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Posted by Eyeballing the N on May Tue 13th 6:30 PM - Never Expires
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  1. Eyeballing the NSA 031
  2.    
  3. VIEW FULL
  4. http://paste.scsys.co.uk/372718
  5.  
  6. Download TXT-HTML
  7. http://filedump.org/files/0O00Mq1400002000.html
  8.    
  9.    
  10.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  11. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  12. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  13.  
  14.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  15.  
  16.  
  17. � FISA Court Rules to Retain Spy Data Past 5 Years ::
  18.  
  19. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/fisc-br14-01-14-0410.pdf
  20. _______________________________________
  21. ? NSA Documents From �No Place To Hide� ::
  22.  
  23. http://hbpub.vo.llnwd.net/o16/video/olmk/holt/greenwald/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Uncompressed.pdf
  24.  
  25. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/94dwpno2eokp
  26.  
  27. ? An Avalanche of Snowden Documents To Be Released
  28. Online Next Week ::
  29.  
  30. http://www.engadget.com/2014/05/08/an-avalanche-of-new-snowden-documents-will-go-online-next-week/
  31. ______________________________________
  32. ? Leak Spy Documents @ The Intercept Dropbox ::
  33.  
  34. http://y6xjgkgwj47us5ca.onion/
  35.  
  36. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/intercept-drop.pdf
  37.  
  38. ? Obama�s Directive Makes Mere Citing of Snowden�s
  39. Leaks a Punishable Offense ::
  40.  
  41.  In a new policy directive from the Obama administrative,
  42. national security and other government officials will no
  43. longer be allowed to publicly discuss or even reference
  44. news reporting that is based on �unauthorized leaks.�
  45.  
  46. https://www.commondreams.org/headline/2014/05/09
  47. _______________________________________
  48. � Munk Debate on State Surveillance ::
  49.  
  50. Greenwald, Ohanian vs Hayden, Dershowitz
  51.  
  52. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_d1tw3mEOoE
  53. ______________________________________
  54. � NSA ; Manageable Network Plan ::
  55.  
  56. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-network-plan.pdf
  57. ______________________________________
  58. � United States of Secrets ; How the Government
  59. Came to Spy on Millions of Americans ::
  60.  
  61. Part One: Tuesday, May 13, 2014, at 9 p.m. on PBS
  62. Part Two: Tuesday, May 20, 2014, at 10 p.m. on PBS
  63.  
  64. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/united-states-of-secrets/
  65.  
  66. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/pressroom/press-release-united-states-of-secrets-how-the-government-came-to-spy-on-millions-of-americans/
  67. ______________________________________
  68. � NSA, Google Inc. Relationship Emails ::
  69.  
  70. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-google.pdf
  71.  
  72. � NSA Scares CEOs Into Cyber Spying (Related) ::
  73.  
  74. http://cryptome.org/2014/05/nsa-scares-ceos.pdf
  75.  
  76. � Emails Reveal Close Google Relationship With NSA ::
  77.  
  78.  �Keep in mind that social media survives by
  79. selling user data. Spying is their business model.
  80. In padding their bottom lines executives have
  81. worked diligently to dilute privacy legislation
  82. in addition to garnering a myriad of fines. All
  83. of this data harvesting services a data broker
  84. industry which generates something in the
  85. neighborhood of $200 billion in revenue annually.�
  86.  
  87.   - Bill Blunden, counterpunch.org
  88.  
  89. http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/6/nsa-chief-google.html
  90. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/05/07/googles_nsa_data_dealings_not_as_bad_as_first_thought_theyre_much_worse/
  91. http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/05/09/the-nsas-corporate-collaborators/
  92. _______________________________________
  93. � GCHQ Director Visits NSA for PRISM Data Access ::
  94.  
  95. Hosted Dinner: 30 April 2013//1830Hrs - Quarters
  96. Hosted Discussions: 1 May 2013//0800-0830
  97.  
  98.  �PURPOSE OF THE VISIT:  (U//FOUO) As the Director
  99. of GCHQ, Sir Iain wants to reconnect with NSA
  100. Leadership on matters of mutual concern, and to
  101. ensure each partner is aware of the other�s
  102. activities and future plans.� � �
  103.  
  104.  �Unsupervised access to FAA 702 data, in a manner
  105. similar to Olympics Option, remains on GCHQ�s wish
  106. list and is something its leadership still desires.�
  107.  
  108. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-gchq-lobban-visit.pdf
  109.  
  110. � GCHQ Unsupervised PRISM Access in 2012 ::
  111.  
  112. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-prism-olympics.pdf
  113.  
  114. � NSA Spied �Suspected Terrorists� At 2012 Olympics ::
  115.  
  116. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-ghostmachine-echobase.pdf
  117.  
  118. � NSA & GCHQ Eyeballed �Suspected Terrorists� Before,
  119. During and After 2012 Olympics ::
  120.  
  121.  The Snowden files do not indicate whether NSA granted
  122. GCHQ�s request, but they do show that the NSA was
  123. �supportive� of the idea, and that GCHQ was permitted
  124. extensive access to PRISM during the London Olympics
  125. in 2012. The request for the broad access was
  126. communicated at �leadership� level, according to
  127. the documents. Neither agency would comment on the
  128. proposed arrangement or whether it was approved. � �
  129.  
  130.  The data sharing between the agencies during the
  131. Olympics, though, was not isolated to PRISM. � �
  132. The NSA was funneling troves of intercepted data
  133. to GCHQ from a system called GHOSTMACHINE, a massive
  134. cloud database used by the NSA to analyze metadata
  135. and store, according to one document in the Snowden
  136. archive, �100s of billions of entries.�
  137.  
  138. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/04/30/gchq-prism-nsa-fisa-unsupervised-access-snowden/
  139. _______________________________________
  140. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  141.  
  142. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  143. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  144. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  145.  
  146.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  147. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  148. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  149. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  150. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  151. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  152. Edward Snowden.
  153.  
  154.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  155. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  156. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  157. for surveillance.
  158.  
  159.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  160. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  161. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  162. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  163. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  164.  
  165.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  166. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  167. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  168. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  169.  
  170.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  171. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  172. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  173. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  174. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  175. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  176. and long-term storage.
  177.  
  178. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  179.  
  180. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  181.  
  182.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  183. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  184. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  185. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  186. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  187. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  188. but they won�t say.
  189.  
  190. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  191.  
  192. � NSA Records All Phone Calls Using Project MYSTIC ::
  193.  
  194. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NYq44T5e3lU
  195.  
  196. Mirror here � http://fileb.ag/3cva7msxqefx
  197. _______________________________________
  198. � NSA/NIS Dagbladet Documents Decensored ::
  199.  
  200.  There are a couple images in the latest Dagbladet
  201. story from the Snowden trove that were originally
  202. blurred instead of blacked out. This allowed the
  203. text to be recovered. There was no particular point
  204. in making a project out of the first, since it had
  205. already been published previously. The second was
  206. completely decoded in a matter of a few hours.
  207.  
  208. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/DagbladetDecensor.pdf
  209.  
  210. � NSA/NIS Aquired Supercomputer to Break Crypto ::
  211.  
  212.  The Norwegian Inteligence Service (NIS) is also
  213. nauseous from the unmanageable amounts of data it
  214. is served daily. This is partly the reason why NSA
  215. now purchases a supercomputer codenamed Steelwinter.
  216. This information comes from a document Edward Snowden
  217. took from NSA and has later shared with Dagbladet.
  218. The document, marked �top secret� is a summary of
  219. how the NSA sees the collaboration with Norway after
  220. a meeting between the two services in March 2013.
  221.  
  222.  The supercomputer NIS buys is a derivation of the
  223. so-called Windsor Blue supercomputer.
  224.  
  225.  �NIS is in the process of acquiring STEEL WINTER
  226. (a WINDSORBLUE derivative supercomputer) and has
  227. entered into a partnership with NSA - cryptanalysis
  228. ( ...) service to develop applications of mutual
  229. benefit� the document says.
  230.  
  231.  �Windsor Blue� is the name of a program for
  232. supercomputers at the American IT-giant IBM. The
  233. company is working towards creating a so-called
  234. exascale supercomputer which means it can make a
  235. quintillion - 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 - calculations
  236. per second.
  237.  
  238. http://www.dagbladet.no/2014/04/26/nyheter/snowden_i_norge/edward_snowden/nsa/etterretningstjenesten/32991102/
  239. _______________________________________
  240. � Germany Blocks Edward Snowden From Testifying ::
  241.  
  242. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/01/germany-edward-snowden-nsa-inquiry
  243. _______________________________________
  244. � NSA Spies More on Americans Than Russians ::
  245.  
  246. http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/edward-snowden-nsa-spies-more-on-americans-than-russians-20140430
  247. _______________________________________
  248. � Snowden Asks Putin About Russian Spying ::
  249.  
  250. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1yH554emkY
  251. http://rt.com/news/snowden-putin-spy-online-140/
  252. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-17/snowden-calls-putin-telethon-discuss-legality-mass-surveillance
  253. _______________________________________
  254. � NSA Spied on Human Rights Workers ::
  255.  
  256.  The US has spied on the staff of prominent
  257. human rights organisations, Edward Snowden has
  258. told the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Europe�s
  259. top human rights body.
  260.  
  261.  Giving evidence via a videolink from Moscow,
  262. Snowden said the National Security Agency � for
  263. which he worked as a contractor � had deliberately
  264. snooped on bodies like Amnesty International and
  265. Human Rights Watch.
  266.  
  267. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/08/edwards-snowden-us-government-spied-human-rights-workers
  268.  
  269. � Edward Snowden Testimony @ Parliamentary Assembly
  270. of the Council of Europe (Full) ::
  271.  
  272. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3f8Lunf1a2w
  273. _______________________________________
  274. � EU High Court Allows Banning Metadata Collection ::
  275.  
  276.  Due to the particularities of EU lawmaking, the
  277. effects of the directive (spying) will still be in
  278. place in most EU member states for the time being.
  279.  
  280.  According to EU legal procedure, a directive is
  281. a type of law that requires each of the 28 member
  282. countries to �transpose� it into their own national
  283. laws. In this case, countries could even choose
  284. whether to expand the six-month requirement to as
  285. high as two years. ... ...
  286.  
  287.  Current EU data retention law will remain in
  288. effect until repealed legislatively or invalidated
  289. by domestic courts.
  290.  
  291. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/04/eu-high-court-strikes-down-metadata-collection-law/
  292. _______________________________________
  293. � Masterspy Orders Snub on Media Contacts ::
  294.  
  295. http://www.infowars.com/intelligence-head-who-lied-to-congress-bans-employees-from-talking-to-media/
  296. _______________________________________
  297. � US Whines - �Anti-Snooping Plans are Unfair� ::
  298.  
  299.  �Recent proposals from countries within the
  300. European Union to create a Europe-only electronic
  301. network (dubbed a �Schengen cloud� by advocates) or
  302. to create national-only electronic networks could
  303. potentially lead to effective exclusion or discrimination
  304. against foreign service suppliers that are directly
  305. offering network services, or dependent on them,�
  306. the USTR said in its annual report.
  307.  
  308. http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2014%20NTE%20Report%20on%20FTB.pdf
  309. http://inserbia.info/today/2014/04/us-blasts-eus-plan-for-schengen-cloud/
  310. http://rt.com/news/us-europe-nsa-snowden-549/
  311. ���������������������������������������
  312. � More Details on GCHQ Propaganda/Deception Tactics ::
  313.  
  314. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/04/04/cuban-twitter-scam-social-media-tool-disseminating-government-propaganda/
  315.  
  316.  This week, the Associated Press exposed a secret
  317. program run by the US Agency for International
  318. Development to create �a Twitter-like Cuban
  319. communications network� run through �secret shell
  320. companies� in order to create the false appearance
  321. of being a privately owned operation. Unbeknownst
  322. to the service�s Cuban users was the fact that
  323. �American contractors were gathering their private
  324. data in the hope that it might be used for political
  325. purposes��specifically, to manipulate those users
  326. in order to foment dissent in Cuba and subvert its
  327. government. According to top-secret documents
  328. published today by The Intercept, this sort of
  329. operation is frequently discussed at western
  330. intelligence agencies, which have plotted ways to
  331. covertly use social media for �propaganda,� �deception,�
  332. �mass messaging,� and �pushing stories.� ...
  333.  
  334. � GCHQ Full Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  335.  
  336. �Destroy Deny Degrade Disrupt Deceive Protect�
  337.  
  338. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/gchq-full-spectrum-cyber.pdf
  339.  
  340.  ... The annual SIGDEV conference, according to one
  341. NSA document published today by The Intercept, �enables
  342. unprecedented visibility of SIGINT Development activities
  343. from across the Extended Enterprise, Second Party and US
  344. Intelligence communities.� The 2009 Conference, held at
  345. Fort Meade, included �eighty-six representatives from
  346. the wider US Intelligence Community, covering agencies
  347. as diverse as CIA (a record 50 participants), the Air
  348. Force Research Laboratory and the National Air and
  349. Space Intelligence Center.�
  350.  
  351.  Defenders of surveillance agencies have often insinuated
  352. that such proposals are nothing more than pipe dreams
  353. and wishful thinking on the part of intelligence agents.
  354. But these documents are not merely proposals or hypothetical
  355. scenarios. As described by the NSA document published
  356. today, the purpose of SIGDEV presentations is �to
  357. synchronize discovery efforts, share breakthroughs,
  358. and swap knowledge on the art of analysis.�
  359.  
  360.  For instance: One of the programs described by the newly
  361. released GCHQ document is dubbed �Royal Concierge,� under
  362. which the British agency intercepts email confirmations
  363. of hotel reservations to enable it to subject hotel
  364. guests to electronic monitoring. It also contemplates
  365. how to �influence the hotel choice� of travelers and
  366. to determine whether they stay at �SIGINT friendly�
  367. hotels. The document asks: �Can we influence the hotel
  368. choice? Can we cancel their visit?� ...
  369.  
  370. � NSA 5 Eyes 2009 SIGDEV Conference ::
  371.  
  372. http://cryptome.org/2014/04/nsa-5-eyes-2009-sigdev.pdf
  373. ---------------------------------------
  374. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  375.  
  376. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  377.  
  378. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  379.  
  380. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  381.  
  382. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  383.  
  384.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  385. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  386. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  387. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  388. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  389. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  390. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  391. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  392. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  393. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  394. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  395.  
  396.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  397. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  398. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  399. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  400. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  401. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  402.  
  403. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  404. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  405. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  406. ---------------------------------------
  407. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  408.  
  409. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  410.  
  411. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  412.  
  413. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  414.  
  415. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  416.  
  417. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  418.  
  419. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  420.  
  421. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  422.  
  423. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  424.  
  425. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  426. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  427. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  428.  
  429. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  430. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  431.  
  432. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  433. ---------------------------------------
  434. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  435.  
  436. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  437. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  438. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  439. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  440.  
  441. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  442.  
  443. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  444.  
  445. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  446.  
  447. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  448.  
  449. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  450.  
  451. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  452. ---------------------------------------
  453. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  454.  
  455. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  456. _______________________________________
  457. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  458.  
  459. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  460.  
  461. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  462.  
  463. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  464. _______________________________________
  465. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  466.  
  467.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  468. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  469. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  470. any information that comes out and will provide an
  471. updated archive from time to time.
  472.  
  473.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  474. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  475. 927MB decompressed.
  476.  
  477.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  478. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  479. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  480.  
  481. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  482. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  483.  
  484. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  485. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  486. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  487. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  488. _______________________________________
  489. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  490.  
  491. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  492. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  493. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  494. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  495. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  496. _______________________________________
  497. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  498.  
  499. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  500.  
  501. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  502.  
  503. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  504.  
  505. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  506.  
  507. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  508. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  509. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  510. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  511.  
  512. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  513. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  514.  
  515. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  516. _______________________________________
  517. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  518.  
  519. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  520.  
  521. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  522.  
  523. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  524.  
  525. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  526.  
  527. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  528.  
  529. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  530.  
  531. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  532. _______________________________________
  533. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  534.  
  535.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  536. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  537. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  538. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  539. public as possible� as well helping the public
  540. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  541. how we�re protecting national security.�
  542.  
  543. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  544. ���������������������������������������
  545. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  546.  
  547. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  548.  
  549. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  550.  
  551. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  552.  
  553. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  554.  
  555. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  556.  
  557. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  558.  
  559. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  560.  
  561.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  562. offensive against China, with targets including the
  563. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  564. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  565. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  566. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  567. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  568. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  569. well as telecommunications companies.
  570.  
  571.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  572. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  573. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  574. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  575. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  576. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  577. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  578. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  579. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  580. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  581. battle for data supremacy.
  582.  
  583.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  584. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  585. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  586. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  587. among other things.
  588.  
  589. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  590. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  591. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  592. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  593.  
  594. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  595.  
  596.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  597. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  598. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  599. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  600. has lodged representations with the American side on
  601. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  602. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  603.  
  604. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  605. _______________________________________
  606. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  607.  
  608.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  609. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  610. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  611. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  612. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  613. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  614. routers, the devices that connect computer
  615. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  616. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  617. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  618. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  619. that flow over their networks.
  620.  
  621.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  622. aspired to create a database that would function
  623. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  624. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  625. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  626. activity � they are targeted only because they
  627. control access to networks the agency wants to
  628. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  629. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  630. of the posts says.
  631.  
  632.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  633. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  634. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  635. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  636. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  637. poses with amusing captions.�
  638.  
  639. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  640. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  641. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  642. _______________________________________
  643. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  644.  
  645. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  646. _______________________________________
  647. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  648.  
  649. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  650.  
  651. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  652.  
  653. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  654.  
  655. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  656.  
  657. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  658.  
  659. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  660. _______________________________________
  661. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  662.  
  663. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  664. _______________________________________
  665. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  666.  
  667. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  668.  
  669. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  670. _______________________________________
  671. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  672.  
  673. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  674. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  675. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  676. _______________________________________
  677. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  678.  
  679. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  680.  
  681. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  682. _______________________________________
  683. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  684.  
  685. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  686. _______________________________________
  687. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  688.  
  689. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  690.  
  691. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  692.  
  693. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  694. _______________________________________
  695. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  696.  
  697.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  698. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  699. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  700. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  701. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  702. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  703. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  704.  
  705. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  706.  
  707. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  708.  
  709. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  710. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  711. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  712.  
  713. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  714.  
  715. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  716.  
  717. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  718.  
  719.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  720. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  721.  
  722. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  723.  
  724. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  725.  
  726. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  727.  
  728. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  729.  
  730.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  731. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  732. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  733. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  734.  
  735. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  736.  
  737. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  738.  
  739. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  740.  
  741. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  742.  
  743. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  744.  
  745. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  746.  
  747. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  748.  
  749. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  750.  
  751. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  752.  
  753. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  754.  
  755. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  756.  
  757. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  758. _______________________________________
  759. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  760.  
  761. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  762. _______________________________________
  763. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  764.  
  765. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  766.  
  767. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  768.  
  769. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  770.  
  771. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  772.  
  773. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  774. _______________________________________
  775. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  776.  
  777. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  778.  
  779. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  780.  
  781. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  782. _______________________________________
  783. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  784.  
  785. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  786. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  787. _______________________________________
  788. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  789. With Malware ::
  790.  
  791.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  792. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  793. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  794. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  795. level of human oversight in the process.
  796.  
  797.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  798. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  799. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  800. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  801. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  802. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  803. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  804. Internet and phone networks.
  805.  
  806. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  807. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  808. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  809. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  810. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  811. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  812. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  813. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  814. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  815.  
  816.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  817. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  818. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  819. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  820. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  821. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  822.  
  823.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  824. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  825. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  826. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  827. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  828. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  829. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  830. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  831. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  832. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  833. instead of individually.�
  834.  
  835. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  836.  
  837. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  838.  
  839.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  840. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  841. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  842. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  843. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  844. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  845. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  846. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  847. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  848. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  849. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  850. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  851. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  852. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  853. execute endpoint operations.�
  854.  
  855. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  856.  
  857.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  858. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  859. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  860. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  861.  
  862.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  863. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  864. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  865. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  866. looks suspicious.
  867.  
  868.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  869. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  870. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  871. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  872. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  873.  
  874.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  875. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  876. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  877. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  878. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  879. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  880. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  881.  
  882.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  883. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  884. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  885. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  886. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  887. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  888. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  889. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  890. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  891. in action.
  892.  
  893. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  894. Computers for Surveillance ::
  895.  
  896. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  897.  
  898. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  899.  
  900. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  901.  
  902.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  903. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  904. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  905. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  906. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  907. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  908.  
  909. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  910.  
  911. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  912. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  913. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  914. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  915. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  916. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  917. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  918. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  919. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  920. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  921.  
  922. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  923.  
  924. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  925.  
  926. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  927.  
  928. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  929. _______________________________________
  930. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  931.  
  932. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  933. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  934. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  935. _______________________________________
  936. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  937.  
  938. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  939. _______________________________________
  940. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  941.  
  942.  Alliances between security services are usually
  943. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  944. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  945. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  946. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  947. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  948. internet traffic.
  949.  
  950.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  951. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  952. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  953. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  954. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  955.  
  956.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  957. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  958. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  959. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  960. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  961. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  962.  
  963.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  964. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  965. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  966. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  967. Americans may possibly use the information for
  968. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  969. by attacking them with armed drones.
  970.  
  971. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  972.  
  973. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  974. _______________________________________
  975. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  976.  
  977. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  978.  
  979. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  980. ---------------------------------------
  981. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  982.  
  983. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  984.  
  985. � NSA Spies Too ::
  986.  
  987. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  988. _______________________________________
  989. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  990.  
  991. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  992.  
  993. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  994.  
  995.  The documents show that images were collected
  996. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  997. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  998. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  999. programs.
  1000.  
  1001. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  1002. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  1003. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  1004. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  1005.  
  1006. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  1007.  
  1008. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  1009. _______________________________________
  1010. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  1011.  
  1012. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  1013. _______________________________________
  1014. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  1015.  
  1016. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  1017.  
  1018. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  1019. _______________________________________
  1020. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  1021. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  1022.  
  1023. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  1024.  
  1025. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  1026. _______________________________________
  1027. � NSA Observer ::
  1028.  
  1029. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  1030. _______________________________________
  1031. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  1032.  
  1033. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  1034.  
  1035. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  1036. _______________________________________
  1037. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  1038.  
  1039. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  1040.  
  1041. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  1042. _______________________________________
  1043. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  1044.  
  1045. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  1046.  
  1047. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  1048.  
  1049. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  1050.  
  1051. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  1052. _______________________________________
  1053. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  1054.  
  1055.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  1056. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  1057. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  1058. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  1059. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  1060. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  1061. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  1062. targets without confirming their veracity on
  1063. the ground.
  1064.  
  1065. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  1066. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  1067. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  1068. _______________________________________
  1069. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  1070.  
  1071.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  1072. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  1073. shows that an American law firm was
  1074. monitored while representing a foreign
  1075. government in trade disputes with the
  1076. United States. The disclosure offers a
  1077. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  1078. which Americans were ensnared by the
  1079. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  1080. interest because lawyers in the United
  1081. States with clients overseas have
  1082. expressed growing concern that their
  1083. confidential communications could be
  1084. compromised by such surveillance.
  1085.  
  1086. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  1087. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  1088. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  1089.  
  1090. NOBODY comments
  1091.  
  1092. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  1093.  
  1094.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  1095. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  1096. be declassified for research in public domain.
  1097. _______________________________________
  1098. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  1099.  
  1100. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  1101.  
  1102. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  1103.  
  1104. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  1105. _______________________________________
  1106. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  1107.  
  1108. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  1109. _______________________________________
  1110. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  1111. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  1112.  
  1113.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  1114. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  1115. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  1116. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  1117. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  1118.  
  1119. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  1120. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  1121. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  1122.  
  1123. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  1124. the German Chancellor ::
  1125.  
  1126. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  1127. _______________________________________
  1128. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  1129. Phone Call Spying ::
  1130.  
  1131. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  1132.  
  1133. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  1134. _______________________________________
  1135. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  1136.  
  1137. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  1138. _______________________________________
  1139. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  1140.  
  1141. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  1142. _______________________________________
  1143.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  1144. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  1145. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  1146. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  1147. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  1148. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  1149.  
  1150. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  1151. ���������������������������������������
  1152. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  1153.  
  1154. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  1155.  
  1156. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  1157.  
  1158. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  1159.  
  1160. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  1161.  
  1162. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  1163.  
  1164.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  1165. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  1166. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  1167. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  1168. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  1169. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  1170. left the terminal.
  1171.  
  1172.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  1173. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  1174. clandestine operation by the Communications
  1175. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  1176. certainly illegal. ... ...
  1177.  
  1178.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  1179. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  1180. software program CSEC was developing with help
  1181. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  1182.  
  1183.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  1184. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  1185. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  1186. into other cities/regions.�
  1187.  
  1188. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  1189.  
  1190.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  1191. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  1192.  
  1193. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  1194.  
  1195. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  1196.  
  1197. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  1198.  
  1199. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  1200.  
  1201. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  1202. _______________________________________
  1203. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  1204.  
  1205. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  1206.  
  1207. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  1208.  
  1209. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  1210. _______________________________________
  1211. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  1212.  
  1213.  Documents taken from the National Security
  1214. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  1215. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  1216. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  1217. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  1218. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  1219. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  1220. information, for analysis. At the time the
  1221. documents were printed, they were also able to
  1222. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  1223.  
  1224.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  1225. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  1226. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  1227. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  1228. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  1229. visits. The monitoring program is called
  1230. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  1231.  
  1232.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  1233. British had to have been either physically able
  1234. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  1235. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  1236. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  1237. and would be able to extract some key data
  1238. about specific users as well.
  1239.  
  1240. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  1241. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  1242. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  1243. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  1244. _______________________________________
  1245. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  1246.  
  1247. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  1248. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  1249. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  1250.  
  1251. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  1252.  
  1253.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  1254. on the iPhone alone.�
  1255.  
  1256. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  1257.  
  1258. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  1259.  
  1260. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  1261.  
  1262. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  1263. _______________________________________
  1264. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  1265.  
  1266.  The National Security Agency program that
  1267. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  1268. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  1269. Thursday in a newly released report.
  1270.  
  1271. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  1272.  
  1273.  �We have not identified a single instance
  1274. involving a threat to the United States in
  1275. which the program made a concrete difference
  1276. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  1277. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  1278. report released Thursday.
  1279.  
  1280.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  1281. domestic spying will continue.
  1282.  
  1283. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  1284. _______________________________________
  1285. � Snowden Speaks ::
  1286.  
  1287. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  1288. _______________________________________
  1289. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  1290.  
  1291. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  1292.  
  1293. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  1294.          ���
  1295. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  1296.  
  1297. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  1298.  
  1299.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  1300. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  1301. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  1302. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  1303. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  1304. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  1305. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  1306. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  1307. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  1308. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  1309. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  1310. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  1311. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  1312. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  1313. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  1314.  
  1315. Reform?
  1316.  
  1317.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  1318. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  1319. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  1320. whether legal or not?
  1321.  
  1322. The reform will come from people taking action.
  1323.  
  1324.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  1325. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  1326. _______________________________________
  1327. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  1328.  
  1329. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  1330. _______________________________________
  1331. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  1332.  
  1333.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  1334. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  1335. main internet cables:
  1336.  
  1337.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  1338.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  1339.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  1340.  
  1341. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  1342. ---------------------------------------
  1343. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  1344. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  1345. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  1346. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  1347. _______________________________________
  1348. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  1349.  
  1350. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  1351.  
  1352. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  1353.  
  1354. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  1355. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  1356. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  1357. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  1358. ---------------------------------------
  1359. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1360. _______________________________________
  1361. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  1362.  
  1363. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  1364.  
  1365. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  1366.  
  1367. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  1368.  
  1369.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  1370. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  1371. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  1372. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  1373.  
  1374.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  1375. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  1376. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  1377. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  1378.  
  1379.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  1380. text message database to extract information
  1381. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  1382. transactions and more � including of individuals
  1383. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  1384.  
  1385. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  1386. _______________________________________
  1387. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  1388.  
  1389. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  1390.  
  1391. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  1392.  
  1393.  The technology, which the agency has used
  1394. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  1395. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  1396. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  1397. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  1398. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  1399. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  1400. set up miles away from the target.
  1401.  
  1402.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  1403. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  1404. American intelligence agencies for years:
  1405. getting into computers that adversaries,
  1406. and some American partners, have tried to
  1407. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  1408. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  1409. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  1410. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  1411. ---------------------------------------
  1412. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  1413.  
  1414. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  1415. _______________________________________
  1416. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  1417.  
  1418. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  1419. ---------------------------------------
  1420. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  1421.  
  1422. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  1423. _______________________________________
  1424. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  1425.  
  1426. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  1427. _______________________________________
  1428. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  1429.  
  1430. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  1431. _______________________________________
  1432. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  1433.  
  1434. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  1435. _______________________________________
  1436. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  1437. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  1438.  
  1439. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  1440.  
  1441. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  1442. _______________________________________
  1443. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  1444. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  1445.  
  1446. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  1447. _______________________________________
  1448. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  1449. All Encryption ::
  1450.  
  1451.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  1452. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  1453. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  1454. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  1455. used to protect banking, medical, business
  1456. and government records around the world.
  1457.  
  1458.  According to documents provided by former
  1459. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  1460. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  1461. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  1462. than classical computers � is part of a
  1463. $79.7 million research program titled
  1464. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  1465. work is hosted under classified contracts
  1466. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  1467.  
  1468. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  1469. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  1470. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  1471. _______________________________________
  1472. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  1473.  
  1474. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  1475. _______________________________________
  1476. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  1477.  
  1478. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  1479. _______________________________________
  1480. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  1481.  
  1482. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  1483.  
  1484. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  1485.  
  1486. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  1487.  
  1488. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  1489.  
  1490. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  1491.  
  1492. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  1493. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  1494. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  1495.  
  1496. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  1497.  
  1498.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  1499. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  1500. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  1501. infiltrates computers around the world and
  1502. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  1503. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  1504. it is targeting. ... ...
  1505.  
  1506. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  1507.  
  1508.  The insert method and other variants of
  1509. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  1510. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  1511. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  1512. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  1513. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  1514. also incorporates routers and servers
  1515. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  1516. network by infecting these networks with
  1517. �implants� that then allow the government
  1518. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  1519.  
  1520.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  1521. to identify and track its targets based on
  1522. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  1523. could include certain email addresses or
  1524. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  1525. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  1526. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  1527. additional information like an email address.
  1528. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  1529. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  1530. ---------------------------------------
  1531. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  1532.  
  1533. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  1534.  
  1535. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  1536.  
  1537.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  1538. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  1539. that are being logged into on that computer
  1540. as long as the user does not clear browser
  1541. cookies.�
  1542.  
  1543. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  1544.  
  1545. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  1546.  
  1547. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  1548. ---------------------------------------
  1549. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  1550.  
  1551.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  1552. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  1553. could be described as master carpenters for
  1554. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  1555. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  1556. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  1557. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  1558. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  1559. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  1560. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  1561. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  1562. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  1563. ability to establish a global covert network
  1564. that operates alongside the Internet.
  1565.  
  1566.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  1567. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  1568. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  1569. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  1570. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  1571. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  1572. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  1573. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  1574. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  1575. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  1576. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  1577. over $1 million.
  1578.  
  1579.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  1580. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  1581. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  1582. clear preference for planting their malicious
  1583. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  1584. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  1585. to load when a computer is turned on.
  1586.  
  1587.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  1588. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  1589. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  1590. to virus protection and other security programs.
  1591. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  1592. computer has been completely erased and a new
  1593. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  1594. can continue to function and ensures that new
  1595. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  1596. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  1597. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  1598. this approach has provided them with the
  1599. possibility of permanent access.
  1600.  
  1601.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  1602. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  1603. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  1604. with the exception of latter, are American
  1605. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  1606. intelligence agency is compromising the
  1607. technology and products of American companies.
  1608.  
  1609. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  1610. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  1611. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  1612. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  1613. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  1614.  
  1615. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  1616.  
  1617. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  1618.  
  1619. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  1620.  
  1621. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  1622.  
  1623. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  1624.  
  1625. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  1626.  
  1627. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  1628.  
  1629. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  1630.  
  1631. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  1632.  
  1633. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  1634.  
  1635. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  1636.  
  1637. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  1638.  
  1639. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  1640.  
  1641. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  1642.  
  1643. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  1644.  
  1645. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  1646.  
  1647. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  1648.  
  1649. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  1650.  
  1651. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  1652.  
  1653. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  1654.  
  1655. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  1656.  
  1657. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  1658.  
  1659. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  1660.  
  1661. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  1662.  
  1663. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  1664.  
  1665. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  1666. ---------------------------------------
  1667. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  1668.  
  1669. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  1670.  
  1671. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  1672.  
  1673. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  1674.  
  1675. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  1676. ---------------------------------------
  1677. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  1678.  
  1679. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  1680.  
  1681. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  1682.  
  1683.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  1684. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  1685. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  1686.  
  1687. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  1688.  
  1689. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  1690. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  1691.  
  1692.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  1693. in its operating system had left devices open
  1694. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  1695. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  1696. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  1697. of its mass spying program.
  1698.  
  1699. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  1700. ---------------------------------------
  1701. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  1702. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  1703.  
  1704. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  1705.  
  1706. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  1707. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  1708.  
  1709. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  1710.  
  1711. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  1712.  
  1713. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  1714.  
  1715.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  1716. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  1717.  
  1718. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  1719. _______________________________________
  1720. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  1721.  
  1722. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  1723.  
  1724. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  1725.  
  1726. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  1727. _______________________________________
  1728. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  1729.  
  1730. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  1731.  
  1732.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  1733. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  1734. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  1735. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  1736. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  1737. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  1738. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  1739. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  1740. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  1741. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  1742.  
  1743.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  1744. learn we are collecting more in the United
  1745. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  1746. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  1747. troubled, he said, and several said they
  1748. did not want to know any more.
  1749. ---------------------------------------
  1750. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  1751.  
  1752. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  1753. _______________________________________
  1754. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  1755. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  1756.  
  1757. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  1758. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  1759. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  1760. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  1761. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  1762. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  1763. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  1764. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  1765.  
  1766. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  1767.  
  1768.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  1769. National Security Agency program which
  1770. collects information on nearly all telephone
  1771. calls made to, from or within the United
  1772. States is likely unconstitutional.
  1773.  
  1774.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  1775. that the program appears to violate the
  1776. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  1777. searches and seizures. He also said the
  1778. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  1779. that collecting the information had helped
  1780. to head off terrorist attacks.
  1781.  
  1782.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  1783. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  1784. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  1785. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  1786. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  1787. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  1788. the order to allow for an appeal.
  1789.  
  1790. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  1791. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  1792.  
  1793.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  1794. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  1795. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  1796. in June in news stories based on leaks
  1797. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  1798. For seven years, the metadata program has
  1799. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  1800. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  1801. Court and found constitutional by at least
  1802. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  1803.  
  1804. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  1805.  
  1806. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  1807.  
  1808. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  1809.  
  1810. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  1811.  
  1812. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  1813.  
  1814. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  1815. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  1816.  
  1817. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  1818.  
  1819. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  1820.  
  1821. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  1822. ---------------------------------------
  1823. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  1824.  
  1825. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  1826.  
  1827. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  1828.  
  1829. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  1830. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  1831.  
  1832. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  1833. Spying Programs ::
  1834.  
  1835. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  1836. ---------------------------------------
  1837. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  1838. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  1839.  
  1840. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  1841.  
  1842. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  1843.  
  1844. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  1845. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  1846.  
  1847. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  1848.  
  1849. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  1850. _______________________________________
  1851. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  1852.  
  1853.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  1854. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  1855. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  1856.  
  1857. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  1858.  
  1859. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  1860.  
  1861.  - Military Information
  1862.  - Economic Information
  1863.  - Information Operations Information
  1864.  - Political Information �
  1865. _______________________________________
  1866. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  1867. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  1868.  
  1869. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  1870. ���������������������������������������
  1871. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  1872.  
  1873. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  1874.  
  1875. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  1876.  
  1877. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  1878.  
  1879. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  1880.  
  1881. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  1882.  
  1883. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  1884.  
  1885. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  1886.  
  1887. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  1888.  
  1889. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  1890. _______________________________________
  1891. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  1892. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  1893.  
  1894.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  1895. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  1896. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  1897. government access in order to make network
  1898. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  1899. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  1900. in millions of homes and businesses within
  1901. the UK,� the paper states.
  1902.  
  1903.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  1904. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  1905. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  1906. assigns all their modems an extra address
  1907. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  1908. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  1909. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  1910. a second IP address for management, except
  1911. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  1912. assigned to the United States Department
  1913. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  1914. of speculation that this is actually a
  1915. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  1916. they can secretly monitor and control
  1917. peoples� home networks.
  1918.  
  1919.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  1920. The better explanation is that BT simply
  1921. chose this address space because it�s
  1922. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  1923. address, it�s only used inside the private
  1924. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  1925. that address space, you�ll see that your
  1926. packets go nowhere.
  1927.  
  1928. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  1929. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  1930. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  1931.  
  1932. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  1933.  
  1934.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  1935. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  1936. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  1937. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  1938. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  1939. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  1940. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  1941. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  1942. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  1943. It�s past time for something new.�
  1944.  
  1945. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  1946. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  1947. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  1948. ---------------------------------------
  1949. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  1950.  
  1951.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  1952. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  1953. worldwide with malicious software designed
  1954. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  1955. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  1956. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  1957.  
  1958.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  1959. explains how the NSA collects information
  1960. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  1961. shows that the intelligence service uses
  1962. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  1963. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  1964. secret infiltration of computer systems
  1965. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  1966. software.
  1967.  
  1968.  One example of this type of hacking was
  1969. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  1970. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  1971. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  1972. has been installing this malicious software
  1973. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  1974. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  1975. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  1976. through a process of luring employees to a
  1977. false Linkedin page.
  1978.  
  1979. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  1980. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  1981. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  1982. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  1983.  
  1984. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  1985.  
  1986.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  1987. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  1988. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  1989. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  1990. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  1991. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  1992. and citizens.
  1993.  
  1994.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  1995. will deter this bounty of profits for
  1996. the comsec industry, unless the public
  1997. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  1998. the nettle, and all those making money
  1999. from this deception operation decide to
  2000. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  2001.  
  2002.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  2003. lists, those participating in standards
  2004. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  2005. grants in think tanks and universities,
  2006. those in law firms and public interest
  2007. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  2008. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  2009. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  2010. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  2011. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  2012. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  2013. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  2014. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  2015. contracts, list lurking, online and
  2016. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  2017. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  2018. fulfilled.
  2019.  
  2020. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  2021.  
  2022. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  2023.  
  2024. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  2025.  
  2026. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2027. ���������������������������������������
  2028. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  2029. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  2030.  
  2031. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  2032. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  2033. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  2034. _______________________________________
  2035. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  2036.  
  2037. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  2038.  
  2039. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  2040.  
  2041. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  2042.  
  2043. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  2044.  
  2045. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  2046. _______________________________________
  2047. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  2048.  
  2049. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  2050. _______________________________________
  2051. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  2052. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  2053.  
  2054. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  2055.  
  2056. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  2057. _______________________________________
  2058. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  2059.  
  2060. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  2061. _______________________________________
  2062. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  2063. of Public Concerns ::
  2064.  
  2065. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  2066.  
  2067. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  2068.  
  2069. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  2070. _______________________________________
  2071. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2072.  
  2073.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  2074. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  2075. of metadata about the world�s secure
  2076. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  2077. certainly not a program through which
  2078. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  2079. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  2080. services like Google, as reported by others,
  2081. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  2082. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  2083. Google are based on a small piece of a
  2084. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  2085. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  2086. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  2087. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  2088. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  2089. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  2090. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  2091. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  2092. by providing information about a target.�
  2093.  
  2094. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  2095.  
  2096. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  2097.  
  2098. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  2099. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  2100. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  2101. ���������������������������������������
  2102. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  2103.  
  2104. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  2105.  
  2106. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  2107. _______________________________________
  2108. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  2109.  
  2110. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  2111. ---------------------------------------
  2112. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  2113.  
  2114. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  2115.  
  2116.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  2117. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  2118. and later managed by big data corporations
  2119. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  2120.  
  2121.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  2122. large files across machines in a large
  2123. cluster.
  2124.  
  2125. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  2126.  
  2127.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  2128. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  2129. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  2130. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  2131.  
  2132.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  2133. major components, a central metadata server
  2134. and file servers from data.
  2135.  
  2136. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  2137.  
  2138. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  2139.  
  2140.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  2141. posted on public domain.
  2142.  
  2143. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  2144.  
  2145. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  2146. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  2147.  
  2148. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2149. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  2150. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  2151.  
  2152. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  2153.  
  2154. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  2155. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  2156. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  2157. ---------------------------------------
  2158. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  2159. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  2160.  
  2161. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  2162.  
  2163. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  2164.  
  2165. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  2166.  
  2167. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  2168.  
  2169. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  2170.  
  2171. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  2172.  
  2173. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  2174.  
  2175. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  2176.  
  2177. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  2178.  
  2179.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  2180. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  2181. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  2182. content of all our communications have
  2183. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  2184. program since the 1990s.
  2185.  
  2186.  The new details concern how, �The National
  2187. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  2188. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  2189. of cellphones around the world.�
  2190.  
  2191.  However, the report reveals itself to
  2192. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  2193. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  2194. does not target Americans� location data
  2195. by design, but the agency acquires a
  2196. substantial amount of information on
  2197. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  2198. �incidentally.�
  2199.  
  2200.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  2201. happens to record the locations of Americans
  2202. using data from their cellphones, and is
  2203. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  2204. surveillance, is yet another example of
  2205. damage control by the establishment.
  2206.  
  2207. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  2208. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  2209. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  2210. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  2211. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  2212. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  2213. ---------------------------------------
  2214. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  2215. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  2216.  
  2217.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  2218. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  2219. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  2220. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  2221. targets for government hacking and to
  2222. bolster surveillance.
  2223.  
  2224. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  2225. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  2226. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  2227. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  2228. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  2229. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  2230. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  2231. ---------------------------------------
  2232. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  2233.  
  2234. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  2235. ---------------------------------------
  2236. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  2237. In a World Without Cookies ::
  2238.  
  2239. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  2240. _______________________________________
  2241. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  2242.  
  2243. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  2244. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  2245. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  2246.  
  2247. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  2248.  
  2249. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  2250. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  2251. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  2252. _______________________________________
  2253. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  2254. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  2255.  
  2256. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  2257. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  2258. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  2259. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  2260. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  2261. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  2262.  
  2263. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  2264.  
  2265. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  2266.  
  2267. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  2268.  
  2269. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  2270.  
  2271. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  2272.  
  2273. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  2274.  
  2275. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  2276.  
  2277. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  2278.  
  2279. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  2280.  
  2281. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  2282.  
  2283. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  2284.  
  2285. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  2286. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  2287. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  2288.  
  2289. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  2290.  
  2291. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  2292. ---------------------------------------
  2293. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  2294.  
  2295. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  2296. ---------------------------------------
  2297. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  2298.  
  2299. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  2300.  
  2301. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  2302.  
  2303. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  2304.  
  2305. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  2306.  
  2307. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  2308.  
  2309. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  2310.  
  2311. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  2312. _______________________________________
  2313.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  2314. worldwide was published by the German
  2315. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  2316. map was put online by accident, but before
  2317. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  2318. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  2319. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  2320. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  2321. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  2322. the names of all other cities were blurred
  2323. by Der Spiegel.�
  2324.  
  2325.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  2326.  
  2327. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  2328.  
  2329. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  2330.  
  2331. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  2332.  
  2333. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  2334.  
  2335. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  2336.  
  2337. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  2338. ---------------------------------------
  2339. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  2340.  
  2341. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  2342.  
  2343. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  2344. _______________________________________
  2345. � Five Eyes ::
  2346.  
  2347. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  2348. _______________________________________
  2349. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  2350.  
  2351. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  2352. _______________________________________
  2353. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  2354. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  2355.  
  2356. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  2357.  
  2358. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  2359. _______________________________________
  2360. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  2361.  
  2362. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  2363.  
  2364. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  2365. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  2366. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  2367. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  2368. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  2369. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  2370. _______________________________________
  2371. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  2372.  
  2373.  September 11th, which also happened to
  2374. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  2375. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  2376. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  2377. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  2378. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  2379. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  2380. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  2381. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  2382. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  2383. itself.
  2384.  
  2385.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  2386. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  2387. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  2388. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  2389. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  2390. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  2391. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  2392. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  2393. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  2394. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  2395. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  2396. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  2397. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  2398. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  2399. its workforce by one-third, to about
  2400. 33,000. The number of private companies
  2401. it depended upon more than tripled during
  2402. that time.
  2403.  
  2404.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  2405. and the increasing reliance on the private
  2406. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  2407. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  2408. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  2409. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  2410. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  2411. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  2412. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  2413. getting those clearances. So you had
  2414. this huge apparatus being built, and
  2415. the government was just managing it.
  2416. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  2417. doing that.� ... ...
  2418.  
  2419.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  2420. workforce, the surveillance he would
  2421. later expose was becoming not just
  2422. institutionalized but very big business.
  2423. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  2424. the full flower of that massive, massive
  2425. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  2426. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  2427. could go.� ... ...
  2428.  
  2429.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  2430. leaking government secrets when he was
  2431. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  2432. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  2433. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  2434. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  2435. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  2436. policies that I thought would be reined
  2437. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  2438. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  2439. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  2440. the more he read �true information,�
  2441. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  2442. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  2443. surveillance program � the more he realized
  2444. that there were actually two governments:
  2445. the one that was elected, and the other,
  2446. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  2447. �If the highest officials in government
  2448. can break the law without fearing punishment
  2449. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  2450. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  2451.  
  2452. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  2453. _______________________________________
  2454. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  2455.  
  2456. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  2457. _______________________________________
  2458. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  2459.  
  2460. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  2461. _______________________________________
  2462. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  2463. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  2464.  
  2465.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  2466. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  2467. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  2468. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  2469. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  2470. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  2471. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  2472. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  2473. in terrorism.
  2474.  
  2475.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  2476. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  2477. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  2478. threatening national security. It is
  2479. successfully restricting release of the
  2480. Snowden material and will likely become
  2481. more forceful as releases continue to the
  2482. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  2483. to criminalize release as a national
  2484. security threat.
  2485.  
  2486. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  2487. _______________________________________
  2488. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  2489.  
  2490.  Includes most reports, slides and
  2491. documents all related to the recent
  2492. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  2493. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  2494. any information that comes out and
  2495. will provide updated archives from
  2496. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  2497.  
  2498.  After decompression - the folder is
  2499. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  2500. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  2501.  
  2502. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2503. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  2504.  
  2505. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  2506. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  2507. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  2508. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2509. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2510. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  2511. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  2512. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2513. _______________________________________
  2514. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  2515.  
  2516. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2517. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2518. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2519.  
  2520. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  2521. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  2522.  
  2523.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  2524. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  2525. Australians, and hands over the material
  2526. to the US and its closest allies, according
  2527. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  2528. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  2529. Australia web site.
  2530.  
  2531.  The document obtained by the former US
  2532. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  2533. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  2534. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  2535. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  2536. as well as the people and governments of
  2537. many Asian countries.
  2538.  
  2539.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  2540. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  2541. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  2542. global partners so-called metadata of
  2543. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  2544. address books and social media posts of
  2545. millions of people.
  2546.  
  2547.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  2548. the recent revelations, also from documents
  2549. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  2550. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  2551. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  2552. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  2553. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  2554. operate as electronic listening posts
  2555. for the US-led spying network.
  2556.  
  2557. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  2558. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  2559. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  2560. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  2561. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  2562. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  2563.  
  2564. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  2565. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  2566.  
  2567.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  2568. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  2569. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  2570. political figures has been furiously
  2571. denounced by other media outlets for
  2572. breaching �national security� and the
  2573. �national interest.� The reaction
  2574. underscores the extent to which the
  2575. media establishment has been integrated
  2576. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  2577.  
  2578.  On November 18, after being approached
  2579. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  2580. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  2581. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  2582. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  2583. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  2584. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  2585. senior political figures. The report
  2586. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  2587. crisis for the Australian government, with
  2588. the Indonesian president suspending military
  2589. and intelligence cooperation.
  2590.  
  2591. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  2592. _______________________________________
  2593. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  2594.  
  2595.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  2596. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  2597. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  2598. allowed the largest American spy agency
  2599. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  2600. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  2601.  
  2602.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  2603. by CBC News.
  2604.  
  2605.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  2606. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  2607. a security command post during a six-day
  2608. spying operation by the National Security
  2609. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  2610. other foreign heads of government were on
  2611. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  2612.  
  2613.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  2614. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  2615.  
  2616.  The world was still struggling to climb
  2617. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  2618. were debating a wide array of possible
  2619. measures including a global tax on banks,
  2620. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  2621. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  2622. eventually scotched.
  2623.  
  2624. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  2625. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  2626. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  2627. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  2628. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  2629.  
  2630. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  2631. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  2632.  
  2633. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  2634.  
  2635.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  2636. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  2637.  
  2638. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  2639.  
  2640. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  2641.  
  2642. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  2643.  
  2644. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  2645. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  2646.  
  2647. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  2648.  
  2649. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  2650.  
  2651. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  2652.  
  2653. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  2654. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  2655.  
  2656. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  2657.  
  2658. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  2659.  
  2660.  The politicians and corporate media
  2661. would have Canadians believe that they
  2662. have only �moved on� from discussing
  2663. CSEC�s activities because there is
  2664. nothing for Canadians to worry about.
  2665.  
  2666.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool
  2667. of the Canadian ruling class that plays
  2668. an important role in the pursuit of its
  2669. imperialist foreign policy and in the
  2670. surveillance and suppression of opposition
  2671. at home. The size of CSEC�s staff�it
  2672. employs almost 2,000 people and a further
  2673. thousand military personnel assist its
  2674. work�give an inkling of the scale of
  2675. its activities.
  2676.  
  2677.  These include everything from supporting
  2678. the overseas operations of the Canadian
  2679. military, to spying on governments that
  2680. are reputed allies of Canada and assisting
  2681. CSIS and the RCMP in conducting a vast
  2682. program of domestic surveillance. Of
  2683. especial importance is the CSEC�s
  2684. partnership with the NSA. According to
  2685. former NSA technical director William
  2686. Binney, the two organizations �have
  2687. integrated personnel� i.e. swap personnel
  2688. to improve seamless collaboration. They
  2689. also share Internet surveillance programs.
  2690.  
  2691.  As a further element of its collaboration
  2692. with the Five Eyes alliance, CSEC was
  2693. relied on in the project of spying on
  2694. diplomats and officials during the 2009
  2695. London G20 meeting according to a report
  2696. in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  2697. which was based on documents supplied
  2698. by Snowden. The highly sensitive operation
  2699. involved the penetration of delegates�
  2700. smartphones to monitor their email
  2701. messages and calls.
  2702.  
  2703. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  2704.  
  2705. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  2706.  
  2707. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  2708.  
  2709. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  2710. _______________________________________
  2711. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  2712.  
  2713. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  2714.  
  2715. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  2716.  
  2717. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  2718. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  2719. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  2720.  
  2721. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  2722.  
  2723. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  2724.  
  2725. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  2726.  
  2727. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  2728. _______________________________________
  2729.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  2730. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  2731. in theory � forbid local governments from
  2732. providing services to federal agencies
  2733. that collect electronic data from Americans
  2734. without a personalized warrant.
  2735.  
  2736.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  2737. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  2738. but at least one legislator has committed
  2739. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  2740. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  2741. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  2742. is introduced.
  2743.  
  2744.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  2745. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  2746. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  2747. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  2748. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  2749. and a handful of other groups.
  2750.  
  2751.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  2752. Maharrey adds.
  2753.  
  2754. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  2755. _______________________________________
  2756. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  2757. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  2758.  
  2759.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  2760. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  2761. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  2762. US and British intelligence � particularly
  2763. their cooperation in data collection and
  2764. snooping programs involving British citizens
  2765. and close allies on the European continent.
  2766.  
  2767.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  2768. to account by British authorities for
  2769. jeopardizing national security. The
  2770. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  2771. is being forced to appear before a
  2772. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  2773. the news outlet�s actions.
  2774.  
  2775. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2776. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  2777. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  2778.  
  2779. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  2780.  
  2781. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2782.  
  2783. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  2784. as the British Dictatorship ::
  2785.  
  2786.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  2787. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  2788. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  2789. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  2790. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  2791. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  2792. seems the United States is reaching the event
  2793. horizon to a police state.
  2794.  
  2795. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  2796.  
  2797. Cryptome noted
  2798.  
  2799.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  2800. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  2801. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  2802. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  2803. UKG), although there could be some which have
  2804. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  2805. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  2806.  
  2807.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  2808. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  2809. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  2810. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  2811. deception, co-optation.
  2812.  
  2813.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  2814. had access, or suspected of access, are
  2815. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  2816. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  2817. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  2818. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  2819. standard coercive means of authorities.
  2820.  
  2821.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  2822. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  2823. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  2824. advised successive cooperators, usually
  2825. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  2826. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  2827. participation.
  2828.  
  2829.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  2830. disputes and disagreements among competing
  2831. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  2832. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  2833. along with threats against families, friends
  2834. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  2835. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  2836. with authorities, including use of rewards
  2837. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  2838.  
  2839. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  2840. _______________________________________
  2841. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  2842.  
  2843. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  2844. _______________________________________
  2845. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  2846. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  2847. Governments ::
  2848.  
  2849. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  2850. _______________________________________
  2851. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  2852. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  2853.  
  2854. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  2855. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  2856. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  2857. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  2858. _______________________________________
  2859. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  2860.  
  2861. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  2862.  
  2863. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  2864.  
  2865. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  2866.  
  2867. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  2868.  
  2869. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  2870.  
  2871. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  2872.  
  2873. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  2874.  
  2875. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  2876.  
  2877. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  2878.  
  2879. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  2880.  
  2881. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  2882.  
  2883. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  2884.  
  2885. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  2886.  
  2887. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  2888.  
  2889. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  2890.  
  2891. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  2892. Steal Email Metadata ::
  2893.  
  2894.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  2895. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  2896. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  2897. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  2898.  
  2899.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  2900. servers around the world, reducing the
  2901. chance of losing your information should
  2902. one fail. When you log in to an account
  2903. with these firms, the data sent between
  2904. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  2905. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  2906. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  2907. And because many of the transfers take place
  2908. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  2909. isn�t required to tap the information.
  2910.  
  2911.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  2912. broken into the main communications links
  2913. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  2914. around the world, according to documents
  2915. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  2916. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  2917. officials.
  2918.  
  2919.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  2920. positioned itself to collect at will from
  2921. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  2922. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  2923. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  2924. but it keeps a lot.
  2925.  
  2926.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  2927. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  2928. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  2929. counterpart, the Government Communications
  2930. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  2931. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  2932. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  2933. that carry information among the data
  2934. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  2935.  
  2936. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  2937. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  2938. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  2939. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  2940. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  2941.  
  2942. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  2943.  
  2944.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  2945. email collecting program �does not apply
  2946. to US citizens.�
  2947.  
  2948.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  2949. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  2950. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  2951. accounts around the world, many of them
  2952. belonging to Americans, according to
  2953. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  2954. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  2955. Edward Snowden.
  2956.  
  2957.  The collection program, which has not
  2958. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  2959. address books and �buddy lists� from
  2960. instant messaging services as they move
  2961. across global data links. Online services
  2962. often transmit those contacts when a user
  2963. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  2964. a computer or mobile device with information
  2965. stored on remote servers.
  2966.  
  2967. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  2968. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  2969. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  2970.  
  2971. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  2972.  
  2973. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  2974.  
  2975. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  2976.  
  2977. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  2978. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  2979. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  2980. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  2981. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  2982. ���������������������������������������
  2983. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  2984.  
  2985. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  2986.  
  2987. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  2988. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  2989.  
  2990. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  2991.  
  2992. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  2993.  
  2994. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  2995.  
  2996. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  2997.  
  2998. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  2999.  
  3000. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  3001.  
  3002. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  3003.  
  3004. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  3005.  
  3006. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  3007.  
  3008. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  3009.  
  3010. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  3011.  
  3012. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  3013.  
  3014. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  3015. ---------------------------------------
  3016. NOBODY comments ?
  3017.  
  3018.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  3019. differs from the Guardians.
  3020.  
  3021. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3022.  
  3023. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  3024.  
  3025. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  3026.  
  3027. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  3028.  
  3029.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  3030. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  3031. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  3032.  
  3033.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  3034. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  3035. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  3036. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  3037. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  3038. ---------------------------------------
  3039. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  3040.  
  3041. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  3042.  
  3043. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3044.  
  3045.  This was written from a person who purports
  3046. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  3047.  
  3048. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  3049.  
  3050. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  3051.  
  3052. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  3053.  
  3054. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  3055. Misleading ::
  3056.  
  3057. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  3058.  
  3059. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  3060. on NSA Spying ::
  3061.  
  3062. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  3063.  
  3064.  �Recent articles published in the
  3065. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  3066. inaccurate and misleading information
  3067. regarding US foreign intelligence
  3068. activities. The allegation that the
  3069. National Security Agency collected more
  3070. than 70 million �recordings of French
  3071. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  3072.  
  3073.  While we are not going to discuss the
  3074. details of our activities, we have
  3075. repeatedly made it clear that the
  3076. United States gathers intelligence of
  3077. the type gathered by all nations. The
  3078. US collects intelligence to protect the
  3079. nation, its interests, and its allies
  3080. from, among other things, threats such
  3081. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  3082. weapons of mass destruction.
  3083.  
  3084.  The United States values our longstanding
  3085. friendship and alliance with France and
  3086. we will continue to cooperate on security
  3087. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  3088.  
  3089. James R. Clapper
  3090. Director of National Intelligence
  3091. ---------------------------------------
  3092. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  3093.  
  3094. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  3095.  
  3096.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  3097. a call without leaving a record with the
  3098. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  3099. or leaves America without passing through
  3100. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  3101. statement Thursday.
  3102.  
  3103.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  3104. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  3105. _______________________________________
  3106. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  3107. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  3108.  
  3109.  US and British intelligence officials
  3110. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  3111. collection of highly classified, heavily
  3112. encrypted materials they believe former
  3113. National Security Agency contractor
  3114. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  3115.  
  3116.  One source saw the cache of documents
  3117. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  3118. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  3119. other harm. ... ...
  3120.  
  3121.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  3122. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  3123. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  3124. that �if anything happens at all to
  3125. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  3126. to get access to the full archives.�
  3127.  
  3128. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  3129. _______________________________________
  3130. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  3131. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  3132.  
  3133.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  3134. government surveillance policies. But he
  3135. is not disclosing those changes to the
  3136. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  3137. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  3138. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  3139. World Bank and the International Monetary
  3140. Fund? He won�t say.
  3141.  
  3142.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  3143. to review and recommend changes to his
  3144. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  3145.  
  3146. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  3147. _______________________________________
  3148. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  3149.  
  3150.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  3151. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  3152. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  3153. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  3154. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  3155.  
  3156.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  3157. broad goals, the five-page document said
  3158. that existing American laws were not adequate
  3159. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  3160. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  3161. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  3162. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  3163. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  3164. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  3165. pace with the complexity of the technology
  3166. and target environments, or the operational
  3167. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  3168. document concluded.
  3169.  
  3170. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  3171. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  3172. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  3173. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  3174. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  3175.  
  3176. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  3177.  
  3178.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  3179. called Treasure Map and describes its
  3180. capabilities but does not publish visual
  3181. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  3182. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  3183. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  3184.  
  3185. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  3186. _______________________________________
  3187. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  3188.  
  3189. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  3190. _______________________________________
  3191. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  3192.  
  3193. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  3194.  
  3195. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  3196.  
  3197. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  3198.  
  3199.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  3200. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  3201. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  3202. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  3203. the door to a variety of spying options.
  3204.  
  3205. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  3206. _______________________________________
  3207. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  3208.  
  3209.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  3210. collection of solely domestic communications
  3211. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  3212. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  3213. request each week until we receive your
  3214. response,� EPIC said.
  3215.  
  3216.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  3217. said this week that it would not be hearing
  3218. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  3219. early Monday in which the high court listed
  3220. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  3221. as denied.
  3222.  
  3223. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  3224.  
  3225. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  3226. _______________________________________
  3227. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  3228.  
  3229. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  3230.  
  3231. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  3232. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  3233.  
  3234. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  3235.  
  3236. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  3237.  
  3238. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  3239. No Privacy ::
  3240.  
  3241. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  3242.  
  3243. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  3244. Spying Programs ::
  3245.  
  3246. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  3247.  
  3248. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  3249.  
  3250. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  3251.  
  3252. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  3253. _______________________________________
  3254. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  3255.  
  3256. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3257.  
  3258. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  3259.  
  3260. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  3261.  
  3262. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3263.  
  3264. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  3265.  
  3266. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  3267.  
  3268. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  3269.  
  3270.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  3271. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  3272. or indigenous cryptographic information
  3273. security devices or systems in order to
  3274. make them exploitable.�
  3275.  
  3276. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  3277.  
  3278.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  3279. successfully exploits cryptographic
  3280. components of commercial information
  3281. security devices or systems when the
  3282. device or system specified.�
  3283.  
  3284. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3285.  
  3286. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  3287.  
  3288. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  3289.  
  3290. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3291. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3292. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  3293.  
  3294. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  3295.  
  3296.  US and British intelligence agencies
  3297. have successfully cracked much of the
  3298. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  3299. of millions of people to protect the
  3300. privacy of their personal data, online
  3301. transactions and emails, according to
  3302. top-secret documents revealed by former
  3303. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  3304.  
  3305.  Those methods include covert measures
  3306. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  3307. international encryption standards, the
  3308. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  3309. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  3310. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  3311. technology companies and internet service
  3312. providers themselves.
  3313.  
  3314.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  3315. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  3316. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  3317. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  3318.  
  3319.  Independent security experts have long
  3320. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  3321. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  3322. confirmed for the first time by another
  3323. secret document. It shows the agency
  3324. worked covertly to get its own version
  3325. of a draft security standard issued by
  3326. the US National Institute of Standards
  3327. and Technology approved for worldwide
  3328. use in 2006.
  3329.  
  3330. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  3331.  
  3332. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  3333.  
  3334. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3335.  
  3336. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  3337.  
  3338. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  3339.  
  3340. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  3341.  
  3342. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3343.  
  3344. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3345.  
  3346. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  3347. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  3348. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  3349.  
  3350. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3351.  
  3352. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  3353. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  3354.  
  3355. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3356.  
  3357. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  3358.  
  3359. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  3360.  
  3361. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  3362.  
  3363. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  3364. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  3365.  
  3366. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  3367.  
  3368. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  3369.  
  3370.  A range of US hardware and software
  3371. companies are in danger of being dragged
  3372. into the widening scandal over internet
  3373. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  3374. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  3375. Security Agency contractor.
  3376.  
  3377.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  3378. that it has collaborated with technology
  3379. companies to plant �back doors� into
  3380. their systems � or ways for the agency
  3381. secretly to penetrate systems without
  3382. the users� knowledge.
  3383.  
  3384. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  3385.  
  3386. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  3387.  
  3388. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  3389. _______________________________________
  3390. � SSL Inspector ::
  3391.  
  3392. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  3393.  
  3394. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  3395.  
  3396. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  3397. _______________________________________
  3398. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  3399. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  3400.  
  3401. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  3402.  
  3403. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  3404.  
  3405. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  3406.  
  3407. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  3408.  
  3409. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  3410.  
  3411. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  3412.  
  3413. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  3414.  
  3415. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  3416.  
  3417. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  3418. ���������������������������������������
  3419. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  3420. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  3421.  
  3422. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  3423. ���������������������������������������
  3424. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  3425.  
  3426.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  3427. activities is an obscure organization called
  3428. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  3429. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  3430. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  3431. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  3432. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  3433. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  3434. presentation given to journalists by former
  3435. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  3436. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  3437. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  3438. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  3439. be collected, which is then gathered and
  3440. delivered by the DITU.
  3441.  
  3442.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  3443. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  3444. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  3445. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  3446. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  3447. collection, processing, and reporting.
  3448.  
  3449. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  3450.  
  3451. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  3452.  
  3453. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  3454. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  3455. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3456.  
  3457.  
  3458. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  3459.  
  3460. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3461. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3462. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3463.  
  3464. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  3465.  
  3466. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  3467.  
  3468. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  3469.  
  3470. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  3471.  
  3472. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  3473.  
  3474. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  3475.  
  3476.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  3477. by the NSA.
  3478.  
  3479.  During the summer, the documents provided
  3480. to the Guardian and the Washington Post by
  3481. former NSA employee Edward Snowden helped
  3482. unveil the extent of surveillance and
  3483. espionage carried out by the NSA and its
  3484. allies. Le Monde also now has access to
  3485. some of these documents.
  3486.  
  3487.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most
  3488. secretive intelligence agencies of the
  3489. United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  3490. who was granted an asylum for a year in
  3491. Russia. Wanting to denounce "the largest
  3492. program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  3493. history," the American working for a
  3494. subcontractor of the NSA has obtained
  3495. several thousands of highly confidential
  3496. documents.
  3497.  
  3498.  In early June, the first secrets of the
  3499. National Security Agency in these parts
  3500. start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  3501. that the telephone operator Verizon
  3502. provides NSA phone data of several
  3503. million Americans, according to a court
  3504. order secret. Then it was the turn of
  3505. the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  3506. allows the US Secret Service, and first
  3507. and foremost to the NSA, to access a
  3508. privileged manner, since December 2007,
  3509. data from nine major Internet companies,
  3510. including Google, Facebook and Microsoft.
  3511.  
  3512. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  3513.  
  3514.  A document providing internal training
  3515. on Prism, which Le Monde has also had
  3516. access, how the NSA analysts can query
  3517. the databases of Web giants, research
  3518. documents, emails or instant discussions.
  3519. All within a legal framework that
  3520. overcomes the request of an individual
  3521. mandate. The companies named in the
  3522. documents have denied that the NSA
  3523. had a direct and unilateral access to
  3524. their servers.
  3525.  
  3526.  In addition to this targeted surveillance,
  3527. Snowden records reveal another method of
  3528. massive collection of the NSA called
  3529. Upstream. This system can collect data
  3530. from the submarine cable and Internet
  3531. infrastructures. A logical strategy,
  3532. when we know that 99% of global
  3533. communications now pass through diving.
  3534.  
  3535.  To learn more about the context of the
  3536. revelations of the World, the editorial
  3537. read : "Fight Big Brother"
  3538.  
  3539.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the
  3540. Government Communications Headquarters
  3541. (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system,
  3542. because of the historical proximity of
  3543. Great Britain and the United States,
  3544. confidentiality agreements and a financial
  3545. dependence of those services from London
  3546. to Washington. There are also technical
  3547. reasons : a significant portion of
  3548. submarine cables linking Europe to
  3549. America through Britain. With Edward
  3550. Snowden, the Tempora program , which
  3551. aims to "control the Internet" by
  3552. monitoring these cables, has been
  3553. revealed. "You're in an enviable
  3554. position, says a document presenting
  3555. Tempora, presented by the Guardian,
  3556. have fun and pull in the best." Turning
  3557. a page of the document presenting the
  3558. Prism program, we discover Upstream
  3559. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview,
  3560. and oakstar Stormbrew ) which we know to
  3561. date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  3562. would largely on intercepted telephone
  3563. conversations via the major US carriers.
  3564.  
  3565. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  3566.  
  3567.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass
  3568. of intercepted data. One of them is called
  3569. XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  3570. detailed in the columns of the Guardian.
  3571. The extreme precision of the data are
  3572. clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  3573. the content of e-mails to a list of
  3574. websites visited by their target or the
  3575. keywords entered by the latter in the
  3576. search engines.
  3577.  
  3578.  The framework for this research is not
  3579. binding, as the Guardian explained, and
  3580. many Americans are data made available to
  3581. agents. According to the presentation
  3582. materials, to promote the capabilities
  3583. of the tool, three hundred terrorists
  3584. have been arrested since 2008 thanks to
  3585. XKeyscore.
  3586.  
  3587.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their
  3588. considerable resources monitoring the
  3589. fight against terrorism, but also to
  3590. spy allies. At the G20 summit in London
  3591. in 2009, computers of diplomats and heads
  3592. of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well
  3593. as some of their phone calls. NSA, she
  3594. focused on the European Union (EU), as
  3595. revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the
  3596. basis of documents Snowden. NSA has
  3597. installed cookies on the premises of
  3598. the EU representation in Washington.
  3599. The EU delegation to the UN in New York,
  3600. and the building of the Council of the
  3601. European Union in Brussels were also
  3602. scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil
  3603. is also one of the countries affected
  3604. by this intelligence. According to
  3605. Brazilian media group O Globo, its
  3606. political leaders as some companies
  3607. have been targeted.
  3608.  
  3609.  The Snowden documents have informed
  3610. the considerable efforts made by the
  3611. United States to start listening to
  3612. Internet, in a sometimes unclear legal
  3613. framework and often away from real
  3614. democratic debate. Interviewed by
  3615. Le Monde, the US authorities have
  3616. assured that the Prism program was
  3617. the subject of a parliamentary debate
  3618. in the United States and was working
  3619. in a strictly regulated legal framework.
  3620. Asked on September 12 revelations
  3621. Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director
  3622. of National Intelligence, said: "What
  3623. happened - and that is harmful -
  3624. sparked conversation and debate that
  3625. it probably was necessary."
  3626. _______________________________________
  3627. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  3628.  
  3629. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  3630.  
  3631. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  3632.  
  3633. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  3634.  
  3635. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  3636. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  3637.  
  3638. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  3639.  
  3640. NOBODY comments
  3641.  
  3642.  100% expected. They will continue to
  3643. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  3644. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  3645. We must adjust to it by learning how
  3646. to counter their surveillance.
  3647.  
  3648. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  3649. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  3650.  
  3651.  The United States and its key intelligence
  3652. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  3653. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  3654. Nations to promote a universal human right
  3655. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  3656. sources and an internal American government
  3657. document obtained by The Cable.
  3658.  
  3659.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  3660. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  3661. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  3662. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  3663. internet surveillance by the National
  3664. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  3665. services. American representatives have made
  3666. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  3667. checks on their global surveillance network.
  3668. The stakes are high, particularly in
  3669. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  3670. an international backlash against NSA
  3671. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  3672. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  3673. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  3674.  
  3675. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  3676.  
  3677. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  3678. _______________________________________
  3679. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  3680. Public News Coverage ::
  3681.  
  3682. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  3683. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  3684. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  3685. _______________________________________
  3686. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  3687. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  3688.  
  3689. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  3690. _______________________________________
  3691. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  3692.  
  3693.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  3694. a division for particularly difficult
  3695. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  3696. (TAO), this department devises special
  3697. methods for special targets.
  3698.  
  3699.  That category includes surveillance of
  3700. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  3701. the division reported its mission
  3702. accomplished. A report classified as
  3703. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  3704. exploited a key mail server in the
  3705. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  3706. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  3707. first-ever access to President Felipe
  3708. Calderon�s public email account.�
  3709.  
  3710. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  3711.  
  3712. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  3713.  
  3714. Cryptome comments ?
  3715.  
  3716.  This spying was apparently done from
  3717. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  3718. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  3719. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  3720. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  3721.  
  3722. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  3723.  
  3724. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  3725. _______________________________________
  3726. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  3727.  
  3728. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  3729.  
  3730. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  3731.  
  3732. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3733.  
  3734. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  3735.  
  3736. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3737.  
  3738. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  3739.  
  3740. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  3741.  
  3742. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  3743.  
  3744. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  3745.  
  3746. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  3747.  
  3748. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  3749.  
  3750.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  3751. thought that the NSA should use its
  3752. technology to intercept emails and
  3753. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  3754. terminal to another, and was upset to
  3755. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  3756. That was a line he would only cross,
  3757. deliberately, with court and congressional
  3758. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  3759. but as we now know, the agency added
  3760. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  3761. suspicious communications that transited
  3762. the border of the United States, and
  3763. later began to collect reams of metadata
  3764. in order to analyze it.
  3765.  
  3766.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  3767. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  3768. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  3769. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  3770. in order to provide policymakers with a
  3771. decision advantage. The advantage the
  3772. NSA provided was accurate information
  3773. about what people who interacted with
  3774. the United States said in private about
  3775. their intentions; that gap between saying
  3776. and doing, and the ability to predict
  3777. action from it, allows the president of
  3778. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  3779.  
  3780.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  3781. States� actions don�t always match up
  3782. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  3783. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  3784. our moral authority wanes and our
  3785. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  3786.  
  3787.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  3788. countries are any purer. They never have
  3789. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  3790. purer than others, so the amount of
  3791. resources the intelligence community
  3792. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  3793. to correspond with how honest our allies
  3794. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  3795. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  3796. can we figure out which allies are more
  3797. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  3798. correspondence between public and private
  3799. words and actions.
  3800.  
  3801.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  3802. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  3803. want their leaders to gain a decision
  3804. advantage in the give and take between
  3805. countries. They want to know what US
  3806. policymakers will do before the Americans
  3807. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  3808. France, they aggressively spy on the
  3809. United States, on US citizens and
  3810. politicians, in order to collect that
  3811. information. The difference lies in the
  3812. scale of intelligence collection: The
  3813. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  3814. most sophisticated intelligence community
  3815. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  3816. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  3817. envious.
  3818. _______________________________________
  3819. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  3820.  
  3821. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  3822. _______________________________________
  3823. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  3824.  
  3825. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  3826. ���������������������������������������
  3827. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  3828. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  3829.  
  3830. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  3831. _______________________________________
  3832. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  3833. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  3834.  
  3835. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  3836. _______________________________________
  3837.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  3838. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  3839. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  3840. from the award ceremony are the first of
  3841. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  3842. Russia.
  3843.  
  3844. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  3845. ���������������������������������������
  3846. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  3847.  
  3848.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  3849. of the Security Service, said the
  3850. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  3851. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  3852. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  3853. agencies.
  3854.  
  3855. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  3856.  
  3857. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  3858.  
  3859.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  3860. they are not using Tor.�
  3861.  
  3862. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  3863.  
  3864. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  3865. ---------------------------------------
  3866.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  3867. old bleach log.
  3868.  
  3869. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  3870. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  3871. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  3872. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  3873.  
  3874. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  3875.  
  3876.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  3877. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  3878. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  3879. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  3880. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  3881. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  3882. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  3883. function.
  3884.  
  3885.  There are also various third party
  3886. programs that can produce files in
  3887. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  3888. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  3889.  
  3890.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  3891. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  3892. data stored on the system running the
  3893. Flash player.�
  3894. ---------------------------------------
  3895. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  3896.  
  3897.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  3898. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  3899. It can be found within Windows systems
  3900. and can be wiped out here ;
  3901.  
  3902. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3903. Application Data\Macromedia\
  3904.  
  3905. and may also be cloned here ;
  3906.  
  3907. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  3908.  
  3909.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  3910. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  3911.  
  3912. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  3913.  
  3914. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3915. Local Settings\Temp\
  3916. ---------------------------------------
  3917. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  3918.  
  3919. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  3920.  
  3921. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  3922.  
  3923. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  3924.  
  3925. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  3926.  
  3927. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  3928.  
  3929. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  3930.  
  3931. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  3932.  
  3933. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  3934.  
  3935. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  3936.  
  3937. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  3938.  
  3939. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  3940.  
  3941. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  3942.  
  3943. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  3944.  
  3945. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  3946. ---------------------------------------
  3947. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  3948.  
  3949.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  3950. application created by Samy Kamkar
  3951. which produces zombie cookies in a
  3952. web browser that are intentionally
  3953. difficult to delete. ... ...
  3954.  
  3955.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  3956. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  3957. by copying itself in different forms on
  3958. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  3959. itself if it notices that some of the
  3960. copies are missing or expired.
  3961.  
  3962.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  3963. Evercookie uses the following storage
  3964. mechanisms when available:
  3965.  
  3966. � Standard HTTP cookies
  3967. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  3968. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  3969. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  3970. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  3971. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  3972. (cookies) back out
  3973. � Storing cookies in Web history
  3974. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  3975. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  3976. � window.name caching
  3977. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  3978. � HTML5 Session Storage
  3979. � HTML5 Local Storage
  3980. � HTML5 Global Storage
  3981. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  3982. ---------------------------------------
  3983. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  3984.  
  3985.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  3986. mean that your browser isn't storing
  3987. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  3988. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  3989. in browser vulnerabilities.
  3990.  
  3991.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  3992. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  3993. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  3994. wide surveillance.
  3995.  
  3996.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  3997. powerful anonymity service, and the
  3998. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  3999. the Internet, makes it easy to
  4000. differentiate Tor users from other
  4001. Web users,� he wrote.
  4002.  
  4003.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  4004. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  4005. identifies you. Even though your IP
  4006. address changed [because of Tor], the
  4007. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  4008.  
  4009. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  4010. ---------------------------------------
  4011. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  4012. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  4013.  
  4014.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  4015. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  4016. �staining� as a means to identify
  4017. individual machines linked to that
  4018. IP address. ... ...
  4019.  
  4020.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  4021. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  4022. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  4023. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  4024. and is stamped into every packet, which
  4025. enables all the events from that stained
  4026. machine to be brought back together to
  4027. recreate a browsing session.�
  4028.  
  4029. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  4030.  
  4031. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  4032.  
  4033. � Packet Staining ::
  4034.  
  4035. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  4036. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  4037. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  4038. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  4039.  
  4040. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  4041.  
  4042. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  4043. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  4044. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  4045. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  4046.  
  4047. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  4048.  
  4049.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  4050. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  4051. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  4052. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  4053. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  4054. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  4055. identify it. We also worked to create
  4056. a custom Tor client which allows the
  4057. user finer control.� ... ...
  4058.  
  4059.  �This accomplishes several things.
  4060. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  4061. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  4062. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  4063. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  4064. be excessively complex, as a single
  4065. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  4066. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  4067. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  4068. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  4069. going to and from the proxy server,
  4070. it is possible to deduce which clients
  4071. are making which requests. Second, if
  4072. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  4073. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  4074. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  4075. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  4076. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  4077. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  4078. must be coordinated across several machines,
  4079. and an attacker must own all the hops
  4080. along the circuit in order to trace
  4081. requests back to the originating client.�
  4082.  
  4083. ... ...
  4084.  
  4085.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  4086. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  4087. a hidden service will turn up the port
  4088. that the hidden service is using to deal
  4089. with incoming connections. It can then be
  4090. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  4091.  
  4092. ... ...
  4093.  
  4094.  �We would have to try to connect to
  4095. each of the ports we see open on a
  4096. machine to determine if there is a
  4097. hidden service being run. We would not
  4098. even know which protocol the hidden
  4099. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  4100. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  4101. etc. The only thing we know is that
  4102. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  4103. not enough to attempt to connect once
  4104. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  4105. Several protocols must be tried.�
  4106.  
  4107. ... ...
  4108.  
  4109.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  4110. directory servers in more detail. Our
  4111. work focused solely on the client, but
  4112. many attacks would be much easier with
  4113. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  4114. servers ultimately control which Tor
  4115. servers are used by clients. We have found
  4116. that a server can put itself on a directory
  4117. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  4118. server running several Tor processes, each
  4119. having a different nickname, open port,
  4120. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  4121. requires different configuration files
  4122. for the different processes, which are
  4123. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  4124. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  4125. since it is listed several times. This
  4126. increases the density of friendly servers
  4127. in the cloud without increasing the number
  4128. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  4129. each listing has the same IP address,
  4130. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  4131. who inspecting the directories.�
  4132.  
  4133. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  4134. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  4135. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  4136.  
  4137. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  4138.  
  4139. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  4140.  
  4141. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  4142.  
  4143. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  4144.  
  4145. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  4146.  
  4147.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  4148. into capabilities the IC has developed
  4149. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  4150. to run multiple research teams (either
  4151. known or unknown to each other) against
  4152. a single target, and a few summer students
  4153. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  4154. small investment. I�d expect there are
  4155. other programs with more sophisticated
  4156. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  4157.  
  4158. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  4159. _______________________________________
  4160. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  4161.  
  4162. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  4163. _______________________________________
  4164. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  4165. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  4166.  
  4167. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  4168.  
  4169.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  4170. the past several months, I�d also thought
  4171. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  4172. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  4173. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  4174. Sasso of The Hill.
  4175.  
  4176.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  4177. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  4178. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  4179. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  4180. help you with that.�
  4181.  
  4182. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  4183.  
  4184.  The conversation then turned specifically
  4185. to the government�s use of targeted
  4186. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  4187. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  4188. hope they make full use of the capacities
  4189. of the National Security Agency when we
  4190. do that.�
  4191.  
  4192.  Hayden was responding to a question
  4193. about a new project announced by journalists
  4194. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  4195. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  4196. assassinations.
  4197.  
  4198. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  4199. _______________________________________
  4200. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  4201.  
  4202. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  4203.  
  4204. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  4205.  
  4206. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  4207. _______________________________________
  4208. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  4209. Breaches ::
  4210.  
  4211. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  4212.  
  4213. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  4214.  
  4215. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  4216. _______________________________________
  4217. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  4218. of US Citizens ::
  4219.  
  4220.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  4221. body of knowledge in recent months about
  4222. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  4223. information concerning Americans, prompting
  4224. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  4225. in the agency and President Obama to order
  4226. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  4227. Almost everything about the agency�s
  4228. operations is hidden, and the decision
  4229. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  4230. was made in secret, without review by the
  4231. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  4232. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  4233. Department memo warned of the potential
  4234. for the �misuse� of such information
  4235. without adequate safeguards.
  4236.  
  4237. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  4238. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  4239. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  4240.  
  4241. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  4242. From American Social Networks ::
  4243.  
  4244. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  4245. _______________________________________
  4246. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  4247. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  4248.  
  4249. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  4250. _______________________________________
  4251. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  4252. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  4253.  
  4254.  Led by the German government, a loose
  4255. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  4256. across the world is pushing to update an
  4257. influential international human rights
  4258. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  4259.  
  4260. ... ...
  4261.  
  4262.  The annual conference was attended by a
  4263. diverse selection of privacy and data
  4264. protection officials from across the
  4265. world, with representatives attending
  4266. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  4267. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  4268. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  4269. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  4270. United Kingdom.
  4271.  
  4272.  During a closed session at the conference
  4273. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  4274. resolution was put forward for a vote
  4275. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  4276. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  4277. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  4278. globally applicable standards for data
  4279. protection and the protection of privacy
  4280. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  4281.  
  4282.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  4283. of the resolution ... the United States.
  4284.  
  4285.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  4286. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  4287. eventually need to be put forward at the
  4288. United Nations and voted on by member
  4289. states, and that could take time. But
  4290. the growing appetite to amend the
  4291. international treaty in light of the
  4292. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  4293. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  4294. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  4295. technology in the digital age to trample
  4296. over basic universal privacy rights.
  4297.  
  4298. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  4299.  
  4300. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  4301.  
  4302. NOBODY comments
  4303.  
  4304.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  4305. all secret agencies around the world,
  4306. in general. All secret agencies and
  4307. their third-party vendors or allies
  4308. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  4309. backdoors in electronic communication
  4310. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  4311. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  4312. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  4313. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  4314. you must kill any trust in security.
  4315.  
  4316.  Security does not exist on the web.
  4317. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  4318. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  4319. _______________________________________
  4320. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  4321.  
  4322. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  4323.  
  4324. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  4325.  
  4326. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  4327. _______________________________________
  4328. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  4329.  
  4330. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  4331. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  4332. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  4333. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  4334. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  4335.  
  4336. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  4337. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  4338.  
  4339. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  4340. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  4341. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  4342.  
  4343.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are
  4344. tapping the backbone itself, via the
  4345. willing assistance of the telcos (who
  4346. still have remained mostly silent on
  4347. all of this) as opposed to �downstream�
  4348. collection, which requires going to the
  4349. internet companies directly.
  4350.  
  4351. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  4352.  
  4353. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  4354.  
  4355. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  4356.  
  4357. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  4358. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  4359. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  4360. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  4361. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  4362. _______________________________________
  4363. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  4364. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  4365. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  4366.  
  4367. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  4368. _______________________________________
  4369. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  4370.  
  4371.  According to a top secret document
  4372. disclosed by NSA whistleblower Edward
  4373. Snowden and obtained by The Hindu, the
  4374. PRISM programme was deployed by the
  4375. American agency to gather key information
  4376. from India by tapping directly into the
  4377. servers of tech giants which provide
  4378. services such as email, video sharing,
  4379. voice-over-IPs, online chats, file
  4380. transfer and social networking services.
  4381.  
  4382.  And, according to the PRISM document
  4383. seen by The Hindu, much of the communication
  4384. targeted by the NSA is unrelated to terrorism,
  4385. contrary to claims of Indian and American
  4386. officials.
  4387.  
  4388.  Instead, much of the surveillance was
  4389. focused on India�s domestic politics and
  4390. the country�s strategic and commercial
  4391. interests.
  4392.  
  4393. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  4394.  
  4395.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication
  4396. intelligence) document about �Close Access
  4397. SIGADs�, the offices of Indian diplomats
  4398. and high-ranking military officials stationed
  4399. at these important posts were targets of
  4400. four different kinds of electronic snooping
  4401. devices:
  4402.  
  4403.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of
  4404. the hard drive of computers.
  4405.  
  4406.  Highlands, which makes digital collection
  4407. from implants.
  4408.  
  4409.  Vagrant, which collects data of open
  4410. computer screens.
  4411.  
  4412.  Magnetic, which is a collection of
  4413. digital signals.
  4414.  
  4415. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  4416. _______________________________________
  4417. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US
  4418. Intelligence ::
  4419.  
  4420.  Accessing archived government documents,
  4421. the National Security Archive, an
  4422. anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  4423. decades-long effort by the US to detect,
  4424. monitor, and in some cases plan the
  4425. destruction of, �more than 10,000 such
  4426. facilities worldwide, many of them in
  4427. hostile territory, and many presumably
  4428. intended to hide or protect lethal military
  4429. equipment and activities, including
  4430. weapons of mass destruction, that could
  4431. threaten US or allied interests.�
  4432.  
  4433. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  4434. _______________________________________
  4435. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  4436.  
  4437. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  4438. _______________________________________
  4439. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the
  4440. Inside Story of NSA Leaks ::
  4441.  
  4442. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  4443. _______________________________________
  4444. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  4445.  
  4446. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  4447. _______________________________________
  4448. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  4449. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  4450.  
  4451. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  4452. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  4453. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  4454.  
  4455. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  4456. Under United States Control ::
  4457.  
  4458.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff
  4459. announces publicly the creation of a
  4460. world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  4461. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  4462.  
  4463.  Not many understand that, while the
  4464. immediate trigger for the decision
  4465. (coupled with the cancellation of a
  4466. summit with the US president) was the
  4467. revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  4468. why Rousseff can take such a historic
  4469. step is that the alternative infrastructure:
  4470. The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  4471. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai,
  4472. India to Cape Town, South Africa to
  4473. Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and
  4474. it�s, actually, in its final phase of
  4475. implementation.
  4476.  
  4477.  �The global backlash is only beginning
  4478. and will get far more severe in coming
  4479. months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  4480. of the Open Technology Institute at the
  4481. Washington-based New America Foundation
  4482. think-tank. �This notion of national
  4483. privacy sovereignty is going to be an
  4484. increasingly salient issue around the
  4485. globe.�
  4486.  
  4487. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  4488. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  4489. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  4490. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  4491.  
  4492. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  4493.  
  4494.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s
  4495. capacity, fibre optic cable system.
  4496.  
  4497. http://www.bricscable.com/
  4498.  
  4499. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  4500. _______________________________________
  4501. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA
  4502. Metadata Collection Orders ::
  4503.  
  4504.  A newly declassified opinion from the
  4505. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4506. from this summer shows the court�s
  4507. interpretation of the controversial
  4508. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
  4509. that�s used to justify the National
  4510. Security Agency�s bulk telephone
  4511. metadata collections, and reveals
  4512. that none of the companies that have
  4513. been served with such orders has ever
  4514. challenged one.
  4515.  
  4516. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  4517. _______________________________________
  4518. � Experts Worry About Long-Term Blowback
  4519. of NSA Revelations ::
  4520.  
  4521.  With all of the disturbing revelations
  4522. that have come to light in the last few
  4523. weeks regarding the NSA�s collection
  4524. methods and its efforts to weaken
  4525. cryptographic protocols and security
  4526. products, experts say that perhaps the
  4527. most worrisome result of all of this
  4528. is that no one knows who or what they
  4529. can trust anymore.
  4530.  
  4531.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA
  4532. leaks, which revealed the agency�s
  4533. ability to subvert some cryptographic
  4534. standards and its �partnerships� with
  4535. software and hardware vendors to insert
  4536. backdoors into various unnamed products,
  4537. has continued to accumulate over the
  4538. course of the last couple of weeks.
  4539. Cryptographers and security researchers
  4540. have been eager to determine which
  4541. products and protocols are suspect,
  4542. and the discussion has veered in a
  4543. lot of different directions. But one
  4544. thing that�s become clear is that when
  4545. the government lost the so-called
  4546. Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA
  4547. didn�t just go back to Fort Meade
  4548. and tend to its knitting.
  4549.  
  4550. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  4551.  
  4552. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  4553.  
  4554.  The security community didn�t invent
  4555. the concept of fear, uncertainty and
  4556. doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  4557. it to the level of religion. It�s the
  4558. way that security products are marketed
  4559. and sold, but it�s also the way that
  4560. the intelligence community justifies
  4561. its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  4562. unconstitutional, data-gathering
  4563. practices. Just as vendors use the
  4564. specter of catastrophic hacks, data
  4565. loss and public embarrassment to push
  4566. their wares, the NSA and its allies
  4567. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and
  4568. global terrorism to justify their
  4569. increasingly aggressive practices,
  4570. some of which have now been shown to
  4571. have deliberately weakened some of the
  4572. fundamental building blocks of security.
  4573.  
  4574.  The most damning bit of string in this
  4575. ball is the news that the NSA likely
  4576. inserted a back door into a key
  4577. cryptographic algorithm known as
  4578. DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  4579. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning
  4580. to its developer customers warning them
  4581. to immediately stop using the company�s
  4582. BSAFE library because it uses the
  4583. compromised random number generator.
  4584. That means that untold numbers of products
  4585. that include the BSAFE crypto libraries
  4586. are compromised.
  4587.  
  4588. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  4589. _______________________________________
  4590. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  4591.  
  4592.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  4593. President approximately every 45 days,
  4594. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  4595. the activities carried out under these
  4596. Authorizations are referred to as the
  4597. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  4598. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  4599. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  4600. the content of communications into and out
  4601. of the United States where there was a
  4602. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  4603. party to the communication was a member
  4604. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  4605.  
  4606.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  4607. acknowledged and described by the President,
  4608. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  4609. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  4610. a series of articles published in The New York
  4611. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  4612. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  4613. intelligence activities were also authorized
  4614. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  4615. but the details of those activities remain
  4616. classified.� ... ...
  4617.  
  4618.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  4619. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  4620. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  4621. as the principal governing authorities for
  4622. conducting electronic surveillance for
  4623. national security purposes. The Foreign
  4624. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  4625. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  4626. "provide legislative authorization and
  4627. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  4628. conducted within the United States for
  4629. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  4630.  
  4631. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  4632.  
  4633. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  4634. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  4635.  
  4636. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  4637.  
  4638. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  4639.  
  4640.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  4641. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  4642. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  4643. require special approval. Therefore, just
  4644. another gap. Also take in consideration
  4645. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  4646. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  4647. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  4648. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  4649. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  4650. _______________________________________
  4651. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  4652. Firm ::
  4653.  
  4654.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  4655. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  4656. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  4657. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  4658. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  4659. A �top secret� Government Communications
  4660. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  4661. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  4662. conducted under the codename �Operation
  4663. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  4664. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  4665. improve understanding of the provider�s
  4666. infrastructure. ... ...
  4667.  
  4668.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  4669. presentation, the attack was directed
  4670. at several Belgacom employees and
  4671. involved the planting of a highly
  4672. developed attack technology referred
  4673. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  4674. appears to be a method with which the
  4675. person being targeted, without their
  4676. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  4677. that then plant malware on their
  4678. computers that can then manipulate
  4679. them. Some of the employees whose
  4680. computers were infiltrated had �good
  4681. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  4682. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  4683. please the British spies, according
  4684. to the slides.
  4685.    
  4686. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  4687. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  4688. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  4689. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  4690. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  4691. _______________________________________
  4692. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  4693.  
  4694. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  4695.  
  4696. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  4697. _______________________________________
  4698. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  4699.  
  4700. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  4701. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  4702. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  4703. _______________________________________
  4704. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  4705. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  4706.  
  4707. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  4708. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  4709. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  4710. _______________________________________
  4711. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  4712.  
  4713. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  4714. ���������������������������������������
  4715. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  4716. Allocated to One Release ::
  4717.  
  4718. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  4719.  
  4720. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  4721.  
  4722. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  4723.  
  4724. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  4725. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  4726.  
  4727. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  4728.  
  4729. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  4730. Schedule ::
  4731.  
  4732. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4733.  
  4734. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4735.  
  4736. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4737.  
  4738. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4739.  
  4740. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4741.  
  4742. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4743.  
  4744. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4745. ���������������������������������������
  4746. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  4747.  
  4748.  In response to a FOIA request from
  4749. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  4750. its ethics office never looked into
  4751. complaints from two federal judges
  4752. that they had been misled about NSA
  4753. surveillance.
  4754.  
  4755. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  4756. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  4757. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  4758. ���������������������������������������
  4759.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  4760. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  4761. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  4762. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  4763. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  4764.  
  4765. Livestream will be at:
  4766.  
  4767. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  4768. _______________________________________
  4769. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  4770. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  4771.  
  4772. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  4773.  
  4774. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  4775. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  4776. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  4777.  
  4778. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  4779.  
  4780.  The Director of National Intelligence
  4781. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  4782. pages of documents related to the
  4783. government�s secret interpretation of
  4784. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  4785. (mis)use of its massive database of
  4786. every American�s phone records. The
  4787. documents were released as a result
  4788. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  4789. Act lawsuit.
  4790.  
  4791.  We�ve posted links to each document
  4792. below. While the government also posted
  4793. many of the documents here ...
  4794.  
  4795. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  4796.  
  4797. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  4798.  
  4799. Links to the documents ;
  4800.  
  4801. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  4802. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4803.  
  4804. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4805.  
  4806. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  4807. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4808. Court
  4809.  
  4810. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4811.  
  4812. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4813. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4814. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4815. Court
  4816.  
  4817. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4818.  
  4819. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4820. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4821. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4822. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  4823.  
  4824. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4825.  
  4826. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  4827. Incident
  4828.  
  4829. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4830.  
  4831. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4832. Intelligence Court
  4833.  
  4834. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4835.  
  4836. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4837. Intelligence Court
  4838.  
  4839. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4840.  
  4841. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  4842. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  4843. Business Records FISA
  4844.  
  4845. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4846.  
  4847. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  4848. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  4849.  
  4850. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4851.  
  4852. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  4853. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4854.  
  4855. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4856.  
  4857. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  4858. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  4859. Surveillance Court
  4860.  
  4861. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4862.  
  4863. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  4864. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  4865. Surveillance Court
  4866.  
  4867. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4868.  
  4869. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  4870. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  4871.  
  4872. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  4873.  
  4874. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  4875. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  4876.  
  4877. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  4878. _______________________________________
  4879. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  4880.  
  4881. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  4882.  
  4883. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  4884.  
  4885. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  4886. ���������������������������������������
  4887. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  4888.  
  4889. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  4890. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  4891. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  4892. _______________________________________
  4893. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  4894. Over Data to the NSA ::
  4895.  
  4896.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4897. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  4898. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  4899. media report. The revelation comes as
  4900. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  4901. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  4902. troves of data with the US and UK.
  4903.  
  4904.  Citing secret government documents,
  4905. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  4906. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4907. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  4908. with domestic security, works closely
  4909. with the US and regularly sends them
  4910. information.
  4911.  
  4912.  The security service gathers intelligence
  4913. on internal security threats. The documents
  4914. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  4915. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  4916. well as regular meetings between officers
  4917. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  4918.  
  4919. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  4920. _______________________________________
  4921. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  4922. Revelations ::
  4923.  
  4924. This is an unofficial translation.
  4925.  
  4926. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  4927.  
  4928.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  4929. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  4930. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  4931.  
  4932. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  4933.  
  4934. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  4935. _______________________________________
  4936. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  4937.  
  4938. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  4939. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  4940. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  4941. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  4942. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  4943. _______________________________________
  4944. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  4945.  
  4946. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  4947.  
  4948. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  4949.  
  4950. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  4951. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  4952.  
  4953. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  4954.  
  4955. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  4956.  
  4957.  (1) The US wants to maintain global
  4958. economic power, (2) the US wants to
  4959. maintain control over major natural
  4960. resources and (3) the US is afraid the
  4961. new economic powers (within the BRICS)
  4962. may destabilize their economic power
  4963. and control over natural resources.
  4964. _______________________________________
  4965. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  4966.  
  4967.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult
  4968. for machines to read.
  4969.  
  4970. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  4971. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  4972. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  4973. _______________________________________
  4974. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  4975.  
  4976. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  4977.  
  4978. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  4979. _______________________________________
  4980. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  4981. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  4982. National Unit ::
  4983.  
  4984.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  4985. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  4986. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  4987. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  4988. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  4989. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  4990. it Wednesday.
  4991.  
  4992.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  4993. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  4994. raw signals intelligence, referred
  4995. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  4996. swathes of digital data traffic that
  4997. the agency gathers under secret court
  4998. authority from US Internet providers.
  4999.  
  5000.  So sensitive is this data that even
  5001. before being disseminated to other US
  5002. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  5003. to a court-mandated process called
  5004. minimization, under which the names
  5005. of any Americans are removed unless
  5006. they are essential for foreign
  5007. intelligence interest.
  5008.  
  5009.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  5010. that the data shared with Israel
  5011. �includes, but is not limited to,
  5012. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  5013. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  5014. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  5015. and content.�
  5016.  
  5017.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  5018. and unminimized raw collection associated
  5019. with selectors from multiple Target office
  5020. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  5021. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  5022. relationship between the two organizations.�
  5023.  
  5024. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  5025. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  5026. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  5027. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  5028. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  5029. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  5030.  
  5031.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  5032. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  5033. that spy most aggressively against the
  5034. United States.
  5035.  
  5036.  �To further safeguard our classified
  5037. networks, we continue to strengthen
  5038. insider threat detection capabilities
  5039. across the Community. In addition, we
  5040. are investing in target surveillance
  5041. and offensive CI against key targets,
  5042. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  5043. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  5044.  
  5045. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5046. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5047. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  5048.  
  5049. NOBODY comments
  5050.  
  5051.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  5052. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  5053. plenty of inside information.
  5054.  
  5055.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  5056. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  5057. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  5058.  
  5059. This reminds of a quote ;
  5060.  
  5061.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  5062. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  5063. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  5064. to play out one big game of destruction
  5065. and domination with humans as the visible
  5066. and spiritual puppets?�
  5067. _______________________________________
  5068. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  5069.  
  5070. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  5071. _______________________________________
  5072. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  5073.  
  5074. (EN)
  5075. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  5076.  
  5077. (DE)
  5078. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  5079.  
  5080. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  5081.  
  5082.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  5083. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  5084. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  5085. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  5086. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  5087. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  5088. deployed in a government intelligence
  5089. agency presentation.
  5090.  
  5091. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  5092. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  5093. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  5094. ���������������������������������������
  5095. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  5096. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  5097.  
  5098.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  5099. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  5100. reverse restrictions on the National
  5101. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  5102. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  5103. the agency to search deliberately for
  5104. Americans� communications in its massive
  5105. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  5106. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  5107. �declassified material� - (which, by
  5108. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  5109. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  5110. of which agency it came from and most
  5111. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  5112.  
  5113. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  5114.  
  5115.  In addition, the court extended the
  5116. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  5117. to retain intercepted US communications
  5118. from five years to six years � and more
  5119. under special circumstances, according
  5120. to the documents, which include a
  5121. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  5122. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  5123. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  5124. Surveillance Court.
  5125.  
  5126. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  5127.  
  5128. NOBODY comments
  5129.  
  5130.  The document which was declassified by
  5131. US intelligence officials explains the
  5132. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  5133. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  5134. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  5135.  
  5136. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  5137. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  5138. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  5139.  
  5140.  National Security Agency analysts
  5141. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  5142. their authority to spy on Americans.
  5143.  
  5144. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  5145.  
  5146.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  5147. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  5148.  
  5149. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5150.  
  5151. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5152.  
  5153.  And this is not the first attempt to
  5154. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  5155.  
  5156. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  5157.  
  5158. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  5159.  
  5160.  The new Washington Post report has
  5161. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  5162. (press) release exposing yet another
  5163. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  5164. or take responsibility for the abuses
  5165. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  5166.  
  5167. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  5168.  
  5169.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  5170. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  5171.  
  5172.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  5173. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  5174.  
  5175.  All of this information is backed up
  5176. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  5177. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  5178. 2,776 violations one year after the
  5179. FISA Court order.
  5180.  
  5181. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5182.  
  5183.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  5184. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  5185. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  5186. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  5187. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  5188. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  5189. them out of office come next election.
  5190. _______________________________________
  5191. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence ::
  5192.  
  5193.  �Ever since the remarkable case of Edward
  5194. Snowden broke into the limelight at the
  5195. beginning of the summer that�s now
  5196. winding down, I�ve had a great deal to
  5197. say about it here, on Twitter, and on
  5198. radio and television. As one of the
  5199. very few former NSA officers who�s
  5200. in the public eye and willing to talk
  5201. about Snowden, I�ve had an audience.
  5202. As a former NSA counterintelligence
  5203. officer with experience dealing with
  5204. the Russians, I�ve been pretty much
  5205. a solo act.
  5206.  
  5207.  From nearly the outset I�ve stated
  5208. that Snowden is very likely an agent
  5209. of Russian intelligence; this was met
  5210. with howls of indignation which have
  5211. died down in recent weeks as it�s
  5212. become apparent that Ed�s staying in
  5213. Russia for some time, along with
  5214. whatever classified materials he
  5215. had on his person. (Since Glenn
  5216. Greenwald�s partner when stopped by
  5217. British authorities at Heathrow had
  5218. 58,000 highly classified documents
  5219. on him, thanks to Ed, one can only
  5220. wonder how big the initial haul
  5221. actually was.) That Snowden was in
  5222. contact with the Russian consulate
  5223. in Hong Kong during his pre-Moscow
  5224. visit there, including spending his
  5225. 30th birthday with his new friends,
  5226. is now admitted. Even President
  5227. Vladimir Putin has conceded that
  5228. Ed�s contacts with Russian officials
  5229. did not commence when he landed at
  5230. Sheremtyevo airport, rather before.�
  5231.  
  5232. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  5233. _______________________________________
  5234. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  5235.  
  5236. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  5237.  
  5238.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  5239. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  5240. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  5241.  
  5242. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  5243.  
  5244. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  5245.  
  5246. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  5247.  
  5248. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  5249.  
  5250. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  5251.  
  5252. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  5253.  
  5254. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  5255.  
  5256. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  5257. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  5258. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  5259. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  5260.  
  5261. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  5262.  
  5263.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  5264. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  5265. reports that the US National Security Agency
  5266. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  5267.  
  5268.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  5269. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  5270. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  5271. Tuesday.
  5272.  
  5273.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  5274. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  5275. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  5276. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  5277. several of her top aides, and tapped
  5278. her phone.
  5279.  
  5280. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  5281.  
  5282. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  5283. Impacted ::
  5284.  
  5285.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  5286. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  5287. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  5288. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  5289. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  5290. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  5291.  
  5292.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  5293. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  5294. visit to Washington in October, the
  5295. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  5296. year, or will take action on digital
  5297. security that may affect US companies
  5298. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  5299.  
  5300.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  5301. a proposal that would suspend operations
  5302. of companies that cooperate with the
  5303. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  5304.  
  5305. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  5306. _______________________________________
  5307. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  5308.  
  5309. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  5310.  
  5311. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  5312.  
  5313. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  5314. ���������������������������������������
  5315. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  5316.  
  5317.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5318. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5319. collect against high priority targets,
  5320. including foreign leadership targets.
  5321. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5322. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5323. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5324. internet traffic.�
  5325.  
  5326. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5327.  
  5328. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5329.  
  5330. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  5331.  
  5332. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  5333.  
  5334. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  5335.  
  5336. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  5337.  
  5338.  �The Post is withholding some information
  5339. after consultation with US officials who
  5340. expressed concerns about the risk to
  5341. intelligence sources and methods.
  5342. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  5343. the documents that The Post is publishing
  5344. only summary tables and charts online.�
  5345.  
  5346. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  5347.  
  5348. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5349. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  5350.  
  5351. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  5352.  
  5353. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  5354.  
  5355. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5356. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  5357.  
  5358. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  5359.  
  5360. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  5361.  
  5362. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  5363.  
  5364.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  5365. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  5366. intelligence services, leaked documents
  5367. reveal.
  5368.  
  5369.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  5370. to have an aggressive intelligence
  5371. collection operations against the
  5372. United States,� Pillar said. While
  5373. much information is collected through
  5374. traditional political contacts, �I
  5375. would personally have no doubt that
  5376. that is supplemented by whatever means
  5377. they can use to find out as much as
  5378. they can about what we�re doing,
  5379. thinking, deciding on anything of
  5380. interest to Israel, which would include
  5381. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  5382.  
  5383. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  5384.  
  5385. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  5386.  
  5387.  �To further safeguard our classified
  5388. networks, we continue to strengthen
  5389. insider threat detection capabilities
  5390. across the Community. In addition, we
  5391. are investing in target surveillance
  5392. and offensive CI against key targets,
  5393. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  5394. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  5395. _______________________________________
  5396. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  5397.  
  5398.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  5399. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  5400. the worst part is the Received headers.
  5401. Everyone should look at their own headers
  5402. -- especially people on this list and
  5403. at least comprehend that your email
  5404. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  5405. the Mailman archive.
  5406.  
  5407.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  5408. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  5409. the actual separators in MIME part
  5410. breaks, and so on.
  5411.  
  5412.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  5413. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  5414. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  5415. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  5416. don�t do it all the time.
  5417.  
  5418.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  5419. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  5420. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  5421. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  5422. is that this tells us that the crypto
  5423. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  5424. for quite some time.
  5425.  
  5426.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  5427. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  5428. that works being deployed everywhere.
  5429. What do you do? You just be patient and
  5430. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  5431. analysis.
  5432.  
  5433. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  5434.  
  5435. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  5436.  
  5437. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  5438.  
  5439.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  5440. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  5441. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  5442. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  5443. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  5444. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  5445. reveal.
  5446.  
  5447. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  5448.  
  5449.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5450. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5451. collect against high priority targets,
  5452. including foreign leadership targets.
  5453. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5454. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5455. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5456. internet traffic.� ... ...
  5457.  
  5458. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  5459.  
  5460.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  5461. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  5462. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  5463. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  5464. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  5465. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  5466.  
  5467.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  5468. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  5469.  
  5470. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5471.  
  5472. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5473.  
  5474. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  5475.  
  5476. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  5477.  
  5478. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  5479.  
  5480.  The US government has attempted to
  5481. obtain the master encryption keys that
  5482. Internet companies use to shield millions
  5483. of users� private web communications
  5484. from eavesdropping.
  5485.  
  5486.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  5487. which have not been disclosed previously,
  5488. represent a technological escalation in
  5489. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  5490. the National Security Agency employ when
  5491. conducting electronic surveillance against
  5492. Internet users. ... ...
  5493.  
  5494.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  5495. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  5496. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  5497. communications are typically destroyed
  5498. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  5499. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  5500. of all communications that are enciphered�
  5501. is permissible.
  5502.  
  5503. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  5504. _______________________________________
  5505. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  5506. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  5507.  
  5508.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  5509. intercepts well before 2001, former
  5510. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  5511. secretive Special Services Office,
  5512. these types of programs were at first
  5513. designed to intercept communications
  5514. overseas through arrangements with
  5515. foreign Internet providers, the former
  5516. officials say. NSA still has such
  5517. arrangements in many countries,
  5518. particularly in the Middle East and
  5519. Europe, the former officials say.�
  5520.  
  5521. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  5522.  
  5523. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  5524.  
  5525. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  5526. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  5527. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  5528. ���������������������������������������
  5529. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  5530. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  5531.  
  5532.  A common hacking technique can be used
  5533. to make emails look as if they came from
  5534. outside the United States.
  5535.  
  5536. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  5537. _______________________________________
  5538. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  5539. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  5540.  
  5541. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  5542.  
  5543. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  5544.  
  5545. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  5546.  
  5547. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  5548. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  5549. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  5550. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  5551. ���������������������������������������
  5552. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  5553. Patrick Leahy ::
  5554.  
  5555. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  5556.  
  5557. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  5558.  
  5559. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  5560. _______________________________________
  5561. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  5562.  
  5563.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  5564. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  5565. their authority to spy on Americans
  5566. multiple times in the past decade,
  5567. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  5568. and lawmakers� statements that no
  5569. willful violations occurred. ...
  5570.  
  5571.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  5572. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  5573. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  5574. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  5575. of having links to terrorism, before a
  5576. secret court that oversees surveillance
  5577. found the operation unconstitutional
  5578. in 2011.
  5579.  
  5580. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  5581.  
  5582. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  5583. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  5584. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  5585.  
  5586.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  5587. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  5588. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  5589. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  5590. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  5591.  
  5592.  The documents were released in response
  5593. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  5594. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  5595.  
  5596.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  5597. litigation and the most significant leak
  5598. in American history to finally get them
  5599. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  5600. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  5601. �but I�m happy that the administration
  5602. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  5603.  
  5604. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  5605. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  5606. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  5607.  
  5608. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  5609.  
  5610. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5611.  
  5612. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5613.  
  5614. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  5615.  
  5616. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  5617.  
  5618. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  5619.  
  5620. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  5621. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  5622.  
  5623. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5624. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  5625. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  5626. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  5627. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  5628. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  5629.  
  5630.  The account is based on top-secret
  5631. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  5632. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  5633. including unauthorized collection,
  5634. storage, access to or distribution of
  5635. legally protected communications � in
  5636. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  5637. originally only meant to be seen by top
  5638. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  5639. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  5640. and other locations in the Washington DC
  5641. region.
  5642.  
  5643. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  5644.  
  5645.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  5646. and other things, there�s people talking
  5647. about privacy violations or abuses or
  5648. willful or violations, right, it is
  5649. important for people to understand,
  5650. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  5651. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  5652. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  5653.  
  5654.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  5655. We detect them, as early as we can.
  5656. We correct them, right. None of the
  5657. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  5658. the document released were willful.
  5659. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  5660. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  5661. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  5662.  
  5663. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  5664.  
  5665. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  5666. Database Queries Per Month ::
  5667.  
  5668. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  5669.  
  5670. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  5671.  
  5672. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  5673. _______________________________________
  5674. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  5675.  
  5676.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  5677. station in the Middle East to intercept
  5678. and process vast quantities of emails,
  5679. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  5680. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  5681. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  5682.  
  5683.  The information is then processed for
  5684. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  5685. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  5686. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  5687. The Government claims the station is a
  5688. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  5689. and provides a vital �early warning�
  5690. system for potential attacks around
  5691. the world.
  5692.  
  5693.  The Independent is not revealing the
  5694. precise location of the station but
  5695. information on its activities was
  5696. contained in the leaked documents
  5697. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  5698. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  5699. these documents in recent months has
  5700. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  5701. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  5702. the destruction of hard drives containing
  5703. the data. ... ...
  5704.  
  5705.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  5706. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  5707. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  5708. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  5709. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  5710. the global interception of digital
  5711. communications, such as emails and text
  5712. messages.
  5713.  
  5714.  Across three sites, communications �
  5715. including telephone calls � are tracked
  5716. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  5717. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  5718.  
  5719. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  5720. ���������������������������������������
  5721. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  5722.  
  5723. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  5724. _______________________________________
  5725. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  5726. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  5727. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  5728. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  5729. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  5730. E Grassley ::
  5731.  
  5732. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  5733.  
  5734. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  5735.  
  5736. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  5737.  
  5738. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  5739.  
  5740. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  5741.  
  5742. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  5743.  
  5744. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  5745.  
  5746. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  5747.  
  5748. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  5749.  
  5750. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  5751.  
  5752. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  5753. Congress ::
  5754.  
  5755.  �I can now confirm that the House
  5756. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  5757. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  5758. available to Representatives in Congress,
  5759. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  5760. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  5761. the now declassified documents detailing
  5762. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  5763.  
  5764. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  5765.  
  5766. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  5767.  
  5768. ?
  5769.  
  5770. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  5771.  
  5772.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  5773. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  5774. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  5775. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  5776. discussions with the president when he
  5777. first came on board we talked to him about
  5778. these programs and the issue was how do
  5779. we know the compliance is there and what
  5780. more could we do? We stood up working with
  5781. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  5782. of compliance. This directorate of
  5783. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  5784. and information specialists that can look
  5785. at everything that we do in these programs
  5786. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  5787. orders but we also have oversight from
  5788. the Director of National Intelligence,
  5789. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  5790. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  5791. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  5792. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  5793. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  5794. _______________________________________
  5795. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  5796.  
  5797.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  5798. public so far.
  5799.  
  5800. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  5801. _______________________________________
  5802. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  5803.  
  5804. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  5805. _______________________________________
  5806. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  5807. Data Lab ::
  5808.  
  5809. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  5810.  
  5811. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  5812. _______________________________________
  5813. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  5814. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  5815.  
  5816. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  5817. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  5818. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  5819. _______________________________________
  5820. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  5821.  
  5822.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  5823. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  5824. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  5825. there since he assumed the position
  5826. of Secretary of State. He has already
  5827. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  5828. � where officials demanded an explanation
  5829. to reports that Washington had collected
  5830. vast amounts of internet data there.
  5831. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  5832. which allegedly was the top regional
  5833. target of the surveillance program.
  5834.  
  5835. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  5836.  
  5837. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  5838.  
  5839. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  5840. Surveillance ::
  5841.  
  5842. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  5843.  
  5844. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  5845.  
  5846. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  5847. _______________________________________
  5848. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  5849.  
  5850. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  5851. ���������������������������������������
  5852. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  5853.  
  5854. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  5855.  
  5856. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  5857.  
  5858. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  5859.  
  5860. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  5861.  
  5862. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  5863. _______________________________________
  5864. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  5865.  
  5866. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  5867.  
  5868. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  5869. _______________________________________
  5870. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  5871.  
  5872. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  5873.  
  5874.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  5875. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  5876. use of certain United States person names
  5877. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  5878. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  5879. implement any USP queries until an effective
  5880. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  5881. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  5882. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  5883. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  5884. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  5885. databases).�
  5886.  
  5887. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  5888.  
  5889. NOBODY comments
  5890.  
  5891. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  5892.  
  5893. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  5894.  
  5895.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  5896. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  5897. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  5898. communications not related to foreign
  5899. information or foreign activity for up
  5900. to five years.
  5901.  
  5902.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  5903. acquired communications of or concerning a
  5904. United States person may be retained no
  5905. longer than five years in any event.�
  5906.  
  5907.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  5908. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  5909. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  5910. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  5911. communications that have been stored.
  5912. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  5913. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  5914. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  5915. to �communications security vulnerability�
  5916. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  5917. _______________________________________
  5918. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  5919.  
  5920. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  5921. _______________________________________
  5922. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  5923.  
  5924. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  5925. _______________________________________
  5926. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  5927. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  5928.  
  5929.  As the steady stream of revelations
  5930. continues, the White House has choosen
  5931. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  5932. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  5933.  
  5934. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  5935. _______________________________________
  5936. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  5937.  
  5938. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  5939.  
  5940. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  5941. Spying Press Conference ::
  5942.  
  5943.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  5944. Presidential press conference in which the
  5945. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  5946. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  5947. that Obama told today about the program
  5948. by citing multiple articles with information
  5949. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  5950.  
  5951. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  5952. ���������������������������������������
  5953. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  5954. Partners ::
  5955.  
  5956. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  5957. ���������������������������������������
  5958. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  5959. Metadata ::
  5960.  
  5961. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  5962. ���������������������������������������
  5963. � National Security Run Amok ::
  5964.  
  5965. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  5966. _______________________________________
  5967.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  5968. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  5969. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  5970. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  5971.  
  5972. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  5973.  
  5974.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  5975. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  5976. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  5977. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  5978. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  5979. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  5980. for including former senators Hillary
  5981. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  5982.  
  5983. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  5984.  
  5985. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  5986. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  5987.  
  5988. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  5989.  
  5990. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  5991.  
  5992. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  5993. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  5994.  
  5995. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  5996.  
  5997.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  5998. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  5999.  
  6000. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  6001. ���������������������������������������
  6002. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  6003.  
  6004. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  6005.  
  6006. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  6007.  
  6008. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  6009.  
  6010. NOBODY comments
  6011.  
  6012. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  6013.  
  6014.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  6015. the document was still classified. It was
  6016. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  6017.  
  6018. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  6019.  
  6020.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  6021. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  6022. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  6023. many of these operations being leaked.
  6024. _______________________________________
  6025. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  6026. on Brazilian Television ::
  6027.  
  6028. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  6029. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  6030. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  6031.  
  6032. NOBODY comments
  6033.  
  6034.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  6035. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  6036.  
  6037.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  6038. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  6039. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  6040.  
  6041. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  6042. ���������������������������������������
  6043. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  6044. English Report ::
  6045.  
  6046.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  6047. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  6048. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  6049. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  6050. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  6051. matters is also much closer than first
  6052. thought. ... ...
  6053.  
  6054.  Day after day and month after month,
  6055. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  6056. amounts of connection data relating
  6057. to the communications it had placed
  6058. under surveillance. The so-called
  6059. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  6060. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  6061. into the Americans� giant databases.
  6062.  
  6063. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  6064.  
  6065. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  6066. Deutsch Report ::
  6067.  
  6068. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  6069.  
  6070. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  6071.  
  6072. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  6073. ���������������������������������������
  6074. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  6075.  
  6076. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  6077. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  6078. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  6079.  
  6080. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  6081.  
  6082. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  6083.  
  6084. � Fed-up Congress Dumps �Em ::
  6085.  
  6086.  The latest revelations will add to
  6087. the intense public and congressional
  6088. debate around the extent of NSA
  6089. surveillance programs. They come
  6090. as senior intelligence officials
  6091. testify to the Senate judiciary
  6092. committee on Wednesday, releasing
  6093. classified documents in response to
  6094. the Guardian�s earlier stories on
  6095. bulk collection of phone records
  6096. and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  6097.  
  6098.  XKeyscore, the documents boast, is
  6099. the NSA�s �widest reaching� system
  6100. developing intelligence from computer
  6101. networks � what the agency calls
  6102. Digital Network Intelligence (DNI).
  6103. One presentation claims the program
  6104. covers �nearly everything a typical
  6105. user does on the internet�, including
  6106. the content of emails, websites
  6107. visited and searches, as well as
  6108. their metadata.
  6109.  
  6110. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  6111. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  6112. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  6113. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  6114.  
  6115. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  6116.  
  6117. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  6118.  
  6119. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  6120.  
  6121. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  6122.  
  6123. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  6124.  
  6125. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  6126.  
  6127. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  6128.  
  6129. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  6130.  
  6131. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  6132.  
  6133. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  6134.  
  6135. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  6136.  
  6137. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  6138.  
  6139. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  6140.  
  6141. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  6142.  
  6143.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  6144. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  6145. they are shunted off to various �production
  6146. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  6147. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  6148. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  6149. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  6150. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  6151. stored in a database called MARINA and
  6152. is generally retained for five years.
  6153.  
  6154. ... ...
  6155.  
  6156.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  6157. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  6158. to change the surveillance laws once the
  6159. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  6160. This was for a simple reason: they did
  6161. not want to be responsible for a program
  6162. that was not legal.�
  6163.  
  6164. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  6165.  
  6166. NOBODY comments
  6167.  
  6168.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  6169. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  6170. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  6171. communications not related to foreign
  6172. information or foreign activity for up
  6173. to five years.
  6174.  
  6175.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  6176. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  6177. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  6178. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  6179. ���������������������������������������
  6180. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  6181. for GCHQ Bude ::
  6182.  
  6183. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  6184. _______________________________________
  6185. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  6186. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  6187.  
  6188.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  6189. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  6190. counterfeiting and even copyright
  6191. infringement complain that their
  6192. attempts to exploit the security
  6193. agency�s vast resources have often
  6194. been turned down because their own
  6195. investigations are not considered a
  6196. high enough priority, current and
  6197. former government officials say.
  6198.  
  6199.  Intelligence officials say they have
  6200. been careful to limit the use of the
  6201. security agency�s troves of data and
  6202. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  6203. could be misused in ways that violate
  6204. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  6205.  
  6206.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  6207. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  6208. senior intelligence official at the
  6209. White House and at the office of the
  6210. director of national intelligence.
  6211. �They collect all this information,
  6212. but it�s difficult for the other
  6213. agencies to get access to what
  6214. they want.�
  6215.  
  6216. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  6217. _______________________________________
  6218. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  6219. Security Forum ::
  6220.  
  6221. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  6222.  
  6223. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  6224. Conference ::
  6225.  
  6226. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  6227.  
  6228. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  6229. Conference ::
  6230.  
  6231. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  6232. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  6233. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  6234.  
  6235.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  6236. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  6237. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  6238. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  6239. discussions with the president when he
  6240. first came on board we talked to him about
  6241. these programs and the issue was how do
  6242. we know the compliance is there and what
  6243. more could we do? We stood up working with
  6244. the committees in Congress a directorate
  6245. of compliance. This directorate of
  6246. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  6247. and information specialists that can look
  6248. at everything that we do in these programs
  6249. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  6250. orders but we also have oversight from
  6251. the Director of National Intelligence,
  6252. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  6253. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  6254. from the White House, from Congress, the
  6255. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  6256. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  6257.  
  6258. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  6259. Blackhat Conference ::
  6260.  
  6261. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  6262.  
  6263. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  6264.  
  6265. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  6266.  
  6267. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  6268.  
  6269. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  6270.  
  6271. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  6272.  
  6273. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  6274. _______________________________________
  6275. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  6276.  
  6277. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  6278.  
  6279. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  6280. All Domestic Calls ::
  6281.  
  6282.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  6283. three documents related to the National
  6284. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  6285. records, including briefings to Congress
  6286. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  6287. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  6288. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6289. Court that outlines rules that must be
  6290. followed when accessing data provided by
  6291. a Verizon subsidiary.
  6292.  
  6293. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  6294.  
  6295.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  6296. what the government was doing with the
  6297. Patriot Act program, several senators
  6298. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  6299. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  6300. the law in a twisted way to do something
  6301. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  6302. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  6303. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  6304. Act to obtain that document.
  6305.  
  6306. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  6307. _______________________________________
  6308. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  6309.  
  6310. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  6311.  
  6312. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  6313. _______________________________________
  6314. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  6315.  
  6316.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  6317. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  6318. two or three years ago.�
  6319.  
  6320. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  6321. _______________________________________
  6322. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6323. Received Dox ::
  6324.  
  6325. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6326. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6327. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6328. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6329. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6330.  
  6331. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  6332.  
  6333. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  6334.  
  6335. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6336. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  6337.  
  6338.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  6339. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  6340. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  6341. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  6342. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  6343. twice as much campaign financing from
  6344. the defense and intelligence industry
  6345. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  6346.  
  6347. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  6348.  
  6349. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  6350. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  6351.  
  6352. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  6353. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  6354. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  6355.  
  6356. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  6357.  
  6358. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  6359.  
  6360. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  6361. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  6362.  
  6363. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  6364. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  6365. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  6366. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  6367.  
  6368. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  6369. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  6370.  
  6371.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  6372. disclosures, the President has said
  6373. that he welcomes a debate about how
  6374. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  6375. our national security and the privacy
  6376. of our citizens.  The Administration
  6377. has taken various proactive steps to
  6378. advance this debate including the
  6379. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  6380. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  6381. his public statements on the disclosed
  6382. programs, the Office of the Director
  6383. of National Intelligence�s release of
  6384. its own public statements, ODNI General
  6385. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  6386. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  6387. disclose publicly that the Administration
  6388. filed an application with the Foreign
  6389. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  6390. look forward to continuing to discuss
  6391. these critical issues with the American
  6392. people and the Congress.
  6393.  
  6394.  However, we oppose the current effort
  6395. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  6396. of our Intelligence Community�s
  6397. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  6398. approach is not the product of an
  6399. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  6400. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  6401. Amendment, and instead move forward
  6402. with an approach that appropriately
  6403. takes into account the need for a
  6404. reasoned review of what tools can
  6405. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  6406.  
  6407. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  6408.  
  6409. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  6410.  
  6411. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  6412. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  6413.  
  6414. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  6415.  
  6416. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  6417. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  6418. to Defund NSA ::
  6419.  
  6420. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  6421. _______________________________________
  6422.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  6423. official letter from the NSA, which was
  6424. sent to the German government to clarify
  6425. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  6426. because German media and politics were
  6427. heavily confused after it became clear
  6428. that there�s more than one program named
  6429. PRISM.
  6430.  
  6431.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  6432. data collection program is about and
  6433. then confirms that this program is
  6434. different from a more common military
  6435. web tool called "Planning tool for
  6436. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  6437. and Management" (PRISM).
  6438.  
  6439.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  6440. there�s even a third program called
  6441. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  6442. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  6443. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  6444. apparently an internal NSA information
  6445. sharing program. It was unknown until
  6446. now, probably because it�s used in the
  6447. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  6448. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  6449.  
  6450.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  6451. different PRISM programs:
  6452.  
  6453. 1. PRISM
  6454.  
  6455.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  6456. of collecting information about foreign
  6457. targets from data of nine major US
  6458. internet companies. This program started
  6459. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  6460. in June 2013.
  6461.  
  6462. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  6463. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  6464.  
  6465.  This is a web tool used by US military
  6466. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  6467. to data collection platforms deployed to
  6468. military operations. This program is
  6469. not very secret and was first mentioned
  6470. in 2002.
  6471.  
  6472. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  6473. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  6474.  
  6475.  This is an internal NSA program for
  6476. real-time sharing of information,
  6477. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  6478. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  6479. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  6480.  
  6481. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  6482.  
  6483. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  6484. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  6485.  
  6486.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  6487. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  6488. surveillance activities in Germany.
  6489. It only added to the mystery. A US
  6490. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  6491. that there are actually three unrelated
  6492. Prism programs. ... ...
  6493.  
  6494.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  6495. and Maassen, officials also read a
  6496. written statement from the NSA in
  6497. response to a query from the German
  6498. government. According to the statement,
  6499. there are three separate Prism programs,
  6500. all of them unconnected to each other.
  6501. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  6502. said that one of the Prism programs was
  6503. only used internally. That program had
  6504. thus far remained secret. Another of
  6505. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  6506. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  6507. -- vaguely described in the statement
  6508. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  6509. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  6510. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  6511. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  6512.  
  6513. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  6514.  
  6515. NOBODY comments
  6516.  
  6517.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  6518. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  6519. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  6520. _______________________________________
  6521. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  6522.  
  6523. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  6524.  
  6525. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  6526.  
  6527. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  6528.  
  6529.  Description and drawings by US Army
  6530. Corps of Engineers.
  6531.  
  6532. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  6533. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  6534. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  6535. _______________________________________
  6536. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  6537.  
  6538. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  6539.  
  6540. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  6541.  
  6542. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  6543. ���������������������������������������
  6544. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  6545.  
  6546. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  6547.  
  6548. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  6549.  
  6550. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  6551.  
  6552. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  6553.  
  6554. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  6555. _______________________________________
  6556. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  6557.  
  6558.  �First, the United States would not seek
  6559. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  6560. return to the United States. The charges
  6561. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  6562. and the United States would not seek the
  6563. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  6564. charged with additional, death penalty-
  6565. eligible crimes.�
  6566.  
  6567. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  6568.  
  6569. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  6570. _______________________________________
  6571. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  6572. Peace Prize ::
  6573.  
  6574.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  6575. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  6576. agency�s data collection program, has
  6577. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  6578.  
  6579.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  6580. at great personal cost � revealed the
  6581. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  6582. the US government devotes electronic
  6583. communications worldwide,� read the
  6584. nomination. �By putting light on this
  6585. monitoring program � conducted in
  6586. contravention of national laws and
  6587. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  6588. has helped to make the world a little
  6589. bit better and safer.� ...
  6590.  
  6591.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  6592. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  6593. to being well justified in itself �
  6594. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  6595. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  6596. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  6597. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  6598. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  6599.  
  6600. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  6601. _______________________________________
  6602. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  6603. Komsomolets News ::
  6604.  
  6605. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  6606. ���������������������������������������
  6607. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  6608. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  6609.  
  6610.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  6611. his experience when he received a Foreign
  6612. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  6613. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  6614. federal government to monitor a customer
  6615. of his.
  6616.  
  6617.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  6618. contained a broad gag order, which still
  6619. prevents him from telling all the details.
  6620.  
  6621.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  6622. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  6623. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  6624. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  6625.  
  6626.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  6627. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  6628. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  6629. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  6630.  
  6631.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  6632. facility that was capturing all of the
  6633. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  6634. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  6635. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  6636. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  6637.  
  6638. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  6639. _______________________________________
  6640. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  6641.  
  6642. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  6643. _______________________________________
  6644. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  6645.  
  6646. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  6647. ���������������������������������������
  6648. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  6649. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  6650.  
  6651.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  6652. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  6653. representative rather casually indicated
  6654. that the government looks at data from
  6655. a universe of far, far more people than
  6656. previously indicated.
  6657.  
  6658.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  6659. was one of several government representatives
  6660. �including from the FBI and the office of
  6661. the Director of National Intelligence�
  6662. testifying before the House Judiciary
  6663. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  6664. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  6665. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  6666. surveillance, including a retread of the
  6667. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  6668. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6669. Act had stopped terror events.
  6670.  
  6671.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  6672. look �two or three hops� from terror
  6673. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  6674. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  6675. how surveillance was extended had been
  6676. described as two hops. This meant that
  6677. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  6678. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  6679. could also look at the calls from the
  6680. people that suspect has spoken with one
  6681. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  6682. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  6683. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  6684. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  6685.  
  6686. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  6687.  
  6688.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  6689. them or not - two hops.
  6690.  
  6691.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  6692. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  6693.  
  6694. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  6695. ���������������������������������������
  6696. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  6697.  
  6698.  It is a good thing that people are
  6699. becoming aware of the fact that they
  6700. are being monitored - it is not only
  6701. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  6702. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  6703. made to collect information and to store
  6704. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  6705. resources that PRISM used and how it
  6706. could combine these resources to multiple
  6707. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  6708.  
  6709. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  6710. _______________________________________
  6711. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  6712.  
  6713. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  6714. ���������������������������������������
  6715. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  6716. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  6717.  
  6718.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  6719. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  6720. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  6721. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  6722. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  6723. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  6724. stories about the US government�s vast
  6725. foreign and domestic spying programs
  6726. will stop. ... ...
  6727.  
  6728.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  6729. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  6730. the United States by releasing more
  6731. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  6732.  
  6733.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  6734. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  6735. since he has already said that he gave
  6736. all of his classified information --
  6737. thousands of documents -- to several
  6738. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  6739. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  6740. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  6741. half done with the stories he plans to
  6742. write based on the secret information.
  6743.  
  6744. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  6745. ���������������������������������������
  6746. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  6747.  
  6748. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  6749. _______________________________________
  6750. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  6751.  
  6752. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  6753. ���������������������������������������
  6754. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  6755.  
  6756.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  6757. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  6758. typewriters. What do they know that
  6759. we don�t?
  6760.  
  6761. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  6762. ���������������������������������������
  6763. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  6764. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  6765.  
  6766.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  6767. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  6768. has existed since at least 2002. The
  6769. following document refers to it directly.
  6770. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  6771. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  6772. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  6773. limitation of it and similar projects.
  6774.  
  6775. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  6776.  
  6777. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  6778. _______________________________________
  6779. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  6780. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  6781.  
  6782. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  6783.  
  6784. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  6785. in Latin America ::
  6786.  
  6787. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  6788. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  6789. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  6790. _______________________________________
  6791. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  6792. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  6793.  
  6794. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  6795.  
  6796. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  6797.  
  6798. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  6799. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  6800.  
  6801. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  6802. _______________________________________
  6803. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  6804.  
  6805. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  6806. _______________________________________
  6807. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  6808. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  6809.  
  6810. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  6811. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  6812. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  6813. ���������������������������������������
  6814. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  6815.  
  6816. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  6817.  
  6818. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  6819.  
  6820. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  6821. _______________________________________
  6822. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  6823. Metadata ::
  6824.  
  6825. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  6826. _______________________________________
  6827. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  6828. by US Citizens ::
  6829.  
  6830. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  6831. ���������������������������������������
  6832. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  6833.  
  6834. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  6835.  
  6836.  �This may look like a small release, but
  6837. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  6838. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  6839. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  6840. sending encrypted data to and from the
  6841. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  6842. those servers. If you crash these servers
  6843. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  6844. "broken". We are also planning to release
  6845. some of that data (which we have access
  6846. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  6847. ���������������������������������������
  6848. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  6849. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  6850.  
  6851.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  6852. Snowden�s employer.
  6853.  
  6854. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  6855.  
  6856. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  6857.  
  6858. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  6859. _______________________________________
  6860. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  6861.  
  6862. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  6863. _______________________________________
  6864. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  6865.  
  6866.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  6867. it became clear that my freedom and
  6868. safety were under threat for revealing
  6869. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  6870. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  6871. old, family, and others who I have never
  6872. met and probably never will. I trusted
  6873. them with my life and they returned that
  6874. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  6875. always be thankful.
  6876.  
  6877.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  6878. before the world that he would not permit
  6879. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  6880. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  6881. after promising not to do so, the President
  6882. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  6883. leaders of nations from which I have
  6884. requested protection to deny my asylum
  6885. petitions.
  6886.  
  6887.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  6888. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  6889. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  6890. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  6891. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  6892. come after me.
  6893.  
  6894.  For decades the United States of America
  6895. have been one of the strongest defenders
  6896. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  6897. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  6898. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  6899. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  6900. the current government of my country. The
  6901. Obama administration has now adopted the
  6902. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  6903. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  6904. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  6905. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  6906. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  6907. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  6908. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  6909. asylum.
  6910.  
  6911.  In the end the Obama administration is
  6912. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  6913. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  6914. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  6915. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  6916. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  6917. demanding the constitutional government
  6918. it was promised � and it should be.
  6919.  
  6920.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  6921. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  6922. many.�
  6923.  
  6924. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  6925. ���������������������������������������
  6926. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  6927.  
  6928. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  6929.  
  6930. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  6931.  
  6932. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  6933. _______________________________________
  6934. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  6935.  
  6936. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  6937. ���������������������������������������
  6938. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  6939.  
  6940. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  6941. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  6942. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  6943. _______________________________________
  6944. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  6945.  
  6946. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  6947. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  6948. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  6949. _______________________________________
  6950. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  6951.  
  6952. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  6953.  
  6954.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  6955. over private data to America.
  6956.  
  6957.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  6958. according to new claims by former US defence
  6959. analyst.
  6960.  
  6961.  At least six European Union countries in
  6962. addition to Britain have been colluding
  6963. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  6964. personal communications data, according
  6965. to a former contractor to America�s
  6966. National Security Agency, who said the
  6967. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  6968.  
  6969.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  6970. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  6971. and over the next 12 years held several
  6972. sensitive positions within the agency,
  6973. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  6974. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  6975. deals with the US.
  6976.  
  6977.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  6978. second and third party status� under
  6979. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  6980. that compels them to hand over data,
  6981. including mobile phone and internet
  6982. information to the NSA if requested.
  6983.  
  6984.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  6985. confirmed by declassified documents,
  6986. nations are categorised by the US according
  6987. to their trust level. The US is first party
  6988. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  6989. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  6990. Germany and France have third party
  6991. relationships.
  6992.  
  6993.  In an interview published last night
  6994. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  6995. who has been attacked for holding
  6996. controversial views on espionage issues,
  6997. said he had decided to speak out after
  6998. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  6999. told by EU politicians regarding the
  7000. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  7001.  
  7002.  He said that under the agreements,
  7003. which were drawn up after the second
  7004. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  7005. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  7006. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  7007. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  7008.  
  7009.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  7010. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  7011. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  7012. about the spying operations while staying
  7013. silent about their own arrangements
  7014. with the US, and was particularly
  7015. concerned that senior German politicians
  7016. had accused the UK of spying when their
  7017. country had a similar third-party deal
  7018. with the NSA.
  7019.  
  7020.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  7021. by other European countries to the NSA is
  7022. not on the same scale as that provided by
  7023. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  7024. embarrassing.
  7025.  
  7026.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  7027. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  7028. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  7029. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  7030. Madsen said.
  7031.  
  7032.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  7033. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  7034. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  7035. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  7036. confirmed that the entire system for
  7037. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  7038. because the EU was unable to intervene
  7039. in intelligence matters, which remained
  7040. the exclusive concern of national
  7041. governments.
  7042.  
  7043.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  7044. these contradictions and no one is really
  7045. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  7046. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  7047. democracy.�
  7048.  
  7049.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  7050. for European governments to come clean
  7051. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  7052. �There needs to be transparency as to
  7053. whether or not it is legal for the US
  7054. or any other security service to
  7055. interrogate private material,� said
  7056. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  7057. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  7058. is that none of these arrangements has
  7059. been debated in any democratic arena.
  7060. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  7061. things have to be done in secret, but you
  7062. don�t break the law in secret.�
  7063.  
  7064.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  7065. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  7066. fibre-optic cable network running between
  7067. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  7068. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  7069. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  7070. including phone calls, emails and records
  7071. of users� access to websites.
  7072.  
  7073.  He said the public needed to be made
  7074. aware of the full scale of the communication
  7075. -sharing arrangements between European
  7076. countries and the US, which predate the
  7077. internet and became of strategic importance
  7078. during the cold war.
  7079.  
  7080.  The covert relationship between the
  7081. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  7082. report by the European parliament, but
  7083. their explicit connection with the NSA
  7084. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  7085. to speak out.
  7086.  
  7087.  The European parliament�s report followed
  7088. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  7089. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  7090. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  7091. established the framework for European
  7092. member states to collaborate with the US.
  7093.  
  7094.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  7095. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  7096. that governments have chosen to keep the
  7097. public in the dark about it. The days
  7098. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  7099. of silence are over.�
  7100.  
  7101.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  7102. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  7103. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  7104. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  7105. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  7106. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  7107. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  7108. ���������������������������������������
  7109. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  7110. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  7111.  
  7112.  A former contractor to the US National
  7113. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  7114. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  7115. intelligence arrangements between the
  7116. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  7117. murky and far reaching� than the public
  7118. has been led to believe. ...
  7119.  
  7120.  He was particularly concerned about the
  7121. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  7122. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  7123. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  7124. while staying silent about their own role
  7125. in global interception arrangements with
  7126. the United States. ...
  7127.  
  7128.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  7129. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  7130.  
  7131.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  7132. many who say he had no authority or right
  7133. to provide the public with details of
  7134. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  7135. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  7136. have to provide information on NSA
  7137. surveillance at five meetings of the
  7138. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  7139. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  7140. Spain and Switzerland?�
  7141.  
  7142.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  7143. American people from a constantly changing
  7144. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  7145. is providing information to elites on
  7146. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  7147. student, religious and progressive
  7148. organizations.�
  7149.  
  7150.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  7151. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  7152. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  7153.  
  7154. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  7155. _______________________________________
  7156. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  7157.  
  7158. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  7159. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  7160. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  7161. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  7162. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  7163. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  7164. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  7165.  
  7166. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  7167.  
  7168. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  7169. ���������������������������������������
  7170. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  7171. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  7172.  
  7173. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  7174. ??????????????????????????????????????
  7175.  ????????????????????????????????????
  7176. ??????????????????????????????????????
  7177. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ �
  7178.  
  7179. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  7180.  
  7181. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data
  7182. Collection �
  7183.  
  7184. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  7185.  
  7186. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on
  7187. Americans �
  7188.  
  7189. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  7190.  
  7191. � List of Retreats for Whistleblowers ;
  7192. Countries With No US Extradition Treaty �
  7193.  
  7194. http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1372346844.php
  7195.  
  7196. � Snowden Was Smart ; NSA Leaks Were
  7197. Given to Untold Others, Encrypted �
  7198.  
  7199. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/greenwald-snowden-s-files-are-out-there-if-anything-happens-to-him.html
  7200.  
  7201. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in
  7202. the Dark on NSA Spying �
  7203.  
  7204. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  7205.  
  7206. � Is PRISM a Not-So-Secret GUI and is
  7207. There More Than One PRISM Tool? �
  7208.  
  7209. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/06/is-prism-just-not-so-secret-web-tool.html
  7210.  
  7211. � Screenshot of the PRISM Input Tool �
  7212.  
  7213. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aKIwdHzpBxM/UbkjPyyl9pI/AAAAAAAAAWQ/hJWQkBFWDic/s1600/PRISM+input+tool.jpg
  7214.  
  7215. � NSA Also Spying on the �Deep Web� �
  7216.  
  7217. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-23/u-s-surveillance-is-not-aimed-at-terrorists.html
  7218.  
  7219. � Obama Regime Irate as Snowden Flees
  7220. Hong Kong to Undisclosed Location �
  7221.  
  7222. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/23/us-usa-security-flight-idUSBRE95M02H20130623
  7223. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_HONG_KONG?SITE=AP
  7224. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-us-politicians-react
  7225.  
  7226. � Wikileaks Comments on Helping Edward
  7227. Snowden Flee to Undisclosed Location �
  7228.  
  7229. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-Statement-On-Edward.html
  7230.  
  7231. � Obama Regime Charges Edward Snowden
  7232. With Espionage �
  7233.  
  7234. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_print.html
  7235.  
  7236. � USA vs. Edward Snowden Complaint �
  7237.  
  7238. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-complaint.pdf
  7239.  
  7240. � Pre-Crime in FISA Leak Detailed �
  7241.  
  7242. http://p.iain.it/view/raw/1296961
  7243.  
  7244. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks �
  7245.  
  7246. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  7247. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  7248. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  7249.  
  7250. � Illegal Warrantless Mass Spying of
  7251. All Telecommunication by NSA via FISA �
  7252.  
  7253. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  7254. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  7255. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  7256. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  7257. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  7258. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  7259. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  7260. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  7261. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  7262. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  7263. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  7264. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  7265. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  7266. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  7267. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  7268. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  7269. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  7270. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  7271. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  7272. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  7273. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  7274. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  7275. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  7276. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  7277. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  7278. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  7279. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  7280. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  7281. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  7282. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  7283. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  7284. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  7285. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  7286. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  7287. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  7288. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  7289.  
  7290. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable
  7291. Tapping 1 & 2 (Repost) �
  7292.  
  7293. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  7294.  
  7295. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  7296.  
  7297. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic
  7298. Tapping (Repost) �
  7299.  
  7300. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  7301.  
  7302. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip �
  7303.  
  7304. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  7305.  
  7306. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  7307. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  7308. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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