pastebin - collaborative debugging

pastebin is a collaborative debugging tool allowing you to share and modify code snippets while chatting on IRC, IM or a message board.

This site is developed to XHTML and CSS2 W3C standards. If you see this paragraph, your browser does not support those standards and you need to upgrade. Visit WaSP for a variety of options.

n3tBin / Home / Archive

Copyright © 2007-2011, n3t-t3z Team

Posted by Eyeballing the N on April Fri 4th 7:05 PM - Never Expires
download | new post

  1. VIEW FULL @ http://lidor.net/p/?p=el9e7
  2.    
  3. DOWNLOAD TXT/HTML @ http://www.uploadzeal.com/ldmrj2yj1wst
  4.    
  5.    
  6.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  7. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  8. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  9.  
  10.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  11.  
  12.  
  13. � ACLU Offers NSA Document Search ::
  14.  
  15. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-search
  16.  
  17. � ACLU Offers Mirrored NSA Documents ::
  18.  
  19. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  20. _______________________________________
  21. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip ::
  22.  
  23.  Includes all news reports, videos, images, slides
  24. and documents from and related to Snowden�s leaks
  25. so far, up to April 2nd of 2014. I�m still collecting
  26. any information that comes out and will provide an
  27. updated archive from time to time.
  28.  
  29.  After decompression - the main folder is titled
  30. �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and it holds a total of
  31. 927MB decompressed.
  32.  
  33.  This was stored on an old OFFLINE system, without
  34. any WiFi card or modem attached so the archive is
  35. safe from being modified, exploited or stolen.
  36.  
  37. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  38. (1,325 files | ZIP | 743MB)
  39.  
  40. http://fileb.ag/1ixi6dqmbj80
  41. http://fpsbay.com/download/64465X13965734822241X344921/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  42. http://davvas.com/l21m47ls819e
  43. http://jumbofiles.org/newfile?n=528498&Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.zip
  44. _______________________________________
  45. � It�s Finally Admitted! ::
  46.  
  47. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1100298-unclassified-702-response.html
  48. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/04/01/james-clapper-confirms-vadm-mike-rogers-needlessly-obfuscated-in-confirmation-hearing/
  49. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/01/nsa-surveillance-loophole-americans-data
  50. http://www.zdnet.com/nsa-searched-u-s-calls-emails-without-warrant-u-s-intelligence-chief-admits-7000027938/
  51. http://rt.com/usa/clapper-wyden-nsa-fisa-665/
  52. _______________________________________
  53. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State ::
  54.  
  55. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-cos.pdf
  56.  
  57. � NSA Spy Chiefs of State (Full List) ::
  58.  
  59. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-nymrod-spy-cos.pdf
  60.  
  61. � GCHQ and NSA Targeted Private German Companies ::
  62.  
  63. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/gchq-and-nsa-targeted-private-german-companies-a-961444.html
  64. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/29/der-spiegel-nsa-ghcq-hacked-german-companies-put-merkel-list-122-targeted-leaders/
  65. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/03/31/nsas-m31.html
  66. http://leaksource.info/2014/03/31/122-country-leaders-in-nsas-target-knowledge-database-2009-document/
  67.  
  68. ? UPDATE ; European Parliament Suspends US
  69. Trade Talks Due to Political Spying ::
  70.  
  71. http://falkvinge.net/2014/03/12/europarl-suspends-u-s-trade-talks-data-sharing-over-mass-surveillance/
  72. _______________________________________
  73. � Video Demonstration of Two Intelligence Analysis Tools ::
  74.  
  75. http://electrospaces.blogspot.se/2014/03/video-demonstration-of-two-intelligence.html
  76.  
  77. � Telephone Call Data Record Link Analysis Software ::
  78.  
  79. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J38tKqq9kpY
  80.  
  81. � IBM i2 Analysts Notebook - Esri Edition ::
  82.  
  83. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJ5CovDQDYU
  84.  
  85. � Report and Both Videos ZIPPED & Mirrored ::
  86.  
  87. http://fpsbay.com/download/64445X13961058822231X344721/Two%20Intelligence%20Analysis%20Tools.zip
  88. _______________________________________
  89. � NSA�s New Civil Liberties and Privacy Officer ::
  90.  
  91.  Becky Richards promises more transparency. She
  92. also promises the NSA will �build privacy into
  93. new technologies� to �protect privacy and civil
  94. liberties� and �to be as transparent with the
  95. public as possible� as well helping the public
  96. �understand how we�re protecting their privacy,
  97. how we�re protecting national security.�
  98.  
  99. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-richards-14-0320.htm
  100. ���������������������������������������
  101. � NSA Huawei SHOTGIANT Hardware Exploit ::
  102.  
  103. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei.pdf
  104.  
  105. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-huawei-02.pdf
  106.  
  107. � Huawei Global Cyber Security Assurance ::
  108.  
  109. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-cyber-security.pdf
  110.  
  111. � Huawei Network Migration Tool (48.7MB) ::
  112.  
  113. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/huawei-network-migration.zip
  114.  
  115. � NSA Breached Chinese Telecom Giant Huawei ::
  116.  
  117.  The American government conducted a major intelligence
  118. offensive against China, with targets including the
  119. Chinese government and networking company Huawei,
  120. according to documents from former NSA worker Edward
  121. Snowden that have been viewed by SPIEGEL and the
  122. New York Times. Among the American intelligence
  123. service�s targets were former Chinese President
  124. Hu Jintao, the Chinese Trade Ministry, banks, as
  125. well as telecommunications companies.
  126.  
  127.  But the NSA made a special effort to target Huawei.
  128. With 150,000 employees and �28 billion ($38.6 billion)
  129. in annual revenues, the company is the world�s second
  130. largest network equipment supplier. At the beginning
  131. of 2009, the NSA began an extensive operation, referred
  132. to internally as �Shotgiant,� against the company, which
  133. is considered a major competitor to US-based Cisco. The
  134. company produces smartphones and tablets, but also mobile
  135. phone infrastructure, WLAN routers and fiber optic cable
  136. -- the kind of technology that is decisive in the NSA�s
  137. battle for data supremacy.
  138.  
  139.  A special unit with the US intelligence agency succeeded
  140. in infiltrating Huwaei�s network and copied a list of
  141. 1,400 customers as well as internal documents providing
  142. training to engineers on the use of Huwaei products,
  143. among other things.
  144.  
  145. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/asia/nsa-breached-chinese-servers-seen-as-spy-peril.html
  146. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-spied-on-chinese-government-and-networking-firm-huawei-a-960199.html
  147. http://news.yahoo.com/nsa-infiltrates-servers-china-telecom-giant-huawei-report-022030765--finance.html
  148. http://www.forbes.com/sites/rosatrieu/2014/03/24/chinas-huawei-condemns-nsa-spying-calls-for-unity-against-cyber-mischief/
  149.  
  150. � Hong Lei Responds to Huawei NSA Backdoors ::
  151.  
  152.  �We are seriously concerned with relevant reports. The
  153. media has disclosed a lot about the eavesdropping,
  154. surveillance and spying activities that the US has
  155. carried out on other countries, including China. China
  156. has lodged representations with the American side on
  157. many occasions. We require the American side to give a
  158. clear explanation and stop such behaviours.�
  159.  
  160. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t1140281.shtml
  161. _______________________________________
  162. � NSA Mapping and Spying System Administrators ::
  163.  
  164.  The document consists of several posts � one of
  165. them is titled �I hunt sys admins� � that were
  166. published in 2012 on an internal discussion board
  167. hosted on the agency�s classified servers. They
  168. were written by an NSA official involved in the
  169. agency�s effort to break into foreign network
  170. routers, the devices that connect computer
  171. networks and transport data across the Internet.
  172. By infiltrating the computers of system administrators
  173. who work for foreign phone and Internet companies,
  174. the NSA can gain access to the calls and emails
  175. that flow over their networks.
  176.  
  177.  The classified posts reveal how the NSA official
  178. aspired to create a database that would function
  179. as an international hit list of sys admins to
  180. potentially target. Yet the document makes clear
  181. that the admins are not suspected of any criminal
  182. activity � they are targeted only because they
  183. control access to networks the agency wants to
  184. infiltrate. �Who better to target than the person
  185. that already has the �keys to the kingdom�?� one
  186. of the posts says.
  187.  
  188.  The NSA wants more than just passwords. The document
  189. includes a list of other data that can be harvested
  190. from computers belonging to sys admins, including
  191. network maps, customer lists, business correspondence
  192. and, the author jokes, �pictures of cats in funny
  193. poses with amusing captions.�
  194.  
  195. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hunt-sysadmins.pdf
  196. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/03/20/hunt-sys-admins/
  197. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/20/inside-nsa-secret-efforts-hunt-hack-system-administrators/
  198. _______________________________________
  199. � NSA Culture, 1980s to the 21st Century ::
  200.  
  201. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-sid-culture.pdf
  202. _______________________________________
  203. � CSEC SNOWGLOBE Slides ::
  204.  
  205. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/cse-snowglobe.pdf
  206.  
  207. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1094526/babarfull.pdf
  208.  
  209. � Default Le Monde Report ::
  210.  
  211. http://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2014/03/21/quand-les-canadiens-partent-en-chasse-de-babar_4387233_3210.html
  212.  
  213. � Le Monde Report Translated to English ::
  214.  
  215. http://slexy.org/view/s20ThA9Vog
  216. _______________________________________
  217. � DNI National Security / Secrecy Panic ::
  218.  
  219. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/litt-14-0318.pdf
  220. _______________________________________
  221. � TED ; Ask Snowden ::
  222.  
  223. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yVwAodrjZMY
  224.  
  225. http://iroots.org/2014/03/18/transcript-edward-snowden-today-at-ted-talk/
  226. _______________________________________
  227. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  228.  
  229. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  230. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  231. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  232. _______________________________________
  233. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  234.  
  235. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  236.  
  237. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  238. _______________________________________
  239. � NSA MYSTIC Telephone Interception Program ::
  240.  
  241. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086618/mysticssoweeklybrief.pdf
  242. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1086616/fromsso-key-brief-overview.pdf
  243. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1088934/mystic-tearsheet-cropped-v2.pdf
  244.  
  245.  The National Security Agency has built a surveillance
  246. system capable of recording �100 percent� of a foreign
  247. country�s telephone calls, enabling the agency to rewind
  248. and review conversations as long as a month after they
  249. take place, according to people with direct knowledge of
  250. the effort and documents supplied by former contractor
  251. Edward Snowden.
  252.  
  253.  A senior manager for the program compares it to a time
  254. machine � one that can replay the voices from any call
  255. without requiring that a person be identified in advance
  256. for surveillance.
  257.  
  258.  The voice interception program, called MYSTIC, began in
  259. 2009. Its RETRO tool, short for �retrospective retrieval,�
  260. and related projects reached full capacity against the
  261. first target nation in 2011. Planning documents two years
  262. later anticipated similar operations elsewhere.
  263.  
  264.  In the initial deployment, collection systems are recording
  265. �every single� conversation nationwide, storing billions of
  266. them in a 30-day rolling buffer that clears the oldest
  267. calls as new ones arrive, according to a classified summary.
  268.  
  269.  The call buffer opens a door �into the past,� the summary
  270. says, enabling users to �retrieve audio of interest that
  271. was not tasked at the time of the original call.� Analysts
  272. listen to only a fraction of 1 percent of the calls, but
  273. the absolute numbers are high. Each month, they send
  274. millions of voice clippings, or �cuts,� for processing
  275. and long-term storage.
  276.  
  277. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html
  278.  
  279. � Washington Post Censors MYSTIC Slides ::
  280.  
  281.  The Washington Post is reporting, based on the
  282. files of whistleblower Edward Snowden, that the NSA
  283. is able to store every phone call made in an entire
  284. nation and replay them for up to 30 days. Not only
  285. can the agency do this, but there is a country where
  286. it�s actually doing this now�the Post knows where,
  287. but they won�t say.
  288.  
  289. http://www.fair.org/blog/2014/03/19/the-nsa-built-a-time-machine-but-washington-post-wont-say-where/
  290. _______________________________________
  291. � NSA Third Party (Five Eye) Relationships ::
  292.  
  293. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-third-parties.pdf
  294. _______________________________________
  295. � Comsec as Essential Public Utility ::
  296.  
  297. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-public-utility.htm
  298.  
  299. � Update ; Comsec as Essential Failure ::
  300.  
  301. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/comsec-ewafmss.htm
  302. _______________________________________
  303. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  304.  
  305.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  306. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  307. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  308. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  309. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  310. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  311. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  312.  
  313. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  314.  
  315. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  316.  
  317. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  318. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  319. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  320.  
  321. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  322.  
  323. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  324.  
  325. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  326.  
  327.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  328. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  329.  
  330. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  331.  
  332. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  333.  
  334. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  335.  
  336. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  337.  
  338.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  339. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  340. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  341. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  342.  
  343. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  344.  
  345. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  346.  
  347. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  348.  
  349. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  350.  
  351. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  352.  
  353. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  354.  
  355. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  356.  
  357. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  358.  
  359. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  360.  
  361. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  362.  
  363. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  364.  
  365. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  366. _______________________________________
  367. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  368.  
  369. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  370. _______________________________________
  371. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  372.  
  373. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  374.  
  375. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  376.  
  377. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  378.  
  379. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  380.  
  381. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  382. _______________________________________
  383. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  384.  
  385. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  386.  
  387. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  388.  
  389. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  390. _______________________________________
  391. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  392.  
  393. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  394. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  395. _______________________________________
  396. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  397. With Malware ::
  398.  
  399.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  400. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  401. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  402. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  403. level of human oversight in the process.
  404.  
  405.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  406. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  407. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  408. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  409. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  410. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  411. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  412. Internet and phone networks.
  413.  
  414. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  415. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  416. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  417. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  418. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  419. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  420. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  421. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  422. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  423.  
  424.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  425. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  426. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  427. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  428. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  429. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  430.  
  431.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  432. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  433. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  434. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  435. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  436. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  437. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  438. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  439. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  440. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  441. instead of individually.�
  442.  
  443. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  444.  
  445. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  446.  
  447.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  448. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  449. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  450. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  451. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  452. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  453. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  454. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  455. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  456. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  457. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  458. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  459. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  460. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  461. execute endpoint operations.�
  462.  
  463. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  464.  
  465.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  466. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  467. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  468. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  469.  
  470.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  471. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  472. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  473. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  474. looks suspicious.
  475.  
  476.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  477. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  478. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  479. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  480. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  481.  
  482.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  483. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  484. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  485. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  486. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  487. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  488. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  489.  
  490.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  491. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  492. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  493. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  494. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  495. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  496. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  497. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  498. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  499. in action.
  500.  
  501. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  502. Computers for Surveillance ::
  503.  
  504. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  505.  
  506. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  507.  
  508. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  509.  
  510.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  511. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  512. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  513. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  514. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  515. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  516.  
  517. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  518.  
  519. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  520. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  521. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  522. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  523. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  524. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  525. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  526. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  527. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  528. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  529.  
  530. � Compare TURBINE Slides (Spiegel vs Intercept) ::
  531.  
  532. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spot-differences.pdf
  533.  
  534. � NSA Denies Thousands of Implants ::
  535.  
  536. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-14-0313.pdf
  537. _______________________________________
  538. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  539.  
  540. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  541. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  542. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  543. _______________________________________
  544. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  545.  
  546. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  547. _______________________________________
  548. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  549.  
  550.  Alliances between security services are usually
  551. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  552. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  553. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  554. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  555. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  556. internet traffic.
  557.  
  558.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  559. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  560. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  561. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  562. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  563.  
  564.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  565. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  566. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  567. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  568. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  569. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  570.  
  571.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  572. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  573. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  574. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  575. Americans may possibly use the information for
  576. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  577. by attacking them with armed drones.
  578.  
  579. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  580.  
  581. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  582. _______________________________________
  583. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  584.  
  585. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  586.  
  587. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  588. ---------------------------------------
  589. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  590.  
  591. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  592.  
  593. � NSA Spies Too ::
  594.  
  595. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  596. _______________________________________
  597. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  598.  
  599. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  600.  
  601. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  602.  
  603.  The documents show that images were collected
  604. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  605. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  606. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  607. programs.
  608.  
  609. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  610. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  611. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  612. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  613.  
  614. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  615.  
  616. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  617. _______________________________________
  618. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  619.  
  620. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  621. _______________________________________
  622. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  623.  
  624. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  625.  
  626. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  627. _______________________________________
  628. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  629. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  630.  
  631. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  632.  
  633. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  634. _______________________________________
  635. � NSA Observer ::
  636.  
  637. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  638. _______________________________________
  639. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  640.  
  641. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  642.  
  643. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  644. _______________________________________
  645. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  646.  
  647. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  648.  
  649. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  650. _______________________________________
  651. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  652.  
  653. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  654.  
  655. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  656.  
  657. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  658.  
  659. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  660.  
  661.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  662. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  663. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  664. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  665. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  666. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  667. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  668. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  669. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  670. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  671. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  672.  
  673.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  674. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  675. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  676. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  677. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  678. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  679.  
  680. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  681. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  682. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  683. ---------------------------------------
  684. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  685.  
  686. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  687.  
  688. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  689.  
  690. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  691.  
  692. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  693.  
  694. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  695.  
  696. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  697.  
  698. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  699.  
  700. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  701.  
  702. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  703. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  704. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  705.  
  706. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  707. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  708.  
  709. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  710. ---------------------------------------
  711. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  712.  
  713. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  714. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  715. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  716. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  717.  
  718. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  719.  
  720. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  721.  
  722. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  723.  
  724. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  725.  
  726. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  727.  
  728. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  729. ---------------------------------------
  730. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  731.  
  732. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  733. _______________________________________
  734. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  735.  
  736. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  737.  
  738. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  739.  
  740. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  741.  
  742. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  743. _______________________________________
  744. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  745.  
  746.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  747. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  748. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  749. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  750. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  751. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  752. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  753. targets without confirming their veracity on
  754. the ground.
  755.  
  756. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  757. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  758. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  759. _______________________________________
  760. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  761.  
  762.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  763. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  764. shows that an American law firm was
  765. monitored while representing a foreign
  766. government in trade disputes with the
  767. United States. The disclosure offers a
  768. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  769. which Americans were ensnared by the
  770. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  771. interest because lawyers in the United
  772. States with clients overseas have
  773. expressed growing concern that their
  774. confidential communications could be
  775. compromised by such surveillance.
  776.  
  777. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  778. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  779. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  780.  
  781. NOBODY comments
  782.  
  783. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  784.  
  785.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  786. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  787. be declassified for research in public domain.
  788. _______________________________________
  789. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  790.  
  791. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  792.  
  793. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  794.  
  795. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  796. _______________________________________
  797. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  798.  
  799. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  800. _______________________________________
  801. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  802. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  803.  
  804.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  805. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  806. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  807. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  808. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  809.  
  810. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  811. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  812. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  813.  
  814. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  815. the German Chancellor ::
  816.  
  817. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  818. _______________________________________
  819. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  820. Phone Call Spying ::
  821.  
  822. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  823.  
  824. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  825. _______________________________________
  826. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  827.  
  828. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  829. _______________________________________
  830. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  831.  
  832. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  833. _______________________________________
  834.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  835. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  836. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  837. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  838. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  839. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  840.  
  841. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  842. ���������������������������������������
  843. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  844.  
  845. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  846.  
  847. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  848.  
  849. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  850.  
  851. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  852.  
  853. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  854.  
  855.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  856. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  857. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  858. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  859. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  860. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  861. left the terminal.
  862.  
  863.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  864. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  865. clandestine operation by the Communications
  866. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  867. certainly illegal. ... ...
  868.  
  869.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  870. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  871. software program CSEC was developing with help
  872. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  873.  
  874.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  875. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  876. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  877. into other cities/regions.�
  878.  
  879. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  880.  
  881.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  882. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  883.  
  884. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  885.  
  886. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  887.  
  888. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  889.  
  890. � How Canada�s CSEC Maps Phone and Internet Connections ::
  891.  
  892. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/03/olympia-how-canadas-csec-maps-phone-and.html
  893. _______________________________________
  894. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  895.  
  896. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  897.  
  898. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  899.  
  900. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  901. _______________________________________
  902. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  903.  
  904.  Documents taken from the National Security
  905. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  906. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  907. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  908. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  909. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  910. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  911. information, for analysis. At the time the
  912. documents were printed, they were also able to
  913. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  914.  
  915.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  916. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  917. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  918. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  919. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  920. visits. The monitoring program is called
  921. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  922.  
  923.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  924. British had to have been either physically able
  925. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  926. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  927. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  928. and would be able to extract some key data
  929. about specific users as well.
  930.  
  931. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  932. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  933. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  934. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  935. _______________________________________
  936. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  937.  
  938. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  939. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  940. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  941.  
  942. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  943.  
  944.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  945. on the iPhone alone.�
  946.  
  947. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  948.  
  949. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  950.  
  951. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  952.  
  953. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  954. _______________________________________
  955. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  956.  
  957.  The National Security Agency program that
  958. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  959. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  960. Thursday in a newly released report.
  961.  
  962. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  963.  
  964.  �We have not identified a single instance
  965. involving a threat to the United States in
  966. which the program made a concrete difference
  967. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  968. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  969. report released Thursday.
  970.  
  971.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  972. domestic spying will continue.
  973.  
  974. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  975. _______________________________________
  976. � Snowden Speaks ::
  977.  
  978. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  979. _______________________________________
  980. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  981.  
  982. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  983.  
  984. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  985.          ���
  986. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  987.  
  988. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  989.  
  990.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  991. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  992. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  993. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  994. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  995. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  996. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  997. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  998. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  999. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  1000. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  1001. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  1002. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  1003. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  1004. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  1005.  
  1006. Reform?
  1007.  
  1008.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  1009. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  1010. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  1011. whether legal or not?
  1012.  
  1013. The reform will come from people taking action.
  1014.  
  1015.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  1016. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  1017. _______________________________________
  1018. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  1019.  
  1020. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  1021. _______________________________________
  1022. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  1023.  
  1024.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  1025. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  1026. main internet cables:
  1027.  
  1028.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  1029.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  1030.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  1031.  
  1032. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  1033. ---------------------------------------
  1034. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  1035. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  1036. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  1037. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  1038. _______________________________________
  1039. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  1040.  
  1041. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  1042.  
  1043. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  1044.  
  1045. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  1046. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  1047. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  1048. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  1049. ---------------------------------------
  1050. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  1051. _______________________________________
  1052. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  1053.  
  1054. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  1055.  
  1056. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  1057.  
  1058. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  1059.  
  1060.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  1061. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  1062. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  1063. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  1064.  
  1065.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  1066. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  1067. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  1068. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  1069.  
  1070.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  1071. text message database to extract information
  1072. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  1073. transactions and more � including of individuals
  1074. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  1075.  
  1076. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  1077. _______________________________________
  1078. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  1079.  
  1080. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  1081.  
  1082. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  1083.  
  1084.  The technology, which the agency has used
  1085. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  1086. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  1087. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  1088. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  1089. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  1090. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  1091. set up miles away from the target.
  1092.  
  1093.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  1094. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  1095. American intelligence agencies for years:
  1096. getting into computers that adversaries,
  1097. and some American partners, have tried to
  1098. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  1099. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  1100. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  1101. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  1102. ---------------------------------------
  1103. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  1104.  
  1105. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  1106. _______________________________________
  1107. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  1108.  
  1109. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  1110. ---------------------------------------
  1111. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  1112.  
  1113. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  1114. _______________________________________
  1115. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  1116.  
  1117. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  1118. _______________________________________
  1119. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  1120.  
  1121. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  1122. _______________________________________
  1123. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  1124.  
  1125. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  1126. _______________________________________
  1127. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  1128. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  1129.  
  1130. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  1131.  
  1132. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  1133. _______________________________________
  1134. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  1135. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  1136.  
  1137. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  1138. _______________________________________
  1139. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  1140. All Encryption ::
  1141.  
  1142.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  1143. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  1144. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  1145. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  1146. used to protect banking, medical, business
  1147. and government records around the world.
  1148.  
  1149.  According to documents provided by former
  1150. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  1151. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  1152. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  1153. than classical computers � is part of a
  1154. $79.7 million research program titled
  1155. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  1156. work is hosted under classified contracts
  1157. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  1158.  
  1159. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  1160. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  1161. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  1162. _______________________________________
  1163. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  1164.  
  1165. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  1166. _______________________________________
  1167. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  1168.  
  1169. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  1170. _______________________________________
  1171. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  1172.  
  1173. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  1174.  
  1175. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  1176.  
  1177. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  1178.  
  1179. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  1180.  
  1181. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  1182.  
  1183. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  1184. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  1185. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  1186.  
  1187. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  1188.  
  1189.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  1190. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  1191. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  1192. infiltrates computers around the world and
  1193. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  1194. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  1195. it is targeting. ... ...
  1196.  
  1197. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  1198.  
  1199.  The insert method and other variants of
  1200. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  1201. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  1202. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  1203. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  1204. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  1205. also incorporates routers and servers
  1206. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  1207. network by infecting these networks with
  1208. �implants� that then allow the government
  1209. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  1210.  
  1211.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  1212. to identify and track its targets based on
  1213. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  1214. could include certain email addresses or
  1215. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  1216. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  1217. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  1218. additional information like an email address.
  1219. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  1220. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  1221. ---------------------------------------
  1222. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  1223.  
  1224. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  1225.  
  1226. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  1227.  
  1228.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  1229. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  1230. that are being logged into on that computer
  1231. as long as the user does not clear browser
  1232. cookies.�
  1233.  
  1234. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  1235.  
  1236. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  1237.  
  1238. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  1239. ---------------------------------------
  1240. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  1241.  
  1242.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  1243. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  1244. could be described as master carpenters for
  1245. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  1246. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  1247. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  1248. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  1249. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  1250. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  1251. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  1252. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  1253. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  1254. ability to establish a global covert network
  1255. that operates alongside the Internet.
  1256.  
  1257.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  1258. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  1259. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  1260. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  1261. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  1262. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  1263. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  1264. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  1265. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  1266. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  1267. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  1268. over $1 million.
  1269.  
  1270.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  1271. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  1272. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  1273. clear preference for planting their malicious
  1274. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  1275. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  1276. to load when a computer is turned on.
  1277.  
  1278.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  1279. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  1280. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  1281. to virus protection and other security programs.
  1282. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  1283. computer has been completely erased and a new
  1284. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  1285. can continue to function and ensures that new
  1286. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  1287. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  1288. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  1289. this approach has provided them with the
  1290. possibility of permanent access.
  1291.  
  1292.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  1293. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  1294. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  1295. with the exception of latter, are American
  1296. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  1297. intelligence agency is compromising the
  1298. technology and products of American companies.
  1299.  
  1300. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  1301. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  1302. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  1303. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  1304. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  1305.  
  1306. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  1307.  
  1308. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  1309.  
  1310. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  1311.  
  1312. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  1313.  
  1314. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  1315.  
  1316. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  1317.  
  1318. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  1319.  
  1320. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  1321.  
  1322. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  1323.  
  1324. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  1325.  
  1326. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  1327.  
  1328. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  1329.  
  1330. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  1331.  
  1332. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  1333.  
  1334. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  1335.  
  1336. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  1337.  
  1338. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  1339.  
  1340. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  1341.  
  1342. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  1343.  
  1344. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  1345.  
  1346. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  1347.  
  1348. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  1349.  
  1350. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  1351.  
  1352. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  1353.  
  1354. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  1355.  
  1356. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  1357. ---------------------------------------
  1358. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  1359.  
  1360. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  1361.  
  1362. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  1363.  
  1364. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  1365.  
  1366. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  1367. ---------------------------------------
  1368. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  1369.  
  1370. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  1371.  
  1372. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  1373.  
  1374.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  1375. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  1376. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  1377.  
  1378. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  1379.  
  1380. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  1381. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  1382.  
  1383.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  1384. in its operating system had left devices open
  1385. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  1386. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  1387. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  1388. of its mass spying program.
  1389.  
  1390. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  1391. ---------------------------------------
  1392. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  1393. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  1394.  
  1395. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  1396.  
  1397. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  1398. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  1399.  
  1400. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  1401.  
  1402. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  1403.  
  1404. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  1405.  
  1406.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  1407. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  1408.  
  1409. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  1410. _______________________________________
  1411. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  1412.  
  1413. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  1414.  
  1415. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  1416.  
  1417. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  1418. _______________________________________
  1419. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  1420.  
  1421. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  1422.  
  1423.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  1424. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  1425. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  1426. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  1427. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  1428. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  1429. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  1430. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  1431. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  1432. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  1433.  
  1434.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  1435. learn we are collecting more in the United
  1436. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  1437. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  1438. troubled, he said, and several said they
  1439. did not want to know any more.
  1440. ---------------------------------------
  1441. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  1442.  
  1443. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  1444. _______________________________________
  1445. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  1446. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  1447.  
  1448. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  1449. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  1450. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  1451. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  1452. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  1453. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  1454. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  1455. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  1456.  
  1457. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  1458.  
  1459.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  1460. National Security Agency program which
  1461. collects information on nearly all telephone
  1462. calls made to, from or within the United
  1463. States is likely unconstitutional.
  1464.  
  1465.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  1466. that the program appears to violate the
  1467. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  1468. searches and seizures. He also said the
  1469. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  1470. that collecting the information had helped
  1471. to head off terrorist attacks.
  1472.  
  1473.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  1474. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  1475. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  1476. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  1477. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  1478. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  1479. the order to allow for an appeal.
  1480.  
  1481. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  1482. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  1483.  
  1484.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  1485. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  1486. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  1487. in June in news stories based on leaks
  1488. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  1489. For seven years, the metadata program has
  1490. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  1491. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  1492. Court and found constitutional by at least
  1493. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  1494.  
  1495. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  1496.  
  1497. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  1498.  
  1499. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  1500.  
  1501. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  1502.  
  1503. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  1504.  
  1505. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  1506. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  1507.  
  1508. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  1509.  
  1510. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  1511.  
  1512. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  1513. ---------------------------------------
  1514. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  1515.  
  1516. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  1517.  
  1518. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  1519.  
  1520. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  1521. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  1522.  
  1523. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  1524. Spying Programs ::
  1525.  
  1526. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  1527. ---------------------------------------
  1528. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  1529. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  1530.  
  1531. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  1532.  
  1533. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  1534.  
  1535. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  1536. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  1537.  
  1538. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  1539.  
  1540. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  1541. _______________________________________
  1542. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  1543.  
  1544.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  1545. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  1546. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  1547.  
  1548. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  1549.  
  1550. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  1551.  
  1552.  - Military Information
  1553.  - Economic Information
  1554.  - Information Operations Information
  1555.  - Political Information �
  1556. _______________________________________
  1557. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  1558. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  1559.  
  1560. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  1561. ���������������������������������������
  1562. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  1563.  
  1564. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  1565.  
  1566. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  1567.  
  1568. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  1569.  
  1570. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  1571.  
  1572. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  1573.  
  1574. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  1575.  
  1576. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  1577.  
  1578. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  1579.  
  1580. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  1581. _______________________________________
  1582. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  1583. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  1584.  
  1585.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  1586. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  1587. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  1588. government access in order to make network
  1589. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  1590. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  1591. in millions of homes and businesses within
  1592. the UK,� the paper states.
  1593.  
  1594.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  1595. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  1596. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  1597. assigns all their modems an extra address
  1598. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  1599. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  1600. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  1601. a second IP address for management, except
  1602. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  1603. assigned to the United States Department
  1604. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  1605. of speculation that this is actually a
  1606. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  1607. they can secretly monitor and control
  1608. peoples� home networks.
  1609.  
  1610.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  1611. The better explanation is that BT simply
  1612. chose this address space because it�s
  1613. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  1614. address, it�s only used inside the private
  1615. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  1616. that address space, you�ll see that your
  1617. packets go nowhere.
  1618.  
  1619. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  1620. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  1621. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  1622.  
  1623. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  1624.  
  1625.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  1626. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  1627. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  1628. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  1629. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  1630. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  1631. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  1632. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  1633. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  1634. It�s past time for something new.�
  1635.  
  1636. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  1637. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  1638. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  1639. ---------------------------------------
  1640. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  1641.  
  1642.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  1643. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  1644. worldwide with malicious software designed
  1645. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  1646. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  1647. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  1648.  
  1649.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  1650. explains how the NSA collects information
  1651. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  1652. shows that the intelligence service uses
  1653. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  1654. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  1655. secret infiltration of computer systems
  1656. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  1657. software.
  1658.  
  1659.  One example of this type of hacking was
  1660. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  1661. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  1662. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  1663. has been installing this malicious software
  1664. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  1665. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  1666. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  1667. through a process of luring employees to a
  1668. false Linkedin page.
  1669.  
  1670. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  1671. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  1672. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  1673. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  1674.  
  1675. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  1676.  
  1677.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  1678. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  1679. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  1680. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  1681. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  1682. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  1683. and citizens.
  1684.  
  1685.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  1686. will deter this bounty of profits for
  1687. the comsec industry, unless the public
  1688. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  1689. the nettle, and all those making money
  1690. from this deception operation decide to
  1691. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  1692.  
  1693.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  1694. lists, those participating in standards
  1695. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  1696. grants in think tanks and universities,
  1697. those in law firms and public interest
  1698. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  1699. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  1700. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  1701. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  1702. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  1703. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  1704. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  1705. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  1706. contracts, list lurking, online and
  1707. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  1708. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  1709. fulfilled.
  1710.  
  1711. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  1712.  
  1713. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  1714.  
  1715. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  1716.  
  1717. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  1718. ���������������������������������������
  1719. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  1720. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  1721.  
  1722. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  1723. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  1724. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  1725. _______________________________________
  1726. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  1727.  
  1728. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  1729.  
  1730. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  1731.  
  1732. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  1733.  
  1734. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  1735.  
  1736. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  1737. _______________________________________
  1738. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  1739.  
  1740. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  1741. _______________________________________
  1742. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  1743. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  1744.  
  1745. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  1746.  
  1747. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  1748. _______________________________________
  1749. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  1750.  
  1751. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  1752. _______________________________________
  1753. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  1754. of Public Concerns ::
  1755.  
  1756. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  1757.  
  1758. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  1759.  
  1760. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1761. _______________________________________
  1762. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  1763.  
  1764.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  1765. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  1766. of metadata about the world�s secure
  1767. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  1768. certainly not a program through which
  1769. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  1770. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  1771. services like Google, as reported by others,
  1772. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  1773. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  1774. Google are based on a small piece of a
  1775. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  1776. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  1777. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  1778. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  1779. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  1780. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  1781. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  1782. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  1783. by providing information about a target.�
  1784.  
  1785. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  1786.  
  1787. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  1788.  
  1789. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  1790. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  1791. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  1792. ���������������������������������������
  1793. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  1794.  
  1795. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  1796.  
  1797. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  1798. _______________________________________
  1799. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  1800.  
  1801. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  1802. ---------------------------------------
  1803. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  1804.  
  1805. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  1806.  
  1807.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  1808. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  1809. and later managed by big data corporations
  1810. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  1811.  
  1812.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  1813. large files across machines in a large
  1814. cluster.
  1815.  
  1816. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  1817.  
  1818.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  1819. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  1820. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  1821. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  1822.  
  1823.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  1824. major components, a central metadata server
  1825. and file servers from data.
  1826.  
  1827. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  1828.  
  1829. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  1830.  
  1831.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  1832. posted on public domain.
  1833.  
  1834. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  1835.  
  1836. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  1837. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  1838.  
  1839. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  1840. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  1841. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  1842.  
  1843. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  1844.  
  1845. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  1846. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  1847. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  1848. ---------------------------------------
  1849. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  1850. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  1851.  
  1852. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  1853.  
  1854. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  1855.  
  1856. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  1857.  
  1858. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  1859.  
  1860. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  1861.  
  1862. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  1863.  
  1864. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  1865.  
  1866. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  1867.  
  1868. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  1869.  
  1870.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  1871. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  1872. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  1873. content of all our communications have
  1874. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  1875. program since the 1990s.
  1876.  
  1877.  The new details concern how, �The National
  1878. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  1879. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  1880. of cellphones around the world.�
  1881.  
  1882.  However, the report reveals itself to
  1883. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  1884. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  1885. does not target Americans� location data
  1886. by design, but the agency acquires a
  1887. substantial amount of information on
  1888. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  1889. �incidentally.�
  1890.  
  1891.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  1892. happens to record the locations of Americans
  1893. using data from their cellphones, and is
  1894. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  1895. surveillance, is yet another example of
  1896. damage control by the establishment.
  1897.  
  1898. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  1899. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  1900. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  1901. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  1902. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  1903. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  1904. ---------------------------------------
  1905. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  1906. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  1907.  
  1908.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  1909. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  1910. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  1911. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  1912. targets for government hacking and to
  1913. bolster surveillance.
  1914.  
  1915. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  1916. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  1917. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  1918. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  1919. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  1920. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  1921. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  1922. ---------------------------------------
  1923. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  1924.  
  1925. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  1926. ---------------------------------------
  1927. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  1928. In a World Without Cookies ::
  1929.  
  1930. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  1931. _______________________________________
  1932. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  1933.  
  1934. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  1935. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  1936. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  1937.  
  1938. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  1939.  
  1940. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  1941. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  1942. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  1943. _______________________________________
  1944. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  1945. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  1946.  
  1947. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  1948. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  1949. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  1950. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  1951. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  1952. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  1953.  
  1954. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  1955.  
  1956. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  1957.  
  1958. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  1959.  
  1960. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  1961.  
  1962. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  1963.  
  1964. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  1965.  
  1966. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  1967.  
  1968. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  1969.  
  1970. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  1971.  
  1972. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  1973.  
  1974. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  1975.  
  1976. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  1977. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  1978. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  1979.  
  1980. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  1981.  
  1982. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  1983. ---------------------------------------
  1984. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  1985.  
  1986. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  1987. ---------------------------------------
  1988. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  1989.  
  1990. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  1991.  
  1992. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1993.  
  1994. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1995.  
  1996. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  1997.  
  1998. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  1999.  
  2000. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  2001.  
  2002. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  2003. _______________________________________
  2004.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  2005. worldwide was published by the German
  2006. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  2007. map was put online by accident, but before
  2008. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  2009. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  2010. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  2011. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  2012. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  2013. the names of all other cities were blurred
  2014. by Der Spiegel.�
  2015.  
  2016.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  2017.  
  2018. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  2019.  
  2020. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  2021.  
  2022. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  2023.  
  2024. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  2025.  
  2026. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  2027.  
  2028. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  2029. ---------------------------------------
  2030. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  2031.  
  2032. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  2033.  
  2034. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  2035. _______________________________________
  2036. � Five Eyes ::
  2037.  
  2038. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  2039. _______________________________________
  2040. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  2041.  
  2042. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  2043. _______________________________________
  2044. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  2045. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  2046.  
  2047. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  2048.  
  2049. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  2050. _______________________________________
  2051. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  2052.  
  2053. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  2054.  
  2055. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  2056. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  2057. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  2058. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  2059. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  2060. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  2061. _______________________________________
  2062. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  2063.  
  2064.  September 11th, which also happened to
  2065. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  2066. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  2067. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  2068. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  2069. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  2070. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  2071. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  2072. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  2073. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  2074. itself.
  2075.  
  2076.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  2077. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  2078. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  2079. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  2080. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  2081. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  2082. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  2083. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  2084. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  2085. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  2086. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  2087. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  2088. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  2089. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  2090. its workforce by one-third, to about
  2091. 33,000. The number of private companies
  2092. it depended upon more than tripled during
  2093. that time.
  2094.  
  2095.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  2096. and the increasing reliance on the private
  2097. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  2098. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  2099. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  2100. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  2101. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  2102. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  2103. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  2104. getting those clearances. So you had
  2105. this huge apparatus being built, and
  2106. the government was just managing it.
  2107. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  2108. doing that.� ... ...
  2109.  
  2110.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  2111. workforce, the surveillance he would
  2112. later expose was becoming not just
  2113. institutionalized but very big business.
  2114. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  2115. the full flower of that massive, massive
  2116. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  2117. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  2118. could go.� ... ...
  2119.  
  2120.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  2121. leaking government secrets when he was
  2122. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  2123. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  2124. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  2125. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  2126. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  2127. policies that I thought would be reined
  2128. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  2129. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  2130. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  2131. the more he read �true information,�
  2132. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  2133. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  2134. surveillance program � the more he realized
  2135. that there were actually two governments:
  2136. the one that was elected, and the other,
  2137. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  2138. �If the highest officials in government
  2139. can break the law without fearing punishment
  2140. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  2141. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  2142.  
  2143. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  2144. _______________________________________
  2145. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  2146.  
  2147. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  2148. _______________________________________
  2149. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  2150.  
  2151. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  2152. _______________________________________
  2153. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  2154. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  2155.  
  2156.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  2157. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  2158. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  2159. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  2160. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  2161. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  2162. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  2163. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  2164. in terrorism.
  2165.  
  2166.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  2167. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  2168. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  2169. threatening national security. It is
  2170. successfully restricting release of the
  2171. Snowden material and will likely become
  2172. more forceful as releases continue to the
  2173. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  2174. to criminalize release as a national
  2175. security threat.
  2176.  
  2177. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  2178. _______________________________________
  2179. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  2180.  
  2181.  Includes most reports, slides and
  2182. documents all related to the recent
  2183. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  2184. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  2185. any information that comes out and
  2186. will provide updated archives from
  2187. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  2188.  
  2189.  After decompression - the folder is
  2190. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  2191. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  2192.  
  2193. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2194. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  2195.  
  2196. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  2197. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  2198. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  2199. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2200. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  2201. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  2202. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  2203. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  2204. _______________________________________
  2205. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  2206.  
  2207. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2208. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2209. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  2210.  
  2211. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  2212. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  2213.  
  2214.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  2215. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  2216. Australians, and hands over the material
  2217. to the US and its closest allies, according
  2218. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  2219. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  2220. Australia web site.
  2221.  
  2222.  The document obtained by the former US
  2223. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  2224. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  2225. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  2226. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  2227. as well as the people and governments of
  2228. many Asian countries.
  2229.  
  2230.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  2231. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  2232. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  2233. global partners so-called metadata of
  2234. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  2235. address books and social media posts of
  2236. millions of people.
  2237.  
  2238.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  2239. the recent revelations, also from documents
  2240. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  2241. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  2242. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  2243. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  2244. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  2245. operate as electronic listening posts
  2246. for the US-led spying network.
  2247.  
  2248. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  2249. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  2250. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  2251. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  2252. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  2253. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  2254.  
  2255. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  2256. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  2257.  
  2258.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  2259. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  2260. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  2261. political figures has been furiously
  2262. denounced by other media outlets for
  2263. breaching �national security� and the
  2264. �national interest.� The reaction
  2265. underscores the extent to which the
  2266. media establishment has been integrated
  2267. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  2268.  
  2269.  On November 18, after being approached
  2270. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  2271. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  2272. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  2273. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  2274. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  2275. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  2276. senior political figures. The report
  2277. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  2278. crisis for the Australian government, with
  2279. the Indonesian president suspending military
  2280. and intelligence cooperation.
  2281.  
  2282. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  2283. _______________________________________
  2284. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  2285.  
  2286.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  2287. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  2288. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  2289. allowed the largest American spy agency
  2290. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  2291. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  2292.  
  2293.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  2294. by CBC News.
  2295.  
  2296.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  2297. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  2298. a security command post during a six-day
  2299. spying operation by the National Security
  2300. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  2301. other foreign heads of government were on
  2302. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  2303.  
  2304.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  2305. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  2306.  
  2307.  The world was still struggling to climb
  2308. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  2309. were debating a wide array of possible
  2310. measures including a global tax on banks,
  2311. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  2312. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  2313. eventually scotched.
  2314.  
  2315. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  2316. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  2317. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  2318. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  2319. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  2320.  
  2321. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  2322. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  2323.  
  2324. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  2325.  
  2326.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  2327. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  2328.  
  2329. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  2330.  
  2331. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  2332.  
  2333. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  2334.  
  2335. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  2336. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  2337.  
  2338. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  2339.  
  2340. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  2341.  
  2342. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  2343.  
  2344. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  2345. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  2346.  
  2347. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  2348.  
  2349. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  2350.  
  2351.  The politicians and corporate media
  2352. would have Canadians believe that they
  2353. have only �moved on� from discussing
  2354. CSEC�s activities because there is
  2355. nothing for Canadians to worry about.
  2356.  
  2357.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool
  2358. of the Canadian ruling class that plays
  2359. an important role in the pursuit of its
  2360. imperialist foreign policy and in the
  2361. surveillance and suppression of opposition
  2362. at home. The size of CSEC�s staff�it
  2363. employs almost 2,000 people and a further
  2364. thousand military personnel assist its
  2365. work�give an inkling of the scale of
  2366. its activities.
  2367.  
  2368.  These include everything from supporting
  2369. the overseas operations of the Canadian
  2370. military, to spying on governments that
  2371. are reputed allies of Canada and assisting
  2372. CSIS and the RCMP in conducting a vast
  2373. program of domestic surveillance. Of
  2374. especial importance is the CSEC�s
  2375. partnership with the NSA. According to
  2376. former NSA technical director William
  2377. Binney, the two organizations �have
  2378. integrated personnel� i.e. swap personnel
  2379. to improve seamless collaboration. They
  2380. also share Internet surveillance programs.
  2381.  
  2382.  As a further element of its collaboration
  2383. with the Five Eyes alliance, CSEC was
  2384. relied on in the project of spying on
  2385. diplomats and officials during the 2009
  2386. London G20 meeting according to a report
  2387. in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  2388. which was based on documents supplied
  2389. by Snowden. The highly sensitive operation
  2390. involved the penetration of delegates�
  2391. smartphones to monitor their email
  2392. messages and calls.
  2393.  
  2394. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  2395.  
  2396. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  2397.  
  2398. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  2399.  
  2400. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  2401. _______________________________________
  2402. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  2403.  
  2404. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  2405.  
  2406. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  2407.  
  2408. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  2409. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  2410. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  2411.  
  2412. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  2413.  
  2414. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  2415.  
  2416. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  2417.  
  2418. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  2419. _______________________________________
  2420.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  2421. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  2422. in theory � forbid local governments from
  2423. providing services to federal agencies
  2424. that collect electronic data from Americans
  2425. without a personalized warrant.
  2426.  
  2427.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  2428. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  2429. but at least one legislator has committed
  2430. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  2431. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  2432. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  2433. is introduced.
  2434.  
  2435.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  2436. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  2437. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  2438. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  2439. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  2440. and a handful of other groups.
  2441.  
  2442.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  2443. Maharrey adds.
  2444.  
  2445. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  2446. _______________________________________
  2447. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  2448. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  2449.  
  2450.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  2451. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  2452. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  2453. US and British intelligence � particularly
  2454. their cooperation in data collection and
  2455. snooping programs involving British citizens
  2456. and close allies on the European continent.
  2457.  
  2458.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  2459. to account by British authorities for
  2460. jeopardizing national security. The
  2461. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  2462. is being forced to appear before a
  2463. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  2464. the news outlet�s actions.
  2465.  
  2466. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2467. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  2468. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  2469.  
  2470. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  2471.  
  2472. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2473.  
  2474. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  2475. as the British Dictatorship ::
  2476.  
  2477.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  2478. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  2479. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  2480. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  2481. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  2482. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  2483. seems the United States is reaching the event
  2484. horizon to a police state.
  2485.  
  2486. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  2487.  
  2488. Cryptome noted
  2489.  
  2490.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  2491. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  2492. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  2493. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  2494. UKG), although there could be some which have
  2495. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  2496. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  2497.  
  2498.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  2499. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  2500. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  2501. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  2502. deception, co-optation.
  2503.  
  2504.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  2505. had access, or suspected of access, are
  2506. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  2507. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  2508. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  2509. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  2510. standard coercive means of authorities.
  2511.  
  2512.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  2513. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  2514. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  2515. advised successive cooperators, usually
  2516. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  2517. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  2518. participation.
  2519.  
  2520.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  2521. disputes and disagreements among competing
  2522. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  2523. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  2524. along with threats against families, friends
  2525. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  2526. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  2527. with authorities, including use of rewards
  2528. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  2529.  
  2530. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  2531. _______________________________________
  2532. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  2533.  
  2534. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  2535. _______________________________________
  2536. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  2537. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  2538. Governments ::
  2539.  
  2540. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  2541. _______________________________________
  2542. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  2543. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  2544.  
  2545. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  2546. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  2547. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  2548. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  2549. _______________________________________
  2550. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  2551.  
  2552. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  2553.  
  2554. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  2555.  
  2556. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  2557.  
  2558. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  2559.  
  2560. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  2561.  
  2562. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  2563.  
  2564. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  2565.  
  2566. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  2567.  
  2568. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  2569.  
  2570. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  2571.  
  2572. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  2573.  
  2574. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  2575.  
  2576. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  2577.  
  2578. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  2579.  
  2580. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  2581.  
  2582. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  2583. Steal Email Metadata ::
  2584.  
  2585.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  2586. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  2587. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  2588. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  2589.  
  2590.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  2591. servers around the world, reducing the
  2592. chance of losing your information should
  2593. one fail. When you log in to an account
  2594. with these firms, the data sent between
  2595. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  2596. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  2597. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  2598. And because many of the transfers take place
  2599. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  2600. isn�t required to tap the information.
  2601.  
  2602.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  2603. broken into the main communications links
  2604. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  2605. around the world, according to documents
  2606. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  2607. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  2608. officials.
  2609.  
  2610.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  2611. positioned itself to collect at will from
  2612. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  2613. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  2614. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  2615. but it keeps a lot.
  2616.  
  2617.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  2618. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  2619. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  2620. counterpart, the Government Communications
  2621. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  2622. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  2623. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  2624. that carry information among the data
  2625. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  2626.  
  2627. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  2628. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  2629. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  2630. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  2631. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  2632.  
  2633. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  2634.  
  2635.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  2636. email collecting program �does not apply
  2637. to US citizens.�
  2638.  
  2639.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  2640. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  2641. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  2642. accounts around the world, many of them
  2643. belonging to Americans, according to
  2644. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  2645. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  2646. Edward Snowden.
  2647.  
  2648.  The collection program, which has not
  2649. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  2650. address books and �buddy lists� from
  2651. instant messaging services as they move
  2652. across global data links. Online services
  2653. often transmit those contacts when a user
  2654. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  2655. a computer or mobile device with information
  2656. stored on remote servers.
  2657.  
  2658. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  2659. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  2660. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  2661.  
  2662. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  2663.  
  2664. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  2665.  
  2666. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  2667.  
  2668. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  2669. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  2670. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  2671. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  2672. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  2673. ���������������������������������������
  2674. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  2675.  
  2676. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  2677.  
  2678. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  2679. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  2680.  
  2681. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  2682.  
  2683. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  2684.  
  2685. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  2686.  
  2687. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  2688.  
  2689. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  2690.  
  2691. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  2692.  
  2693. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  2694.  
  2695. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  2696.  
  2697. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  2698.  
  2699. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  2700.  
  2701. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  2702.  
  2703. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  2704.  
  2705. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  2706. ---------------------------------------
  2707. NOBODY comments ?
  2708.  
  2709.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  2710. differs from the Guardians.
  2711.  
  2712. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  2713.  
  2714. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  2715.  
  2716. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  2717.  
  2718. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  2719.  
  2720.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  2721. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  2722. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  2723.  
  2724.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  2725. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  2726. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  2727. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  2728. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  2729. ---------------------------------------
  2730. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  2731.  
  2732. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  2733.  
  2734. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  2735.  
  2736.  This was written from a person who purports
  2737. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  2738.  
  2739. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  2740.  
  2741. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  2742.  
  2743. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  2744.  
  2745. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  2746. Misleading ::
  2747.  
  2748. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  2749.  
  2750. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  2751. on NSA Spying ::
  2752.  
  2753. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  2754.  
  2755.  �Recent articles published in the
  2756. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  2757. inaccurate and misleading information
  2758. regarding US foreign intelligence
  2759. activities. The allegation that the
  2760. National Security Agency collected more
  2761. than 70 million �recordings of French
  2762. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  2763.  
  2764.  While we are not going to discuss the
  2765. details of our activities, we have
  2766. repeatedly made it clear that the
  2767. United States gathers intelligence of
  2768. the type gathered by all nations. The
  2769. US collects intelligence to protect the
  2770. nation, its interests, and its allies
  2771. from, among other things, threats such
  2772. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  2773. weapons of mass destruction.
  2774.  
  2775.  The United States values our longstanding
  2776. friendship and alliance with France and
  2777. we will continue to cooperate on security
  2778. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  2779.  
  2780. James R. Clapper
  2781. Director of National Intelligence
  2782. ---------------------------------------
  2783. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  2784.  
  2785. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  2786.  
  2787.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  2788. a call without leaving a record with the
  2789. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  2790. or leaves America without passing through
  2791. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  2792. statement Thursday.
  2793.  
  2794.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  2795. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  2796. _______________________________________
  2797. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  2798. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  2799.  
  2800.  US and British intelligence officials
  2801. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  2802. collection of highly classified, heavily
  2803. encrypted materials they believe former
  2804. National Security Agency contractor
  2805. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  2806.  
  2807.  One source saw the cache of documents
  2808. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  2809. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  2810. other harm. ... ...
  2811.  
  2812.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  2813. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  2814. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  2815. that �if anything happens at all to
  2816. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  2817. to get access to the full archives.�
  2818.  
  2819. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  2820. _______________________________________
  2821. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  2822. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  2823.  
  2824.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  2825. government surveillance policies. But he
  2826. is not disclosing those changes to the
  2827. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  2828. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  2829. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  2830. World Bank and the International Monetary
  2831. Fund? He won�t say.
  2832.  
  2833.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  2834. to review and recommend changes to his
  2835. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  2836.  
  2837. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  2838. _______________________________________
  2839. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  2840.  
  2841.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  2842. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  2843. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  2844. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  2845. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  2846.  
  2847.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  2848. broad goals, the five-page document said
  2849. that existing American laws were not adequate
  2850. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  2851. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  2852. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  2853. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  2854. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  2855. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  2856. pace with the complexity of the technology
  2857. and target environments, or the operational
  2858. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  2859. document concluded.
  2860.  
  2861. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  2862. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  2863. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  2864. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  2865. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  2866.  
  2867. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  2868.  
  2869.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  2870. called Treasure Map and describes its
  2871. capabilities but does not publish visual
  2872. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  2873. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  2874. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  2875.  
  2876. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  2877. _______________________________________
  2878. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  2879.  
  2880. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  2881. _______________________________________
  2882. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  2883.  
  2884. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  2885.  
  2886. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  2887.  
  2888. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  2889.  
  2890.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  2891. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  2892. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  2893. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  2894. the door to a variety of spying options.
  2895.  
  2896. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  2897. _______________________________________
  2898. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  2899.  
  2900.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  2901. collection of solely domestic communications
  2902. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  2903. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  2904. request each week until we receive your
  2905. response,� EPIC said.
  2906.  
  2907.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  2908. said this week that it would not be hearing
  2909. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  2910. early Monday in which the high court listed
  2911. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  2912. as denied.
  2913.  
  2914. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  2915.  
  2916. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  2917. _______________________________________
  2918. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  2919.  
  2920. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  2921.  
  2922. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  2923. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  2924.  
  2925. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  2926.  
  2927. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  2928.  
  2929. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  2930. No Privacy ::
  2931.  
  2932. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  2933.  
  2934. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  2935. Spying Programs ::
  2936.  
  2937. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  2938.  
  2939. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  2940.  
  2941. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  2942.  
  2943. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  2944. _______________________________________
  2945. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  2946.  
  2947. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  2948.  
  2949. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  2950.  
  2951. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  2952.  
  2953. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  2954.  
  2955. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  2956.  
  2957. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  2958.  
  2959. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  2960.  
  2961.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  2962. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  2963. or indigenous cryptographic information
  2964. security devices or systems in order to
  2965. make them exploitable.�
  2966.  
  2967. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  2968.  
  2969.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  2970. successfully exploits cryptographic
  2971. components of commercial information
  2972. security devices or systems when the
  2973. device or system specified.�
  2974.  
  2975. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  2976.  
  2977. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  2978.  
  2979. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  2980.  
  2981. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  2982. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  2983. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  2984.  
  2985. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  2986.  
  2987.  US and British intelligence agencies
  2988. have successfully cracked much of the
  2989. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  2990. of millions of people to protect the
  2991. privacy of their personal data, online
  2992. transactions and emails, according to
  2993. top-secret documents revealed by former
  2994. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  2995.  
  2996.  Those methods include covert measures
  2997. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  2998. international encryption standards, the
  2999. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  3000. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  3001. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  3002. technology companies and internet service
  3003. providers themselves.
  3004.  
  3005.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  3006. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  3007. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  3008. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  3009.  
  3010.  Independent security experts have long
  3011. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  3012. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  3013. confirmed for the first time by another
  3014. secret document. It shows the agency
  3015. worked covertly to get its own version
  3016. of a draft security standard issued by
  3017. the US National Institute of Standards
  3018. and Technology approved for worldwide
  3019. use in 2006.
  3020.  
  3021. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  3022.  
  3023. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  3024.  
  3025. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  3026.  
  3027. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  3028.  
  3029. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  3030.  
  3031. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  3032.  
  3033. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  3034.  
  3035. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3036.  
  3037. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  3038. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  3039. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  3040.  
  3041. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3042.  
  3043. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  3044. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  3045.  
  3046. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  3047.  
  3048. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  3049.  
  3050. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  3051.  
  3052. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  3053.  
  3054. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  3055. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  3056.  
  3057. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  3058.  
  3059. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  3060.  
  3061.  A range of US hardware and software
  3062. companies are in danger of being dragged
  3063. into the widening scandal over internet
  3064. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  3065. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  3066. Security Agency contractor.
  3067.  
  3068.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  3069. that it has collaborated with technology
  3070. companies to plant �back doors� into
  3071. their systems � or ways for the agency
  3072. secretly to penetrate systems without
  3073. the users� knowledge.
  3074.  
  3075. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  3076.  
  3077. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  3078.  
  3079. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  3080. _______________________________________
  3081. � SSL Inspector ::
  3082.  
  3083. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  3084.  
  3085. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  3086.  
  3087. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  3088. _______________________________________
  3089. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  3090. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  3091.  
  3092. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  3093.  
  3094. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  3095.  
  3096. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  3097.  
  3098. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  3099.  
  3100. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  3101.  
  3102. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  3103.  
  3104. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  3105.  
  3106. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  3107.  
  3108. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  3109. ���������������������������������������
  3110. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  3111. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  3112.  
  3113. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  3114. ���������������������������������������
  3115. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  3116.  
  3117.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  3118. activities is an obscure organization called
  3119. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  3120. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  3121. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  3122. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  3123. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  3124. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  3125. presentation given to journalists by former
  3126. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  3127. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  3128. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  3129. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  3130. be collected, which is then gathered and
  3131. delivered by the DITU.
  3132.  
  3133.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  3134. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  3135. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  3136. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  3137. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  3138. collection, processing, and reporting.
  3139.  
  3140. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  3141.  
  3142. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  3143.  
  3144. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  3145. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  3146. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3147.  
  3148.  
  3149. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  3150.  
  3151. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3152. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  3153. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  3154.  
  3155. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  3156.  
  3157. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  3158.  
  3159. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  3160.  
  3161. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  3162.  
  3163. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  3164.  
  3165. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  3166.  
  3167.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  3168. by the NSA.
  3169.  
  3170.  During the summer, the documents provided
  3171. to the Guardian and the Washington Post by
  3172. former NSA employee Edward Snowden helped
  3173. unveil the extent of surveillance and
  3174. espionage carried out by the NSA and its
  3175. allies. Le Monde also now has access to
  3176. some of these documents.
  3177.  
  3178.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most
  3179. secretive intelligence agencies of the
  3180. United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  3181. who was granted an asylum for a year in
  3182. Russia. Wanting to denounce "the largest
  3183. program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  3184. history," the American working for a
  3185. subcontractor of the NSA has obtained
  3186. several thousands of highly confidential
  3187. documents.
  3188.  
  3189.  In early June, the first secrets of the
  3190. National Security Agency in these parts
  3191. start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  3192. that the telephone operator Verizon
  3193. provides NSA phone data of several
  3194. million Americans, according to a court
  3195. order secret. Then it was the turn of
  3196. the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  3197. allows the US Secret Service, and first
  3198. and foremost to the NSA, to access a
  3199. privileged manner, since December 2007,
  3200. data from nine major Internet companies,
  3201. including Google, Facebook and Microsoft.
  3202.  
  3203. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  3204.  
  3205.  A document providing internal training
  3206. on Prism, which Le Monde has also had
  3207. access, how the NSA analysts can query
  3208. the databases of Web giants, research
  3209. documents, emails or instant discussions.
  3210. All within a legal framework that
  3211. overcomes the request of an individual
  3212. mandate. The companies named in the
  3213. documents have denied that the NSA
  3214. had a direct and unilateral access to
  3215. their servers.
  3216.  
  3217.  In addition to this targeted surveillance,
  3218. Snowden records reveal another method of
  3219. massive collection of the NSA called
  3220. Upstream. This system can collect data
  3221. from the submarine cable and Internet
  3222. infrastructures. A logical strategy,
  3223. when we know that 99% of global
  3224. communications now pass through diving.
  3225.  
  3226.  To learn more about the context of the
  3227. revelations of the World, the editorial
  3228. read : "Fight Big Brother"
  3229.  
  3230.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the
  3231. Government Communications Headquarters
  3232. (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system,
  3233. because of the historical proximity of
  3234. Great Britain and the United States,
  3235. confidentiality agreements and a financial
  3236. dependence of those services from London
  3237. to Washington. There are also technical
  3238. reasons : a significant portion of
  3239. submarine cables linking Europe to
  3240. America through Britain. With Edward
  3241. Snowden, the Tempora program , which
  3242. aims to "control the Internet" by
  3243. monitoring these cables, has been
  3244. revealed. "You're in an enviable
  3245. position, says a document presenting
  3246. Tempora, presented by the Guardian,
  3247. have fun and pull in the best." Turning
  3248. a page of the document presenting the
  3249. Prism program, we discover Upstream
  3250. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview,
  3251. and oakstar Stormbrew ) which we know to
  3252. date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  3253. would largely on intercepted telephone
  3254. conversations via the major US carriers.
  3255.  
  3256. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  3257.  
  3258.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass
  3259. of intercepted data. One of them is called
  3260. XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  3261. detailed in the columns of the Guardian.
  3262. The extreme precision of the data are
  3263. clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  3264. the content of e-mails to a list of
  3265. websites visited by their target or the
  3266. keywords entered by the latter in the
  3267. search engines.
  3268.  
  3269.  The framework for this research is not
  3270. binding, as the Guardian explained, and
  3271. many Americans are data made available to
  3272. agents. According to the presentation
  3273. materials, to promote the capabilities
  3274. of the tool, three hundred terrorists
  3275. have been arrested since 2008 thanks to
  3276. XKeyscore.
  3277.  
  3278.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their
  3279. considerable resources monitoring the
  3280. fight against terrorism, but also to
  3281. spy allies. At the G20 summit in London
  3282. in 2009, computers of diplomats and heads
  3283. of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well
  3284. as some of their phone calls. NSA, she
  3285. focused on the European Union (EU), as
  3286. revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the
  3287. basis of documents Snowden. NSA has
  3288. installed cookies on the premises of
  3289. the EU representation in Washington.
  3290. The EU delegation to the UN in New York,
  3291. and the building of the Council of the
  3292. European Union in Brussels were also
  3293. scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil
  3294. is also one of the countries affected
  3295. by this intelligence. According to
  3296. Brazilian media group O Globo, its
  3297. political leaders as some companies
  3298. have been targeted.
  3299.  
  3300.  The Snowden documents have informed
  3301. the considerable efforts made by the
  3302. United States to start listening to
  3303. Internet, in a sometimes unclear legal
  3304. framework and often away from real
  3305. democratic debate. Interviewed by
  3306. Le Monde, the US authorities have
  3307. assured that the Prism program was
  3308. the subject of a parliamentary debate
  3309. in the United States and was working
  3310. in a strictly regulated legal framework.
  3311. Asked on September 12 revelations
  3312. Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director
  3313. of National Intelligence, said: "What
  3314. happened - and that is harmful -
  3315. sparked conversation and debate that
  3316. it probably was necessary."
  3317. _______________________________________
  3318. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  3319.  
  3320. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  3321.  
  3322. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  3323.  
  3324. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  3325.  
  3326. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  3327. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  3328.  
  3329. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  3330.  
  3331. NOBODY comments
  3332.  
  3333.  100% expected. They will continue to
  3334. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  3335. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  3336. We must adjust to it by learning how
  3337. to counter their surveillance.
  3338.  
  3339. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  3340. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  3341.  
  3342.  The United States and its key intelligence
  3343. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  3344. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  3345. Nations to promote a universal human right
  3346. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  3347. sources and an internal American government
  3348. document obtained by The Cable.
  3349.  
  3350.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  3351. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  3352. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  3353. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  3354. internet surveillance by the National
  3355. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  3356. services. American representatives have made
  3357. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  3358. checks on their global surveillance network.
  3359. The stakes are high, particularly in
  3360. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  3361. an international backlash against NSA
  3362. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  3363. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  3364. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  3365.  
  3366. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  3367.  
  3368. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  3369. _______________________________________
  3370. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  3371. Public News Coverage ::
  3372.  
  3373. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  3374. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  3375. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  3376. _______________________________________
  3377. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  3378. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  3379.  
  3380. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  3381. _______________________________________
  3382. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  3383.  
  3384.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  3385. a division for particularly difficult
  3386. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  3387. (TAO), this department devises special
  3388. methods for special targets.
  3389.  
  3390.  That category includes surveillance of
  3391. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  3392. the division reported its mission
  3393. accomplished. A report classified as
  3394. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  3395. exploited a key mail server in the
  3396. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  3397. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  3398. first-ever access to President Felipe
  3399. Calderon�s public email account.�
  3400.  
  3401. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  3402.  
  3403. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  3404.  
  3405. Cryptome comments ?
  3406.  
  3407.  This spying was apparently done from
  3408. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  3409. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  3410. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  3411. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  3412.  
  3413. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  3414.  
  3415. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  3416. _______________________________________
  3417. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  3418.  
  3419. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  3420.  
  3421. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  3422.  
  3423. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3424.  
  3425. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  3426.  
  3427. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3428.  
  3429. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  3430.  
  3431. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  3432.  
  3433. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  3434.  
  3435. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  3436.  
  3437. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  3438.  
  3439. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  3440.  
  3441.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  3442. thought that the NSA should use its
  3443. technology to intercept emails and
  3444. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  3445. terminal to another, and was upset to
  3446. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  3447. That was a line he would only cross,
  3448. deliberately, with court and congressional
  3449. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  3450. but as we now know, the agency added
  3451. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  3452. suspicious communications that transited
  3453. the border of the United States, and
  3454. later began to collect reams of metadata
  3455. in order to analyze it.
  3456.  
  3457.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  3458. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  3459. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  3460. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  3461. in order to provide policymakers with a
  3462. decision advantage. The advantage the
  3463. NSA provided was accurate information
  3464. about what people who interacted with
  3465. the United States said in private about
  3466. their intentions; that gap between saying
  3467. and doing, and the ability to predict
  3468. action from it, allows the president of
  3469. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  3470.  
  3471.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  3472. States� actions don�t always match up
  3473. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  3474. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  3475. our moral authority wanes and our
  3476. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  3477.  
  3478.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  3479. countries are any purer. They never have
  3480. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  3481. purer than others, so the amount of
  3482. resources the intelligence community
  3483. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  3484. to correspond with how honest our allies
  3485. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  3486. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  3487. can we figure out which allies are more
  3488. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  3489. correspondence between public and private
  3490. words and actions.
  3491.  
  3492.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  3493. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  3494. want their leaders to gain a decision
  3495. advantage in the give and take between
  3496. countries. They want to know what US
  3497. policymakers will do before the Americans
  3498. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  3499. France, they aggressively spy on the
  3500. United States, on US citizens and
  3501. politicians, in order to collect that
  3502. information. The difference lies in the
  3503. scale of intelligence collection: The
  3504. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  3505. most sophisticated intelligence community
  3506. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  3507. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  3508. envious.
  3509. _______________________________________
  3510. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  3511.  
  3512. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  3513. _______________________________________
  3514. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  3515.  
  3516. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  3517. ���������������������������������������
  3518. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  3519. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  3520.  
  3521. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  3522. _______________________________________
  3523. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  3524. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  3525.  
  3526. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  3527. _______________________________________
  3528.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  3529. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  3530. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  3531. from the award ceremony are the first of
  3532. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  3533. Russia.
  3534.  
  3535. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  3536. ���������������������������������������
  3537. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  3538.  
  3539.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  3540. of the Security Service, said the
  3541. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  3542. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  3543. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  3544. agencies.
  3545.  
  3546. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  3547.  
  3548. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  3549.  
  3550.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  3551. they are not using Tor.�
  3552.  
  3553. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  3554.  
  3555. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  3556. ---------------------------------------
  3557.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  3558. old bleach log.
  3559.  
  3560. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  3561. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  3562. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  3563. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  3564.  
  3565. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  3566.  
  3567.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  3568. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  3569. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  3570. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  3571. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  3572. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  3573. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  3574. function.
  3575.  
  3576.  There are also various third party
  3577. programs that can produce files in
  3578. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  3579. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  3580.  
  3581.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  3582. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  3583. data stored on the system running the
  3584. Flash player.�
  3585. ---------------------------------------
  3586. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  3587.  
  3588.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  3589. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  3590. It can be found within Windows systems
  3591. and can be wiped out here ;
  3592.  
  3593. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3594. Application Data\Macromedia\
  3595.  
  3596. and may also be cloned here ;
  3597.  
  3598. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  3599.  
  3600.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  3601. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  3602.  
  3603. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  3604.  
  3605. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3606. Local Settings\Temp\
  3607. ---------------------------------------
  3608. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  3609.  
  3610. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  3611.  
  3612. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  3613.  
  3614. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  3615.  
  3616. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  3617.  
  3618. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  3619.  
  3620. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  3621.  
  3622. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  3623.  
  3624. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  3625.  
  3626. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  3627.  
  3628. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  3629.  
  3630. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  3631.  
  3632. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  3633.  
  3634. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  3635.  
  3636. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  3637. ---------------------------------------
  3638. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  3639.  
  3640.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  3641. application created by Samy Kamkar
  3642. which produces zombie cookies in a
  3643. web browser that are intentionally
  3644. difficult to delete. ... ...
  3645.  
  3646.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  3647. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  3648. by copying itself in different forms on
  3649. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  3650. itself if it notices that some of the
  3651. copies are missing or expired.
  3652.  
  3653.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  3654. Evercookie uses the following storage
  3655. mechanisms when available:
  3656.  
  3657. � Standard HTTP cookies
  3658. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  3659. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  3660. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  3661. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  3662. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  3663. (cookies) back out
  3664. � Storing cookies in Web history
  3665. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  3666. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  3667. � window.name caching
  3668. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  3669. � HTML5 Session Storage
  3670. � HTML5 Local Storage
  3671. � HTML5 Global Storage
  3672. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  3673. ---------------------------------------
  3674. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  3675.  
  3676.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  3677. mean that your browser isn't storing
  3678. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  3679. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  3680. in browser vulnerabilities.
  3681.  
  3682.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  3683. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  3684. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  3685. wide surveillance.
  3686.  
  3687.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  3688. powerful anonymity service, and the
  3689. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  3690. the Internet, makes it easy to
  3691. differentiate Tor users from other
  3692. Web users,� he wrote.
  3693.  
  3694.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  3695. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  3696. identifies you. Even though your IP
  3697. address changed [because of Tor], the
  3698. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  3699.  
  3700. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  3701. ---------------------------------------
  3702. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  3703. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  3704.  
  3705.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  3706. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  3707. �staining� as a means to identify
  3708. individual machines linked to that
  3709. IP address. ... ...
  3710.  
  3711.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  3712. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  3713. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  3714. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  3715. and is stamped into every packet, which
  3716. enables all the events from that stained
  3717. machine to be brought back together to
  3718. recreate a browsing session.�
  3719.  
  3720. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  3721.  
  3722. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  3723.  
  3724. � Packet Staining ::
  3725.  
  3726. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  3727. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  3728. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  3729. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  3730.  
  3731. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  3732.  
  3733. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  3734. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  3735. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  3736. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  3737.  
  3738. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  3739.  
  3740.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  3741. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  3742. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  3743. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  3744. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  3745. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  3746. identify it. We also worked to create
  3747. a custom Tor client which allows the
  3748. user finer control.� ... ...
  3749.  
  3750.  �This accomplishes several things.
  3751. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  3752. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  3753. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  3754. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  3755. be excessively complex, as a single
  3756. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  3757. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  3758. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  3759. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  3760. going to and from the proxy server,
  3761. it is possible to deduce which clients
  3762. are making which requests. Second, if
  3763. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  3764. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  3765. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  3766. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  3767. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  3768. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  3769. must be coordinated across several machines,
  3770. and an attacker must own all the hops
  3771. along the circuit in order to trace
  3772. requests back to the originating client.�
  3773.  
  3774. ... ...
  3775.  
  3776.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  3777. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  3778. a hidden service will turn up the port
  3779. that the hidden service is using to deal
  3780. with incoming connections. It can then be
  3781. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  3782.  
  3783. ... ...
  3784.  
  3785.  �We would have to try to connect to
  3786. each of the ports we see open on a
  3787. machine to determine if there is a
  3788. hidden service being run. We would not
  3789. even know which protocol the hidden
  3790. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  3791. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  3792. etc. The only thing we know is that
  3793. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  3794. not enough to attempt to connect once
  3795. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  3796. Several protocols must be tried.�
  3797.  
  3798. ... ...
  3799.  
  3800.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  3801. directory servers in more detail. Our
  3802. work focused solely on the client, but
  3803. many attacks would be much easier with
  3804. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  3805. servers ultimately control which Tor
  3806. servers are used by clients. We have found
  3807. that a server can put itself on a directory
  3808. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  3809. server running several Tor processes, each
  3810. having a different nickname, open port,
  3811. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  3812. requires different configuration files
  3813. for the different processes, which are
  3814. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  3815. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  3816. since it is listed several times. This
  3817. increases the density of friendly servers
  3818. in the cloud without increasing the number
  3819. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  3820. each listing has the same IP address,
  3821. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  3822. who inspecting the directories.�
  3823.  
  3824. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  3825. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  3826. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  3827.  
  3828. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  3829.  
  3830. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  3831.  
  3832. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  3833.  
  3834. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  3835.  
  3836. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  3837.  
  3838.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  3839. into capabilities the IC has developed
  3840. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  3841. to run multiple research teams (either
  3842. known or unknown to each other) against
  3843. a single target, and a few summer students
  3844. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  3845. small investment. I�d expect there are
  3846. other programs with more sophisticated
  3847. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  3848.  
  3849. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  3850. _______________________________________
  3851. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  3852.  
  3853. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  3854. _______________________________________
  3855. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  3856. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  3857.  
  3858. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  3859.  
  3860.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  3861. the past several months, I�d also thought
  3862. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  3863. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  3864. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  3865. Sasso of The Hill.
  3866.  
  3867.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  3868. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  3869. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  3870. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  3871. help you with that.�
  3872.  
  3873. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  3874.  
  3875.  The conversation then turned specifically
  3876. to the government�s use of targeted
  3877. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  3878. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  3879. hope they make full use of the capacities
  3880. of the National Security Agency when we
  3881. do that.�
  3882.  
  3883.  Hayden was responding to a question
  3884. about a new project announced by journalists
  3885. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  3886. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  3887. assassinations.
  3888.  
  3889. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  3890. _______________________________________
  3891. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  3892.  
  3893. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  3894.  
  3895. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  3896.  
  3897. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  3898. _______________________________________
  3899. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  3900. Breaches ::
  3901.  
  3902. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  3903.  
  3904. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  3905.  
  3906. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  3907. _______________________________________
  3908. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  3909. of US Citizens ::
  3910.  
  3911.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  3912. body of knowledge in recent months about
  3913. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  3914. information concerning Americans, prompting
  3915. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  3916. in the agency and President Obama to order
  3917. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  3918. Almost everything about the agency�s
  3919. operations is hidden, and the decision
  3920. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  3921. was made in secret, without review by the
  3922. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  3923. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  3924. Department memo warned of the potential
  3925. for the �misuse� of such information
  3926. without adequate safeguards.
  3927.  
  3928. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  3929. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  3930. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  3931.  
  3932. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  3933. From American Social Networks ::
  3934.  
  3935. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  3936. _______________________________________
  3937. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  3938. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  3939.  
  3940. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  3941. _______________________________________
  3942. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  3943. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  3944.  
  3945.  Led by the German government, a loose
  3946. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  3947. across the world is pushing to update an
  3948. influential international human rights
  3949. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  3950.  
  3951. ... ...
  3952.  
  3953.  The annual conference was attended by a
  3954. diverse selection of privacy and data
  3955. protection officials from across the
  3956. world, with representatives attending
  3957. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  3958. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  3959. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  3960. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  3961. United Kingdom.
  3962.  
  3963.  During a closed session at the conference
  3964. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  3965. resolution was put forward for a vote
  3966. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  3967. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  3968. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  3969. globally applicable standards for data
  3970. protection and the protection of privacy
  3971. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  3972.  
  3973.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  3974. of the resolution ... the United States.
  3975.  
  3976.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  3977. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  3978. eventually need to be put forward at the
  3979. United Nations and voted on by member
  3980. states, and that could take time. But
  3981. the growing appetite to amend the
  3982. international treaty in light of the
  3983. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  3984. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  3985. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  3986. technology in the digital age to trample
  3987. over basic universal privacy rights.
  3988.  
  3989. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  3990.  
  3991. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  3992.  
  3993. NOBODY comments
  3994.  
  3995.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  3996. all secret agencies around the world,
  3997. in general. All secret agencies and
  3998. their third-party vendors or allies
  3999. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  4000. backdoors in electronic communication
  4001. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  4002. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  4003. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  4004. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  4005. you must kill any trust in security.
  4006.  
  4007.  Security does not exist on the web.
  4008. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  4009. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  4010. _______________________________________
  4011. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  4012.  
  4013. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  4014.  
  4015. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  4016.  
  4017. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  4018. _______________________________________
  4019. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  4020.  
  4021. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  4022. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  4023. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  4024. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  4025. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  4026.  
  4027. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  4028. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  4029.  
  4030. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  4031. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  4032. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  4033.  
  4034.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are
  4035. tapping the backbone itself, via the
  4036. willing assistance of the telcos (who
  4037. still have remained mostly silent on
  4038. all of this) as opposed to �downstream�
  4039. collection, which requires going to the
  4040. internet companies directly.
  4041.  
  4042. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  4043.  
  4044. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  4045.  
  4046. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  4047.  
  4048. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  4049. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  4050. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  4051. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  4052. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  4053. _______________________________________
  4054. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  4055. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  4056. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  4057.  
  4058. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  4059. _______________________________________
  4060. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  4061.  
  4062.  According to a top secret document
  4063. disclosed by NSA whistleblower Edward
  4064. Snowden and obtained by The Hindu, the
  4065. PRISM programme was deployed by the
  4066. American agency to gather key information
  4067. from India by tapping directly into the
  4068. servers of tech giants which provide
  4069. services such as email, video sharing,
  4070. voice-over-IPs, online chats, file
  4071. transfer and social networking services.
  4072.  
  4073.  And, according to the PRISM document
  4074. seen by The Hindu, much of the communication
  4075. targeted by the NSA is unrelated to terrorism,
  4076. contrary to claims of Indian and American
  4077. officials.
  4078.  
  4079.  Instead, much of the surveillance was
  4080. focused on India�s domestic politics and
  4081. the country�s strategic and commercial
  4082. interests.
  4083.  
  4084. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  4085.  
  4086.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication
  4087. intelligence) document about �Close Access
  4088. SIGADs�, the offices of Indian diplomats
  4089. and high-ranking military officials stationed
  4090. at these important posts were targets of
  4091. four different kinds of electronic snooping
  4092. devices:
  4093.  
  4094.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of
  4095. the hard drive of computers.
  4096.  
  4097.  Highlands, which makes digital collection
  4098. from implants.
  4099.  
  4100.  Vagrant, which collects data of open
  4101. computer screens.
  4102.  
  4103.  Magnetic, which is a collection of
  4104. digital signals.
  4105.  
  4106. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  4107. _______________________________________
  4108. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US
  4109. Intelligence ::
  4110.  
  4111.  Accessing archived government documents,
  4112. the National Security Archive, an
  4113. anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  4114. decades-long effort by the US to detect,
  4115. monitor, and in some cases plan the
  4116. destruction of, �more than 10,000 such
  4117. facilities worldwide, many of them in
  4118. hostile territory, and many presumably
  4119. intended to hide or protect lethal military
  4120. equipment and activities, including
  4121. weapons of mass destruction, that could
  4122. threaten US or allied interests.�
  4123.  
  4124. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  4125. _______________________________________
  4126. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  4127.  
  4128. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  4129. _______________________________________
  4130. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the
  4131. Inside Story of NSA Leaks ::
  4132.  
  4133. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  4134. _______________________________________
  4135. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  4136.  
  4137. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  4138. _______________________________________
  4139. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  4140. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  4141.  
  4142. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  4143. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  4144. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  4145.  
  4146. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  4147. Under United States Control ::
  4148.  
  4149.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff
  4150. announces publicly the creation of a
  4151. world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  4152. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  4153.  
  4154.  Not many understand that, while the
  4155. immediate trigger for the decision
  4156. (coupled with the cancellation of a
  4157. summit with the US president) was the
  4158. revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  4159. why Rousseff can take such a historic
  4160. step is that the alternative infrastructure:
  4161. The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  4162. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai,
  4163. India to Cape Town, South Africa to
  4164. Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and
  4165. it�s, actually, in its final phase of
  4166. implementation.
  4167.  
  4168.  �The global backlash is only beginning
  4169. and will get far more severe in coming
  4170. months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  4171. of the Open Technology Institute at the
  4172. Washington-based New America Foundation
  4173. think-tank. �This notion of national
  4174. privacy sovereignty is going to be an
  4175. increasingly salient issue around the
  4176. globe.�
  4177.  
  4178. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  4179. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  4180. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  4181. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  4182.  
  4183. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  4184.  
  4185.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s
  4186. capacity, fibre optic cable system.
  4187.  
  4188. http://www.bricscable.com/
  4189.  
  4190. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  4191. _______________________________________
  4192. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA
  4193. Metadata Collection Orders ::
  4194.  
  4195.  A newly declassified opinion from the
  4196. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4197. from this summer shows the court�s
  4198. interpretation of the controversial
  4199. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
  4200. that�s used to justify the National
  4201. Security Agency�s bulk telephone
  4202. metadata collections, and reveals
  4203. that none of the companies that have
  4204. been served with such orders has ever
  4205. challenged one.
  4206.  
  4207. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  4208. _______________________________________
  4209. � Experts Worry About Long-Term Blowback
  4210. of NSA Revelations ::
  4211.  
  4212.  With all of the disturbing revelations
  4213. that have come to light in the last few
  4214. weeks regarding the NSA�s collection
  4215. methods and its efforts to weaken
  4216. cryptographic protocols and security
  4217. products, experts say that perhaps the
  4218. most worrisome result of all of this
  4219. is that no one knows who or what they
  4220. can trust anymore.
  4221.  
  4222.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA
  4223. leaks, which revealed the agency�s
  4224. ability to subvert some cryptographic
  4225. standards and its �partnerships� with
  4226. software and hardware vendors to insert
  4227. backdoors into various unnamed products,
  4228. has continued to accumulate over the
  4229. course of the last couple of weeks.
  4230. Cryptographers and security researchers
  4231. have been eager to determine which
  4232. products and protocols are suspect,
  4233. and the discussion has veered in a
  4234. lot of different directions. But one
  4235. thing that�s become clear is that when
  4236. the government lost the so-called
  4237. Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA
  4238. didn�t just go back to Fort Meade
  4239. and tend to its knitting.
  4240.  
  4241. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  4242.  
  4243. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  4244.  
  4245.  The security community didn�t invent
  4246. the concept of fear, uncertainty and
  4247. doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  4248. it to the level of religion. It�s the
  4249. way that security products are marketed
  4250. and sold, but it�s also the way that
  4251. the intelligence community justifies
  4252. its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  4253. unconstitutional, data-gathering
  4254. practices. Just as vendors use the
  4255. specter of catastrophic hacks, data
  4256. loss and public embarrassment to push
  4257. their wares, the NSA and its allies
  4258. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and
  4259. global terrorism to justify their
  4260. increasingly aggressive practices,
  4261. some of which have now been shown to
  4262. have deliberately weakened some of the
  4263. fundamental building blocks of security.
  4264.  
  4265.  The most damning bit of string in this
  4266. ball is the news that the NSA likely
  4267. inserted a back door into a key
  4268. cryptographic algorithm known as
  4269. DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  4270. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning
  4271. to its developer customers warning them
  4272. to immediately stop using the company�s
  4273. BSAFE library because it uses the
  4274. compromised random number generator.
  4275. That means that untold numbers of products
  4276. that include the BSAFE crypto libraries
  4277. are compromised.
  4278.  
  4279. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  4280. _______________________________________
  4281. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  4282.  
  4283.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  4284. President approximately every 45 days,
  4285. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  4286. the activities carried out under these
  4287. Authorizations are referred to as the
  4288. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  4289. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  4290. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  4291. the content of communications into and out
  4292. of the United States where there was a
  4293. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  4294. party to the communication was a member
  4295. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  4296.  
  4297.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  4298. acknowledged and described by the President,
  4299. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  4300. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  4301. a series of articles published in The New York
  4302. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  4303. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  4304. intelligence activities were also authorized
  4305. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  4306. but the details of those activities remain
  4307. classified.� ... ...
  4308.  
  4309.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  4310. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  4311. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  4312. as the principal governing authorities for
  4313. conducting electronic surveillance for
  4314. national security purposes. The Foreign
  4315. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  4316. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  4317. "provide legislative authorization and
  4318. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  4319. conducted within the United States for
  4320. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  4321.  
  4322. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  4323.  
  4324. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  4325. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  4326.  
  4327. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  4328.  
  4329. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  4330.  
  4331.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  4332. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  4333. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  4334. require special approval. Therefore, just
  4335. another gap. Also take in consideration
  4336. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  4337. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  4338. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  4339. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  4340. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  4341. _______________________________________
  4342. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  4343. Firm ::
  4344.  
  4345.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  4346. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  4347. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  4348. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  4349. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  4350. A �top secret� Government Communications
  4351. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  4352. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  4353. conducted under the codename �Operation
  4354. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  4355. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  4356. improve understanding of the provider�s
  4357. infrastructure. ... ...
  4358.  
  4359.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  4360. presentation, the attack was directed
  4361. at several Belgacom employees and
  4362. involved the planting of a highly
  4363. developed attack technology referred
  4364. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  4365. appears to be a method with which the
  4366. person being targeted, without their
  4367. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  4368. that then plant malware on their
  4369. computers that can then manipulate
  4370. them. Some of the employees whose
  4371. computers were infiltrated had �good
  4372. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  4373. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  4374. please the British spies, according
  4375. to the slides.
  4376.    
  4377. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  4378. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  4379. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  4380. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  4381. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  4382. _______________________________________
  4383. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  4384.  
  4385. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  4386.  
  4387. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  4388. _______________________________________
  4389. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  4390.  
  4391. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  4392. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  4393. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  4394. _______________________________________
  4395. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  4396. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  4397.  
  4398. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  4399. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  4400. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  4401. _______________________________________
  4402. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  4403.  
  4404. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  4405. ���������������������������������������
  4406. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  4407. Allocated to One Release ::
  4408.  
  4409. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  4410.  
  4411. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  4412.  
  4413. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  4414.  
  4415. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  4416. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  4417.  
  4418. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  4419.  
  4420. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  4421. Schedule ::
  4422.  
  4423. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4424.  
  4425. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4426.  
  4427. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4428.  
  4429. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4430.  
  4431. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4432.  
  4433. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4434.  
  4435. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4436. ���������������������������������������
  4437. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  4438.  
  4439.  In response to a FOIA request from
  4440. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  4441. its ethics office never looked into
  4442. complaints from two federal judges
  4443. that they had been misled about NSA
  4444. surveillance.
  4445.  
  4446. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  4447. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  4448. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  4449. ���������������������������������������
  4450.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  4451. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  4452. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  4453. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  4454. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  4455.  
  4456. Livestream will be at:
  4457.  
  4458. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  4459. _______________________________________
  4460. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  4461. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  4462.  
  4463. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  4464.  
  4465. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  4466. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  4467. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  4468.  
  4469. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  4470.  
  4471.  The Director of National Intelligence
  4472. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  4473. pages of documents related to the
  4474. government�s secret interpretation of
  4475. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  4476. (mis)use of its massive database of
  4477. every American�s phone records. The
  4478. documents were released as a result
  4479. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  4480. Act lawsuit.
  4481.  
  4482.  We�ve posted links to each document
  4483. below. While the government also posted
  4484. many of the documents here ...
  4485.  
  4486. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  4487.  
  4488. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  4489.  
  4490. Links to the documents ;
  4491.  
  4492. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  4493. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4494.  
  4495. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4496.  
  4497. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  4498. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4499. Court
  4500.  
  4501. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4502.  
  4503. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4504. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4505. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4506. Court
  4507.  
  4508. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4509.  
  4510. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4511. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4512. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4513. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  4514.  
  4515. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4516.  
  4517. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  4518. Incident
  4519.  
  4520. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4521.  
  4522. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4523. Intelligence Court
  4524.  
  4525. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4526.  
  4527. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4528. Intelligence Court
  4529.  
  4530. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4531.  
  4532. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  4533. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  4534. Business Records FISA
  4535.  
  4536. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4537.  
  4538. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  4539. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  4540.  
  4541. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4542.  
  4543. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  4544. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4545.  
  4546. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4547.  
  4548. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  4549. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  4550. Surveillance Court
  4551.  
  4552. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4553.  
  4554. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  4555. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  4556. Surveillance Court
  4557.  
  4558. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4559.  
  4560. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  4561. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  4562.  
  4563. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  4564.  
  4565. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  4566. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  4567.  
  4568. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  4569. _______________________________________
  4570. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  4571.  
  4572. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  4573.  
  4574. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  4575.  
  4576. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  4577. ���������������������������������������
  4578. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  4579.  
  4580. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  4581. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  4582. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  4583. _______________________________________
  4584. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  4585. Over Data to the NSA ::
  4586.  
  4587.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4588. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  4589. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  4590. media report. The revelation comes as
  4591. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  4592. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  4593. troves of data with the US and UK.
  4594.  
  4595.  Citing secret government documents,
  4596. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  4597. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4598. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  4599. with domestic security, works closely
  4600. with the US and regularly sends them
  4601. information.
  4602.  
  4603.  The security service gathers intelligence
  4604. on internal security threats. The documents
  4605. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  4606. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  4607. well as regular meetings between officers
  4608. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  4609.  
  4610. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  4611. _______________________________________
  4612. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  4613. Revelations ::
  4614.  
  4615. This is an unofficial translation.
  4616.  
  4617. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  4618.  
  4619.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  4620. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  4621. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  4622.  
  4623. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  4624.  
  4625. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  4626. _______________________________________
  4627. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  4628.  
  4629. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  4630. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  4631. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  4632. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  4633. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  4634. _______________________________________
  4635. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  4636.  
  4637. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  4638.  
  4639. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  4640.  
  4641. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  4642. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  4643.  
  4644. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  4645.  
  4646. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  4647.  
  4648.  (1) The US wants to maintain global
  4649. economic power, (2) the US wants to
  4650. maintain control over major natural
  4651. resources and (3) the US is afraid the
  4652. new economic powers (within the BRICS)
  4653. may destabilize their economic power
  4654. and control over natural resources.
  4655. _______________________________________
  4656. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  4657.  
  4658.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult
  4659. for machines to read.
  4660.  
  4661. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  4662. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  4663. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  4664. _______________________________________
  4665. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  4666.  
  4667. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  4668.  
  4669. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  4670. _______________________________________
  4671. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  4672. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  4673. National Unit ::
  4674.  
  4675.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  4676. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  4677. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  4678. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  4679. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  4680. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  4681. it Wednesday.
  4682.  
  4683.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  4684. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  4685. raw signals intelligence, referred
  4686. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  4687. swathes of digital data traffic that
  4688. the agency gathers under secret court
  4689. authority from US Internet providers.
  4690.  
  4691.  So sensitive is this data that even
  4692. before being disseminated to other US
  4693. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  4694. to a court-mandated process called
  4695. minimization, under which the names
  4696. of any Americans are removed unless
  4697. they are essential for foreign
  4698. intelligence interest.
  4699.  
  4700.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  4701. that the data shared with Israel
  4702. �includes, but is not limited to,
  4703. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  4704. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  4705. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  4706. and content.�
  4707.  
  4708.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  4709. and unminimized raw collection associated
  4710. with selectors from multiple Target office
  4711. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  4712. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  4713. relationship between the two organizations.�
  4714.  
  4715. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  4716. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  4717. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  4718. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  4719. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  4720. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  4721.  
  4722.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  4723. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  4724. that spy most aggressively against the
  4725. United States.
  4726.  
  4727.  �To further safeguard our classified
  4728. networks, we continue to strengthen
  4729. insider threat detection capabilities
  4730. across the Community. In addition, we
  4731. are investing in target surveillance
  4732. and offensive CI against key targets,
  4733. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  4734. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  4735.  
  4736. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  4737. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  4738. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  4739.  
  4740. NOBODY comments
  4741.  
  4742.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  4743. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  4744. plenty of inside information.
  4745.  
  4746.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  4747. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  4748. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  4749.  
  4750. This reminds of a quote ;
  4751.  
  4752.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  4753. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  4754. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  4755. to play out one big game of destruction
  4756. and domination with humans as the visible
  4757. and spiritual puppets?�
  4758. _______________________________________
  4759. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  4760.  
  4761. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  4762. _______________________________________
  4763. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  4764.  
  4765. (EN)
  4766. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  4767.  
  4768. (DE)
  4769. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  4770.  
  4771. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  4772.  
  4773.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  4774. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  4775. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  4776. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  4777. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  4778. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  4779. deployed in a government intelligence
  4780. agency presentation.
  4781.  
  4782. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  4783. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  4784. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  4785. ���������������������������������������
  4786. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  4787. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  4788.  
  4789.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  4790. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  4791. reverse restrictions on the National
  4792. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  4793. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  4794. the agency to search deliberately for
  4795. Americans� communications in its massive
  4796. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  4797. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  4798. �declassified material� - (which, by
  4799. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  4800. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  4801. of which agency it came from and most
  4802. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  4803.  
  4804. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  4805.  
  4806.  In addition, the court extended the
  4807. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  4808. to retain intercepted US communications
  4809. from five years to six years � and more
  4810. under special circumstances, according
  4811. to the documents, which include a
  4812. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  4813. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  4814. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  4815. Surveillance Court.
  4816.  
  4817. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  4818.  
  4819. NOBODY comments
  4820.  
  4821.  The document which was declassified by
  4822. US intelligence officials explains the
  4823. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  4824. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  4825. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  4826.  
  4827. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  4828. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  4829. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  4830.  
  4831.  National Security Agency analysts
  4832. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  4833. their authority to spy on Americans.
  4834.  
  4835. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  4836.  
  4837.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  4838. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  4839.  
  4840. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  4841.  
  4842. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  4843.  
  4844.  And this is not the first attempt to
  4845. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  4846.  
  4847. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  4848.  
  4849. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  4850.  
  4851.  The new Washington Post report has
  4852. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  4853. (press) release exposing yet another
  4854. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  4855. or take responsibility for the abuses
  4856. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  4857.  
  4858. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  4859.  
  4860.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  4861. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  4862.  
  4863.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  4864. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  4865.  
  4866.  All of this information is backed up
  4867. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  4868. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  4869. 2,776 violations one year after the
  4870. FISA Court order.
  4871.  
  4872. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  4873.  
  4874.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  4875. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  4876. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  4877. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  4878. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  4879. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  4880. them out of office come next election.
  4881. _______________________________________
  4882. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence ::
  4883.  
  4884.  �Ever since the remarkable case of Edward
  4885. Snowden broke into the limelight at the
  4886. beginning of the summer that�s now
  4887. winding down, I�ve had a great deal to
  4888. say about it here, on Twitter, and on
  4889. radio and television. As one of the
  4890. very few former NSA officers who�s
  4891. in the public eye and willing to talk
  4892. about Snowden, I�ve had an audience.
  4893. As a former NSA counterintelligence
  4894. officer with experience dealing with
  4895. the Russians, I�ve been pretty much
  4896. a solo act.
  4897.  
  4898.  From nearly the outset I�ve stated
  4899. that Snowden is very likely an agent
  4900. of Russian intelligence; this was met
  4901. with howls of indignation which have
  4902. died down in recent weeks as it�s
  4903. become apparent that Ed�s staying in
  4904. Russia for some time, along with
  4905. whatever classified materials he
  4906. had on his person. (Since Glenn
  4907. Greenwald�s partner when stopped by
  4908. British authorities at Heathrow had
  4909. 58,000 highly classified documents
  4910. on him, thanks to Ed, one can only
  4911. wonder how big the initial haul
  4912. actually was.) That Snowden was in
  4913. contact with the Russian consulate
  4914. in Hong Kong during his pre-Moscow
  4915. visit there, including spending his
  4916. 30th birthday with his new friends,
  4917. is now admitted. Even President
  4918. Vladimir Putin has conceded that
  4919. Ed�s contacts with Russian officials
  4920. did not commence when he landed at
  4921. Sheremtyevo airport, rather before.�
  4922.  
  4923. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  4924. _______________________________________
  4925. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  4926.  
  4927. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  4928.  
  4929.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  4930. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  4931. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  4932.  
  4933. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  4934.  
  4935. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  4936.  
  4937. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  4938.  
  4939. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  4940.  
  4941. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  4942.  
  4943. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  4944.  
  4945. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  4946.  
  4947. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  4948. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  4949. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  4950. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  4951.  
  4952. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  4953.  
  4954.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  4955. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  4956. reports that the US National Security Agency
  4957. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  4958.  
  4959.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  4960. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  4961. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  4962. Tuesday.
  4963.  
  4964.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  4965. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  4966. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  4967. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  4968. several of her top aides, and tapped
  4969. her phone.
  4970.  
  4971. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  4972.  
  4973. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  4974. Impacted ::
  4975.  
  4976.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  4977. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  4978. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  4979. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  4980. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  4981. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  4982.  
  4983.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  4984. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  4985. visit to Washington in October, the
  4986. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  4987. year, or will take action on digital
  4988. security that may affect US companies
  4989. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  4990.  
  4991.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  4992. a proposal that would suspend operations
  4993. of companies that cooperate with the
  4994. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  4995.  
  4996. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  4997. _______________________________________
  4998. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  4999.  
  5000. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  5001.  
  5002. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  5003.  
  5004. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  5005. ���������������������������������������
  5006. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  5007.  
  5008.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5009. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5010. collect against high priority targets,
  5011. including foreign leadership targets.
  5012. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5013. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5014. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5015. internet traffic.�
  5016.  
  5017. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5018.  
  5019. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5020.  
  5021. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  5022.  
  5023. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  5024.  
  5025. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  5026.  
  5027. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  5028.  
  5029.  �The Post is withholding some information
  5030. after consultation with US officials who
  5031. expressed concerns about the risk to
  5032. intelligence sources and methods.
  5033. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  5034. the documents that The Post is publishing
  5035. only summary tables and charts online.�
  5036.  
  5037. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  5038.  
  5039. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5040. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  5041.  
  5042. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  5043.  
  5044. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  5045.  
  5046. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  5047. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  5048.  
  5049. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  5050.  
  5051. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  5052.  
  5053. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  5054.  
  5055.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  5056. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  5057. intelligence services, leaked documents
  5058. reveal.
  5059.  
  5060.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  5061. to have an aggressive intelligence
  5062. collection operations against the
  5063. United States,� Pillar said. While
  5064. much information is collected through
  5065. traditional political contacts, �I
  5066. would personally have no doubt that
  5067. that is supplemented by whatever means
  5068. they can use to find out as much as
  5069. they can about what we�re doing,
  5070. thinking, deciding on anything of
  5071. interest to Israel, which would include
  5072. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  5073.  
  5074. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  5075.  
  5076. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  5077.  
  5078.  �To further safeguard our classified
  5079. networks, we continue to strengthen
  5080. insider threat detection capabilities
  5081. across the Community. In addition, we
  5082. are investing in target surveillance
  5083. and offensive CI against key targets,
  5084. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  5085. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  5086. _______________________________________
  5087. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  5088.  
  5089.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  5090. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  5091. the worst part is the Received headers.
  5092. Everyone should look at their own headers
  5093. -- especially people on this list and
  5094. at least comprehend that your email
  5095. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  5096. the Mailman archive.
  5097.  
  5098.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  5099. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  5100. the actual separators in MIME part
  5101. breaks, and so on.
  5102.  
  5103.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  5104. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  5105. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  5106. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  5107. don�t do it all the time.
  5108.  
  5109.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  5110. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  5111. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  5112. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  5113. is that this tells us that the crypto
  5114. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  5115. for quite some time.
  5116.  
  5117.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  5118. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  5119. that works being deployed everywhere.
  5120. What do you do? You just be patient and
  5121. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  5122. analysis.
  5123.  
  5124. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  5125.  
  5126. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  5127.  
  5128. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  5129.  
  5130.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  5131. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  5132. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  5133. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  5134. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  5135. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  5136. reveal.
  5137.  
  5138. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  5139.  
  5140.  �We are bolstering our support for
  5141. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  5142. collect against high priority targets,
  5143. including foreign leadership targets.
  5144. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  5145. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  5146. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  5147. internet traffic.� ... ...
  5148.  
  5149. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  5150.  
  5151.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  5152. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  5153. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  5154. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  5155. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  5156. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  5157.  
  5158.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  5159. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  5160.  
  5161. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  5162.  
  5163. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  5164.  
  5165. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  5166.  
  5167. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  5168.  
  5169. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  5170.  
  5171.  The US government has attempted to
  5172. obtain the master encryption keys that
  5173. Internet companies use to shield millions
  5174. of users� private web communications
  5175. from eavesdropping.
  5176.  
  5177.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  5178. which have not been disclosed previously,
  5179. represent a technological escalation in
  5180. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  5181. the National Security Agency employ when
  5182. conducting electronic surveillance against
  5183. Internet users. ... ...
  5184.  
  5185.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  5186. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  5187. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  5188. communications are typically destroyed
  5189. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  5190. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  5191. of all communications that are enciphered�
  5192. is permissible.
  5193.  
  5194. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  5195. _______________________________________
  5196. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  5197. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  5198.  
  5199.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  5200. intercepts well before 2001, former
  5201. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  5202. secretive Special Services Office,
  5203. these types of programs were at first
  5204. designed to intercept communications
  5205. overseas through arrangements with
  5206. foreign Internet providers, the former
  5207. officials say. NSA still has such
  5208. arrangements in many countries,
  5209. particularly in the Middle East and
  5210. Europe, the former officials say.�
  5211.  
  5212. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  5213.  
  5214. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  5215.  
  5216. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  5217. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  5218. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  5219. ���������������������������������������
  5220. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  5221. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  5222.  
  5223.  A common hacking technique can be used
  5224. to make emails look as if they came from
  5225. outside the United States.
  5226.  
  5227. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  5228. _______________________________________
  5229. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  5230. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  5231.  
  5232. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  5233.  
  5234. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  5235.  
  5236. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  5237.  
  5238. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  5239. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  5240. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  5241. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  5242. ���������������������������������������
  5243. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  5244. Patrick Leahy ::
  5245.  
  5246. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  5247.  
  5248. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  5249.  
  5250. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  5251. _______________________________________
  5252. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  5253.  
  5254.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  5255. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  5256. their authority to spy on Americans
  5257. multiple times in the past decade,
  5258. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  5259. and lawmakers� statements that no
  5260. willful violations occurred. ...
  5261.  
  5262.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  5263. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  5264. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  5265. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  5266. of having links to terrorism, before a
  5267. secret court that oversees surveillance
  5268. found the operation unconstitutional
  5269. in 2011.
  5270.  
  5271. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  5272.  
  5273. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  5274. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  5275. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  5276.  
  5277.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  5278. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  5279. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  5280. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  5281. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  5282.  
  5283.  The documents were released in response
  5284. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  5285. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  5286.  
  5287.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  5288. litigation and the most significant leak
  5289. in American history to finally get them
  5290. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  5291. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  5292. �but I�m happy that the administration
  5293. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  5294.  
  5295. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  5296. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  5297. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  5298.  
  5299. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  5300.  
  5301. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5302.  
  5303. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5304.  
  5305. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  5306.  
  5307. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  5308.  
  5309. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  5310.  
  5311. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  5312. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  5313.  
  5314. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5315. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  5316. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  5317. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  5318. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  5319. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  5320.  
  5321.  The account is based on top-secret
  5322. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  5323. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  5324. including unauthorized collection,
  5325. storage, access to or distribution of
  5326. legally protected communications � in
  5327. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  5328. originally only meant to be seen by top
  5329. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  5330. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  5331. and other locations in the Washington DC
  5332. region.
  5333.  
  5334. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  5335.  
  5336.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  5337. and other things, there�s people talking
  5338. about privacy violations or abuses or
  5339. willful or violations, right, it is
  5340. important for people to understand,
  5341. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  5342. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  5343. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  5344.  
  5345.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  5346. We detect them, as early as we can.
  5347. We correct them, right. None of the
  5348. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  5349. the document released were willful.
  5350. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  5351. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  5352. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  5353.  
  5354. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  5355.  
  5356. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  5357. Database Queries Per Month ::
  5358.  
  5359. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  5360.  
  5361. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  5362.  
  5363. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  5364. _______________________________________
  5365. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  5366.  
  5367.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  5368. station in the Middle East to intercept
  5369. and process vast quantities of emails,
  5370. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  5371. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  5372. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  5373.  
  5374.  The information is then processed for
  5375. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  5376. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  5377. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  5378. The Government claims the station is a
  5379. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  5380. and provides a vital �early warning�
  5381. system for potential attacks around
  5382. the world.
  5383.  
  5384.  The Independent is not revealing the
  5385. precise location of the station but
  5386. information on its activities was
  5387. contained in the leaked documents
  5388. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  5389. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  5390. these documents in recent months has
  5391. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  5392. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  5393. the destruction of hard drives containing
  5394. the data. ... ...
  5395.  
  5396.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  5397. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  5398. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  5399. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  5400. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  5401. the global interception of digital
  5402. communications, such as emails and text
  5403. messages.
  5404.  
  5405.  Across three sites, communications �
  5406. including telephone calls � are tracked
  5407. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  5408. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  5409.  
  5410. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  5411. ���������������������������������������
  5412. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  5413.  
  5414. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  5415. _______________________________________
  5416. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  5417. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  5418. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  5419. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  5420. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  5421. E Grassley ::
  5422.  
  5423. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  5424.  
  5425. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  5426.  
  5427. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  5428.  
  5429. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  5430.  
  5431. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  5432.  
  5433. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  5434.  
  5435. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  5436.  
  5437. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  5438.  
  5439. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  5440.  
  5441. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  5442.  
  5443. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  5444. Congress ::
  5445.  
  5446.  �I can now confirm that the House
  5447. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  5448. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  5449. available to Representatives in Congress,
  5450. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  5451. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  5452. the now declassified documents detailing
  5453. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  5454.  
  5455. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  5456.  
  5457. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  5458.  
  5459. ?
  5460.  
  5461. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  5462.  
  5463.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  5464. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  5465. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  5466. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  5467. discussions with the president when he
  5468. first came on board we talked to him about
  5469. these programs and the issue was how do
  5470. we know the compliance is there and what
  5471. more could we do? We stood up working with
  5472. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  5473. of compliance. This directorate of
  5474. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  5475. and information specialists that can look
  5476. at everything that we do in these programs
  5477. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  5478. orders but we also have oversight from
  5479. the Director of National Intelligence,
  5480. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  5481. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  5482. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  5483. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  5484. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  5485. _______________________________________
  5486. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  5487.  
  5488.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  5489. public so far.
  5490.  
  5491. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  5492. _______________________________________
  5493. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  5494.  
  5495. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  5496. _______________________________________
  5497. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  5498. Data Lab ::
  5499.  
  5500. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  5501.  
  5502. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  5503. _______________________________________
  5504. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  5505. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  5506.  
  5507. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  5508. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  5509. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  5510. _______________________________________
  5511. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  5512.  
  5513.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  5514. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  5515. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  5516. there since he assumed the position
  5517. of Secretary of State. He has already
  5518. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  5519. � where officials demanded an explanation
  5520. to reports that Washington had collected
  5521. vast amounts of internet data there.
  5522. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  5523. which allegedly was the top regional
  5524. target of the surveillance program.
  5525.  
  5526. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  5527.  
  5528. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  5529.  
  5530. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  5531. Surveillance ::
  5532.  
  5533. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  5534.  
  5535. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  5536.  
  5537. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  5538. _______________________________________
  5539. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  5540.  
  5541. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  5542. ���������������������������������������
  5543. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  5544.  
  5545. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  5546.  
  5547. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  5548.  
  5549. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  5550.  
  5551. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  5552.  
  5553. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  5554. _______________________________________
  5555. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  5556.  
  5557. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  5558.  
  5559. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  5560. _______________________________________
  5561. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  5562.  
  5563. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  5564.  
  5565.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  5566. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  5567. use of certain United States person names
  5568. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  5569. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  5570. implement any USP queries until an effective
  5571. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  5572. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  5573. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  5574. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  5575. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  5576. databases).�
  5577.  
  5578. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  5579.  
  5580. NOBODY comments
  5581.  
  5582. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  5583.  
  5584. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  5585.  
  5586.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  5587. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  5588. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  5589. communications not related to foreign
  5590. information or foreign activity for up
  5591. to five years.
  5592.  
  5593.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  5594. acquired communications of or concerning a
  5595. United States person may be retained no
  5596. longer than five years in any event.�
  5597.  
  5598.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  5599. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  5600. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  5601. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  5602. communications that have been stored.
  5603. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  5604. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  5605. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  5606. to �communications security vulnerability�
  5607. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  5608. _______________________________________
  5609. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  5610.  
  5611. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  5612. _______________________________________
  5613. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  5614.  
  5615. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  5616. _______________________________________
  5617. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  5618. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  5619.  
  5620.  As the steady stream of revelations
  5621. continues, the White House has choosen
  5622. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  5623. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  5624.  
  5625. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  5626. _______________________________________
  5627. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  5628.  
  5629. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  5630.  
  5631. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  5632. Spying Press Conference ::
  5633.  
  5634.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  5635. Presidential press conference in which the
  5636. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  5637. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  5638. that Obama told today about the program
  5639. by citing multiple articles with information
  5640. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  5641.  
  5642. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  5643. ���������������������������������������
  5644. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  5645. Partners ::
  5646.  
  5647. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  5648. ���������������������������������������
  5649. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  5650. Metadata ::
  5651.  
  5652. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  5653. ���������������������������������������
  5654. � National Security Run Amok ::
  5655.  
  5656. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  5657. _______________________________________
  5658.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  5659. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  5660. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  5661. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  5662.  
  5663. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  5664.  
  5665.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  5666. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  5667. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  5668. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  5669. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  5670. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  5671. for including former senators Hillary
  5672. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  5673.  
  5674. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  5675.  
  5676. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  5677. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  5678.  
  5679. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  5680.  
  5681. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  5682.  
  5683. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  5684. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  5685.  
  5686. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  5687.  
  5688.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  5689. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  5690.  
  5691. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  5692. ���������������������������������������
  5693. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  5694.  
  5695. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  5696.  
  5697. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  5698.  
  5699. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  5700.  
  5701. NOBODY comments
  5702.  
  5703. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  5704.  
  5705.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  5706. the document was still classified. It was
  5707. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  5708.  
  5709. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  5710.  
  5711.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  5712. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  5713. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  5714. many of these operations being leaked.
  5715. _______________________________________
  5716. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  5717. on Brazilian Television ::
  5718.  
  5719. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  5720. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  5721. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  5722.  
  5723. NOBODY comments
  5724.  
  5725.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  5726. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  5727.  
  5728.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  5729. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  5730. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  5731.  
  5732. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  5733. ���������������������������������������
  5734. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  5735. English Report ::
  5736.  
  5737.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  5738. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  5739. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  5740. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  5741. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  5742. matters is also much closer than first
  5743. thought. ... ...
  5744.  
  5745.  Day after day and month after month,
  5746. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  5747. amounts of connection data relating
  5748. to the communications it had placed
  5749. under surveillance. The so-called
  5750. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  5751. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  5752. into the Americans� giant databases.
  5753.  
  5754. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  5755.  
  5756. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  5757. Deutsch Report ::
  5758.  
  5759. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  5760.  
  5761. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  5762.  
  5763. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  5764. ���������������������������������������
  5765. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  5766.  
  5767. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  5768. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  5769. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  5770.  
  5771. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  5772.  
  5773. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  5774.  
  5775. � Fed-up Congress Dumps �Em ::
  5776.  
  5777.  The latest revelations will add to
  5778. the intense public and congressional
  5779. debate around the extent of NSA
  5780. surveillance programs. They come
  5781. as senior intelligence officials
  5782. testify to the Senate judiciary
  5783. committee on Wednesday, releasing
  5784. classified documents in response to
  5785. the Guardian�s earlier stories on
  5786. bulk collection of phone records
  5787. and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  5788.  
  5789.  XKeyscore, the documents boast, is
  5790. the NSA�s �widest reaching� system
  5791. developing intelligence from computer
  5792. networks � what the agency calls
  5793. Digital Network Intelligence (DNI).
  5794. One presentation claims the program
  5795. covers �nearly everything a typical
  5796. user does on the internet�, including
  5797. the content of emails, websites
  5798. visited and searches, as well as
  5799. their metadata.
  5800.  
  5801. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  5802. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  5803. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  5804. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  5805.  
  5806. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  5807.  
  5808. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  5809.  
  5810. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  5811.  
  5812. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  5813.  
  5814. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  5815.  
  5816. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  5817.  
  5818. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  5819.  
  5820. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  5821.  
  5822. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  5823.  
  5824. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  5825.  
  5826. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  5827.  
  5828. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  5829.  
  5830. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  5831.  
  5832. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  5833.  
  5834.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  5835. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  5836. they are shunted off to various �production
  5837. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  5838. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  5839. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  5840. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  5841. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  5842. stored in a database called MARINA and
  5843. is generally retained for five years.
  5844.  
  5845. ... ...
  5846.  
  5847.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  5848. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  5849. to change the surveillance laws once the
  5850. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  5851. This was for a simple reason: they did
  5852. not want to be responsible for a program
  5853. that was not legal.�
  5854.  
  5855. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  5856.  
  5857. NOBODY comments
  5858.  
  5859.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  5860. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  5861. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  5862. communications not related to foreign
  5863. information or foreign activity for up
  5864. to five years.
  5865.  
  5866.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  5867. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  5868. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  5869. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  5870. ���������������������������������������
  5871. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  5872. for GCHQ Bude ::
  5873.  
  5874. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  5875. _______________________________________
  5876. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  5877. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  5878.  
  5879.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  5880. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  5881. counterfeiting and even copyright
  5882. infringement complain that their
  5883. attempts to exploit the security
  5884. agency�s vast resources have often
  5885. been turned down because their own
  5886. investigations are not considered a
  5887. high enough priority, current and
  5888. former government officials say.
  5889.  
  5890.  Intelligence officials say they have
  5891. been careful to limit the use of the
  5892. security agency�s troves of data and
  5893. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  5894. could be misused in ways that violate
  5895. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  5896.  
  5897.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  5898. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  5899. senior intelligence official at the
  5900. White House and at the office of the
  5901. director of national intelligence.
  5902. �They collect all this information,
  5903. but it�s difficult for the other
  5904. agencies to get access to what
  5905. they want.�
  5906.  
  5907. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  5908. _______________________________________
  5909. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  5910. Security Forum ::
  5911.  
  5912. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  5913.  
  5914. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  5915. Conference ::
  5916.  
  5917. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  5918.  
  5919. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  5920. Conference ::
  5921.  
  5922. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  5923. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  5924. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  5925.  
  5926.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  5927. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  5928. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  5929. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  5930. discussions with the president when he
  5931. first came on board we talked to him about
  5932. these programs and the issue was how do
  5933. we know the compliance is there and what
  5934. more could we do? We stood up working with
  5935. the committees in Congress a directorate
  5936. of compliance. This directorate of
  5937. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  5938. and information specialists that can look
  5939. at everything that we do in these programs
  5940. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  5941. orders but we also have oversight from
  5942. the Director of National Intelligence,
  5943. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  5944. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  5945. from the White House, from Congress, the
  5946. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  5947. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  5948.  
  5949. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  5950. Blackhat Conference ::
  5951.  
  5952. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  5953.  
  5954. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  5955.  
  5956. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  5957.  
  5958. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  5959.  
  5960. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  5961.  
  5962. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  5963.  
  5964. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  5965. _______________________________________
  5966. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  5967.  
  5968. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  5969.  
  5970. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  5971. All Domestic Calls ::
  5972.  
  5973.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  5974. three documents related to the National
  5975. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  5976. records, including briefings to Congress
  5977. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  5978. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  5979. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5980. Court that outlines rules that must be
  5981. followed when accessing data provided by
  5982. a Verizon subsidiary.
  5983.  
  5984. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  5985.  
  5986.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  5987. what the government was doing with the
  5988. Patriot Act program, several senators
  5989. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  5990. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  5991. the law in a twisted way to do something
  5992. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  5993. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  5994. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  5995. Act to obtain that document.
  5996.  
  5997. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  5998. _______________________________________
  5999. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  6000.  
  6001. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  6002.  
  6003. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  6004. _______________________________________
  6005. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  6006.  
  6007.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  6008. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  6009. two or three years ago.�
  6010.  
  6011. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  6012. _______________________________________
  6013. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6014. Received Dox ::
  6015.  
  6016. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  6017. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  6018. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  6019. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  6020. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  6021.  
  6022. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  6023.  
  6024. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  6025.  
  6026. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  6027. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  6028.  
  6029.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  6030. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  6031. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  6032. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  6033. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  6034. twice as much campaign financing from
  6035. the defense and intelligence industry
  6036. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  6037.  
  6038. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  6039.  
  6040. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  6041. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  6042.  
  6043. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  6044. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  6045. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  6046.  
  6047. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  6048.  
  6049. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  6050.  
  6051. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  6052. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  6053.  
  6054. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  6055. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  6056. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  6057. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  6058.  
  6059. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  6060. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  6061.  
  6062.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  6063. disclosures, the President has said
  6064. that he welcomes a debate about how
  6065. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  6066. our national security and the privacy
  6067. of our citizens.  The Administration
  6068. has taken various proactive steps to
  6069. advance this debate including the
  6070. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  6071. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  6072. his public statements on the disclosed
  6073. programs, the Office of the Director
  6074. of National Intelligence�s release of
  6075. its own public statements, ODNI General
  6076. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  6077. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  6078. disclose publicly that the Administration
  6079. filed an application with the Foreign
  6080. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  6081. look forward to continuing to discuss
  6082. these critical issues with the American
  6083. people and the Congress.
  6084.  
  6085.  However, we oppose the current effort
  6086. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  6087. of our Intelligence Community�s
  6088. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  6089. approach is not the product of an
  6090. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  6091. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  6092. Amendment, and instead move forward
  6093. with an approach that appropriately
  6094. takes into account the need for a
  6095. reasoned review of what tools can
  6096. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  6097.  
  6098. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  6099.  
  6100. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  6101.  
  6102. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  6103. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  6104.  
  6105. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  6106.  
  6107. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  6108. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  6109. to Defund NSA ::
  6110.  
  6111. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  6112. _______________________________________
  6113.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  6114. official letter from the NSA, which was
  6115. sent to the German government to clarify
  6116. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  6117. because German media and politics were
  6118. heavily confused after it became clear
  6119. that there�s more than one program named
  6120. PRISM.
  6121.  
  6122.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  6123. data collection program is about and
  6124. then confirms that this program is
  6125. different from a more common military
  6126. web tool called "Planning tool for
  6127. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  6128. and Management" (PRISM).
  6129.  
  6130.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  6131. there�s even a third program called
  6132. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  6133. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  6134. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  6135. apparently an internal NSA information
  6136. sharing program. It was unknown until
  6137. now, probably because it�s used in the
  6138. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  6139. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  6140.  
  6141.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  6142. different PRISM programs:
  6143.  
  6144. 1. PRISM
  6145.  
  6146.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  6147. of collecting information about foreign
  6148. targets from data of nine major US
  6149. internet companies. This program started
  6150. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  6151. in June 2013.
  6152.  
  6153. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  6154. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  6155.  
  6156.  This is a web tool used by US military
  6157. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  6158. to data collection platforms deployed to
  6159. military operations. This program is
  6160. not very secret and was first mentioned
  6161. in 2002.
  6162.  
  6163. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  6164. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  6165.  
  6166.  This is an internal NSA program for
  6167. real-time sharing of information,
  6168. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  6169. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  6170. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  6171.  
  6172. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  6173.  
  6174. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  6175. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  6176.  
  6177.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  6178. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  6179. surveillance activities in Germany.
  6180. It only added to the mystery. A US
  6181. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  6182. that there are actually three unrelated
  6183. Prism programs. ... ...
  6184.  
  6185.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  6186. and Maassen, officials also read a
  6187. written statement from the NSA in
  6188. response to a query from the German
  6189. government. According to the statement,
  6190. there are three separate Prism programs,
  6191. all of them unconnected to each other.
  6192. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  6193. said that one of the Prism programs was
  6194. only used internally. That program had
  6195. thus far remained secret. Another of
  6196. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  6197. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  6198. -- vaguely described in the statement
  6199. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  6200. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  6201. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  6202. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  6203.  
  6204. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  6205.  
  6206. NOBODY comments
  6207.  
  6208.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  6209. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  6210. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  6211. _______________________________________
  6212. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  6213.  
  6214. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  6215.  
  6216. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  6217.  
  6218. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  6219.  
  6220.  Description and drawings by US Army
  6221. Corps of Engineers.
  6222.  
  6223. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  6224. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  6225. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  6226. _______________________________________
  6227. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  6228.  
  6229. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  6230.  
  6231. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  6232.  
  6233. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  6234. ���������������������������������������
  6235. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  6236.  
  6237. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  6238.  
  6239. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  6240.  
  6241. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  6242.  
  6243. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  6244.  
  6245. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  6246. _______________________________________
  6247. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  6248.  
  6249.  �First, the United States would not seek
  6250. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  6251. return to the United States. The charges
  6252. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  6253. and the United States would not seek the
  6254. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  6255. charged with additional, death penalty-
  6256. eligible crimes.�
  6257.  
  6258. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  6259.  
  6260. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  6261. _______________________________________
  6262. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  6263. Peace Prize ::
  6264.  
  6265.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  6266. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  6267. agency�s data collection program, has
  6268. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  6269.  
  6270.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  6271. at great personal cost � revealed the
  6272. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  6273. the US government devotes electronic
  6274. communications worldwide,� read the
  6275. nomination. �By putting light on this
  6276. monitoring program � conducted in
  6277. contravention of national laws and
  6278. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  6279. has helped to make the world a little
  6280. bit better and safer.� ...
  6281.  
  6282.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  6283. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  6284. to being well justified in itself �
  6285. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  6286. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  6287. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  6288. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  6289. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  6290.  
  6291. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  6292. _______________________________________
  6293. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  6294. Komsomolets News ::
  6295.  
  6296. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  6297. ���������������������������������������
  6298. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  6299. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  6300.  
  6301.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  6302. his experience when he received a Foreign
  6303. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  6304. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  6305. federal government to monitor a customer
  6306. of his.
  6307.  
  6308.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  6309. contained a broad gag order, which still
  6310. prevents him from telling all the details.
  6311.  
  6312.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  6313. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  6314. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  6315. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  6316.  
  6317.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  6318. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  6319. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  6320. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  6321.  
  6322.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  6323. facility that was capturing all of the
  6324. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  6325. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  6326. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  6327. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  6328.  
  6329. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  6330. _______________________________________
  6331. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  6332.  
  6333. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  6334. _______________________________________
  6335. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  6336.  
  6337. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  6338. ���������������������������������������
  6339. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  6340. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  6341.  
  6342.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  6343. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  6344. representative rather casually indicated
  6345. that the government looks at data from
  6346. a universe of far, far more people than
  6347. previously indicated.
  6348.  
  6349.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  6350. was one of several government representatives
  6351. �including from the FBI and the office of
  6352. the Director of National Intelligence�
  6353. testifying before the House Judiciary
  6354. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  6355. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  6356. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  6357. surveillance, including a retread of the
  6358. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  6359. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6360. Act had stopped terror events.
  6361.  
  6362.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  6363. look �two or three hops� from terror
  6364. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  6365. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  6366. how surveillance was extended had been
  6367. described as two hops. This meant that
  6368. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  6369. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  6370. could also look at the calls from the
  6371. people that suspect has spoken with one
  6372. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  6373. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  6374. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  6375. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  6376.  
  6377. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  6378.  
  6379.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  6380. them or not - two hops.
  6381.  
  6382.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  6383. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  6384.  
  6385. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  6386. ���������������������������������������
  6387. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  6388.  
  6389.  It is a good thing that people are
  6390. becoming aware of the fact that they
  6391. are being monitored - it is not only
  6392. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  6393. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  6394. made to collect information and to store
  6395. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  6396. resources that PRISM used and how it
  6397. could combine these resources to multiple
  6398. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  6399.  
  6400. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  6401. _______________________________________
  6402. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  6403.  
  6404. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  6405. ���������������������������������������
  6406. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  6407. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  6408.  
  6409.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  6410. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  6411. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  6412. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  6413. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  6414. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  6415. stories about the US government�s vast
  6416. foreign and domestic spying programs
  6417. will stop. ... ...
  6418.  
  6419.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  6420. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  6421. the United States by releasing more
  6422. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  6423.  
  6424.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  6425. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  6426. since he has already said that he gave
  6427. all of his classified information --
  6428. thousands of documents -- to several
  6429. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  6430. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  6431. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  6432. half done with the stories he plans to
  6433. write based on the secret information.
  6434.  
  6435. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  6436. ���������������������������������������
  6437. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  6438.  
  6439. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  6440. _______________________________________
  6441. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  6442.  
  6443. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  6444. ���������������������������������������
  6445. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  6446.  
  6447.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  6448. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  6449. typewriters. What do they know that
  6450. we don�t?
  6451.  
  6452. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  6453. ���������������������������������������
  6454. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  6455. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  6456.  
  6457.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  6458. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  6459. has existed since at least 2002. The
  6460. following document refers to it directly.
  6461. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  6462. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  6463. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  6464. limitation of it and similar projects.
  6465.  
  6466. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  6467.  
  6468. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  6469. _______________________________________
  6470. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  6471. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  6472.  
  6473. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  6474.  
  6475. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  6476. in Latin America ::
  6477.  
  6478. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  6479. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  6480. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  6481. _______________________________________
  6482. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  6483. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  6484.  
  6485. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  6486.  
  6487. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  6488.  
  6489. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  6490. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  6491.  
  6492. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  6493. _______________________________________
  6494. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  6495.  
  6496. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  6497. _______________________________________
  6498. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  6499. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  6500.  
  6501. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  6502. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  6503. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  6504. ���������������������������������������
  6505. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  6506.  
  6507. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  6508.  
  6509. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  6510.  
  6511. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  6512. _______________________________________
  6513. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  6514. Metadata ::
  6515.  
  6516. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  6517. _______________________________________
  6518. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  6519. by US Citizens ::
  6520.  
  6521. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  6522. ���������������������������������������
  6523. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  6524.  
  6525. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  6526.  
  6527.  �This may look like a small release, but
  6528. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  6529. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  6530. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  6531. sending encrypted data to and from the
  6532. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  6533. those servers. If you crash these servers
  6534. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  6535. "broken". We are also planning to release
  6536. some of that data (which we have access
  6537. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  6538. ���������������������������������������
  6539. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  6540. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  6541.  
  6542.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  6543. Snowden�s employer.
  6544.  
  6545. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  6546.  
  6547. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  6548.  
  6549. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  6550. _______________________________________
  6551. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  6552.  
  6553. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  6554. _______________________________________
  6555. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  6556.  
  6557.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  6558. it became clear that my freedom and
  6559. safety were under threat for revealing
  6560. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  6561. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  6562. old, family, and others who I have never
  6563. met and probably never will. I trusted
  6564. them with my life and they returned that
  6565. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  6566. always be thankful.
  6567.  
  6568.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  6569. before the world that he would not permit
  6570. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  6571. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  6572. after promising not to do so, the President
  6573. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  6574. leaders of nations from which I have
  6575. requested protection to deny my asylum
  6576. petitions.
  6577.  
  6578.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  6579. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  6580. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  6581. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  6582. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  6583. come after me.
  6584.  
  6585.  For decades the United States of America
  6586. have been one of the strongest defenders
  6587. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  6588. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  6589. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  6590. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  6591. the current government of my country. The
  6592. Obama administration has now adopted the
  6593. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  6594. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  6595. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  6596. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  6597. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  6598. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  6599. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  6600. asylum.
  6601.  
  6602.  In the end the Obama administration is
  6603. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  6604. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  6605. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  6606. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  6607. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  6608. demanding the constitutional government
  6609. it was promised � and it should be.
  6610.  
  6611.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  6612. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  6613. many.�
  6614.  
  6615. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  6616. ���������������������������������������
  6617. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  6618.  
  6619. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  6620.  
  6621. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  6622.  
  6623. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  6624. _______________________________________
  6625. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  6626.  
  6627. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  6628. ���������������������������������������
  6629. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  6630.  
  6631. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  6632. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  6633. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  6634. _______________________________________
  6635. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  6636.  
  6637. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  6638. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  6639. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  6640. _______________________________________
  6641. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  6642.  
  6643. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  6644.  
  6645.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  6646. over private data to America.
  6647.  
  6648.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  6649. according to new claims by former US defence
  6650. analyst.
  6651.  
  6652.  At least six European Union countries in
  6653. addition to Britain have been colluding
  6654. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  6655. personal communications data, according
  6656. to a former contractor to America�s
  6657. National Security Agency, who said the
  6658. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  6659.  
  6660.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  6661. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  6662. and over the next 12 years held several
  6663. sensitive positions within the agency,
  6664. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  6665. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  6666. deals with the US.
  6667.  
  6668.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  6669. second and third party status� under
  6670. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  6671. that compels them to hand over data,
  6672. including mobile phone and internet
  6673. information to the NSA if requested.
  6674.  
  6675.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  6676. confirmed by declassified documents,
  6677. nations are categorised by the US according
  6678. to their trust level. The US is first party
  6679. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  6680. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  6681. Germany and France have third party
  6682. relationships.
  6683.  
  6684.  In an interview published last night
  6685. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  6686. who has been attacked for holding
  6687. controversial views on espionage issues,
  6688. said he had decided to speak out after
  6689. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  6690. told by EU politicians regarding the
  6691. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  6692.  
  6693.  He said that under the agreements,
  6694. which were drawn up after the second
  6695. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  6696. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  6697. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  6698. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  6699.  
  6700.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  6701. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  6702. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  6703. about the spying operations while staying
  6704. silent about their own arrangements
  6705. with the US, and was particularly
  6706. concerned that senior German politicians
  6707. had accused the UK of spying when their
  6708. country had a similar third-party deal
  6709. with the NSA.
  6710.  
  6711.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  6712. by other European countries to the NSA is
  6713. not on the same scale as that provided by
  6714. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  6715. embarrassing.
  6716.  
  6717.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  6718. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  6719. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  6720. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  6721. Madsen said.
  6722.  
  6723.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  6724. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  6725. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  6726. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  6727. confirmed that the entire system for
  6728. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  6729. because the EU was unable to intervene
  6730. in intelligence matters, which remained
  6731. the exclusive concern of national
  6732. governments.
  6733.  
  6734.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  6735. these contradictions and no one is really
  6736. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  6737. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  6738. democracy.�
  6739.  
  6740.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  6741. for European governments to come clean
  6742. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  6743. �There needs to be transparency as to
  6744. whether or not it is legal for the US
  6745. or any other security service to
  6746. interrogate private material,� said
  6747. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  6748. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  6749. is that none of these arrangements has
  6750. been debated in any democratic arena.
  6751. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  6752. things have to be done in secret, but you
  6753. don�t break the law in secret.�
  6754.  
  6755.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  6756. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  6757. fibre-optic cable network running between
  6758. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  6759. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  6760. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  6761. including phone calls, emails and records
  6762. of users� access to websites.
  6763.  
  6764.  He said the public needed to be made
  6765. aware of the full scale of the communication
  6766. -sharing arrangements between European
  6767. countries and the US, which predate the
  6768. internet and became of strategic importance
  6769. during the cold war.
  6770.  
  6771.  The covert relationship between the
  6772. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  6773. report by the European parliament, but
  6774. their explicit connection with the NSA
  6775. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  6776. to speak out.
  6777.  
  6778.  The European parliament�s report followed
  6779. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  6780. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  6781. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  6782. established the framework for European
  6783. member states to collaborate with the US.
  6784.  
  6785.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  6786. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  6787. that governments have chosen to keep the
  6788. public in the dark about it. The days
  6789. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  6790. of silence are over.�
  6791.  
  6792.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  6793. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  6794. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  6795. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  6796. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  6797. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  6798. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  6799. ���������������������������������������
  6800. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  6801. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  6802.  
  6803.  A former contractor to the US National
  6804. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  6805. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  6806. intelligence arrangements between the
  6807. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  6808. murky and far reaching� than the public
  6809. has been led to believe. ...
  6810.  
  6811.  He was particularly concerned about the
  6812. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  6813. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  6814. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  6815. while staying silent about their own role
  6816. in global interception arrangements with
  6817. the United States. ...
  6818.  
  6819.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  6820. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  6821.  
  6822.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  6823. many who say he had no authority or right
  6824. to provide the public with details of
  6825. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  6826. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  6827. have to provide information on NSA
  6828. surveillance at five meetings of the
  6829. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  6830. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  6831. Spain and Switzerland?�
  6832.  
  6833.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  6834. American people from a constantly changing
  6835. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  6836. is providing information to elites on
  6837. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  6838. student, religious and progressive
  6839. organizations.�
  6840.  
  6841.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  6842. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  6843. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  6844.  
  6845. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  6846. _______________________________________
  6847. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  6848.  
  6849. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  6850. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  6851. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  6852. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  6853. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  6854. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  6855. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  6856.  
  6857. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  6858.  
  6859. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  6860. ���������������������������������������
  6861. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  6862. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  6863.  
  6864. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  6865. ??????????????????????????????????????
  6866.  ????????????????????????????????????
  6867. ??????????????????????????????????????
  6868. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ �
  6869.  
  6870. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  6871.  
  6872. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data
  6873. Collection �
  6874.  
  6875. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  6876.  
  6877. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on
  6878. Americans �
  6879.  
  6880. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  6881.  
  6882. � List of Retreats for Whistleblowers ;
  6883. Countries With No US Extradition Treaty �
  6884.  
  6885. http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1372346844.php
  6886.  
  6887. � Snowden Was Smart ; NSA Leaks Were
  6888. Given to Untold Others, Encrypted �
  6889.  
  6890. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/greenwald-snowden-s-files-are-out-there-if-anything-happens-to-him.html
  6891.  
  6892. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in
  6893. the Dark on NSA Spying �
  6894.  
  6895. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  6896.  
  6897. � Is PRISM a Not-So-Secret GUI and is
  6898. There More Than One PRISM Tool? �
  6899.  
  6900. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/06/is-prism-just-not-so-secret-web-tool.html
  6901.  
  6902. � Screenshot of the PRISM Input Tool �
  6903.  
  6904. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aKIwdHzpBxM/UbkjPyyl9pI/AAAAAAAAAWQ/hJWQkBFWDic/s1600/PRISM+input+tool.jpg
  6905.  
  6906. � NSA Also Spying on the �Deep Web� �
  6907.  
  6908. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-23/u-s-surveillance-is-not-aimed-at-terrorists.html
  6909.  
  6910. � Obama Regime Irate as Snowden Flees
  6911. Hong Kong to Undisclosed Location �
  6912.  
  6913. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/23/us-usa-security-flight-idUSBRE95M02H20130623
  6914. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_HONG_KONG?SITE=AP
  6915. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-us-politicians-react
  6916.  
  6917. � Wikileaks Comments on Helping Edward
  6918. Snowden Flee to Undisclosed Location �
  6919.  
  6920. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-Statement-On-Edward.html
  6921.  
  6922. � Obama Regime Charges Edward Snowden
  6923. With Espionage �
  6924.  
  6925. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_print.html
  6926.  
  6927. � USA vs. Edward Snowden Complaint �
  6928.  
  6929. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-complaint.pdf
  6930.  
  6931. � Pre-Crime in FISA Leak Detailed �
  6932.  
  6933. http://p.iain.it/view/raw/1296961
  6934.  
  6935. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks �
  6936.  
  6937. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  6938. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  6939. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  6940.  
  6941. � Illegal Warrantless Mass Spying of
  6942. All Telecommunication by NSA via FISA �
  6943.  
  6944. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  6945. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  6946. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  6947. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  6948. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  6949. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  6950. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  6951. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  6952. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  6953. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  6954. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  6955. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  6956. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  6957. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  6958. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  6959. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  6960. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  6961. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  6962. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  6963. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  6964. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  6965. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  6966. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  6967. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  6968. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  6969. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  6970. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  6971. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  6972. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  6973. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  6974. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  6975. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  6976. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  6977. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  6978. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  6979. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  6980.  
  6981. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable
  6982. Tapping 1 & 2 (Repost) �
  6983.  
  6984. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  6985.  
  6986. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  6987.  
  6988. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic
  6989. Tapping (Repost) �
  6990.  
  6991. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  6992.  
  6993. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip �
  6994.  
  6995. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  6996.  
  6997. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  6998. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  6999. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

Submit a correction or amendment below. (click here to make a fresh posting)
After submitting an amendment, you'll be able to view the differences between the old and new posts easily.
Syntax Highlighting:
To highlight particular lines, prefix each line with @@
Pressing TAB inserts 3 spaces