311. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  2312.  
  2313. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  2314. _______________________________________
  2315. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  2316. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  2317.  
  2318.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  2319. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  2320. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  2321. government access in order to make network
  2322. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  2323. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  2324. in millions of homes and businesses within
  2325. the UK,� the paper states.
  2326.  
  2327.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  2328. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  2329. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  2330. assigns all their modems an extra address
  2331. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  2332. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  2333. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  2334. a second IP address for management, except
  2335. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  2336. assigned to the United States Department
  2337. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  2338. of speculation that this is actually a
  2339. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  2340. they can secretly monitor and control
  2341. peoples� home networks.
  2342.  
  2343.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  2344. The better explanation is that BT simply
  2345. chose this address space because it�s
  2346. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  2347. address, it�s only used inside the private
  2348. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  2349. that address space, you�ll see that your
  2350. packets go nowhere.
  2351.  
  2352. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  2353. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  2354. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  2355.  
  2356. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  2357.  
  2358.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  2359. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  2360. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  2361. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  2362. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  2363. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  2364. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  2365. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  2366. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  2367. It�s past time for something new.�
  2368.  
  2369. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  2370. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  2371. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  2372. ---------------------------------------
  2373. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  2374.  
  2375.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  2376. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  2377. worldwide with malicious software designed
  2378. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  2379. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  2380. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  2381.  
  2382.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  2383. explains how the NSA collects information
  2384. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  2385. shows that the intelligence service uses
  2386. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  2387. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  2388. secret infiltration of computer systems
  2389. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  2390. software.
  2391.  
  2392.  One example of this type of hacking was
  2393. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  2394. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  2395. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  2396. has been installing this malicious software
  2397. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  2398. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  2399. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  2400. through a process of luring employees to a
  2401. false Linkedin page.
  2402.  
  2403. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  2404. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  2405. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  2406. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  2407.  
  2408. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  2409.  
  2410.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  2411. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  2412. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  2413. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  2414. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  2415. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  2416. and citizens.
  2417.  
  2418.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  2419. will deter this bounty of profits for
  2420. the comsec industry, unless the public
  2421. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  2422. the nettle, and all those making money
  2423. from this deception operation decide to
  2424. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  2425.  
  2426.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  2427. lists, those participating in standards
  2428. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  2429. grants in think tanks and universities,
  2430. those in law firms and public interest
  2431. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  2432. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  2433. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  2434. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  2435. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  2436. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  2437. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  2438. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  2439. contracts, list lurking, online and
  2440. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  2441. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  2442. fulfilled.
  2443.  
  2444. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  2445.  
  2446. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  2447.  
  2448. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  2449.  
  2450. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2451. ���������������������������������������
  2452. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  2453. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  2454.  
  2455. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  2456. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  2457. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  2458. _______________________________________
  2459. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  2460.  
  2461. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  2462.  
  2463. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  2464.  
  2465. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  2466.  
  2467. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  2468.  
  2469. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  2470. _______________________________________
  2471. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  2472.  
  2473. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  2474. _______________________________________
  2475. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  2476. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  2477.  
  2478. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  2479.  
  2480. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  2481. _______________________________________
  2482. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  2483.  
  2484. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  2485. _______________________________________
  2486. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  2487. of Public Concerns ::
  2488.  
  2489. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  2490.  
  2491. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  2492.  
  2493. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  2494. _______________________________________
  2495. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2496.  
  2497.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  2498. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  2499. of metadata about the world�s secure
  2500. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  2501. certainly not a program through which
  2502. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  2503. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  2504. services like Google, as reported by others,
  2505. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  2506. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  2507. Google are based on a small piece of a
  2508. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  2509. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  2510. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  2511. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  2512. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  2513. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  2514. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  2515. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  2516. by providing information about a target.�
  2517.  
  2518. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  2519.  
  2520. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2521.  
  2522. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  2523. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  2524. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  2525. ���������������������������������������
  2526. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  2527.  
  2528. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  2529.  
  2530. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  2531. _______________________________________
  2532. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  2533.  
  2534. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  2535. ---------------------------------------
  2536. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  2537.  
  2538. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  2539.  
  2540.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  2541. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  2542. and later managed by big data corporations
  2543. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  2544.  
  2545.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  2546. large files across machines in a large
  2547. cluster.
  2548.  
  2549. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  2550.  
  2551.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  2552. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  2553. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  2554. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  2555.  
  2556.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  2557. major components, a central metadata server
  2558. and file servers from data.
  2559.  
  2560. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  2561.  
  2562. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  2563.  
  2564.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  2565. posted on public domain.
  2566.  
  2567. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  2568.  
  2569. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  2570. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  2571.  
  2572. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2573. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2574. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  2575.  
  2576. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  2577.  
  2578. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  2579. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  2580. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  2581. ---------------------------------------
  2582. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  2583. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  2584.  
  2585. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  2586.  
  2587. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  2588.  
  2589. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  2590.  
  2591. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  2592.  
  2593. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  2594.  
  2595. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  2596.  
  2597. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  2598.  
  2599. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2600.  
  2601. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  2602.  
  2603.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  2604. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  2605. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  2606. content of all our communications have
  2607. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  2608. program since the 1990s.
  2609.  
  2610.  The new details concern how, �The National
  2611. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  2612. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  2613. of cellphones around the world.�
  2614.  
  2615.  However, the report reveals itself to
  2616. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  2617. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  2618. does not target Americans� location data
  2619. by design, but the agency acquires a
  2620. substantial amount of information on
  2621. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  2622. �incidentally.�
  2623.  
  2624.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  2625. happens to record the locations of Americans
  2626. using data from their cellphones, and is
  2627. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  2628. surveillance, is yet another example of
  2629. damage control by the establishment.
  2630.  
  2631. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  2632. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  2633. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  2634. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  2635. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  2636. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  2637. ---------------------------------------
  2638. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  2639. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  2640.  
  2641.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  2642. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  2643. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  2644. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  2645. targets for government hacking and to
  2646. bolster surveillance.
  2647.  
  2648. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  2649. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  2650. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  2651. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  2652. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  2653. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  2654. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  2655. ---------------------------------------
  2656. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  2657.  
  2658. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  2659. ---------------------------------------
  2660. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  2661. In a World Without Cookies ::
  2662.  
  2663. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  2664. _______________________________________
  2665. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  2666.  
  2667. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  2668. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  2669. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  2670.  
  2671. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  2672.  
  2673. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  2674. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  2675. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  2676. _______________________________________
  2677. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  2678. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  2679.  
  2680. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  2681. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  2682. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  2683. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  2684. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  2685. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  2686.  
  2687. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  2688.  
  2689. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  2690.  
  2691. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  2692.  
  2693. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  2694.  
  2695. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  2696.  
  2697. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  2698.  
  2699. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  2700.  
  2701. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  2702.  
  2703. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  2704.  
  2705. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  2706.  
  2707. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  2708.  
  2709. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  2710. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  2711. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  2712.  
  2713. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  2714.  
  2715. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  2716. ---------------------------------------
  2717. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  2718.  
  2719. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  2720. ---------------------------------------
  2721. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  2722.  
  2723. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  2724.  
  2725. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  2726.  
  2727. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  2728.  
  2729. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  2730.  
  2731. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  2732.  
  2733. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  2734.  
  2735. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  2736. _______________________________________
  2737.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  2738. worldwide was published by the German
  2739. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  2740. map was put online by accident, but before
  2741. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  2742. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  2743. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  2744. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  2745. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  2746. the names of all other cities were blurred
  2747. by Der Spiegel.�
  2748.  
  2749.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  2750.  
  2751. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  2752.  
  2753. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  2754.  
  2755. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  2756.  
  2757. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  2758.  
  2759. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  2760.  
  2761. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  2762. ---------------------------------------
  2763. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  2764.  
  2765. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  2766.  
  2767. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  2768. _______________________________________
  2769. � Five Eyes ::
  2770.  
  2771. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  2772. _______________________________________
  2773. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  2774.  
  2775. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  2776. _______________________________________
  2777. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  2778. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  2779.  
  2780. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  2781.  
  2782. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  2783. _______________________________________
  2784. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  2785.  
  2786. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  2787.  
  2788. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  2789. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  2790. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  2791. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  2792. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  2793. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  2794. _______________________________________
  2795. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  2796.  
  2797.  September 11th, which also happened to
  2798. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  2799. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  2800. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  2801. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  2802. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  2803. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  2804. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  2805. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  2806. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  2807. itself.
  2808.  
  2809.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  2810. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  2811. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  2812. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  2813. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  2814. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  2815. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  2816. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  2817. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  2818. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  2819. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  2820. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  2821. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  2822. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  2823. its workforce by one-third, to about
  2824. 33,000. The number of private companies
  2825. it depended upon more than tripled during
  2826. that time.
  2827.  
  2828.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  2829. and the increasing reliance on the private
  2830. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  2831. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  2832. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  2833. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  2834. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  2835. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  2836. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  2837. getting those clearances. So you had
  2838. this huge apparatus being built, and
  2839. the government was just managing it.
  2840. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  2841. doing that.� ... ...
  2842.  
  2843.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  2844. workforce, the surveillance he would
  2845. later expose was becoming not just
  2846. institutionalized but very big business.
  2847. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  2848. the full flower of that massive, massive
  2849. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  2850. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  2851. could go.� ... ...
  2852.  
  2853.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  2854. leaking government secrets when he was
  2855. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  2856. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  2857. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  2858. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  2859. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  2860. policies that I thought would be reined
  2861. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  2862. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  2863. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  2864. the more he read �true information,�
  2865. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  2866. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  2867. surveillance program � the more he realized
  2868. that there were actually two governments:
  2869. the one that was elected, and the other,
  2870. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  2871. �If the highest officials in government
  2872. can break the law without fearing punishment
  2873. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  2874. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  2875.  
  2876. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  2877. _______________________________________
  2878. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  2879.  
  2880. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  2881. _______________________________________
  2882. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  2883.  
  2884. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  2885. _______________________________________
  2886. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  2887. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  2888.  
  2889.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  2890. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  2891. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  2892. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  2893. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  2894. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  2895. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  2896. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  2897. in terrorism.
  2898.  
  2899.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  2900. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  2901. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  2902. threatening national security. It is
  2903. successfully restricting release of the
  2904. Snowden material and will likely become
  2905. more forceful as releases continue to the
  2906. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  2907. to criminalize release as a national
  2908. security threat.
  2909.  
  2910. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  2911. _______________________________________
  2912. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  2913.  
  2914.  Includes most reports, slides and
  2915. documents all related to the recent
  2916. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  2917. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  2918. any information that comes out and
  2919. will provide updated archives from
  2920. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  2921.  
  2922.  After decompression - the folder is
  2923. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  2924. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  2925.  
  2926. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2927. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  2928.  
  2929. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  2930. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  2931. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  2932. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2933. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2934. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  2935. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  2936. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2937. _______________________________________
  2938. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  2939.  
  2940. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2941. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2942. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2943.  
  2944. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  2945. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  2946.  
  2947.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  2948. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  2949. Australians, and hands over the material
  2950. to the US and its closest allies, according
  2951. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  2952. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  2953. Australia web site.
  2954.  
  2955.  The document obtained by the former US
  2956. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  2957. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  2958. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  2959. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  2960. as well as the people and governments of
  2961. many Asian countries.
  2962.  
  2963.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  2964. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  2965. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  2966. global partners so-called metadata of
  2967. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  2968. address books and social media posts of
  2969. millions of people.
  2970.  
  2971.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  2972. the recent revelations, also from documents
  2973. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  2974. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  2975. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  2976. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  2977. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  2978. operate as electronic listening posts
  2979. for the US-led spying network.
  2980.  
  2981. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  2982. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  2983. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  2984. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  2985. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  2986. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  2987.  
  2988. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  2989. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  2990.  
  2991.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  2992. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  2993. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  2994. political figures has been furiously
  2995. denounced by other media outlets for
  2996. breaching �national security� and the
  2997. �national interest.� The reaction
  2998. underscores the extent to which the
  2999. media establishment has been integrated
  3000. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  3001.  
  3002.  On November 18, after being approached
  3003. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  3004. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  3005. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  3006. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  3007. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  3008. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  3009. senior political figures. The report
  3010. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  3011. crisis for the Australian government, with
  3012. the Indonesian president suspending military
  3013. and intelligence cooperation.
  3014.  
  3015. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  3016. _______________________________________
  3017. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  3018.  
  3019.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  3020. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  3021. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  3022. allowed the largest American spy agency
  3023. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  3024. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  3025.  
  3026.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  3027. by CBC News.
  3028.  
  3029.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  3030. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  3031. a security command post during a six-day
  3032. spying operation by the National Security
  3033. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  3034. other foreign heads of government were on
  3035. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  3036.  
  3037.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  3038. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  3039.  
  3040.  The world was still struggling to climb
  3041. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  3042. were debating a wide array of possible
  3043. measures including a global tax on banks,
  3044. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  3045. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  3046. eventually scotched.
  3047.  
  3048. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  3049. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  3050. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  3051. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  3052. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  3053.  
  3054. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  3055. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  3056.  
  3057. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  3058.  
  3059.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  3060. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  3061.  
  3062. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  3063.  
  3064. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  3065.  
  3066. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  3067.  
  3068. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  3069. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  3070.  
  3071. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  3072.  
  3073. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  3074.  
  3075. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  3076.  
  3077. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  3078. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  3079.  
  3080. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  3081.  
  3082. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  3083.  
  3084.  The politicians and corporate media
  3085. would have Canadians believe that they
  3086. have only �moved on� from discussing
  3087. CSEC�s activities because there is
  3088. nothing for Canadians to worry about.
  3089.  
  3090.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool
  3091. of the Canadian ruling class that plays
  3092. an important role in the pursuit of its
  3093. imperialist foreign policy and in the
  3094. surveillance and suppression of opposition
  3095. at home. The size of CSEC�s staff�it
  3096. employs almost 2,000 people and a further
  3097. thousand military personnel assist its
  3098. work�give an inkling of the scale of
  3099. its activities.
  3100.  
  3101.  These include everything from supporting
  3102. the overseas operations of the Canadian
  3103. military, to spying on governments that
  3104. are reputed allies of Canada and assisting
  3105. CSIS and the RCMP in conducting a vast
  3106. program of domestic surveillance. Of
  3107. especial importance is the CSEC�s
  3108. partnership with the NSA. According to
  3109. former NSA technical director William
  3110. Binney, the two organizations �have
  3111. integrated personnel� i.e. swap personnel
  3112. to improve seamless collaboration. They
  3113. also share Internet surveillance programs.
  3114.  
  3115.  As a further element of its collaboration
  3116. with the Five Eyes alliance, CSEC was
  3117. relied on in the project of spying on
  3118. diplomats and officials during the 2009
  3119. London G20 meeting according to a report
  3120. in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  3121. which was based on documents supplied
  3122. by Snowden. The highly sensitive operation
  3123. involved the penetration of delegates�
  3124. smartphones to monitor their email
  3125. messages and calls.
  3126.  
  3127. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  3128.  
  3129. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  3130.  
  3131. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  3132.  
  3133. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  3134. _______________________________________
  3135. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  3136.  
  3137. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  3138.  
  3139. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  3140.  
  3141. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  3142. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  3143. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  3144.  
  3145. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  3146.  
  3147. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  3148.  
  3149. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  3150.  
  3151. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  3152. _______________________________________
  3153.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  3154. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  3155. in theory � forbid local governments from
  3156. providing services to federal agencies
  3157. that collect electronic data from Americans
  3158. without a personalized warrant.
  3159.  
  3160.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  3161. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  3162. but at least one legislator has committed
  3163. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  3164. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  3165. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  3166. is introduced.
  3167.  
  3168.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  3169. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  3170. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  3171. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  3172. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  3173. and a handful of other groups.
  3174.  
  3175.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  3176. Maharrey adds.
  3177.  
  3178. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  3179. _______________________________________
  3180. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  3181. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  3182.  
  3183.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  3184. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  3185. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  3186. US and British intelligence � particularly
  3187. their cooperation in data collection and
  3188. snooping programs involving British citizens
  3189. and close allies on the European continent.
  3190.  
  3191.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  3192. to account by British authorities for
  3193. jeopardizing national security. The
  3194. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  3195. is being forced to appear before a
  3196. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  3197. the news outlet�s actions.
  3198.  
  3199. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3200. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  3201. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  3202.  
  3203. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  3204.  
  3205. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  3206.  
  3207. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  3208. as the British Dictatorship ::
  3209.  
  3210.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  3211. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  3212. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  3213. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  3214. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  3215. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  3216. seems the United States is reaching the event
  3217. horizon to a police state.
  3218.  
  3219. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  3220.  
  3221. Cryptome noted
  3222.  
  3223.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  3224. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  3225. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  3226. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  3227. UKG), although there could be some which have
  3228. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  3229. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  3230.  
  3231.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  3232. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  3233. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  3234. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  3235. deception, co-optation.
  3236.  
  3237.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  3238. had access, or suspected of access, are
  3239. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  3240. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  3241. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  3242. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  3243. standard coercive means of authorities.
  3244.  
  3245.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  3246. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  3247. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  3248. advised successive cooperators, usually
  3249. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  3250. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  3251. participation.
  3252.  
  3253.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  3254. disputes and disagreements among competing
  3255. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  3256. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  3257. along with threats against families, friends
  3258. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  3259. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  3260. with authorities, including use of rewards
  3261. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  3262.  
  3263. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  3264. _______________________________________
  3265. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  3266.  
  3267. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  3268. _______________________________________
  3269. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  3270. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  3271. Governments ::
  3272.  
  3273. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  3274. _______________________________________
  3275. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  3276. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  3277.  
  3278. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  3279. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  3280. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  3281. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  3282. _______________________________________
  3283. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  3284.  
  3285. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  3286.  
  3287. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  3288.  
  3289. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  3290.  
  3291. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  3292.  
  3293. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  3294.  
  3295. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  3296.  
  3297. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  3298.  
  3299. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  3300.  
  3301. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  3302.  
  3303. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  3304.  
  3305. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  3306.  
  3307. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  3308.  
  3309. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  3310.  
  3311. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  3312.  
  3313. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  3314.  
  3315. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  3316. Steal Email Metadata ::
  3317.  
  3318.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  3319. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  3320. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  3321. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  3322.  
  3323.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  3324. servers around the world, reducing the
  3325. chance of losing your information should
  3326. one fail. When you log in to an account
  3327. with these firms, the data sent between
  3328. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  3329. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  3330. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  3331. And because many of the transfers take place
  3332. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  3333. isn�t required to tap the information.
  3334.  
  3335.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  3336. broken into the main communications links
  3337. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  3338. around the world, according to documents
  3339. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  3340. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  3341. officials.
  3342.  
  3343.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  3344. positioned itself to collect at will from
  3345. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  3346. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  3347. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  3348. but it keeps a lot.
  3349.  
  3350.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  3351. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  3352. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  3353. counterpart, the Government Communications
  3354. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  3355. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  3356. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  3357. that carry information among the data
  3358. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  3359.  
  3360. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  3361. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  3362. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  3363. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  3364. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  3365.  
  3366. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  3367.  
  3368.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  3369. email collecting program �does not apply
  3370. to US citizens.�
  3371.  
  3372.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  3373. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  3374. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  3375. accounts around the world, many of them
  3376. belonging to Americans, according to
  3377. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  3378. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  3379. Edward Snowden.
  3380.  
  3381.  The collection program, which has not
  3382. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  3383. address books and �buddy lists� from
  3384. instant messaging services as they move
  3385. across global data links. Online services
  3386. often transmit those contacts when a user
  3387. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  3388. a computer or mobile device with information
  3389. stored on remote servers.
  3390.  
  3391. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  3392. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  3393. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  3394.  
  3395. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  3396.  
  3397. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  3398.  
  3399. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  3400.  
  3401. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  3402. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  3403. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  3404. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  3405. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  3406. ���������������������������������������
  3407. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  3408.  
  3409. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  3410.  
  3411. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  3412. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  3413.  
  3414. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  3415.  
  3416. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  3417.  
  3418. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  3419.  
  3420. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  3421.  
  3422. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  3423.  
  3424. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  3425.  
  3426. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  3427.  
  3428. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  3429.  
  3430. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  3431.  
  3432. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  3433.  
  3434. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  3435.  
  3436. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  3437.  
  3438. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  3439. ---------------------------------------
  3440. NOBODY comments ?
  3441.  
  3442.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  3443. differs from the Guardians.
  3444.  
  3445. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3446.  
  3447. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  3448.  
  3449. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3450.  
  3451. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  3452.  
  3453.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  3454. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  3455. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  3456.  
  3457.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  3458. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  3459. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  3460. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  3461. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  3462. ---------------------------------------
  3463. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  3464.  
  3465. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  3466.  
  3467. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3468.  
  3469.  This was written from a person who purports
  3470. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  3471.  
  3472. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  3473.  
  3474. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3475.  
  3476. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  3477.  
  3478. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  3479. Misleading ::
  3480.  
  3481. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  3482.  
  3483. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  3484. on NSA Spying ::
  3485.  
  3486. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  3487.  
  3488.  �Recent articles published in the
  3489. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  3490. inaccurate and misleading information
  3491. regarding US foreign intelligence
  3492. activities. The allegation that the
  3493. National Security Agency collected more
  3494. than 70 million �recordings of French
  3495. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  3496.  
  3497.  While we are not going to discuss the
  3498. details of our activities, we have
  3499. repeatedly made it clear that the
  3500. United States gathers intelligence of
  3501. the type gathered by all nations. The
  3502. US collects intelligence to protect the
  3503. nation, its interests, and its allies
  3504. from, among other things, threats such
  3505. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  3506. weapons of mass destruction.
  3507.  
  3508.  The United States values our longstanding
  3509. friendship and alliance with France and
  3510. we will continue to cooperate on security
  3511. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  3512.  
  3513. James R. Clapper
  3514. Director of National Intelligence
  3515. ---------------------------------------
  3516. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  3517.  
  3518. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  3519.  
  3520.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  3521. a call without leaving a record with the
  3522. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  3523. or leaves America without passing through
  3524. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  3525. statement Thursday.
  3526.  
  3527.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  3528. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  3529. _______________________________________
  3530. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  3531. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  3532.  
  3533.  US and British intelligence officials
  3534. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  3535. collection of highly classified, heavily
  3536. encrypted materials they believe former
  3537. National Security Agency contractor
  3538. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  3539.  
  3540.  One source saw the cache of documents
  3541. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  3542. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  3543. other harm. ... ...
  3544.  
  3545.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  3546. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  3547. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  3548. that �if anything happens at all to
  3549. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  3550. to get access to the full archives.�
  3551.  
  3552. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  3553. _______________________________________
  3554. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  3555. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  3556.  
  3557.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  3558. government surveillance policies. But he
  3559. is not disclosing those changes to the
  3560. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  3561. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  3562. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  3563. World Bank and the International Monetary
  3564. Fund? He won�t say.
  3565.  
  3566.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  3567. to review and recommend changes to his
  3568. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  3569.  
  3570. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  3571. _______________________________________
  3572. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  3573.  
  3574.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  3575. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  3576. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  3577. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  3578. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  3579.  
  3580.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  3581. broad goals, the five-page document said
  3582. that existing American laws were not adequate
  3583. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  3584. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  3585. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  3586. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  3587. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  3588. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  3589. pace with the complexity of the technology
  3590. and target environments, or the operational
  3591. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  3592. document concluded.
  3593.  
  3594. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  3595. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  3596. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  3597. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  3598. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  3599.  
  3600. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  3601.  
  3602.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  3603. called Treasure Map and describes its
  3604. capabilities but does not publish visual
  3605. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  3606. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  3607. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  3608.  
  3609. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  3610. _______________________________________
  3611. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  3612.  
  3613. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  3614. _______________________________________
  3615. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  3616.  
  3617. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  3618.  
  3619. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  3620.  
  3621. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  3622.  
  3623.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  3624. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  3625. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  3626. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  3627. the door to a variety of spying options.
  3628.  
  3629. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  3630. _______________________________________
  3631. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  3632.  
  3633.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  3634. collection of solely domestic communications
  3635. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  3636. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  3637. request each week until we receive your
  3638. response,� EPIC said.
  3639.  
  3640.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  3641. said this week that it would not be hearing
  3642. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  3643. early Monday in which the high court listed
  3644. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  3645. as denied.
  3646.  
  3647. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  3648.  
  3649. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  3650. _______________________________________
  3651. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  3652.  
  3653. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  3654.  
  3655. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  3656. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  3657.  
  3658. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  3659.  
  3660. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  3661.  
  3662. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  3663. No Privacy ::
  3664.  
  3665. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  3666.  
  3667. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  3668. Spying Programs ::
  3669.  
  3670. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  3671.  
  3672. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  3673.  
  3674. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  3675.  
  3676. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  3677. _______________________________________
  3678. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  3679.  
  3680. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3681.  
  3682. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  3683.  
  3684. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  3685.  
  3686. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3687.  
  3688. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  3689.  
  3690. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  3691.  
  3692. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  3693.  
  3694.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  3695. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  3696. or indigenous cryptographic information
  3697. security devices or systems in order to
  3698. make them exploitable.�
  3699.  
  3700. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  3701.  
  3702.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  3703. successfully exploits cryptographic
  3704. components of commercial information
  3705. security devices or systems when the
  3706. device or system specified.�
  3707.  
  3708. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3709.  
  3710. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  3711.  
  3712. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  3713.  
  3714. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3715. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3716. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  3717.  
  3718. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  3719.  
  3720.  US and British intelligence agencies
  3721. have successfully cracked much of the
  3722. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  3723. of millions of people to protect the
  3724. privacy of their personal data, online
  3725. transactions and emails, according to
  3726. top-secret documents revealed by former
  3727. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  3728.  
  3729.  Those methods include covert measures
  3730. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  3731. international encryption standards, the
  3732. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  3733. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  3734. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  3735. technology companies and internet service
  3736. providers themselves.
  3737.  
  3738.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  3739. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  3740. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  3741. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  3742.  
  3743.  Independent security experts have long
  3744. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  3745. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  3746. confirmed for the first time by another
  3747. secret document. It shows the agency
  3748. worked covertly to get its own version
  3749. of a draft security standard issued by
  3750. the US National Institute of Standards
  3751. and Technology approved for worldwide
  3752. use in 2006.
  3753.  
  3754. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  3755.  
  3756. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  3757.  
  3758. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3759.  
  3760. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  3761.  
  3762. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  3763.  
  3764. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  3765.  
  3766. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3767.  
  3768. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3769.  
  3770. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  3771. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  3772. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  3773.  
  3774. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3775.  
  3776. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  3777. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  3778.  
  3779. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3780.  
  3781. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  3782.  
  3783. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  3784.  
  3785. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  3786.  
  3787. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  3788. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  3789.  
  3790. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  3791.  
  3792. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  3793.  
  3794.  A range of US hardware and software
  3795. companies are in danger of being dragged
  3796. into the widening scandal over internet
  3797. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  3798. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  3799. Security Agency contractor.
  3800.  
  3801.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  3802. that it has collaborated with technology
  3803. companies to plant �back doors� into
  3804. their systems � or ways for the agency
  3805. secretly to penetrate systems without
  3806. the users� knowledge.
  3807.  
  3808. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  3809.  
  3810. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  3811.  
  3812. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  3813. _______________________________________
  3814. � SSL Inspector ::
  3815.  
  3816. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  3817.  
  3818. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  3819.  
  3820. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  3821. _______________________________________
  3822. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  3823. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  3824.  
  3825. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  3826.  
  3827. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  3828.  
  3829. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  3830.  
  3831. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  3832.  
  3833. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  3834.  
  3835. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  3836.  
  3837. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  3838.  
  3839. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  3840.  
  3841. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  3842. ���������������������������������������
  3843. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  3844. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  3845.  
  3846. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  3847. ���������������������������������������
  3848. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  3849.  
  3850.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  3851. activities is an obscure organization called
  3852. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  3853. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  3854. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  3855. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  3856. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  3857. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  3858. presentation given to journalists by former
  3859. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  3860. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  3861. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  3862. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  3863. be collected, which is then gathered and
  3864. delivered by the DITU.
  3865.  
  3866.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  3867. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  3868. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  3869. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  3870. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  3871. collection, processing, and reporting.
  3872.  
  3873. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  3874.  
  3875. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  3876.  
  3877. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  3878. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  3879. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3880.  
  3881.  
  3882. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  3883.  
  3884. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3885. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3886. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3887.  
  3888. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  3889.  
  3890. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  3891.  
  3892. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  3893.  
  3894. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  3895.  
  3896. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  3897.  
  3898. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  3899.  
  3900.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  3901. by the NSA.
  3902.  
  3903.  During the summer, the documents provided
  3904. to the Guardian and the Washington Post by
  3905. former NSA employee Edward Snowden helped
  3906. unveil the extent of surveillance and
  3907. espionage carried out by the NSA and its
  3908. allies. Le Monde also now has access to
  3909. some of these documents.
  3910.  
  3911.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most
  3912. secretive intelligence agencies of the
  3913. United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  3914. who was granted an asylum for a year in
  3915. Russia. Wanting to denounce "the largest
  3916. program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  3917. history," the American working for a
  3918. subcontractor of the NSA has obtained
  3919. several thousands of highly confidential
  3920. documents.
  3921.  
  3922.  In early June, the first secrets of the
  3923. National Security Agency in these parts
  3924. start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  3925. that the telephone operator Verizon
  3926. provides NSA phone data of several
  3927. million Americans, according to a court
  3928. order secret. Then it was the turn of
  3929. the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  3930. allows the US Secret Service, and first
  3931. and foremost to the NSA, to access a
  3932. privileged manner, since December 2007,
  3933. data from nine major Internet companies,
  3934. including Google, Facebook and Microsoft.
  3935.  
  3936. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  3937.  
  3938.  A document providing internal training
  3939. on Prism, which Le Monde has also had
  3940. access, how the NSA analysts can query
  3941. the databases of Web giants, research
  3942. documents, emails or instant discussions.
  3943. All within a legal framework that
  3944. overcomes the request of an individual
  3945. mandate. The companies named in the
  3946. documents have denied that the NSA
  3947. had a direct and unilateral access to
  3948. their servers.
  3949.  
  3950.  In addition to this targeted surveillance,
  3951. Snowden records reveal another method of
  3952. massive collection of the NSA called
  3953. Upstream. This system can collect data
  3954. from the submarine cable and Internet
  3955. infrastructures. A logical strategy,
  3956. when we know that 99% of global
  3957. communications now pass through diving.
  3958.  
  3959.  To learn more about the context of the
  3960. revelations of the World, the editorial
  3961. read : "Fight Big Brother"
  3962.  
  3963.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the
  3964. Government Communications Headquarters
  3965. (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system,
  3966. because of the historical proximity of
  3967. Great Britain and the United States,
  3968. confidentiality agreements and a financial
  3969. dependence of those services from London
  3970. to Washington. There are also technical
  3971. reasons : a significant portion of
  3972. submarine cables linking Europe to
  3973. America through Britain. With Edward
  3974. Snowden, the Tempora program , which
  3975. aims to "control the Internet" by
  3976. monitoring these cables, has been
  3977. revealed. "You're in an enviable
  3978. position, says a document presenting
  3979. Tempora, presented by the Guardian,
  3980. have fun and pull in the best." Turning
  3981. a page of the document presenting the
  3982. Prism program, we discover Upstream
  3983. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview,
  3984. and oakstar Stormbrew ) which we know to
  3985. date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  3986. would largely on intercepted telephone
  3987. conversations via the major US carriers.
  3988.  
  3989. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  3990.  
  3991.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass
  3992. of intercepted data. One of them is called
  3993. XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  3994. detailed in the columns of the Guardian.
  3995. The extreme precision of the data are
  3996. clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  3997. the content of e-mails to a list of
  3998. websites visited by their target or the
  3999. keywords entered by the latter in the
  4000. search engines.
  4001.  
  4002.  The framework for this research is not
  4003. binding, as the Guardian explained, and
  4004. many Americans are data made available to
  4005. agents. According to the presentation
  4006. materials, to promote the capabilities
  4007. of the tool, three hundred terrorists
  4008. have been arrested since 2008 thanks to
  4009. XKeyscore.
  4010.  
  4011.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their
  4012. considerable resources monitoring the
  4013. fight against terrorism, but also to
  4014. spy allies. At the G20 summit in London
  4015. in 2009, computers of diplomats and heads
  4016. of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well
  4017. as some of their phone calls. NSA, she
  4018. focused on the European Union (EU), as
  4019. revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the
  4020. basis of documents Snowden. NSA has
  4021. installed cookies on the premises of
  4022. the EU representation in Washington.
  4023. The EU delegation to the UN in New York,
  4024. and the building of the Council of the
  4025. European Union in Brussels were also
  4026. scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil
  4027. is also one of the countries affected
  4028. by this intelligence. According to
  4029. Brazilian media group O Globo, its
  4030. political leaders as some companies
  4031. have been targeted.
  4032.  
  4033.  The Snowden documents have informed
  4034. the considerable efforts made by the
  4035. United States to start listening to
  4036. Internet, in a sometimes unclear legal
  4037. framework and often away from real
  4038. democratic debate. Interviewed by
  4039. Le Monde, the US authorities have
  4040. assured that the Prism program was
  4041. the subject of a parliamentary debate
  4042. in the United States and was working
  4043. in a strictly regulated legal framework.
  4044. Asked on September 12 revelations
  4045. Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director
  4046. of National Intelligence, said: "What
  4047. happened - and that is harmful -
  4048. sparked conversation and debate that
  4049. it probably was necessary."
  4050. _______________________________________
  4051. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  4052.  
  4053. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  4054.  
  4055. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  4056.  
  4057. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  4058.  
  4059. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  4060. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  4061.  
  4062. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  4063.  
  4064. NOBODY comments
  4065.  
  4066.  100% expected. They will continue to
  4067. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  4068. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  4069. We must adjust to it by learning how
  4070. to counter their surveillance.
  4071.  
  4072. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  4073. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  4074.  
  4075.  The United States and its key intelligence
  4076. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  4077. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  4078. Nations to promote a universal human right
  4079. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  4080. sources and an internal American government
  4081. document obtained by The Cable.
  4082.  
  4083.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  4084. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  4085. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  4086. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  4087. internet surveillance by the National
  4088. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  4089. services. American representatives have made
  4090. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  4091. checks on their global surveillance network.
  4092. The stakes are high, particularly in
  4093. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  4094. an international backlash against NSA
  4095. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  4096. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  4097. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  4098.  
  4099. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  4100.  
  4101. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  4102. _______________________________________
  4103. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  4104. Public News Coverage ::
  4105.  
  4106. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  4107. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  4108. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  4109. _______________________________________
  4110. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  4111. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  4112.  
  4113. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  4114. _______________________________________
  4115. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  4116.  
  4117.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  4118. a division for particularly difficult
  4119. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  4120. (TAO), this department devises special
  4121. methods for special targets.
  4122.  
  4123.  That category includes surveillance of
  4124. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  4125. the division reported its mission
  4126. accomplished. A report classified as
  4127. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  4128. exploited a key mail server in the
  4129. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  4130. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  4131. first-ever access to President Felipe
  4132. Calderon�s public email account.�
  4133.  
  4134. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  4135.  
  4136. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  4137.  
  4138. Cryptome comments ?
  4139.  
  4140.  This spying was apparently done from
  4141. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  4142. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  4143. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  4144. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  4145.  
  4146. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  4147.  
  4148. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  4149. _______________________________________
  4150. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  4151.  
  4152. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  4153.  
  4154. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  4155.  
  4156. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4157.  
  4158. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  4159.  
  4160. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  4161.  
  4162. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  4163.  
  4164. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  4165.  
  4166. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  4167.  
  4168. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  4169.  
  4170. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  4171.  
  4172. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  4173.  
  4174.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  4175. thought that the NSA should use its
  4176. technology to intercept emails and
  4177. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  4178. terminal to another, and was upset to
  4179. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  4180. That was a line he would only cross,
  4181. deliberately, with court and congressional
  4182. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  4183. but as we now know, the agency added
  4184. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  4185. suspicious communications that transited
  4186. the border of the United States, and
  4187. later began to collect reams of metadata
  4188. in order to analyze it.
  4189.  
  4190.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  4191. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  4192. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  4193. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  4194. in order to provide policymakers with a
  4195. decision advantage. The advantage the
  4196. NSA provided was accurate information
  4197. about what people who interacted with
  4198. the United States said in private about
  4199. their intentions; that gap between saying
  4200. and doing, and the ability to predict
  4201. action from it, allows the president of
  4202. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  4203.  
  4204.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  4205. States� actions don�t always match up
  4206. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  4207. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  4208. our moral authority wanes and our
  4209. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  4210.  
  4211.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  4212. countries are any purer. They never have
  4213. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  4214. purer than others, so the amount of
  4215. resources the intelligence community
  4216. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  4217. to correspond with how honest our allies
  4218. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  4219. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  4220. can we figure out which allies are more
  4221. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  4222. correspondence between public and private
  4223. words and actions.
  4224.  
  4225.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  4226. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  4227. want their leaders to gain a decision
  4228. advantage in the give and take between
  4229. countries. They want to know what US
  4230. policymakers will do before the Americans
  4231. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  4232. France, they aggressively spy on the
  4233. United States, on US citizens and
  4234. politicians, in order to collect that
  4235. information. The difference lies in the
  4236. scale of intelligence collection: The
  4237. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  4238. most sophisticated intelligence community
  4239. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  4240. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  4241. envious.
  4242. _______________________________________
  4243. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  4244.  
  4245. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  4246. _______________________________________
  4247. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  4248.  
  4249. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  4250. ���������������������������������������
  4251. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  4252. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  4253.  
  4254. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  4255. _______________________________________
  4256. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  4257. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  4258.  
  4259. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  4260. _______________________________________
  4261.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  4262. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  4263. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  4264. from the award ceremony are the first of
  4265. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  4266. Russia.
  4267.  
  4268. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  4269. ���������������������������������������
  4270. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  4271.  
  4272.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  4273. of the Security Service, said the
  4274. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  4275. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  4276. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  4277. agencies.
  4278.  
  4279. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  4280.  
  4281. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  4282.  
  4283.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  4284. they are not using Tor.�
  4285.  
  4286. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  4287.  
  4288. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  4289. ---------------------------------------
  4290.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  4291. old bleach log.
  4292.  
  4293. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  4294. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  4295. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  4296. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  4297.  
  4298. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  4299.  
  4300.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  4301. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  4302. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  4303. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  4304. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  4305. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  4306. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  4307. function.
  4308.  
  4309.  There are also various third party
  4310. programs that can produce files in
  4311. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  4312. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  4313.  
  4314.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  4315. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  4316. data stored on the system running the
  4317. Flash player.�
  4318. ---------------------------------------
  4319. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  4320.  
  4321.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  4322. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  4323. It can be found within Windows systems
  4324. and can be wiped out here ;
  4325.  
  4326. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4327. Application Data\Macromedia\
  4328.  
  4329. and may also be cloned here ;
  4330.  
  4331. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  4332.  
  4333.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  4334. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  4335.  
  4336. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  4337.  
  4338. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  4339. Local Settings\Temp\
  4340. ---------------------------------------
  4341. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  4342.  
  4343. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  4344.  
  4345. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  4346.  
  4347. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  4348.  
  4349. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  4350.  
  4351. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  4352.  
  4353. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  4354.  
  4355. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  4356.  
  4357. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  4358.  
  4359. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  4360.  
  4361. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  4362.  
  4363. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  4364.  
  4365. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  4366.  
  4367. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  4368.  
  4369. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  4370. ---------------------------------------
  4371. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  4372.  
  4373.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  4374. application created by Samy Kamkar
  4375. which produces zombie cookies in a
  4376. web browser that are intentionally
  4377. difficult to delete. ... ...
  4378.  
  4379.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  4380. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  4381. by copying itself in different forms on
  4382. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  4383. itself if it notices that some of the
  4384. copies are missing or expired.
  4385.  
  4386.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  4387. Evercookie uses the following storage
  4388. mechanisms when available:
  4389.  
  4390. � Standard HTTP cookies
  4391. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  4392. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  4393. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  4394. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  4395. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  4396. (cookies) back out
  4397. � Storing cookies in Web history
  4398. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  4399. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  4400. � window.name caching
  4401. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  4402. � HTML5 Session Storage
  4403. � HTML5 Local Storage
  4404. � HTML5 Global Storage
  4405. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  4406. ---------------------------------------
  4407. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  4408.  
  4409.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  4410. mean that your browser isn't storing
  4411. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  4412. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  4413. in browser vulnerabilities.
  4414.  
  4415.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  4416. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  4417. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  4418. wide surveillance.
  4419.  
  4420.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  4421. powerful anonymity service, and the
  4422. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  4423. the Internet, makes it easy to
  4424. differentiate Tor users from other
  4425. Web users,� he wrote.
  4426.  
  4427.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  4428. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  4429. identifies you. Even though your IP
  4430. address changed [because of Tor], the
  4431. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  4432.  
  4433. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  4434. ---------------------------------------
  4435. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  4436. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  4437.  
  4438.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  4439. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  4440. �staining� as a means to identify
  4441. individual machines linked to that
  4442. IP address. ... ...
  4443.  
  4444.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  4445. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  4446. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  4447. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  4448. and is stamped into every packet, which
  4449. enables all the events from that stained
  4450. machine to be brought back together to
  4451. recreate a browsing session.�
  4452.  
  4453. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  4454.  
  4455. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  4456.  
  4457. � Packet Staining ::
  4458.  
  4459. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  4460. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  4461. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  4462. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  4463.  
  4464. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  4465.  
  4466. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  4467. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  4468. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  4469. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  4470.  
  4471. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  4472.  
  4473.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  4474. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  4475. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  4476. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  4477. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  4478. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  4479. identify it. We also worked to create
  4480. a custom Tor client which allows the
  4481. user finer control.� ... ...
  4482.  
  4483.  �This accomplishes several things.
  4484. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  4485. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  4486. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  4487. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  4488. be excessively complex, as a single
  4489. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  4490. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  4491. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  4492. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  4493. going to and from the proxy server,
  4494. it is possible to deduce which clients
  4495. are making which requests. Second, if
  4496. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  4497. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  4498. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  4499. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  4500. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  4501. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  4502. must be coordinated across several machines,
  4503. and an attacker must own all the hops
  4504. along the circuit in order to trace
  4505. requests back to the originating client.�
  4506.  
  4507. ... ...
  4508.  
  4509.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  4510. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  4511. a hidden service will turn up the port
  4512. that the hidden service is using to deal
  4513. with incoming connections. It can then be
  4514. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  4515.  
  4516. ... ...
  4517.  
  4518.  �We would have to try to connect to
  4519. each of the ports we see open on a
  4520. machine to determine if there is a
  4521. hidden service being run. We would not
  4522. even know which protocol the hidden
  4523. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  4524. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  4525. etc. The only thing we know is that
  4526. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  4527. not enough to attempt to connect once
  4528. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  4529. Several protocols must be tried.�
  4530.  
  4531. ... ...
  4532.  
  4533.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  4534. directory servers in more detail. Our
  4535. work focused solely on the client, but
  4536. many attacks would be much easier with
  4537. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  4538. servers ultimately control which Tor
  4539. servers are used by clients. We have found
  4540. that a server can put itself on a directory
  4541. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  4542. server running several Tor processes, each
  4543. having a different nickname, open port,
  4544. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  4545. requires different configuration files
  4546. for the different processes, which are
  4547. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  4548. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  4549. since it is listed several times. This
  4550. increases the density of friendly servers
  4551. in the cloud without increasing the number
  4552. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  4553. each listing has the same IP address,
  4554. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  4555. who inspecting the directories.�
  4556.  
  4557. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  4558. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  4559. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  4560.  
  4561. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  4562.  
  4563. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  4564.  
  4565. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  4566.  
  4567. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  4568.  
  4569. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  4570.  
  4571.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  4572. into capabilities the IC has developed
  4573. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  4574. to run multiple research teams (either
  4575. known or unknown to each other) against
  4576. a single target, and a few summer students
  4577. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  4578. small investment. I�d expect there are
  4579. other programs with more sophisticated
  4580. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  4581.  
  4582. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  4583. _______________________________________
  4584. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  4585.  
  4586. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  4587. _______________________________________
  4588. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  4589. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  4590.  
  4591. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  4592.  
  4593.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  4594. the past several months, I�d also thought
  4595. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  4596. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  4597. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  4598. Sasso of The Hill.
  4599.  
  4600.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  4601. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  4602. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  4603. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  4604. help you with that.�
  4605.  
  4606. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  4607.  
  4608.  The conversation then turned specifically
  4609. to the government�s use of targeted
  4610. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  4611. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  4612. hope they make full use of the capacities
  4613. of the National Security Agency when we
  4614. do that.�
  4615.  
  4616.  Hayden was responding to a question
  4617. about a new project announced by journalists
  4618. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  4619. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  4620. assassinations.
  4621.  
  4622. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  4623. _______________________________________
  4624. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  4625.  
  4626. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  4627.  
  4628. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  4629.  
  4630. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  4631. _______________________________________
  4632. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  4633. Breaches ::
  4634.  
  4635. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  4636.  
  4637. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  4638.  
  4639. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  4640. _______________________________________
  4641. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  4642. of US Citizens ::
  4643.  
  4644.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  4645. body of knowledge in recent months about
  4646. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  4647. information concerning Americans, prompting
  4648. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  4649. in the agency and President Obama to order
  4650. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  4651. Almost everything about the agency�s
  4652. operations is hidden, and the decision
  4653. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  4654. was made in secret, without review by the
  4655. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  4656. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  4657. Department memo warned of the potential
  4658. for the �misuse� of such information
  4659. without adequate safeguards.
  4660.  
  4661. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  4662. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  4663. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  4664.  
  4665. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  4666. From American Social Networks ::
  4667.  
  4668. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  4669. _______________________________________
  4670. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  4671. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  4672.  
  4673. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  4674. _______________________________________
  4675. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  4676. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  4677.  
  4678.  Led by the German government, a loose
  4679. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  4680. across the world is pushing to update an
  4681. influential international human rights
  4682. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  4683.  
  4684. ... ...
  4685.  
  4686.  The annual conference was attended by a
  4687. diverse selection of privacy and data
  4688. protection officials from across the
  4689. world, with representatives attending
  4690. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  4691. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  4692. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  4693. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  4694. United Kingdom.
  4695.  
  4696.  During a closed session at the conference
  4697. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  4698. resolution was put forward for a vote
  4699. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  4700. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  4701. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  4702. globally applicable standards for data
  4703. protection and the protection of privacy
  4704. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  4705.  
  4706.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  4707. of the resolution ... the United States.
  4708.  
  4709.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  4710. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  4711. eventually need to be put forward at the
  4712. United Nations and voted on by member
  4713. states, and that could take time. But
  4714. the growing appetite to amend the
  4715. international treaty in light of the
  4716. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  4717. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  4718. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  4719. technology in the digital age to trample
  4720. over basic universal privacy rights.
  4721.  
  4722. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  4723.  
  4724. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  4725.  
  4726. NOBODY comments
  4727.  
  4728.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  4729. all secret agencies around the world,
  4730. in general. All secret agencies and
  4731. their third-party vendors or allies
  4732. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  4733. backdoors in electronic communication
  4734. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  4735. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  4736. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  4737. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  4738. you must kill any trust in security.
  4739.  
  4740.  Security does not exist on the web.
  4741. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  4742. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  4743. _______________________________________
  4744. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  4745.  
  4746. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  4747.  
  4748. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  4749.  
  4750. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  4751. _______________________________________
  4752. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  4753.  
  4754. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  4755. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  4756. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  4757. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  4758. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  4759.  
  4760. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  4761. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  4762.  
  4763. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  4764. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  4765. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  4766.  
  4767.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are
  4768. tapping the backbone itself, via the
  4769. willing assistance of the telcos (who
  4770. still have remained mostly silent on
  4771. all of this) as opposed to �downstream�
  4772. collection, which requires going to the
  4773. internet companies directly.
  4774.  
  4775. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  4776.  
  4777. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  4778.  
  4779. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  4780.  
  4781. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  4782. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  4783. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  4784. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  4785. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  4786. _______________________________________
  4787. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  4788. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  4789. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  4790.  
  4791. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  4792. _______________________________________
  4793. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  4794.  
  4795.  According to a top secret document
  4796. disclosed by NSA whistleblower Edward
  4797. Snowden and obtained by The Hindu, the
  4798. PRISM programme was deployed by the
  4799. American agency to gather key information
  4800. from India by tapping directly into the
  4801. servers of tech giants which provide
  4802. services such as email, video sharing,
  4803. voice-over-IPs, online chats, file
  4804. transfer and social networking services.
  4805.  
  4806.  And, according to the PRISM document
  4807. seen by The Hindu, much of the communication
  4808. targeted by the NSA is unrelated to terrorism,
  4809. contrary to claims of Indian and American
  4810. officials.
  4811.  
  4812.  Instead, much of the surveillance was
  4813. focused on India�s domestic politics and
  4814. the country�s strategic and commercial
  4815. interests.
  4816.  
  4817. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  4818.  
  4819.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication
  4820. intelligence) document about �Close Access
  4821. SIGADs�, the offices of Indian diplomats
  4822. and high-ranking military officials stationed
  4823. at these important posts were targets of
  4824. four different kinds of electronic snooping
  4825. devices:
  4826.  
  4827.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of
  4828. the hard drive of computers.
  4829.  
  4830.  Highlands, which makes digital collection
  4831. from implants.
  4832.  
  4833.  Vagrant, which collects data of open
  4834. computer screens.
  4835.  
  4836.  Magnetic, which is a collection of
  4837. digital signals.
  4838.  
  4839. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  4840. _______________________________________
  4841. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US
  4842. Intelligence ::
  4843.  
  4844.  Accessing archived government documents,
  4845. the National Security Archive, an
  4846. anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  4847. decades-long effort by the US to detect,
  4848. monitor, and in some cases plan the
  4849. destruction of, �more than 10,000 such
  4850. facilities worldwide, many of them in
  4851. hostile territory, and many presumably
  4852. intended to hide or protect lethal military
  4853. equipment and activities, including
  4854. weapons of mass destruction, that could
  4855. threaten US or allied interests.�
  4856.  
  4857. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  4858. _______________________________________
  4859. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  4860.  
  4861. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  4862. _______________________________________
  4863. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the
  4864. Inside Story of NSA Leaks ::
  4865.  
  4866. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  4867. _______________________________________
  4868. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  4869.  
  4870. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  4871. _______________________________________
  4872. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  4873. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  4874.  
  4875. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  4876. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  4877. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  4878.  
  4879. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  4880. Under United States Control ::
  4881.  
  4882.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff
  4883. announces publicly the creation of a
  4884. world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  4885. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  4886.  
  4887.  Not many understand that, while the
  4888. immediate trigger for the decision
  4889. (coupled with the cancellation of a
  4890. summit with the US president) was the
  4891. revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  4892. why Rousseff can take such a historic
  4893. step is that the alternative infrastructure:
  4894. The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  4895. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai,
  4896. India to Cape Town, South Africa to
  4897. Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and
  4898. it�s, actually, in its final phase of
  4899. implementation.
  4900.  
  4901.  �The global backlash is only beginning
  4902. and will get far more severe in coming
  4903. months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  4904. of the Open Technology Institute at the
  4905. Washington-based New America Foundation
  4906. think-tank. �This notion of national
  4907. privacy sovereignty is going to be an
  4908. increasingly salient issue around the
  4909. globe.�
  4910.  
  4911. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  4912. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  4913. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  4914. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  4915.  
  4916. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  4917.  
  4918.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s
  4919. capacity, fibre optic cable system.
  4920.  
  4921. http://www.bricscable.com/
  4922.  
  4923. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  4924. _______________________________________
  4925. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA
  4926. Metadata Collection Orders ::
  4927.  
  4928.  A newly declassified opinion from the
  4929. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4930. from this summer shows the court�s
  4931. interpretation of the controversial
  4932. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
  4933. that�s used to justify the National
  4934. Security Agency�s bulk telephone
  4935. metadata collections, and reveals
  4936. that none of the companies that have
  4937. been served with such orders has ever
  4938. challenged one.
  4939.  
  4940. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  4941. _______________________________________
  4942. � Experts Worry About Long-Term Blowback
  4943. of NSA Revelations ::
  4944.  
  4945.  With all of the disturbing revelations
  4946. that have come to light in the last few
  4947. weeks regarding the NSA�s collection
  4948. methods and its efforts to weaken
  4949. cryptographic protocols and security
  4950. products, experts say that perhaps the
  4951. most worrisome result of all of this
  4952. is that no one knows who or what they
  4953. can trust anymore.
  4954.  
  4955.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA
  4956. leaks, which revealed the agency�s
  4957. ability to subvert some cryptographic
  4958. standards and its �partnerships� with
  4959. software and hardware vendors to insert
  4960. backdoors into various unnamed products,
  4961. has continued to accumulate over the
  4962. course of the last couple of weeks.
  4963. Cryptographers and security researchers
  4964. have been eager to determine which
  4965. products and protocols are suspect,
  4966. and the discussion has veered in a
  4967. lot of different directions. But one
  4968. thing that�s become clear is that when
  4969. the government lost the so-called
  4970. Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA
  4971. didn�t just go back to Fort Meade
  4972. and tend to its knitting.
  4973.  
  4974. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  4975.  
  4976. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  4977.  
  4978.  The security community didn�t invent
  4979. the concept of fear, uncertainty and
  4980. doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  4981. it to the level of religion. It�s the
  4982. way that security products are marketed
  4983. and sold, but it�s also the way that
  4984. the intelligence community justifies
  4985. its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  4986. unconstitutional, data-gathering
  4987. practices. Just as vendors use the
  4988. specter of catastrophic hacks, data
  4989. loss and public embarrassment to push
  4990. their wares, the NSA and its allies
  4991. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and
  4992. global terrorism to justify their
  4993. increasingly aggressive practices,
  4994. some of which have now been shown to
  4995. have deliberately weakened some of the
  4996. fundamental building blocks of security.
  4997.  
  4998.  The most damning bit of string in this
  4999. ball is the news that the NSA likely
  5000. inserted a back door into a key
  5001. cryptographic algorithm known as
  5002. DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  5003. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning
  5004. to its developer customers warning them
  5005. to immediately stop using the company�s
  5006. BSAFE library because it uses the
  5007. compromised random number generator.
  5008. That means that untold numbers of products
  5009. that include the BSAFE crypto libraries
  5010. are compromised.
  5011.  
  5012. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  5013. _______________________________________
  5014. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  5015.  
  5016.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  5017. President approximately every 45 days,
  5018. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  5019. the activities carried out under these
  5020. Authorizations are referred to as the
  5021. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  5022. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  5023. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  5024. the content of communications into and out
  5025. of the United States where there was a
  5026. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  5027. party to the communication was a member
  5028. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  5029.  
  5030.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  5031. acknowledged and described by the President,
  5032. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  5033. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  5034. a series of articles published in The New York
  5035. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  5036. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  5037. intelligence activities were also authorized
  5038. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  5039. but the details of those activities remain
  5040. classified.� ... ...
  5041.  
  5042.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  5043. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  5044. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  5045. as the principal governing authorities for
  5046. conducting electronic surveillance for
  5047. national security purposes. The Foreign
  5048. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  5049. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  5050. "provide legislative authorization and
  5051. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  5052. conducted within the United States for
  5053. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  5054.  
  5055. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  5056.  
  5057. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  5058. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  5059.  
  5060. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  5061.  
  5062. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  5063.  
  5064.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  5065. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  5066. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  5067. require special approval. Therefore, just
  5068. another gap. Also take in consideration
  5069. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  5070. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  5071. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  5072. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  5073. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  5074. _______________________________________
  5075. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  5076. Firm ::
  5077.  
  5078.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  5079. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  5080. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  5081. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  5082. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  5083. A �top secret� Government Communications
  5084. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  5085. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  5086. conducted under the codename �Operation
  5087. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  5088. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  5089. improve understanding of the provider�s
  5090. infrastructure. ... ...
  5091.  
  5092.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  5093. presentation, the attack was directed
  5094. at several Belgacom employees and
  5095. involved the planting of a highly
  5096. developed attack technology referred
  5097. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  5098. appears to be a method with which the
  5099. person being targeted, without their
  5100. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  5101. that then plant malware on their
  5102. computers that can then manipulate
  5103. them. Some of the employees whose
  5104. computers were infiltrated had �good
  5105. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  5106. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  5107. please the British spies, according
  5108. to the slides.
  5109.    
  5110. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  5111. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  5112. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  5113. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  5114. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  5115. _______________________________________
  5116. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  5117.  
  5118. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  5119.  
  5120. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  5121. _______________________________________
  5122. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  5123.  
  5124. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  5125. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  5126. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  5127. _______________________________________
  5128. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  5129. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  5130.  
  5131. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  5132. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  5133. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  5134. _______________________________________
  5135. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  5136.  
  5137. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  5138. ���������������������������������������
  5139. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  5140. Allocated to One Release ::
  5141.  
  5142. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  5143.  
  5144. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  5145.  
  5146. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  5147.  
  5148. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  5149. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  5150.  
  5151. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  5152.  
  5153. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  5154. Schedule ::
  5155.  
  5156. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5157.  
  5158. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5159.  
  5160. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5161.  
  5162. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5163.  
  5164. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5165.  
  5166. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  5167.  
  5168. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  5169. ���������������������������������������
  5170. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  5171.  
  5172.  In response to a FOIA request from
  5173. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  5174. its ethics office never looked into
  5175. complaints from two federal judges
  5176. that they had been misled about NSA
  5177. surveillance.
  5178.  
  5179. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  5180. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  5181. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  5182. ���������������������������������������
  5183.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  5184. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  5185. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  5186. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  5187. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  5188.  
  5189. Livestream will be at:
  5190.  
  5191. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  5192. _______________________________________
  5193. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  5194. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  5195.  
  5196. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  5197.  
  5198. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  5199. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  5200. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  5201.  
  5202. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  5203.  
  5204.  The Director of National Intelligence
  5205. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  5206. pages of documents related to the
  5207. government�s secret interpretation of
  5208. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  5209. (mis)use of its massive database of
  5210. every American�s phone records. The
  5211. documents were released as a result
  5212. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  5213. Act lawsuit.
  5214.  
  5215.  We�ve posted links to each document
  5216. below. While the government also posted
  5217. many of the documents here ...
  5218.  
  5219. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  5220.  
  5221. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  5222.  
  5223. Links to the documents ;
  5224.  
  5225. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  5226. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  5227.  
  5228. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5229.  
  5230. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  5231. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5232. Court
  5233.  
  5234. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5235.  
  5236. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  5237. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  5238. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5239. Court
  5240.  
  5241. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5242.  
  5243. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  5244. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  5245. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5246. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  5247.  
  5248. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5249.  
  5250. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  5251. Incident
  5252.  
  5253. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5254.  
  5255. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  5256. Intelligence Court
  5257.  
  5258. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5259.  
  5260. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  5261. Intelligence Court
  5262.  
  5263. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5264.  
  5265. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  5266. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  5267. Business Records FISA
  5268.  
  5269. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5270.  
  5271. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  5272. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  5273.  
  5274. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  5275.  
  5276. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  5277. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  5278.  
  5279. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5280.  
  5281. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  5282. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  5283. Surveillance Court
  5284.  
  5285. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5286.  
  5287. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  5288. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  5289. Surveillance Court
  5290.  
  5291. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  5292.  
  5293. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  5294. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  5295.  
  5296. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  5297.  
  5298. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  5299. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  5300.  
  5301. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  5302. _______________________________________
  5303. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  5304.  
  5305. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  5306.  
  5307. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  5308.  
  5309. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  5310. ���������������������������������������
  5311. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  5312.  
  5313. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  5314. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  5315. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  5316. _______________________________________
  5317. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  5318. Over Data to the NSA ::
  5319.  
  5320.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  5321. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  5322. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  5323. media report. The revelation comes as
  5324. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  5325. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  5326. troves of data with the US and UK.
  5327.  
  5328.  Citing secret government documents,
  5329. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  5330. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  5331. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  5332. with domestic security, works closely
  5333. with the US and regularly sends them
  5334. information.
  5335.  
  5336.  The security service gathers intelligence
  5337. on internal security threats. The documents
  5338. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  5339. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  5340. well as regular meetings between officers
  5341. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  5342.  
  5343. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  5344. _______________________________________
  5345. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  5346. Revelations ::
  5347.  
  5348. This is an unofficial translation.
  5349.  
  5350. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  5351.  
  5352.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  5353. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  5354. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  5355.  
  5356. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  5357.  
  5358. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  5359. _______________________________________
  5360. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  5361.  
  5362. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  5363. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  5364. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  5365. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  5366. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  5367. _______________________________________
  5368. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  5369.  
  5370. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  5371.  
  5372. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  5373.  
  5374. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  5375. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  5376.  
  5377. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  5378.  
  5379. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  5380.  
  5381.  (1) The US wants to maintain global
  5382. economic power, (2) the US wants to
  5383. maintain control over major natural
  5384. resources and (3) the US is afraid the
  5385. new economic powers (within the BRICS)
  5386. may destabilize their economic power
  5387. and control over natural resources.
  5388. _______________________________________
  5389. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  5390.  
  5391.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult
  5392. for machines to read.
  5393.  
  5394. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  5395. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  5396. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  5397. _______________________________________
  5398. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  5399.  
  5400. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  5401.  
  5402. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  5403. _______________________________________
  5404. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  5405. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  5406. National Unit ::
  5407.  
  5408.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  5409. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  5410. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  5411. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  5412. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  5413. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  5414. it Wednesday.
  5415.  
  5416.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  5417. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  5418. raw signals intelligence, referred
  5419. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  5420. swathes of digital data traffic that
  5421. the agency gathers under secret court
  5422. authority from US Internet providers.
  5423.  
  5424.  So sensitive is this data that even
  5425. before being disseminated to other US
  5426. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  5427. to a court-mandated process called
  5428. minimization, under which the names
  5429. of any Americans are removed unless
  5430. they are essential for foreign
  5431. intelligence interest.
  5432.  
  5433.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  5434. that the data shared with Israel
  5435. �includes, but is not limited to,
  5436. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  5437. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  5438. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  5439. and content.�
  5440.  
  5441.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  5442. and unminimized raw collection associated
  5443. with selectors from multiple Target office
  5444. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  5445. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  5446. relationship between the two organizations.�
  5447.  
  5448. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  5449. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  5450. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  5451. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  5452. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  5453. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  5454.  
  5455.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  5456. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  5457. that spy most aggressively against the
  5458. United States.
  5459.  
  5460.  �To further safeguard our classified
  5461. networks, we continue to strengthen
  5462. insider threat detection capabilities
  5463. across the Community. In addition, we
  5464. are investing in target surveillance
  5465. and offensive CI against key targets,
  5466. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  5467. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  5468.  
  5469. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5470. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5471. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  5472.  
  5473. NOBODY comments
  5474.  
  5475.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  5476. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  5477. plenty of inside information.
  5478.  
  5479.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  5480. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  5481. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  5482.  
  5483. This reminds of a quote ;
  5484.  
  5485.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  5486. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  5487. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  5488. to play out one big game of destruction
  5489. and domination with humans as the visible
  5490. and spiritual puppets?�
  5491. _______________________________________
  5492. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  5493.  
  5494. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  5495. _______________________________________
  5496. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  5497.  
  5498. (EN)
  5499. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  5500.  
  5501. (DE)
  5502. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  5503.  
  5504. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  5505.  
  5506.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  5507. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  5508. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  5509. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  5510. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  5511. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  5512. deployed in a government intelligence
  5513. agency presentation.
  5514.  
  5515. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  5516. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  5517. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  5518. ���������������������������������������
  5519. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  5520. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  5521.  
  5522.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  5523. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  5524. reverse restrictions on the National
  5525. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  5526. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  5527. the agency to search deliberately for
  5528. Americans� communications in its massive
  5529. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  5530. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  5531. �declassified material� - (which, by
  5532. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  5533. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  5534. of which agency it came from and most
  5535. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  5536.  
  5537. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  5538.  
  5539.  In addition, the court extended the
  5540. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  5541. to retain intercepted US communications
  5542. from five years to six years � and more
  5543. under special circumstances, according
  5544. to the documents, which include a
  5545. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  5546. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  5547. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  5548. Surveillance Court.
  5549.  
  5550. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  5551.  
  5552. NOBODY comments
  5553.  
  5554.  The document which was declassified by
  5555. US intelligence officials explains the
  5556. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  5557. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  5558. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  5559.  
  5560. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  5561. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  5562. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  5563.  
  5564.  National Security Agency analysts
  5565. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  5566. their authority to spy on Americans.
  5567.  
  5568. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  5569.  
  5570.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  5571. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  5572.  
  5573. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5574.  
  5575. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5576.  
  5577.  And this is not the first attempt to
  5578. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  5579.  
  5580. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  5581.  
  5582. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  5583.  
  5584.  The new Washington Post report has
  5585. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  5586. (press) release exposing yet another
  5587. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  5588. or take responsibility for the abuses
  5589. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  5590.  
  5591. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  5592.  
  5593.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  5594. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  5595.  
  5596.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  5597. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  5598.  
  5599.  All of this information is backed up
  5600. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  5601. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  5602. 2,776 violations one year after the
  5603. FISA Court order.
  5604.  
  5605. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5606.  
  5607.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  5608. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  5609. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  5610. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  5611. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  5612. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  5613. them out of office come next election.
  5614. _______________________________________
  5615. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence ::
  5616.  
  5617.  �Ever since the remarkable case of Edward
  5618. Snowden broke into the limelight at the
  5619. beginning of the summer that�s now
  5620. winding down, I�ve had a great deal to
  5621. say about it here, on Twitter, and on
  5622. radio and television. As one of the
  5623. very few former NSA officers who�s
  5624. in the public eye and willing to talk
  5625. about Snowden, I�ve had an audience.
  5626. As a former NSA counterintelligence
  5627. officer with experience dealing with
  5628. the Russians, I�ve been pretty much
  5629. a solo act.
  5630.  
  5631.  From nearly the outset I�ve stated
  5632. that Snowden is very likely an agent
  5633. of Russian intelligence; this was met
  5634. with howls of indignation which have
  5635. died down in recent weeks as it�s
  5636. become apparent that Ed�s staying in
  5637. Russia for some time, along with
  5638. whatever classified materials he
  5639. had on his person. (Since Glenn
  5640. Greenwald�s partner when stopped by
  5641. British authorities at Heathrow had
  5642. 58,000 highly classified documents
  5643. on him, thanks to Ed, one can only
  5644. wonder how big the initial haul
  5645. actually was.) That Snowden was in
  5646. contact with the Russian consulate
  5647. in Hong Kong during his pre-Moscow
  5648. visit there, including spending his
  5649. 30th birthday with his new friends,
  5650. is now admitted. Even President
  5651. Vladimir Putin has conceded that
  5652. Ed�s contacts with Russian officials
  5653. did not commence when he landed at
  5654. Sheremtyevo airport, rather before.�
  5655.  
  5656. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  5657. _______________________________________
  5658. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  5659.  
  5660. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  5661.  
  5662.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  5663. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  5664. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  5665.  
  5666. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  5667.  
  5668. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  5669.  
  5670. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  5671.  
  5672. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  5673.  
  5674. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  5675.  
  5676. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  5677.  
  5678. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  5679.  
  5680. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  5681. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  5682. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  5683. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  5684.  
  5685. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  5686.  
  5687.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  5688. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  5689. reports that the US National Security Agency
  5690. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  5691.  
  5692.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  5693. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  5694. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  5695. Tuesday.
  5696.  
  5697.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  5698. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  5699. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  5700. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  5701. several of her top aides, and tapped
  5702. her phone.
  5703.  
  5704. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  5705.  
  5706. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  5707. Impacted ::
  5708.  
  5709.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  5710. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  5711. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  5712. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  5713. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  5714. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  5715.  
  5716.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  5717. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  5718. visit to Washington in October, the
  5719. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  5720. year, or will take action on digital
  5721. security that may affect US companies
  5722. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  5723.  
  5724.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  5725. a proposal that would suspend operations
  5726. of companies that cooperate with the
  5727. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  5728.  
  5729. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  5730. _______________________________________
  5731. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  5732.  
  5733. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  5734.  
  5735. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  5736.  
  5737. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  5738. ���������������������������������������
  5739. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  5740.  
  5741.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5742. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5743. collect against high priority targets,
  5744. including foreign leadership targets.
  5745. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5746. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5747. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5748. internet traffic.�
  5749.  
  5750. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5751.  
  5752. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5753.  
  5754. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  5755.  
  5756. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  5757.  
  5758. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  5759.  
  5760. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  5761.  
  5762.  �The Post is withholding some information
  5763. after consultation with US officials who
  5764. expressed concerns about the risk to
  5765. intelligence sources and methods.
  5766. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  5767. the documents that The Post is publishing
  5768. only summary tables and charts online.�
  5769.  
  5770. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  5771.  
  5772. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5773. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  5774.  
  5775. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  5776.  
  5777. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  5778.  
  5779. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5780. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  5781.  
  5782. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  5783.  
  5784. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  5785.  
  5786. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  5787.  
  5788.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  5789. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  5790. intelligence services, leaked documents
  5791. reveal.
  5792.  
  5793.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  5794. to have an aggressive intelligence
  5795. collection operations against the
  5796. United States,� Pillar said. While
  5797. much information is collected through
  5798. traditional political contacts, �I
  5799. would personally have no doubt that
  5800. that is supplemented by whatever means
  5801. they can use to find out as much as
  5802. they can about what we�re doing,
  5803. thinking, deciding on anything of
  5804. interest to Israel, which would include
  5805. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  5806.  
  5807. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  5808.  
  5809. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  5810.  
  5811.  �To further safeguard our classified
  5812. networks, we continue to strengthen
  5813. insider threat detection capabilities
  5814. across the Community. In addition, we
  5815. are investing in target surveillance
  5816. and offensive CI against key targets,
  5817. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  5818. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  5819. _______________________________________
  5820. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  5821.  
  5822.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  5823. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  5824. the worst part is the Received headers.
  5825. Everyone should look at their own headers
  5826. -- especially people on this list and
  5827. at least comprehend that your email
  5828. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  5829. the Mailman archive.
  5830.  
  5831.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  5832. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  5833. the actual separators in MIME part
  5834. breaks, and so on.
  5835.  
  5836.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  5837. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  5838. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  5839. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  5840. don�t do it all the time.
  5841.  
  5842.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  5843. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  5844. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  5845. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  5846. is that this tells us that the crypto
  5847. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  5848. for quite some time.
  5849.  
  5850.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  5851. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  5852. that works being deployed everywhere.
  5853. What do you do? You just be patient and
  5854. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  5855. analysis.
  5856.  
  5857. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  5858.  
  5859. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  5860.  
  5861. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  5862.  
  5863.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  5864. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  5865. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  5866. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  5867. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  5868. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  5869. reveal.
  5870.  
  5871. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  5872.  
  5873.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5874. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5875. collect against high priority targets,
  5876. including foreign leadership targets.
  5877. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5878. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5879. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5880. internet traffic.� ... ...
  5881.  
  5882. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  5883.  
  5884.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  5885. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  5886. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  5887. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  5888. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  5889. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  5890.  
  5891.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  5892. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  5893.  
  5894. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5895.  
  5896. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5897.  
  5898. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  5899.  
  5900. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  5901.  
  5902. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  5903.  
  5904.  The US government has attempted to
  5905. obtain the master encryption keys that
  5906. Internet companies use to shield millions
  5907. of users� private web communications
  5908. from eavesdropping.
  5909.  
  5910.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  5911. which have not been disclosed previously,
  5912. represent a technological escalation in
  5913. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  5914. the National Security Agency employ when
  5915. conducting electronic surveillance against
  5916. Internet users. ... ...
  5917.  
  5918.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  5919. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  5920. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  5921. communications are typically destroyed
  5922. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  5923. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  5924. of all communications that are enciphered�
  5925. is permissible.
  5926.  
  5927. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  5928. _______________________________________
  5929. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  5930. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  5931.  
  5932.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  5933. intercepts well before 2001, former
  5934. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  5935. secretive Special Services Office,
  5936. these types of programs were at first
  5937. designed to intercept communications
  5938. overseas through arrangements with
  5939. foreign Internet providers, the former
  5940. officials say. NSA still has such
  5941. arrangements in many countries,
  5942. particularly in the Middle East and
  5943. Europe, the former officials say.�
  5944.  
  5945. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  5946.  
  5947. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  5948.  
  5949. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  5950. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  5951. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  5952. ���������������������������������������
  5953. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  5954. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  5955.  
  5956.  A common hacking technique can be used
  5957. to make emails look as if they came from
  5958. outside the United States.
  5959.  
  5960. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  5961. _______________________________________
  5962. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  5963. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  5964.  
  5965. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  5966.  
  5967. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  5968.  
  5969. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  5970.  
  5971. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  5972. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  5973. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  5974. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  5975. ���������������������������������������
  5976. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  5977. Patrick Leahy ::
  5978.  
  5979. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  5980.  
  5981. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  5982.  
  5983. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  5984. _______________________________________
  5985. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  5986.  
  5987.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  5988. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  5989. their authority to spy on Americans
  5990. multiple times in the past decade,
  5991. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  5992. and lawmakers� statements that no
  5993. willful violations occurred. ...
  5994.  
  5995.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  5996. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  5997. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  5998. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  5999. of having links to terrorism, before a
  6000. secret court that oversees surveillance
  6001. found the operation unconstitutional
  6002. in 2011.
  6003.  
  6004. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  6005.  
  6006. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  6007. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  6008. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  6009.  
  6010.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  6011. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  6012. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  6013. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  6014. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  6015.  
  6016.  The documents were released in response
  6017. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  6018. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  6019.  
  6020.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  6021. litigation and the most significant leak
  6022. in American history to finally get them
  6023. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  6024. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  6025. �but I�m happy that the administration
  6026. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  6027.  
  6028. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  6029. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  6030. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  6031.  
  6032. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  6033.  
  6034. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  6035.  
  6036. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6037.  
  6038. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  6039.  
  6040. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  6041.  
  6042. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  6043.  
  6044. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  6045. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  6046.  
  6047. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  6048. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  6049. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  6050. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  6051. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  6052. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  6053.  
  6054.  The account is based on top-secret
  6055. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  6056. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  6057. including unauthorized collection,
  6058. storage, access to or distribution of
  6059. legally protected communications � in
  6060. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  6061. originally only meant to be seen by top
  6062. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  6063. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  6064. and other locations in the Washington DC
  6065. region.
  6066.  
  6067. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  6068.  
  6069.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  6070. and other things, there�s people talking
  6071. about privacy violations or abuses or
  6072. willful or violations, right, it is
  6073. important for people to understand,
  6074. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  6075. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  6076. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  6077.  
  6078.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  6079. We detect them, as early as we can.
  6080. We correct them, right. None of the
  6081. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  6082. the document released were willful.
  6083. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  6084. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  6085. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  6086.  
  6087. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  6088.  
  6089. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  6090. Database Queries Per Month ::
  6091.  
  6092. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  6093.  
  6094. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  6095.  
  6096. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  6097. _______________________________________
  6098. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  6099.  
  6100.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  6101. station in the Middle East to intercept
  6102. and process vast quantities of emails,
  6103. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  6104. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  6105. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  6106.  
  6107.  The information is then processed for
  6108. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  6109. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  6110. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  6111. The Government claims the station is a
  6112. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  6113. and provides a vital �early warning�
  6114. system for potential attacks around
  6115. the world.
  6116.  
  6117.  The Independent is not revealing the
  6118. precise location of the station but
  6119. information on its activities was
  6120. contained in the leaked documents
  6121. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  6122. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  6123. these documents in recent months has
  6124. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  6125. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  6126. the destruction of hard drives containing
  6127. the data. ... ...
  6128.  
  6129.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  6130. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  6131. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  6132. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  6133. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  6134. the global interception of digital
  6135. communications, such as emails and text
  6136. messages.
  6137.  
  6138.  Across three sites, communications �
  6139. including telephone calls � are tracked
  6140. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  6141. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  6142.  
  6143. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  6144. ���������������������������������������
  6145. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  6146.  
  6147. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  6148. _______________________________________
  6149. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  6150. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  6151. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  6152. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  6153. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  6154. E Grassley ::
  6155.  
  6156. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  6157.  
  6158. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  6159.  
  6160. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  6161.  
  6162. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  6163.  
  6164. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  6165.  
  6166. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  6167.  
  6168. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  6169.  
  6170. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  6171.  
  6172. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  6173.  
  6174. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  6175.  
  6176. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  6177. Congress ::
  6178.  
  6179.  �I can now confirm that the House
  6180. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  6181. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  6182. available to Representatives in Congress,
  6183. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  6184. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  6185. the now declassified documents detailing
  6186. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  6187.  
  6188. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  6189.  
  6190. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  6191.  
  6192. ?
  6193.  
  6194. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  6195.  
  6196.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  6197. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  6198. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  6199. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  6200. discussions with the president when he
  6201. first came on board we talked to him about
  6202. these programs and the issue was how do
  6203. we know the compliance is there and what
  6204. more could we do? We stood up working with
  6205. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  6206. of compliance. This directorate of
  6207. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  6208. and information specialists that can look
  6209. at everything that we do in these programs
  6210. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  6211. orders but we also have oversight from
  6212. the Director of National Intelligence,
  6213. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  6214. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  6215. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  6216. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  6217. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  6218. _______________________________________
  6219. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  6220.  
  6221.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  6222. public so far.
  6223.  
  6224. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  6225. _______________________________________
  6226. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  6227.  
  6228. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  6229. _______________________________________
  6230. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  6231. Data Lab ::
  6232.  
  6233. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  6234.  
  6235. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  6236. _______________________________________
  6237. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  6238. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  6239.  
  6240. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  6241. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  6242. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  6243. _______________________________________
  6244. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  6245.  
  6246.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  6247. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  6248. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  6249. there since he assumed the position
  6250. of Secretary of State. He has already
  6251. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  6252. � where officials demanded an explanation
  6253. to reports that Washington had collected
  6254. vast amounts of internet data there.
  6255. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  6256. which allegedly was the top regional
  6257. target of the surveillance program.
  6258.  
  6259. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  6260.  
  6261. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  6262.  
  6263. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  6264. Surveillance ::
  6265.  
  6266. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  6267.  
  6268. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  6269.  
  6270. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  6271. _______________________________________
  6272. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  6273.  
  6274. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  6275. ���������������������������������������
  6276. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  6277.  
  6278. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  6279.  
  6280. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  6281.  
  6282. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  6283.  
  6284. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  6285.  
  6286. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  6287. _______________________________________
  6288. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  6289.  
  6290. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  6291.  
  6292. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  6293. _______________________________________
  6294. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  6295.  
  6296. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  6297.  
  6298.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  6299. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  6300. use of certain United States person names
  6301. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  6302. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  6303. implement any USP queries until an effective
  6304. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  6305. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  6306. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  6307. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  6308. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  6309. databases).�
  6310.  
  6311. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  6312.  
  6313. NOBODY comments
  6314.  
  6315. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  6316.  
  6317. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  6318.  
  6319.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  6320. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  6321. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  6322. communications not related to foreign
  6323. information or foreign activity for up
  6324. to five years.
  6325.  
  6326.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  6327. acquired communications of or concerning a
  6328. United States person may be retained no
  6329. longer than five years in any event.�
  6330.  
  6331.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  6332. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  6333. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  6334. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  6335. communications that have been stored.
  6336. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  6337. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  6338. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  6339. to �communications security vulnerability�
  6340. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  6341. _______________________________________
  6342. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  6343.  
  6344. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  6345. _______________________________________
  6346. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  6347.  
  6348. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  6349. _______________________________________
  6350. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  6351. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  6352.  
  6353.  As the steady stream of revelations
  6354. continues, the White House has choosen
  6355. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  6356. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  6357.  
  6358. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  6359. _______________________________________
  6360. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  6361.  
  6362. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  6363.  
  6364. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  6365. Spying Press Conference ::
  6366.  
  6367.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  6368. Presidential press conference in which the
  6369. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  6370. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  6371. that Obama told today about the program
  6372. by citing multiple articles with information
  6373. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  6374.  
  6375. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  6376. ���������������������������������������
  6377. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  6378. Partners ::
  6379.  
  6380. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  6381. ���������������������������������������
  6382. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  6383. Metadata ::
  6384.  
  6385. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  6386. ���������������������������������������
  6387. � National Security Run Amok ::
  6388.  
  6389. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  6390. _______________________________________
  6391.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  6392. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  6393. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  6394. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  6395.  
  6396. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  6397.  
  6398.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  6399. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  6400. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  6401. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  6402. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  6403. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  6404. for including former senators Hillary
  6405. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  6406.  
  6407. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  6408.  
  6409. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  6410. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  6411.  
  6412. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  6413.  
  6414. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  6415.  
  6416. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  6417. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  6418.  
  6419. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  6420.  
  6421.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  6422. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  6423.  
  6424. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  6425. ���������������������������������������
  6426. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  6427.  
  6428. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  6429.  
  6430. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  6431.  
  6432. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  6433.  
  6434. NOBODY comments
  6435.  
  6436. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  6437.  
  6438.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  6439. the document was still classified. It was
  6440. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  6441.  
  6442. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  6443.  
  6444.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  6445. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  6446. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  6447. many of these operations being leaked.
  6448. _______________________________________
  6449. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  6450. on Brazilian Television ::
  6451.  
  6452. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  6453. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  6454. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  6455.  
  6456. NOBODY comments
  6457.  
  6458.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  6459. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  6460.  
  6461.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  6462. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  6463. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  6464.  
  6465. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  6466. ���������������������������������������
  6467. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  6468. English Report ::
  6469.  
  6470.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  6471. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  6472. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  6473. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  6474. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  6475. matters is also much closer than first
  6476. thought. ... ...
  6477.  
  6478.  Day after day and month after month,
  6479. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  6480. amounts of connection data relating
  6481. to the communications it had placed
  6482. under surveillance. The so-called
  6483. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  6484. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  6485. into the Americans� giant databases.
  6486.  
  6487. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  6488.  
  6489. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  6490. Deutsch Report ::
  6491.  
  6492. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  6493.  
  6494. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  6495.  
  6496. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  6497. ���������������������������������������
  6498. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  6499.  
  6500. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  6501. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  6502. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  6503.  
  6504. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  6505.  
  6506. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  6507.  
  6508. � Fed-up Congress Dumps �Em ::
  6509.  
  6510.  The latest revelations will add to
  6511. the intense public and congressional
  6512. debate around the extent of NSA
  6513. surveillance programs. They come
  6514. as senior intelligence officials
  6515. testify to the Senate judiciary
  6516. committee on Wednesday, releasing
  6517. classified documents in response to
  6518. the Guardian�s earlier stories on
  6519. bulk collection of phone records
  6520. and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  6521.  
  6522.  XKeyscore, the documents boast, is
  6523. the NSA�s �widest reaching� system
  6524. developing intelligence from computer
  6525. networks � what the agency calls
  6526. Digital Network Intelligence (DNI).
  6527. One presentation claims the program
  6528. covers �nearly everything a typical
  6529. user does on the internet�, including
  6530. the content of emails, websites
  6531. visited and searches, as well as
  6532. their metadata.
  6533.  
  6534. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  6535. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  6536. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  6537. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  6538.  
  6539. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  6540.  
  6541. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  6542.  
  6543. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  6544.  
  6545. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  6546.  
  6547. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  6548.  
  6549. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  6550.  
  6551. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  6552.  
  6553. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  6554.  
  6555. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  6556.  
  6557. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  6558.  
  6559. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  6560.  
  6561. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  6562.  
  6563. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  6564.  
  6565. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  6566.  
  6567.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  6568. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  6569. they are shunted off to various �production
  6570. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  6571. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  6572. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  6573. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  6574. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  6575. stored in a database called MARINA and
  6576. is generally retained for five years.
  6577.  
  6578. ... ...
  6579.  
  6580.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  6581. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  6582. to change the surveillance laws once the
  6583. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  6584. This was for a simple reason: they did
  6585. not want to be responsible for a program
  6586. that was not legal.�
  6587.  
  6588. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  6589.  
  6590. NOBODY comments
  6591.  
  6592.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  6593. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  6594. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  6595. communications not related to foreign
  6596. information or foreign activity for up
  6597. to five years.
  6598.  
  6599.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  6600. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  6601. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  6602. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  6603. ���������������������������������������
  6604. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  6605. for GCHQ Bude ::
  6606.  
  6607. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  6608. _______________________________________
  6609. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  6610. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  6611.  
  6612.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  6613. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  6614. counterfeiting and even copyright
  6615. infringement complain that their
  6616. attempts to exploit the security
  6617. agency�s vast resources have often
  6618. been turned down because their own
  6619. investigations are not considered a
  6620. high enough priority, current and
  6621. former government officials say.
  6622.  
  6623.  Intelligence officials say they have
  6624. been careful to limit the use of the
  6625. security agency�s troves of data and
  6626. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  6627. could be misused in ways that violate
  6628. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  6629.  
  6630.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  6631. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  6632. senior intelligence official at the
  6633. White House and at the office of the
  6634. director of national intelligence.
  6635. �They collect all this information,
  6636. but it�s difficult for the other
  6637. agencies to get access to what
  6638. they want.�
  6639.  
  6640. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  6641. _______________________________________
  6642. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  6643. Security Forum ::
  6644.  
  6645. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  6646.  
  6647. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  6648. Conference ::
  6649.  
  6650. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  6651.  
  6652. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  6653. Conference ::
  6654.  
  6655. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  6656. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  6657. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  6658.  
  6659.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  6660. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  6661. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  6662. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  6663. discussions with the president when he
  6664. first came on board we talked to him about
  6665. these programs and the issue was how do
  6666. we know the compliance is there and what
  6667. more could we do? We stood up working with
  6668. the committees in Congress a directorate
  6669. of compliance. This directorate of
  6670. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  6671. and information specialists that can look
  6672. at everything that we do in these programs
  6673. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  6674. orders but we also have oversight from
  6675. the Director of National Intelligence,
  6676. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  6677. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  6678. from the White House, from Congress, the
  6679. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  6680. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  6681.  
  6682. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  6683. Blackhat Conference ::
  6684.  
  6685. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  6686.  
  6687. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  6688.  
  6689. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  6690.  
  6691. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  6692.  
  6693. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  6694.  
  6695. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  6696.  
  6697. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  6698. _______________________________________
  6699. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  6700.  
  6701. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  6702.  
  6703. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  6704. All Domestic Calls ::
  6705.  
  6706.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  6707. three documents related to the National
  6708. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  6709. records, including briefings to Congress
  6710. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  6711. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  6712. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6713. Court that outlines rules that must be
  6714. followed when accessing data provided by
  6715. a Verizon subsidiary.
  6716.  
  6717. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  6718.  
  6719.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  6720. what the government was doing with the
  6721. Patriot Act program, several senators
  6722. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  6723. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  6724. the law in a twisted way to do something
  6725. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  6726. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  6727. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  6728. Act to obtain that document.
  6729.  
  6730. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  6731. _______________________________________
  6732. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  6733.  
  6734. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  6735.  
  6736. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  6737. _______________________________________
  6738. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  6739.  
  6740.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  6741. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  6742. two or three years ago.�
  6743.  
  6744. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  6745. _______________________________________
  6746. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6747. Received Dox ::
  6748.  
  6749. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6750. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6751. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6752. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6753. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6754.  
  6755. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  6756.  
  6757. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  6758.  
  6759. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6760. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  6761.  
  6762.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  6763. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  6764. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  6765. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  6766. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  6767. twice as much campaign financing from
  6768. the defense and intelligence industry
  6769. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  6770.  
  6771. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  6772.  
  6773. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  6774. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  6775.  
  6776. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  6777. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  6778. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  6779.  
  6780. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  6781.  
  6782. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  6783.  
  6784. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  6785. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  6786.  
  6787. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  6788. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  6789. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  6790. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  6791.  
  6792. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  6793. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  6794.  
  6795.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  6796. disclosures, the President has said
  6797. that he welcomes a debate about how
  6798. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  6799. our national security and the privacy
  6800. of our citizens.  The Administration
  6801. has taken various proactive steps to
  6802. advance this debate including the
  6803. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  6804. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  6805. his public statements on the disclosed
  6806. programs, the Office of the Director
  6807. of National Intelligence�s release of
  6808. its own public statements, ODNI General
  6809. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  6810. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  6811. disclose publicly that the Administration
  6812. filed an application with the Foreign
  6813. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  6814. look forward to continuing to discuss
  6815. these critical issues with the American
  6816. people and the Congress.
  6817.  
  6818.  However, we oppose the current effort
  6819. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  6820. of our Intelligence Community�s
  6821. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  6822. approach is not the product of an
  6823. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  6824. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  6825. Amendment, and instead move forward
  6826. with an approach that appropriately
  6827. takes into account the need for a
  6828. reasoned review of what tools can
  6829. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  6830.  
  6831. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  6832.  
  6833. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  6834.  
  6835. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  6836. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  6837.  
  6838. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  6839.  
  6840. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  6841. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  6842. to Defund NSA ::
  6843.  
  6844. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  6845. _______________________________________
  6846.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  6847. official letter from the NSA, which was
  6848. sent to the German government to clarify
  6849. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  6850. because German media and politics were
  6851. heavily confused after it became clear
  6852. that there�s more than one program named
  6853. PRISM.
  6854.  
  6855.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  6856. data collection program is about and
  6857. then confirms that this program is
  6858. different from a more common military
  6859. web tool called "Planning tool for
  6860. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  6861. and Management" (PRISM).
  6862.  
  6863.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  6864. there�s even a third program called
  6865. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  6866. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  6867. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  6868. apparently an internal NSA information
  6869. sharing program. It was unknown until
  6870. now, probably because it�s used in the
  6871. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  6872. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  6873.  
  6874.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  6875. different PRISM programs:
  6876.  
  6877. 1. PRISM
  6878.  
  6879.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  6880. of collecting information about foreign
  6881. targets from data of nine major US
  6882. internet companies. This program started
  6883. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  6884. in June 2013.
  6885.  
  6886. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  6887. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  6888.  
  6889.  This is a web tool used by US military
  6890. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  6891. to data collection platforms deployed to
  6892. military operations. This program is
  6893. not very secret and was first mentioned
  6894. in 2002.
  6895.  
  6896. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  6897. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  6898.  
  6899.  This is an internal NSA program for
  6900. real-time sharing of information,
  6901. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  6902. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  6903. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  6904.  
  6905. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  6906.  
  6907. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  6908. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  6909.  
  6910.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  6911. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  6912. surveillance activities in Germany.
  6913. It only added to the mystery. A US
  6914. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  6915. that there are actually three unrelated
  6916. Prism programs. ... ...
  6917.  
  6918.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  6919. and Maassen, officials also read a
  6920. written statement from the NSA in
  6921. response to a query from the German
  6922. government. According to the statement,
  6923. there are three separate Prism programs,
  6924. all of them unconnected to each other.
  6925. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  6926. said that one of the Prism programs was
  6927. only used internally. That program had
  6928. thus far remained secret. Another of
  6929. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  6930. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  6931. -- vaguely described in the statement
  6932. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  6933. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  6934. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  6935. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  6936.  
  6937. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  6938.  
  6939. NOBODY comments
  6940.  
  6941.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  6942. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  6943. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  6944. _______________________________________
  6945. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  6946.  
  6947. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  6948.  
  6949. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  6950.  
  6951. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  6952.  
  6953.  Description and drawings by US Army
  6954. Corps of Engineers.
  6955.  
  6956. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  6957. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  6958. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  6959. _______________________________________
  6960. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  6961.  
  6962. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  6963.  
  6964. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  6965.  
  6966. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  6967. ���������������������������������������
  6968. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  6969.  
  6970. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  6971.  
  6972. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  6973.  
  6974. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  6975.  
  6976. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  6977.  
  6978. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  6979. _______________________________________
  6980. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  6981.  
  6982.  �First, the United States would not seek
  6983. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  6984. return to the United States. The charges
  6985. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  6986. and the United States would not seek the
  6987. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  6988. charged with additional, death penalty-
  6989. eligible crimes.�
  6990.  
  6991. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  6992.  
  6993. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  6994. _______________________________________
  6995. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  6996. Peace Prize ::
  6997.  
  6998.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  6999. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  7000. agency�s data collection program, has
  7001. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  7002.  
  7003.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  7004. at great personal cost � revealed the
  7005. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  7006. the US government devotes electronic
  7007. communications worldwide,� read the
  7008. nomination. �By putting light on this
  7009. monitoring program � conducted in
  7010. contravention of national laws and
  7011. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  7012. has helped to make the world a little
  7013. bit better and safer.� ...
  7014.  
  7015.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  7016. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  7017. to being well justified in itself �
  7018. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  7019. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  7020. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  7021. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  7022. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  7023.  
  7024. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  7025. _______________________________________
  7026. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  7027. Komsomolets News ::
  7028.  
  7029. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  7030. ���������������������������������������
  7031. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  7032. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  7033.  
  7034.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  7035. his experience when he received a Foreign
  7036. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  7037. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  7038. federal government to monitor a customer
  7039. of his.
  7040.  
  7041.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  7042. contained a broad gag order, which still
  7043. prevents him from telling all the details.
  7044.  
  7045.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  7046. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  7047. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  7048. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  7049.  
  7050.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  7051. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  7052. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  7053. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  7054.  
  7055.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  7056. facility that was capturing all of the
  7057. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  7058. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  7059. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  7060. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  7061.  
  7062. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  7063. _______________________________________
  7064. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  7065.  
  7066. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  7067. _______________________________________
  7068. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  7069.  
  7070. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  7071. ���������������������������������������
  7072. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  7073. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  7074.  
  7075.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  7076. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  7077. representative rather casually indicated
  7078. that the government looks at data from
  7079. a universe of far, far more people than
  7080. previously indicated.
  7081.  
  7082.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  7083. was one of several government representatives
  7084. �including from the FBI and the office of
  7085. the Director of National Intelligence�
  7086. testifying before the House Judiciary
  7087. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  7088. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  7089. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  7090. surveillance, including a retread of the
  7091. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  7092. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  7093. Act had stopped terror events.
  7094.  
  7095.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  7096. look �two or three hops� from terror
  7097. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  7098. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  7099. how surveillance was extended had been
  7100. described as two hops. This meant that
  7101. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  7102. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  7103. could also look at the calls from the
  7104. people that suspect has spoken with one
  7105. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  7106. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  7107. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  7108. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  7109.  
  7110. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  7111.  
  7112.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  7113. them or not - two hops.
  7114.  
  7115.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  7116. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  7117.  
  7118. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  7119. ���������������������������������������
  7120. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  7121.  
  7122.  It is a good thing that people are
  7123. becoming aware of the fact that they
  7124. are being monitored - it is not only
  7125. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  7126. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  7127. made to collect information and to store
  7128. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  7129. resources that PRISM used and how it
  7130. could combine these resources to multiple
  7131. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  7132.  
  7133. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  7134. _______________________________________
  7135. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  7136.  
  7137. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  7138. ���������������������������������������
  7139. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  7140. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  7141.  
  7142.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  7143. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  7144. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  7145. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  7146. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  7147. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  7148. stories about the US government�s vast
  7149. foreign and domestic spying programs
  7150. will stop. ... ...
  7151.  
  7152.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  7153. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  7154. the United States by releasing more
  7155. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  7156.  
  7157.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  7158. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  7159. since he has already said that he gave
  7160. all of his classified information --
  7161. thousands of documents -- to several
  7162. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  7163. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  7164. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  7165. half done with the stories he plans to
  7166. write based on the secret information.
  7167.  
  7168. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  7169. ���������������������������������������
  7170. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  7171.  
  7172. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  7173. _______________________________________
  7174. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  7175.  
  7176. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  7177. ���������������������������������������
  7178. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  7179.  
  7180.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  7181. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  7182. typewriters. What do they know that
  7183. we don�t?
  7184.  
  7185. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  7186. ���������������������������������������
  7187. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  7188. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  7189.  
  7190.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  7191. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  7192. has existed since at least 2002. The
  7193. following document refers to it directly.
  7194. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  7195. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  7196. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  7197. limitation of it and similar projects.
  7198.  
  7199. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  7200.  
  7201. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  7202. _______________________________________
  7203. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  7204. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  7205.  
  7206. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  7207.  
  7208. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  7209. in Latin America ::
  7210.  
  7211. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  7212. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  7213. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  7214. _______________________________________
  7215. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  7216. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  7217.  
  7218. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  7219.  
  7220. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  7221.  
  7222. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  7223. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  7224.  
  7225. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  7226. _______________________________________
  7227. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  7228.  
  7229. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  7230. _______________________________________
  7231. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  7232. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  7233.  
  7234. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  7235. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  7236. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  7237. ���������������������������������������
  7238. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  7239.  
  7240. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  7241.  
  7242. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  7243.  
  7244. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  7245. _______________________________________
  7246. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  7247. Metadata ::
  7248.  
  7249. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  7250. _______________________________________
  7251. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  7252. by US Citizens ::
  7253.  
  7254. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  7255. ���������������������������������������
  7256. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  7257.  
  7258. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  7259.  
  7260.  �This may look like a small release, but
  7261. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  7262. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  7263. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  7264. sending encrypted data to and from the
  7265. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  7266. those servers. If you crash these servers
  7267. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  7268. "broken". We are also planning to release
  7269. some of that data (which we have access
  7270. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  7271. ���������������������������������������
  7272. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  7273. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  7274.  
  7275.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  7276. Snowden�s employer.
  7277.  
  7278. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  7279.  
  7280. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  7281.  
  7282. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  7283. _______________________________________
  7284. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  7285.  
  7286. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  7287. _______________________________________
  7288. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  7289.  
  7290.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  7291. it became clear that my freedom and
  7292. safety were under threat for revealing
  7293. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  7294. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  7295. old, family, and others who I have never
  7296. met and probably never will. I trusted
  7297. them with my life and they returned that
  7298. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  7299. always be thankful.
  7300.  
  7301.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  7302. before the world that he would not permit
  7303. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  7304. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  7305. after promising not to do so, the President
  7306. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  7307. leaders of nations from which I have
  7308. requested protection to deny my asylum
  7309. petitions.
  7310.  
  7311.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  7312. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  7313. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  7314. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  7315. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  7316. come after me.
  7317.  
  7318.  For decades the United States of America
  7319. have been one of the strongest defenders
  7320. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  7321. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  7322. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  7323. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  7324. the current government of my country. The
  7325. Obama administration has now adopted the
  7326. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  7327. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  7328. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  7329. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  7330. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  7331. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  7332. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  7333. asylum.
  7334.  
  7335.  In the end the Obama administration is
  7336. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  7337. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  7338. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  7339. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  7340. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  7341. demanding the constitutional government
  7342. it was promised � and it should be.
  7343.  
  7344.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  7345. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  7346. many.�
  7347.  
  7348. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  7349. ���������������������������������������
  7350. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  7351.  
  7352. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  7353.  
  7354. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  7355.  
  7356. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  7357. _______________________________________
  7358. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  7359.  
  7360. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  7361. ���������������������������������������
  7362. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  7363.  
  7364. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  7365. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  7366. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  7367. _______________________________________
  7368. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  7369.  
  7370. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  7371. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  7372. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  7373. _______________________________________
  7374. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  7375.  
  7376. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  7377.  
  7378.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  7379. over private data to America.
  7380.  
  7381.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  7382. according to new claims by former US defence
  7383. analyst.
  7384.  
  7385.  At least six European Union countries in
  7386. addition to Britain have been colluding
  7387. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  7388. personal communications data, according
  7389. to a former contractor to America�s
  7390. National Security Agency, who said the
  7391. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  7392.  
  7393.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  7394. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  7395. and over the next 12 years held several
  7396. sensitive positions within the agency,
  7397. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  7398. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  7399. deals with the US.
  7400.  
  7401.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  7402. second and third party status� under
  7403. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  7404. that compels them to hand over data,
  7405. including mobile phone and internet
  7406. information to the NSA if requested.
  7407.  
  7408.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  7409. confirmed by declassified documents,
  7410. nations are categorised by the US according
  7411. to their trust level. The US is first party
  7412. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  7413. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  7414. Germany and France have third party
  7415. relationships.
  7416.  
  7417.  In an interview published last night
  7418. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  7419. who has been attacked for holding
  7420. controversial views on espionage issues,
  7421. said he had decided to speak out after
  7422. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  7423. told by EU politicians regarding the
  7424. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  7425.  
  7426.  He said that under the agreements,
  7427. which were drawn up after the second
  7428. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  7429. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  7430. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  7431. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  7432.  
  7433.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  7434. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  7435. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  7436. about the spying operations while staying
  7437. silent about their own arrangements
  7438. with the US, and was particularly
  7439. concerned that senior German politicians
  7440. had accused the UK of spying when their
  7441. country had a similar third-party deal
  7442. with the NSA.
  7443.  
  7444.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  7445. by other European countries to the NSA is
  7446. not on the same scale as that provided by
  7447. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  7448. embarrassing.
  7449.  
  7450.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  7451. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  7452. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  7453. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  7454. Madsen said.
  7455.  
  7456.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  7457. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  7458. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  7459. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  7460. confirmed that the entire system for
  7461. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  7462. because the EU was unable to intervene
  7463. in intelligence matters, which remained
  7464. the exclusive concern of national
  7465. governments.
  7466.  
  7467.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  7468. these contradictions and no one is really
  7469. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  7470. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  7471. democracy.�
  7472.  
  7473.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  7474. for European governments to come clean
  7475. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  7476. �There needs to be transparency as to
  7477. whether or not it is legal for the US
  7478. or any other security service to
  7479. interrogate private material,� said
  7480. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  7481. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  7482. is that none of these arrangements has
  7483. been debated in any democratic arena.
  7484. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  7485. things have to be done in secret, but you
  7486. don�t break the law in secret.�
  7487.  
  7488.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  7489. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  7490. fibre-optic cable network running between
  7491. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  7492. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  7493. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  7494. including phone calls, emails and records
  7495. of users� access to websites.
  7496.  
  7497.  He said the public needed to be made
  7498. aware of the full scale of the communication
  7499. -sharing arrangements between European
  7500. countries and the US, which predate the
  7501. internet and became of strategic importance
  7502. during the cold war.
  7503.  
  7504.  The covert relationship between the
  7505. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  7506. report by the European parliament, but
  7507. their explicit connection with the NSA
  7508. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  7509. to speak out.
  7510.  
  7511.  The European parliament�s report followed
  7512. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  7513. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  7514. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  7515. established the framework for European
  7516. member states to collaborate with the US.
  7517.  
  7518.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  7519. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  7520. that governments have chosen to keep the
  7521. public in the dark about it. The days
  7522. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  7523. of silence are over.�
  7524.  
  7525.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  7526. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  7527. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  7528. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  7529. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  7530. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  7531. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  7532. ���������������������������������������
  7533. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  7534. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  7535.  
  7536.  A former contractor to the US National
  7537. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  7538. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  7539. intelligence arrangements between the
  7540. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  7541. murky and far reaching� than the public
  7542. has been led to believe. ...
  7543.  
  7544.  He was particularly concerned about the
  7545. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  7546. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  7547. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  7548. while staying silent about their own role
  7549. in global interception arrangements with
  7550. the United States. ...
  7551.  
  7552.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  7553. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  7554.  
  7555.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  7556. many who say he had no authority or right
  7557. to provide the public with details of
  7558. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  7559. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  7560. have to provide information on NSA
  7561. surveillance at five meetings of the
  7562. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  7563. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  7564. Spain and Switzerland?�
  7565.  
  7566.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  7567. American people from a constantly changing
  7568. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  7569. is providing information to elites on
  7570. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  7571. student, religious and progressive
  7572. organizations.�
  7573.  
  7574.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  7575. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  7576. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  7577.  
  7578. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  7579. _______________________________________
  7580. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  7581.  
  7582. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  7583. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  7584. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  7585. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  7586. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  7587. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  7588. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  7589.  
  7590. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  7591.  
  7592. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  7593. ���������������������������������������
  7594. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  7595. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  7596.  
  7597. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  7598. ??????????????????????????????????????
  7599.  ????????????????????????????????????
  7600. ??????????????????????????????????????
  7601. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ �
  7602.  
  7603. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  7604.  
  7605. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data
  7606. Collection �
  7607.  
  7608. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7609.  
  7610. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on
  7611. Americans �
  7612.  
  7613. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  7614.  
  7615. � List of Retreats for Whistleblowers ;
  7616. Countries With No US Extradition Treaty �
  7617.  
  7618. http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1372346844.php
  7619.  
  7620. � Snowden Was Smart ; NSA Leaks Were
  7621. Given to Untold Others, Encrypted �
  7622.  
  7623. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/greenwald-snowden-s-files-are-out-there-if-anything-happens-to-him.html
  7624.  
  7625. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in
  7626. the Dark on NSA Spying �
  7627.  
  7628. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  7629.  
  7630. � Is PRISM a Not-So-Secret GUI and is
  7631. There More Than One PRISM Tool? �
  7632.  
  7633. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/06/is-prism-just-not-so-secret-web-tool.html
  7634.  
  7635. � Screenshot of the PRISM Input Tool �
  7636.  
  7637. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aKIwdHzpBxM/UbkjPyyl9pI/AAAAAAAAAWQ/hJWQkBFWDic/s1600/PRISM+input+tool.jpg
  7638.  
  7639. � NSA Also Spying on the �Deep Web� �
  7640.  
  7641. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-23/u-s-surveillance-is-not-aimed-at-terrorists.html
  7642.  
  7643. � Obama Regime Irate as Snowden Flees
  7644. Hong Kong to Undisclosed Location �
  7645.  
  7646. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/23/us-usa-security-flight-idUSBRE95M02H20130623
  7647. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_HONG_KONG?SITE=AP
  7648. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-us-politicians-react
  7649.  
  7650. � Wikileaks Comments on Helping Edward
  7651. Snowden Flee to Undisclosed Location �
  7652.  
  7653. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-Statement-On-Edward.html
  7654.  
  7655. � Obama Regime Charges Edward Snowden
  7656. With Espionage �
  7657.  
  7658. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_print.html
  7659.  
  7660. � USA vs. Edward Snowden Complaint �
  7661.  
  7662. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-complaint.pdf
  7663.  
  7664. � Pre-Crime in FISA Leak Detailed �
  7665.  
  7666. http://p.iain.it/view/raw/1296961
  7667.  
  7668. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks �
  7669.  
  7670. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  7671. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7672. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  7673.  
  7674. � Illegal Warrantless Mass Spying of
  7675. All Telecommunication by NSA via FISA �
  7676.  
  7677. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  7678. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  7679. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  7680. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  7681. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  7682. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  7683. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  7684. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  7685. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7686. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  7687. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  7688. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  7689. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  7690. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  7691. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  7692. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  7693. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  7694. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  7695. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  7696. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  7697. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  7698. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  7699. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  7700. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  7701. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  7702. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  7703. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  7704. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  7705. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7706. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7707. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  7708. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  7709. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  7710. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  7711. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  7712. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  7713.  
  7714. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable
  7715. Tapping 1 & 2 (Repost) �
  7716.  
  7717. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  7718.  
  7719. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  7720.  
  7721. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic
  7722. Tapping (Repost) �
  7723.  
  7724. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  7725.  
  7726. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip �
  7727.  
  7728. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  7729.  
  7730. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  7731. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  7732. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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