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Posted by Eyeballing the N on March Thu 13th 6:09 PM - Never Expires
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  1. VIEW FULL @ http://code.hackerspace.no/1064/
  2.  
  3. DOWNLOAD TXT/HTML @ http://filebeam.com/c7d9bb0d30cee9297fef5606f373472e
  4.        
  5.        
  6.  �Defeat adversary cyber-security practices
  7. in order to acquire the SIGINT data we need
  8. from anyone, anytime, anywhere.�
  9.  
  10.   - NSA ; SIGINT Strategy 2012 - 2016
  11.  
  12.  
  13. � NSA/FISA Spying Timeline ::
  14.  
  15.  1978 FISA ; 1981 EO 12333, 1982 DoD Reg 5240.1-R,
  16. 1993 USSID SP0018 ; 2001 USA Patriot Act, 2002 FISC
  17. �Raw Take� Share Motion ; 2003 SP002 ; 2004 PR/TT FISA ;
  18. 2004 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 ; 2006 BR FISA ; 2006 RAS Memo ;
  19. 2007 PAA (expired) ; 2008 FAA ; 2008 SP002 (Revised) ;
  20. 2008 EO 12333 (Revised) ; 2008 RAS Memo (Revised) ;
  21. 2009 NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Revised).
  22.  
  23. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-spy-timeline.pdf
  24.  
  25. ? FISA Surveillance Leaks ::
  26.  
  27. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  28. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  29. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  30.  
  31. ? Executive Order 12333 (Default 1981) ::
  32.  
  33. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html
  34.  
  35. ? DoD Regulation 5240.1-R (1982) ::
  36.  
  37.  Guidance to DoD components in implementing EO 12333
  38. and general rules pursuant to FISA.
  39.  
  40. http://cryptome.org/dod5240-1-r.htm
  41.  
  42. ? USSID SP0018 (2003) ::
  43.  
  44. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANEDFinal%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf
  45.  
  46. ? FISA ; Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) ::
  47.  
  48.  Opinion of the FISC granting the government application
  49. seeking the collection of bulk electronic communications
  50. metadata pursuant to Section 402 of FISA, the Pen Register
  51. and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) provision.
  52.  
  53. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-13-1118/CLEANEDPRTT%201.pdf
  54.  
  55. ? Bulk Collection Programs Under PATRIOT ACT ::
  56.  
  57. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  58.  
  59. ? NSA/CSS Policy 1-23 (Default 2004) ::
  60.  
  61. http://cryptome.org/nsa-css-1-23.pdf
  62.  
  63. ? Executive Order 12333 (Revised 2008) ::
  64.  
  65. http://cryptome.org/eo12333-amend.htm
  66.  
  67. NSA�s FOIA Release � http://cryptome.org/nsa-eo12333.pdf
  68.  
  69. ? NSA ; FISA/PAA/FAA Classification Guide ::
  70.  
  71. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-fisa-faa-class.pdf
  72.  
  73. ? NSA Attorney General Dissemination Procedures ::
  74.  
  75. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ag-dissemination.pdf
  76. _______________________________________
  77. � NSA/CSS Classification/Damage Control ::
  78.  
  79. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-policy-1-52.pdf
  80. _______________________________________
  81. � NSA/FBI Cryptanalysts Database Sharing ::
  82.  
  83. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-crypt-fisa-share.pdf
  84.  
  85. ? FBI�s Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) ::
  86.  
  87. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  88.  
  89. ? FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  90.  
  91. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  92. _______________________________________
  93. � STELLARWIND Classification Guide ::
  94.  
  95. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-stellarwind-class.pdf
  96.  
  97. ? NSA ; STELLARWIND Program ::
  98.  
  99. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  100. _______________________________________
  101. � FISC Orders to Preserve NSA Metadata Spying ::
  102.  
  103. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-order-14-0312.pdf
  104. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/fisc-br14-01-tro-14-0311.pdf
  105. _______________________________________
  106. � How the NSA Plans to Infect Millions of Computers
  107. With Malware ::
  108.  
  109.  Top-secret documents reveal that the National
  110. Security Agency is dramatically expanding its
  111. ability to covertly hack into computers on a mass
  112. scale by using automated systems that reduce the
  113. level of human oversight in the process.
  114.  
  115.  The classified files � provided previously by NSA
  116. whistleblower Edward Snowden � contain new details
  117. about groundbreaking surveillance technology the
  118. agency has developed to infect potentially millions
  119. of computers worldwide with malware �implants.� The
  120. clandestine initiative enables the NSA to break into
  121. targeted computers and to siphon out data from foreign
  122. Internet and phone networks.
  123.  
  124. https://prod01-cdn02.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/nsa_malware_feature.jpg
  125. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/turbine-large.jpg
  126. https://prod01-cdn01.cdn.firstlook.org/wp-uploads/2014/03/tao-2-1024x768.png
  127. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076889/nsa-technology-directorate-analysis-of-converged.pdf
  128. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077724/industry-scale-exploitation.pdf
  129. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1077721/thousands-of-implants.pdf
  130. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076859/nsa-phishing-tactics-and-man-in-the-middle-attacks.pdf
  131. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076891/there-is-more-than-one-way-to-quantum.pdf
  132. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1076862/quantum-insert-diagrams.pdf
  133.  
  134.  The covert infrastructure that supports the hacking
  135. efforts operates from the agency�s headquarters in
  136. Fort Meade, Maryland, and from eavesdropping bases
  137. in the United Kingdom and Japan. GCHQ, the British
  138. intelligence agency, appears to have played an integral
  139. role in helping to develop the implants tactic.
  140.  
  141.  The implants being deployed were once reserved for
  142. a few hundred hard-to-reach targets, whose communications
  143. could not be monitored through traditional wiretaps. But
  144. the documents analyzed by The Intercept show how the NSA
  145. has aggressively accelerated its hacking initiatives in
  146. the past decade by computerizing some processes previously
  147. handled by humans. The automated system � codenamed TURBINE
  148. � is designed to �allow the current implant network to
  149. scale to large size (millions of implants) by creating
  150. a system that does automated control implants by groups
  151. instead of individually.�
  152.  
  153. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/12/nsa-plans-infect-millions-computers-malware/
  154.  
  155. � �Thousands of Implants� ::
  156.  
  157.  �Building the operations floor and increasing the number
  158. of break-out rooms will enable us to grow from the current
  159. average of these operations per clay to over per day and will
  160. facilitate the integration of 55 computer network operations
  161. and real--time customer support. Sustained collection involving
  162. automated implants pushing collected data from targets to the
  163. RDC as well as voice and geolocation collection are managed from
  164. the Operations Teaming Areas. The increased capacity in this
  165. area will support a growth from managing an average of I 543
  166. active implants today to simultaneously managing thousands of
  167. implanted targets. The increased personnel capacity will support
  168. this net growth in operations tempo and will allow the integration
  169. of TAD's Requirements Targeting Division alongside the operators
  170. in order to better target development and efficiently plan and
  171. execute endpoint operations.�
  172.  
  173. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  174.  
  175.  According to one top-secret document from 2012, the agency
  176. can deploy malware by sending out spam emails that trick targets
  177. into clicking a malicious link. Once activated, a �back-door
  178. implant� infects their computers within eight seconds.
  179.  
  180.  There�s only one problem with this tactic, codenamed WILLOWVIXEN:
  181. According to the documents, the spam method has become less
  182. successful in recent years, as Internet users have become wary
  183. of unsolicited emails and less likely to click on anything that
  184. looks suspicious.
  185.  
  186.  Consequently, the NSA has turned to new and more advanced
  187. hacking techniques. These include performing so-called
  188. �man-in-the-middle� and �man-on-the-side� attacks, which
  189. covertly force a user�s internet browser to route to NSA
  190. computer servers that try to infect them with an implant.
  191.  
  192.  To perform a man-on-the-side attack, the NSA observes a
  193. target�s Internet traffic using its global network of covert
  194. �accesses� to data as it flows over fiber optic cables or
  195. satellites. When the target visits a website that the NSA
  196. is able to exploit, the agency�s surveillance sensors alert
  197. the TURBINE system, which then �shoots� data packets at the
  198. targeted computer�s IP address within a fraction of a second.
  199.  
  200.  In one man-on-the-side technique, codenamed QUANTUMHAND,
  201. the agency disguises itself as a fake Facebook server. When
  202. a target attempts to log in to the social media site, the
  203. NSA transmits malicious data packets that trick the target�s
  204. computer into thinking they are being sent from the real
  205. Facebook. By concealing its malware within what looks like
  206. an ordinary Facebook page, the NSA is able to hack into the
  207. targeted computer and covertly siphon out data from its
  208. hard drive. A top-secret animation demonstrates the tactic
  209. in action.
  210.  
  211. � How the NSA Secretly Masqueraded as Facebook to Hack
  212. Computers for Surveillance ::
  213.  
  214. https://player.vimeo.com/video/88822483
  215.  
  216. and @ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Td8nZscYvT4
  217.  
  218. Mirrored � http://megaswf.com/f/2647410
  219.  
  220.  According to Matt Blaze, a surveillance and cryptography
  221. expert at the University of Pennsylvania, it appears that
  222. the QUANTUMHAND technique is aimed at targeting specific
  223. individuals. But he expresses concerns about how it has
  224. been covertly integrated within Internet networks as part
  225. of the NSA�s automated TURBINE system.
  226.  
  227. � NSA TURBINE Automated Hacking Documents (Mirrored) ::
  228.  
  229. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-turbine-turmoil.pdf
  230. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-industry-exploit.pdf
  231. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-converged.pdf
  232. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-quantum-insert.pdf
  233. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-thousands-implants.pdf
  234. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-gchq-quantumtheory.pdf
  235. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-more-than-one-way.pdf
  236. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-hammerchant.pdf
  237. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-phishing-mtm.pdf
  238. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tao-quantuminsert-bonanza.htm
  239. _______________________________________
  240. � NSA Hacking Routers & Social Media (Misc) ::
  241.  
  242. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-5-eyes-hacking.pdf
  243. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-menwith-xkeyscore.pdf
  244. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-selector.pdf
  245. _______________________________________
  246. � Cryptome Eyeballs Deputy Director Richard Ledgett ::
  247.  
  248. http://cryptome.org/2014-info/richard-ledgett/richard-ledgett.htm
  249. _______________________________________
  250. � NSA Assistance to Dutch Somali Piracy Control ::
  251.  
  252.  Alliances between security services are usually
  253. kept secret. But thousands of NSA documents are
  254. now in the hands of a select group of journalists,
  255. thanks to former NSA worker Edward Snowden. They
  256. show that the NSA is the central organisation in
  257. an international exchange of tapped telephone and
  258. internet traffic.
  259.  
  260.  The Netherlands is also a part of this. In September,
  261. the German weekly Der Spiegel published an NSA document
  262. about the Netherlands. The graph, entitled �Netherlands
  263. � 30 days�, appeared to show that the NSA had listened
  264. in to 1.8 million Dutch telephone calls.
  265.  
  266.  But last month, the cabinet showed that the reality
  267. was different. The 1.8 million telephone calls, wrote
  268. home affairs minister Ronald Plasterk and defence
  269. minister Jeanine Hennis, were not intercepted by
  270. the Americans, but by the Dutch and then shared with
  271. the NSA. It was not American, but Dutch espionage.
  272.  
  273.  Two new documents give further details. The Netherlands,
  274. it transpires, intercepts vast amounts of Somali
  275. telephone traffic and shares it with the NSA. The
  276. Dutch use the information to combat piracy. But the
  277. Americans may possibly use the information for
  278. something else as well: taking out terrorism suspects
  279. by attacking them with armed drones.
  280.  
  281. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-dutch-assist.pdf
  282.  
  283. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/03/05/the-secret-role-of-the-dutch-in-the-american-war-on-terror/
  284. _______________________________________
  285. � SXSW ; Ask Snowden ::
  286.  
  287. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nRQTDNbYjqY
  288. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/snowden-sxsw.htm
  289. http://blog.inside.com/blog/2014/3/10/edward-snowden-sxsw-full-transcription-and-video
  290. _______________________________________
  291. � NSA ; Ask Zelda ::
  292.  
  293. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/nsa-ask-zelda.pdf
  294.  
  295. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/03/07/nsa-advice-columnist-seriously/
  296. _______________________________________
  297. � NSA Blames Tech Firms, Vice Versa ::
  298.  
  299. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/tech-stop-spying.htm
  300.  
  301. http://cryptome.org/2014/03/big-data-spying.htm
  302. ---------------------------------------
  303. � Tech Firms Spy ::
  304.  
  305. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  306.  
  307. � NSA Spies Too ::
  308.  
  309. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  310. _______________________________________
  311. � GCHQ �OPTIC NERVE� Spy Programme ::
  312.  
  313. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-optic-nerve.pdf
  314.  
  315. � GCHQ Collects Webcam Photos of Yahoo Users ::
  316.  
  317.  The documents show that images were collected
  318. from webcams at regular intervals, one image
  319. every five minutes, and were used by the spy
  320. agency to trial automated facial recognition
  321. programs.
  322.  
  323. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-yahoo
  324. http://www.infowars.com/you-read-it-here-first-government-spies-on-innocent-people-via-webcams-laptops-xbox/
  325. http://news.softpedia.com/news/GCHQ-Collected-Webcam-Images-of-Millions-of-Yahoo-Fans-429705.shtml
  326. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2014/02/28/gchq-f28.html
  327.  
  328. � FLASHBACK ; Infowars Warned Users in 2006 ::
  329.  
  330. http://www.infowars.com/articles/bb/gov_industry_use_computer_mics_spy_on_americans.htm
  331. _______________________________________
  332. � NSA Director Alexander�s Phones ::
  333.  
  334. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/02/nsa-director-alexanders-phones.html
  335. _______________________________________
  336. � NSA Seeks to Expand Database, 26 Feb 2014 ::
  337.  
  338. http://www.breitbart.com/InstaBlog/2014/02/27/NSA-Seeks-to-Expand-Database
  339.  
  340. http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br14-01-motion-140226.pdf
  341. _______________________________________
  342. � NSA Bugged Top German Officials After Orders
  343. Not to Spy On Chancellor Claims New Whistleblower ::
  344.  
  345. http://www.mintpressnews.com/snowden-2-0-new-active-duty-nsa-whistleblower/180502/
  346.  
  347. http://techcrunch.com/2014/02/24/report-nsa-bugged-top-german-officials-after-obama-ordered-cease-of-spying-on-chancellor/
  348. _______________________________________
  349. � NSA Observer ::
  350.  
  351. https://nsa-observer.laquadrature.net/
  352. _______________________________________
  353. � Spy Documents Released Since June 2013 ::
  354.  
  355. https://www.aclu.org/nsa-documents-released-public-june-2013
  356.  
  357. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/snowden-tabulations.htm
  358. _______________________________________
  359. � NSA Spying Zero Hedge Connections ::
  360.  
  361. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/02/ZH%20browsing%20govt_1.jpg
  362.  
  363. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-02-19/while-browsing-zero-hedge-certain-government-agency
  364. _______________________________________
  365. � GCHQ Trolls, Spies and Deceives Online Users ::
  366.  
  367. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-online-deception.pdf
  368.  
  369. � GCHQ Disruption Operations ::
  370.  
  371. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-disruption.pdf
  372.  
  373. � GCHQ Spreads Propaganda to Discredit Critics ::
  374.  
  375.  The documents from the GCHQ (the British equivalent
  376. of the NSA), titled �The Art of Deception: Training
  377. for Online Covert Operations,� were given to the
  378. NSA and leaked by Snowden. They reveal that the
  379. GCHQ is involved, through a unit known as JTRIG
  380. (Joint Threat Research Intelligence Group), in
  381. �the monitoring of YouTube and Blogger, the
  382. targeting of Anonymous with the very same DDoS
  383. attacks they accuse �hacktivists� of using, the
  384. use of honey traps (luring people into compromising
  385. situations using sex) and destructive viruses.�
  386.  
  387.  The goals of the JTRIG program are �(1) to inject
  388. all sorts of false material onto the internet in
  389. order to destroy the reputation of its targets;
  390. and (2) to use social sciences and other techniques
  391. to manipulate online discourse and activism to
  392. generate outcomes it considers desirable.�
  393.  
  394. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  395. http://www.examiner.com/article/government-infiltrating-websites-to-deny-disrupt-degrade-deceive
  396. http://rt.com/news/five-eyes-online-manipulation-deception-564/
  397. ---------------------------------------
  398. � GCHQ Attacked Anonymous in 2012 ::
  399.  
  400. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-anonymous.pdf
  401.  
  402. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/snowden_anonymous_nbc_document.pdf
  403.  
  404. � GCHQ Cyber Attack Operations ::
  405.  
  406. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-attack.pdf
  407.  
  408. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1015553/snowden-cyber-offensive1-nbc-document.pdf
  409.  
  410. � GCHQ Full-Spectrum Cyber Effects ::
  411.  
  412. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-cyber-effects.pdf
  413.  
  414. � GCHQ Spies Attacked Anonymous IRC Chats ::
  415.  
  416. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/war-anonymous-british-spies-attacked-hackers-snowden-docs-show-n21361
  417. http://www.zdnet.com/uk-used-denial-of-service-against-anonymous-7000025993/
  418. http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2014-02/05/gchq-ddos-attack-anonymous
  419.  
  420. � British Spies Used Porn and Dirty Tricks to
  421. Lure Targets to Honeypots ::
  422.  
  423. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/snowden-docs-british-spies-used-sex-dirty-tricks-n23091
  424. ---------------------------------------
  425. � NSA & GCHQ Spies on Wikileaks, TPB Visitors ::
  426.  
  427. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/18/snowden-docs-reveal-covert-surveillance-and-pressure-tactics-aimed-at-wikileaks-and-its-supporters/
  428. http://wikileaks.org/NSA-and-GCHQ-spying-on-WikiLeaks.html
  429. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/surveillance-and-pressure-wikileaks-readers
  430. http://torrentcrazy.com/news/nsa-authorized-monitoring-of-pirate-bay-and-proxy-users
  431.  
  432. � NSA-GCHQ Discovery SIGINT Targeting ::
  433.  
  434. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-discovery.pdf
  435.  
  436. � Youtube Targets by SQUEAKYDOLPHIN Presentation ::
  437.  
  438. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-squeakydolphin-videos.htm
  439.  
  440. � GCHQ Psychology SIGDEV ::
  441.  
  442. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/gchq-psychology.pdf
  443. ---------------------------------------
  444. ? Reddit Censors All Stories Above ::
  445.  
  446. http://www.infowars.com/reddit-censors-big-story-about-government-manipulation-and-disruption-of-the-internet/
  447. _______________________________________
  448. � NYT Samantha Storey Inept Redactions ::
  449.  
  450. Inlcudes two GCHQ documents.
  451.  
  452. 01 �MOBILE THEME BRIEFING MAY 28 2010�
  453.  
  454. 02 �Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices�
  455.  
  456. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nyt-leak.zip
  457. _______________________________________
  458. � NSA�s Secret Role in the US Assassination Program ::
  459.  
  460.  An anonymous former drone operator for Joint
  461. Special Operations Command (JSOC) told The
  462. Intercept � a new publication helmed by
  463. Glenn Greenwald, who broke the first of many
  464. NSA revelations last year � that the US military
  465. and CIA use the NSA�s metadata analysis and
  466. phone-tracking abilities to identify airstrike
  467. targets without confirming their veracity on
  468. the ground.
  469.  
  470. https://firstlook.org/theintercept/article/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/
  471. https://www.activistpost.com/2013/10/add-death-by-drone-to-nsas-list-of.html
  472. http://www.infowars.com/new-whistleblower-reveals-nsa-picking-drone-targets-based-on-bad-data-death-by-unreliable-metadata/
  473. _______________________________________
  474. � ASD Helps NSA Spy on Law Firms, Laywers ::
  475.  
  476.  A top-secret document, obtained by the
  477. former NSA contractor Edward J. Snowden,
  478. shows that an American law firm was
  479. monitored while representing a foreign
  480. government in trade disputes with the
  481. United States. The disclosure offers a
  482. rare glimpse of a specific instance in
  483. which Americans were ensnared by the
  484. eavesdroppers, and is of particular
  485. interest because lawyers in the United
  486. States with clients overseas have
  487. expressed growing concern that their
  488. confidential communications could be
  489. compromised by such surveillance.
  490.  
  491. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/16/us/eavesdropping-ensnared-american-law-firm.html
  492. http://www.activistpost.com/2014/02/new-snowden-docs-implicate-nsa-in.html
  493. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/asia-pacific/198506-report-spies-watched-us-lawyers-in-trade-deal
  494.  
  495. NOBODY comments
  496.  
  497. NY Times has not provided any documentation.
  498.  
  499.  There should be an FOIA request to the IC
  500. and perhaps to the DNI for this document to
  501. be declassified for research in public domain.
  502. _______________________________________
  503. � NSA FISA Business Spying ::
  504.  
  505. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-business.pdf
  506.  
  507. � NSA Course on FISA Spying Operations ::
  508.  
  509. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-fisa-course.pdf
  510. _______________________________________
  511. � Snowden Allegedly Used Web Scraper Tool ::
  512.  
  513. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/us/snowden-used-low-cost-tool-to-best-nsa.html?hp&_r=1
  514. _______________________________________
  515. � Ex-chancellor Gerhard Schr�der Allegedly
  516. Spied by NSA (No Documentation Presented) ::
  517.  
  518.  Munich daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung and
  519. public broadcaster NDR reported Tuesday
  520. that Merkel�s predecessor Gerhard Schroeder
  521. was added to the NSA�s National Sigint
  522. Requirement List as number 388 in 2002.
  523.  
  524. http://www.dw.de/reports-nsa-first-targeted-german-chancellor-schr%C3%B6der-then-merkel/a-17408683
  525. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/04/us-nsa-gerhard-schroeder-surveillance?view=mobile
  526. http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/ausspaeh-affaere-die-spionage-botschaft-12635377.html
  527.  
  528. � New Interpretations of NSA Monitoring
  529. the German Chancellor ::
  530.  
  531. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/02/new-interpretations-of-nsa-monitoring.html
  532. _______________________________________
  533. � Dutch Intelligence Claims Responsibility for
  534. Phone Call Spying ::
  535.  
  536. http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2014/02/the_netherlands_not_usa_gather.php
  537.  
  538. http://static3.volkskrant.nl/static/asset/2014/kamerbrief_met_reactie_op_berichtgeving_metadata_telefoonverkeer_3761.pdf
  539. _______________________________________
  540. � First Congressman To Battle the NSA is Dead ::
  541.  
  542. http://pando.com/2014/02/04/the-first-congressman-to-battle-the-nsa-is-dead-no-one-noticed-no-one-cares/
  543. _______________________________________
  544. � Mike Rogers Wants Journalists With Leaks Jailed ::
  545.  
  546. http://nypost.com/2014/02/05/pol-journalist-fencing-snowden-secrets-should-be-jailed/
  547. _______________________________________
  548.  On Saturday 20 July 2013, in the basement of the
  549. Guardian�s office in Kings Cross, London, watched by
  550. two GCHQ technicians, Guardian editors destroyed
  551. hard drives and memory cards on which encrypted files
  552. leaked by Edward Snowden had been stored. This is
  553. the first time footage of the event has been released.
  554.  
  555. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bUokM5d1qic
  556. ���������������������������������������
  557. � CSEC IP Profiling & Mission Impacts ::
  558.  
  559. http://www.cbc.ca/news2/pdf/airports_redacted.pdf
  560.  
  561. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-ip-profile.pdf
  562.  
  563. � CSEC Objects to Disclosure of IP Profiling ::
  564.  
  565. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/csec-14-0131.pdf
  566.  
  567. � CSEC Used Airport Wi-Fi to Track Travellers ::
  568.  
  569.  A top secret document retrieved by US whistleblower
  570. Edward Snowden and obtained by CBC News shows
  571. that Canada�s electronic spy agency used information
  572. from the free internet service at a major Canadian
  573. airport to track the wireless devices of thousands
  574. of ordinary airline passengers for days after they
  575. left the terminal.
  576.  
  577.  After reviewing the document, one of Canada�s
  578. foremost authorities on cyber-security says the
  579. clandestine operation by the Communications
  580. Security Establishment Canada (CSEC) was almost
  581. certainly illegal. ... ...
  582.  
  583.  The document indicates the passenger tracking
  584. operation was a trial run of a powerful new
  585. software program CSEC was developing with help
  586. from its US counterpart, the NSA.
  587.  
  588.  In the document, CSEC called the new technologies
  589. �game-changing,� and said they could be used for
  590. tracking �any target that makes occasional forays
  591. into other cities/regions.�
  592.  
  593. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/csec-used-airport-wi-fi-to-track-canadian-travellers-edward-snowden-documents-1.2517881
  594.  
  595.  CSEC concluded: �Can then take seeds from these
  596. airports and repeat to cover whole world.�
  597.  
  598. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/01/new-snowden-docs-show-canadian-spies-tracked-thousands-of-travelers/
  599.  
  600. � More Details Into CSEC IP Profiling ::
  601.  
  602. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2014/02/did-csec-really-tracked-canadian.html
  603. _______________________________________
  604. � NSA, GCHQ Allegedly Hack Cryptographer ::
  605.  
  606. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/nsa-gchq-quisquater.pdf
  607.  
  608. � ... And Now It�s Personal ::
  609.  
  610. http://cryptome.org/2014/02/stopping-nsa.htm
  611. _______________________________________
  612. � GCHQ Snooped on YouTube and Facebook ::
  613.  
  614.  Documents taken from the National Security
  615. Agency by Edward Snowden and obtained by NBC
  616. News detail how British cyber spies demonstrated
  617. a pilot program to their US partners in 2012
  618. in which they were able to monitor YouTube in
  619. real time and collect addresses from the billions
  620. of videos watched daily, as well as some user
  621. information, for analysis. At the time the
  622. documents were printed, they were also able to
  623. spy on Facebook and Twitter.
  624.  
  625.  Called �Psychology A New Kind of SIGDEV�
  626. (Signals Development), the presentation includes
  627. a section that spells out �Broad real-time
  628. monitoring of online activity� of YouTube videos,
  629. URLs �liked� on Facebook, and Blogspot/Blogger
  630. visits. The monitoring program is called
  631. �Squeaky Dolphin.�
  632.  
  633.  Experts told NBC News the documents show the
  634. British had to have been either physically able
  635. to tap the cables carrying the world�s web
  636. traffic or able to use a third party to gain
  637. physical access to the massive stream of data,
  638. and would be able to extract some key data
  639. about specific users as well.
  640.  
  641. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-squeaky-dolphin.pdf
  642. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-newtons-cat.pdf
  643. http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/Sections/NEWS/snowden_youtube_nbc_document.pdf
  644. http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/27/22469304-snowden-docs-reveal-british-spies-snooped-on-youtube-and-facebook?lite
  645. _______________________________________
  646. � NSA/GCHQ Smartphone App Location Spying ::
  647.  
  648. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-birds-personal-data
  649. https://www.propublica.org/article/spy-agencies-probe-angry-birds-and-other-apps-for-personal-data
  650. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/28/world/spy-agencies-scour-phone-apps-for-personal-data.html?_r=0
  651.  
  652. � GCHQ Mobile Theme Briefing ::
  653.  
  654.  �Over 200 3rd party Location Aware Applications
  655. on the iPhone alone.�
  656.  
  657. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/gchq-mobile-theme.pdf
  658.  
  659. � NSA Converged Analysis of Smartphone Devices ::
  660.  
  661. �Android Phones pass GPS data in the clear.�
  662.  
  663. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-smartphones-analysis.pdf
  664. _______________________________________
  665. � Obama Grants NSA Exemption From Law ::
  666.  
  667.  The National Security Agency program that
  668. collects data on nearly every US phone call
  669. isn�t legal, a privacy review board said
  670. Thursday in a newly released report.
  671.  
  672. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/pclob-14-0123.pdf
  673.  
  674.  �We have not identified a single instance
  675. involving a threat to the United States in
  676. which the program made a concrete difference
  677. in the outcome of a counterterrorism
  678. investigation,� the board wrote in the
  679. report released Thursday.
  680.  
  681.  Despite Obama�s promise to reform the NSA,
  682. domestic spying will continue.
  683.  
  684. http://edition.cnn.com/2014/01/23/politics/nsa-telephone-records-privacy/index.html?hpt=hp_t3
  685. _______________________________________
  686. � Snowden Speaks ::
  687.  
  688. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/snowden-video-13-0126.zip
  689. _______________________________________
  690. ? Snowden Calls Russian-Spy Story �Absurd� ::
  691.  
  692. http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/snowden-calls-russian-spy-story-absurd.html
  693.  
  694. ? NSA is NOT the Source of All Spying ::
  695.          ���
  696. http://20committee.com/2014/01/18/the-end-of-the-snowden-operation/
  697.  
  698. NOBODY�s comment blocked @ 20committee.com
  699.  
  700.  Reform? Reform was never intended to come
  701. from politicians or the white house. Reform
  702. will come from peoples� change of online use ;
  703. growing public use of open-source encryption,
  704. growing use of services such as Tor, a growing
  705. amount of computers air-gapped, growing use of
  706. hardcopy backups rather than �the cloud� - and
  707. add to that, more people bleaching their cookies
  708. among other web browser cache, surging VPN use,
  709. growing use of proxies. Sudden disconnections
  710. of users� modems when not actually being used. The
  711. use of alternative search engines (such as ixquick,
  712. duckduckgo, startpage, privatelee, et al) and
  713. also consider the growing use of XPIs such as
  714. Noscript, Ghostery, HTTPS Everywhere and others.
  715.  
  716. Reform?
  717.  
  718.  How about the death of RSA and a new generation
  719. of young privacy-crypto-enthusiasts who start to
  720. say �fuck the corporate platforms� and change it
  721. whether legal or not?
  722.  
  723. The reform will come from people taking action.
  724.  
  725.  Here�s what I�d like to know - will �big government�
  726. follow up reform with their �internet kill switch?�
  727. _______________________________________
  728. � NSA Redactions Fail, Fail and Fail Again ::
  729.  
  730. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-redaction-fails.pdf
  731. _______________________________________
  732. � NSA�s Upstream Collection Detailed ::
  733.  
  734.  The corporate partnerships are one of
  735. three ways NSA is intercepting the world�s
  736. main internet cables:
  737.  
  738.  - Cooperation with telecommunication companies
  739.  - Cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies
  740.  - Unilateral cable tapping operations
  741.  
  742. http://electrospaces.blogspot.de/2014/01/slides-about-nsas-upstream-collection.html
  743. ---------------------------------------
  744. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  745. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  746. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  747. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  748. _______________________________________
  749. � 24 FISA Court Documents DECLASSIFIED ::
  750.  
  751. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc-13-0117.zip
  752.  
  753. � FISA Court Orders Comparison ::
  754.  
  755. http://cryptome.org/vz-slip.jpg
  756. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc/fisc-orders-compare.htm
  757. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc2/fisc-before-after-obama.htm
  758. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/fisc3/fisc-br-11-07-v-11-57.htm
  759. ---------------------------------------
  760. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  761. _______________________________________
  762. � SMS Text Messages - A Goldmine to Exploit ::
  763.  
  764. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-sms-exploit.pdf
  765.  
  766. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006111/sms.pdf
  767.  
  768. � NSA Vacuuming SMS Texts Around the World ::
  769.  
  770.  The documents also reveal the UK spy agency
  771. GCHQ has made use of the NSA database to search
  772. the metadata of �untargeted and unwarranted�
  773. communications belonging to people in the UK.
  774.  
  775.  The NSA program, codenamed Dishfire, collects
  776. �pretty much everything it can�, according to
  777. GCHQ documents, rather than merely storing the
  778. communications of existing surveillance targets.
  779.  
  780.  The NSA has made extensive use of its vast
  781. text message database to extract information
  782. on people�s travel plans, contact books, financial
  783. transactions and more � including of individuals
  784. under no suspicion of illegal activity.
  785.  
  786. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/16/nsa-collects-millions-text-messages-daily-untargeted-global-sweep
  787. _______________________________________
  788. � NSA Covert Radio Signals Break Air-gaps ::
  789.  
  790. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-radio.htm
  791.  
  792. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/15/us/nsa-effort-pries-open-computers-not-connected-to-internet.html
  793.  
  794.  The technology, which the agency has used
  795. since at least 2008, relies on a covert
  796. channel of radio waves that can be transmitted
  797. from tiny circuit boards and USB cards inserted
  798. surreptitiously into the computers. In some
  799. cases, they are sent to a briefcase-size
  800. relay station that intelligence agencies can
  801. set up miles away from the target.
  802.  
  803.  The radio frequency technology has helped
  804. solve one of the biggest problems facing
  805. American intelligence agencies for years:
  806. getting into computers that adversaries,
  807. and some American partners, have tried to
  808. make impervious to spying or cyberattack.
  809. In most cases, the radio frequency hardware
  810. must be physically inserted by a spy, a
  811. manufacturer or an unwitting user.
  812. ---------------------------------------
  813. Refer to NSA�s Tailored Access Operations
  814.  
  815. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=23643
  816. _______________________________________
  817. � NSA Windows Event Monitoring ::
  818.  
  819. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-windows-event.pdf
  820. ---------------------------------------
  821. � Locate And Destroy WinRM Registry ::
  822.  
  823. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/e8a662d4
  824. _______________________________________
  825. � NSA Reducing the Effectiveness of Hash ::
  826.  
  827. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-pass-hash.pdf
  828. _______________________________________
  829. � NSA�s Organizational Designations ::
  830.  
  831. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2014/01/nsas-organizational-designations.html
  832. _______________________________________
  833. � Analysis of NSA�s 215 Metadata Spy Programs ::
  834.  
  835. http://politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/NSAshane3.pdf
  836. _______________________________________
  837. � John Inglis Explains Why US-Based Collection
  838. of Internet Metadata Doesn�t Work ::
  839.  
  840. http://www.npr.org/2014/01/10/261282601/transcript-nsa-deputy-director-john-inglis?live=1
  841.  
  842. http://www.emptywheel.net/2014/01/10/john-inglis-explains-why-us-based-collection-of-internet-metadata-doesnt-work/
  843. _______________________________________
  844. � Rand Paul to Lead Class-Action Lawsuit
  845. Against Obama Over NSA Spying ::
  846.  
  847. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2014/01/03/Rand-Paul-to-Sue-Obama-over-NSA-Spying
  848. _______________________________________
  849. � NSA Quantum Computing Research for Cracking
  850. All Encryption ::
  851.  
  852.  In room-size metal boxes �secure against
  853. electromagnetic leaks, the National Security
  854. Agency is racing to build a computer that
  855. could break nearly every kind of encryption
  856. used to protect banking, medical, business
  857. and government records around the world.
  858.  
  859.  According to documents provided by former
  860. NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the effort
  861. to build �a cryptologically useful quantum
  862. computer� � a machine exponentially faster
  863. than classical computers � is part of a
  864. $79.7 million research program titled
  865. �Penetrating Hard Targets.� Much of the
  866. work is hosted under classified contracts
  867. at a laboratory in College Park, Md.
  868.  
  869. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer.pdf
  870. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-quantum-computer-2.pdf
  871. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-seeks-to-build-quantum-computer-that-could-crack-most-types-of-encryption/2014/01/02/8fff297e-7195-11e3-8def-a33011492df2_print.html
  872. _______________________________________
  873. � NSA and Random Number Generators ::
  874.  
  875. http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/12/a-few-more-notes-on-nsa-random-number.html
  876. _______________________________________
  877. � Updated List of NSA Codenames ::
  878.  
  879. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-codenames.htm
  880. _______________________________________
  881. � Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  882.  
  883. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  884.  
  885. Mirror � http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  886.  
  887. � Jacob�s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  888.  
  889. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  890.  
  891. � NSA Catalog Image Formats (16.7MB) Mirrored ::
  892.  
  893. http://upsto.re/CtXqio
  894. http://f.lui.li/get_1228_a2b4.html
  895. http://blakker.pl/files/get/fenW1XyGrl/nsa-catalog-images.zip
  896.  
  897. � Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  898.  
  899.  The NSA�s TAO hacking unit is considered
  900. to be the intelligence agency�s top secret
  901. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  902. infiltrates computers around the world and
  903. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  904. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  905. it is targeting. ... ...
  906.  
  907. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  908.  
  909.  The insert method and other variants of
  910. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  911. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  912. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  913. infrastructure comprised of �covert�
  914. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  915. also incorporates routers and servers
  916. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  917. network by infecting these networks with
  918. �implants� that then allow the government
  919. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  920.  
  921.  In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  922. to identify and track its targets based on
  923. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  924. could include certain email addresses or
  925. website cookies set on a person�s computer.
  926. Of course, a cookie doesn�t automatically
  927. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  928. additional information like an email address.
  929. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  930. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  931. ---------------------------------------
  932. � NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  933.  
  934. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  935.  
  936. � NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  937.  
  938.  �YahooBcookie�s are unique to a specific
  939. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  940. that are being logged into on that computer
  941. as long as the user does not clear browser
  942. cookies.�
  943.  
  944. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  945.  
  946. � NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  947.  
  948. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  949. ---------------------------------------
  950. � NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  951.  
  952.  The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  953. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  954. could be described as master carpenters for
  955. the NSA�s department for Tailored Access
  956. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO�s usual
  957. hacking and data-skimming methods don�t suffice,
  958. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  959. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  960. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  961. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  962. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  963. considerable role in the intelligence agency�s
  964. ability to establish a global covert network
  965. that operates alongside the Internet.
  966.  
  967.  Some of the equipment available is quite
  968. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  969. allows �TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  970. on the targeted monitor,� for example, is
  971. available for just $30. But an �active GSM
  972. base station� -- a tool that makes it possible
  973. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  974. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  975. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  976. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  977. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  978. over $1 million.
  979.  
  980.  The ANT division doesn�t just manufacture
  981. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  982. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  983. clear preference for planting their malicious
  984. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  985. computer�s motherboard that is the first thing
  986. to load when a computer is turned on.
  987.  
  988.  This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  989. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  990. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  991. to virus protection and other security programs.
  992. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  993. computer has been completely erased and a new
  994. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  995. can continue to function and ensures that new
  996. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  997. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  998. developers call this �Persistence� and believe
  999. this approach has provided them with the
  1000. possibility of permanent access.
  1001.  
  1002.  Another program attacks the firmware in
  1003. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  1004. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  1005. with the exception of latter, are American
  1006. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  1007. intelligence agency is compromising the
  1008. technology and products of American companies.
  1009.  
  1010. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  1011. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  1012. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  1013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  1014. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  1015.  
  1016. � NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  1017.  
  1018. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  1019.  
  1020. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  1021.  
  1022. � NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  1023.  
  1024. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  1025.  
  1026. � NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  1027.  
  1028. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  1029.  
  1030. � NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  1031.  
  1032. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  1033.  
  1034. � NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  1035.  
  1036. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  1037.  
  1038. � NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  1039.  
  1040. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  1041.  
  1042. � NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  1043.  
  1044. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  1045.  
  1046. � NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  1047.  
  1048. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  1049.  
  1050. � NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  1051.  
  1052. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  1053.  
  1054. � NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  1055.  
  1056. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  1057.  
  1058. � NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  1059.  
  1060. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  1061.  
  1062. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  1063.  
  1064. � Jacob Appelbaum Comment on Der Spiegel Reports ::
  1065.  
  1066. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/appelbaum-der-spiegel.htm
  1067. ---------------------------------------
  1068. BLOWBACK SETS IN ...
  1069.  
  1070. � IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  1071.  
  1072. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  1073.  
  1074. � Foreign Firms Won�t Buy American Tech ::
  1075.  
  1076. https://www.informationweek.com/security/risk-management/nsa-fallout-why-foreign-firms-wont-buy-american-tech/d/d-id/1113384
  1077. ---------------------------------------
  1078. � Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  1079.  
  1080. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  1081.  
  1082. � Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  1083.  
  1084.  Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  1085. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  1086. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  1087.  
  1088. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/77d624be
  1089.  
  1090. � Cyber�Security Experts Ask If Apple �Flaw�
  1091. Was Really NSA Backdoor ::
  1092.  
  1093.  Following an admission by Apple that a �bug�
  1094. in its operating system had left devices open
  1095. to potential hacking, experts are questioning
  1096. whether the security hole was intentional, in
  1097. order to allow the NSA backdoor access as part
  1098. of its mass spying program.
  1099.  
  1100. http://www.infowars.com/cyber-security-experts-ask-apple-flaw-was-really-nsa-backdoor/
  1101. ---------------------------------------
  1102. � Intel CEO Refuses To Answer Questions On
  1103. Whether NSA Can Access Processors ::
  1104.  
  1105. http://www.infowars.com/intel-ceo-refuses-to-answer-questions-on-whether-nsa-can-access-processors/
  1106.  
  1107. � Dell Inc. Apologizes for the �Inconvenience�
  1108. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  1109.  
  1110. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  1111.  
  1112. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  1113.  
  1114. � Locate And Destroy 802.11 Registry ::
  1115.  
  1116.  How to disable SOMBERKNAVE implant to
  1117. properly air-gap the Windows XP system.
  1118.  
  1119. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/bdd440b3
  1120. _______________________________________
  1121. � NSA Whistleblower ; Planned Police State ::
  1122.  
  1123. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x9Kcgme2I0c
  1124.  
  1125. � NSA Whistleblower ; National Security Scam ::
  1126.  
  1127. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPemLhvwfos
  1128. _______________________________________
  1129. � Edward Snowden Interview by Barton Gellman ::
  1130.  
  1131. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/edward-snowden-after-months-of-nsa-revelations-says-his-missions-accomplished/2013/12/23/49fc36de-6c1c-11e3-a523-fe73f0ff6b8d_story.html
  1132.  
  1133.  Beginning in October 2012, he said, he
  1134. brought his misgivings to two superiors
  1135. in the NSA�s Technology Directorate and
  1136. two more in the NSA Threat Operations
  1137. Center�s regional base in Hawaii. For
  1138. each of them, and 15 other co-workers,
  1139. Snowden said he opened a data query tool
  1140. called BOUNDLESSINFORMANT, which used
  1141. color-coded �heat maps� to depict the
  1142. volume of data ingested by NSA taps.
  1143.  
  1144.  His colleagues were often �astonished to
  1145. learn we are collecting more in the United
  1146. States on Americans than we are on Russians
  1147. in Russia,� he said. Many of them were
  1148. troubled, he said, and several said they
  1149. did not want to know any more.
  1150. ---------------------------------------
  1151. BOUNDLESS INFORMANT REPORTS/DOCS REFER HERE ;
  1152.  
  1153. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=19580
  1154. _______________________________________
  1155. � New York Judge, William Pauley III, Declares
  1156. Metadata Hoarding Legal ::
  1157.  
  1158. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/pauley-13-1227.pdf
  1159. http://www.scribd.com/doc/194082600/NSA-Opinion
  1160. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/nsa-phone-surveillance-ruling-101569.html
  1161. http://www.infowars.com/judge-falls-for-the-big-lie-about-nsa-spying/
  1162. /\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/
  1163. \/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\/\
  1164. � Judge Declares Metadata Hoarding Violates
  1165. Fourth Amendment Rights ::
  1166.  
  1167. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-048-049.pdf
  1168.  
  1169.  A federal judge ruled Monday that the
  1170. National Security Agency program which
  1171. collects information on nearly all telephone
  1172. calls made to, from or within the United
  1173. States is likely unconstitutional.
  1174.  
  1175.  US District Court Judge Richard Leon found
  1176. that the program appears to violate the
  1177. Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable
  1178. searches and seizures. He also said the
  1179. Justice Department had failed to demonstrate
  1180. that collecting the information had helped
  1181. to head off terrorist attacks.
  1182.  
  1183.  Acting on a lawsuit brought by conservative
  1184. legal activist Larry Klayman, Leon issued
  1185. a preliminary injunction barring the NSA
  1186. from collecting so-called metadata pertaining
  1187. to the Verizon accounts of Klayman and one
  1188. of his clients. However, the judge stayed
  1189. the order to allow for an appeal.
  1190.  
  1191. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/national-security-agency-phones-judge-101203.html
  1192. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/17/cour-d17.html
  1193.  
  1194.  Leon�s 68-page opinion is the first
  1195. significant legal setback for the NSA�s
  1196. surveillance program since it was disclosed
  1197. in June in news stories based on leaks
  1198. from former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
  1199. For seven years, the metadata program has
  1200. been approved repeatedly by numerous judges
  1201. on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  1202. Court and found constitutional by at least
  1203. one judge sitting in a criminal case.
  1204.  
  1205. https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2013cv0851-48
  1206.  
  1207. � Klayman v. NSA 7 Court Documents ::
  1208.  
  1209. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-051-058.zip
  1210.  
  1211. ? Delay Motion for Class Action Lawsuit ::
  1212.  
  1213. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/klayman-060.pdf
  1214.  
  1215. ? White House Tries to Prevent Judge From
  1216. Ruling on Surveillance Efforts ::
  1217.  
  1218. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/22/us/white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-surveillance-efforts.html?_r=0
  1219.  
  1220. � Bulk Metadata Collection Ruled Illegal ::
  1221.  
  1222. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/leon-13-1216.pdf
  1223. ---------------------------------------
  1224. � White House Spying Review Group Report ::
  1225.  
  1226. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/obama-nsa-report.pdf
  1227.  
  1228. � White House Spy Report Commentary ::
  1229.  
  1230. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-001.htm
  1231. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/prgi-comments-002.htm
  1232.  
  1233. � Obama Advisory Committee Whitewashes US
  1234. Spying Programs ::
  1235.  
  1236. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/19/spyi-d19.html
  1237. ---------------------------------------
  1238. ? FLASHBACK ; Michael Hayden Admits They
  1239. Will NOT Stifle Surveillance ::
  1240.  
  1241. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XS6nfkbNvlo
  1242.  
  1243. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-boss-government-will-continue-surveillance-so-get-used-to-it/
  1244.  
  1245. ? Counter-spy_Manual.zip
  1246. (22 files | ZIP | 2.93MB)
  1247.  
  1248. http://paste.darkbyte.ru/view/5459487
  1249.  
  1250. http://ae7.st/p/26c (mirror)
  1251. _______________________________________
  1252. � NSA/CSS Mission Slides ::
  1253.  
  1254.  These slides, from an internal presentation
  1255. in the first week of October 2001, show how
  1256. critical the NSA sees electronic eavesdropping.
  1257.  
  1258. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-css-mission.pdf
  1259.  
  1260. � 1B. Ability to exploit:
  1261.  
  1262.  - Military Information
  1263.  - Economic Information
  1264.  - Information Operations Information
  1265.  - Political Information �
  1266. _______________________________________
  1267. � Eben Moglen & Bruce Schneier Talk About
  1268. NSA Leaks, Software and Cryptography ::
  1269.  
  1270. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8Sc6pUR1mA
  1271. ���������������������������������������
  1272. � NSA Rigging RSA Crypto Market ::
  1273.  
  1274. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/20/us-usa-security-rsa-idUSBRE9BJ1C220131220
  1275.  
  1276. � RSA Cryptographers Duped and Bribed by NSA ::
  1277.  
  1278. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa.htm
  1279.  
  1280. � NSA Kills RSA Trust and Therefore RSA Jobs ::
  1281.  
  1282. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-kills-rsa-workers.htm
  1283.  
  1284. � List of Canceled RSA Talks Continues to Grow ::
  1285.  
  1286. http://threatpost.com/list-of-canceled-rsa-talks-continues-to-grow/103508
  1287.  
  1288. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Rigging the Crypto Market ::
  1289.  
  1290. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  1291. _______________________________________
  1292. � Did British Telecom Provides Backdoors
  1293. for NSA and GCHQ (?) ::
  1294.  
  1295.  In a paper titled �The Internet Dark Age�
  1296. the researchers say that BT is shipping
  1297. hardware with backdoors that allow secret
  1298. government access in order to make network
  1299. compromise easier. �BT are directly responsible
  1300. for covertly embedding secret spy equipment
  1301. in millions of homes and businesses within
  1302. the UK,� the paper states.
  1303.  
  1304.  Recently on Cryptome (the better leaks
  1305. than wikileaks site), a paper appeared
  1306. pointing out that BT (British Telecom)
  1307. assigns all their modems an extra address
  1308. in the 30.x.x.x address space, and then
  1309. attaches SSH and SNMP to that address.
  1310. This looks like what many ISPs do, assigning
  1311. a second IP address for management, except
  1312. for one thing: the 30.0.0.0/8 block is
  1313. assigned to the United States Department
  1314. of Defense. This has caused a fevered round
  1315. of speculation that this is actually a
  1316. secret backdoor for the NSA/GCHQ, so that
  1317. they can secretly monitor and control
  1318. peoples� home networks.
  1319.  
  1320.  Maybe, but it�s probably not the case.
  1321. The better explanation is that BT simply
  1322. chose this address space because it�s
  1323. non-routable. While it�s assigned public
  1324. address, it�s only used inside the private
  1325. DoD military network. Try tracerouting to
  1326. that address space, you�ll see that your
  1327. packets go nowhere.
  1328.  
  1329. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/Full-Disclosure.pdf
  1330. http://www.csoonline.com/article/744697/report-accuses-bt-of-supplying-backdoors-for-gchq-and-nsa
  1331. http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/12/dod-address-space-its-not-conspiracy.html
  1332.  
  1333. � Bruce Schneier Leaves British Telecom ::
  1334.  
  1335.  �Yes, it�s true. And contrary to rumors,
  1336. this has nothing to do with the NSA or GCHQ.
  1337. No, BT wasn�t always happy with my writings
  1338. on the topic, but it knew that I am an
  1339. independent thinker and didn�t try to
  1340. muzzle me in any way. I�m just ready to
  1341. leave. I spent seven years at BT, and
  1342. seven years at Counterpane Internet
  1343. Security, Inc., before BT bought us.
  1344. It�s past time for something new.�
  1345.  
  1346. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/12/yes_im_leaving.html
  1347. http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/12/nsa-surveillance-critic-bruce-schneier-to-leave-post-at-bt/
  1348. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2319296/bruce-schneier-leaves-bt-after-eight-years-as-security-futurologist
  1349. ---------------------------------------
  1350. � NSA Infected Around 50,000 Networks Worldwide ::
  1351.  
  1352.  The American intelligence service - NSA -
  1353. infected more than 50,000 computer networks
  1354. worldwide with malicious software designed
  1355. to steal sensitive information. Documents
  1356. provided by former NSA-employee Edward Snowden
  1357. and seen by this newspaper, prove this.
  1358.  
  1359.  A management presentation dating from 2012
  1360. explains how the NSA collects information
  1361. worldwide. In addition, the presentation
  1362. shows that the intelligence service uses
  1363. �Computer Network Exploitation� (CNE) in
  1364. more than 50,000 locations. CNE is the
  1365. secret infiltration of computer systems
  1366. achieved by installing malware, malicious
  1367. software.
  1368.  
  1369.  One example of this type of hacking was
  1370. discovered in September 2013 at the Belgium
  1371. telecom provider Belgacom. For a number of
  1372. years the British intelligence service - GCHQ �
  1373. has been installing this malicious software
  1374. in the Belgacom network in order to tap
  1375. their customers� telephone and data traffic.
  1376. The Belgacom network was infiltrated by GCHQ
  1377. through a process of luring employees to a
  1378. false Linkedin page.
  1379.  
  1380. http://www.nrc.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/nsa568.jpg
  1381. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  1382. http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/11/23/nsa-infected-50000-computer-networks-with-malicious-software/
  1383. http://hothardware.com/News/Dutch-News-Agency-Reports-NSA-Infected-50000-Networks-With-Malware/
  1384.  
  1385. � NSA Power to Generate Profits and Pay ::
  1386.  
  1387.  The NSA SIGINT Strategy 2012-2016 pretty
  1388. well covers all the comsec and crypto
  1389. initiatives to covertly exploit people,
  1390. cryptographers, anonymizers, informants,
  1391. planted spies, security firms, networks,
  1392. governments, nations, friends, lovers
  1393. and citizens.
  1394.  
  1395.  Not sure leaks, lawsuits and protests
  1396. will deter this bounty of profits for
  1397. the comsec industry, unless the public
  1398. is aroused to demand the 3 branches grasp
  1399. the nettle, and all those making money
  1400. from this deception operation decide to
  1401. give up their profits, perks and prestige.
  1402.  
  1403.  I mean those on the comsec and crypto
  1404. lists, those participating in standards
  1405. committees, those enjoying contracts and
  1406. grants in think tanks and universities,
  1407. those in law firms and public interest
  1408. orgs, those in the media and academia,
  1409. those in non-spy gov agencies, pretending
  1410. to be in opposition as they scramble to
  1411. rejigger their products and sales pitches,
  1412. to exploit what is being fabricated to
  1413. diminish Snowden�s revelations with new
  1414. forms of secrecy, technology, law,
  1415. regulations, bribery, lobbying, grants,
  1416. contracts, list lurking, online and
  1417. offline spying, break-ins, the usual
  1418. kaboodle, to assure the NSA goals are
  1419. fulfilled.
  1420.  
  1421. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-profit-pay.htm
  1422.  
  1423. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-cryptologic-platform.pdf
  1424.  
  1425. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  1426.  
  1427. http://electrospaces.blogspot.fr/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  1428. ���������������������������������������
  1429. � GCHQ Accused of Spying European, German
  1430. and Israeli Politicians (No Documentation) ::
  1431.  
  1432. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/snowden-documents-show-gchq-targeted-european-and-german-politicians-a-940135.html
  1433. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/dec/20/gchq-targeted-aid-agencies-german-government-eu-commissioner
  1434. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/21/world/nsa-dragnet-included-allies-aid-groups-and-business-elite.html?_r=0
  1435. _______________________________________
  1436. � CBS 60min ; Inside the NSA (Part One) ::
  1437.  
  1438. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WgPNyAYOr04
  1439.  
  1440. � CBS 60min ; The Snowden Affair (Part Two) ::
  1441.  
  1442. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AaREKHQI8E
  1443.  
  1444. � NSA Interviewed by CBS - Transcript ::
  1445.  
  1446. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-60mins/nsa-60mins.htm
  1447. _______________________________________
  1448. � Proposal for Distribution of Snowden Cache ::
  1449.  
  1450. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-cache-dist.htm
  1451. _______________________________________
  1452. � EU Data Retention Directive �Unlawful�
  1453. and �Incompatible� with Charter of Rights ::
  1454.  
  1455. http://www.scribd.com/doc/191078925/Data-Retention-Challenge-Press-Release
  1456.  
  1457. http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2318838/eu-data-retention-directive-unlawful-and-incompatible-with-charter-of-rights
  1458. _______________________________________
  1459. � GOOGLE CENSORING NSA SEARCH RESULTS (?) ::
  1460.  
  1461. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/17/edward-snowden-doesnt-show-up-once-in-googles-list-of-top-2013-searches/
  1462. _______________________________________
  1463. � Clapper, Feinstein, Obama Total Disregard
  1464. of Public Concerns ::
  1465.  
  1466. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/spies-reign-obama.htm
  1467.  
  1468. � Merkel Throws a Pissy Fit ::
  1469.  
  1470. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/merkel-compares-nsa-stasi-obama
  1471. _______________________________________
  1472. � GCHQ�s Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  1473.  
  1474.  �FLYING PIG is a program that allows
  1475. analysts to query GCHQ�s vast repository
  1476. of metadata about the world�s secure
  1477. communications over TLS/SSL. It�s
  1478. certainly not a program through which
  1479. the GCHQ, or NSA for that matter, performs
  1480. man-in-the-middle attacks against internet
  1481. services like Google, as reported by others,
  1482. including Bruce Schneier. The reports that
  1483. claim the NSA performed MITM attacks against
  1484. Google are based on a small piece of a
  1485. document that describes a FLYING PIG
  1486. (which is a not an NSA program, as you may
  1487. have noticed) use case (presumably, an
  1488. investigation into the DigiNotar CA breach).
  1489. That�s not to say the GCHQ doesn�t perform
  1490. MITM attacks, but there�s no evidence to
  1491. be found in this document. Though, FLYING PIG
  1492. may be used to prepare MITM attacks, e.g.
  1493. by providing information about a target.�
  1494.  
  1495. http://koen.io/2013/12/flying-pig-gchq-tls-ssl-knowledge-base/
  1496.  
  1497. � NSA Use of FLYING PIG to Spy ::
  1498.  
  1499. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/785152-166819124-mitm-google.html
  1500. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130910/10470024468/flying-pig-nsa-is-running-man-middle-attacks-imitating-googles-servers.shtml
  1501. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57602701-38/nsa-disguised-itself-as-google-to-spy-say-reports/
  1502. ���������������������������������������
  1503. � John Young Breaks Down the NSA Leaks ::
  1504.  
  1505. http://www.corbettreport.com/mp3/2013-12-17%20John%20Young.mp3
  1506.  
  1507. http://www.corbettreport.com/interview-793-john-young-breaks-down-the-snowdennsa-saga/
  1508. _______________________________________
  1509. � FASCIA Database of Device-Location Records ::
  1510.  
  1511. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-fascia.pdf
  1512. ---------------------------------------
  1513. � hdfs:// Cloud Holds FASCIA Database ::
  1514.  
  1515. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ghost-machine.pdf
  1516.  
  1517.  HDFS stands for �Hadoop Distributed File
  1518. System� which was inspired by Google Inc,
  1519. and later managed by big data corporations
  1520. such as IBM, Yahoo, Facebook, et al.
  1521.  
  1522.  HDFS is designed to reliably store very
  1523. large files across machines in a large
  1524. cluster.
  1525.  
  1526. � Hadoop Emerging Technology ::
  1527.  
  1528.  �Hadoop is a data processing system that
  1529. follows the MapReduce paradigm for scalable
  1530. data analysis.� ... �Largest install is at
  1531. Yahoo, a major contributor.�
  1532.  
  1533.  HDFS is a scalable file system with two
  1534. major components, a central metadata server
  1535. and file servers from data.
  1536.  
  1537. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/uTqMG-LMlY/hadoop-emerging-technology.pdf
  1538.  
  1539. � Yahoo - Managing a Hadoop Cluster ::
  1540.  
  1541.  This was taken from the Yahoo website,
  1542. posted on public domain.
  1543.  
  1544. http://msfire.tk/files/get/SIut69QW7Q/yahoo-hadoop.zip
  1545.  
  1546. � Apache Hadoop FileSystem and its Usage
  1547. in Facebook (This File Is Mirrored) ::
  1548.  
  1549. http://4lodzik.de/xu2/files/get/U-eeftxCDJ/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  1550. http://www.uploadmini.com/index.php/files/get/rnvpDpXfZu/facebook-hadhoop.zip
  1551. http://cloudseminar.berkeley.edu/data/hdfs.pdf
  1552.  
  1553. � hadoop_install.zip (Mirrored) ::
  1554.  
  1555. http://fileb.ag/nukq1uicayye
  1556. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/vfym4eZHvY/hadoop-install.zip
  1557. http://cloud.elearning.uq.edu.au/download/hadoop_install.zip
  1558. ---------------------------------------
  1559. � CO-TRAVELER Cellphone Tracking ; FASCIA
  1560. Database Available With Ghostmachine ::
  1561.  
  1562. �Proxies can make IP resolution challenging.�
  1563.  
  1564. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-cotraveler.pdf
  1565.  
  1566. � CHALKFUN Location Tool Highly Censored ::
  1567.  
  1568. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-chalkfun.pdf
  1569.  
  1570. � NSA Targets Device Location Verification ::
  1571.  
  1572. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-target-location.pdf
  1573.  
  1574. � NSA�s Global Interception Network ::
  1575.  
  1576. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  1577.  
  1578. � NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations ::
  1579.  
  1580.  In unveiling new Edward Snowden revelations
  1581. about NSA spying, the Washington Post has
  1582. once again whitewashed the fact that the
  1583. content of all our communications have
  1584. been stored and analyzed under the Echelon
  1585. program since the 1990s.
  1586.  
  1587.  The new details concern how, �The National
  1588. Security Agency is gathering nearly 5
  1589. billion records a day on the whereabouts
  1590. of cellphones around the world.�
  1591.  
  1592.  However, the report reveals itself to
  1593. be little more than an exercise in soft-
  1594. peddling when it claims that, �The NSA
  1595. does not target Americans� location data
  1596. by design, but the agency acquires a
  1597. substantial amount of information on
  1598. the whereabouts of domestic cellphones
  1599. �incidentally.�
  1600.  
  1601.  This notion that the NSA just accidentally
  1602. happens to record the locations of Americans
  1603. using data from their cellphones, and is
  1604. not deliberately engaging in domestic
  1605. surveillance, is yet another example of
  1606. damage control by the establishment.
  1607.  
  1608. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  1609. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/_ie-fallbacks/NSA_Co-traveler_g.jpg
  1610. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/fascia-the-nsas-huge-trove-of-location-records/637/
  1611. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-to-tell-if-a-target-is-foreign/635/
  1612. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  1613. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  1614. ---------------------------------------
  1615. � NSA Uses Google Cookies and GSM Geohashes
  1616. to Pinpoint Targets ::
  1617.  
  1618.  The National Security Agency is �secretly�
  1619. piggybacking on the tools that enable
  1620. Internet advertisers to track consumers,
  1621. using cookies and location data to pinpoint
  1622. targets for government hacking and to
  1623. bolster surveillance.
  1624.  
  1625. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-sigint-successes.pdf
  1626. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gsm-tracking.pdf
  1627. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-signal-surveillance-success-stories/647/
  1628. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-google-cookies-to-pinpoint-targets-for-hacking/
  1629. http://boingboing.net/2013/12/10/nsa-uses-googles-tracking-co.html
  1630. http://www.theverge.com/2013/12/10/5198592/nsa-reportedly-piggybacking-on-google-advertising-cookies
  1631. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/snow-d14.html
  1632. ---------------------------------------
  1633. � FLASHBACK ; Anonymizing Google�s Cookie ::
  1634.  
  1635. http://www.imilly.com/google-cookie.htm
  1636. ---------------------------------------
  1637. � How Marketers Will Find and Track You
  1638. In a World Without Cookies ::
  1639.  
  1640. http://blog.thefetch.com/2013/11/18/cookie-monsters-how-marketers-will-find-and-track-you-in-a-world-without-cookies/
  1641. _______________________________________
  1642. � How the NSA Targets Italy ::
  1643.  
  1644. http://espresso.repubblica.it/foto/2013/12/05/galleria/nsa-intercettazioni-1.144400
  1645. http://espresso.repubblica.it/inchieste/2013/12/05/news/revealed-how-the-nsa-targets-italy-1.144428
  1646. http://www.pcworld.com/article/2070480/nsa-spies-on-italians-from-roof-of-us-embassy-in-rome-magazine-reports.html
  1647.  
  1648. � SCS_Italy_Spying.zip | 371KB ::
  1649.  
  1650. http://ge.tt/api/1/files/2Bbc4C81/0/blob?download
  1651. http://megaswf.com/f/2625421
  1652. http://msfire.tk/files/get/srIJUWgvYg/scs-italy-spying.zip
  1653. _______________________________________
  1654. � Swedish Intelligence Agency (FRA) Spied
  1655. on Russian Leaders for NSA ::
  1656.  
  1657. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spied-ru.htm
  1658. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-ru-baltic.pdf
  1659. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0yP7n8qZrz0
  1660. http://rt.com/news/sweden-spied-russia-nsa-759/
  1661. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-leaks-sweden-spied-on-russian-leaders-for-us/
  1662. http://www.thelocal.se/20131211/sweden-aided-in-nsa-hacking-operations-report
  1663.  
  1664. � NSA & FRA Quantum Hacking Programme ::
  1665.  
  1666. http://www.svt.se/ug/fra-part-of-top-secret-hacker-project
  1667.  
  1668. � NSA & FRA Relationship Was �Top Secret� ::
  1669.  
  1670. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-spies.pdf
  1671.  
  1672. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/889126/nsa-intelligence-relationship-with-sweden.pdf
  1673.  
  1674. � NSA & FRA Relationship �Actively Engaged� ::
  1675.  
  1676. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-relationship.pdf
  1677.  
  1678. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/894384/nsa-internal-pm-on-fra-and-sweden-relations.pdf
  1679.  
  1680. � NSA & FRA Joint Quantum Spy Agenda ::
  1681.  
  1682. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-spying-agenda.pdf
  1683.  
  1684. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Quantum Spying Accomplishments ::
  1685.  
  1686. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-fra-quantum.pdf
  1687. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-quantum-2.pdf
  1688. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/gchq-se-fra-quantum-3.pdf
  1689.  
  1690. � NSA/GCHQ/FRA Communication Intelligence ::
  1691.  
  1692. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-se-fra-comint.pdf
  1693. ---------------------------------------
  1694. PAST XKEYSCORE REPORTS/DOCUMENTS REFER HERE ;
  1695.  
  1696. http://paste.cdtag.de/view.php?id=16647
  1697. ---------------------------------------
  1698. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Website Viewers ::
  1699.  
  1700. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore-slide.pdf
  1701.  
  1702. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Targets Tor, etc. ::
  1703.  
  1704. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-tor-slides.pdf
  1705.  
  1706. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Exploit Sources ::
  1707.  
  1708. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-xkeyscore-sources.pdf
  1709.  
  1710. � NSA/FRA XKeyscore Data Hoarding Plans ::
  1711.  
  1712. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-se-fra-xkeyscore.pdf
  1713. _______________________________________
  1714.  �Earlier, a map showing SCS locations
  1715. worldwide was published by the German
  1716. magazine Der Spiegel. Initially an unredacted
  1717. map was put online by accident, but before
  1718. it was replaced, it was already copied onto
  1719. several websites. This map showed 74 staffed
  1720. SCS locations, 14 unmanned remote controlled
  1721. locations and 8 other locations as of August
  1722. 2010. Except for the SCS locations in Europe,
  1723. the names of all other cities were blurred
  1724. by Der Spiegel.�
  1725.  
  1726.   - electrospaces.blogspot.fr
  1727.  
  1728. REDACTED MAP (CENSORED)
  1729.  
  1730. https://lh3.ggpht.com/-ymi_oEW0XcI/UpzfqqqPRsI/AAAAAAAABCs/WU4lKnfs52w/s320/scs-global-map-redacted.jpg
  1731.  
  1732. UNREDACTED MAP (DEFAULT)
  1733.  
  1734. http://postimg.org/image/6kzpypy1l/
  1735.  
  1736. BOTH REDACTED AND UNREDACTED (ZIP | 223KB)
  1737.  
  1738. http://f.lui.li/get_1065_f4ab.html
  1739. ---------------------------------------
  1740. � Decensoring SCS Locations ::
  1741.  
  1742. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/decensoring-scs-slides.htm
  1743.  
  1744. The NSA spies under diplomatic cover.
  1745. _______________________________________
  1746. � Five Eyes ::
  1747.  
  1748. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-5-eyes-partners.pdf
  1749. _______________________________________
  1750. � A Conspiracy So Vast ::
  1751.  
  1752. http://www.lewrockwell.com/2013/12/andrew-p-napolitano/a-conspiracy-so-vast%E2%80%A8/
  1753. _______________________________________
  1754. � PayPal Corporation Said To Be Implicated
  1755. in Withheld NSA Documents ::
  1756.  
  1757. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTivPZZorWY
  1758.  
  1759. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2013/12/11/bfp-breaking-news-omidyars-paypal-corporation-said-to-be-implicated-in-withheld-nsa-documents/
  1760. _______________________________________
  1761. � NSA GCHQ Spies on Video Game Geeks ::
  1762.  
  1763. Say hello to undercover NSA orcs.
  1764.  
  1765. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-gchq-spy-games.pdf
  1766. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-spy-games.pdf
  1767. http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/12/world-of-spycraft-nsa-gchq-hacked-wow-and-xbox-live-other-games/
  1768. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/09/nsa-spies-online-games-world-warcraft-second-life
  1769. http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/2013/12/09/Report--NSA-spying-on-virtual-worlds--online-games
  1770. http://www.businessinsider.com/spy-agencies-infiltrated-video-games-nsa-gchq-world-of-warcraft-2013-12
  1771. _______________________________________
  1772. � Rollingstone Describes NSA�s Influx of Money ::
  1773.  
  1774.  September 11th, which also happened to
  1775. be Drake�s first day at Fort Meade, changed
  1776. the equation. Drake explains the shift in
  1777. two ways: The first was a massive expansion
  1778. of US spying capabilities as the agency
  1779. �unchained itself from the Constitution,�
  1780. and began to spy on Americans and foreign
  1781. citizens, at home and abroad. The other
  1782. change, felt across the entire intelligence
  1783. community, was a rapid expansion of the NSA
  1784. itself.
  1785.  
  1786.  �Massive amounts of money were pumped
  1787. into the NSA after 9/11, and Congress was
  1788. saying, �How big do you want the check?��
  1789. says Drake. With virtually every agency
  1790. involved in tracking terrorists clamoring
  1791. for its SIGINT, or signals intelligence,
  1792. the NSA expanded its outposts in Texas,
  1793. Georgia, Hawaii, Colorado and Utah, as
  1794. well as listening posts abroad, and also
  1795. went on a building spree at Fort Meade,
  1796. where the NSA�s sprawling 5,000-acre
  1797. campus is now almost 10 times the size
  1798. of the Pentagon. By 2013, according to
  1799. The Washington Post, the NSA had expanded
  1800. its workforce by one-third, to about
  1801. 33,000. The number of private companies
  1802. it depended upon more than tripled during
  1803. that time.
  1804.  
  1805.  Soon, thanks to this influx of money
  1806. and the increasing reliance on the private
  1807. sector to handle even sensitive jobs,
  1808. the very heart of America�s intelligence
  1809. infrastructure was being outsourced to
  1810. contractors. �Essentially, 9/11 was a
  1811. massive jobs program, in which the ticket
  1812. you needed for the party was your clearance,�
  1813. says Drake. �And tons of people were
  1814. getting those clearances. So you had
  1815. this huge apparatus being built, and
  1816. the government was just managing it.
  1817. And in some cases, they weren�t even
  1818. doing that.� ... ...
  1819.  
  1820.  By the time Snowden joined the agency�s
  1821. workforce, the surveillance he would
  1822. later expose was becoming not just
  1823. institutionalized but very big business.
  1824. �It was around 2009, 2010 that you saw
  1825. the full flower of that massive, massive
  1826. bubble of money,� says Drake. �And people
  1827. were taking it for a ride as far as it
  1828. could go.� ... ...
  1829.  
  1830.  Prior to 2009, Snowden had considered
  1831. leaking government secrets when he was
  1832. at the CIA, but held off, he later said,
  1833. not wanting to harm agents in the field,
  1834. and hoping that Obama would reform the
  1835. system. His optimism didn�t last long.
  1836. �I watched as Obama advanced the very
  1837. policies that I thought would be reined
  1838. in,� he later said. As a result, he added,
  1839. �I got hardened.� The more Snowden saw of
  1840. the NSA�s actual business � and, particularly,
  1841. the more he read �true information,�
  1842. including a 2009 Inspector General�s report
  1843. detailing the Bush era�s warrantless-
  1844. surveillance program � the more he realized
  1845. that there were actually two governments:
  1846. the one that was elected, and the other,
  1847. secret regime, governing in the dark.
  1848. �If the highest officials in government
  1849. can break the law without fearing punishment
  1850. or even any repercussions at all, secret
  1851. powers become tremendously dangerous.�
  1852.  
  1853. http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/snowden-and-greenwald-the-men-who-leaked-the-secrets-20131204
  1854. _______________________________________
  1855. � Rajiv Pant Describes Snowden Files Transfer ::
  1856.  
  1857. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nyt-snowden-transfer.htm
  1858. _______________________________________
  1859. � Is British Intelligence in Damage Control? ::
  1860.  
  1861. http://www.globalresearch.ca/british-intelligence-operation-to-kidnap-snowden-number-one-mi-6-officer-working-undercover-in-moscow-embassy/5358555
  1862. _______________________________________
  1863. � Snowden Leaks �Greatest Intelligence
  1864. Failure Since World War 2� Exaggerated ::
  1865.  
  1866.  The Director of NSA claims Snowden stole
  1867. 200,000 documents. Allegations in Australian
  1868. press claim he stole �up to 20,000.� British
  1869. authorities accuse Snowden of stealing 58,000.
  1870. Claims are bruited in the 5 Eyes that this
  1871. is the �greatest intelligence failure since
  1872. World War 2.� High officials and ex-spies
  1873. accuse Snowden and related media of engaging
  1874. in terrorism.
  1875.  
  1876.  This suggests a counter-espionage campaign
  1877. to exaggerate Snowden�s damage, of betrayal
  1878. to his country, of aiding the enemy, of
  1879. threatening national security. It is
  1880. successfully restricting release of the
  1881. Snowden material and will likely become
  1882. more forceful as releases continue to the
  1883. extent of legislation (open or secret)
  1884. to criminalize release as a national
  1885. security threat.
  1886.  
  1887. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/snowden-civil-war.htm
  1888. _______________________________________
  1889. � KILLCEN ; Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z ::
  1890.  
  1891.  Includes most reports, slides and
  1892. documents all related to the recent
  1893. Snowden leaks so far up to December
  1894. 4th of 2013. I�m still collecting
  1895. any information that comes out and
  1896. will provide updated archives from
  1897. time to time. Grab this while you can.
  1898.  
  1899.  After decompression - the folder is
  1900. titled �Eyeballing_Snowden_Info� and
  1901. holds a total of 371MB decompressed.
  1902.  
  1903. Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  1904. (783 files | 7zip | 286MB)
  1905.  
  1906. http://fileb.ag/iv8x797lqzdw
  1907. http://uploadhero.co/dl/aBBhCePf
  1908. http://bitshare.com/files/fuxhd3ry/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z.html
  1909. http://www.upload-box.com/index.php/files/get/0VPCtiKFxf/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  1910. http://f.ishoo.ru/files/get/3GfGXXqGSH/eyeballing-snowden-info.7z
  1911. http://davvas.com/frrbbi2975xe
  1912. http://BillionUploads.com/hpww20r554x4
  1913. http://bayfiles.net/file/119rR/Y6ax0Z/Eyeballing_Snowden_Info.7z
  1914. _______________________________________
  1915. � indonesia-spying-slides.zip (mirrored) ::
  1916.  
  1917. http://up.sef.ps/xu/files/get/Aen2UBNeep/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  1918. http://document-space.com/index.php/files/get/yWGp5DplsK/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  1919. http://www.quickupdown.com/files/get/BEqtDnYz8M/indonesia-spying-slides.zip
  1920.  
  1921. � Australian Intelligence Agency (ASD)
  1922. Swaps Bulk Metadata With the NSA ::
  1923.  
  1924.  Australia�s intelligence apparatus mines
  1925. the telecommunications data of ordinary
  1926. Australians, and hands over the material
  1927. to the US and its closest allies, according
  1928. to the latest leaked document from Edward
  1929. Snowden, partly published by the Guardian
  1930. Australia web site.
  1931.  
  1932.  The document obtained by the former US
  1933. National Security Agency (NSA) contractor
  1934. confirms that the electronic surveillance
  1935. agency, the Australian Signals Directorate
  1936. (ASD), monitors the domestic population,
  1937. as well as the people and governments of
  1938. many Asian countries.
  1939.  
  1940.  Despite Australian legislation supposedly
  1941. restricting the ASD�s internal spying,
  1942. the agency hands over to the NSA and its
  1943. global partners so-called metadata of
  1944. the phone calls, texts, emails, on-line
  1945. address books and social media posts of
  1946. millions of people.
  1947.  
  1948.  This exposure of mass surveillance follows
  1949. the recent revelations, also from documents
  1950. leaked by Snowden, that the ASD, then known
  1951. as the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD),
  1952. tapped the phone calls of Indonesian
  1953. prez Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and that
  1954. Australian embassies throughout Asia
  1955. operate as electronic listening posts
  1956. for the US-led spying network.
  1957.  
  1958. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/australia-spied-on-indonesian-president-leaked-docu
  1959. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-18/canberra-jakarta-and-the-digital-great-game/5100502
  1960. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/18/australia-tried-to-monitor-indonesian-presidents-phone
  1961. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/data-d03.html
  1962. http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1359356/indonesian-ambassador-australia-recalled-over-spying-claims
  1963. http://www.voanews.com/content/indonesia-to-review-cooperation-with-australia-due-to-spying-claims/1792523.html
  1964.  
  1965. � Australian Media Denounces Exposure of
  1966. Indonesia Spying Operations ::
  1967.  
  1968.  The Australian Broadcasting Corporation�s
  1969. (ABC) recent joint reporting of Australian
  1970. espionage operations targeting Indonesian
  1971. political figures has been furiously
  1972. denounced by other media outlets for
  1973. breaching �national security� and the
  1974. �national interest.� The reaction
  1975. underscores the extent to which the
  1976. media establishment has been integrated
  1977. into the state-intelligence apparatus.
  1978.  
  1979.  On November 18, after being approached
  1980. by the Guardian with documents leaked
  1981. by former National Security Agency (NSA)
  1982. contractor Edward Snowden, the ABC
  1983. co-released the story, revealing Australian
  1984. phone tapping of Indonesian Prez Susilo
  1985. Bambang Yudhoyono, his wife and eight
  1986. senior political figures. The report
  1987. triggered a still-unresolved diplomatic
  1988. crisis for the Australian government, with
  1989. the Indonesian president suspending military
  1990. and intelligence cooperation.
  1991.  
  1992. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/medi-d03.html
  1993. _______________________________________
  1994. � NSA G8 - G20 Summit SIGINT Directive ::
  1995.  
  1996.  Top secret documents retrieved by US
  1997. whistleblower Edward Snowden show that
  1998. Prime Minister Stephen Harper�s dictatorship
  1999. allowed the largest American spy agency
  2000. to conduct widespread surveillance in
  2001. Canada during the 2010 G8 and G20 summits.
  2002.  
  2003.  The documents are being reported exclusively
  2004. by CBC News.
  2005.  
  2006.  The briefing notes, stamped �Top Secret,�
  2007. show the US turned its Ottawa embassy into
  2008. a security command post during a six-day
  2009. spying operation by the National Security
  2010. Agency while US Prez Barack Obama and 25
  2011. other foreign heads of government were on
  2012. Canadian soil in June of 2010.
  2013.  
  2014.  The covert US operation was no secret to
  2015. Canadian authorities. ... ...
  2016.  
  2017.  The world was still struggling to climb
  2018. out of the great recession of 2008. Leaders
  2019. were debating a wide array of possible
  2020. measures including a global tax on banks,
  2021. an idea strongly opposed by both the US
  2022. and Canadian governments. That notion was
  2023. eventually scotched.
  2024.  
  2025. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-g8-g20-spying.pdf
  2026. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/read-snowden-nsa-document-on-g8-g20-summit-surveillance-1.2447387
  2027. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/new-snowden-docs-show-u-s-spied-during-g20-in-toronto-1.2442448
  2028. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/03/cana-d03.html
  2029. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/14/cses-d14.html
  2030.  
  2031. � Canada�s CSEC Slides Expose Espionage
  2032. Against Brazilian Ministry ::
  2033.  
  2034. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/cse-br/cse-br.htm
  2035.  
  2036.  UPDATE ; 18 CSEC slides posted on PDF @
  2037. cryptome.org, November 30, 2013.
  2038.  
  2039. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/csec-br-spy.pdf
  2040.  
  2041. � Interpreting the CSEC Presentation ::
  2042.  
  2043. http://theoreti.ca/?p=5057
  2044.  
  2045. � Minist�rio de Minas e Energia est� na
  2046. mira de espi�es americanos e canadenses ::
  2047.  
  2048. http://m.g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/ministerio-das-minas-e-energia-esta-na-mira-de-espioes-americanos-e-canadenses.html
  2049.  
  2050. TRANSLATED @ slexy.org
  2051.  
  2052. http://slexy.org/view/s2tDGSktog
  2053.  
  2054. � American and Canadian Spies Target Brazilian
  2055. Energy and Mining Ministry (English) ::
  2056.  
  2057. http://g1.globo.com/fantastico/noticia/2013/10/american-and-canadian-spies-target-brazilian-energy-and-mining-ministry.html
  2058.  
  2059. � Canada�s CSEC Provides Data to NSA ::
  2060.  
  2061.  The politicians and corporate media
  2062. would have Canadians believe that they
  2063. have only �moved on� from discussing
  2064. CSEC�s activities because there is
  2065. nothing for Canadians to worry about.
  2066.  
  2067.  In reality, the CSEC is a vital tool
  2068. of the Canadian ruling class that plays
  2069. an important role in the pursuit of its
  2070. imperialist foreign policy and in the
  2071. surveillance and suppression of opposition
  2072. at home. The size of CSEC�s staff�it
  2073. employs almost 2,000 people and a further
  2074. thousand military personnel assist its
  2075. work�give an inkling of the scale of
  2076. its activities.
  2077.  
  2078.  These include everything from supporting
  2079. the overseas operations of the Canadian
  2080. military, to spying on governments that
  2081. are reputed allies of Canada and assisting
  2082. CSIS and the RCMP in conducting a vast
  2083. program of domestic surveillance. Of
  2084. especial importance is the CSEC�s
  2085. partnership with the NSA. According to
  2086. former NSA technical director William
  2087. Binney, the two organizations �have
  2088. integrated personnel� i.e. swap personnel
  2089. to improve seamless collaboration. They
  2090. also share Internet surveillance programs.
  2091.  
  2092.  As a further element of its collaboration
  2093. with the Five Eyes alliance, CSEC was
  2094. relied on in the project of spying on
  2095. diplomats and officials during the 2009
  2096. London G20 meeting according to a report
  2097. in the British newspaper The Guardian,
  2098. which was based on documents supplied
  2099. by Snowden. The highly sensitive operation
  2100. involved the penetration of delegates�
  2101. smartphones to monitor their email
  2102. messages and calls.
  2103.  
  2104. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/09/28/csec-s28.html
  2105.  
  2106. http://www.scribd.com/doc/188094600/CSEC-Presentation
  2107.  
  2108. � NSA CSEC Partnership ::
  2109.  
  2110. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-csec-partners.pdf
  2111. _______________________________________
  2112. � EU Nations Address Mass Spying ::
  2113.  
  2114. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-mass-spying.pdf
  2115.  
  2116. � EU Hearings On NSA ::
  2117.  
  2118. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/events.html?id=hearings
  2119. http://euobserver.com/justice/121979
  2120. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/11/viviane-reding-nsa-needs-counterweight.html
  2121.  
  2122. � EU/US Data Protection Hoot ::
  2123.  
  2124. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/eu-us-data-protect-13-1127.pdf
  2125.  
  2126. � EU to Run Yet Another Ineffectual Probe ::
  2127.  
  2128. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/02/edward-snowden-un-investigation-surveillance
  2129. _______________________________________
  2130.  Draft state-level legislation called the
  2131. Fourth Amendment Protection Act would �
  2132. in theory � forbid local governments from
  2133. providing services to federal agencies
  2134. that collect electronic data from Americans
  2135. without a personalized warrant.
  2136.  
  2137.  No Utah lawmaker has came forward to
  2138. introduce the suggested legislation yet,
  2139. but at least one legislator has committed
  2140. to doing so, according to Mike Maharrey
  2141. of the Tenth Amendment Center. He declined
  2142. to identify the lawmaker before the bill
  2143. is introduced.
  2144.  
  2145.  �We are still very early in the campaign,
  2146. and this is in fact a multi-step, multi-year
  2147. long-term strategy,� says Maharrey, whose
  2148. group is part of the OffNow coalition along
  2149. with the Bill of Rights Defense Committee
  2150. and a handful of other groups.
  2151.  
  2152.  The campaign is looking beyond Utah,
  2153. Maharrey adds.
  2154.  
  2155. http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/12/03/some-nsa-opponents-want-to-nullify-surveillance-with-state-law
  2156. _______________________________________
  2157. � Guardian�s Reporters Face Threats and
  2158. Intimidation From British Dictatorship ::
  2159.  
  2160.  In the months since, the Guardian has
  2161. continued to make officials here exceedingly
  2162. nervous by exposing the joint operations of
  2163. US and British intelligence � particularly
  2164. their cooperation in data collection and
  2165. snooping programs involving British citizens
  2166. and close allies on the European continent.
  2167.  
  2168.  In response, the Guardian is being called
  2169. to account by British authorities for
  2170. jeopardizing national security. The
  2171. Guardian�s top editor, Alan Rusbridger,
  2172. is being forced to appear before a
  2173. parliamentary committee Tuesday to explain
  2174. the news outlet�s actions.
  2175.  
  2176. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/britain-targets-guardian-newspaper-over-intelligence-leaks-related-to-edward-snowden/2013/11/29/1ec3d9c0-581e-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2177. http://www.infowars.com/uk-police-threaten-guardian-editor-with-terrorism-charges-over-snowden-leaks/
  2178. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/10/18/guar-o18.html
  2179.  
  2180. � Alan Rusbridger Interviewed ::
  2181.  
  2182. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/q-and-a-with-alan-rusbridger-editor-of-the-guardian/2013/11/29/11b36798-5821-11e3-bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html
  2183.  
  2184. � US Dictatorship Fuels the Same Threats
  2185. as the British Dictatorship ::
  2186.  
  2187.  Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter who
  2188. published Edward Snowden�s leaks, was
  2189. recently suggested to be a criminal for
  2190. shining light on the NSA�s abuse of power.
  2191. This is a key identifiable step when societies
  2192. close down; it is a point of no return. It
  2193. seems the United States is reaching the event
  2194. horizon to a police state.
  2195.  
  2196. http://falkvinge.net/2013/06/30/with-journalism-persecuted-the-united-states-is-now-at-event-horizon-to-a-police-state/
  2197.  
  2198. Cryptome noted
  2199.  
  2200.  �There have been no reports of leakage
  2201. from the insurance stashes, the publication
  2202. outlets or the various reported transmissions
  2203. among them (except for the Miranda snatch by
  2204. UKG), although there could be some which have
  2205. not been disclosed, not known, were sold or
  2206. bartered, or were stolen for future use.
  2207.  
  2208.  It is likely that intelligence and law
  2209. enforcement agencies have made stringent
  2210. efforts to access the documents by customarily
  2211. secret burglary, bribery, barter, purchase,
  2212. deception, co-optation.
  2213.  
  2214.  Those multiple persons and outlets who have
  2215. had access, or suspected of access, are
  2216. certain to have been targeted, some perhaps
  2217. successfully persuaded to cooperate with
  2218. promises of confidentiality, backed by
  2219. threats if cooperation is refused -- a
  2220. standard coercive means of authorities.
  2221.  
  2222.  While Edward Snowden is knowledgeable
  2223. about counter-espionage and likely advised
  2224. his initial correspondents, who in turn
  2225. advised successive cooperators, usually
  2226. these counter-operations are not revealed,
  2227. but hints of them are leaked to discourage
  2228. participation.
  2229.  
  2230.  Beyond that, it is customary to foment
  2231. disputes and disagreements among competing
  2232. publications, reporters, opinionators,
  2233. experts, the spying industry and consumers,
  2234. along with threats against families, friends
  2235. and employers, as now occurring, to rattle
  2236. and pressure targets to consider cooperating
  2237. with authorities, including use of rewards
  2238. -- monetary and career -- for informants.�
  2239.  
  2240. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-related-targets.htm
  2241. _______________________________________
  2242. � NSA Describes Dutch SIGINT Spying ::
  2243.  
  2244. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-dutch-sigint.pdf
  2245. _______________________________________
  2246. � Mass Surveillance Is Big Business ;
  2247. Corporations Are as Good at Spying as
  2248. Governments ::
  2249.  
  2250. http://motherboard.vice.com/blog/mass-surveillance-is-big-business-corporations-are-as-good-at-spying-as-governments
  2251. _______________________________________
  2252. � NSA Spies on Pornography Viewing to
  2253. Discredit Targeted Enemies ::
  2254.  
  2255. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-muslim-porn.pdf
  2256. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131127/00243625384/nsa-spied-porn-habits-radicalizers-planned-to-use-details-to-embarrass-them.shtml
  2257. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/nsa-porn-muslims_n_4346128.html
  2258. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/11/26/1258660/-NSA-spied-on-radicalizers-to-discredit-them
  2259. _______________________________________
  2260. � NSA WINDSTOP, MUSCULAR, INCENSER Slides ::
  2261.  
  2262. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-windstop-muscular-incenser.pdf
  2263.  
  2264. � What Else Do We Know About MUSCULAR? ::
  2265.  
  2266. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-muscular.htm
  2267.  
  2268. � NSA WINDSTOP Month of Mass Spying ::
  2269.  
  2270. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-windstop.pdf
  2271.  
  2272. � NSA Collection Optimization Overview ::
  2273.  
  2274. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-overview.pdf
  2275.  
  2276. � NSA Content Acquisition Optimization ::
  2277.  
  2278. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-content.pdf
  2279.  
  2280. � NSA Collection Optimization Slides ::
  2281.  
  2282. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-sso-slides.pdf
  2283.  
  2284. � NSA SSO Cryptologic Provider ::
  2285.  
  2286. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-crypto.pdf
  2287.  
  2288. � NSA SSO Yahoo, Google Exploitation ::
  2289.  
  2290. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sso-yahoo-google.pdf
  2291.  
  2292. � NSA and GCHQ Breaks 3rd Party SSL to
  2293. Steal Email Metadata ::
  2294.  
  2295.  Even though they cooperate with the US
  2296. spy agency on court-ordered surveillance,
  2297. firms like Google and Yahoo are subject to
  2298. additional surveillance they never agreed to.
  2299.  
  2300.  Web companies host copies of your data on
  2301. servers around the world, reducing the
  2302. chance of losing your information should
  2303. one fail. When you log in to an account
  2304. with these firms, the data sent between
  2305. you and their servers is encrypted, making
  2306. it difficult to snoop � but the internal
  2307. transfers between data centres are unencrypted.
  2308. And because many of the transfers take place
  2309. outside the US, approval from a FISA court
  2310. isn�t required to tap the information.
  2311.  
  2312.  The National Security Agency has secretly
  2313. broken into the main communications links
  2314. that connect Yahoo and Google data centers
  2315. around the world, according to documents
  2316. obtained from former NSA contractor Edward
  2317. Snowden and interviews with knowledgeable
  2318. officials.
  2319.  
  2320.  By tapping those links, the agency has
  2321. positioned itself to collect at will from
  2322. hundreds of millions of user accounts,
  2323. many of them belonging to Americans. The
  2324. NSA does not keep everything it collects,
  2325. but it keeps a lot.
  2326.  
  2327.  The NSA�s principal tool to exploit the
  2328. data links is a project called MUSCULAR,
  2329. operated jointly with the agency�s British
  2330. counterpart, the Government Communications
  2331. Headquarters. From undisclosed interception
  2332. points, the NSA and the GCHQ are copying
  2333. entire data flows across fiber-optic cables
  2334. that carry information among the data
  2335. centers of the Silicon Valley giants.
  2336.  
  2337. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
  2338. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-10-31/news/43528723_1_data-centers-google-claire-cain-miller
  2339. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn24519-nsa-snoops-tech-companies-fibreoptic-networks.html
  2340. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/04/eric-schmidt-nsa-spying-data-centres-outrageous
  2341. http://article.wn.com/view/2013/10/30/NSA_Broke_Into_Yahoo_Google_Data_Centers_Report/
  2342.  
  2343. � NSA Collects Bulk Email Address Books ::
  2344.  
  2345.  In June, President Obama said the NSA�s
  2346. email collecting program �does not apply
  2347. to US citizens.�
  2348.  
  2349.  The National Security Agency is harvesting
  2350. hundreds of millions of contact lists from
  2351. personal e-mail and instant messaging
  2352. accounts around the world, many of them
  2353. belonging to Americans, according to
  2354. senior intelligence officials and top-secret
  2355. documents provided by former NSA contractor
  2356. Edward Snowden.
  2357.  
  2358.  The collection program, which has not
  2359. been disclosed before, intercepts e-mail
  2360. address books and �buddy lists� from
  2361. instant messaging services as they move
  2362. across global data links. Online services
  2363. often transmit those contacts when a user
  2364. logs on, composes a message, or synchronizes
  2365. a computer or mobile device with information
  2366. stored on remote servers.
  2367.  
  2368. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
  2369. http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/14/report-nsa-collects-millions-of-contact-lists-from-personal-email-and-instant-messaging-accounts-globally/
  2370. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2013/10/nsa-collects-email-address-books-contact-lists/70535/
  2371.  
  2372. � Special Collection Services Wikis ::
  2373.  
  2374. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/scs-fr-us.pdf
  2375.  
  2376. � NSA Exploits Microsoft Vulnerabilities ::
  2377.  
  2378. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft.pdf
  2379. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841655/microsoft-realms-redacted.pdf
  2380. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-microsoft-cloud-exploit.pdf
  2381. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/841654/microsoft-in-cloud-exploitation-redacted.pdf
  2382. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/microsoft-nsa-collaboration-user-data
  2383. ���������������������������������������
  2384. � NSA�s Boundless Informant ::
  2385.  
  2386. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant.pdf
  2387.  
  2388. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Collected
  2389. 124+ Billion Phone Calls in One Month ::
  2390.  
  2391. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-125b-calls.htm
  2392.  
  2393. � NSA�s Boundless Informant Metadata ::
  2394.  
  2395. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/10/boundlessinformant-only-shows-metadata.html
  2396.  
  2397. � Guardian�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  2398.  
  2399. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/08/nsa-boundless-informant-global-datamining
  2400.  
  2401. � Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Report ::
  2402.  
  2403. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/france-in-the-nsa-s-crosshair-phone-networks-under-surveillance_3499741_651865.html
  2404.  
  2405. � Three Boundless Informant �Heatmaps� ::
  2406.  
  2407. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-boundless-informant-images.htm
  2408.  
  2409. � NSA Boundless Informant Spied Norway ::
  2410.  
  2411. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundlessinformant-no-33m.pdf
  2412.  
  2413. � US Says France, Spain Aided NSA Spying ::
  2414.  
  2415. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-us-france-spain.htm
  2416. ---------------------------------------
  2417. NOBODY comments ?
  2418.  
  2419.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant document
  2420. differs from the Guardians.
  2421.  
  2422. Le Monde�s Boundless Informant Graph ...
  2423.  
  2424. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807033/boundless-monde.pdf
  2425.  
  2426. Guardians� Boundless Informant Graph ...
  2427.  
  2428. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/6/8/1370716131074/boundless-heatmap-008.jpg
  2429.  
  2430.  Le Monde shows 3,095,533,478 intercepts
  2431. in the US compared to the Guardian showing
  2432. 2,392,343,446 US intercepts.
  2433.  
  2434.  Le Monde�s Boundless Informant graph
  2435. shows the �aggregate� estimate, both
  2436. digital networks (DNI) and telephony (DNR)
  2437. interception ; while the Guardian�s graph
  2438. only shows the digital �DNI� estimate.
  2439. ---------------------------------------
  2440. � DRTBOX and the DRT Surveillance Systems ::
  2441.  
  2442. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/drtbox-and-drt-surveillance-systems.html
  2443.  
  2444. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  2445.  
  2446.  This was written from a person who purports
  2447. to actually use the Boundless Informant tool.
  2448.  
  2449. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-explicated.htm
  2450.  
  2451. � RE-BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Explicated ::
  2452.  
  2453. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-boundless-informant-gm-place.htm
  2454.  
  2455. � BOUNDLESS INFORMANT Screenshots Can Be
  2456. Misleading ::
  2457.  
  2458. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/11/screenshots-from-boundlessinformant-can.html
  2459.  
  2460. � DNI Masterspy Says Le Monde Misleads
  2461. on NSA Spying ::
  2462.  
  2463. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/dni-13-1022.pdf
  2464.  
  2465.  �Recent articles published in the
  2466. French newspaper Le Monde contain
  2467. inaccurate and misleading information
  2468. regarding US foreign intelligence
  2469. activities. The allegation that the
  2470. National Security Agency collected more
  2471. than 70 million �recordings of French
  2472. citizens� telephone data� is false.
  2473.  
  2474.  While we are not going to discuss the
  2475. details of our activities, we have
  2476. repeatedly made it clear that the
  2477. United States gathers intelligence of
  2478. the type gathered by all nations. The
  2479. US collects intelligence to protect the
  2480. nation, its interests, and its allies
  2481. from, among other things, threats such
  2482. as terrorism and the proliferation of
  2483. weapons of mass destruction.
  2484.  
  2485.  The United States values our longstanding
  2486. friendship and alliance with France and
  2487. we will continue to cooperate on security
  2488. and intelligence matters going forward.�
  2489.  
  2490. James R. Clapper
  2491. Director of National Intelligence
  2492. ---------------------------------------
  2493. � Snowden Responds to Feinstein�s Stupidity ::
  2494.  
  2495. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/330497-snowden-fires-back-at-feinstein-over-surveillance-claim
  2496.  
  2497.  �Today, no telephone in America makes
  2498. a call without leaving a record with the
  2499. NSA. Today, no Internet transaction enters
  2500. or leaves America without passing through
  2501. the NSA�s hands,� Snowden said in a
  2502. statement Thursday.
  2503.  
  2504.  �Our representatives in Congress tell us
  2505. this is not surveillance. They�re wrong.�
  2506. _______________________________________
  2507. � US and UK Governments Still Worry Over
  2508. Cache of Encrypted Documents by Snowden ::
  2509.  
  2510.  US and British intelligence officials
  2511. say they are concerned about a �doomsday�
  2512. collection of highly classified, heavily
  2513. encrypted materials they believe former
  2514. National Security Agency contractor
  2515. Edward Snowden may have stored away.
  2516.  
  2517.  One source saw the cache of documents
  2518. as an �insurance policy� for Snowden
  2519. should he feel threatened by arrest or
  2520. other harm. ... ...
  2521.  
  2522.  Adding merit to the suspicion that the
  2523. well-secured cache may be an insurance
  2524. policy of sorts, Greenwald said in June
  2525. that �if anything happens at all to
  2526. Edward Snowden, he has arranged for them
  2527. to get access to the full archives.�
  2528.  
  2529. http://www.infowars.com/us-uk-officials-worry-snowden-still-has-doomsday-collection-of-classified-material/
  2530. _______________________________________
  2531. � (Go Figure) Obama�s �Overhaul� of Spy
  2532. Programs Cloaked in More Secrecy ::
  2533.  
  2534.  Obama has been gradually tweaking vast
  2535. government surveillance policies. But he
  2536. is not disclosing those changes to the
  2537. public. Has he stopped spying on friendly
  2538. world leaders? He won�t say. Has he stopped
  2539. eavesdropping on the United Nations, the
  2540. World Bank and the International Monetary
  2541. Fund? He won�t say.
  2542.  
  2543.  Even the report by the group Obama created
  2544. to review and recommend changes to his
  2545. surveillance programs has been kept secret.
  2546.  
  2547. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/11/25/209465/obamas-overhaul-of-spy-programs.html
  2548. _______________________________________
  2549. � NSA Report Outlined Goals for More Power ::
  2550.  
  2551.  Officials at the National Security Agency,
  2552. intent on maintaining its dominance in
  2553. intelligence collection, pledged last year
  2554. to push to expand its surveillance powers,
  2555. according to a top-secret strategy document.
  2556.  
  2557.  Written as an agency mission statement with
  2558. broad goals, the five-page document said
  2559. that existing American laws were not adequate
  2560. to meet the needs of the NSA to conduct broad
  2561. surveillance in what it cited as �the golden
  2562. age of Sigint,� or signals intelligence.
  2563. �The interpretation and guidelines for
  2564. applying our authorities, and in some cases
  2565. the authorities themselves, have not kept
  2566. pace with the complexity of the technology
  2567. and target environments, or the operational
  2568. expectations levied on NSA�s mission,� the
  2569. document concluded.
  2570.  
  2571. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategy-2012-2016.pdf
  2572. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-power-goals.htm
  2573. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/23/us/politics/nsa-report-outlined-goals-for-more-power.html
  2574. http://rt.com/usa/snowden-leak-expand-surveillance-goal-185/
  2575. http://www.dailydot.com/politics/snowden-leak-nsa-power/
  2576.  
  2577. � NSA TreasureMap Description ::
  2578.  
  2579.  The NY Times today cites an NSA tool
  2580. called Treasure Map and describes its
  2581. capabilities but does not publish visual
  2582. examples. Also cited is Packaged Goods,
  2583. an associated tool. If publicly available,
  2584. Cryptome asked for pointers to the two.
  2585.  
  2586. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-treasuremap.htm
  2587. _______________________________________
  2588. � Documents Show Tony Blair Let US Spy Britons ::
  2589.  
  2590. http://www.channel4.com/news/nsa-edward-snowden-america-britain-tony-blair
  2591. _______________________________________
  2592. � GCHQ ROYAL CONCIERGE Diplomatic Hotel Spy ::
  2593.  
  2594. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge-de.pdf
  2595.  
  2596. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/gchq-royal-concierge.jpg
  2597.  
  2598. � GCHQ Monitors Diplomats Hotel Bookings ::
  2599.  
  2600.  Britain�s GCHQ intelligence service monitors
  2601. diplomats� travels using a sophisticated
  2602. automated system that tracks hotel bookings.
  2603. Once a room has been identified, it opens
  2604. the door to a variety of spying options.
  2605.  
  2606. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/gchq-monitors-hotel-reservations-to-track-diplomats-a-933914.html
  2607. _______________________________________
  2608. � Supreme Court Blocks Challenge to Spying ::
  2609.  
  2610.  �We ask the NSA to immediately suspend
  2611. collection of solely domestic communications
  2612. pending the competition of a public rulemaking
  2613. as required by law. We intend to renew our
  2614. request each week until we receive your
  2615. response,� EPIC said.
  2616.  
  2617.  Five months later, though, the Supreme Court
  2618. said this week that it would not be hearing
  2619. EPIC�s plea. A document began circulating
  2620. early Monday in which the high court listed
  2621. the petition filed by the privacy advocates
  2622. as denied.
  2623.  
  2624. http://rt.com/usa/supreme-court-nsa-spying-906/
  2625.  
  2626. http://www.infowars.com/supreme-court-blocks-challenge-to-nsa-phone-tracking/
  2627. _______________________________________
  2628. � NSA Deputy Director John Inglis Speaks ::
  2629.  
  2630. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ydkw4xgZ-Y
  2631.  
  2632. � Intelligence Community Lawyers Argue
  2633. Over Metadata Hoarding ::
  2634.  
  2635. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131105/08030825135/dni-lawyer-argues-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will-damage-americans-privacy.shtml
  2636.  
  2637. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/intelligence-community-lawyers-argue-that-curbing-metadata-collections-will/
  2638.  
  2639. � Bill Clinton Warns We Have No Security,
  2640. No Privacy ::
  2641.  
  2642. http://www.infowars.com/bill-clinton-on-nsa-spying-we-are-on-the-verge-of-having-the-worst-of-all-worlds-well-have-no-security-and-no-privacy/
  2643.  
  2644. � Obama Regime Pledges to Continue Illegal
  2645. Spying Programs ::
  2646.  
  2647. http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/11/06/spyi-n06.html
  2648.  
  2649. � John McCain Interview by Der Spiegel ::
  2650.  
  2651. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/mccain-nsa-affair.pdf
  2652.  
  2653. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-john-mccain-on-nsa-spying-on-angela-merkel-a-932721.html
  2654. _______________________________________
  2655. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Brief ::
  2656.  
  2657. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-brief-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  2658.  
  2659. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784284/bullrun-briefing-sheet-from-gchq.pdf
  2660.  
  2661. � NSA & GCHQ �Bullrun� Decryption Guide ::
  2662.  
  2663. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-bullrun-2-16-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  2664.  
  2665. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784047/bullrun-guide-final.pdf
  2666.  
  2667. � NSA ; Cryptanalysis & Exploitation ::
  2668.  
  2669. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  2670.  
  2671.  �(TS//SI) The fact that NSA/CSS makes
  2672. cryptographic modifications to commercial
  2673. or indigenous cryptographic information
  2674. security devices or systems in order to
  2675. make them exploitable.�
  2676.  
  2677. �TOP SECRET//COMINT at a minimum�
  2678.  
  2679.  �(U//FOUO) The fact that NSA/CSS
  2680. successfully exploits cryptographic
  2681. components of commercial information
  2682. security devices or systems when the
  2683. device or system specified.�
  2684.  
  2685. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-cryptanalysis-2-12-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  2686.  
  2687. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/784048/crypt-guide2.pdf
  2688.  
  2689. � NSA & GCHQ Breaks Other SIGINT Crypto ::
  2690.  
  2691. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  2692. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  2693. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-sigint-enabling-redacts.jpg
  2694.  
  2695. � NSA and GCHQ Defeats Encryption ::
  2696.  
  2697.  US and British intelligence agencies
  2698. have successfully cracked much of the
  2699. online encryption relied upon by hundreds
  2700. of millions of people to protect the
  2701. privacy of their personal data, online
  2702. transactions and emails, according to
  2703. top-secret documents revealed by former
  2704. contractor Edward Snowden. ...
  2705.  
  2706.  Those methods include covert measures
  2707. to ensure NSA control over setting of
  2708. international encryption standards, the
  2709. use of supercomputers to break encryption
  2710. with �brute force�, and � the most closely
  2711. guarded secret of all � collaboration with
  2712. technology companies and internet service
  2713. providers themselves.
  2714.  
  2715.  Through these covert partnerships, the
  2716. agencies have inserted secret vulnerabilities
  2717. � known as backdoors or trapdoors � into
  2718. commercial encryption software. ... ...
  2719.  
  2720.  Independent security experts have long
  2721. suspected that the NSA has been introducing
  2722. weaknesses into security standards, a fact
  2723. confirmed for the first time by another
  2724. secret document. It shows the agency
  2725. worked covertly to get its own version
  2726. of a draft security standard issued by
  2727. the US National Institute of Standards
  2728. and Technology approved for worldwide
  2729. use in 2006.
  2730.  
  2731. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
  2732.  
  2733. � Full Guardian Report Mirrored ::
  2734.  
  2735. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-guardian-13-0905.pdf
  2736.  
  2737. � Full New York Times Report Mirrored ::
  2738.  
  2739. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-nyt-13-0905.pdf
  2740.  
  2741. � Full ProPublica Report Mirrored ::
  2742.  
  2743. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-propublica-13-0905.pdf
  2744.  
  2745. � Bruce Schneier - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  2746.  
  2747. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-01.pdf
  2748. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-02.pdf
  2749. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-schneier-13-0905-03.pdf
  2750.  
  2751. � Matthew Green - NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  2752.  
  2753. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0905.pdf
  2754. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-matthew-green-13-0910.pdf
  2755.  
  2756. � DNI Response to NSA Cracks Crypto ::
  2757.  
  2758. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-masterspy-13-0906.htm
  2759.  
  2760. � Cryptography List Members Face Ulcers ::
  2761.  
  2762. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-decrypt-cryptography-13-0905.htm
  2763.  
  2764. � Documents Confirm �Back Doors� Inserted
  2765. Into Web and Software to Exploit Crypto ::
  2766.  
  2767. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-gchq-encryption-snowden-478/
  2768.  
  2769. http://www.infowars.com/documents-confirm-nsa-inserts-back-doors-into-web-software/
  2770.  
  2771.  A range of US hardware and software
  2772. companies are in danger of being dragged
  2773. into the widening scandal over internet
  2774. surveillance, following the latest leaks
  2775. from Edward Snowden, the former National
  2776. Security Agency contractor.
  2777.  
  2778.  The leaked documents include NSA claims
  2779. that it has collaborated with technology
  2780. companies to plant �back doors� into
  2781. their systems � or ways for the agency
  2782. secretly to penetrate systems without
  2783. the users� knowledge.
  2784.  
  2785. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0054adb2-1709-11e3-9ec2-00144feabdc0.html
  2786.  
  2787. � You Are the Enemy of the Police State ::
  2788.  
  2789. http://anewdomain.net/2013/09/06/john-c-dvorak-nsa-spying-americans-now-enemy/
  2790. _______________________________________
  2791. � SSL Inspector ::
  2792.  
  2793. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/NETRONOME-2011-SSLInsp-en.pdf
  2794.  
  2795. � Examining SSL-Encrypted Communications ::
  2796.  
  2797. http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/METRONOME-2011-ExamSSL-Comm-en.pdf
  2798. _______________________________________
  2799. � Bobby R. Inman Suggests NSA Declassify
  2800. All Suspected Leaks From Snowden ASAP ::
  2801.  
  2802. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html?_r=0
  2803.  
  2804. � Around 42 Years to Publish All Leaks ::
  2805.  
  2806. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/snowden-tally.htm
  2807.  
  2808. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2007 ::
  2809.  
  2810. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2007.pdf
  2811.  
  2812. � US SIGINT Strategic Mission 2013 ::
  2813.  
  2814. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-sigint-strategic-mission-2013.pdf
  2815.  
  2816. � A Weeks Worth of Eavesdropping ::
  2817.  
  2818. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-week-spy-2009.pdf
  2819. ���������������������������������������
  2820. � Greenwald�s Partner, David Miranda
  2821. Accused of Terrorism in the UK ::
  2822.  
  2823. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/01/us-uk-nsa-idUSBRE9A013O20131101
  2824. ���������������������������������������
  2825. � Meet the Spies Doing the NSA�s Dirty Work ::
  2826.  
  2827.  The heart of the FBI�s signals intelligence
  2828. activities is an obscure organization called
  2829. the Data Intercept Technology Unit, or DITU
  2830. (pronounced DEE-too). The handful of news
  2831. articles that mentioned it prior to revelations
  2832. of NSA surveillance this summer did so mostly
  2833. in passing. It has barely been discussed in
  2834. congressional testimony. An NSA PowerPoint
  2835. presentation given to journalists by former
  2836. NSA contractor Edward Snowden hints at DITU�s
  2837. pivotal role in the NSA�s Prism system --
  2838. it appears as a nondescript box on a flowchart
  2839. showing how the NSA task[s] information to
  2840. be collected, which is then gathered and
  2841. delivered by the DITU.
  2842.  
  2843.  The DITU is located in a sprawling compound
  2844. at Marine Corps Base Quantico in Virginia,
  2845. home of the FBI�s training academy and the
  2846. bureau�s Operational Technology Division,
  2847. which runs all the FBI�s technical intelligence
  2848. collection, processing, and reporting.
  2849.  
  2850. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  2851.  
  2852. � More PRISM Slides Published ::
  2853.  
  2854. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-prism-13-1021.pdf
  2855. https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807036/prism-entier.pdf
  2856. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  2857.  
  2858.  
  2859. � PRISM ; FAA Passive Spying ::
  2860.  
  2861. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  2862. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/807031/wanadoo-alcatel.pdf
  2863. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/espionnage-de-la-nsa-tous-les-documents-publies-par-le-monde_3499986_651865.html
  2864.  
  2865. � Compare PRISM Slide Publication ::
  2866.  
  2867. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/10/le-monde-prism/le-monde-prism.htm
  2868.  
  2869. � NSA PRISM Slides From Guardian ::
  2870.  
  2871. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/nsa-prism-guardian-13-1101.pdf
  2872.  
  2873. � Le Monde�s PRISM Report (TRANSLATED) ::
  2874.  
  2875. http://www.lemonde.fr/technologies/article/2013/10/21/l-ampleur-de-l-espionnage-mondial-par-la-nsa_3499756_651865.html
  2876.  
  2877.  The magnitude of the global espionage
  2878. by the NSA.
  2879.  
  2880.  During the summer, the documents provided
  2881. to the Guardian and the Washington Post by
  2882. former NSA employee Edward Snowden helped
  2883. unveil the extent of surveillance and
  2884. espionage carried out by the NSA and its
  2885. allies. Le Monde also now has access to
  2886. some of these documents.
  2887.  
  2888.  Before the summer, the NSA was the most
  2889. secretive intelligence agencies of the
  2890. United States. Then came Edward Snowden,
  2891. who was granted an asylum for a year in
  2892. Russia. Wanting to denounce "the largest
  2893. program of arbitrary monitoring of human
  2894. history," the American working for a
  2895. subcontractor of the NSA has obtained
  2896. several thousands of highly confidential
  2897. documents.
  2898.  
  2899.  In early June, the first secrets of the
  2900. National Security Agency in these parts
  2901. start to filter. The Guardian reveals
  2902. that the telephone operator Verizon
  2903. provides NSA phone data of several
  2904. million Americans, according to a court
  2905. order secret. Then it was the turn of
  2906. the Prism program to be unveiled. It
  2907. allows the US Secret Service, and first
  2908. and foremost to the NSA, to access a
  2909. privileged manner, since December 2007,
  2910. data from nine major Internet companies,
  2911. including Google, Facebook and Microsoft.
  2912.  
  2913. MONITORING OF SUBMARINE CABLE
  2914.  
  2915.  A document providing internal training
  2916. on Prism, which Le Monde has also had
  2917. access, how the NSA analysts can query
  2918. the databases of Web giants, research
  2919. documents, emails or instant discussions.
  2920. All within a legal framework that
  2921. overcomes the request of an individual
  2922. mandate. The companies named in the
  2923. documents have denied that the NSA
  2924. had a direct and unilateral access to
  2925. their servers.
  2926.  
  2927.  In addition to this targeted surveillance,
  2928. Snowden records reveal another method of
  2929. massive collection of the NSA called
  2930. Upstream. This system can collect data
  2931. from the submarine cable and Internet
  2932. infrastructures. A logical strategy,
  2933. when we know that 99% of global
  2934. communications now pass through diving.
  2935.  
  2936.  To learn more about the context of the
  2937. revelations of the World, the editorial
  2938. read : "Fight Big Brother"
  2939.  
  2940.  The British equivalent of the NSA, the
  2941. Government Communications Headquarters
  2942. (GCHQ), plays a major role in this system,
  2943. because of the historical proximity of
  2944. Great Britain and the United States,
  2945. confidentiality agreements and a financial
  2946. dependence of those services from London
  2947. to Washington. There are also technical
  2948. reasons : a significant portion of
  2949. submarine cables linking Europe to
  2950. America through Britain. With Edward
  2951. Snowden, the Tempora program , which
  2952. aims to "control the Internet" by
  2953. monitoring these cables, has been
  2954. revealed. "You're in an enviable
  2955. position, says a document presenting
  2956. Tempora, presented by the Guardian,
  2957. have fun and pull in the best." Turning
  2958. a page of the document presenting the
  2959. Prism program, we discover Upstream
  2960. relies on four programs (Blarney, Fairview,
  2961. and oakstar Stormbrew ) which we know to
  2962. date, the outline. Fairview, for example,
  2963. would largely on intercepted telephone
  2964. conversations via the major US carriers.
  2965.  
  2966. DATA ANALYSIS TOOLS
  2967.  
  2968.  Many tools are needed to sort the mass
  2969. of intercepted data. One of them is called
  2970. XKeyscore, and its operation has been
  2971. detailed in the columns of the Guardian.
  2972. The extreme precision of the data are
  2973. clear. With XKeyscore, analysts can access
  2974. the content of e-mails to a list of
  2975. websites visited by their target or the
  2976. keywords entered by the latter in the
  2977. search engines.
  2978.  
  2979.  The framework for this research is not
  2980. binding, as the Guardian explained, and
  2981. many Americans are data made available to
  2982. agents. According to the presentation
  2983. materials, to promote the capabilities
  2984. of the tool, three hundred terrorists
  2985. have been arrested since 2008 thanks to
  2986. XKeyscore.
  2987.  
  2988.  NSA and GCHQ not only devote their
  2989. considerable resources monitoring the
  2990. fight against terrorism, but also to
  2991. spy allies. At the G20 summit in London
  2992. in 2009, computers of diplomats and heads
  2993. of state were monitored by GCHQ, as well
  2994. as some of their phone calls. NSA, she
  2995. focused on the European Union (EU), as
  2996. revealed by Der Spiegel, always on the
  2997. basis of documents Snowden. NSA has
  2998. installed cookies on the premises of
  2999. the EU representation in Washington.
  3000. The EU delegation to the UN in New York,
  3001. and the building of the Council of the
  3002. European Union in Brussels were also
  3003. scrutinized by the US agency. Brazil
  3004. is also one of the countries affected
  3005. by this intelligence. According to
  3006. Brazilian media group O Globo, its
  3007. political leaders as some companies
  3008. have been targeted.
  3009.  
  3010.  The Snowden documents have informed
  3011. the considerable efforts made by the
  3012. United States to start listening to
  3013. Internet, in a sometimes unclear legal
  3014. framework and often away from real
  3015. democratic debate. Interviewed by
  3016. Le Monde, the US authorities have
  3017. assured that the Prism program was
  3018. the subject of a parliamentary debate
  3019. in the United States and was working
  3020. in a strictly regulated legal framework.
  3021. Asked on September 12 revelations
  3022. Snowden, James Clapper, the US Director
  3023. of National Intelligence, said: "What
  3024. happened - and that is harmful -
  3025. sparked conversation and debate that
  3026. it probably was necessary."
  3027. _______________________________________
  3028. � UN Resolution Against US Spying ::
  3029.  
  3030. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/un-v-us-spying.htm
  3031.  
  3032. � 21 Nations Line Up Behind UN Effort ::
  3033.  
  3034. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/10/25/exclusive_21_nations_line_up_behind_un_effort_to_restrain_nsa
  3035.  
  3036. � Government May Stop Spying On So-called
  3037. �World Leaders�, But Not You ::
  3038.  
  3039. http://www.infowars.com/government-may-stop-spying-on-world-leaders-but-not-you/
  3040.  
  3041. NOBODY comments
  3042.  
  3043.  100% expected. They will continue to
  3044. spy on 99.9% of the world, no doubt.
  3045. Any secret data-hoardering agency will.
  3046. We must adjust to it by learning how
  3047. to counter their surveillance.
  3048.  
  3049. � UPDATE ; Inside America�s Plan to Kill
  3050. Online Privacy Rights Everywhere ::
  3051.  
  3052.  The United States and its key intelligence
  3053. allies are quietly working behind the scenes
  3054. to kneecap a mounting movement in the United
  3055. Nations to promote a universal human right
  3056. to online privacy, according to diplomatic
  3057. sources and an internal American government
  3058. document obtained by The Cable.
  3059.  
  3060.  The diplomatic battle is playing out in an
  3061. obscure UN General Assembly committee that
  3062. is considering a proposal by Brazil and
  3063. Germany to place constraints on unchecked
  3064. internet surveillance by the National
  3065. Security Agency and other foreign intelligence
  3066. services. American representatives have made
  3067. it clear that they won�t tolerate such
  3068. checks on their global surveillance network.
  3069. The stakes are high, particularly in
  3070. Washington -- which is seeking to contain
  3071. an international backlash against NSA
  3072. spying -- and in Brasilia, where Brazilian
  3073. President Dilma Roussef is personally
  3074. involved in monitoring the UN negotiations.
  3075.  
  3076. http://cryptome.org/2013/11/us-kill-privacy.htm
  3077.  
  3078. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/11/20/exclusive_inside_americas_plan_to_kill_online_privacy_rights_everywhere
  3079. _______________________________________
  3080. � Keith Alexander Promotes NSA / Scorns
  3081. Public News Coverage ::
  3082.  
  3083. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Kc5Xvr24Aw
  3084. http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/10/nsa-chief-stop-reporters-selling-spy-documents-175896.html
  3085. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/25/europe-erupts-nsa-spying-chief-government
  3086. _______________________________________
  3087. � Leaked Memos Reveal GCHQ Efforts to
  3088. Keep Mass Surveillance Secret ::
  3089.  
  3090. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden
  3091. _______________________________________
  3092. � US Dictatorship Spied Mexican Dictator ::
  3093.  
  3094.  The National Security Agency (NSA) has
  3095. a division for particularly difficult
  3096. missions. Called �Tailored Access Operations�
  3097. (TAO), this department devises special
  3098. methods for special targets.
  3099.  
  3100.  That category includes surveillance of
  3101. neighboring Mexico, and in May 2010,
  3102. the division reported its mission
  3103. accomplished. A report classified as
  3104. �top secret� said: �TAO successfully
  3105. exploited a key mail server in the
  3106. Mexican Presidencia domain within the
  3107. Mexican Presidential network to gain
  3108. first-ever access to President Felipe
  3109. Calderon�s public email account.�
  3110.  
  3111. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html
  3112.  
  3113. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-leak-mx-2.htm
  3114.  
  3115. Cryptome comments ?
  3116.  
  3117.  This spying was apparently done from
  3118. the NSA�s Medina Regional SIGINT Operations
  3119. Center (MRSOC), Lackland Air Force Base
  3120. Annex, San Antonio, TX (formerly Medina
  3121. Regional SIGINT Operations Center):
  3122.  
  3123. http://cryptome.org/2012-info/nsa-mrsoc-2012/nsa-mrsoc-2012.htm
  3124.  
  3125. http://cryptome.org/mrsoc.pdf
  3126. _______________________________________
  3127. � More NSA Targets Revealed ::
  3128.  
  3129. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-selected-coverage.htm
  3130.  
  3131. � NSA Spies on French Government ::
  3132.  
  3133. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3134.  
  3135. � NSA Spies on Indian Government ::
  3136.  
  3137. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/india-close-access-sigads.pdf
  3138.  
  3139. � NSA Spies on Everyone ::
  3140.  
  3141. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/nsa-surveillance-world-leaders-calls
  3142.  
  3143. � EU Rules New Policy to Curb NSA Spying ::
  3144.  
  3145. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/17/eu-rules-data-us-edward-snowden
  3146.  
  3147. � Other Governments �Envious� of NSA ::
  3148.  
  3149. http://theweek.com/article/index/251628/why-the-nsa-spies-on-france-and-germany
  3150.  
  3151.  David Addington, Cheney�s chief of staff,
  3152. thought that the NSA should use its
  3153. technology to intercept emails and
  3154. telephone calls sent from one domestic
  3155. terminal to another, and was upset to
  3156. learn that Hayden thought differently.
  3157. That was a line he would only cross,
  3158. deliberately, with court and congressional
  3159. approval. Addington dropped the idea,
  3160. but as we now know, the agency added
  3161. to its portfolio a mandate to monitor
  3162. suspicious communications that transited
  3163. the border of the United States, and
  3164. later began to collect reams of metadata
  3165. in order to analyze it.
  3166.  
  3167.  Hayden wasn�t being cautious just for
  3168. the record: NSA�s job was to collect
  3169. foreign intelligence � to steal stuff,
  3170. or purloin letters, real and digital,
  3171. in order to provide policymakers with a
  3172. decision advantage. The advantage the
  3173. NSA provided was accurate information
  3174. about what people who interacted with
  3175. the United States said in private about
  3176. their intentions; that gap between saying
  3177. and doing, and the ability to predict
  3178. action from it, allows the president of
  3179. the United States to stay a step ahead.
  3180.  
  3181.  It�s one thing to say that the United
  3182. States� actions don�t always match up
  3183. with the values we espouse, and that�s
  3184. true. When our hypocrisy is exposed,
  3185. our moral authority wanes and our
  3186. ability to maneuver is reduced.
  3187.  
  3188.  It�s quite another to assume that other
  3189. countries are any purer. They never have
  3190. been and probably won�t be. Many are much
  3191. purer than others, so the amount of
  3192. resources the intelligence community
  3193. devotes to harder strategic targets ought
  3194. to correspond with how honest our allies
  3195. are, or how little they deceive us. The
  3196. egg comes before the chicken: How the hell
  3197. can we figure out which allies are more
  3198. reliable if we don�t figure out the
  3199. correspondence between public and private
  3200. words and actions.
  3201.  
  3202.  Of course, Brazil, France, Germany, and
  3203. Mexico do exactly the same thing. They
  3204. want their leaders to gain a decision
  3205. advantage in the give and take between
  3206. countries. They want to know what US
  3207. policymakers will do before the Americans
  3208. do it. And in the case of Brazil and
  3209. France, they aggressively spy on the
  3210. United States, on US citizens and
  3211. politicians, in order to collect that
  3212. information. The difference lies in the
  3213. scale of intelligence collection: The
  3214. US has the most effective, most distributed,
  3215. most sophisticated intelligence community
  3216. in the West. It is Goliath. And other
  3217. countries, rightly in their mind, are
  3218. envious.
  3219. _______________________________________
  3220. � NSA Involvement in Drone Kill Operations ::
  3221.  
  3222. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html
  3223. _______________________________________
  3224. � 58 Things Learned About NSA Spying ::
  3225.  
  3226. http://www.tedgioia.com/nsa_facts.html
  3227. ���������������������������������������
  3228. � Brazil Prepares to Counter NSA�s PRISM
  3229. with �Secure Email� Plan ::
  3230.  
  3231. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/14/brazil_waxes_lyrical_on_security/
  3232. _______________________________________
  3233. � Dutch Cabinet Response to Parliamentary
  3234. Questions About NSA Wiretapping ::
  3235.  
  3236. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/10/dutch-govt-response-to-parliamentary.html
  3237. _______________________________________
  3238.  This week Edward Snowden received the
  3239. Integrity Award from the Sam Adams Associates
  3240. for Integrity in Intelligence. These videos
  3241. from the award ceremony are the first of
  3242. Mr Snowden after being granted asylum in
  3243. Russia.
  3244.  
  3245. http://wikileaks.org/Video-Edward-Snowden-wins-Sam.html
  3246. ���������������������������������������
  3247. ? GCHQ Freaks Out Over Recent Leaks ::
  3248.  
  3249.  Andrew Parker, the director general
  3250. of the Security Service, said the
  3251. exposing of intelligence techniques,
  3252. by the Guardian newspaper, had given
  3253. fanatics the ability to evade the spy
  3254. agencies.
  3255.  
  3256. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/10365026/GCHQ-leaks-have-gifted-terrorists-ability-to-attack-at-will-warns-spy-chief.html
  3257.  
  3258. � NSA & GCHQ Counter-Tor Slides ::
  3259.  
  3260.  �Use cookies to identify Tor users when
  3261. they are not using Tor.�
  3262.  
  3263. �Investigate Evercookie persistence.�
  3264.  
  3265. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-stinks.pdf
  3266. ---------------------------------------
  3267.  Here is evercookie.sol found from an
  3268. old bleach log.
  3269.  
  3270. C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\Application Data\
  3271. Macromedia\Flash Player\#SharedObjects\ED5YHQQU\
  3272. bbcdn-bbnaut.ibillboard.com\server-static-files\
  3273. bbnaut.swf\evercookie.sol
  3274.  
  3275. bbnaut.swf holding evercookie.sol
  3276.  
  3277.  �SWF is an Adobe Flash file format used
  3278. for multimedia, vector graphics and
  3279. ActionScript. Originating with FutureWave
  3280. Software, then transferred to Macromedia,
  3281. and then coming under the control of Adobe,
  3282. SWF files can contain animations or applets
  3283. of varying degrees of interactivity and
  3284. function.
  3285.  
  3286.  There are also various third party
  3287. programs that can produce files in
  3288. this format, such as Multimedia Fusion,
  3289. Captivate and SWiSH Max.�
  3290.  
  3291.  �.sol files are created by Adobe Flash
  3292. Player to hold Local Shared Objects,
  3293. data stored on the system running the
  3294. Flash player.�
  3295. ---------------------------------------
  3296. ? NOBODY comments on Evercookie
  3297.  
  3298.  Evercookie is an .sol format, created
  3299. as a macromedia (or flashplayer) cache.
  3300. It can be found within Windows systems
  3301. and can be wiped out here ;
  3302.  
  3303. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3304. Application Data\Macromedia\
  3305.  
  3306. and may also be cloned here ;
  3307.  
  3308. C:\WINDOWS\system32\Macromed\Flash\
  3309.  
  3310.  I recommend users ALWAYS bleach their
  3311. cache, cookies, logs, TEMP.
  3312.  
  3313. The %TEMP% directory can be found here ;
  3314.  
  3315. C:\Documents and Settings\User\
  3316. Local Settings\Temp\
  3317. ---------------------------------------
  3318. � Adobe Flash Player Registry �
  3319.  
  3320. http://code.str0.be/view/1d23ed24
  3321.  
  3322. http://ae7.st/p/6ci  (mirror)
  3323.  
  3324. � swflash.ocx Raw Data Dump �
  3325.  
  3326. http://code.str0.be/view/41185b11
  3327.  
  3328. http://ae7.st/p/1ve  (mirror)
  3329.  
  3330. � Evercookie Cache Format Registry �
  3331.  
  3332. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/1d527692
  3333.  
  3334. http://ae7.st/p/35m  (mirror)
  3335.  
  3336. � Adobe �Asset Cache� Format Registry �
  3337.  
  3338. http://pb.stoleyour.com/view/722ea22f
  3339.  
  3340. http://ae7.st/p/4rq  (mirror)
  3341.  
  3342. � Macromedia - a Third-party Cacher �
  3343.  
  3344. http://p.pomf.se/1252
  3345.  
  3346. http://ae7.st/p/5dk  (mirror)
  3347. ---------------------------------------
  3348. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evercookie
  3349.  
  3350.  Evercookie is a JavaScript-based
  3351. application created by Samy Kamkar
  3352. which produces zombie cookies in a
  3353. web browser that are intentionally
  3354. difficult to delete. ... ...
  3355.  
  3356.  An Evercookie is not merely difficult
  3357. to delete. It actively resists deletion
  3358. by copying itself in different forms on
  3359. the user�s machine and resurrecting
  3360. itself if it notices that some of the
  3361. copies are missing or expired.
  3362.  
  3363.  Specifically, when creating a new cookie,
  3364. Evercookie uses the following storage
  3365. mechanisms when available:
  3366.  
  3367. � Standard HTTP cookies
  3368. � Local Shared Objects (Flash cookies)
  3369. � Silverlight Isolated Storage
  3370. � Storing cookies in RGB values of
  3371. auto-generated, force-cached PNGs
  3372. using HTML5 Canvas tag to read pixels
  3373. (cookies) back out
  3374. � Storing cookies in Web history
  3375. � Storing cookies in HTTP ETags
  3376. � Storing cookies in Web cache
  3377. � window.name caching
  3378. � Internet Explorer userData storage
  3379. � HTML5 Session Storage
  3380. � HTML5 Local Storage
  3381. � HTML5 Global Storage
  3382. � HTML5 Database Storage via SQLite
  3383. ---------------------------------------
  3384. � Cookies Threaten Tor User Anonymity ::
  3385.  
  3386.  �Just because you�re using Tor doesn�t
  3387. mean that your browser isn't storing
  3388. cookies,� said Jeremiah Grossman, a
  3389. colleague of Hansen�s who also specializes
  3390. in browser vulnerabilities.
  3391.  
  3392.  As Grossman described the procedure to
  3393. CNET, the NSA is aware of Tor�s entry
  3394. and exit nodes because of its Internet
  3395. wide surveillance.
  3396.  
  3397.  �The very feature that makes Tor a
  3398. powerful anonymity service, and the
  3399. fact that all Tor users look alike on
  3400. the Internet, makes it easy to
  3401. differentiate Tor users from other
  3402. Web users,� he wrote.
  3403.  
  3404.  �The NSA then cookies that ad, so that
  3405. every time you go to a site, the cookie
  3406. identifies you. Even though your IP
  3407. address changed [because of Tor], the
  3408. cookies gave you away,� he said.
  3409.  
  3410. http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57606178-83/nsa-tracks-google-ads-to-find-tor-users/
  3411. ---------------------------------------
  3412. � GCHQ ; MULLENIZE Operation to Tag and
  3413. Identify Packet Traffic From Machines ::
  3414.  
  3415.  �Working together, CT and CNE have
  3416. devised a method to carry out large-scale
  3417. �staining� as a means to identify
  3418. individual machines linked to that
  3419. IP address. ... ...
  3420.  
  3421.  User Agent Staining is a technique that
  3422. involves writing a unique marker (or stain)
  3423. onto a target machine. Each stain is
  3424. visible in passively collected SIGINT
  3425. and is stamped into every packet, which
  3426. enables all the events from that stained
  3427. machine to be brought back together to
  3428. recreate a browsing session.�
  3429.  
  3430. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/gchq-mullenize.pdf
  3431.  
  3432. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/801762/mullenize-28redacted-29.pdf
  3433.  
  3434. � Packet Staining ::
  3435.  
  3436. http://prezi.com/p5et9yawg2c6/ip-packet-staining/
  3437. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-00
  3438. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-macaulay-6man-packet-stain-01
  3439. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/packet-stain/packet-staining.htm
  3440.  
  3441. � NSA Peeling Back the Layers of Tor ::
  3442.  
  3443. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-egotisticalgiraffe.pdf
  3444. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/oct/04/egotistical-giraffe-nsa-tor-document
  3445. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
  3446. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/nsa-gchq-attack-tor-network-encryption
  3447.  
  3448. � NSA ; Tor Source Code Vulnerabilities ::
  3449.  
  3450.  �We have seen several targets using Tor.
  3451. Our goal was to analyze Tor source code
  3452. and determine any vulnerabilities in
  3453. the system. We set up an internal Tor
  3454. network to analyze Tor traffic, in the
  3455. hopes of discovering ways to passively
  3456. identify it. We also worked to create
  3457. a custom Tor client which allows the
  3458. user finer control.� ... ...
  3459.  
  3460.  �This accomplishes several things.
  3461. Most basically, the Tor servers, many
  3462. of which are listed on publicly advertised
  3463. directory servers, are chosen to act as
  3464. a series of proxies. This may seem to
  3465. be excessively complex, as a single
  3466. proxy server can be used to hide one�s
  3467. location, but a single-hop proxy is
  3468. vulnerable in two ways. First, by
  3469. analyzing the pattern of the traffic
  3470. going to and from the proxy server,
  3471. it is possible to deduce which clients
  3472. are making which requests. Second, if
  3473. an attacker owns the proxy server, then
  3474. it certainly knows who is asking for what,
  3475. and anonymization is ruined. By using
  3476. multiple hops, Tor is much more resistant
  3477. to both of these attacks. Traffic analysis
  3478. becomes extraordinarily difficult, as it
  3479. must be coordinated across several machines,
  3480. and an attacker must own all the hops
  3481. along the circuit in order to trace
  3482. requests back to the originating client.�
  3483.  
  3484. ... ...
  3485.  
  3486.  �In our time in the lab, we found that
  3487. running an nmap on a node that is offering
  3488. a hidden service will turn up the port
  3489. that the hidden service is using to deal
  3490. with incoming connections. It can then be
  3491. directly connected to, outside of Tor.�
  3492.  
  3493. ... ...
  3494.  
  3495.  �We would have to try to connect to
  3496. each of the ports we see open on a
  3497. machine to determine if there is a
  3498. hidden service being run. We would not
  3499. even know which protocol the hidden
  3500. service is running. It may be an HTTP
  3501. server, an FTP server, an SMTP server,
  3502. etc. The only thing we know is that
  3503. the protocol must run over TCP. It is
  3504. not enough to attempt to connect once
  3505. to each port, using an HTTP GET request.
  3506. Several protocols must be tried.�
  3507.  
  3508. ... ...
  3509.  
  3510.  �It may also be useful to study Tor
  3511. directory servers in more detail. Our
  3512. work focused solely on the client, but
  3513. many attacks would be much easier with
  3514. access to more Tor servers. The directory
  3515. servers ultimately control which Tor
  3516. servers are used by clients. We have found
  3517. that a server can put itself on a directory
  3518. server multiple times; all it takes is the
  3519. server running several Tor processes, each
  3520. having a different nickname, open port,
  3521. fingerprint, and LOG FILE. This only
  3522. requires different configuration files
  3523. for the different processes, which are
  3524. easy to set up. That machine will handle
  3525. a disproportionate amount of traffic,
  3526. since it is listed several times. This
  3527. increases the density of friendly servers
  3528. in the cloud without increasing the number
  3529. of servers we have set up. Unfortunately,
  3530. each listing has the same IP address,
  3531. which would be very noticeable to anyone
  3532. who inspecting the directories.�
  3533.  
  3534. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor.pdf
  3535. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/802061/ces-summer-2006-tor-paper-28redacted-29-1.pdf
  3536. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/secret-nsa-documents-show-campaign-against-tor-encrypted-network/2013/10/04/610f08b6-2d05-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_story.html
  3537.  
  3538. � NSA ; Types of IAT ::
  3539.  
  3540. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-iat-tor.pdf
  3541.  
  3542. � NSA Link Removed by Guardian ::
  3543.  
  3544. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-link-removed.htm
  3545.  
  3546. � Tor Media Reports Disinformative (?) ::
  3547.  
  3548.  �This document doesn�t give much insight
  3549. into capabilities the IC has developed
  3550. against Tor. It�s apparently quite common
  3551. to run multiple research teams (either
  3552. known or unknown to each other) against
  3553. a single target, and a few summer students
  3554. with a dozen lab machines is a pretty
  3555. small investment. I�d expect there are
  3556. other programs with more sophisticated
  3557. attacks, especially now 7 years later.�
  3558.  
  3559. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/nsa-tor-disinfo.htm
  3560. _______________________________________
  3561. � Greenwald and Gibson Q&A @ Reddit ::
  3562.  
  3563. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/greenwald-gibson-reddit.pdf
  3564. _______________________________________
  3565. � Mike Rogers Says He�d Like To See
  3566. Snowden On a Hit List ::
  3567.  
  3568. http://www.infowars.com/former-nsa-head-says-hed-like-to-see-snowden-on-us-kill-list/
  3569.  
  3570.  �I must admit, in my darker moment over
  3571. the past several months, I�d also thought
  3572. of nominating Mr. Snowden, but it was
  3573. for a different list,� Hayden said during
  3574. a panel discussion, according to Brendan
  3575. Sasso of The Hill.
  3576.  
  3577.  Sasso notes that the audience laughed,
  3578. and Rep. Mike Rogers (R-Mich), chairman
  3579. of the House Intelligence Committee who
  3580. was also on the panel, responded, �I can
  3581. help you with that.�
  3582.  
  3583. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/326315-former-nsa-chief-jokes-about-putting-snowden-on-kill-list
  3584.  
  3585.  The conversation then turned specifically
  3586. to the government�s use of targeted
  3587. killings, with Hayden noting �Yes, we
  3588. do targeted killings, and I certainly
  3589. hope they make full use of the capacities
  3590. of the National Security Agency when we
  3591. do that.�
  3592.  
  3593.  Hayden was responding to a question
  3594. about a new project announced by journalists
  3595. Glenn Greenwald and Jeremy Scahill,
  3596. delving into the NSA�s alleged role in
  3597. assassinations.
  3598.  
  3599. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-assassination-leaks-greenwald-514/
  3600. _______________________________________
  3601. � NSA Police Guard Threatens Reporters ::
  3602.  
  3603. Infowars crew arrive at Utah Data Center.
  3604.  
  3605. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-goons-confiscate-cameras-from-reporters/
  3606.  
  3607. http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/politics/56958862-90/data-center-utah-amp.html.csp
  3608. _______________________________________
  3609. � Cost and Responsibility for Snowden�s
  3610. Breaches ::
  3611.  
  3612. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/snowden-cost.htm
  3613.  
  3614. � Questioning Snowden Truth ::
  3615.  
  3616. http://cryptome.org/2013/10/questioning-snowden-truth.htm
  3617. _______________________________________
  3618. � NSA Gathers Data on Social Networks
  3619. of US Citizens ::
  3620.  
  3621.  The new disclosures add to the growing
  3622. body of knowledge in recent months about
  3623. the NSA�s access to and use of private
  3624. information concerning Americans, prompting
  3625. lawmakers in Washington to call for reining
  3626. in the agency and President Obama to order
  3627. an examination of its surveillance policies.
  3628. Almost everything about the agency�s
  3629. operations is hidden, and the decision
  3630. to revise the limits concerning Americans
  3631. was made in secret, without review by the
  3632. nation�s intelligence court or any public
  3633. debate. As far back as 2006, a Justice
  3634. Department memo warned of the potential
  3635. for the �misuse� of such information
  3636. without adequate safeguards.
  3637.  
  3638. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse.htm
  3639. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-syanpse-large.jpg
  3640. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsa-examines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0
  3641.  
  3642. � NSA Director Admits NSA Collects Data
  3643. From American Social Networks ::
  3644.  
  3645. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_SOCIAL_NETWORKS?SITE=AP
  3646. _______________________________________
  3647. � GCHQ Faces Legal Challenge in European
  3648. Court Over Online Privacy ::
  3649.  
  3650. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/oct/03/gchq-legal-challenge-europe-privacy-surveillance
  3651. _______________________________________
  3652. UNITED STATES ONLY COUNTRY TO VOTE �NO�
  3653. TO A NEW TREATY FOR DIGITAL PRIVACY ::
  3654.  
  3655.  Led by the German government, a loose
  3656. coalition of privacy chiefs from countries
  3657. across the world is pushing to update an
  3658. influential international human rights
  3659. treaty that enshrines the right to privacy.
  3660.  
  3661. ... ...
  3662.  
  3663.  The annual conference was attended by a
  3664. diverse selection of privacy and data
  3665. protection officials from across the
  3666. world, with representatives attending
  3667. from countries including Japan, New Zealand,
  3668. France, Slovenia, Uruguay, Belgium, Ireland,
  3669. Finland, Spain, Australia, Germany, Burkina
  3670. Faso, Canada, the United States, and the
  3671. United Kingdom.
  3672.  
  3673.  During a closed session at the conference
  3674. open only to the privacy chiefs, a
  3675. resolution was put forward for a vote
  3676. on the proposal to update Article 17.
  3677. They voted overwhelmingly in favor of
  3678. the idea, recognizing a need to �create
  3679. globally applicable standards for data
  3680. protection and the protection of privacy
  3681. in accordance with the rule of law.�
  3682.  
  3683.  Notably, only one country did not approve
  3684. of the resolution ... the United States.
  3685.  
  3686.  At this point, the proposed Article 17
  3687. protocol is still a long way off. It will
  3688. eventually need to be put forward at the
  3689. United Nations and voted on by member
  3690. states, and that could take time. But
  3691. the growing appetite to amend the
  3692. international treaty in light of the
  3693. Snowden revelations is highly symbolic
  3694. if nothing else, reflecting widespread
  3695. concerns about the power of mass surveillance
  3696. technology in the digital age to trample
  3697. over basic universal privacy rights.
  3698.  
  3699. https://privacyconference2013.org/web/pageFiles/kcfinder/files/5.%20International%20law%20resolution%20EN%281%29.pdf
  3700.  
  3701. http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/26/article_17_surveillance_update_countries_want_digital_privacy_in_the_iccpr.html
  3702.  
  3703. NOBODY comments
  3704.  
  3705.  �The problem is not just the NSA, but
  3706. all secret agencies around the world,
  3707. in general. All secret agencies and
  3708. their third-party vendors or allies
  3709. break (or bypass) crypto and manufacture
  3710. backdoors in electronic communication
  3711. devices by stealth. Not just the NSA.
  3712. Not just the GCHQ. Not just the GFO.
  3713. Not just the ISNU, et al. The major
  3714. problem is trust. If you desire privacy,
  3715. you must kill any trust in security.
  3716.  
  3717.  Security does not exist on the web.
  3718. Digital privacy is a hoax. It�s null.
  3719. It�s a wet dream. It�s justice FUBAR.�
  3720. _______________________________________
  3721. � Deutsche Telekom Defies NSA Spying ::
  3722.  
  3723. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303983904579096082938662594.html
  3724.  
  3725. � Deutsche DSL Phone Switch Data Dump ::
  3726.  
  3727. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dtag-dsl-switches.txt
  3728. _______________________________________
  3729. � Senate FISA Hearings, September 2013 ::
  3730.  
  3731. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/edgar-13-0926.pdf
  3732. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/wittes-13-0926.pdf
  3733. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-nsa-doj-13-0926.pdf
  3734. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0926.pdf
  3735. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-13-0926.pdf
  3736.  
  3737. � Dianne Feinstein Accidentally Confirms
  3738. NSA Tapped the Internet Backbone ::
  3739.  
  3740. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130927/13562624678/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-internet-backbone.shtml
  3741. http://www.infowars.com/dianne-feinstein-accidentally-confirms-that-nsa-tapped-the-internet-backbone/
  3742. http://www.c-spanvideo.org/clip/4466341
  3743.  
  3744.  In short, �upstream� capabilities are
  3745. tapping the backbone itself, via the
  3746. willing assistance of the telcos (who
  3747. still have remained mostly silent on
  3748. all of this) as opposed to �downstream�
  3749. collection, which requires going to the
  3750. internet companies directly.
  3751.  
  3752. � Senators Blame Public News Covering Leaks ::
  3753.  
  3754. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/26/senators-nsa-media_n_3998229.html
  3755.  
  3756. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying ::
  3757.  
  3758. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  3759. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  3760. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  3761. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  3762. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  3763. _______________________________________
  3764. � Declassified Documents Reveal the NSA
  3765. Wiretapped Martin Luther King, Muhammad
  3766. Ali and Two US Senators ::
  3767.  
  3768. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/26/nsa-surveillance-anti-vietnam-muhammad-ali-mlk
  3769. _______________________________________
  3770. � NSA Hacked Indian Politicos, Scientists ::
  3771.  
  3772.  According to a top secret document
  3773. disclosed by NSA whistleblower Edward
  3774. Snowden and obtained by The Hindu, the
  3775. PRISM programme was deployed by the
  3776. American agency to gather key information
  3777. from India by tapping directly into the
  3778. servers of tech giants which provide
  3779. services such as email, video sharing,
  3780. voice-over-IPs, online chats, file
  3781. transfer and social networking services.
  3782.  
  3783.  And, according to the PRISM document
  3784. seen by The Hindu, much of the communication
  3785. targeted by the NSA is unrelated to terrorism,
  3786. contrary to claims of Indian and American
  3787. officials.
  3788.  
  3789.  Instead, much of the surveillance was
  3790. focused on India�s domestic politics and
  3791. the country�s strategic and commercial
  3792. interests.
  3793.  
  3794. http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nsa-targets-indian-politics-space-nprogrammes/article5161299.ece
  3795.  
  3796.  According to the 2010 COMINT (communication
  3797. intelligence) document about �Close Access
  3798. SIGADs�, the offices of Indian diplomats
  3799. and high-ranking military officials stationed
  3800. at these important posts were targets of
  3801. four different kinds of electronic snooping
  3802. devices:
  3803.  
  3804.  Lifesaver, which facilitates imaging of
  3805. the hard drive of computers.
  3806.  
  3807.  Highlands, which makes digital collection
  3808. from implants.
  3809.  
  3810.  Vagrant, which collects data of open
  3811. computer screens.
  3812.  
  3813.  Magnetic, which is a collection of
  3814. digital signals.
  3815.  
  3816. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/nsa-planted-bugs-at-indian-missions-in-dc-un/article5164944.ece
  3817. _______________________________________
  3818. � Secret Bunkers, a Challenge for US
  3819. Intelligence ::
  3820.  
  3821.  Accessing archived government documents,
  3822. the National Security Archive, an
  3823. anti-secrecy group, has revealed a
  3824. decades-long effort by the US to detect,
  3825. monitor, and in some cases plan the
  3826. destruction of, �more than 10,000 such
  3827. facilities worldwide, many of them in
  3828. hostile territory, and many presumably
  3829. intended to hide or protect lethal military
  3830. equipment and activities, including
  3831. weapons of mass destruction, that could
  3832. threaten US or allied interests.�
  3833.  
  3834. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/secret-bunkers-a-challenge-for-us-intelligence/article5164833.ece
  3835. _______________________________________
  3836. � More Unreported, Unredacted NSA Slides ::
  3837.  
  3838. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/09/unreportedunredacted-nsa-slidesprogram-names-revealed-on-brazil-news/
  3839. _______________________________________
  3840. � Guardian�s Alan Rusbridger on the
  3841. Inside Story of NSA Leaks ::
  3842.  
  3843. http://leaksource.wordpress.com/2013/09/24/guardians-alan-rusbridger-on-the-inside-story-of-snowden-nsa-leaks/
  3844. _______________________________________
  3845. � PRISM Part of the BLARNEY Program ::
  3846.  
  3847. http://electrospaces.blogspot.nl/2013/09/prism-as-part-of-blarney-program.html
  3848. _______________________________________
  3849. � New Separate Internet Being Built by
  3850. Countries Targeted by NSA and GCHQ ::
  3851.  
  3852. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/U564-Imphandze-BRICS-Leaflet.pdf
  3853. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2013-submarine-cable-market-industry-report.pdf
  3854. http://www.bricscable.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/BRICS-BUSINESS-FORUM-JOINT-COMMUNIQUE-26-March-2013.pdf
  3855.  
  3856. � New Separate Internet Will Not be
  3857. Under United States Control ::
  3858.  
  3859.  The President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff
  3860. announces publicly the creation of a
  3861. world internet system INDEPENDENT from
  3862. US and Britain or �US-centric internet.�
  3863.  
  3864.  Not many understand that, while the
  3865. immediate trigger for the decision
  3866. (coupled with the cancellation of a
  3867. summit with the US president) was the
  3868. revelations on NSA spying, the reason
  3869. why Rousseff can take such a historic
  3870. step is that the alternative infrastructure:
  3871. The BRICS cable from Vladivostock,
  3872. Russia to Shantou, China to Chennai,
  3873. India to Cape Town, South Africa to
  3874. Fortaleza, Brazil, is being built and
  3875. it�s, actually, in its final phase of
  3876. implementation.
  3877.  
  3878.  �The global backlash is only beginning
  3879. and will get far more severe in coming
  3880. months,� said Sascha Meinrath, director
  3881. of the Open Technology Institute at the
  3882. Washington-based New America Foundation
  3883. think-tank. �This notion of national
  3884. privacy sovereignty is going to be an
  3885. increasingly salient issue around the
  3886. globe.�
  3887.  
  3888. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/www.globalresearch.ca/the-brics-independent-internet-in-defiance-of-the-us-centric-internet/5350272
  3889. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/brazil-plans-to-go-offline-from-uscentric-internet/article5137689.ece
  3890. http://www.excitingrio.com/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet/
  3891. http://indrus.in/economics/2013/03/01/brics_cable_connecting_continents_brick_by_brick_22617.html
  3892.  
  3893. � The BRICS Fiber-optic Cable ::
  3894.  
  3895.  A 34,000 km, 2 fibre pair, 12.8 Tbit/s
  3896. capacity, fibre optic cable system.
  3897.  
  3898. http://www.bricscable.com/
  3899.  
  3900. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkQI4bJcDGw
  3901. _______________________________________
  3902. � No Phone Company Ever Challenged NSA
  3903. Metadata Collection Orders ::
  3904.  
  3905.  A newly declassified opinion from the
  3906. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  3907. from this summer shows the court�s
  3908. interpretation of the controversial
  3909. Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act
  3910. that�s used to justify the National
  3911. Security Agency�s bulk telephone
  3912. metadata collections, and reveals
  3913. that none of the companies that have
  3914. been served with such orders has ever
  3915. challenged one.
  3916.  
  3917. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  3918. _______________________________________
  3919. � Experts Worry About Long-Term Blowback
  3920. of NSA Revelations ::
  3921.  
  3922.  With all of the disturbing revelations
  3923. that have come to light in the last few
  3924. weeks regarding the NSA�s collection
  3925. methods and its efforts to weaken
  3926. cryptographic protocols and security
  3927. products, experts say that perhaps the
  3928. most worrisome result of all of this
  3929. is that no one knows who or what they
  3930. can trust anymore.
  3931.  
  3932.  The fallout from the most-recent NSA
  3933. leaks, which revealed the agency�s
  3934. ability to subvert some cryptographic
  3935. standards and its �partnerships� with
  3936. software and hardware vendors to insert
  3937. backdoors into various unnamed products,
  3938. has continued to accumulate over the
  3939. course of the last couple of weeks.
  3940. Cryptographers and security researchers
  3941. have been eager to determine which
  3942. products and protocols are suspect,
  3943. and the discussion has veered in a
  3944. lot of different directions. But one
  3945. thing that�s become clear is that when
  3946. the government lost the so-called
  3947. Crypto Wars in the 1990s, the NSA
  3948. didn�t just go back to Fort Meade
  3949. and tend to its knitting.
  3950.  
  3951. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/experts-worry-about-long-term-implications-of-nsa-revelations/102355
  3952.  
  3953. � The Sky is Not Falling � It�s Fallen ::
  3954.  
  3955.  The security community didn�t invent
  3956. the concept of fear, uncertainty and
  3957. doubt, but it has perfected it and raised
  3958. it to the level of religion. It�s the
  3959. way that security products are marketed
  3960. and sold, but it�s also the way that
  3961. the intelligence community justifies
  3962. its extra-legal and, in some cases,
  3963. unconstitutional, data-gathering
  3964. practices. Just as vendors use the
  3965. specter of catastrophic hacks, data
  3966. loss and public embarrassment to push
  3967. their wares, the NSA and its allies
  3968. have used the dark shadow of 9/11 and
  3969. global terrorism to justify their
  3970. increasingly aggressive practices,
  3971. some of which have now been shown to
  3972. have deliberately weakened some of the
  3973. fundamental building blocks of security.
  3974.  
  3975.  The most damning bit of string in this
  3976. ball is the news that the NSA likely
  3977. inserted a back door into a key
  3978. cryptographic algorithm known as
  3979. DUAL EC DRBG. That�s bad. What�s worse
  3980. is that RSA on Thursday sent a warning
  3981. to its developer customers warning them
  3982. to immediately stop using the company�s
  3983. BSAFE library because it uses the
  3984. compromised random number generator.
  3985. That means that untold numbers of products
  3986. that include the BSAFE crypto libraries
  3987. are compromised.
  3988.  
  3989. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/the-sky-is-not-falling-its-fallen/102372
  3990. _______________________________________
  3991. � President Surveillance Program Review ::
  3992.  
  3993.  �The program was reauthorized by the
  3994. President approximately every 45 days,
  3995. with certain modifications. Collectively,
  3996. the activities carried out under these
  3997. Authorizations are referred to as the
  3998. �President�s Surveillance Program� or
  3999. �PSP.� One of the activities authorized
  4000. as part of the PSP was the interception of
  4001. the content of communications into and out
  4002. of the United States where there was a
  4003. reasonable basis to conclude that one
  4004. party to the communication was a member
  4005. of al-Qa�ida or related terrorist organizations.
  4006.  
  4007.  This aspect of the PSP was publicly
  4008. acknowledged and described by the President,
  4009. the Attorney General, and other Administration
  4010. officials beginning in December 2005 following
  4011. a series of articles published in The New York
  4012. Times. The Attorney General subsequently
  4013. publicly acknowledged the fact that other
  4014. intelligence activities were also authorized
  4015. under the same Presidential Authorization,
  4016. but the details of those activities remain
  4017. classified.� ... ...
  4018.  
  4019.  �Prior to September 11,2001, the Foreign
  4020. Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
  4021. Executive Order 12333 were generally viewed
  4022. as the principal governing authorities for
  4023. conducting electronic surveillance for
  4024. national security purposes. The Foreign
  4025. Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C.
  4026. � 1801, et seq., was enacted in 1978 to
  4027. "provide legislative authorization and
  4028. regulation for all electronic surveillance
  4029. conducted within the United States for
  4030. foreign intelligence purposes."�
  4031.  
  4032. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/psp-09-0710.pdf
  4033.  
  4034. � NSA ; PSP Analysis Loophole to Snoop
  4035. Domestic Contacts Along with Metadata ::
  4036.  
  4037. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf
  4038.  
  4039. NOBODY comments (nsa-ig-09-0324.pdf)
  4040.  
  4041.  The President�s Surveillance Program (PSP)
  4042. should be of high interest. As mentioned
  4043. on page 17, the PSP did not - �did not� -
  4044. require special approval. Therefore, just
  4045. another gap. Also take in consideration
  4046. other abuse against FISA laws, court order
  4047. to stifle FAA 702 upstream analysis, EO 12333,
  4048. and of-course NSA�s now admitted abuse -
  4049. deliberately ignoring restrictions against
  4050. domestic communications (a risk to comsec).
  4051. _______________________________________
  4052. � Britain�s GCHQ Hacked Belgian Telecom
  4053. Firm ::
  4054.  
  4055.  Documents from the archive of whistleblower
  4056. Edward Snowden indicate that Britain�s
  4057. GCHQ intelligence service was behind a
  4058. cyber attack against Belgacom, a partly
  4059. state-owned Belgian telecoms company.
  4060. A �top secret� Government Communications
  4061. Headquarters (GCHQ) presentation seen by
  4062. SPIEGEL indicate that the goal of project,
  4063. conducted under the codename �Operation
  4064. Socialist,� was �to enable better
  4065. exploitation of Belgacom� and to
  4066. improve understanding of the provider�s
  4067. infrastructure. ... ...
  4068.  
  4069.  According to the slides in the GCHQ
  4070. presentation, the attack was directed
  4071. at several Belgacom employees and
  4072. involved the planting of a highly
  4073. developed attack technology referred
  4074. to as a �Quantum Insert� (�QI�). It
  4075. appears to be a method with which the
  4076. person being targeted, without their
  4077. knowledge, is redirected to websites
  4078. that then plant malware on their
  4079. computers that can then manipulate
  4080. them. Some of the employees whose
  4081. computers were infiltrated had �good
  4082. access� to important parts of Belgacom�s
  4083. infrastructure, and this seemed to
  4084. please the British spies, according
  4085. to the slides.
  4086.    
  4087. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/british-spy-agency-gchq-hacked-belgian-telecoms-firm-a-923406.html
  4088. http://www.infowars.com/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco/
  4089. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130920/16112724595/latest-snowden-leaks-show-gchq-gleefully-hacking-belgian-telco.shtml
  4090. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom-hack-en.htm
  4091. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/belgacom.htm
  4092. _______________________________________
  4093. � European Parliament Brief on NSA ::
  4094.  
  4095. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/europarl-nsa.pdf
  4096.  
  4097. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/briefingnote_/briefingnote_en.pdf
  4098. _______________________________________
  4099. � NSA Buys Vupen Exploits ::
  4100.  
  4101. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-vupen.pdf
  4102. http://news.softpedia.com/news/Security-Firm-VUPEN-Confirms-the-NSA-Bought-Exploits-Service-Subscription-383597.shtml
  4103. http://proxy.rickmartensen.nl/threatpost.com/nsa-bought-exploit-service-from-vupen-contract-shows
  4104. _______________________________________
  4105. � US Government Foreign Telecommunications
  4106. Providers Network Security Agreements ::
  4107.  
  4108. http://publicintelligence.net/us-nsas/
  4109. http://info.publicintelligence.net/US-NSAs.zip
  4110. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
  4111. _______________________________________
  4112. � FISA Court Releases FBI Spy Documents ::
  4113.  
  4114. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-13-0917-4.pdf
  4115. ���������������������������������������
  4116. ? FISC Orders All Spy Data Disclosure
  4117. Allocated to One Release ::
  4118.  
  4119. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-five-13-0918.pdf
  4120.  
  4121. � Linkedin Moves to Disclose Spy Data ::
  4122.  
  4123. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-linkedin-13-0917.pdf
  4124.  
  4125. � FISC Schedule for Microsoft, Google,
  4126. Yahoo and Facebook Spy Data Release ::
  4127.  
  4128. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/fisc-ms-google-yahoo-fb-13-0913.pdf
  4129.  
  4130. � Microsoft, Google Spy Data Briefing
  4131. Schedule ::
  4132.  
  4133. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/ms-goog-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4134.  
  4135. � Google Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4136.  
  4137. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/google-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4138.  
  4139. � Yahoo Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4140.  
  4141. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/yahoo-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4142.  
  4143. � Facebook Moves to Disclose User Spy Data ::
  4144.  
  4145. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/facebook-fisc-13-0909.pdf
  4146. ���������������������������������������
  4147. � DoJ Stonewalls USA Today ::
  4148.  
  4149.  In response to a FOIA request from
  4150. USA TODAY, the Justice Department said
  4151. its ethics office never looked into
  4152. complaints from two federal judges
  4153. that they had been misled about NSA
  4154. surveillance.
  4155.  
  4156. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj.pdf
  4157. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/usa-today-doj-shots.jpg
  4158. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/09/19/nsa-surveillance-justice-opr-investigation/2805867/
  4159. ���������������������������������������
  4160.  Perry Metzger: Matthew Green tweeted
  4161. earlier today that Johns Hopkins will
  4162. be hosting a roundtable at 10am EDT
  4163. tomorrow (Wednesday, September 18th)
  4164. to discuss the NSA crypto revelations.
  4165.  
  4166. Livestream will be at:
  4167.  
  4168. https://connect.johnshopkins.edu/jhuisicrypto/
  4169. _______________________________________
  4170. � NSA Spying Documents to be Released as
  4171. Result of EFF Lawsuit Against NSA ::
  4172.  
  4173. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/hundreds-pages-nsa-spying-documents-be-released-result-eff-lawsuit
  4174.  
  4175. � Government Releases NSA Surveillance
  4176. Docs and Previously Secret FISA Court
  4177. Opinions In Response to EFF Lawsuit ::
  4178.  
  4179. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/government-releases-nsa-surveillance-docs-and-previously-secret-fisa-court
  4180.  
  4181.  The Director of National Intelligence
  4182. (DNI) just today released hundreds of
  4183. pages of documents related to the
  4184. government�s secret interpretation of
  4185. Patriot Act Section 215 and the NSA�s
  4186. (mis)use of its massive database of
  4187. every American�s phone records. The
  4188. documents were released as a result
  4189. of EFF�s ongoing Freedom of Information
  4190. Act lawsuit.
  4191.  
  4192.  We�ve posted links to each document
  4193. below. While the government also posted
  4194. many of the documents here ...
  4195.  
  4196. http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/
  4197.  
  4198. ... our copies are completely searchable.
  4199.  
  4200. Links to the documents ;
  4201.  
  4202. � May 24, 2006 � Order from the Foreign
  4203. Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4204.  
  4205. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_06-05_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4206.  
  4207. � December 12, 2008 � Supplemental Opinion
  4208. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4209. Court
  4210.  
  4211. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_february_2011_production_br10-82_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4212.  
  4213. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4214. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4215. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4216. Court
  4217.  
  4218. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_alert_list_order_1-28-09_final_redacted1.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4219.  
  4220. � January 28, 2009 � Order Regarding Preliminary
  4221. Notice of Compliance Incident Dated January 15,
  4222. 2009 from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  4223. Court - With Cover Letter and Attached Declarations
  4224.  
  4225. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/5_march_09_production-final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4226.  
  4227. � February 26, 2009 � Notice of Compliance
  4228. Incident
  4229.  
  4230. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_doj_notice_with_supp_decl_as_filed_26_feb_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4231.  
  4232. � March 2, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4233. Intelligence Court
  4234.  
  4235. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_08-13_order_3-2-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4236.  
  4237. � June 22, 2009 � Order from the Foreign
  4238. Intelligence Court
  4239.  
  4240. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-06_order_and_supplemental_order_6-22-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4241.  
  4242. � June 25, 2009 � Implementation of the Foreign
  4243. Intelligence Surveillance Court Authorized
  4244. Business Records FISA
  4245.  
  4246. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/nsa_business_records_fisa_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4247.  
  4248. � August 19, 2009 � Report of the United
  4249. States with Attachments and Cover Letter
  4250.  
  4251. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/4_september_09_production_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_1.pdf
  4252.  
  4253. � September 3, 2009 � Primary Order from the
  4254. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
  4255.  
  4256. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_orders_signed_3_sept_09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4257.  
  4258. � September 25, 2009 � Order Regarding Further
  4259. Compliance Incidence from the Foreign Intelligence
  4260. Surveillance Court
  4261.  
  4262. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-13_-_september_25_order_regarding_further_compliance_incidents_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4263.  
  4264. � November 5, 2009 � Supplemental Opinion
  4265. and Order from the Foreign Intelligence
  4266. Surveillance Court
  4267.  
  4268. https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/br_09-15_supplemental_order_and_opinion_11-5-09_final_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf
  4269.  
  4270. � Gems Mined from the NSA Documents and
  4271. FISA Court Opinions Released Today ::
  4272.  
  4273. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/09/gems-mined-nsa-docs-released-today
  4274.  
  4275. � NSA FISA Business Records Offer a Lot
  4276. to Learn (NSA Networks Not Encrypted) ::
  4277.  
  4278. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-fisa-business-records.htm
  4279. _______________________________________
  4280. � NSA Spy Community Architecture 2011 ::
  4281.  
  4282. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spy-architecture.pdf
  4283.  
  4284. � DNI Spy Community Architecture 2009 ::
  4285.  
  4286. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-spy-architecture.pdf
  4287. ���������������������������������������
  4288. � Keith�s Information Dominance Center ::
  4289.  
  4290. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/info-dominance.pdf
  4291. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/08/the_cowboy_of_the_nsa_keith_alexander?print=yes
  4292. http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2013-09-15/man-charge-nsa-modeled-his-office-bridge-starship-enterprise
  4293. _______________________________________
  4294. � Germany�s Domestic Spy Agency Hands
  4295. Over Data to the NSA ::
  4296.  
  4297.  Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4298. Protection of the Constitution regularly
  4299. hands over classified data to the NSA,
  4300. media report. The revelation comes as
  4301. Edward Snowden�s leaks show that
  4302. Germany�s foreign spy agencies share
  4303. troves of data with the US and UK.
  4304.  
  4305.  Citing secret government documents,
  4306. Suddeutsche Zeitung reported that
  4307. Germany�s Federal Office for the
  4308. Protection of the Constitution, charged
  4309. with domestic security, works closely
  4310. with the US and regularly sends them
  4311. information.
  4312.  
  4313.  The security service gathers intelligence
  4314. on internal security threats. The documents
  4315. obtained by Sueddeutsche Zeitung recorded
  4316. 864 data packages sent to the NSA, as
  4317. well as regular meetings between officers
  4318. of the German Federal Office and the NSA.
  4319.  
  4320. http://rt.com/news/germany-shares-data-nsa-spying-858/
  4321. _______________________________________
  4322. � Dutch Government Response to Snowden�s
  4323. Revelations ::
  4324.  
  4325. This is an unofficial translation.
  4326.  
  4327. http://blog.cyberwar.nl/2013/09/dutch-govt-response-to-revelations-by.html
  4328.  
  4329.  On September 13th 2013, the Dutch
  4330. government responded (.pdf, in Dutch)
  4331. to the revelations by Edward Snowded.
  4332.  
  4333. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/09/14/kabinetsreactie-op-onthullingen-edward-snowden/nederlandse-kabinetsreactie-edward-snowden-13-sept-2013-1.pdf
  4334.  
  4335. https://www.aivd.nl/publish/pages/2533/nederlandse_kabinetsreactie_edward_snowden_13_sept_2013.pdf
  4336. _______________________________________
  4337. � NSA Spied Credit Card Transactions ::
  4338.  
  4339. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-de.pdf
  4340. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-finance-spy-slides.jpg
  4341. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-exclusive-nsa-spies-on-international-bank-transactions-a-922276.html
  4342. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/report-nsa-credit-card-transactions-92390.html
  4343. http://weaselzippers.us/2013/06/06/wsj-report-nsa-tracking-credit-card-transactions-also-has-access-to-phone-records-from-att-and-sprint-along-with-verizon/
  4344. _______________________________________
  4345. � NSA Brazil Spy Slides Decensored ::
  4346.  
  4347. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx-3/nsa-br-mx-3.htm
  4348.  
  4349. � All SATC Slides, Brazil Spying Reports ::
  4350.  
  4351. NSA_SATC_Slides.zip
  4352. (54 files | ZIP | 3.37MB)
  4353.  
  4354. http://filebeam.com/dacf6706b520431f2c4052484abd5b36
  4355.  
  4356. Why does the NSA spy on Brazil?
  4357.  
  4358.  (1) The US wants to maintain global
  4359. economic power, (2) the US wants to
  4360. maintain control over major natural
  4361. resources and (3) the US is afraid the
  4362. new economic powers (within the BRICS)
  4363. may destabilize their economic power
  4364. and control over natural resources.
  4365. _______________________________________
  4366. � A Font to Discourage NSA Snooping ::
  4367.  
  4368.  The ZXX font is designed to be difficult
  4369. for machines to read.
  4370.  
  4371. http://dl.dropbox.com/u/20517415/ZXX.zip
  4372. http://reason.com/blog/2013/06/21/dont-want-the-nsa-to-read-your-email-use
  4373. http://reason.com/archives/2013/09/14/a-font-to-discourage-nsa-snooping
  4374. _______________________________________
  4375. � IETF Draft to Prevent NSA Intercepts ::
  4376.  
  4377. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/prism-proof.htm
  4378.  
  4379. http://www.ietf.org/id/draft-hallambaker-prismproof-req-00.txt
  4380. _______________________________________
  4381. � NSA Targeted Israel for Surveillance,
  4382. Also Sharing Data With Israeli SIGINT
  4383. National Unit ::
  4384.  
  4385.  A copy of a top-secret deal inked
  4386. in 2009 between the NSA and the
  4387. Israeli Signals-intelligence National
  4388. Unit (ISNU) was provided by NSA
  4389. leaker Edward J. Snowden to the
  4390. Guardian newspaper, which posted
  4391. it Wednesday.
  4392.  
  4393.  It reveals that the NSA �routinely�
  4394. passed to its Israeli counterpart
  4395. raw signals intelligence, referred
  4396. to as �SIGINT,� including the vast
  4397. swathes of digital data traffic that
  4398. the agency gathers under secret court
  4399. authority from US Internet providers.
  4400.  
  4401.  So sensitive is this data that even
  4402. before being disseminated to other US
  4403. agencies, the NSA has to subject it
  4404. to a court-mandated process called
  4405. minimization, under which the names
  4406. of any Americans are removed unless
  4407. they are essential for foreign
  4408. intelligence interest.
  4409.  
  4410.  But the US-Israeli agreement states
  4411. that the data shared with Israel
  4412. �includes, but is not limited to,
  4413. unevaluated and unminimized transcripts,
  4414. gists, facsimiles, telex, voice and
  4415. Digital Network Intelligence metadata
  4416. and content.�
  4417.  
  4418.  �NSA routinely sends ISNU minimized
  4419. and unminimized raw collection associated
  4420. with selectors from multiple Target office
  4421. Primary Interest (TOPI) offices in Analysis
  4422. and Production, S2 as part of SIGINT
  4423. relationship between the two organizations.�
  4424.  
  4425. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-israel-spy-share.pdf
  4426. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785495/doc1.pdf
  4427. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/11/nsa-americans-personal-data-israel-documents
  4428. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/11/nsa-shares-raw-data-americans-israeli-spy-agency/
  4429. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/11/the-nsa-is-sharing-data-with-israel-before-filtering-out-americans-information/
  4430. http://killerapps.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/11/irony_alert_nsa_targets_israel_and_still_gives_your_data_to_its_spies
  4431.  
  4432.  Other documents leaked by Mr. Snowden
  4433. reveal that Israel was one of the nations
  4434. that spy most aggressively against the
  4435. United States.
  4436.  
  4437.  �To further safeguard our classified
  4438. networks, we continue to strengthen
  4439. insider threat detection capabilities
  4440. across the Community. In addition, we
  4441. are investing in target surveillance
  4442. and offensive CI against key targets,
  4443. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  4444. Pakistan, and Cuba.�  - Page 3
  4445.  
  4446. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  4447. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  4448. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  4449.  
  4450. NOBODY comments
  4451.  
  4452.  Ironic NSA considers Israel an �insider
  4453. threat� - meanwhile we provide them with
  4454. plenty of inside information.
  4455.  
  4456.  However the NSA used cryptanalysis and
  4457. exploitation against Brazil leadership
  4458. and Brazil was never a �key target.�
  4459.  
  4460. This reminds of a quote ;
  4461.  
  4462.  �What if all secret agencies were of one
  4463. accord spiritually, like in the paintings
  4464. of dogs playing poker, just using humanity
  4465. to play out one big game of destruction
  4466. and domination with humans as the visible
  4467. and spiritual puppets?�
  4468. _______________________________________
  4469. � DNI Releases Phone Metadata Spying Docs ::
  4470.  
  4471. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/dni-13-0910.pdf
  4472. _______________________________________
  4473. � Smartphones Are Gold Mines to NSA ::
  4474.  
  4475. (EN)
  4476. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  4477.  
  4478. (DE)
  4479. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones.pdf
  4480.  
  4481. � NSA Presentation You Won�t Believe ::
  4482.  
  4483.  Referring to customers as �zombies� is
  4484. the sort of thing you�d expect from
  4485. neckbearded hipsters and other self-
  4486. proclaimed individualists who tend to
  4487. take a dim view of any popular activity.
  4488. It�s rather jarring to hear the lingo
  4489. deployed in a government intelligence
  4490. agency presentation.
  4491.  
  4492. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-smartphones-en.pdf
  4493. https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130909/08582024452/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation.shtml
  4494. http://www.infowars.com/steve-jobs-is-big-brother-and-smartphone-users-are-zombies-according-to-nsa-cell-phone-tapping-presentation/
  4495. ���������������������������������������
  4496. � DNI and NSA Blame Obama to Cover Up
  4497. Violations Against a 2011 Court Order ::
  4498.  
  4499.  The Obama regime secretly won permission
  4500. from a surveillance court in 2011 to
  4501. reverse restrictions on the National
  4502. Security Agency�s use of intercepted
  4503. phone calls and e-mails, permitting
  4504. the agency to search deliberately for
  4505. Americans� communications in its massive
  4506. databases, ACCORDING TO INTERVIEWS WITH
  4507. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS and recently
  4508. �declassified material� - (which, by
  4509. the way, had NO classification, NO date,
  4510. NO stamp, NO names, NO identification
  4511. of which agency it came from and most
  4512. shocking of all NO blackouts, odd.)
  4513.  
  4514. http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/DNI%20Clapper%20Section%20702%20Declassification%20Cover%20Letter.pdf
  4515.  
  4516.  In addition, the court extended the
  4517. length of time that the NSA is allowed
  4518. to retain intercepted US communications
  4519. from five years to six years � and more
  4520. under special circumstances, according
  4521. to the documents, which include a
  4522. recently released 2011 opinion by US
  4523. District Judge John D. Bates, then
  4524. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  4525. Surveillance Court.
  4526.  
  4527. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  4528.  
  4529. NOBODY comments
  4530.  
  4531.  The document which was declassified by
  4532. US intelligence officials explains the
  4533. chief judge of the Foreign Intelligence
  4534. Surveillance Court ruled the FAA 702
  4535. upstream collection unconstitutional.
  4536.  
  4537. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  4538. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  4539. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  4540.  
  4541.  National Security Agency analysts
  4542. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  4543. their authority to spy on Americans.
  4544.  
  4545. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  4546.  
  4547.  NSA analysts admitted to abuse after
  4548. the 2012 FISA Court audit was released.
  4549.  
  4550. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  4551.  
  4552. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  4553.  
  4554.  And this is not the first attempt to
  4555. try to cover up their FISA violations.
  4556.  
  4557. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  4558.  
  4559. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  4560.  
  4561.  The new Washington Post report has
  4562. linked to disinformation from a DNI
  4563. (press) release exposing yet another
  4564. attempt to dodge any criminal charges
  4565. or take responsibility for the abuses
  4566. exposed from the FISA Court audit.
  4567.  
  4568. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-administration-had-restrictions-on-nsa-reversed-in-2011/2013/09/07/c26ef658-0fe5-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html
  4569.  
  4570.  I suspect another attempt by the DNI
  4571. and NSA to cover up FISA violations.
  4572.  
  4573.  Just blame the puppet-in-charge, Obama,
  4574. to use as a scapegoat - go figure.
  4575.  
  4576.  All of this information is backed up
  4577. and will be mirrored soon. Meanwhile,
  4578. here is the leaked 2012 audit exposing
  4579. 2,776 violations one year after the
  4580. FISA Court order.
  4581.  
  4582. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  4583.  
  4584.  As for Congress they will lay down like
  4585. a bunch of leashed dogs who are getting
  4586. kickbacks for doing nothing to prevent
  4587. this abuse nor fix any problems. I will not
  4588. link to their PR circus stunts anymore and
  4589. I encourage voters to throw a majority of
  4590. them out of office come next election.
  4591. _______________________________________
  4592. � Snowden, NSA, and Counterintelligence ::
  4593.  
  4594.  �Ever since the remarkable case of Edward
  4595. Snowden broke into the limelight at the
  4596. beginning of the summer that�s now
  4597. winding down, I�ve had a great deal to
  4598. say about it here, on Twitter, and on
  4599. radio and television. As one of the
  4600. very few former NSA officers who�s
  4601. in the public eye and willing to talk
  4602. about Snowden, I�ve had an audience.
  4603. As a former NSA counterintelligence
  4604. officer with experience dealing with
  4605. the Russians, I�ve been pretty much
  4606. a solo act.
  4607.  
  4608.  From nearly the outset I�ve stated
  4609. that Snowden is very likely an agent
  4610. of Russian intelligence; this was met
  4611. with howls of indignation which have
  4612. died down in recent weeks as it�s
  4613. become apparent that Ed�s staying in
  4614. Russia for some time, along with
  4615. whatever classified materials he
  4616. had on his person. (Since Glenn
  4617. Greenwald�s partner when stopped by
  4618. British authorities at Heathrow had
  4619. 58,000 highly classified documents
  4620. on him, thanks to Ed, one can only
  4621. wonder how big the initial haul
  4622. actually was.) That Snowden was in
  4623. contact with the Russian consulate
  4624. in Hong Kong during his pre-Moscow
  4625. visit there, including spending his
  4626. 30th birthday with his new friends,
  4627. is now admitted. Even President
  4628. Vladimir Putin has conceded that
  4629. Ed�s contacts with Russian officials
  4630. did not commence when he landed at
  4631. Sheremtyevo airport, rather before.�
  4632.  
  4633. http://20committee.com/2013/09/04/snowden-nsa-and-counterintelligence/
  4634. _______________________________________
  4635. � NSA SATC Slide [Images] Leak ::
  4636.  
  4637. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XlkHBB3-DhY
  4638.  
  4639.  Screen shots of Brazilian Fanstastico
  4640. TV show on NSA spying Brazil and Mexico
  4641. presidents, aired 1 September 2013. ?
  4642.  
  4643. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/09/nsa-br-mx/nsa-br-mx.htm
  4644.  
  4645. � NSA Spying Brazil, Mexico Presidents ::
  4646.  
  4647. Translation by Google, tidied by Cryptome.
  4648.  
  4649. http://cryptome.org/2013/09/nsa-spying-brazil.htm
  4650.  
  4651. � NSA SATC Eavesdropping Case Study ::
  4652.  
  4653. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/09/an-nsa-eavesdropping-case-study.html
  4654.  
  4655. ? All 14 SATC Slides Released (Mirrored) ::
  4656.  
  4657. http://up.inet.ge/download.php?file=eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  4658. http://filebeam.com/eb9465849119fa5efe4256304d2c5630
  4659. http://tishare.com/y7ldwxx397kl.htm
  4660. http://f.lui.li/get_822_b946.html
  4661.  
  4662. � Brazil Senate Committee to Probe Espionage ::
  4663.  
  4664.  Brazil�s senate has formed an Investigative
  4665. Parliamentary Commission to follow up on
  4666. reports that the US National Security Agency
  4667. (NSA) spied on Brazilian Prez Dilma Rousseff.
  4668.  
  4669.  �We intend to protect national sovereignty,�
  4670. Xinhua quoted Senator Vanessa Graziotin of
  4671. the Communist Party of Brazil as saying
  4672. Tuesday.
  4673.  
  4674.  The committee, comprising 11 main members
  4675. and seven substitutes, initially has 180
  4676. days to investigate claims that the NSA
  4677. monitored emails between Rousseff and
  4678. several of her top aides, and tapped
  4679. her phone.
  4680.  
  4681. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-senate-committee-probe-us-spying-032012289.html
  4682.  
  4683. � BLOWBACK ; US/Brazil Bilateral Relation
  4684. Impacted ::
  4685.  
  4686.  Revelations of a US spy program that
  4687. allegedly allows digital surveillance
  4688. of the presidents of Brazil and Mexico
  4689. have drawn cries of indignation and anger
  4690. in both nations, but the fallout may be
  4691. strongest for US-Brazil relations.
  4692.  
  4693.  At stake is whether Brazilian Prez Dilma
  4694. Rousseff will cancel a planned state
  4695. visit to Washington in October, the
  4696. first offered by Prez Barack Obama this
  4697. year, or will take action on digital
  4698. security that may affect US companies
  4699. such as Google, Facebook and Yahoo.
  4700.  
  4701.  Rousseff is reported to be considering
  4702. a proposal that would suspend operations
  4703. of companies that cooperate with the
  4704. NSA or US intelligence agencies.
  4705.  
  4706. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/09/03/201125/nsa-leak-might-lead-to-cancellation.html
  4707. _______________________________________
  4708. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 02 ::
  4709.  
  4710. http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/320357-nra-claims-nsa-illegally-created-a-gun-database
  4711.  
  4712. � ACLU Sues the NSA Update 01 ::
  4713.  
  4714. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/27/nsa-surveillance-program-illegal-aclu-lawsuit
  4715. ���������������������������������������
  4716. � Top Secret US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ::
  4717.  
  4718.  �We are bolstering our support for
  4719. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  4720. collect against high priority targets,
  4721. including foreign leadership targets.
  4722. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  4723. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  4724. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  4725. internet traffic.�
  4726.  
  4727. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  4728.  
  4729. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  4730.  
  4731. ? Snapshots of Budget Exhibit ::
  4732.  
  4733. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-exhibit-13.pdf
  4734.  
  4735. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-tidbits.pdf
  4736.  
  4737. ? US Spy Budget FY 2013 - Spoon Fed ::
  4738.  
  4739.  �The Post is withholding some information
  4740. after consultation with US officials who
  4741. expressed concerns about the risk to
  4742. intelligence sources and methods.
  4743. Sensitive details are so pervasive in
  4744. the documents that The Post is publishing
  4745. only summary tables and charts online.�
  4746.  
  4747. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/black-budget-summary-details-us-spy-networks-successes-failures-and-objectives/2013/08/29/7e57bb78-10ab-11e3-8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html
  4748.  
  4749. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  4750. FY 2013 Vol 4 ::
  4751.  
  4752. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v4.pdf
  4753.  
  4754. http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/fy2013cbjb.pdf
  4755.  
  4756. ? Declassified, Censored US Spy Budget
  4757. FY 2013 Vol 12 ::
  4758.  
  4759. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13-v12.pdf
  4760.  
  4761. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/cbjb-2013.pdf
  4762.  
  4763. � Intelligence vs Intelligence ::
  4764.  
  4765.  The Obama regime views Israel as one
  4766. of the top spying threats facing it�s
  4767. intelligence services, leaked documents
  4768. reveal.
  4769.  
  4770.  �Israel should be assumed to continue
  4771. to have an aggressive intelligence
  4772. collection operations against the
  4773. United States,� Pillar said. While
  4774. much information is collected through
  4775. traditional political contacts, �I
  4776. would personally have no doubt that
  4777. that is supplemented by whatever means
  4778. they can use to find out as much as
  4779. they can about what we�re doing,
  4780. thinking, deciding on anything of
  4781. interest to Israel, which would include
  4782. just about any Middle Eastern topic.�
  4783.  
  4784. http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/middle-east-north-africa/319513-leaked-documents-reveal-us-sees-israel-as-a-major-spying-threat
  4785.  
  4786. From US Spy Budget FY 2013 Vol 1 ...
  4787.  
  4788.  �To further safeguard our classified
  4789. networks, we continue to strengthen
  4790. insider threat detection capabilities
  4791. across the Community. In addition, we
  4792. are investing in target surveillance
  4793. and offensive CI against key targets,
  4794. such as China, Russia, Iran, Israel,
  4795. Pakistan, and Cuba.�
  4796. _______________________________________
  4797. � NSA Exploit Isn�t Crypto, It�s SMTP ::
  4798.  
  4799.  �The crypto is the easy part. The hard
  4800. part is the traffic analysis, of which
  4801. the worst part is the Received headers.
  4802. Everyone should look at their own headers
  4803. -- especially people on this list and
  4804. at least comprehend that your email
  4805. geotracks you forever, as it�s all in
  4806. the Mailman archive.
  4807.  
  4808.  There are plenty of other leaks like
  4809. Message-ID, Mime-Version, X-Mailer,
  4810. the actual separators in MIME part
  4811. breaks, and so on.
  4812.  
  4813.  It�s absolutely correct that some
  4814. combination of VPNs, Tor, remailers of
  4815. whatever stripe, and so on can help
  4816. with this, but we�re all lazy and we
  4817. don�t do it all the time.
  4818.  
  4819.  What we�re learning from Snowden is
  4820. that they�re doing traffic analysis --
  4821. analyzing movements, social graphs,
  4822. and so on and so forth. The irony here
  4823. is that this tells us that the crypto
  4824. works. That�s where I�ve been thinking
  4825. for quite some time.
  4826.  
  4827.  Imagine that you�re a SIGINT group trying
  4828. to deal with the inevitability of crypto
  4829. that works being deployed everywhere.
  4830. What do you do? You just be patient and
  4831. start filling in scatter plots of traffic
  4832. analysis.
  4833.  
  4834. The problem isn�t the crypto, it�s SMTP.�
  4835.  
  4836. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-nsa-smtp.htm
  4837.  
  4838. � NSA Trying to Break Encryption ::
  4839.  
  4840.  Among the NSA�s annual budget of $52.6
  4841. billion are requests to bankroll ground-
  4842. breaking cryptanalytic capabilities that
  4843. can beat cryptography and mine regular
  4844. Internet traffic, new documents leaked
  4845. by Edward Snowden to the Washington Post
  4846. reveal.
  4847.  
  4848. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57600647-38/nsa-seeks-groundbreaking-spying-powers-new-leak-reveals/
  4849.  
  4850.  �We are bolstering our support for
  4851. clandestine SIGINT capabilities to
  4852. collect against high priority targets,
  4853. including foreign leadership targets.
  4854. Also, we are investing in groundbreaking
  4855. cryptanalytic capabilities to defeat
  4856. adversarial cryptography and exploit
  4857. internet traffic.� ... ...
  4858.  
  4859. Processing & Exploitation 15% of budget.
  4860.  
  4861.  Cryptanalysis & Exploitation Services ;
  4862. Analysis of Target Systems, Cryptanalytic
  4863. IT Systems, Cyber Cryptanalysis, Exploitation
  4864. Solutions, Microelectronics, PEO Program,
  4865. PEO Program B, PEO Program C, Target Pursuit,
  4866. Target Reconnaissance & Survey.
  4867.  
  4868.  SIGINT Stations ; Cryptologic Centers,
  4869. Field Sites, OCMC, SIGINT Ground Operations.
  4870.  
  4871. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/spy-budget-fy13.pdf
  4872.  
  4873. http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/781537/cbjb-fy13-v1-extract.pdf
  4874.  
  4875. � NSA Rigging the Crypto Market Repost ::
  4876.  
  4877. http://cryptome.org/jya/nsa-sun.htm
  4878.  
  4879. ? NSA May Have SSL Encryption Keys ::
  4880.  
  4881.  The US government has attempted to
  4882. obtain the master encryption keys that
  4883. Internet companies use to shield millions
  4884. of users� private web communications
  4885. from eavesdropping.
  4886.  
  4887.  These demands for master encryption keys,
  4888. which have not been disclosed previously,
  4889. represent a technological escalation in
  4890. the clandestine methods that the FBI and
  4891. the National Security Agency employ when
  4892. conducting electronic surveillance against
  4893. Internet users. ... ...
  4894.  
  4895.  Leaked NSA surveillance procedures,
  4896. authorized by Attorney General Eric
  4897. Holder, suggest that intercepted domestic
  4898. communications are typically destroyed
  4899. -- unless they�re encrypted. If that�s
  4900. the case, the procedures say, �retention
  4901. of all communications that are enciphered�
  4902. is permissible.
  4903.  
  4904. http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
  4905. _______________________________________
  4906. � NSA Arrangements with Foreign Internet
  4907. Providers and Foreign Intelligence ::
  4908.  
  4909.  �The NSA started setting up Internet
  4910. intercepts well before 2001, former
  4911. intelligence officials say. Run by NSA�s
  4912. secretive Special Services Office,
  4913. these types of programs were at first
  4914. designed to intercept communications
  4915. overseas through arrangements with
  4916. foreign Internet providers, the former
  4917. officials say. NSA still has such
  4918. arrangements in many countries,
  4919. particularly in the Middle East and
  4920. Europe, the former officials say.�
  4921.  
  4922. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/08/nsa-has-also-arrangements-with-foreign.html
  4923.  
  4924. � NSA�s Global Surveillance ::
  4925.  
  4926. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-NSAB08202013.jpg
  4927. http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/08/21/319731/nsa-surveillance-new-detail/
  4928. http://www.dailypaul.com/296515/wsj-new-details-show-broader-nsa-surveillance-reach-programs-cover-seventy-five-of-nations-traffic
  4929. ���������������������������������������
  4930. � Another Loophole Around FISA Laws for
  4931. the NSA - Postpone Timestamp Process ::
  4932.  
  4933.  A common hacking technique can be used
  4934. to make emails look as if they came from
  4935. outside the United States.
  4936.  
  4937. http://paste.servut.us/wsiq
  4938. _______________________________________
  4939. � Google and the NSA ; Who�s Holding the
  4940. Shit-Bag Now? ::
  4941.  
  4942. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/assange-google-nsa.htm
  4943.  
  4944. http://thestringer.com.au/google-and-the-nsa-whos-holding-the-shit-bag-now
  4945.  
  4946. ? Related ; Surveillance Industry Profit ::
  4947.  
  4948. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  4949. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  4950. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/nsa-prism-costs-tech-companies-paid
  4951. http://www.informationweek.com/security/government/nsa-paid-tech-companies-millions-for-pri/240160383
  4952. ���������������������������������������
  4953. � Judge Walton FISA Letter to Senator
  4954. Patrick Leahy ::
  4955.  
  4956. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/walton-leahy-13-0729.pdf
  4957.  
  4958. � USA to Provide Declassified FISA Documents ::
  4959.  
  4960. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/usa-fisa-13-0729.pdf
  4961. _______________________________________
  4962. � NSA Analysts Admit Deliberate Abuse ::
  4963.  
  4964.  Some National Security Agency analysts
  4965. deliberately ignored restrictions on
  4966. their authority to spy on Americans
  4967. multiple times in the past decade,
  4968. contradicting Obama regime officials�
  4969. and lawmakers� statements that no
  4970. willful violations occurred. ...
  4971.  
  4972.  Legal opinions declassified on Aug. 21
  4973. revealed that the NSA intercepted as
  4974. many as 56,000 electronic communications
  4975. a year of Americans who weren�t suspected
  4976. of having links to terrorism, before a
  4977. secret court that oversees surveillance
  4978. found the operation unconstitutional
  4979. in 2011.
  4980.  
  4981. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-23/nsa-analysts-intentionally-abused-spying-powers-multiple-times.html
  4982.  
  4983. � FISA Court Shut Down NSA�s Authority to
  4984. Collect Domestic Calls (FAA 702 Upstream)
  4985. in 2011 but the NSA Kept Collecting ::
  4986.  
  4987.  The 86-page document, which was declassified
  4988. by US intelligence officials Wednesday,
  4989. explains why the chief judge of the Foreign
  4990. Intelligence Surveillance Court ruled the
  4991. collection method unconstitutional. ...
  4992.  
  4993.  The documents were released in response
  4994. to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit
  4995. filed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.
  4996.  
  4997.  �It�s unfortunate it took a year of
  4998. litigation and the most significant leak
  4999. in American history to finally get them
  5000. to release this opinion,� EFF staff
  5001. attorney Mark Rumold said Wednesday,
  5002. �but I�m happy that the administration
  5003. is beginning to take this debate seriously.�
  5004.  
  5005. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-shut-nsa-phone-records.pdf
  5006. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/fisa-court-documents-on-illegal-nsa-e-mail-collection-program/409/
  5007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-gathered-thousands-of-americans-e-mails-before-court-struck-down-program/2013/08/21/146ba4b6-0a90-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html
  5008.  
  5009. � NSA Audit of 2,776 FISA Violations ::
  5010.  
  5011. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit.pdf
  5012.  
  5013. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5014.  
  5015. � NSA Fudging FISA Violations ::
  5016.  
  5017. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-fisa-audit-note.pdf
  5018.  
  5019. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/what-to-say-and-not-to-say-to-our-overseers/390/
  5020.  
  5021. � Leaked NSA Audit Found Agency Broke
  5022. Privacy Rules Thousands of Times ::
  5023.  
  5024. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/nsa-report-on-privacy-violations-in-the-first-quarter-of-2012/395/
  5025. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-per-year-audit-finds/2013/08/15/3310e554-05ca-11e3-a07f-49ddc7417125_story_1.html
  5026. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/leaked-nsa-audit-found-agency-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times/
  5027. http://www.dailybinarynews.com/wapo-nsa-broke-privacy-rules-thousands-of-times-harms-uncertain/
  5028. http://www.infowars.com/uncontrolled-by-fisa-court-nsa-commits-thousands-of-privacy-violations-per-year/
  5029. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/16/nsa-violated-privacy-rules-audit
  5030.  
  5031.  The account is based on top-secret
  5032. documents and a May 2012 internal NSA
  5033. audit that found 2,776 infractions �
  5034. including unauthorized collection,
  5035. storage, access to or distribution of
  5036. legally protected communications � in
  5037. the preceding 12 months alone. The audit,
  5038. originally only meant to be seen by top
  5039. NSA leaders, only accounted for violations
  5040. at NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, Virginia,
  5041. and other locations in the Washington DC
  5042. region.
  5043.  
  5044. ? NSA Claims to Have Zero Tolerance Policy ::
  5045.  
  5046.  �I do think in a lot of the headlines
  5047. and other things, there�s people talking
  5048. about privacy violations or abuses or
  5049. willful or violations, right, it is
  5050. important for people to understand,
  5051. NSA has a zero tolerance policy for
  5052. willful misconduct. Zero. That�s our
  5053. tolerance, it�s very simple.
  5054.  
  5055.  Right, we do realize mistakes do occur.
  5056. We detect them, as early as we can.
  5057. We correct them, right. None of the
  5058. mistakes, the incidents that were in
  5059. the document released were willful.
  5060. Right, it doesn�t mean that we have
  5061. any desire to have any mistakes; it
  5062. doesn�t mean we think a mistake is okay.�
  5063.  
  5064. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0816.pdf
  5065.  
  5066. � NSA Reveals That It Does 20,000,000
  5067. Database Queries Per Month ::
  5068.  
  5069. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130819/02153624228/nsa-reveals-that-it-does-20-million-database-queries-per-month.shtml
  5070.  
  5071. � Breaking Down Mass NSA Spying & Lies ::
  5072.  
  5073. http://www.infowars.com/you-wont-believe-whats-going-on-with-government-spying-on-americans/
  5074. _______________________________________
  5075. � UK GCHQ Bude and NSA Exchange Data ::
  5076.  
  5077.  Britain runs a secret internet-monitoring
  5078. station in the Middle East to intercept
  5079. and process vast quantities of emails,
  5080. telephone calls and web traffic on behalf
  5081. of Western intelligence agencies, The
  5082. Independent has learnt. ... ...
  5083.  
  5084.  The information is then processed for
  5085. intelligence and passed to GCHQ in
  5086. Cheltenham and shared with the National
  5087. Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.
  5088. The Government claims the station is a
  5089. key element in the West�s �war on terror�
  5090. and provides a vital �early warning�
  5091. system for potential attacks around
  5092. the world.
  5093.  
  5094.  The Independent is not revealing the
  5095. precise location of the station but
  5096. information on its activities was
  5097. contained in the leaked documents
  5098. obtained from the NSA by Edward Snowden.
  5099. The Guardian newspaper�s reporting on
  5100. these documents in recent months has
  5101. sparked a dispute with the Government,
  5102. with GCHQ security experts overseeing
  5103. the destruction of hard drives containing
  5104. the data. ... ...
  5105.  
  5106.  The data-gathering operation is part of
  5107. a �1,000,000,000 internet project still
  5108. being assembled by GCHQ. It is part of
  5109. the surveillance and monitoring system,
  5110. code-named �Tempora�, whose wider aim is
  5111. the global interception of digital
  5112. communications, such as emails and text
  5113. messages.
  5114.  
  5115.  Across three sites, communications �
  5116. including telephone calls � are tracked
  5117. both by satellite dishes and by tapping
  5118. into underwater fibre-optic cables.
  5119.  
  5120. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/exclusive-uks-secret-mideast-internet-surveillance-base-is-revealed-in-edward-snowden-leaks-8781082.html
  5121. ���������������������������������������
  5122. � Backbone Wiretaps to Backdoor Microcode ::
  5123.  
  5124. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/callas-snowden.htm
  5125. _______________________________________
  5126. � FISA Reauthorization to John Boehner,
  5127. Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, Mitch McConnell,
  5128. Mike Rodgers, Dutch Ruppersberger, Lamar
  5129. Smith, John Conyers Jr, Dianne Feinstein,
  5130. Sexby Chambliss, Patrick J Leahy, Charles
  5131. E Grassley ::
  5132.  
  5133. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-12-0326.pdf
  5134.  
  5135. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-dni-ag-12-0208.pdf
  5136.  
  5137. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship March 2009 ::
  5138.  
  5139. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-march-2009.pdf
  5140.  
  5141. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship May 2010 ::
  5142.  
  5143. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-may-2010.pdf
  5144.  
  5145. � FISA 2008 Heavy Censorship December 2009 ::
  5146.  
  5147. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-december-2009.pdf
  5148.  
  5149. � FISA Horse Droppings ::
  5150.  
  5151. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/fisa-droppings.htm
  5152.  
  5153. � FISA Documents Withheld From Most of
  5154. Congress ::
  5155.  
  5156.  �I can now confirm that the House
  5157. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
  5158. did NOT, in fact, make the 2011 document
  5159. available to Representatives in Congress,
  5160. meaning that the large class of Representatives
  5161. elected in 2010 did not receive either of
  5162. the now declassified documents detailing
  5163. these programs.�  - Justin Amash
  5164.  
  5165. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/12/intelligence-committee-nsa-vote-justin-amash
  5166.  
  5167. http://www.infowars.com/amash-nsa-docs-were-withheld-from-congress-by-higher-ups/
  5168.  
  5169. ?
  5170.  
  5171. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  5172.  
  5173.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  5174. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  5175. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  5176. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  5177. discussions with the president when he
  5178. first came on board we talked to him about
  5179. these programs and the issue was how do
  5180. we know the compliance is there and what
  5181. more could we do? We stood up working with
  5182. the COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS a directorate
  5183. of compliance. This directorate of
  5184. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  5185. and information specialists that can look
  5186. at everything that we do in these programs
  5187. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  5188. orders but we also have oversight from
  5189. the Director of National Intelligence,
  5190. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  5191. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  5192. from the White House, FROM CONGRESS, the
  5193. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  5194. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  5195. _______________________________________
  5196. � EU Privacy Watchdogs Seek PRISM Slides ::
  5197.  
  5198.  Only 9 out of 41 slides have become
  5199. public so far.
  5200.  
  5201. http://cnsnews.com/news/article/eu-privacy-watchdogs-seek-details-nsa-spying
  5202. _______________________________________
  5203. � NEVER LET SURVEILLANCE SHUT YOU UP ::
  5204.  
  5205. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323639704579015101857760922.html
  5206. _______________________________________
  5207. � NSA Funds New �Top Secret� $60,000,000
  5208. Data Lab ::
  5209.  
  5210. http://www.infowars.com/nsa-funds-new-top-secret-60-million-dollar-data-lab/
  5211.  
  5212. http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/15/3109412/nc-state-teams-up-with-nsa-on.html
  5213. _______________________________________
  5214. � What the NSA�s Massive Org Chart
  5215. (Probably) Looks Like ::
  5216.  
  5217. http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2013/08/what-nsas-massive-org-chart-probably-looks/68642/
  5218. http://www.mindmeister.com/308518551/the-national-security-agency-operates-more-than-500-separate-signals-intelligence-platforms-employs-roughly-30-000-civilians-and-military-budget-10-billion
  5219. http://cdn.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/d1nsaorgmapimg.jpg
  5220. _______________________________________
  5221. � NSA Spying Under Fire in Latin America ::
  5222.  
  5223.  The massive NSA snooping revelations
  5224. have cast a shadow over John Kerry�s
  5225. trip to Latin America � his first visit
  5226. there since he assumed the position
  5227. of Secretary of State. He has already
  5228. received a chilly reception in Colombia
  5229. � where officials demanded an explanation
  5230. to reports that Washington had collected
  5231. vast amounts of internet data there.
  5232. The next stop on his trip is Brazil �
  5233. which allegedly was the top regional
  5234. target of the surveillance program.
  5235.  
  5236. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpRPnc6Ucy8
  5237.  
  5238. http://sgtreport.com/2013/08/kerry-on-damage-control-nsa-spying-under-fire-in-latin-america/
  5239.  
  5240. � Brazil Demands Clarifications on NSA
  5241. Surveillance ::
  5242.  
  5243. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=txCcJ0wqdFc
  5244.  
  5245. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cv1WjVI3lQA
  5246.  
  5247. http://news.yahoo.com/brazil-demands-clarifications-nsa-surveillance-200545031.html
  5248. _______________________________________
  5249. � Ten Operational Directorates of NSA ::
  5250.  
  5251. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2013/08/13/nsa-a-little-help-with-transparency/
  5252. ���������������������������������������
  5253. � NSA Strategy and Core Values ::
  5254.  
  5255. http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/nsacss_strategy.pdf
  5256.  
  5257. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-strategy-values.htm
  5258.  
  5259. � NSA Deputy Director on NSA Core Values ::
  5260.  
  5261. http://www.nsa.gov/about/values/core_values.shtml
  5262.  
  5263. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-core-values-inglis.htm
  5264. _______________________________________
  5265. � Edward Snowden Speaks to Peter Maass ::
  5266.  
  5267. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/magazine/snowden-maass-transcript.html
  5268.  
  5269. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/snowden-maass.htm
  5270. _______________________________________
  5271. � Detail Into FAA Section 702 ::
  5272.  
  5273. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsa-loophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls
  5274.  
  5275.  �While the FAA 702 minimization procedures
  5276. approved on 3 October 2011 now allow for
  5277. use of certain United States person names
  5278. and identifiers as query terms when reviewing
  5279. collected FAA 702 data, analysts may NOT/NOT
  5280. implement any USP queries until an effective
  5281. oversight process has been developed by NSA
  5282. and agreed to by DOJ/ODNI. Until further
  5283. notice, collected FAA 702 data (702 data is
  5284. contained in MARINA, MAINWAY, NUCLEON, PINWALE
  5285. (Sweet* and Sour* partitions) and other
  5286. databases).�
  5287.  
  5288. http://static.guim.co.uk/sys-images/Guardian/Pix/pictures/2013/8/9/1376060880108/FAA-document-001.jpg
  5289.  
  5290. NOBODY comments
  5291.  
  5292. Refer to this leaked FISA document.
  5293.  
  5294. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  5295.  
  5296.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  5297. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  5298. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  5299. communications not related to foreign
  5300. information or foreign activity for up
  5301. to five years.
  5302.  
  5303.  Found in section 3 (1) �Such inadvertently
  5304. acquired communications of or concerning a
  5305. United States person may be retained no
  5306. longer than five years in any event.�
  5307.  
  5308.  Under the FISA minimization, section 5
  5309. �Domestic Communications (U)� there is
  5310. more than one loophole the NSA can use to
  5311. be granted authorization to snoop domestic
  5312. communications that have been stored.
  5313. Look into section 5, sub-sections (2) and
  5314. (3). ? (2) refers to criminal activity and
  5315. *suspected* criminal activity. (3) refers
  5316. to �communications security vulnerability�
  5317. both being used as excuses to snoop.
  5318. _______________________________________
  5319. � NSA ; Adobe Reader Very Vulnerable ::
  5320.  
  5321. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-adobe-reader-XI.pdf
  5322. _______________________________________
  5323. � NSA ; Mobility Capability Package ::
  5324.  
  5325. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-mobility-capability.pdf
  5326. _______________________________________
  5327. � Obama Meets With Third-Party Corporate
  5328. Executives Behind Closed Doors ::
  5329.  
  5330.  As the steady stream of revelations
  5331. continues, the White House has choosen
  5332. to meet quietly with tech executives and
  5333. consumer groups behind closed doors.
  5334.  
  5335. http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/tim-cook-barack-obama-technology-95362.html
  5336. _______________________________________
  5337. � Obama Press Conference on NSA Spying ::
  5338.  
  5339. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/obama-nsa-13-0809.htm
  5340.  
  5341. � Luke Rudkowski Talks About Obama�s NSA
  5342. Spying Press Conference ::
  5343.  
  5344.  Luke Rudkowski breaks down today�s
  5345. Presidential press conference in which the
  5346. focus was predominantly on the NSA spying
  5347. program. Luke points out many of the lies
  5348. that Obama told today about the program
  5349. by citing multiple articles with information
  5350. that completely contradict what Obama said.
  5351.  
  5352. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=adZyfrcvtgg
  5353. ���������������������������������������
  5354. � NSA  Missions, Authorities, Oversight,
  5355. Partners ::
  5356.  
  5357. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0809.pdf
  5358. ���������������������������������������
  5359. � DoJ ; NSA Bulk Collection of Telephony
  5360. Metadata ::
  5361.  
  5362. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/doj-13-0809.pdf
  5363. ���������������������������������������
  5364. � National Security Run Amok ::
  5365.  
  5366. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/9/paul-national-security-run-amok/
  5367. _______________________________________
  5368.  The Western Center for Journalism released
  5369. a video briefing over Russel Tice former
  5370. NSA whistleblower and his story about
  5371. blackmailing former senator Barack Obama.
  5372.  
  5373. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K31xCh6f_VY
  5374.  
  5375.  Abby Martin talks to Russell Tice, former
  5376. intelligence analyst and original NSA
  5377. whistleblower, about how the recent NSA
  5378. scandal is only scratches the surface of
  5379. a massive surveillance apparatus, citing
  5380. specific targets the he saw spying orders
  5381. for including former senators Hillary
  5382. Clinton and Barack Obama.
  5383.  
  5384. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d6m1XbWOfVk
  5385.  
  5386. � Boiling Frogs Post Podcast Show of NSA
  5387. whistleblower Russell Tice ::
  5388.  
  5389. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2DmN80yi5mo
  5390.  
  5391. http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/podpress_trac/web/20927/0/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  5392.  
  5393. � Corbett Report ; NSA Wiretapped Obama,
  5394. Petraeus, Alito, and Others ::
  5395.  
  5396. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H1ZAzu_0YZU
  5397.  
  5398.  Ron Paul talks about NSA spying and
  5399. why they want to sweep it under the rug.
  5400.  
  5401. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0h4yOr-27mA
  5402. ���������������������������������������
  5403. � NSA and Spying Nicknames and Codewords ::
  5404.  
  5405. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/nicknames-and-codewords.html
  5406.  
  5407. � NSA�s Code Names Revealed (2012) ::
  5408.  
  5409. http://williamaarkin.wordpress.com/2012/03/13/nsa-code-names-revealed/
  5410.  
  5411. NOBODY comments
  5412.  
  5413. RAGTIME is the codename for Stellar Wind.
  5414.  
  5415.  This operation was debated years ago, yet
  5416. the document was still classified. It was
  5417. leaked to cryptome.org last month. ?
  5418.  
  5419. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  5420.  
  5421.  OCELOT and STORMBREW are both managed
  5422. by Stu Bathurst - both telephony data
  5423. grabbing operations. RAGTIME sponsored
  5424. many of these operations being leaked.
  5425. _______________________________________
  5426. � Uncensored NSA FAIRVIEW Slides Air
  5427. on Brazilian Television ::
  5428.  
  5429. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kOAv7zbJkCk
  5430. http://www.dailydot.com/news/nsa-fairview-slides-brazil-spying/
  5431. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-codenames.htm
  5432.  
  5433. NOBODY comments
  5434.  
  5435.  Upstream collection via FAA 702 includes
  5436. FAIRVIEW, STORMBREW, BLARNEY and OAKSTAR.
  5437.  
  5438.  Original leaks of FAIRVIEW slides censored
  5439. program managers - for FAIRVIEW �Craig Hicks�
  5440. and for STORMBREW �Stu Bathurst.� ?
  5441.  
  5442. http://postimg.org/image/9viuxblpd/
  5443. ���������������������������������������
  5444. � Transfers From Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  5445. English Report ::
  5446.  
  5447.  German intelligence sends massive amounts
  5448. of intercepted data to the NSA, according
  5449. to documents from whistleblower Edward
  5450. Snowden, which SPIEGEL has seen. The
  5451. trans-Atlantic cooperation on technical
  5452. matters is also much closer than first
  5453. thought. ... ...
  5454.  
  5455.  Day after day and month after month,
  5456. the BND passes on to the NSA massive
  5457. amounts of connection data relating
  5458. to the communications it had placed
  5459. under surveillance. The so-called
  5460. metadata -- telephone numbers, email
  5461. addresses, IP connections -- then flow
  5462. into the Americans� giant databases.
  5463.  
  5464. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-intelligence-sends-massive-amounts-of-data-to-the-nsa-a-914821.html
  5465.  
  5466. � Transfers from Germany Aid US Surveillance,
  5467. Deutsch Report ::
  5468.  
  5469. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/der-spiegel-13-0804.pdf
  5470.  
  5471. � Germany Nixes Spy Pact With US, UK (?) ::
  5472.  
  5473. http://bigstory.ap.org/article/germany-nixes-surveillance-pact-us-britain
  5474. ���������������������������������������
  5475. � NSA XKEYSCORE Slides, 2008 ::
  5476.  
  5477. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeyscore.pdf
  5478. http://www.slideshare.net/xkeyscore/xkeyscore-nsa-program-presentation
  5479. http://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743244-xkeyscore-slidedeck.html
  5480.  
  5481. � XKEYSCORE God-terminal Into Internet ::
  5482.  
  5483. http://www.dw.de/xkeyscore-a-god-terminal-into-internet/a-16994780
  5484.  
  5485. � Fed-up Congress Dumps �Em ::
  5486.  
  5487.  The latest revelations will add to
  5488. the intense public and congressional
  5489. debate around the extent of NSA
  5490. surveillance programs. They come
  5491. as senior intelligence officials
  5492. testify to the Senate judiciary
  5493. committee on Wednesday, releasing
  5494. classified documents in response to
  5495. the Guardian�s earlier stories on
  5496. bulk collection of phone records
  5497. and FISA surveillance court oversight.
  5498.  
  5499.  XKeyscore, the documents boast, is
  5500. the NSA�s �widest reaching� system
  5501. developing intelligence from computer
  5502. networks � what the agency calls
  5503. Digital Network Intelligence (DNI).
  5504. One presentation claims the program
  5505. covers �nearly everything a typical
  5506. user does on the internet�, including
  5507. the content of emails, websites
  5508. visited and searches, as well as
  5509. their metadata.
  5510.  
  5511. http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jul/31/nsa-xkeyscore-program-full-presentation
  5512. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-top-secret-program-online-data
  5513. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-security-intelligence-idUSBRE96U03320130731
  5514. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/31/declassified-documents-show-nsa-snooping-had-compl/
  5515.  
  5516. � NSA XKeyscore Produced by SAIC ::
  5517.  
  5518. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-xkeyscore-saic.htm
  5519.  
  5520. � NSA Press Statement on XKEYSCORE ::
  5521.  
  5522. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-xkeystore.htm
  5523.  
  5524. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2013/30_July_2013.shtml
  5525.  
  5526. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Locations ::
  5527.  
  5528. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-servers.htm
  5529.  
  5530. � NSA X-KEYSCORE Global Cyber-espionage ::
  5531.  
  5532. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-x-keyscore-family.htm
  5533.  
  5534. � Instrument of Mass Surveillance ::
  5535.  
  5536. http://www.infowars.com/xkeyscore-instrument-of-mass-surveillance/
  5537.  
  5538. � NSA�s X-Keyscore One of Many More ::
  5539.  
  5540. http://www.infowars.com/nsas-x-keyscore-one-of-many-surveillance-programs-used-on-americans/
  5541.  
  5542. � RAGTIME and X-KEYSCORE @ Fort Meade ::
  5543.  
  5544.  �At Fort Meade, a program called
  5545. XKEYSCORE processes all signals before
  5546. they are shunted off to various �production
  5547. lines� that deal with specific issues.
  5548. PINWALE is the main NSA database for
  5549. recorded signals intercepts. It is
  5550. compartmentalized by keywords (the NSA
  5551. calls them �selectors�). Metadata is
  5552. stored in a database called MARINA and
  5553. is generally retained for five years.
  5554.  
  5555. ... ...
  5556.  
  5557.  �Congress repeatedly resisted the
  5558. entreaties of the Bush Administration
  5559. to change the surveillance laws once the
  5560. RAGTIME program had been institutionalized.
  5561. This was for a simple reason: they did
  5562. not want to be responsible for a program
  5563. that was not legal.�
  5564.  
  5565. https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1718-ambinder10-things.pdf
  5566.  
  5567. NOBODY comments
  5568.  
  5569.  Under the FISA minimization, section 3
  5570. (b) (2)  �Monitoring, Recording, and
  5571. Processing (U)� the NSA can hold domestic
  5572. communications not related to foreign
  5573. information or foreign activity for up
  5574. to five years.
  5575.  
  5576.  This confirms an XKeyscore presentation
  5577. posted by the Guardian regarding the
  5578. metadata aggregation to PINWALE databank
  5579. seen in the DNI discovery options.
  5580. ���������������������������������������
  5581. � NSA Pays �100,000,000 in Secret Funding
  5582. for GCHQ Bude ::
  5583.  
  5584. http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/01/nsa-paid-gchq-spying-edward-snowden
  5585. _______________________________________
  5586. � Other Agencies Clamor for Data NSA
  5587. Compiles but Claim Rejections ::
  5588.  
  5589.  Agencies working to curb drug trafficking,
  5590. cyberattacks, money laundering,
  5591. counterfeiting and even copyright
  5592. infringement complain that their
  5593. attempts to exploit the security
  5594. agency�s vast resources have often
  5595. been turned down because their own
  5596. investigations are not considered a
  5597. high enough priority, current and
  5598. former government officials say.
  5599.  
  5600.  Intelligence officials say they have
  5601. been careful to limit the use of the
  5602. security agency�s troves of data and
  5603. eavesdropping spyware for fear they
  5604. could be misused in ways that violate
  5605. Americans� privacy rights. ...
  5606.  
  5607.  �It�s a very common complaint about
  5608. NSA,� said Timothy H. Edgar, a former
  5609. senior intelligence official at the
  5610. White House and at the office of the
  5611. director of national intelligence.
  5612. �They collect all this information,
  5613. but it�s difficult for the other
  5614. agencies to get access to what
  5615. they want.�
  5616.  
  5617. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/us/other-agencies-clamor-for-data-nsa-compiles.html?hp&_r=0
  5618. _______________________________________
  5619. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Aspen
  5620. Security Forum ::
  5621.  
  5622. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-aspen.pdf
  5623.  
  5624. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at AFCEA
  5625. Conference ::
  5626.  
  5627. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-afcea.pdf
  5628.  
  5629. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks at Blackhat
  5630. Conference ::
  5631.  
  5632. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Sg4AtcW0LU
  5633. https://soundcloud.com/larrymagid/nsa-director-general-keith
  5634. http://cryptome.org/2013/08/nsa-13-0731.pdf
  5635.  
  5636.  Youtube video ; 27:18 �So on this program,
  5637. 100% audibility on every query that we make.
  5638. And that is overseen by our Inspector General,
  5639. our General Council. In 2009 in our
  5640. discussions with the president when he
  5641. first came on board we talked to him about
  5642. these programs and the issue was how do
  5643. we know the compliance is there and what
  5644. more could we do? We stood up working with
  5645. the committees in Congress a directorate
  5646. of compliance. This directorate of
  5647. compliance is headed by legal professionals
  5648. and information specialists that can look
  5649. at everything that we do in these programs
  5650. and ensure they (comply ?) with the court
  5651. orders but we also have oversight from
  5652. the Director of National Intelligence,
  5653. General Council and IEG, from the Defense
  5654. Department, from the Department of Justice,
  5655. from the White House, from Congress, the
  5656. Intel(ligence) committees and from the
  5657. courts.�  - Keith Alexander
  5658.  
  5659. ? NSA�s Keith Alexander Angers a Few at
  5660. Blackhat Conference ::
  5661.  
  5662. �Read the constitution� someone shouts.
  5663.  
  5664. �I did, you should too� replied Keith.
  5665.  
  5666. http://www.infowars.com/security-consultant-heckles-nsa-head-shouts-freedom-read-the-constitution/
  5667.  
  5668. http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/31/nsa-director-heckled-at-conference-as-he-asks-for-security-communitys-understanding/
  5669.  
  5670. � NSA�s Keith Alexander Remarks to Workforce ::
  5671.  
  5672. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-workforce.htm
  5673.  
  5674. http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/speeches_testimonies/25jun13_dir.shtml
  5675. _______________________________________
  5676. � Obama Releases Three Patriot Act Docs ::
  5677.  
  5678. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/obama-releases-13-0731.pdf
  5679.  
  5680. � US Outlines NSA Culling of Data for
  5681. All Domestic Calls ::
  5682.  
  5683.  On Wednesday, the Obama regime released
  5684. three documents related to the National
  5685. Security Agency�s collection of phone
  5686. records, including briefings to Congress
  5687. as the relevant provision of the Patriot
  5688. Act was up for renewal, and a ruling
  5689. from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  5690. Court that outlines rules that must be
  5691. followed when accessing data provided by
  5692. a Verizon subsidiary.
  5693.  
  5694. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/08/01/us/01nsa-docs.html
  5695.  
  5696.  Before Mr. Snowden�s leaks made clear
  5697. what the government was doing with the
  5698. Patriot Act program, several senators
  5699. on the Intelligence Committee had made
  5700. cryptic warnings that it was interpreting
  5701. the law in a twisted way to do something
  5702. alarming and made reference to the 2011
  5703. briefing paper. The New York Times filed
  5704. a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information
  5705. Act to obtain that document.
  5706.  
  5707. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/743215-2011-coverletters-report-collection.html
  5708. _______________________________________
  5709. � Senate FISA Spying Hearing Statements ::
  5710.  
  5711. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731.pdf
  5712.  
  5713. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/fisa-hearing-13-0731-2.pdf
  5714. _______________________________________
  5715. � Monitoring Emails Purely �Accidental� ::
  5716.  
  5717.  Saxby Chambliss ; �no emails are monitored
  5718. now� ... �they used to be but that stopped
  5719. two or three years ago.�
  5720.  
  5721. http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/glenn-greenwald-low-level-nsa-analysts-have-powerful-and-invasive-search-tool/
  5722. _______________________________________
  5723. ? Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  5724. Received Dox ::
  5725.  
  5726. (1) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56175
  5727. (2) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56176
  5728. (3) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56177
  5729. (4) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56178
  5730. (5) http://c.nopaste.dk/p56179
  5731.  
  5732. ? Lawmakers Who Sold Out ::
  5733.  
  5734. http://pastebin.com/6fhaDJMp
  5735.  
  5736. � Lawmakers Who Upheld NSA Phone Spying
  5737. Received Double Defense Campaign Funds ::
  5738.  
  5739.  The numbers tell the story � in votes
  5740. and dollars. On Wednesday, the house
  5741. voted 217 to 205 not to rein in the
  5742. NSA�s phone-spying dragnet. It turns
  5743. out that those 217 �no� voters received
  5744. twice as much campaign financing from
  5745. the defense and intelligence industry
  5746. as the 205 �yes� voters.
  5747.  
  5748. http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/07/money-nsa-vote/
  5749.  
  5750. � These Are The 217 People Who Voted
  5751. To Preserve NSA Surveillance ::
  5752.  
  5753. http://www.infowars.com/these-are-the-217-people-who-voted-to-preserve-nsa-surveillance/
  5754. http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2013/roll412.xml
  5755. http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2013/07/NOES_0.jpg
  5756.  
  5757. ? US Congress Doxed, July 2013 ::
  5758.  
  5759. http://slexy.org/view/s2fZ764IzB
  5760.  
  5761. � Justin Amash�s Amendment to Defund
  5762. the NSA Will Get a Vote [Failed] ::
  5763.  
  5764. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUy3IT0A8hM
  5765. http://washingtonexaminer.com/defund-nsa-amendment-will-get-a-vote/article/2533380
  5766. http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/07/23/197485/sen-wyden-says-he-tried-to-warn.html
  5767. http://www.infowars.com/house-fight-brews-over-nsa-stasi-state/
  5768.  
  5769. � White House Responds to Amash�s
  5770. Amendment [Before It Failed] ::
  5771.  
  5772.  �In light of the recent unauthorized
  5773. disclosures, the President has said
  5774. that he welcomes a debate about how
  5775. best to simultaneously safeguard both
  5776. our national security and the privacy
  5777. of our citizens.  The Administration
  5778. has taken various proactive steps to
  5779. advance this debate including the
  5780. President�s meeting with the Privacy
  5781. and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,
  5782. his public statements on the disclosed
  5783. programs, the Office of the Director
  5784. of National Intelligence�s release of
  5785. its own public statements, ODNI General
  5786. Counsel Bob Litt�s speech at Brookings,
  5787. and ODNI�s decision to declassify and
  5788. disclose publicly that the Administration
  5789. filed an application with the Foreign
  5790. Intelligence Surveillance Court. We
  5791. look forward to continuing to discuss
  5792. these critical issues with the American
  5793. people and the Congress.
  5794.  
  5795.  However, we oppose the current effort
  5796. in the House to hastily dismantle one
  5797. of our Intelligence Community�s
  5798. counterterrorism tools. This blunt
  5799. approach is not the product of an
  5800. informed, open, or deliberative process.
  5801. We urge the House to reject the Amash
  5802. Amendment, and instead move forward
  5803. with an approach that appropriately
  5804. takes into account the need for a
  5805. reasoned review of what tools can
  5806. best secure the nation.� - WH Press
  5807.  
  5808. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/07/23/statement-press-secretary-amash-amendment
  5809.  
  5810. http://washingtonexaminer.com/white-house-scrambles-to-defeat-bill-to-defund-nsa-program/article/2533418
  5811.  
  5812. ? RELATED ; Privacy and Civil Liberties
  5813. Board Meets Behind Closed Doors ::
  5814.  
  5815. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/pclob-13-0617.htm
  5816.  
  5817. � NSA Director Calls Emergency Meeting to
  5818. Lobby Against Justin Amash�s Amendment
  5819. to Defund NSA ::
  5820.  
  5821. http://washingtonexaminer.com/nsa-director-calls-emergency-meeting-to-lobby-against-rep.-justin-amashs-nsa-amendment/article/2533407
  5822. _______________________________________
  5823.  Yesterday, German media wrote about an
  5824. official letter from the NSA, which was
  5825. sent to the German government to clarify
  5826. some misconceptions about PRISM. This
  5827. because German media and politics were
  5828. heavily confused after it became clear
  5829. that there�s more than one program named
  5830. PRISM.
  5831.  
  5832.  The NSA letter explains what the PRISM
  5833. data collection program is about and
  5834. then confirms that this program is
  5835. different from a more common military
  5836. web tool called "Planning tool for
  5837. Resource Integration, Synchronization
  5838. and Management" (PRISM).
  5839.  
  5840.  Surprisingly, the NSA also reveals that
  5841. there�s even a third program called
  5842. PRISM. In this case the name stands
  5843. for �Portal for Real-time Information
  5844. Sharing and Management� and it�s
  5845. apparently an internal NSA information
  5846. sharing program. It was unknown until
  5847. now, probably because it�s used in the
  5848. NSA�s highly sensitive Information
  5849. Assurance Directorate (IAD). ... ...
  5850.  
  5851.  Here�s a short summary of all three
  5852. different PRISM programs:
  5853.  
  5854. 1. PRISM
  5855.  
  5856.  This is a codeword for an NSA project
  5857. of collecting information about foreign
  5858. targets from data of nine major US
  5859. internet companies. This program started
  5860. in 2007 and was unveiled by Edward Snowden
  5861. in June 2013.
  5862.  
  5863. 2. Planning tool for Resource Integration,
  5864. Synchronization and Management (PRISM)
  5865.  
  5866.  This is a web tool used by US military
  5867. intelligence to send tasking instructions
  5868. to data collection platforms deployed to
  5869. military operations. This program is
  5870. not very secret and was first mentioned
  5871. in 2002.
  5872.  
  5873. 3. Portal for Real-time Information
  5874. Sharing and Management (PRISM)
  5875.  
  5876.  This is an internal NSA program for
  5877. real-time sharing of information,
  5878. apparently in the NSA�s Information
  5879. Assurance Directorate. Its existance
  5880. was revealed by the NSA in July 2013.
  5881.  
  5882. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/nsa-says-there-are-three-different.html
  5883.  
  5884. � Three Different PRISM Programs? German
  5885. Parliament Seeks Clarity in NSA Scandal ::
  5886.  
  5887.  A Thursday meeting in German parliament
  5888. was supposed to shed light on NSA
  5889. surveillance activities in Germany.
  5890. It only added to the mystery. A US
  5891. response to a Berlin inquiry claims
  5892. that there are actually three unrelated
  5893. Prism programs. ... ...
  5894.  
  5895.  In addition to testimony from Schindler
  5896. and Maassen, officials also read a
  5897. written statement from the NSA in
  5898. response to a query from the German
  5899. government. According to the statement,
  5900. there are three separate Prism programs,
  5901. all of them unconnected to each other.
  5902. Meeting participants say the NSA response
  5903. said that one of the Prism programs was
  5904. only used internally. That program had
  5905. thus far remained secret. Another of
  5906. the programs was used by the Pentagon
  5907. in Afghanistan. Yet another NSA tool
  5908. -- vaguely described in the statement
  5909. and allegedly �totally unrelated to the
  5910. first� -- carries the name PRISM and
  5911. �tracks and queries requests pertaining
  5912. to our Information Assurance Directorate.�
  5913.  
  5914. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/merkel-chief-of-staff-testifies-before-parliament-on-nsa-spying-a-913268.html
  5915.  
  5916. NOBODY comments
  5917.  
  5918.  The snapshot of the PRISM input tool
  5919. posted on electrospaces blogspot must
  5920. have been from the Pentagon�s PRISM.
  5921. _______________________________________
  5922. � UPDATE ; NSA Utah Data Center Probe ::
  5923.  
  5924. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-utah-probe/nsa-utah-probe.htm
  5925.  
  5926. � NSA Utah Data Center Construction ::
  5927.  
  5928. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/07/nsa-utah-dc/nsa-utah-dc.htm
  5929.  
  5930.  Description and drawings by US Army
  5931. Corps of Engineers.
  5932.  
  5933. http://cryptome.org/nsa-utah-data.zip
  5934. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-award.pdf
  5935. http://cryptome.org/dodi/nsa-utah-data-02.pdf
  5936. _______________________________________
  5937. � Eyeballing the UK�s GCHQ Spy Policy ::
  5938.  
  5939. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-spy-commish-2012.pdf
  5940.  
  5941. � Eyeballing the UK�s RIPA Spy Policy ::
  5942.  
  5943. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uk-cop-spy-2012-13.pdf
  5944. ���������������������������������������
  5945. � NSA Organizational Chart 1950 ::
  5946.  
  5947. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-org-chart-1950.pdf
  5948.  
  5949. � NSA Headquarters Plans/Drawings 1953 ::
  5950.  
  5951. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-hq-plans-1953.pdf
  5952.  
  5953. � NSA Employee Conduct Guide 1955 ::
  5954.  
  5955. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-conduct-guide-1955.pdf
  5956. _______________________________________
  5957. � DoJ Responds to Snowden Russia Asylum ::
  5958.  
  5959.  �First, the United States would not seek
  5960. death penalty for Mr. Snowden should he
  5961. return to the United States. The charges
  5962. he faces do not carry that possibility,
  5963. and the United States would not seek the
  5964. death penalty even if Mr. Snowden were
  5965. charged with additional, death penalty-
  5966. eligible crimes.�
  5967.  
  5968. �Second, Mr. Snowden will not be tortured.�
  5969.  
  5970. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/usdoj-rumoj-snowden.pdf
  5971. _______________________________________
  5972. � Edward Snowden Nominated for Nobel
  5973. Peace Prize ::
  5974.  
  5975.  Edward Snowden, the National Security
  5976. Agency whistleblower who revealed the
  5977. agency�s data collection program, has
  5978. been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize.
  5979.  
  5980.  �Edward Snowden has � in a heroic effort
  5981. at great personal cost � revealed the
  5982. existence and extent of the surveillance,
  5983. the US government devotes electronic
  5984. communications worldwide,� read the
  5985. nomination. �By putting light on this
  5986. monitoring program � conducted in
  5987. contravention of national laws and
  5988. international agreements � Edward Snowden
  5989. has helped to make the world a little
  5990. bit better and safer.� ...
  5991.  
  5992.  �The decision to award the 2013 prize
  5993. to Edward Snowden would � in addition
  5994. to being well justified in itself �
  5995. also help to save the Nobel Peace Prize
  5996. from the disrepute that incurred by the
  5997. hasty and ill-conceived decision to
  5998. award [war criminal] Barack Obama the 2009
  5999. award,� Svallfors wrote to the committee.
  6000.  
  6001. http://washingtonexaminer.com/edward-snowden-nominated-for-nobel-peace-prize/article/2533071
  6002. _______________________________________
  6003. � Glenn Greenwald Interviewed Moskovsky
  6004. Komsomolets News ::
  6005.  
  6006. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/gg-snowden-leak-halt.htm
  6007. ���������������������������������������
  6008. � Minute Details of How the NSA Installs
  6009. Their Surveillance Equipment ::
  6010.  
  6011.  Pete Ashdown, the CEO of XMission, detailed
  6012. his experience when he received a Foreign
  6013. Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrant
  6014. in 2010 which forced him to allow the
  6015. federal government to monitor a customer
  6016. of his.
  6017.  
  6018.  Of course, like all FISA orders, it also
  6019. contained a broad gag order, which still
  6020. prevents him from telling all the details.
  6021.  
  6022.  �The FISA request was a tricky one, because
  6023. it was a warrant through the FISA court �
  6024. whether you believe that is legitimate or
  6025. not,� Ashdown wrote.
  6026.  
  6027.  He had to help the agents �set up a
  6028. duplicate port to tap in to monitor that
  6029. customer�s traffic. It was a 2U (two-unit)
  6030. PC that we ran a mirrored ethernet port to.�
  6031.  
  6032.  Ashdown eventually had a box in his
  6033. facility that was capturing all of the
  6034. traffic sent to his customer. He did not
  6035. remember if it was connected to the internet,
  6036. but wrote that it was likely capturing
  6037. all data to a hard drive for later analysis.
  6038.  
  6039. http://endthelie.com/2013/07/21/owner-of-small-utah-isp-describes-how-the-nsa-attempted-to-get-him-to-install-surveillance-equipment/
  6040. _______________________________________
  6041. � NSA Briefs a New Administration, 2004 ::
  6042.  
  6043. http://tinyurl.com/kqmpf4w
  6044. _______________________________________
  6045. � New Slides About NSA Collection Programs ::
  6046.  
  6047. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-slides-about-nsa-collection-programs.html
  6048. ���������������������������������������
  6049. � NSA Admits They Snoop Targets� Contacts�
  6050. Contacts� Contacts (3 Hops) ::
  6051.  
  6052.  As an aside during testimony on Capitol
  6053. Hill today, a National Security Agency
  6054. representative rather casually indicated
  6055. that the government looks at data from
  6056. a universe of far, far more people than
  6057. previously indicated.
  6058.  
  6059.  Chris Inglis, the agency�s deputy director,
  6060. was one of several government representatives
  6061. �including from the FBI and the office of
  6062. the Director of National Intelligence�
  6063. testifying before the House Judiciary
  6064. Committee this morning. Most of the testimony
  6065. largely echoed previous testimony by the
  6066. agencies on the topic of the government�s
  6067. surveillance, including a retread of the
  6068. same offered examples for how the Patriot
  6069. Act and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
  6070. Act had stopped terror events.
  6071.  
  6072.  But Inglis� statement was new. Analysts
  6073. look �two or three hops� from terror
  6074. suspects when evaluating terror activity,
  6075. Inglis revealed. Previously, the limit of
  6076. how surveillance was extended had been
  6077. described as two hops. This meant that
  6078. if the NSA were following a phone metadata
  6079. or web trail from a terror suspect, it
  6080. could also look at the calls from the
  6081. people that suspect has spoken with one
  6082. hop. And then, the calls that second person
  6083. had also spoken with two hops. Terror suspect
  6084. to person two to person three. Two hops.
  6085. And now: A third hop. ... ...
  6086.  
  6087. So all of your friends, that�s one hop.
  6088.  
  6089.  Your friends� friends, whether you know
  6090. them or not - two hops.
  6091.  
  6092.  Your friends� friends� friends, whoever
  6093. they happen to be, are that third hop.
  6094.  
  6095. http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287/
  6096. ���������������������������������������
  6097. � The Private Global Information Grid ::
  6098.  
  6099.  It is a good thing that people are
  6100. becoming aware of the fact that they
  6101. are being monitored - it is not only
  6102. speculation anymore. We have seen PRISM,
  6103. FinSpy and ECHELON. These programs are
  6104. made to collect information and to store
  6105. them in a database. Now just imagine the
  6106. resources that PRISM used and how it
  6107. could combine these resources to multiple
  6108. databases. This is where GiG comes in.
  6109.  
  6110. http://cyberwarzone.com/government-spying-database-global-information-grid
  6111. _______________________________________
  6112. � Edward Snowden Application for Asylum ::
  6113.  
  6114. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-ru-asylum.htm
  6115. ���������������������������������������
  6116. � NSA Leaks Nothing Compared to Further
  6117. Leaks Not-Yet-Released-to-Public ::
  6118.  
  6119.  Fugitive NSA leaker Edward Snowden today
  6120. applied for asylum in Russia and, as a
  6121. condition, agreed to stop �harming� the
  6122. US, according to a Russian lawyer who
  6123. is advising him, but that doesn�t
  6124. necessarily mean headline-grabbing
  6125. stories about the US government�s vast
  6126. foreign and domestic spying programs
  6127. will stop. ... ...
  6128.  
  6129.  Putin has said that Snowden can stay
  6130. in Russia, but only if he stops �harming�
  6131. the United States by releasing more
  6132. intelligence secrets. ... ...
  6133.  
  6134.  But while Snowden agreed to stop leaking
  6135. secrets, it could prove a technicality
  6136. since he has already said that he gave
  6137. all of his classified information --
  6138. thousands of documents -- to several
  6139. journalists. The most prominent of which,
  6140. The Guardian columnist Glenn Greenwald,
  6141. told ABC News Friday that he�s not even
  6142. half done with the stories he plans to
  6143. write based on the secret information.
  6144.  
  6145. http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/edward-snowden-legal-apply-russian-asylum/story?id=19678502
  6146. ���������������������������������������
  6147. � Mirror of Removed NSA Recruitment Drive ::
  6148.  
  6149. http://cypherpoet.com/nsa/
  6150. _______________________________________
  6151. � Snowden NSA Revelations Mirrored ::
  6152.  
  6153. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/cryptogram-13-0715.htm
  6154. ���������������������������������������
  6155. � When You�re Online, You�re Hacked ::
  6156.  
  6157.  In Russia, Prez Putin�s office just
  6158. stopped using PC�s and switched to
  6159. typewriters. What do they know that
  6160. we don�t?
  6161.  
  6162. http://steveblank.com/2013/07/15/your-computer-may-already-be-hacked-nsa-inside/
  6163. ���������������������������������������
  6164. � MITRE Corporation Outlined Collection
  6165. Management for PRISM and Other Spying ::
  6166.  
  6167.  Planning Tool for Resource Integration,
  6168. Synchronization, and Management aka PRISM
  6169. has existed since at least 2002. The
  6170. following document refers to it directly.
  6171. This demonstrates PRISM not only existed
  6172. in July 2002, but it had been undergoing
  6173. usage for some time, enough time to recognize
  6174. limitation of it and similar projects.
  6175.  
  6176. http://pastebin.com/h5a1c1Pd
  6177.  
  6178. http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_02/kane_isrplatforms/isrinformationservices.pdf
  6179. _______________________________________
  6180. � Brasil � alvo da Maci�a Opera��o de
  6181. Espionagem da NSA  (TRANSLATED) ::
  6182.  
  6183. http://code.str0.be/view/raw/540c2ebf
  6184.  
  6185. � Brazil is the Most Monitored Country
  6186. in Latin America ::
  6187.  
  6188. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-tracking/nsa-tracking.htm
  6189. http://oglobo.globo.com/infograficos/volume-rastreamento-governo-americano/
  6190. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/paper-reveals-nsa-ops-in-latin-america/2013/07/09/eff0cc7e-e8e3-11e2-818e-aa29e855f3ab_print.html
  6191. _______________________________________
  6192. � US Dictatorship in Damage Control,
  6193. Hyper-paranoia Over Snowden�s Leaks ::
  6194.  
  6195. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/snowden-us-threat.htm
  6196.  
  6197. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/13/usa-security-snowden-greenwald-idINDEE96C05520130713
  6198.  
  6199. � Future PRISM Leaks May Be Used As An
  6200. Excuse for Global Internet Censorship ::
  6201.  
  6202. http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/07/15/usa-security-cybertruce-idINDEE96E0DQ20130715
  6203. _______________________________________
  6204. � Intel in Bed with NSA ::
  6205.  
  6206. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/intel-bed-nsa.htm
  6207. _______________________________________
  6208. � News Media Censoring or Editing PRISM
  6209. Slides / Slides Differ ::
  6210.  
  6211. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.htm
  6212. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/nsa-upstream-differ.jpg
  6213. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-nsa-slide-you-havent-seen/2013/07/10/32801426-e8e6-11e2-aa9f-c03a72e2d342_story.html
  6214. ���������������������������������������
  6215. � NSA Policy on IP Encryptor ::
  6216.  
  6217. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-19.pdf
  6218.  
  6219. � NSA Policy on Information Assurance ::
  6220.  
  6221. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/CNSSP-11.pdf
  6222. _______________________________________
  6223. � PRISM Method of Storing and Transferring
  6224. Metadata ::
  6225.  
  6226. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/07/new-insights-into-prism-program.html
  6227. _______________________________________
  6228. � NSA Rejecting Every FOIA Request Made
  6229. by US Citizens ::
  6230.  
  6231. http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/06/1221694/-NSA-Rejecting-Every-FOIA-Request-Made-by-U-S-Citizens
  6232. ���������������������������������������
  6233. � National Security Agency DNS Tunnels ::
  6234.  
  6235. http://pastebin.com/TpGTHDSy
  6236.  
  6237.  �This may look like a small release, but
  6238. it's actually huge. See, we hacked the
  6239. NSA yet again because we just love doing
  6240. that. These are DNS tunnels that are
  6241. sending encrypted data to and from the
  6242. PRISM databases. We have the IP's of
  6243. those servers. If you crash these servers
  6244. with DDoS, you literally render PRISM
  6245. "broken". We are also planning to release
  6246. some of that data (which we have access
  6247. to) if we can decrypt it.�
  6248. ���������������������������������������
  6249. � BEFORE PRISM ; Presidents Surveillance
  6250. Program 2001 - 2006 ::
  6251.  
  6252.  Contractors include Booze Allen Hamilton,
  6253. Snowden�s employer.
  6254.  
  6255. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/Presidents-Spy-Program-Sept14-2001.htm
  6256.  
  6257. � History Behind Fiber-optic Wiretapping ::
  6258.  
  6259. http://pastebin.com/VzqpaF8y
  6260. _______________________________________
  6261. � France Has Own PRISM Spy System ::
  6262.  
  6263. http://www.megapastebin.com.ar/DU5BPIIK
  6264. _______________________________________
  6265. � Edward Snowden�s WikiLeaks Statement ::
  6266.  
  6267.  �One week ago I left Hong Kong after
  6268. it became clear that my freedom and
  6269. safety were under threat for revealing
  6270. the truth. My continued liberty has been
  6271. owed to the efforts of friends new and
  6272. old, family, and others who I have never
  6273. met and probably never will. I trusted
  6274. them with my life and they returned that
  6275. trust with a faith in me for which I will
  6276. always be thankful.
  6277.  
  6278.  On Thursday, President Obama declared
  6279. before the world that he would not permit
  6280. any diplomatic �wheeling and dealing� over
  6281. my case. Yet now it is being reported that
  6282. after promising not to do so, the President
  6283. ordered his Vice President to pressure the
  6284. leaders of nations from which I have
  6285. requested protection to deny my asylum
  6286. petitions.
  6287.  
  6288.  This kind of deception from a world leader
  6289. is not justice, and neither is the extralegal
  6290. penalty of exile. These are the old, bad
  6291. tools of political aggression. Their purpose
  6292. is to frighten, not me, but those who would
  6293. come after me.
  6294.  
  6295.  For decades the United States of America
  6296. have been one of the strongest defenders
  6297. of the human right to seek asylum. Sadly,
  6298. this right, laid out and voted for by the
  6299. US in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
  6300. of Human Rights, is now being rejected by
  6301. the current government of my country. The
  6302. Obama administration has now adopted the
  6303. strategy of using citizenship as a weapon.
  6304. Although I am convicted of nothing, it has
  6305. unilaterally revoked my passport, leaving
  6306. me a stateless person. Without any judicial
  6307. order, the administration now seeks to stop
  6308. me exercising a basic right. A right that
  6309. belongs to everybody. The right to seek
  6310. asylum.
  6311.  
  6312.  In the end the Obama administration is
  6313. not afraid of whistleblowers like me,
  6314. Bradley Manning or Thomas Drake. We are
  6315. stateless, imprisoned, or powerless. No,
  6316. the Obama administration is afraid of you.
  6317. It is afraid of an informed, angry public
  6318. demanding the constitutional government
  6319. it was promised � and it should be.
  6320.  
  6321.  I am unbowed in my convictions and
  6322. impressed at the efforts taken by so
  6323. many.�
  6324.  
  6325. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10154064/Edward-Snowdens-WikiLeaks-statement-in-full.html
  6326. ���������������������������������������
  6327. � The Internet Counter-culture ::
  6328.  
  6329. http://media.risky.biz/RB284.mp3
  6330.  
  6331. � Surveillance Scandals and Thought Crimes ::
  6332.  
  6333. http://media.risky.biz/RB283.mp3
  6334. _______________________________________
  6335. � Cyber Command Suffers Second Defeat ::
  6336.  
  6337. http://cryptome.org/2013/07/uscybercom-dump.htm
  6338. ���������������������������������������
  6339. � Washington Post Publishes More PRISM ::
  6340.  
  6341. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  6342. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/washington-post-new-slides-prism
  6343. http://cryptome.org/2013-info/06/wapo-13-0629/prism-wapo-13-0629.htm
  6344. _______________________________________
  6345. � US Army Blocked Access to The Guardian ::
  6346.  
  6347. http://www.infowars.com/u-s-army-now-censoring-the-guardian/
  6348. http://www.montereyherald.com/local/ci_23554739/restricted-web-access-guardian-is-army-wide-officials
  6349. http://endthelie.com/2013/06/28/u-s-army-restricting-access-to-the-guardian-across-all-of-their-networks-over-security-concerns/
  6350. _______________________________________
  6351. � Mirror of Deleted Article by Guardian ::
  6352.  
  6353. http://pastebin.com/NTJvUZdJ
  6354.  
  6355.  Revealed: secret European deals to hand
  6356. over private data to America.
  6357.  
  6358.  Germany among countries offering intelligence
  6359. according to new claims by former US defence
  6360. analyst.
  6361.  
  6362.  At least six European Union countries in
  6363. addition to Britain have been colluding
  6364. with the US over the mass harvesting of
  6365. personal communications data, according
  6366. to a former contractor to America�s
  6367. National Security Agency, who said the
  6368. public should not be �kept in the dark.�
  6369.  
  6370.  Wayne Madsen, a former US navy lieutenant
  6371. who first worked for the NSA in 1985
  6372. and over the next 12 years held several
  6373. sensitive positions within the agency,
  6374. names Denmark, the Netherlands, France,
  6375. Germany, Spain and Italy as having secret
  6376. deals with the US.
  6377.  
  6378.  Madsen said the countries had �formal
  6379. second and third party status� under
  6380. signal intelligence (sigint) agreements
  6381. that compels them to hand over data,
  6382. including mobile phone and internet
  6383. information to the NSA if requested.
  6384.  
  6385.  Under international intelligence agreements,
  6386. confirmed by declassified documents,
  6387. nations are categorised by the US according
  6388. to their trust level. The US is first party
  6389. while the UK, Canada, Australia and New
  6390. Zealand enjoy second party relationships.
  6391. Germany and France have third party
  6392. relationships.
  6393.  
  6394.  In an interview published last night
  6395. on the PrivacySurgeon.org blog, Madsen,
  6396. who has been attacked for holding
  6397. controversial views on espionage issues,
  6398. said he had decided to speak out after
  6399. becoming concerned about the �half story�
  6400. told by EU politicians regarding the
  6401. extent of the NSA�s activities in Europe.
  6402.  
  6403.  He said that under the agreements,
  6404. which were drawn up after the second
  6405. world war, the �NSA gets the lion�s
  6406. share� of the sigint �take.� In return,
  6407. the third parties to the NSA agreements
  6408. received �highly sanitised intelligence.�
  6409.  
  6410.  Madsen said he was alarmed at the
  6411. �sanctimonious outcry� of political
  6412. leaders who were �feigning shock�
  6413. about the spying operations while staying
  6414. silent about their own arrangements
  6415. with the US, and was particularly
  6416. concerned that senior German politicians
  6417. had accused the UK of spying when their
  6418. country had a similar third-party deal
  6419. with the NSA.
  6420.  
  6421.  Although the level of co-operation provided
  6422. by other European countries to the NSA is
  6423. not on the same scale as that provided by
  6424. the UK, the allegations are potentially
  6425. embarrassing.
  6426.  
  6427.  �I can�t understand how Angela Merkel can
  6428. keep a straight face, demanding assurances
  6429. from [Barack] Obama and the UK while Germany
  6430. has entered into those exact relationships,�
  6431. Madsen said.
  6432.  
  6433.  The Liberal Democrat MEP Baroness Ludford,
  6434. a senior member of the European parliament�s
  6435. civil liberties, justice and home affairs
  6436. committee, said Madsen�s allegations
  6437. confirmed that the entire system for
  6438. monitoring data interception was a mess,
  6439. because the EU was unable to intervene
  6440. in intelligence matters, which remained
  6441. the exclusive concern of national
  6442. governments.
  6443.  
  6444.  �The intelligence agencies are exploiting
  6445. these contradictions and no one is really
  6446. holding them to account,� Ludford said.
  6447. �It�s terribly undermining to liberal
  6448. democracy.�
  6449.  
  6450.  Madsen�s disclosures have prompted calls
  6451. for European governments to come clean
  6452. on their arrangements with the NSA.
  6453. �There needs to be transparency as to
  6454. whether or not it is legal for the US
  6455. or any other security service to
  6456. interrogate private material,� said
  6457. John Cooper QC, a leading international
  6458. human rights lawyer. �The problem here
  6459. is that none of these arrangements has
  6460. been debated in any democratic arena.
  6461. I agree with William Hague that sometimes
  6462. things have to be done in secret, but you
  6463. don�t break the law in secret.�
  6464.  
  6465.  Madsen said all seven European countries
  6466. and the US have access to the Tat 14
  6467. fibre-optic cable network running between
  6468. Denmark and Germany, the Netherlands,
  6469. France, the UK and the US, allowing them
  6470. to intercept vast amounts of data,
  6471. including phone calls, emails and records
  6472. of users� access to websites.
  6473.  
  6474.  He said the public needed to be made
  6475. aware of the full scale of the communication
  6476. -sharing arrangements between European
  6477. countries and the US, which predate the
  6478. internet and became of strategic importance
  6479. during the cold war.
  6480.  
  6481.  The covert relationship between the
  6482. countries was first outlined in a 2001
  6483. report by the European parliament, but
  6484. their explicit connection with the NSA
  6485. was not publicised until Madsen decided
  6486. to speak out.
  6487.  
  6488.  The European parliament�s report followed
  6489. revelations that the NSA was conducting a
  6490. global intelligence-gathering operation,
  6491. known as Echelon, which appears to have
  6492. established the framework for European
  6493. member states to collaborate with the US.
  6494.  
  6495.  �A lot of this information isn�t secret,
  6496. nor is it new,� Madsen said. �It�s just
  6497. that governments have chosen to keep the
  6498. public in the dark about it. The days
  6499. when they could get away with a conspiracy
  6500. of silence are over.�
  6501.  
  6502.  This month another former NSA contractor,
  6503. Edward Snowden, revealed to the Guardian
  6504. previously undisclosed US programmes to
  6505. monitor telephone and internet traffic.
  6506. The NSA is alleged to have shared some of
  6507. its data, gathered using a specialist tool
  6508. called Prism, with Britain�s GCHQ.
  6509. ���������������������������������������
  6510. � Wayne Madsen, Former Contractor for NSA,
  6511. Talks About Global SIGINT Interception ::
  6512.  
  6513.  A former contractor to the US National
  6514. Security Agency (NSA) has told the
  6515. Privacy Surgeon that communications
  6516. intelligence arrangements between the
  6517. US and Europe are much more �complex,
  6518. murky and far reaching� than the public
  6519. has been led to believe. ...
  6520.  
  6521.  He was particularly concerned about the
  6522. �sanctimonious outcry� of political leaders
  6523. who were �feigning shock� about recently
  6524. disclosed spying operations such as PRISM
  6525. while staying silent about their own role
  6526. in global interception arrangements with
  6527. the United States. ...
  6528.  
  6529.  Madsen also expressed anger over the
  6530. NSA�s hypocrisy over Edward Snowden.
  6531.  
  6532.  �Snowden is being roundly condemned by
  6533. many who say he had no authority or right
  6534. to provide the public with details of
  6535. NSA snooping. But what right or authority
  6536. did NSA director, General Keith Alexander,
  6537. have to provide information on NSA
  6538. surveillance at five meetings of the
  6539. global Bilderberg Conference � two in
  6540. Virginia and one meeting each in Greece,
  6541. Spain and Switzerland?�
  6542.  
  6543.  �Alexander claims he is protecting the
  6544. American people from a constantly changing
  6545. number of terrorist attacks. In fact, he
  6546. is providing information to elites on
  6547. the methods NSA uses to spy on labor,
  6548. student, religious and progressive
  6549. organizations.�
  6550.  
  6551.  �When Alexander leaks to the elites,
  6552. he�s thanked. When Snowden does it,
  6553. he�s called a traitor and a coward.�
  6554.  
  6555. http://www.privacysurgeon.org/blog/incision/former-nsa-contractor-warns-of-murky-interception-arrangements/
  6556. _______________________________________
  6557. � NSA Spying Pisses Off European Union ::
  6558.  
  6559. http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2013/06/30/new-nsa-leak-documents-show-how-the-us-is-bugging-its-european-allies/
  6560. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57591678/european-officials-lash-out-at-new-nsa-spying-report/
  6561. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/30/nsa-spying-europe-claims-us-eu-trade
  6562. http://www.infowars.com/report-nsa-joint-wiretapping-operations-with-foreign-nations/
  6563. http://www.waynemadsenreport.com/articles/20130630
  6564. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/secret-documents-nsa-targeted-germany-and-eu-buildings-a-908609.html
  6565. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/10152478/Francois-Hollande-tells-the-US-to-stop-eavesdropping-on-Europe-if-it-wants-progress-on-trade-deal.html
  6566.  
  6567. � FLASHBACK ; Why We Spy on Our Allies ::
  6568.  
  6569. http://cryptome.org/echelon-cia2.htm
  6570. ���������������������������������������
  6571. � FLASHBACK ; Pentagon Wanted Searchable
  6572. Database of People�s Lives in 2003 ::
  6573.  
  6574. http://dailycaller.com/2013/07/01/pentagon-wanted-searchable-database-of-peoples-lives-in-2003/?print=1
  6575. ??????????????????????????????????????
  6576.  ????????????????????????????????????
  6577. ??????????????????????????????????????
  6578. � Two NSA IG Reports Differ �
  6579.  
  6580. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-reports-differ.htm
  6581.  
  6582. � NSA Stellar Wind Email Internet Data
  6583. Collection �
  6584.  
  6585. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-stellar-wind.pdf
  6586.  
  6587. � DoJ Memo on NSA Data Collection on
  6588. Americans �
  6589.  
  6590. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/doj-nsa-memo.pdf
  6591.  
  6592. � List of Retreats for Whistleblowers ;
  6593. Countries With No US Extradition Treaty �
  6594.  
  6595. http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1372346844.php
  6596.  
  6597. � Snowden Was Smart ; NSA Leaks Were
  6598. Given to Untold Others, Encrypted �
  6599.  
  6600. http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/25/greenwald-snowden-s-files-are-out-there-if-anything-happens-to-him.html
  6601.  
  6602. � Congress Insisted They Be Kept in
  6603. the Dark on NSA Spying �
  6604.  
  6605. http://www.infowars.com/congress-insisted-they-be-kept-in-the-dark-on-nsa-spying/
  6606.  
  6607. � Is PRISM a Not-So-Secret GUI and is
  6608. There More Than One PRISM Tool? �
  6609.  
  6610. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/06/is-prism-just-not-so-secret-web-tool.html
  6611.  
  6612. � Screenshot of the PRISM Input Tool �
  6613.  
  6614. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aKIwdHzpBxM/UbkjPyyl9pI/AAAAAAAAAWQ/hJWQkBFWDic/s1600/PRISM+input+tool.jpg
  6615.  
  6616. � NSA Also Spying on the �Deep Web� �
  6617.  
  6618. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-23/u-s-surveillance-is-not-aimed-at-terrorists.html
  6619.  
  6620. � Obama Regime Irate as Snowden Flees
  6621. Hong Kong to Undisclosed Location �
  6622.  
  6623. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/23/us-usa-security-flight-idUSBRE95M02H20130623
  6624. http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_NSA_SURVEILLANCE_HONG_KONG?SITE=AP
  6625. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/23/edward-snowden-us-politicians-react
  6626.  
  6627. � Wikileaks Comments on Helping Edward
  6628. Snowden Flee to Undisclosed Location �
  6629.  
  6630. http://wikileaks.org/WikiLeaks-Statement-On-Edward.html
  6631.  
  6632. � Obama Regime Charges Edward Snowden
  6633. With Espionage �
  6634.  
  6635. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_print.html
  6636.  
  6637. � USA vs. Edward Snowden Complaint �
  6638.  
  6639. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-complaint.pdf
  6640.  
  6641. � Pre-Crime in FISA Leak Detailed �
  6642.  
  6643. http://p.iain.it/view/raw/1296961
  6644.  
  6645. � NSA FISA Surveillance Leaks �
  6646.  
  6647. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-targeting.pdf
  6648. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-minimization.pdf
  6649. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-fisa-certification.pdf
  6650.  
  6651. � Illegal Warrantless Mass Spying of
  6652. All Telecommunication by NSA via FISA �
  6653.  
  6654. http://cryptome.org/2014/01/nsa-prism-dk.pdf
  6655. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-documents/
  6656. http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/national/inner-workings-of-a-top-secret-spy-program/282/
  6657. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/20/fisa-court-nsa-without-warrant
  6658. http://techcrunch.com/2013/06/21/new-nsa-warrantless-tactics-reveal-little-room-for-presumption-of-innocence/
  6659. http://www.informationweek.com/global-cio/interviews/nsa-dragnet-debacle-what-it-means-to-it/240156243
  6660. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/inside-the-nsa-peeling-back-the-curtain-on-americas-intelligence-agency-8658016.html
  6661. http://www.washingtonsblog.com/2013/06/nsa-whistleblower-nsa-spying-on-and-blackmailing-high-level-government-officials-and-military-officers.html
  6662. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0112.Tice_20130617.mp3
  6663. http://boilingfrogspost.com/wp-content/uploads/BF.0111.Young_20130613.mp3
  6664. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html
  6665. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/nsa-arch-spy.htm
  6666. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/12/prism-class-action-lawsuit-filed-20b-injunction-sought-against-complicit-companies-and-officials
  6667. http://www.usnews.com/news/newsgram/articles/2013/06/11/nine-companies-tied-to-prism-obama-will-be-smacked-with-class-action-lawsuit-wednesday
  6668. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/federal-eye/wp/2013/06/13/former-justice-prosecutor-seeks-23-billion-in-damages-for-nsa-surveillance-programs/
  6669. http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/06/09/rand-paul-planning-class-action-lawsuit-against-surveillance-programs/
  6670. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-nsa-prism-scandal-20130609,0,432240.story
  6671. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/snowden-censored.htm
  6672. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-250_162-57588385/nsa-seeks-criminal-probe-of-program-leaker/
  6673. http://theweek.com/article/index/245311/sources-nsa-sucks-in-data-from-50-companies
  6674. http://theweek.com/article/index/245360/solving-the-mystery-of-prism
  6675. http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/welcome-to-the-bush-obama-white-house-they-re-spying-on-us-20130606
  6676. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data
  6677. http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_print.html
  6678. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/obama-prism.pdf
  6679. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/tpm-palantir-prism.pdf
  6680. http://cryptome.org/2013/06/prism-spy-tools.htm
  6681. http://openchannel.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/06/07/18831985-officials-nsa-mistakenly-intercepted-emails-phone-calls-of-innocent-americans
  6682. http://rt.com/usa/nsa-payed-internet-companies-911/
  6683. http://www.infowars.com/leaked-document-reveals-government-paid-millions-to-prism-participants/
  6684. http://threatpost.com/fisc-no-phone-company-ever-challenged-metadata-collection-orders/102334
  6685. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/the_obscure_fbi_team_that_does_the_nsa_dirty_work
  6686. http://www.infowars.com/new-nsa-revelations-another-limited-hangout-whitewash/
  6687. http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/2013/12/nsas-global-interception-network.html
  6688. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-c6ca94801fac_print.html
  6689. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/04/nsa-storing-cell-phone-records-daily-snowden
  6690.  
  6691. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Cable
  6692. Tapping 1 & 2 (Repost) �
  6693.  
  6694. http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm
  6695.  
  6696. http://cryptome.org/telecomm-weak.htm
  6697.  
  6698. � FLASHBACK ; NSA Undersea Fiber Optic
  6699. Tapping (Repost) �
  6700.  
  6701. http://cryptome.org/nsa-seatap.htm
  6702.  
  6703. � RELATED ; All Online Spy Guides 7zip �
  6704.  
  6705. http://cryptome.org/isp-spy/online-spying.htm
  6706.  
  6707. http://cryptome.org/online-spying-11-1206.7z
  6708. {[????????????????????????????????????]}
  6709. {[????????????????????????????????????]}

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